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PERSECUTION AND THE ART OF WRITING

Author(s): LEO STRAUSS


Source: Social Research, Vol. 8, No. 4 (NOVEMBER 1941), pp. 488-504
Published by: The New School
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PERSECUTION AND THE ART OF
WRITING
BY LEO STRAUSS

"That vice has oftenprovedan emancipator


of
themind,is one ofthemosthumiliating,
but,at
thesame time,one of the mostunquestionable,
- W. E. H. Lecky
factsin history/'
I

In a considerable numberof countries which,forabouta hun-


dredyears,haveenjoyeda practically completefreedom ofpublic
discussion, is
thatfreedom now suppressedand replacedby a
compulsionto coordinatespeechwithsuchviewsas thegovern-
mentbelievesto be expedient, or holdsin all seriousness.
It may
be worthour while to considerbriefly the effectof thatcom-
pulsion,or persecution,on thoughts as wellas actions.1
A large sectionof the people, probablythe greatmajority
of the youngergeneration,2 acceptsthe government-sponsored
viewsas true,if notat onceat leastaftera time.How havethey
beenconvinced? Andwheredoesthetimefactor enter?Theyhave
notbeenconvincedbycompulsion, forcompulsion doesnotpro-
duceconviction. It merely the for
paves way conviction bysilenc-
ing contradiction.What is called freedom of in
thought a large
-
numberofcasesamountsto and evenforall practicalpurposes
consistsof- theabilityto choosebetweentwoor moredifferent
viewspresented by thesmallminority of peoplewho are public
1 Scribere est agere. See Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries,Book IV,
chap. 6.
Compare Machiavelli, Discorsi, III, 6 (/ Classici del Giglio, pp. 424-26) and
Descartes,Discours de la methode, VI, beginning.
2 "Socrates: Do
you know by what means they might be persuaded to accept this
story?Glauco: By no means, as far as they themselvesare concerned, but I know
how it could be done as regards their sons and their descendants and the people of
a later age generally speaking. Socrates: ... I understand, more or less, what you
mean."- Plato, Republic, 415 c6-d5.

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PERSECUTION AND WRITING 489
speakersor writers.3 If thischoice is prevented,the only kind of
intellectualindependenceof which many people are capable is
destroyed,and that is the only freedomof thoughtwhich is of
political importance.Persecutionis thereforethe indispensable
conditionfor the highestefficiency of what may be called logica
equina. Accordingto thehorse-drawn Parmenides,or to Gulliver's
Houyhnhnms, one cannot say,or one cannotreasonablysay "the
thingwhich is not": that is, lies are inconceivable.This logic is
not peculiar to horses or horse-drawnphilosophers,but deter-
mines,if in a somewhatmodifiedmanner,the thoughtof many
ordinaryhuman beingsas well. They would admit,as a matterof
course,thatman can lie and does lie. But theywould add thatlies
are short-lived and cannot stand the testof repetition- let alone
of constantrepetition - and that thereforea statementwhich is
constantly repeatedand nevercontradictedmustbe true.Another
line of argumentmaintainsthata statementmade by an ordinary
personmay be a lie, but the truthof a statementmade by a re-
sponsible and respectedman, and thereforeparticularlyby a
man in a highlyresponsibleor exaltedposition,is morallycertain.
These two enthymemeslead to the conclusion that a statement
which is constantlyrepeatedby the head of the governmentand
nevercontradictedis a truthof at least the secondpower.
This implies that in the countriesconcernedall those whose
thinkingdoes not followtherulesof logicaequina, in otherwords,
all thosecapable of trulyindependentthinking, cannotbe brought
to accept the government-sponsored views. These people may be
called, in the absence of a betterterm,the intelligentminority,
to distinguishthem fromsuch groups as the intelligentsia.Per-
secution,then,cannot preventindependentthinking.It cannot
preventeven the expressionof independentthought.For it is as
truetodayas it was more than two thousandyearsago thatit is a
safe ventureto tell the truthone knowsto benevolentand trust-
worthyacquaintances,or more precisely,to reasonable friends.4
3 "Reason is but
choosing" is the central thesis of Milton's Areopagitica.
* Plato,
Republic, 450 d3-el.

