Answer all Questions Answer all Questions

Question One Question One

A- Derive a general expression for the unreliability of the ‫ﺗﻌﺑﯾرا ﻋﺎ ًﻣﺎ ﻋن ﻋدم ﻣوﺛوﻗﯾﺔ اﻟﻧظﺎم اﻟذي ﯾظﮭر ﻧﻣوذج اﻟﻣوﺛوﻗﯾﺔ‬
ً ‫ اﺳﺗﻧﺑط‬-‫أ‬
system whose reliability model is shown in Fig.Q11. ‫ ﺿﻊ ﻓﻲ اﻋﺗﺑﺎرك اﻟﺣﺎﻟﺔ اﻟﺗﻲ ﺗﻛون ﻓﯾﮭﺎ ﺟﻣﯾﻊ‬.11 ‫اﻟﺧﺎص ﺑﮫ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺷﻛل‬
Consider the case in which all parallel branches of this ‫اﻟﻔروع اﻟﻣﺗوازﯾﺔ ﻟﮭذا اﻟﻧظﺎم زاﺋدة ﻋن اﻟﺣﺎﺟﺔ ﺗﻣﺎ ًﻣﺎ ﺑﺎﺳﺗﺛﻧﺎء ذﻟك اﻟﻣﻛون‬
system are fully redundant with the exception of that
‫ واﻟﺗﻲ ﯾﺗطﻠب وﺟود أي ﻓرﻋﯾن ﻣن ﻓروﻋﮭﺎ ﻟﻧﺟﺎح‬6 ‫ و‬5 ‫ و‬4 ‫ﻣن اﻟﻣﻛوﻧﺎت‬
consisting of components 4, 5 and 6 for which any 2 of the
branches are required for system success.92 .‫اﻟﻧظﺎم‬

Fig. Q11 Q11 ‫اﻟﺷﻛل‬

The principle of network reduction applies equally well to this
problem, i.e., components 2 and 3 are combined to give
equivalent component 8; components 4, 5 and 6 are combined to
give equivalent component 9, component 1 and equivalent
components 8 and 9 are combined to give equivalent component
10 and finally equivalent component 10 is combined with
component 7 to give the system equivalent component 11. These
steps are shown in Figure Q11-1
‫ أي ﯾﺗم دﻣﺞ‬، ‫ﯾﻧطﺑﻖ ﻣﺑدأ اﺧﺗزال اﻟﺷﺑﻛﺔ ﺑﺷﻛل ﺟﯾد ﻋﻠﻰ ھذه اﻟﻣﺳﺎﻟﺔ‬
6 ‫ و‬5 ‫ و‬4 ‫ ؛ ﯾﺗم دﻣﺞ اﻟﻣﻛوﻧﺎت‬8 ‫ ﻹﻋطﺎء اﻟﻣﻛون اﻟﻣﻛﺎﻓﺊ‬3 ‫ و‬2 ‫اﻟﻣﻛوﻧﯾن‬
‫ ﻣﺟﻣﻌﺔ‬9 ‫ و‬8 ‫ واﻟﻣﻛوﻧﺎت اﻟﻣﻛﺎﻓﺋﺔ‬1 ‫ واﻟﻣﻛون‬9 ‫ﻹﻋطﺎء اﻟﻣﻛون اﻟﻣﻛﺎﻓﺊ‬
‫ ﻣﻊ اﻟﻣﻛون‬10 ‫ وأﺧﯾرا ً ﯾﺗم دﻣﺞ اﻟﻣﻛون اﻟﻣﻛﺎﻓﺊ‬10 ‫ﻹﻋطﺎء اﻟﻣﻛون اﻟﻣﻛﺎﻓﺊ‬
‫ ھذه اﻟﺧطوات ﻣﺑﯾﻧﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺷﻛل‬.11 ‫ ﻹﻋطﺎء اﻟﻣﻛون اﻟﻣﻛﺎﻓﺊ ﻟﻠﻧظﺎم‬7
Q11-1
.

Q11 ‫ ھﻲ اﻻﺧﺗزاﻻت ﻣن اﻟﺻورة‬Q11-1 ‫اﻟﺻورة‬

Figure Q11-1 Reduction of Fig Q11 .‫ )ب( اﻻﺧﺗزال اﻟﺛﺎﻧﻲ‬.‫ )أ( اﻻﺧﺗزال اﻷول‬Q11
. Q11 (a) First reduction. (b) Second reduction. (c) Third
‫)ج( اﻻﺧﺗزال اﻟﺛﺎﻟث‬
reduction
If R1 ... , R7 and Q1 ... , Q7 are the reliabilities and un- ‫ ھﻲ اﻻﻋﺗﻣﺎدﯾﺔ وﻏﯾر اﻟﻣوﺛوﻗﺔ‬Q7 ‫ ﻓﺈن‬، ... Q1 ‫ و‬R7 ‫ و‬... R1 ‫إذا ﻛﺎﻧت‬
reliabilities of components 1, ... ,7, then ‫ﻟـ‬
Q8=Q2Q3 ‫ ﺛم‬، 7 ، ... ، 1 ‫اﻟﻣﻛوﻧﺎت‬
Rl0=R1R8R9
Q8=Q2Q3
Q11 = Ql0Q7
Rl0=R1R8R9
= Q7(1- R 1R8R9)
Q11 = Ql0Q7
= Q7(1- R 1(1- Q2Q3)R9 )
= Q 7(1- R1R9+ R 1R Q2Q3) = Q7(1- R 1R8R9)
R9 is evaluated by applying the binomial distribution to = Q7(1- R 1(1- Q2Q3)R9 )
components 4, 5 and 6. = Q 7(1- R1R9+ R 1R Q2Q3)
If R4 = R5 = R6 = R and Q4= Q5 = Q6 , then .6 ‫ و‬5 ‫ و‬4 ‫ ﻣن ﺧﻼل ﺗطﺑﯾﻖ اﻟﺗوزﯾﻊ ذي اﻟﺣدﯾن ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻣﻛوﻧﺎت‬R9 ‫ﯾﺗم ﺗﻘﯾﯾم‬
R9 =R3 +3R2Q If R4 = R5 = R6 = R and Q4= Q5 = Q6 , then
and Q9= 3RQ2 + Q3 R9 =R3 +3R2Q
If R4 ≠R5≠ R6 and Q4≠ Q5≠ Q6, then and Q9= 3RQ2 + Q3
R9 = R4R5R6+ R4R5Q6+R5R6Q4+R6R4Q5 If R4 ≠R5≠ R6 and Q4≠ Q5≠ Q6, then
and Q9= R4Q5Q6+R5Q6Q4+R6Q4Q5+Q4Q5Q6 R9 = R4R5R6+ R4R5Q6+R5R6Q4+R6R4Q5
In the special case when all components have a reliability of 0.8 and Q9= R4Q5Q6+R5Q6Q4+R6Q4Q5+Q4Q5Q6
R9 = 0.8960, Q9=0.1040 and Q11 = 0.06237 0.8 ‫ﻓﻲ اﻟﺣﺎﻟﺔ اﻟﺧﺎﺻﺔ ﻋﻧدﻣﺎ ﺗﻛون ﺟﻣﯾﻊ اﻟﻣﻛوﻧﺎت ﻣوﺛوﻗﯾﺗﮭﺎ‬
R9 = 0.8960, Q9=0.1040 and Q11 = 0.06237
B- A series system has 10 identical components. If the
overall system reliability must be at least 0.99, what is
the minimum reliability required of each component?
from this equation99
n n
Rs= ∏ Ri
i=1
0.99=R10
i.e. R=0.991/10 =.09989
C- The system shown in Fig.Q12 is made up of ten
components. Components 3, 4 and 5 are not identical
and at least one component of this group must be
available for system success. Components 8, 9 and 10
are identical and for this particular group it is necessary
that two out of the three components functions
satisfactorily for system success.
1-Write an expression for the system reliability in terms of
the R values given.
