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Ramona Locsin v. Honorable Judge Vicente P.

Valenzuela
G.R. No. L-51333, February 19, 1991

Feliciano, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner Ramona R. Locsin, Teresita Guanzon, Celia R. Sibug, Maria Rosa R. Perez, Editha
Ylanan and Ana Marie R. Benedicto were co-owners of a large tract of agricultural land known as
“Hacienda Villa Regalado” located in Barrio Panubigan Canlaon City, Negros Occidental. The tract of
land was covered by TCT No. T-494, described in the following terms:

TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. T-494

A parcel of land . . . containing an area of THREE MILLION THIRTY THREE THOUSAND AND FORTY
EIGHT PESOS (3,033,048) square meters, more or less.

A portion of this land, known as Lot No. 2-C-A-3 and consisting of an area of 60.07464 hectares, was
subject to the lifetime usufructuary rights of respondent Helen Schon. The bulk of this lot was
cultivated by the lessees-tenants who customarily delivered the rentals to Helen Schon.

On October 22, 1972, after the onset of the martial law administration of former President Marcos,
PD No. 27 was promulgated, decreeing the “Emancipation of Tenants.” The tract of land owned in
common by the petitioners, including the portion thereof subject to Helen Schon’s usufructuary
rights, fell within the scope of “Operation Land Transfer.” In consequence, petitioners sought opinion
of DAR as to who would be entitled to receive the rental payments which continued to be made by
respondent tenants to Helen Schon.

On May 30, 1977 the DAR District Officer rendered an opinion that the rental payments as of October
22, 1972 were properly considered as amortization payments for the land and as such should pertain
to the land owners and not to the usufructuary.

1. Civil Case No. 13828, Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental.

On May 22, 1978, petitioners filed against the spouses Joseph and Helen Schon a case for the
collection of rentals plus damages with prayer for preliminary injunction. Petitioners sought in
this case to recover all such previous rentals or the money value thereof, and prayed for
injunction to prevent the respondents from collecting any further rental payments from the
tenants of the land involved. Upon the other hand, the respondents Schon, in their Answer
contended that the Court of First Instance was bereft of jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the case. That jurisdiction, as respondents urged, was vested in the CAR instead.

2. CAR Case No. 76, Court of Agrarian Relations.

Five months after, petitioners filed a second complaint on October 13, 1978 with the Court of
Agrarian Relations, 11th Judicial District, San Carlos City. The petitioners impleaded as co-
respondents of the spouses Schon the tenants who were cultivating the land burdened with
the usufruct of Helen Schon and prayed that they be required to pay all future rentals
beginning with the crop year of 1978 and every year thereafter, until full payment of the
amortization payments computed by the DAR. In their answer, respondents again raised lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter because the dispute between petitioners and
respondents related to the continued existence or termination of the usufructuary rights of
Helen Schon, which issue did not constitute an agrarian dispute and thus, must be litigated
elsewhere.
ISSUE:
1. WON the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental and Court of Agrarian Relations has
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.

RULING:

No. The Court of First Instance held that it was the Court of Agrarian Relations that had jurisdiction
over the case:

“In determining whether the Court has jurisdiction, a determination should first be made as to the
nature of the lease rentals being paid by the tenants-lesees. Section 12 of PD No. 946 enumerates the
case that falls under the jurisdiction of the CAR, as follows:

(a) cases involving rights and obligations of persons in cultivation and use of agricultural land. . .
(b) Questions involving rights granted and obligations imposed by law, PD, orders, instructions,
rules and regulations issued and promulgations in relation to the agrarian reform program. .
(c) Cases involving amortization on payment for lands acquired under PD No. 27 as amended. . .

Moreover, the Agrarian Court in its resolution held that it had also no jurisdiction to decide the case:

“… it is crystal clear that the contending parties are actually Ramona R. Locsin, et.al., and the naked
owners of the 101 hectares subject agricultural land, on the one hand and Helen Schon, the
usufructuary of the same land, on the other.

Helen Schon belongs to the category of a landowner, since she is the recipient of any and all fruits
derived from the land of which the plaintiffs are the naked owners. The usufructuary lasts for as long
as Schon lives. Therefore, this case is actually a dispute between two landowners --- the naked owner
and the beneficial owner – whose controversy revolves on who of them should receive the rentals
being paid by the tenants or lessees in question. Thus, no agrarian dispute which this Court may take
cognizance of.

However, in view of the provisions of Section 19 (7) of B.P. Blg. 129 which was enacted by BP on
August 10, 1981 and implemented on February 14, 1983, jurisdiction over both cases is clearly
vested in the appropriate Regional Trial Court. It provides that:

“Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise original jurisdiction.

(7) In all civil actions and special proceedings falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
juvenile and domestic relations courts and of the courts of agrarian relations as now provided by
law;

The RTC have full authority and jurisdiction to interpret and apply both the mass of statutes and
rules and regulations relating to land reform and the general civil law, including the law on usufruct.
A regional trial court seized of an agrarian dispute and interpreting and applying statutes and
administrative rules and regulations concerning land reform and the elimination of agricultural
tenancy relationships, continues to act as a court of general and plenary jurisdiction. Section 44 of
B.P. Blg 129 abolished the CAR and did not re-create them.

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