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490 SOCIAL RESEARCH
Persecutioncannotpreventeven public expressionof the hetero-
dox truth,fora man of independentthoughtcan utterhis viewsin
public and remainunharmed,providedhe moveswithcircumspec-
tion. He can even utter them in print without incurringany
danger,providedhe is capable of writingbetweenthe lines.
The expression"writingbetweenthe lines" indicatesthe sub-
ject of thisarticle.For the influenceof persecutionon literature
is preciselythatit compelsall writerswho hold heterodoxviews
to develop a peculiar techniqueof writing,the techniquewhich
we have in mind when speakingof writingbetween the lines.
This expressionis clearlymetaphoric.Any attemptto expressits
meaningin unmetaphoriclanguage would lead to the discovery
of a terraincognita,a fieldwhose verydimensionsare as yet un-
exploredand whichoffersample scope forhighlyintriguingand
even importantinvestigations. One maysaywithoutfearof being
of
presentlyconvicted grave exaggerationthat almost the only
preparatory work to guide the explorerin this fieldis buried in
thewritingsof therhetoricians ofantiquity.
To returnto our presentsubject,let us look at a simpleexam-
ple which,I have reasonto believe,is not so remotefromrealityas
it mightfirstseem..We can easilyimaginethata historianliving
in a totalitariancountry,a generallyrespectedand unsuspected
memberof theonlypartyin existence,mightbe led by his investi-
gationsto doubt the soundnessof the government-sponsored in-
terpretationof the historyof religion. Nobody would prevent
him frompublishinga passionateattackon what he would call
the liberalview. He would of coursehave to statethe liberalview
beforeattackingit; he could make thatstatementin the quiet, un-
spectacularand somewhatboringmannerwhichwould seem to be
but natural;he would use manytechnicalterms,give manyquota-
tions and attach undue importanceto insignificantdetails: he
would seemto forgetthe holywar of mankindin the pettysquab-
bles of pedants.Only when he reached the core of the argument
would he writethreeor foursentencesin thatterseand livelystyle
which is apt to arrestthe attentionof young men who love to

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PERSECUTION AND WRITING 491
think.That centralpassagewouldstatethecaseoftheadversaries
moreclearly, compellingly and mercilessly thanit had everbeen
statedin theveryheyday ofliberalism, forhe wouldsilently drop
all thefoolish
excrescencesoftheliberalcreedwhichwereallowed
to growup duringthetimewhenliberalismhad succeededand
thereforewasapproaching dormancy. His reasonable youngreader
wouldforthe firsttimecatcha glimpseof the forbidden fruit.
The attack,thebulkofthework,wouldconsistofvirulent expan-
sionsofthemostvirulent utterances in theholybookor booksof
therulingparty.The intelligent youngmanwho,beingyoung,
had untilthenbeensomehowattracted by thoseimmoderate ut-
terances,wouldnowbe merelydisgusted and, afterhaving tasted
theforbidden fruit,evenboredby them.Readingthe book for
thesecondand thirdtime,he woulddetectin theveryarrange-
mentof the quotationsfromthe authoritative bookssignificant
additionsto thosefewtersestatements, in thecenteroftherather
shortfirstpart.
Persecution,then,givesriseto a peculiartechniqueofwriting,
and therewith to a peculiartypeof literature, in whichthetruth
aboutall crucialthingsis presented exclusively betweenthelines.
That literatureis addressed,notto all readers, but to trustworthy
and intelligentreadersonly.It has all theadvantages of private
communication withouthavingitsgreatest disadvantage- thatit
reachesonlypersonalacquaintances. It has all theadvantages of
public communication without its
having greatest disadvantage-
capitalpunishment fortheauthor.But howcan a man perform
themiracleofspeaking in a publication toa minority,whilebeing
silentto the majority of his readers?Experienceand reasoning
showthatwhatseemstobe a miracleis perfectly natural.The fact
whichmakesthisliterature possiblecanbe expressed in theaxiom
thatthoughtless men are carelessreaders,and only thoughtful
menare carefulreaders.Thereforean authorwho wishesto ad-
dressonlythoughtful men has but to writein sucha waythat
onlya verycarefulreadercan detectthe meaningof his book.
But,it willbe objected,theremaybe clevermen,carefulreaders,

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492 SOCIAL RESEARCH
who are not trustworthy, and who,afterhavingfoundthe author
out, would denounce him to the authorities.As a matterof fact,
this literaturewould be impossibleif the Socratic dictum that
virtueis knowledge,and thereforethat thoughtfulmen as such
are trustworthy and not cruel,wereentirelywrong.
Anotheraxiom, but one which is meaningfulonly so long as
persecutionremainswithinthe bounds of legal procedure,is that
a carefulwriterof normal intelligenceis more intelligentthan
the mostintelligentcensor,as such. For the burdenof proofrests
withthecensor.It is he, or thepublic prosecutor, who mustprove
thatthe authorholds or has uttered heterodoxviews.In orderto
do so he mustshow thatcertainliterarydeficienciesof the work
are not due to chance,but thattheauthorused a givenambiguous
expressiondeliberately,or thathe constructeda certainsentence
badly on purpose.That is to say,the censormustprove not only
thatthe authoris intelligentand a good writerin general,fora
man who intentionally blundersin writingmustpossessthe art of
writing,5 but above all thathe was on the usual level of his intel-
lectual abilitieswhen writingthe incriminatingwords.But how
can thatbe proved,if even Homer nods fromtimeto time?

Suppressionof independentthoughthas occurredfairlyfrequently


in the past. It is reasonableto assume thatearlierages produced
proportionately as manymen capable of independentthoughtas
we findtoday,and thatat least some of thesemen combinedin-
telligencewithprudence.Thus, one mayverywell wonderwhether
some of the greatestwritersof the past have not adapted their
literarytechniqueto the requirementsof persecution,by present-
ing theirviews on all the then crucial questionsexclusivelybe-
tweenthe lines.
We are preventedfromconsideringthis possibility,and still
more fromconsideringthe questions connectedwith it once it
has been suggested,by some habitsproducedby, or related to, a
6Xenophon,Memorabilia,IV, 2, 20.