2- Also evaluate the system reliability if the reliability of
each component = 0.8. 98
Fig. Q12
In parallel system P(A U B) = P(A)+P(B)- P(A)· P(B)
In series system P(A ∩ B) = P(A) . P(B)
1- Rs =12R5-17R6 + 13R8-9R9+2R10
2- Rs = 0.663538893
Question Two
A- Evaluate the reliability of the system shown in Fig.Q21
using conditional probability and cut set methods if each
component has a reliability of 0.99 111
fig.Q21
‫ إذا ﻛﺎن ﯾﺟب أن ﺗﻛون ﻣوﺛوﻗﯾﺔ‬.‫ ﻣﻛوﻧﺎت ﻣﺗطﺎﺑﻘﺔ‬10 ‫ﯾﺣﺗوي ﻧظﺎم اﻟﺳﻠﺳﻠﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ‬
‫ ﻓﻣﺎ ھو اﻟﺣد اﻷدﻧﻰ ﻣن اﻟﻣوﺛوﻗﯾﺔ اﻟﻣطﻠوﺑﺔ ﻟﻛل‬، ‫ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻷﻗل‬0.99 ‫اﻟﻧظﺎم اﻹﺟﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ‬
‫ﻣﻛون؟‬
‫ﻣن ھذه اﻟﻣﻌﺎدﻟﺔ‬
Rs= ∏ Ri
i=1
0.99=R10
i.e. R=0.991/10 =.09989
.‫ ﻣن ﻋﺷرة ﻣﻛوﻧﺎت‬12 ‫ ﯾﺗﻛون اﻟﻧظﺎم اﻟﻣوﺿﺢ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺷﻛل‬-‫ج‬
‫ ﻏﯾر ﻣﺗطﺎﺑﻘﺔ وﯾﺟب ﺗوﻓر ﻣﻛون واﺣد ﻋﻠﻰ‬5 ‫ و‬4 ‫ و‬3 ‫اﻟﻣﻛوﻧﺎت‬
10 ‫ و‬9 ‫ و‬8 ‫ اﻟﻣﻛوﻧﺎت‬.‫اﻷﻗل ﻣن ھذه اﻟﻣﺟﻣوﻋﺔ ﻟﻧﺟﺎح اﻟﻧظﺎم‬
‫ ﻣن اﻟﺿروري أن ﯾﻌﻣل‬، ‫ وﺑﺎﻟﻧﺳﺑﺔ ﻟﮭذه اﻟﻣﺟﻣوﻋﺔ ﺑﺎﻟذات‬، ‫ﻣﺗطﺎﺑﻘﺔ‬
.‫اﺛﻧﺎن ﻣن اﻟﻣﻛوﻧﺎت اﻟﺛﻼﺛﺔ ﺑﺷﻛل ﻣرض ﻟﻧﺟﺎح اﻟﻧظﺎم‬
.‫ اﻟﻣﻌطﺎة‬R ‫ﺗﻌﺑﯾرا ﻋن ﻣوﺛوﻗﯾﺔ اﻟﻧظﺎم ﻣن ﺣﯾث ﻗﯾم‬
ً ‫ اﻛﺗب‬-1
0.8 = ‫ أﯾﺿﺎ ﻗﯾﯾم ﻣوﺛوﻗﯾﺔ اﻟﻧظﺎم إذا ﻛﺎﻧت ﻣوﺛوﻗﯾﺔ ﻛل ﻣﻛون‬- 2
Fig. Q12
1- Rs =12R5-17R6 + 13R8-9R9+2R10
2- Rs = 0.663538893
Question Two
‫ ﺑﺎﺳﺗﺧدام اﻻﺣﺗﻣﺎل اﻟﺷرطﻲ وطرق‬21 ‫ ﺗﻘﯾﯾم ﻣوﺛوﻗﯾﺔ اﻟﻧظﺎم اﻟﻣوﺿﺢ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺷﻛل‬-‫أ‬
.0.99 ‫ﺿﺑط اﻟﻣﺟﻣوﻋﺔ إذا ﻛﺎن ﻟﻛل ﻣﻛون ﻣوﺛوﻗﯾﺔ‬
fig.Q21
(a) Conditional probability method
It was previously noted that any component can be selected to
initiate the analysis. Judicious selection can reduce the effort
required to obtain a solution. The selection of component F
reduces the original system to the two subsystems shown in
fig.Q21-1b and fig.Q21-1c. Although Figure 5.5c now consists of
series/parallel components, fig.Q21-1b does not, and this
fig.Q21-1Sequential reduction using conditional probability
subsystem must be further decomposed. The selection of
component A to be considered 'good' and 'bad' produces the two
subsystems shown in fig.Q21-1d and fig.Q21-1e. In the case of
fig.Q21-1d, components Band 0 do not appear because, when A
is 'good', the signal reaches E irrespective whether Band D are
good or bad and therefore they become irrelevant. The reliability
of the system can now be deduced as follows:
Rs = Rs(if F is good) RF+ Rs(if F is bad) QF
Rs(if F is bad) = 1-(1- RBRDRE)(1- RARC)
Rs(if F is good) = Rs(if A is good) RA + Rs(if A is bad) QA
Rs(if A is good) = 1 - QCQE
Rs(if A is bad) = RBRDRE
substituting gives
Rs = [(1- QCQE)RA+ RBRDREQA]RF
+ [1- (1- RBRDRE)(1- RARC]QF
substituting numerical values gives
Rs = 0.999602 and Qs = 0.000398
(b) Cut set method Using visual inspection or one of the two
methods described in Section 5.3.4, the minimal cut sets of the
network shown in Figure 5.4 are (AB), (AD), (AE), (CE), (BCF)
and (CDF). Evaluation of the precise value of system reliability
using the rigorous techniques described in Section 5.3.2becomes
‫أ( طرﯾﻘﺔ اﻻﺣﺗﻣﺎل اﻟﺷرطﻲ‬
‫ ﯾﻣﻛن أن ﯾﻘﻠل‬.‫وﻗد ﻟوﺣظ ﺳﺎﺑﻘًﺎ أﻧﮫ ﯾﻣﻛن اﺧﺗﯾﺎر أي ﻣﻛون ﻟﺑدء اﻟﺗﺣﻠﯾل‬
‫ ﯾؤدي ﺗﺣدﯾد اﻟﻣﻛون‬.‫اﻻﺧﺗﯾﺎر اﻟﺣﻛﯾم ﻣن اﻟﺟﮭد اﻟﻣطﻠوب ﻟﻠﺣﺻول ﻋﻠﻰ ﺣل‬
‫إﻟﻰ ﺗﻘﻠﯾل اﻟﻧظﺎم اﻷﺻﻠﻲ إﻟﻰ اﻟﻧظﺎﻣﯾن اﻟﻔرﻋﯾﯾن اﻟﻣوﺿﺣﯾن ﻓﻲ اﻟﺷﻛﻠﯾن‬F
‫ ج ﯾﺗﻛون اﻵن‬5.5 ‫ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟرﻏم ﻣن أن اﻟﺷﻛل‬fig.Q21-1c. ‫و‬Q21-1b
‫ وھذا‬، ‫ ﻻ‬Q21-1b ‫ ﻓﺈن اﻟﺷﻛل‬، ‫ ﻣﺗوازﯾﺔ‬/ ‫ﻣن ﻣﻛوﻧﺎت ﻣﺗﺳﻠﺳﻠﺔ‬
‫ اﻟﺣد اﻷدﻧﻰ ﺑﺎﺳﺗﺧدام اﻻﺣﺗﻣﺎل اﻟﺷرطﻲ‬fig.Q21-1
"‫ ﯾﻧﺗﺞ ﻋن اﺧﺗﯾﺎر اﻟﻣﻛون "أ" "ﺟﯾد" و "ﺳﻲء‬.‫ﯾﺟب أن ﺗﺗﺣﻠل اﻟﻧظﺎم اﻟﻔرﻋﻲ‬