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PERSECUTION AND WRITING 493
comparatively recentprogressin historicalresearch.This progress
was due, at firstglance,to the generalacceptanceand occasional
applicationof the followingprinciples.Each period of the past,
it was demanded,mustbe understoodby itself,and mustnot be
judged by standardsalien to it. Each authormust,as far as pos-
sible,be interpreted by himself:no termof anyconsequencemust
be used in interpretation of an authorwhich cannot be literally
translatedinto his language,and which was not used by him or
was not in fairlycommonuse in his time.The only presentations
of an author'sviewswhichcan be acceptedas trueare thoseulti-
matelyborneout by his own explicitstatements. The last of these
principles is decisive:it seems to exclude a priorifromthe sphere
of humanknowledgesuch viewsof earlierwritersas are indicated
exclusivelybetweenthe lines. For if an author does not tire of
assertingexplicitlyon everypage of his book thata is b, but indi-
catesbetweenthe lines thata is not b, the modernhistorianwill
stilldemandexplicitevidenceshowingthatthe authorbelieved a
not to be 6. Such evidencecannot possiblybe forthcoming, and
the modernhistorianwinshis argument:he can dismissany read-
ing betweenthe lines as arbitraryguesswork,or, if he is lazy,he
will acceptit as intuitiveknowledge.
The applicationof these principleshas had importantconse-
quences. Up to a time within the memoryof men still living,
many people, bearing in mind famous statementsof Bodin,
Hobbes, Burke, Condorcetand others,believed that there is a
difference in fundamentalconceptionsbetweenjnodernpolitical
thoughtand the political thoughtof the Middle Ages and of
antiquity.The presentgenerationof scholarshas been taughtby
one of the mostfamoushistoriansof our timethat"at least from
the lawyersof the second centuryto the theoristsof the French
Revolution,the historyof political thoughtis continuous,chang-
ing in form,modifiedin content,but still the same in its funda-
mentalconceptions/'6 Until the middleof thenineteenthcentury,
6 A. J. Carlyle,A Historyof MediaevalPoliticalTheoryin the West,vol. 1 (2nd
ed., London 1927)p. 2.

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494 SOCIAL RESEARCH
Averroeswas thoughtto have been hostile to all religion.After
Renan's successfulattackon whatis now called a mediaevallegend,
present-day scholarsgenerallyconsiderAverroesa loyal,and even
a believing,Moslem.7Previous writershad believed that "the
abrogationof religiousand magical thought"was characteristic
of the attitudeof the Greek physicians.A more recentwriteras-
sertsthat"the Hippocraticphysicians... as scientistsembraced
a supernaturaldogma."8Lessing,who was one of the most pro-
foundhumanistsof all times,with an exceedinglyrare combina-
tion of scholarship,tasteand philosophy,and who was convinced
thatthereare truthswhichshould not or cannotbe pronounced,
believedthat"all ancientphilosophers"had distinguished between
theirexotericand theiresotericteaching.Afterthe greattheolo-
gian Schleiermacherasserted,with an unusuallyable argument,
the view thatthereis onlyone Platonic teaching,the questionof
the esotericismof the ancient philosopherswas narroweddown,
forall practicalpurposes,to the meaningof Aristotle's"exoteric
speeches";and in thisregardone of the greatesthumanistsof the
presentday assertsthat the attributionof a secret teaching to
Aristotleis "obviouslya late inventionoriginatingin the spirit
of Neo-Pythagoreanism."9 Accordingto Gibbon, Eusebius "indi-
rectlyconfessesthat he has relatedwhatevermightredoundto the
glory,and thathe has suppressedall thatcould tendto thedisgrace
ofreligion."Accordingto a present-day historian,"thejudgmentof
Gibbon, that the EcclesiasticalHistorywas grosslyunfair,is it-
7 Ernest Renan, Averroes et VAverroisme
(3rd ed., Paris 1866) p. 292 ff. L6on
Gauthier, La thiorie d*lbn Rochd {Averroes)sur les rapports de la religion et de
la philosophic (Paris 1909) p. 126 ff. and p. 177 ff. Compare the same author's
"Scolastique musulmane et scolastique chre"tienne," Revue d'Histoire de la Philoso-
phiet vol. 2 (1928) p. 221 ff.and p. 333 ff.
8
Ludwig Edelstein, "Greek Medicine in its Relation to Religion and Magic,"
Bulletin of the Institute of the History of Medicine, vol. 5 (1937) pp. 201 and 211.
9 Lessing, Ernst und Falk, 2nd
dialogue; and "Leibniz von den ewigen Strafen,"
Werke (Petersen and v. Olshausen edition) vol. 21, p. 147. Friedrich Schleiermacher,
Platons Werke (Berlin 1804) vol. I, 1, pp. 12-20. Werner Jaeger, Aristotle (Oxford
1934) p. 33. See also Sir Alexander Grant, The Ethics of Aristotle (London 1874)
vol. 1, p. 398 ff.and Eduard Zeller, Aristotleand the Earlier Peripatetics (London
1897) vol. 1, p. 120 ff.

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PERSECUTION AND WRITING 495
selfa prejudiced Up totheendofthenineteenth
verdict/'10 century
and
manyphilosophers theologians believed thatHobbes was an
atheist.At present manyhistorians tacitlyor explicitlyrejectthat
view:a contemporary thinker,whilefeelingthat Hobbes wasnot
exactly man,hasdescriedin hiswritings
a religious theoutlinesof
a neo-Kantian philosophy of religion.11Montesquieuhimself, as
wellas someof his contemporaries, believedthatDe Vespritdes
lois had a good and evena wonderful plan; Laboulayestillbe-
lievedthattheapparentobscurity of itsplan as well as itsother
apparentliterary weredue to censorship
deficiencies or persecu-
tion.One ofthemostoutstanding present-day historiansofpoliti-
"
cal thought, however,assertsthat thereis not in truthmuch
concatenation and the amountof irrelevance
of subject-matter,
is extraordinary,"and that"it cannotbe said thatMontesquieu's
SpiritoftheLawshasanyarrangement."12
This selectionofexamples,whichis notwhollyarbitrary, shows
10
James T. Shotwell, The History of History, vol. 1 (New York 1939) p. 356 ff.
11Ferdinand Tonnies, Thomas Hobbes
(3rd ed., Stuttgart 1925) p. 148. George
E. G. Catlin, Thomas Hobbes (Oxford 1922) p. 25. Richard Honigswald, Hobbes
und die Staatsphilosophie (Munich 1924) p. 176 ff.Leo Strauss, Die Religionskritik
Spinozas (Berlin 1930) p. 80. Z. Lubienski, Die Grundlagen des ethisch-politischen
Systemsvon Hobbes (Munich 1932) p. 213 ff.
12
George H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory (New York 1937) pp. 556 and
551. Friedrich Meinecke, Die Entstehung des Historismus (Munich 1936) p. 139 ff.
and p. 151, footnote 1. Edouard Laboulaye, "Introduction a l'Esprit des Lois,"
Oeuvres completes de Montesquieu (Paris 1876) vol. 3, p. xviii ff.Laboulaye quotes
in that context an important passage from d'Alembert's "Eloge de Montesquieu."
See also Bertolini's "Analyse raisonne"ede l'Esprit des Lois," ibid., pp. 6, 14, 23 ff.,34
and 60 ff.The remarksof d'Alembert,Bertolini and Laboulaye are merely explana-
tions of what Montesquieu himself indicates for example where he says, in the
preface: "Si Ton veut chercherle dessein de l'auteur, on ne le peut bien de'couvrir
que dans le dessein de l'ouvrage." (See also the end of the eleventh book and two
lettersfromHelvetius, ibid., vol. 6, pp. 314, 320.) D'Alembert says: "Nous disons de
Vobscuriteque Ton peut se permettredans un tel ouvrage, la meme chose que du
defaut d'ordre. Ce qui seroit obscur pour les lecteurs vulgaires, ne Test pas pour
ceux que l'auteur a eus en vue; d'ailleurs l'obscurite*volontaire n'en est pas une.
M. de Montesquieu ayant a presenter quelquefois des ve"rit£simportantes, dont
l'e'nonce*absolu et direct auroit pu blesser sans fruit, a eu la prudence de les
envelopper; et, par cet innocent artifice,les a voices a ceux a qui elles seroient
nuisibles, sans qu 'elles fussent perdues pour les sages." Similarly, certain contem-
poraries of the "rhetor" Xenophon believed that "what is beautifully and method-
ically written,is not beautifullyand methodically written" (Cynegeticus,13. 6).

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496 SOCIAL RESEARCH
that the typicaldifference betweenolder views and more recent
viewsis due not entirelyto progressin historicalexactness,but also
to a morebasic changein the intellectualclimate.During the last
fewdecades the rationalisttradition,whichwas the commonde-
nominatorof the older views,and whichwas still ratherinfluen-
tial in nineteenthcenturypositivism,has been eitherstill further
transformed or altogetherrejectedby an ever-increasing number
of people. Whetherand to what extentthischange is to be con-
sidereda progressor a decline is a question which only the phi-
losophercan answer.
A moremodestdutyis imposedon thehistorian.He will merely,
and rightly,demand that in spite of all changeswhich have oc-
curredor whichwill occur in the intellectualclimate,the tradi-
tion of historicalexactnessshall be continued.Accordingly,he
will not accept an arbitrarystandardof exactnesswhich might
exclude a priorithe mostimportantfactsof the past fromhuman
knowledge,but will adapt the rules of certaintywhich guide his
researchto thenatureofhis subject.He will thenfollowsuchrules
as these: Reading between the lines is strictlyprohibitedin all
cases whereit would be less exact than not doing so. Only such
readingbetweenthe lines as startsfroman exact considerationof
the explicit statementsof the author is legitimate.The context
in which a statementoccurs,and the literarycharacterof the
whole workas well as its plan, mustbe perfectly understoodbe-
forean interpretation of the statementcan reasonablyclaim to be
adequate, or even correct.One is not entitledto delete a passage,
nor to emend its text,beforeone has fullyconsideredall reason-
able possibilitiesof understandingthe passage as it stands- two
of thesepossibilitiesbeing thatthe passagemaybe ironic,or that
the editoror copyistresponsibleforan alterationof the original
was intelligentand knew what he was doing. If a masterof the
art of writingcommitssuch blundersas would shame an intel-
ligent highschoolboy, it is reasonable to assume that they are
intentional,especiallyif the author discusses,howeverinciden-
tally,the possibilityof intentionalblundersin writing.The views