‫ ﻓﻲ ﺣﺎﻟﺔ‬.fig.Q21-1e ‫ و‬Q21-1d ‫اﻟﻧظﺎﻣﺎن اﻟﻔرﻋﯾﺎن اﻟﻣوﺿﺣﺎن ﻓﻲ اﻟﺷﻛﻠﯾن‬
، ‫" ﺟﯾدة‬A" ‫ ﻷﻧﮫ ﻋﻧدﻣﺎ ﺗﻛون‬Band 0 ‫ ﻻ ﺗظﮭر اﻟﻣﻛوﻧﺎت‬، Q21-1d ‫اﻟﺷﻛل‬
‫ ﺟﯾدًا أو ﺳﯾﺋًﺎ وﺑﺎﻟﺗﺎﻟﻲ‬D ‫ ﺑﻐض اﻟﻧظر ﻋﻣﺎ إذا ﻛﺎن اﻟﻧطﺎق‬E ‫ﺗﺻل اﻹﺷﺎرة إﻟﻰ‬
:‫ ﯾﻣﻛن اﻵن اﺳﺗﻧﺗﺎج ﻣوﺛوﻗﯾﺔ اﻟﻧظﺎم ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻧﺣو اﻟﺗﺎﻟﻲ‬.‫ﯾﺻﺑﺢ ﻏﯾر ذي ﺻﻠﺔ‬
Rs = Rs(if F is good) RF+ Rs(if F is bad) QF
Rs(if F is bad) = 1-(1- RBRDRE)(1- RARC)
Rs(if F is good) = Rs(if A is good) RA + Rs(if A is bad) QA
Rs(if A is good) = 1 - QCQE
Rs(if A is bad) = RBRDRE
‫اﻻﺳﺗﺑدل ﯾﻌطﻲ‬
Rs = [(1- QCQE)RA+ RBRDREQA]RF
+ [1- (1- RBRDRE)(1- RARC]QF
‫اﺳﺗﺑدال اﻟﻘﯾم اﻟﻌددﯾﺔ ﯾﻌطﻲ‬
Rs = 0.999602 and Qs = 0.000398
‫)ب( طرﯾﻘﺔ اﻟﻣﺟﻣوﻋﺔ اﻟﻣﻘطوﻋﺔ ﺑﺎﺳﺗﺧدام اﻟﻔﺣص اﻟﺑﺻري أو أﺣد اﻟطرﯾﻘﺗﯾن‬
‫ ﻓﺈن ﻣﺟﻣوﻋﺎت اﻟﻘطﻊ اﻟدﻧﯾﺎ ﻟﻠﺷﺑﻛﺔ اﻟﻣوﺿﺣﺔ ﻓﻲ‬، 5.3.4 ‫اﻟﻣوﺿﺣﺗﯾن ﻓﻲ اﻟﻘﺳم‬
‫ ﺗﻘﯾﯾم اﻟﻘﯾﻣﺔ‬.(CDF) ‫(( و‬BCF ،(CE) ،(AE) ،(AD) ،AB) ) ‫ ھﻲ‬5.4 ‫اﻟﺷﻛل‬
، 5.3.2 ‫اﻟدﻗﯾﻘﺔ ﻟﻣوﺛوﻗﯾﺔ اﻟﻧظﺎم ﺑﺎﺳﺗﺧدام اﻟﺗﻘﻧﯾﺎت اﻟﺻﺎرﻣﺔ اﻟﻣوﺿﺣﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻘﺳم‬
very tedious using hand calculations since in the case of this 6 ‫وھﻲ ﻣﻣﻠﺔ ﻟﻠﻐﺎﯾﺔ ﺑﺎﺳﺗﺧدام اﻟﺣﺳﺎﺑﺎت اﻟﯾدوﯾﺔ ﻷﻧﮫ ﻓﻲ ﺣﺎﻟﺔ ھذا اﻟﻧظﺎم ﻣﻊ‬
system with 6 cuts; the number of terms in the exact equation is ‫ ﯾﻌد ﺗﻣرﯾﻧًﺎ‬، ‫ وﻣﻊ ذﻟك‬.63 ‫ﺗﺧﻔﯾﺿﺎت ؛ ﻋدد اﻟﻣﺻطﻠﺣﺎت ﻓﻲ اﻟﻣﻌﺎدﻟﺔ اﻟدﻗﯾﻘﺔ ھو‬
63. However, it is a useful and logical exercise to deduce all 63
‫ واﻟﺗﺄﻛﯾد ﻋﻠﻰ أن اﻟﻧﺗﯾﺟﺔ ﻣﻣﺎﺛﻠﺔ‬63 ‫ﻣﻔﯾدًا وﻣﻧطﻘﯾًﺎ ﻻﺳﺗﻧﺗﺎج ﻛل اﻟﻣﺻطﻠﺣﺎت اﻟـ‬
terms and confirm that the result is identical to that obtained
using the conditional probability approach. The results obtained ‫ اﻟﻧﺗﺎﺋﺞ اﻟﺗﻲ ﺗم‬.‫ﻟﺗﻠك اﻟﺗﻲ ﺗم اﻟﺣﺻول ﻋﻠﯾﮭﺎ ﺑﺎﺳﺗﺧدام ﻧﮭﺞ اﻻﺣﺗﻣﺎل اﻟﺷرطﻲ‬
using the suggested approximations are as follows: Consider ً‫ ﺧذ ﺑﻌﯾن اﻻﻋﺗﺑﺎر أوﻻ‬:‫اﻟﺣﺻول ﻋﻠﯾﮭﺎ ﺑﺎﺳﺗﺧدام اﻟﺗﻘدﯾرات اﻟﻣﻘﺗرﺣﺔ ھﻲ ﻛﻣﺎ ﯾﻠﻲ‬
first the result that will be obtained if only second order events ‫اﻟﻧﺗﯾﺟﺔ اﻟﺗﻲ ﺳﯾﺗم اﻟﺣﺻول ﻋﻠﯾﮭﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺣﺎﻟﺔ اﺳﺗﺧدام أﺣداث اﻟﺗرﺗﯾب اﻟﺛﺎﻧﻲ ﻓﻘط‬
are used and the evaluation is reduced to one of summating the :‫ ﻓﻲ ھذه اﻟﺣﺎﻟﺔ‬.‫وﺗﻘﻠﯾل اﻟﺗﻘﯾﯾم إﻟﻰ ﻧﺗﯾﺟﺔ ﻟﺗﻠﺧﯾص اﻻﺣﺗﻣﺎﻻت اﻟﻣﻘطوﻋﺔ‬
cut probabilities. In this case:
Qs = QAQB+ QAQD+ QAQE+ QCQE Qs = QAQB+ QAQD+ QAQE+ QCQE
=0.000400 =0.000400
Rs = 0.999600 Rs = 0.999600
i.e., an imprecision of +0.5% is introduced in the value of ٪0.0002- ‫ ﺑﻘﯾﻣﺔ ﻋدم اﻟﻣوﺛوﻗﯾﺔ وﯾﺗم ﺗﻘدﯾم‬٪0.5 + ‫ﻣﻌﻧﻰ أﻧﮫ ﯾﺗم ﺗﻘدﯾم دﻗﺔ‬
unreliability and -0.0002% is introduced in the value of ‫ ﻓﻛر اﻵن ﻓﻲ اﻟﻧﺗﯾﺟﺔ اﻟﺗﻲ ﺳﯾﺗم اﻟﺣﺻول ﻋﻠﯾﮭﺎ إذا ﺗم‬.‫ﻓﻲ ﻗﯾﻣﺔ اﻟﻣوﺛوﻗﯾﺔ‬
reliability. Consider now the result that will be obtained if all of ‫ﻣﻘﺻورا ﻣرة أﺧرى ﻋﻠﻰ واﺣد ﻣن‬ ‫اﺳﺗﺧدام ﺟﻣﯾﻊ اﻟﺗﺧﻔﯾﺿﺎت وﻛﺎن اﻟﺗﻘﯾﯾم‬
ً
the cuts are used and the evaluation is again limited to one of
‫ ﻓﻲ ھذه اﻟﺣﺎﻟﺔ‬.‫ﺗﻠﺧﯾص اﺣﺗﻣﺎﻻت اﻟﺧﻔض‬
summating the cut probabilities. In this case
Qs = QAQB+ QAQD+ QAQE+ QCQE+ QBQCQp+ QCQDQp Qs = QAQB+ QAQD+ QAQE+ QCQE+ QB QC Qp + QC QD Qp
= 0.000402 (upper bound to system unreliability) = 0.000402 (‫)اﻟﻌﻠوي ﻣﻠزﻣﺔ ﻟﻌدم ﻣوﺛوﻗﯾﺔ اﻟﻧظﺎم‬
Rs = 0.999598 Rs = 0.999598
i.e., the imprecisions are +1.0% and -0.0004% in the values of ‫ ﻓﻲ ﻗﯾم ﻋدم اﻟﻣوﺛوﻗﯾﺔ‬٪0.0004- ‫ و‬٪1.0 + ‫ﺑﻣﻌﻧﻰ أن ﻗﯾم ﻋدم اﻟدﻗﺔ ھﻲ‬
unreliability and reliability respectively. If the three sets of
‫ ﻓﺈن‬، ‫ إذا ﺗﻣت ﻣﻘﺎرﻧﺔ ﻣﺟﻣوﻋﺎت اﻟﻧﺗﺎﺋﺞ اﻟﺛﻼﺛﺔ‬.‫واﻟﻣوﺛوﻗﯾﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺗواﻟﻲ‬
results are compared, the minimal cut set method, even with the
approximations, gives results that are sufficiently precise for ‫ ﺗﻌطﻲ ﻧﺗﺎﺋﺞ دﻗﯾﻘﺔ ﺑﻣﺎ ﻓﯾﮫ‬، ‫ ﺣﺗﻰ ﻣﻊ اﻟﺗﻘرﯾب‬، ‫طرﯾﻘﺔ اﻟﺣد اﻷدﻧﻰ ﻟﻠﺿﺑط‬