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PERSECUTION AND WRITING 497
of theauthorofa dramaor dialoguemustnot,withoutprevious
proof,be identified withtheviewsexpressed by one or moreof
hischaracters, orwiththoseagreeduponbyall hischaracters or by
hissympathetic characters. The real opinionof author not
an is
necessarily identicalwiththatwhichhe expresses in the largest
numberofpassages. In short,exactness is notto be confused with
or
refusal, inability, to see thewoods forthe trees.The truly exact
historian will reconcilehimselfto thefactthatthereis a differ-
ence betweenwinningan argument, or provingto practically
everyone thathe is right,and understanding the thoughtof the
greatwriters ofthepast.
It must,then,be considered possiblethatreadingbetweenthe
lineswill notlead to completeagreement amongall scholars.If
an to
thisis objection reading between the linesas such,thereis
the counter-objection thatneitherhave the methodsgenerally
usedat present led to universal or evenwideagreement in regard
toveryimportant points.Scholars ofthelastcentury wereinclined
to solveliterary problems byhavingrecourseto thegenesisofthe
author'swork,or even of his thought.Contradictions or diver-
genceswithinonebook,orbetweentwobooksbythesameauthor,
weresupposedto provethathisthought had changed.If thecon-
tradictions exceededa certainlimititwassometimes decidedwith-
outanyexternal evidencethatone oftheworksmustbe spurious.
That procedure has latelycomeintosomedisrepute, and at pres-
ent manyscholarsare inclinedto be rathermoreconservative
abouttheliterary tradition, and lessimpressed bymerely internal
evidence.The conflict betweenthetraditionalists and thehigher
criticsis,however, farfrom being settled.
The traditionalistscould
showin important casesthatthehighercriticshave not proved
theirhypotheses at all; but evenif all theanswerssuggested by
thehighercriticsshouldultimately prove to be the
wrong, ques-
tionswhichled themawayfromthetradition and temptedthem
to trya new approachoftenshow an awarenessof difficulties
whichdo notdisturbtheslumberofthetypicaltraditionalist. An
adequate answer to the most seriousof thesequestionsrequires

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498 SOCIAL RESEARCH
methodicalreflection on theliterarytechniqueof thegreatwriters
of earlier ages, because of the typicalcharacterof the literary
problemsinvolved- obscurityof the plan, contradictionswithin
one workor betweentwoor moreworksof thesame author,omis-
sion of importantlinks of the argument,and so on. Such con-
templation necessarilytranscendsthe boundaries of modern
aestheticsand even of traditionalpoetics,and will, I believe,com-
pel studentssooneror laterto take into account the phenomenon
of persecution.To mentionsomethingwhichis hardlymore than
anotheraspect of the same fact,we sometimesobservea conflict
betweena traditional,superficialand doxographicinterpretation
of some greatwriterof the past, and a more intelligent,deeper
and monographicinterpretation. They are equally exact, so far
as both are borne out by explicit statementsof the writercon-
cerned.Only a fewpeople at present,however,considerthe pos-
sibilitythatthe traditionalinterpretation mayreflectthe exoteric
teachingof the author,whereasthe monographicinterpretation
stops halfwaybetweenthe exotericand esotericteachingof the
author.
Modernhistoricalresearch,whichemergedat a timewhen per-
secutionwas a matterof feeblerecollectionratherthanof forceful
experience,has counteractedor even destroyedan earliertendency
to read betweenthelinesofthegreatwriters, to attachmoreweight
to theirfundamentaldesignthan to thoseviewswhich theyhave
repeatedmostoften.Any attemptto restorethe earlierapproach
in thisage of historicism is confrontedby the problemof criteria
for distinguishingbetween legitimateand illegitimatereading
betweenthe lines. If it is truethatthereis a necessarycorrelation
betweenpersecutionand writingbetweenthe lines,then thereis
a necessarynegativecriterion:that the book in question must
have been composedin an era of persecution,that is, at a time
when some political or otherorthodoxywas enforcedby law or
custom.One positivecriterionis this: if an able writerwho has
a clear mind and a perfectknowledgeof the orthodoxview and
contradictssurreptitiously
all its ramifications, and as it were in

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PERSECUTION AND WRITING 499
passingone of itsnecessarypresuppositionsor consequenceswhich
he explicitlyrecognizesand maintainseverywhereelse, we can
reasonablysuspectthathe was opposed to the orthodoxsystemas
such and- we must studyhis whole book all over again, with
much greatercare and much less naivete than ever before. In
some cases, we possesseven explicit evidence proving that the
author has indicated his views on the most importantsubjects
only betweenthe lines. Such statements,however,do not usually
occurin theprefaceor otherveryconspicuousplace. Some of them
cannoteven be noticed,let alone understood,so long as we confine
ourselvesto the view of persecutionand the attitudetowardfree-
dom of speech and candor whichhave become prevalentduring
thelast threehundredyears.
in

The term persecutioncovers a varietyof phenomena,ranging


fromthe mostcruel type,as exemplifiedby the Spanish Inquisi-
tion, to the mildest,which is social ostracism.Between these ex-
tremesare the typeswhichare mostimportantfromthe point of
view of literaryor intellectualhistory.Examples of these are
found in the Athensof the fifthand fourthcenturiesB.C., in
some Moslem countriesof the earlyMiddle Ages,in seventeenth
centuryHolland and England,and in eighteenthcenturyFrance
and Germany - all of themcomparativelyliberal periods.But a
glance at the biographiesof Anaxagoras,Protagoras,Socrates,
Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle,Avicenna, Averroes,Maimonides,
Grotius,Descartes,Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, Bayle, Wolff,Mon-
tesquieu, Voltaire, Rousseau, Lessing and Kant,13and in some
to
cases even a glanceat the titlepages of theirbooks,is sufficient
show thattheywitnessedor suffered, duringat least partof their
lifetimes,a kind of persecution which was more tangible than
13In regard to Kant, whose case is in a class by itself,even a historian so little
given to suspicion or any other sort of skepticismas C. E. Vaughan remarks: "We
are almost led to suspect Kant of having trifledwith his readers, and of nursing an
esotericsympathywith Revolution." (Studies in the History of Political Philosophy,
Manchester 1939, vol. 2, p. 83.)

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500 SOCIAL RESEARCH
social ostracism.Nor should we overlookthe fact,not sufficiently
stressedby all authorities,thatreligiouspersecutionand persecu-
tionof freeinquiryare not identical.There were timesand coun-
triesin which all kinds,or at least a great varietyof kinds,of
worshipwerepermitted, but freeinquirywas not.14
The attitudepeople adopt towardfreedomof public discussion
dependsdecisivelyon theirattitudetowardthe possibilityof, or
the limitson, popular education,that is, the communicationof
the truthdiscoveredby philosophyor science to people who are
not philosophersor scientists.Generally speaking, premodern
philosopherswere more timid in this respectthan modernphi-
losophers.Afterabout the middle of the seventeenthcenturyan
ever-increasing number of heterodoxphilosopherswho had suf-
feredfrompersecutionpublishedtheirbooks not only to express
themselvesbut also because they desired to contributeto the
abolition of persecutionas such. They believed that suppression
of freeinquiry,and of publicationof the resultsof freeinquiry,
was accidental,an outcomeof the faultyconstruction of the body
politic,and that the kingdomof general darknesscould be re-
placed by the republicof universallight.They looked forwardto
a time when, as a result of the progressof popular education,
-
practicallycompletefreedomof speechwould be possible,or to
exaggerateforpurposesof clarification - to a time when no one
would sufferany harmfromhearingany truth.15 They concealed
theirviewsonly farenough to protectthemselvesas well as pos-
sible frompersecution;had theybeen moresubtlethan that,they
would have defeatedtheir purpose,which was to enlightenan
ever-increasing numberof people who were not philosophers.It
is thereforecomparatively easy to read betweenthe lines of their
14See the"fragment" by H. S. Reimarus,"Von Duldungder Deisten,"in Lessing's
Werke(Petersenand v. Olshausenedition)vol. 22,p. 38 ff.
15The questionwhetherthat extremegoal is attainablein any but the most
halcyonconditionshas beenraisedin our timebyArchibaldMacLeishin "Post-War
Writersand Pre-WarReaders,"Journalof AdultEducation,vol. 12 (June1940)in
thefollowingterms:"Perhapstheluxuryof the completeconfession, the uttermost
doubt should be denied themselves
despair,the farthest by writerslivingin any
but the mostorderlyand settledtimes.I do not know."