most applications. The magnitude of the imprecision decreases ‫ ﯾﺗﻧﺎﻗص ﺣﺟم ﻋدم اﻟدﻗﺔ ﺑﺷﻛل ﻣﻠﺣوظ ﻣﻊ زﯾﺎدة‬.‫اﻟﻛﻔﺎﯾﺔ ﻟﻣﻌظم اﻟﺗطﺑﯾﻘﺎت‬
significantly as the component reliabilities increase and can be ‫ إﻟﻰ ﻗﯾﻣﺔ ﺿﺋﯾﻠﺔ إذا‬، ‫ ﺣﺗﻰ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻣﺛﺎل اﻟﺣﺎﻟﻲ‬، ‫ﻣوﺛوﻗﯾﺔ اﻟﻣﻛون وﯾﻣﻛن ﺗﻘﻠﯾﻠﮫ‬
decreased, even in the present example, to a negligible value if
the probabilities of two cuts occurring simultaneously, P(C1
P (C1 ، ‫ﺗم ﺗﺿﻣﯾن اﺣﺗﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ ﺣدوث ﻋﻣﻠﯾﺗﯾن ﻟﻠﺗﺧﻔﯾﺿﺎت ﻓﻲ وﻗت واﺣد‬
∩C2) etc., are included. In the present example this would ‫ ﻣﺻطﻠ ًﺣﺎ‬15 ‫ ﻗد ﯾؤدي ھذا إﻟﻰ إدﺧﺎل‬، ‫ ﻓﻲ ھذا اﻟﻣﺛﺎل‬.‫∩وﻣﺎ إﻟﻰ ذﻟك‬C2)
introduce 15 further terms in the equation of system unreliability ‫إﺿﺎﻓﯾًﺎ ﻓﻲ ﻣﻌﺎدﻟﺔ ﻋدم ﻣوﺛوﻗﯾﺔ اﻟﻧظﺎم وﺗﻘﻠﯾل ﻗﯾم ﻋدم اﻟﻣوﺛوﻗﯾﺔ ﻟﻠﺗﻘرﯾرﯾن‬
and reduce the values of unreliability for the two approximations
‫ )اﻟﺣد اﻷدﻧﻰ ﻟﻌدم ﻣوﺛوﻗﯾﺔ اﻟﻧظﺎم( و‬0.000396 ‫اﻟﻠذﯾن ﺗم إﺟراؤھﻣﺎ ﻟـ‬
made to 0.000396 (lower bound to system unreliability) and
0.000398, respectively ‫ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺗواﻟﻲ‬، 0.000398
B- Consider the cooling system of the continuous process ‫ اﻟﻨﻈﺮ ﻧﻈﺎم اﻟﺘ ﺪ ﻟﻤﺤﻄﺔ اﻟﻤﻌﺎﻟﺠﺔ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻤﺮة اﻟﻤﻮﺿﺤﺔ ﺸ ﻞ ﺗﺨﻄ‬-‫ب‬
plant shown schematically in Fig.Q22 and the ‫ وﺗﺴﻠﺴﻞ اﻷﺣﺪاث اﻟ ﻗﺪ ﺗﺘﺒﻊ اﻧﻘﻄﺎﻋﺎ اﻷﻧﺒﻮب اﻟﻤﺴﺘﺨﺪم ﻋﺎدة‬22 ‫اﻟﺸ ﻞ‬
sequence of events that may follow a break in the pipe
normally used to supply the cooling water (initiating ‫ ﻳﺆدي ﻓﻘﺪ ﺎﺷﻒ اﻟﺘﺪﻓﻖ‬، ‫ ﻋﻨﺪﻣﺎ ﺤﺪث ﻫﺬا‬.(‫ﻟ و ﺪ ﻣ ﺎە اﻟﺘ ﺪ )ﺣﺪث اﻟ ﺪء‬
event). When this happens a loss of flow detector D ‫ ﺿﻊ اﻋﺘ ﺎرك أن ﻠﺘﺎ‬.P2 ‫ و‬P1 ‫ إ ﺸﻐ ﻞ اﻟﻤﻀﺨﺎت اﻟ ﺗﻌﻤﻞ ﺎﻟ ﻬ ﺎء‬D
causes both electrically driven pumps P1 and P2 to
operate. Consider that both pumps are required for ‫ وﻣﻀﺨﺔ واﺣﺪة ﻟﻨﺠﺎح اﻟﻨﻈﺎم‬، ٪100 ‫اﻟﻤﻀﺨﺘ ﻣﻄﻠ ﺘﺎن ﻟﻨﺠﺎح اﻟﻨﻈﺎم ﺑﻨﺴ ﺔ‬
100% system success, 1 pump for 50% system success ‫ اﺳﺘﻨﺘﺞ ﺷﺠﺮة‬.‫ و ﺤﺪث ﻫﺬا اﻟﻔﺸﻞ إذا ﻓﺸﻠﺖ اﻟﻤﻀﺨﺎت اﻟﻌﻤﻞ‬، ٪50 ‫ﺑﻨﺴ ﺔ‬
and that failure occurs if both pumps fail to operate.
Deduce the event tree of the system, the probability of ‫أﺣﺪاث اﻟﻨﻈﺎم واﺣﺘﻤﺎل ﻞ ﻧ ﺠﺔ ﻟﻠﻨﻈﺎم إذا ﺎﻧﺖ ﺟﻤﻴﻊ اﻟﻤﻜﻮﻧﺎت واﻷﻧﻈﻤﺔ‬
each system outcome if all components and subsystems ‫ وﻣﺠﻤﻮﻋﺎت اﻟﻘﻄﻊ اﻟﺪﻧ ﺎ اﻟ ﺗﺆدي إ‬0.99 ‫اﻟﻔﺮﻋ ﺔ ﻟﺪﻳﻬﺎ اﺣﺘﻤﺎل ﻧﺠﺎح ﻗﺪرە‬
have a success probability of 0.99 and the minimal cut
sets leading to partial and complete system failure. 127 .‫ﻓﺸﻞ ﺟﺰ و ﺎﻣﻞ ﻟﻠﻨﻈﺎم‬

Fig.Q22
Fig.Q22
 Fig. Q22-1 Complete event tree
Fig. Q22-2 Reduced event tree. X, terminated paths
Since the complete emergency cooling system fails if either the
electric power fails or the detector fails, the complete event tree
can be reduced to that shown in Figure 5.13 in which only 6
paths of the original 16 are required. A further reduction in
storage can be achieved by gnoring those paths leading to
complete system failure and terminating he paths at the points
shown in Figure 5.13. This leaves only 3 paths to be stored. The
system outcome associated with each path whichever tree s
constructed must be deduced from an engineering knowledge of
the system operational requirements. These outcomes are shown
in Figures 5.12 and 5.13 as complete success (S), partial success
(P) and complete failure (F).
From Figure 5.13
P(system success) = P(EP) . P(D) . P(P1) . P(P2)
which, if all success probabilities are 0.99 gives
P(system success) = 0.994 = 0.960596
Similarly
P(partial success) = P(EP) . P(D) . P(P1) . Q(P2)+P(EP) . P(D)
. Q(P1) . P(P2)
which, if all success probabilities are 0.99 gives:
P(partial success) = 2 x 0.993 x 0.01 = 0.019406
Finally