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PERSECUTION AND WRITING 501
books.16The attitude of an earlier type of writerswas funda-
mentallydifferent. They believed that the gulf separating"the
wise" and "the vulgar" was a basic factof human nature which
could not be influencedby any progressof popular education:
philosophy,or science,was essentiallya privilegeof "the few."
They were convincedthatphilosophyas such was suspectto, and
hated by,the majorityof men.17Even if theyhad had nothingto
fearfromany particularpoliticalquarter,thosewho startedfrom
that assumptionwould have been driven to the conclusion that
public communicationof the philosophicor scientifictruthwas
impossibleor undesirable,not only forthe timebeing but forall
times.They mustconcealtheiropinionsfromall but philosophers,
either by limitingthemselvesto oral instructionof a carefully
selectedgroup of pupils,or by writingabout the mostimportant
subjectby meansof "briefindication."18
161 am
thinkingof Hobbes in particular, whose significancefor the development
outlined above can hardly be overestimated.This was clearly recognized by Tonnies,
who emphasized especially these two sayingsof his hero: "Paulatim eruditur vulgus"
and "Philosophia ut crescat libera esse debet nee metu nee pudore coercenda."
(Tonnies, op. cit., pp. iv, 195.) Hobbes also says: "Suppression of doctrines does but
unite and exasperate, that is, increase both the malice and power of them that
have already believed them." (English Works, Molesworth edition, vol. 6, p. 242.)
In his Of Liberty and Necessity(London 1654, p. 35 ff.)he writes to the Marquess
of Newcastle: "I must confess,if we consider the greatestpart of Mankinde, not as
theyshould be, but as they are ... I must, I say, confess that the dispute of this
question will rather hurt than help their piety, and therefore if his Lordship
[Bishop Bramhall] had not desired this answer, I should not have written it, nor
do I write it but in hopes your Lordship and his, will keep it private."
17Cicero, Tusculanae
Disputationes, II, 1, 4. Plato, Phaedo, 64 b; Republic, 520
b2-3 and 494 a4-10.
18Plato, Timaeus, 28 c3-5, and Seventh Letter, 332 d6-7, 341 c4-e3, and 344 d4-e2.
That the view mentioned above is reconcilable with the democratic creed is shown
most clearly by Spinoza, who was a champion not only of liberalism but also of
democracy(Tractatus politicus, XI, 2, Bruder edition). See his Tractatus de intel-
lectus emendatione, 14 and 17, as well as Tractatus theologico-politicus, V 35-39,
XIV 20 and XV end. It would be a mistake to think that his Ethics is an esoteric,
straightforwardor scientificpresentation of his doctrine because it is ordine geo-
metrico demonstrata; for his Renati des Cartes Principia Philosophiae is likewise
more geometrico demonstrata,although he disagreed with those principles in not
a few points (see Epistola, IX). Professor H. A. Wolfson has the great merit of
having emphasized the allusive, evasive and elliptical style of the Ethics, and of
having observed in particular that Spinoza's "statements are not significant for

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502 SOCIAL RESEARCH
Writingsare naturallyaccessibleto all who can read. Therefore
a philosopherwho chose the secondwaycould expound onlysuch
opinions as were suitable for the nonphilosophicmajority:all
of his writingswould have to be, strictlyspeaking,exoteric.These
opinionswould not be in all respectsconsonantwithtruth.Being
a philosopher,thatis, hating"the lie in the soul" more than any-
thingelse, he would not deceive himselfabout the factthatsuch
opinionsare merely"likely tales," or "noble lies," or "probable
opinions,"and would leave it to his philosophicreadersto disen-
tanglethe truthfromits poetic or dialecticpresentation.But he
would defeat his purpose if he indicated clearly which of his
statementsexpresseda noble lie, and which the still more noble
truth.For philosophicreadershe would do almost more than
enough by drawingtheir attentionto the fact that he did not
object to tellinglies whichwerenoble, or taleswhichweremerely
similarto truth.From the point of view of the literaryhistorian
at least,thereis no morenoteworthy differencebetweenthe typical
premodernphilosopher(who is hard to distinguishfromthe pre-
modernpoet) and the typicalmodern philosopherthan that in
theirattitudestoward"noble (or just) lies," "pious frauds,"the
"ductus obliquus"19 or "economy of the truth." Every decent
modernreaderis bound to be shockedby themeresuggestionthat
a greatman mighthave deliberatelydeceivedthe largemajorityof
his readers.20And yet,as a liberal theologianonce remarked,these
what they actually affirmbut for the denials which they imply." He has tried to
trace back these facts to the circumstance that Spinoza, a Jew, lived in a non-
Jewishenvironment,in which he "never felt himselfquite free to speak his mind."
Accordingly,he is compelled to assert: "Little did (Spinoza) understand the real
cause of his own behavior." (The Philosophy of Spinoza, Cambridge, Mass. 1934,
vol. 1, pp. 22-24.) I for one am convinced that Spinoza understood the real cause
perfectlywell, and that therefore the mature Spinoza would have been equally
"cautious, hesitant and reserved" if he had lived in a purely Jewish environment.
See also, for example, Tractatus theologico-politicus,II, 31; XV, 2-3; and XVII, 24.
19Sir Thomas More, Utopia, latter part of firstbook.
20A rather extensive discussion of the "magna quaestio, latebrosa tractatio,
disputatio inter doctos alternans,"as Augustinus called it, is to be found in Grotius'
De Jure Belli ac Pads, III, chap. 1, §7 ff.,and in particular §17, 3. See also inter alia
Pascal's ninth Provinciale and JeremyTaylor, Ductor Dubitantium, Book III, chap.
2, rule 5.