P(system failure) =P(EP) . P(D). Q(P1). Q(P2)+P(EP). Q(D)
+Q(EP)
Alternatively
‫ ﺷﺠﺮة اﻟﺤﺪث اﻟ ﺎﻣﻠﺔ‬Q22-1 ‫ﺻﻮرة‬
‫ ﻣﺴﺎرات ﻣﻨﺘﻬ ﺔ‬، X .‫ ﺷﺠﺮة ﺣﺪث ﻣﺨﻔﻀﺔ‬Q22-2 ‫ﺻﻮرة‬
‫ﻧﻈﺮا ﻟﺘﻌﻄﻞ ﻧﻈﺎم اﻟﺘ ﺪ اﻟ ﺎﻣﻞ ﻟﻠﻄﻮارئ ﺣﺎﻟﺔ ﺗﻌﻄﻞ اﻟﻄﺎﻗﺔ اﻟ ﻬ ﺎﺋ ﺔ أو ﻓﺸﻞ‬
‫ ﻤﻜﻦ ﺗﻘﻠ ﻞ ﺷﺠﺮة اﻷﺣﺪاث اﻟ ﺎﻣﻠﺔ إ ﺗﻠﻚ اﻟﻤﻮﺿﺤﺔ اﻟﺸ ﻞ‬، ‫اﻟﻤﻜﺸﺎف‬
‫ ﻤﻜﻦ ﺗﺤﻘﻴﻖ ﺗﺨﻔ ﺾ‬. ‫ اﻷﺻ‬16 ‫ ﻣﺴﺎرات ﻣﻦ‬6 ‫ واﻟ ﻻ ﻠﺰم ﻓﻴﻬﺎ ﺳﻮى‬5.13
‫اﻟﺘﺨ ﻦ ﻣﻦ ﺧﻼل ﺗﺤﺪ ﺪ اﻟﻤﺴﺎرات اﻟ ﺗﺆدي إ ﻓﺸﻞ اﻟﻨﻈﺎم ﺎﻟ ﺎﻣﻞ‬ ‫إﺿﺎ‬
‫ ﻣﺴﺎرات ﻟﻴﺘﻢ‬3 ‫ ﻫﺬا ﻳ ك ﻓﻘﻂ‬.5.13 ‫و ﻧﻬﺎﺋﻪ ﻋﻨﺪ اﻟﻨﻘﺎط اﻟﻤﻮﺿﺤﺔ اﻟﺸ ﻞ‬
‫ﻞ ﻣﺴﺎر أ ﺎ ﺎﻧﺖ اﻟﺸﺠﺮة اﻟﻤﺸ ﺪة‬ ‫ﺠﺐ اﺳ ﻨﺘﺎج ﻧﺎﺗﺞ اﻟﻨﻈﺎم اﻟﻤﺮﺗ ﻂ‬.‫ﺗﺨ ﻨﻬﺎ‬
‫وﺗﻈﻬﺮ ﻫﺬە اﻟﻨﺘﺎﺋﺞ اﻟﺸ ﻠ‬ .‫ﻣﻦ ﻣﻌﺮﻓﺔ ﻫﻨﺪﺳ ﺔ ﺎﻟﻤﺘﻄﻠ ﺎت اﻟﺘﺸﻐ ﻠ ﺔ ﻟﻠﻨﻈﺎم‬
.(F) ‫( وﻓﺸﻞ ﺗﺎم‬P) ‫ ﻧﺠﺎح ﺟﺰ‬، (S) ‫ ﻋ أﻧﻬﺎ ﻧﺠﺎح ﺎﻣﻞ‬5.13 ‫ و‬5.12
5.13 ‫ﻣﻦ اﻟﺸ ﻞ‬
P = (‫ )ﻧﺠﺎح اﻟﻨﻈﺎم‬P (EP .(‫ ف )د‬.(P (P1). P (P2)
‫ ﻌ‬0.99 ‫ إذا ﺎﻧﺖ ﻞ اﺣﺘﻤﺎﻻت اﻟﻨﺠﺎح‬، ‫واﻟ‬
P0.960596 = 0.994 = (‫)ﻧﺠﺎح اﻟﻨﻈﺎم‬
‫و ﺎﻟﻤﺜﻞ‬
P = ( ‫ )ﻧﺠﺎح ﺟﺰ‬P (EP .(‫ ف )د‬.(P (P1). Q (P2) + P (EP). P (D(
.Q (P1). P (P2(
:0.99 ‫ إذا ﺎﻧﺖ ﺟﻤﻴﻊ اﺣﺘﻤﺎﻻت اﻟﻨﺠﺎح‬، ‫واﻟ‬
P0.019406 = 0.01 × 0.993 × 2 = ( ‫)ﻧﺠﺎح ﺟﺰ‬
‫أﺧ ا‬
P = (‫ )ﻓﺸﻞ اﻟﻨﻈﺎم‬P (EP). P (D). Q (P1). Q (P2) + P (EP). Q (D(
+Q (EP(
= 0.992X 0.012+0.99 x 0.01 +0.01
=0.019998
P{system failure) = l-[P{system success) + P{partial success)]
=0.019998
The results are the probabilities of the various outcomes given
that the pipe break occurs. If required, they could be weighted by
the probability of a pipe break and its complement to give the
overall system outcome
probabilities. The cut sets leading to partial system success can
be deduced by enumerating the failed components in the paths
leading to partial system success, i.e. paths 2 and 3 of Figure
5.13. This enumeration gives two first order minimal cut sets for
partial system success, these being P1,P2 The cut sets leading to
total system failure can be deduced by analyzing the tie sets of
the paths leading to system success and partial system success,
i.e., paths 1, 2 and 3 of Figure 5.13 or enumerating the failed
components in the paths leading to "~omplete system failure, i.e.,
paths 4, 5 and 6 of Figure 5.13. Either method would give the
following minimal cut sets: EP, D, (P1 and P2) In Example 5.6,
it is assumed that only one detector is used to determine when
the normal coolant supply fails. In practice however more than
one detector is likely to be used, e.g., one or more flow detectors
may be used together with one or more temperature sensors.
This does not cause any increase in conceptual complexity
although it does increase the amount of analysis. Two methods
for solving the problem can be implemented. The first method
considers each component separately and the system event tree
is constructed with each component identified in the event tree.
This clearly increases the number of sequences considered in the
tree and produces a much larger number of system paths. The
technique is however identical to that described previously.
Whether any given path of this enhanced tree leads to system
success, partial success or failure depends on the operational
requirements of the detectors, e.g., system success may occur if
one detector is successful, if all detectors are required to work or
if only a certain number between these extremes are required. In
all cases, the appropriate paths can be traced through the tree. In
the second method, the detectors are grouped together to form a
subsystem and the event tree is constructed in terms of this
subsystem only. The system event tree is therefore identical to
that shown in Figures 5.12 and 5.13 but the probability of
success of the subsystem representing the detectors must be