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PERSECUTION AND WRITING 503
imitatorsof the resourcefulOdysseuswere perhaps merelymore
sincerethan we when theycalled "lying nobly" what we would
call "consideringone's social responsibilities.'1
An exotericbook containsthentwo teachings:a popular teach-
ing of an edifyingcharacter,which is in the foreground;and a
philosophicteachingconcerningthemostimportantsubject,which
is indicated only between the lines.21This is not to deny that
some great writersmight have stated certain importanttruths
quite openly by using as mouthpiecesome disreputablecharac-
ter: theywould thus show how much theydisapprovedof pro-
nouncing the truthsin question. There would then be good
reasonforour findingin thegreatestliteratureof the pastso many
interestingdevils, madmen, beggars,sophists,drunkards,epicu-
reansand buffoons. Those to whomsuch booksare trulyaddressed
are, however,neitherthe unphilosophicmajoritynor the perfect
philosopheras such, but the young men who might become
philosophers:the potentialphilosophersare to be led step by step
21Only theexotericteachingis of interestto thesociologistof knowledge, foronly
the exotericteachinghad, could have and was intendedto have a popularappeal.
But sociologyis not enough: therewere alwayspeople who were not merelyex-
ponentsof the societyto whichtheybelonged,or of any society,but who success-
fullyendeavoredto leave "the cave." It is those people, and those people only,
whomwe still call philosophers, loversof the truthabout "the whole" and not
merelyabout "the wholehistoricalprocess."The independence of the philosopher,
as faras he is a philosopher,is onlyone aspectof a morefundamental independ-
ence, whichwas recognizedequally by thosewho spoke of a presocial"state of
nature"and by thosewho emphasizedso strongly the factthat "man is generated
by man and the sun,"not by society.It sometimes happensthata genuinephilos-
opheragreeswiththe politicalviewsof his family, or sect,or class,and that there-
fore the political(and moral) opinionswhich he expoundsin his writingsare
merelymoreimpressive and imaginativeexpressionsof whathis fatheror uncle or
brotheralso said. But if one wantsto understandthe hiddenreasonwhyhe chose
thesepoliticalviewsand not thoseof anotherclass- forhe was, as a philosopher,
freeto choose - one mustlook beneaththe surfaceof his teachingby disinterring
his esotericteachingwhichis indicatedbetweenthe lines,and whichis usuallynot
veryflattering to father,uncle or brother.To take the superficialand practical
agreement of a philosopher withhis familyor classas a proofthatthatphilosopher
was under the spell of the prejudicesof his familyor class,is an example still
fairlycommonof post hoc, ergo propterhoc. This fallacyis much more serious
thanany paralogismcommitted by Plato,forexample,becauseit is not noticedby
thosewho commitit.

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504 SOCIAL RESEARCH
fromthe popular views which are indispensablefor all practical
and political purposesto the truthwhich is merelyand purely
theoretical,guided by certain obtrusivelyenigmaticfeaturesin
the presentationof the popular teaching- obscurityof the plan,
contradictions,pseudonyms,inexact repetitionsof earlier state-
ments, strange expressions,etc. Such featuresdo not disturb
the slumberof thosewho cannot see the wood forthe trees,but
act as awakeningstumblingblocks for those who can. All books
of that kind owe theirexistenceto the love of the mature phi-
losopherfor the puppies22of his race, by whom he wants to be
loved in turn: all exotericbooks are "writtenspeechescaused by
love."
Exotericliteraturepresupposesthatthereare basic truthswhich
would not be pronouncedin public by any decentman, because
theywould do harmto manypeople who,havingbeen hurt,would
naturallybe inclined to hurt in turn him who pronouncesthe
unpleasanttruths.It presupposes,in other words,that freedom
of inquiry,and of publication of all resultsof inquiry,is not
guaranteedas a basic right. This literatureis then essentially
relatedto a societywhich is not liberal. Thus one may verywell
raisethe questionof whatuse it could be in a trulyliberal society.
The answeris simple. In Plato's Banquet, Alcibiades- that out-
-
spoken son of outspoken Athens compares Socrates and his
speechesto certainsculptureswhich are veryugly fromthe out-
side,but withinhave mostbeautifulimagesof thingsdivine. The
worksof thegreatwritersof the past are verybeautifuleven from
without.And yet theirvisible beautyis sheerugliness,compared
with the beauty of those hidden treasureswhich disclose them-
selvesonly afterverylong, nevereasy,but alwayspleasantwork.
This alwaysdifficult but alwayspleasantwork is, I believe,what
the philosophershad in mind whentheyrecommendededucation.
Education,theyfelt,is theonlyanswerto thealwayspressingques-
tion,to the political question,of how to reconcileorderwhichis
not oppressionwithfreedomwhichis not license.
22ComparePlato,Republic,539 a5-dl, withApology,23 c2-8.

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