evaluated as a separate exercise. This can be done either from
basic probability laws, from an event tree constructed just for the
subsystem being considered or from a fault tree analysis, the
latter being the subject of Section 5.8. The above discussion
concerning detectors is equally applicable to any part of the
system that contains one or more components, e.g., the electric
power supply which may consist of the normal AC. Supply
together with standby batteries or emergency generators.
Question Three
A- A simple electronic circuit consists of 6 transistors each
having a failure rate of 10-6 f/hr, 4 diodes each having a
failure rate of 0.5 x 10-6 f/hr, 3 capacitors each having a
failure rate of 0.2 x 10-6 f/hr, 10 resistors each having a
failure rate of
5 x 10-6 f/hr and 2 switches each having a failure rate
of 2 x 10-6 f/hr. Assuming connectors and wiring are
‫ﺪﻻ ﻣﻦ ذﻟﻚ‬
0.992 =X 0.012 + 0.99 × 0.01 +0.01
0.019998 =
P = (‫ }ﻓﺸﻞ اﻟﻨﻈﺎم‬l- [P + (‫ }ﻧﺠﺎح اﻟﻨﻈﺎم‬P[( ‫}ﻧﺠﺎح ﺟﺰ‬
0.019998 =
‫ إذا ﻟﺰم‬.‫اﻟﻨﺘﺎﺋﺞ اﻟﻤﺨﺘﻠﻔﺔ ﺎﻟﻨﻈﺮ إ ﺣﺪوث ﻛ اﻷﻧﺎﺑ ﺐ‬ ‫ﺋﺞ اﺣﺘﻤﺎﻻت‬ ‫اﻟﻨﺘﺎ‬
‫ ﻤﻜﻦ ﺗﺮﺟ ﺤﻬﻢ ﺎﺣﺘﻤﺎﻟ ﺔ اﻧﻘﻄﺎع اﻷﻧﺎﺑ ﺐ و ﻤﺎﻟﻬﺎ ﻹﻋﻄﺎء اﻟﻨ ﺠﺔ اﻟ ﻠ ﺔ‬، ‫اﻷﻣﺮ‬
‫ﻟﻠﻨﻈﺎم‬
‫ ﻤﻜﻦ اﺳ ﻨﺘﺎج ﻣﺠﻤﻮﻋﺎت اﻟﻘﻄﻊ اﻟﻤﺆد ﺔ إ ﻧﺠﺎح ﺟﺰ ﻟﻠﻨﻈﺎم ﻋﻦ‬.‫اﻻﺣﺘﻤﺎﻻت‬
، ‫ﻃ ﻖ ﺗﻌﺪاد اﻟﻤﻜﻮﻧﺎت اﻟﻔﺎﺷﻠﺔ اﻟﻤﺴﺎرات اﻟ ﺗﺆدي إ ﻧﺠﺎح ﺟﺰ ﻟﻠﻨﻈﺎم‬
‫ ﻌ ﻫﺬا اﻟﺘﻌﺪاد ﻣﺠﻤﻮﻋﺘ ﻣﻦ ﻗﻄﻊ‬.5.13 ‫ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺸ ﻞ‬3 ‫ و‬2 ‫أي اﻟﻤﺴﺎر ﻦ‬
‫ ﻤﻜﻦ‬.P2 ‫ و‬P1 ‫ وﻫﻤﺎ‬، ‫اﻟﺤﺪ اﻷد ﻣﻦ اﻟﺪرﺟﺔ اﻷو ﻟﻠﻨﺠﺎح اﻟﺠﺰ ﻟﻠﻨﻈﺎم‬
‫ﺗﺤﺪ ﺪ ﻣﺠﻤﻮﻋﺎت اﻟﻘﻄﻊ اﻟ ﺗﺆدي إ اﻟﻔﺸﻞ اﻟ ﻟﻠﻨﻈﺎم ﻣﻦ ﺧﻼل ﺗﺤﻠ ﻞ‬
‫ أي‬، ‫ﻣﺠﻤﻮﻋﺎت رﻂ اﻟﻤﺴﺎرات اﻟ ﺗﺆدي إ ﻧﺠﺎح اﻟﻨﻈﺎم وﻧﺠﺎح اﻟﻨﻈﺎم ﺟﺰﺋ ﺎ‬
‫ أو ﺗﻌﺪاد اﻟﻤﻜﻮﻧﺎت اﻟﻔﺎﺷﻠﺔ اﻟﻤﺴﺎرات‬5.13 ‫ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺸ ﻞ‬3 ‫ و‬2 ‫ و‬1 ‫اﻟﻤﺴﺎرات‬
.5.13 ‫ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺸ ﻞ‬6 ‫ و‬5 ‫ و‬4 ‫ أي اﻟﻤﺴﺎرات‬، ‫اﻟ ﺗﺆدي إ "~ ﻓﺸﻞ ﻧﻈﺎم ﺎﻣﻞ‬
(P2 ‫( و‬P1 ،D ،EP :‫ﻠﺘﺎ اﻟﻄ ﻘﺘ ﻣﺠﻤﻮﻋﺎت اﻟﻘﻄﻊ اﻟﺪﻧ ﺎ اﻟﺘﺎﻟ ﺔ‬ ‫وﺗﻌ‬
‫ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﻔ ض أن ﻳﺘﻢ اﺳﺘﺨﺪام ﺎﺷﻒ واﺣﺪ ﻓﻘﻂ ﻟﺘﺤﺪ ﺪ وﻗﺖ‬، 5.6 ‫اﻟﻤﺜﺎل‬
‫ وﻟ ﻦ اﻟﻤﻤﺎرﺳﺔ اﻟﻌﻤﻠ ﺔ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﺤﺘﻤﻞ‬.‫ﺗﻌﻄﻞ ﻣﻮرد ﺳﺎﺋﻞ اﻟﺘ ﺪ اﻟﻌﺎدي‬
‫ ﻤﻜﻦ اﺳﺘﺨﺪام ﺎﺷﻒ ﺗﺪﻓﻖ‬، ‫ ﻋ ﺳ ﻞ اﻟﻤﺜﺎل‬، ‫اﺳﺘﺨﺪام أ ﻣﻦ ﺎﺷﻒ واﺣﺪ‬
، ‫واﺣﺪ أو أ ﺟﻨ ﺎ إ ﺟﻨﺐ ﻣﻊ واﺣﺪ أو أ ﻣﻦ أﺟﻬﺰة اﺳ ﺸﻌﺎر درﺟﺔ اﻟﺤﺮارة‬
‫وﻫﺬا ﻻ ﺴ ﺐ أي ز ﺎدة اﻟﺘﻌﻘ ﺪ اﻟﻤﻔﺎﻫ ﻋ اﻟﺮﻏﻢ ﻣﻦ أﻧﻪ ﻳ ﺪ ﻣﻦ ﻤ ﺔ‬
‫اﻟﻄ ﻘﺔ اﻷو ﺗﻨﻈﺮ ﻞ ﻣﻜﻮن‬.‫ ﻤﻜﻦ ﺗﻨﻔ ﺬ ﻃ ﻘﺘ ﻟﺤﻞ اﻟﻤﺸ ﻠﺔ‬.‫اﻟﺘﺤﻠ ﻞ‬
.‫ ﻣﻊ ﻞ ﻣﻜﻮن ﻣﺤﺪد ﺷﺠﺮة اﻟﺤﺪث‬t ‫ﻋ ﺣﺪة وﺣ اﻟﻨﻈﺎم ﻳﺘﻢ إﻧﺸﺎء ﺷﺠﺮة‬
‫ﻳﺆدي ﻫﺬا ﺑﻮﺿ ح إ ز ﺎدة ﻋﺪد اﻟﺘﺘﺎ ﻌﺎت اﻟ ﻳﺘﻢ اﻟﻨﻈﺮ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ اﻟﺸﺠﺮة و ﻨﺘﺞ‬
.‫ﻫﺬە اﻟﺘﻘﻨ ﺔ ﻣﻄﺎ ﻘﺔ ﻟﺘﻠﻚ اﻟﻤﻮﺿﺤﺔ ﺳﺎ ﻘﺎ‬ .‫ﻋﺪدا أ ﻜﺜ ﻣﻦ ﻣﺴﺎرات اﻟﻨﻈﺎم‬
‫ ﻓﺈن‬، ‫ﺳﻮاء ﺎن أي ﻣﺴﺎر ﻣﻌ ﻣﻦ ﻫﺬە اﻟﺸﺠﺮة اﻟﻤﺤﺴﻨﺔ ﻳﺆدي إ ﻧﺠﺎح اﻟﻨﻈﺎم‬
‫ ﻋ ﺳ ﻞ‬، ‫اﻟﻨﺠﺎح اﻟﺠﺰ أو اﻟﻔﺸﻞ ﻌﺘﻤﺪ ﻋ اﻟﻤﺘﻄﻠ ﺎت اﻟ ﺸﻐ ﻠ ﺔ ﻟﻠ ﺎﺷﻔﺎت‬
‫ أو إذا ﺎن ﻣﻄﻠ ﺎ‬، ‫ ﻗﺪ ﺤﺪث ﻧﺠﺎح اﻟﻨﻈﺎم ﺣﺎﻟﺔ ﻧﺠﺎح أﺣﺪ اﻟ ﺎﺷﻔﺎت‬، ‫اﻟﻤﺜﺎل‬
‫ﻣﻦ ﺟﻤﻴﻊ اﻟ ﺎﺷﻔﺎت أن ﺗﻌﻤﻞ أو إذا ﺎن ﻣﻌﻴﻨﺎ ﻓﻘﻂ ﻋﺪد ﺑ ﻫﺬە اﻟﺤﺪود‬
‫ ﻤﻜﻦ ﺗ ﺒﻊ اﻟﻤﺴﺎرات اﻟﻤﻨﺎﺳ ﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺧﻼل‬، ‫ ﺟﻤﻴﻊ اﻟﺤﺎﻻت‬.‫اﻟﻘﺼﻮى ﻣﻄﻠ ﺔ‬
‫ ﻳﺘﻢ ﺗﺠﻤﻴﻊ أﺟﻬﺰة اﻟ ﺸﻒ ﻣﻌﺎ ﻟ ﺸﻜ ﻞ ﻧﻈﺎم ﻓﺮ‬، ‫ اﻟﻄ ﻘﺔ اﻟﺜﺎﻧ ﺔ‬.‫اﻟﺸﺠﺮة‬
‫ و ﺎﻟﺘﺎ ﻓﺈن ﺷﺠﺮة‬.‫و ﺘﻢ إﻧﺸﺎء ﺷﺠﺮة اﻷﺣﺪاث وﻓﻘﺎ ﻟﻬﺬا اﻟﻨﻈﺎم اﻟﻔﺮ ﻓﻘﻂ‬
‫ وﻟ ﻦ ﺠﺐ‬5.13 ‫ و‬5.12 ‫أﺣﺪاث اﻟﻨﻈﺎم ﻣﻤﺎﺛﻠﺔ ﻟﺘﻠﻚ اﻟﻤﻮﺿﺤﺔ اﻟﺸ ﻠ‬
‫ﺗﻘﻴ ﻢ اﺣﺘﻤﺎل ﻧﺠﺎح اﻟﻨﻈﺎم اﻟﻔﺮ اﻟﺬي ﻤﺜﻞ أﺟﻬﺰة اﻟ ﺸﻒ ﻋ أﻧﻪ ﺗﻤ ﻦ‬
‫ أو ﻣﻦ‬، ‫ﻤﻜﻦ اﻟﻘ ﺎم ﺬﻟﻚ إﻣﺎ ﻣﻦ ﺧﻼل ﻗﻮاﻧ اﻻﺣﺘﻤﺎﻻت اﻷﺳﺎﺳ ﺔ‬.‫ﻣﻨﻔﺼﻞ‬
‫ﺷﺠﺮة ﺣﺪث ﺗﻢ إﻧﺸﺎؤﻫﺎ ﻓﻘﻂ ﻟﻠﻨﻈﺎم اﻟﻔﺮ اﻟﺬي ﻳﺘﻢ اﻟﻨﻈﺮ ﻓ ﻪ أو ﻣﻦ ﺗﺤﻠ ﻞ‬
‫ ﺗﻨﻄﺒﻖ اﻟﻤﻨﺎﻗﺸﺔ أﻋﻼە اﻟﻤﺘﻌﻠﻘﺔ‬.5.8 ‫ واﻷﺧ ﻫﻮ ﻣﻮﺿ ع اﻟﻘﺴﻢ‬، ‫ﺷﺠﺮة اﻟﺨﻄﺄ‬
‫ ﻋ‬، ‫ﺎﻟ ﺎﺷﻔﺎت أ ﻀﺎ ﻋ أي ﺟﺰء ﻣﻦ اﻟﻨﻈﺎم ﺤﺘﻮي ﻋ ﻣﻜﻮن واﺣﺪ أو أ‬
‫ ﺗﻮر ﺪ‬.‫ اﻟﻌﺎدي‬AC ‫ ﻣﺰود اﻟﻄﺎﻗﺔ اﻟ ﻬ ﺎﺋ ﺔ اﻟﺬي ﻗﺪ ﻳﺘﻜﻮن ﻣﻦ‬، ‫ﺳ ﻞ اﻟﻤﺜﺎل‬
‫ﺟﻨ ﺎ إ ﺟﻨﺐ ﻣﻊ اﻟ ﻄﺎر ﺎت اﻻﺣﺘ ﺎﻃ ﺔ أو ﻣﻮﻟﺪات اﻟﻄﻮارئ‬
Question Three
‫ ﺗراﻧزﺳﺗورات ﻟﻛل‬6 ‫ ﺗﺗﻛون اﻟداﺋرة اﻹﻟﻛﺗروﻧﯾﺔ اﻟﺑﺳﯾطﺔ ﻣن‬-A
‫ اﻟﺛﻧﺎﺋﯾﺎت ﻟﻛل ﻣﻧﮭﺎ‬4 ، ‫ ﺳﺎﻋﺔ‬/ f 6-10 ‫ﻣﻧﮭﺎ ﻣﻌدل ﻋطل‬
‫ ﻣﻛﺛﻔﺎت ﻟﻛل ﻣﻧﮭﺎ‬3 ، ‫ ﺳﺎﻋﺔ‬/ f 6-10 × 0.5 ‫ﻣﻌدل ﻓﺷل‬
‫ ﻣﻘﺎوﻣﺎت ﻟﻛل‬10 ،f / hr 6 -10 × 0.2 ‫ﻣﻌدل ﻋطل ﻗدره‬
‫ﻣﻧﮭﺎ ﻣﻌدل ﻓﺷل‬
× 2 ‫ ﻣﻔﺎﺗﯾﺢ ﻟﻛل ﻣﻧﮭﺎ ﻣﻌدل ﻓﺷل‬2 ‫ و‬f / hr 6-10 × 5
 100% reliable (these can be included if considered
significant), evaluate the equivalent failure rate of the
system and the probability of the system surviving
1000 hr and also 10000 hr if all components must
operate for system success.223
from this equation
‫ ﺑﺎﻓﺗراض أن اﻟﻣوﺻﻼت واﻷﺳﻼك ﯾﻣﻛن‬.f / hr 6-10
(‫ )ﯾﻣﻛن ﺗﺿﻣﯾﻧﮭﺎ إذا ﻛﺎﻧت ھﺎﻣﺔ‬٪100 ‫اﻻﻋﺗﻣﺎد ﻋﻠﯾﮭﺎ ﺑﻧﺳﺑﺔ‬
‫ وﺗﻘﯾﯾم ﻣﻌدل اﻟﻔﺷل اﻟﻣﻛﺎﻓﺊ ﻟﻠﻧظﺎم واﺣﺗﻣﺎل ﺑﻘﺎء اﻟﻧظﺎم‬،
‫ ﺳﺎﻋﺔ إذا ﻛﺎﻧت ﺟﻣﯾﻊ اﻟﻣﻛوﻧﺎت‬10000 ‫ﺿﺎ‬ ً ‫ ﺳﺎﻋﺔ وأﯾ‬1000
.‫ﯾﺟب أن ﺗﻌﻣل ﻣن أﺟل ﻧﺟﺎح اﻟﻧظﺎم‬
‫ﻣن ھذه اﻟﻣﻌﺎدﻟﺔ‬

e =∑ e =∑

e = 6 × (1 × 10-6) +4× (0.5 × 106) +3 × (0.2× 10-6) + 10×

e = 6 × (1 × 10-6) +4× (0.5 × 106) +3 × (0.2× 10-6) + 10×
(5 × 10-6 )+2× (2× 10-6)
(5 × 10-6 )+2× (2× 10-6)
= 6.26 × 10-5 f/hr
= 6.26 × 10-5 f/hr
R.(1000) = exp (-6.26 × 10-5 × 1000)
R.(1000) = exp (-6.26 × 10-5 × 1000)
=0.9393
=0.9393
R.(10 000) = exp (-6.26 × 10-5 × 10 000)
R.(10 000) = exp (-6.26 × 10-5 × 10 000)
=0.5347
=0.5347
Since Qs (t) =1-Rs(t)
Since Qs (t) =1-Rs(t)
Qs(1000) = 0.0707
Qs(1000) = 0.0707
and Qs (10 000) = 0.4653
and Qs (10 000) = 0.4653
B- A system contains 50 identical components each of ‫ﻋﻧﺻرا ﻣﺗطﺎﺑﻘًﺎ ﻟﻛل ﻣﻧﮭﺎ ﻣﻌدل ﻓﺷل ﻗدره‬
ً 50 ‫ ﯾﺣﺗوي اﻟﻧظﺎم ﻋﻠﻰ‬-‫ب‬
which has a failure rate of 0.001 f/hr. Assuming that
‫ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻓﺗراض أن ﻓﺷل اﻟﻧظﺎم ﯾﺣدث ﻋﻧد ﻓﺷل أي‬.f / hr 0.001
system failure occurs when anyone component fails',
evaluate the system reliability for an operating period ‫ ﺳﺎﻋﺔ و‬20 ‫ ﻗم ﺑﺗﻘﯾﯾم ﻣوﺛوﻗﯾﺔ اﻟﻧظﺎم ﻟﻔﺗرة ﺗﺷﻐﯾل ﺗﺑﻠﻎ‬،" ‫ﻣﻛون‬
of 20 hr and the MTIF when no spares are available ‫ﺿﺎ ﻋﻧدﻣﺎ ﯾﺗم ﻧﻘل ﻋدد ﻣﺗﺑﺎﯾن ﻣن‬ً ‫ ﻋﻧدﻣﺎ ﻻ ﺗﺗوﻓر ﻗطﻊ ﻏﯾﺎر وأﯾ‬MTIF
and also when a varying number of spares between 1 ‫ إذا ﻛﺎن ﯾﺟب أن ﯾﻛون ﻟدى‬.‫ ﻛﺑدﯾﻠﯾن ﻓورﯾﯾن‬6 ‫ و‬1 ‫ﻗطﻊ اﻟﻐﯾﺎر ﺑﯾن‬
and 6 are carried as immediate replacements. If the
system is to have a minimum reliability of 0.9950, ‫ ﻓﻣﺎ ھو اﻟﺣد اﻷدﻧﻰ ﻟﻌدد‬، 0.9950 ‫اﻟﻧظﺎم ﺣد أدﻧﻰ ﻣن اﻟﻣوﺛوﻗﯾﺔ ﯾﺑﻠﻎ‬
what is the minimum number of spares that must be ‫ﻗطﻊ اﻟﻐﯾﺎر اﻟﺗﻲ ﯾﺟب أن ﺗﻛون ﺑدﯾﻼً ﻓورﯾًﺎ؟‬
carried as immediate replacements?237
System failure rate =N System failure rate =N
= 50x0.001 =0.05 f/hr = 50x0.001 =0.05 f/hr
R (no spares available) = e-0.05x20 R (no spares available) = e-0.05x20
=0.367879 =0.367879
R (n spares available) = e . [1 + (0.05 20) + R (n spares available) = e . [1 + (0.05 20) +
( . ) ( . ) ( . ) ( . )
+ ⋯+ ] !
+ ⋯+ !
]
! !
Table (A) Results for Q3 B System Table (A) Results for Q3 B System

system reliability MTTF ، ‫م‬

Number of spares, n R(20) MITF m,hr ‫ ن‬، ‫ﻋدد ﻗطﻊ اﻟﻐﯾﺎر‬ ‫ﻣﻮﺛﻮﻗ ﺔ اﻟﻨﻈﺎم‬
R (20) ‫ﺳﺎﻋﺔ‬
0 0.367879 20 0 0.367879 20
1 0.735759 40 1 0.735759 40
2 0.919699 60 2 0.919699 60
3 0.981012 80 3 0.981012 80
4 0.99634 100 4 0.99634 100
5 0.999406 120 5 0.999406 120
6 0.999917 140 6 0.999917 140
The solution of this equation is shown in Table 1-3B 1-3B ‫ﯾﻈﮭﺮ ﺣﻞ ھﺬه اﻟﻤﻌﺎدﻟﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺠﺪول‬
for n =0, 1,2, ... , 6. for n =0, 1,2, ... , 6.
Also m (no spares available) = Also m (no spares available) =
= =20hr = =20hr
. .

and m (n spares available .) = and m (n spares available .) =

 = =
. .
0.05The solution of this equation is also shown in Table 1 = n ‫ ﺑﺎﻟﻧﺳﺑﺔ إﻟﻰ‬1-3B‫ ﯾظﮭر ﺣل ھذه اﻟﻣﻌﺎدﻟﺔ أﯾﺿًﺎ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺟدول‬0.05
for n = 0,1,2, ... ,6. It can be seen from Table 1-3B that the ‫ أن ﻋدد ﻗطﻊ اﻟﻐﯾﺎر ﯾﺟب أن‬1-3B‫ ﯾﻣﻛن أن ﻧرى ﻣن اﻟﺟدول‬.6 ، ... ، 0،1،2
number of spares should be between 3 and 4 in order to
achieve a minimum reliability of 0.9950. Since only an ً .0.9950 ‫ ﻣن أﺟل ﺗﺣﻘﯾﻖ اﻟﺣد اﻷدﻧﻰ ﻣن اﻟﻣوﺛوﻗﯾﺔ‬4 ‫ و‬3 ‫ﯾﺗراوح ﺑﯾن‬
‫ﻧظرا ﻷﻧﮫ‬
integer number of spares can be carried, the minimum
‫ ﻓﺈن اﻟﺣد اﻷدﻧﻰ ﻟﻌدد ﻗطﻊ اﻟﻐﯾﺎر ھو‬، ‫ﯾﻣﻛن ﻓﻘط ﺗﻧﻔﯾذ ﻋدد ﺻﺣﯾﺢ ﻣن ﻗطﻊ اﻟﻐﯾﺎر‬
number of spares is 4. One important conclusion that can be
drawn from the results of Example 7.7 is that the provision ‫ ھو أن‬7.7 ‫ أﺣد اﻻﺳﺗﻧﺗﺎﺟﺎت اﻟﻣﮭﻣﺔ اﻟﺗﻲ ﯾﻣﻛن اﺳﺗﺧﻼﺻﮭﺎ ﻣن ﻧﺗﺎﺋﺞ اﻟﻣﺛﺎل‬.4
of a small number of spares in a large system can make a
very large difference to the system reliability. The greatest ‫ﺗوﻓﯾر ﻋدد ﺻﻐﯾر ﻣن ﻗطﻊ اﻟﻐﯾﺎر ﻓﻲ ﻧظﺎم ﻛﺑﯾر ﯾﻣﻛن أن ﯾؤدي إﻟﻰ ﺣد ﻛﺑﯾر ﻓرق‬
change in reliability is created by the provision of the first ‫ ﯾﺗم إﻧﺷﺎء أﻛﺑر ﺗﻐﯾﯾر ﻓﻲ اﻟﻣوﺛوﻗﯾﺔ ﻣن ﺧﻼل ﺗوﻓﯾر اﻟﻐﯾﺎر‬.‫ﻛﺑﯾر ﻟﻣوﺛوﻗﯾﺔ اﻟﻧظﺎم‬
spare. The values of MTI'F on the other hand continue to
increase linearly. It should be remembered however that the ‫ ﯾﺟب أن‬، ‫ وﻣﻊ ذﻟك‬.‫ ﻣن ﻧﺎﺣﯾﺔ أﺧرى ﻓﻲ اﻟزﯾﺎدة اﻟﺧطﯾﺔ‬MTTF ‫ ﺗﺳﺗﻣر ﻗﯾم‬.‫اﻷول‬
wear out region may be reached long before these values of ‫ﻧﺗذﻛر أﻧﮫ ﯾﻣﻛن اﻟوﺻول إﻟﻰ ﻣﻧطﻘﺔ اﻟﺗﺂﻛل ﻗﺑل وﻗت طوﯾل ﻣن اﻟﺣﺻول ﻋﻠﻰ ﻗﯾم‬
MTI'F are obtained. The question of how many spares
should be carried in practice depends on whether it is a ‫ ﯾﻌﺗﻣد اﻟﺳؤال ﻋن ﻋدد ﻗطﻊ اﻟﻐﯾﺎر اﻟﺗﻲ ﯾﺟب ﺗﻧﻔﯾذھﺎ ﻓﻲ اﻟواﻗﻊ اﻟﻌﻣﻠﻲ‬.‫ ھذه‬MTTF
safety problem or an availability problem. In the first case, ‫ ﯾﺣﻘﻖ اﻟﻣﻌﯾﺎر‬، ‫ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺣﺎﻟﺔ اﻷوﻟﻰ‬.‫ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ إذا ﻛﺎﻧت ﻣﺷﻛﻠﺔ أﻣﺎن أو ﻣﺷﻛﻠﺔ ﺗوﻓر‬
the predominant criterion is achieving an acceptable level of
reliability to satisfy the safety requirements, and cost ً
.‫ وﺗﺻﺑﺢ اﻟﺗﻛﻠﻔﺔ ﺛﺎﻧوﯾﺔ‬، ‫ﻣﻘﺑوﻻ ﻣن اﻟﻣوﺛوﻗﯾﺔ ﻟﺗﻠﺑﯾﺔ ﻣﺗطﻠﺑﺎت اﻟﺳﻼﻣﺔ‬ ‫اﻟﺳﺎﺋد ﻣﺳﺗوى‬
becomes secondary. In the second case, the cost is also of ‫ ﻣﻊ زﯾﺎدة ﻋدد ﻗطﻊ اﻟﻐﯾﺎر‬.‫ اﻟﺗﻛﻠﻔﺔ ھﻲ أﯾﺿﺎ ذات أوﻟوﯾﺔ ﻋﺎﻟﯾﺔ‬، ‫ﻓﻲ اﻟﺣﺎﻟﺔ اﻟﺛﺎﻧﯾﺔ‬
high priority. As the number of spares carried is increased,
the capital cost of the system also increases. In order to ‫ ﻟﻠوﺻول إﻟﻰ اﻟﻌدد اﻟﻣطﻠوب ﻣن‬.‫ ﺗزداد اﻟﺗﻛﻠﻔﺔ اﻟرأﺳﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ ﻟﻠﻧظﺎم أﯾﺿًﺎ‬، ‫اﻟﻣﺣﻣوﻟﺔ‬
arrive at the required number of spares it is necessary to ‫ ﻣن اﻟﺿروري إﺟراء ﻣﻘﺎرﻧﺔ اﻗﺗﺻﺎدﯾﺔ ﺑﯾن زﯾﺎدة اﻟﻌﺎﺋد ﺑﺳﺑب زﯾﺎدة‬، ‫ﻗطﻊ اﻟﻐﯾﺎر‬
make an economic comparison between the increased return
due to increased reliability and the required capital invested ‫ اﻟﺟواﻧب‬.‫اﻟﻣوﺛوﻗﯾﺔ ورأس اﻟﻣﺎل اﻟﻣطﻠوب اﻟﻣﺳﺗﺛﻣر ﻟﺗﺣﻘﯾﻖ ھذه اﻟﻣوﺛوﻗﯾﺔ اﻟﻣﺗزاﯾدة‬
to achieve this increased reliability. Economic aspects are ‫ ﻟﻛن ﻣن اﻟواﺿﺢ أﻧﮫ ﻋﺎﻣل ﻣﮭم ﻓﻲ ﺗﺣدﯾد‬، ‫اﻻﻗﺗﺻﺎدﯾﺔ ﺧﺎرج ﻧطﺎق ھذا اﻟﻛﺗﺎب‬
outside the scope of this book but it clearly is an important
factor in deciding the required level of system reliability. .‫اﻟﻣﺳﺗوى اﻟﻣطﻠوب ﻣن ﻣوﺛوﻗﯾﺔ اﻟﻧظﺎم‬
Question Four Question Four
A- A pump has a useful life failure rate of 100 failures per ، ‫ ﺳﺎﻋﺎت‬106 ‫ ﻋطل ﻟﻛل‬100 ‫ ﺗﺗﻣﺗﻊ اﻟﻣﺿﺧﺔ ﺑﻣﻌدل ﻓﺷل ﻋﻣﻠﻲ ﻣﻔﯾد ﯾﺑﻠﻎ‬- A
106 hours, a mean wear out life of 10000 hr with a 2000 ‫ ﺳﺎﻋﺔ ﻣﻊ اﻧﺣراف ﻣﻌﯾﺎري ﻗدره‬10000 ‫وھو ﻣﺗوﺳط ﻋﻣر اﻟﺗﺂﻛل ﯾﺑﻠﻎ‬
standard deviation of 2000 hr. Assuming that the wear
out failure distribution is normal, evaluate the ‫ ﻗم ﺑﺗﻘﯾﯾم ﻣوﺛوﻗﯾﺔ اﻟﻣﺿﺧﺔ‬، ‫ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻓﺗراض أن ﺗوزﯾﻊ ﻋطل اﻟﺑﻠﻰ أﻣر طﺑﯾﻌﻲ‬.‫ﺳﺎﻋﺔ‬
reliability of the pump for (a) a 100 hr mission starting ‫( ﻣﮭﻣﺔ‬B) ‫ ﺳﺎﻋﺔ ﻣن دورة ﺣﯾﺎﺗﮭﺎ و‬9900 ‫ ﺳﺎﻋﺔ ﺗﺑدأ ﻣن‬100 ‫( ﻣﮭﻣﺔ ﻟﻣدة‬A) ‫ﻟـ‬
at the 9900 hour point of its life cycle and, (b) a similar
mission starting 1000 hours later.248 .‫ ﺳﺎﻋﺔ‬1000 ‫ﻣﻣﺎﺛﻠﺔ ﺗﺑدأ ﺑﻌد‬
(a) During the useful life period ‫( ﺧﻼل ﻓﺗرة اﻟﻌﻣر اﻟﻣﻔﯾدة‬A)
Rc(t) = exp (-100 x 10-6 x 100)
=0.990050 Rc(t) = exp (-100 x 10-6 x 100)
In this equation =0.990050
In this equation
( + 1)
Rw(t) = ( + 1)
Rw(T) Rw(t) =
Rw(T)
, T = 9900, t = 100 and T + t = 10000.
In this Equation , T = 9900, t = 100 and T + t = 10000.
1 ( − ) In this Equation
( )= exp − 1 ( − )
√2 2 ( )= exp −
M = 10000 and σ =2000. √2 2
For the time T= 9900: M = 10000 and σ =2000.
For the time T= 9900:
Z1 = = −0.05
Z1 = = −0.05
and for the time T+t= 10000:
and for the time T+t= 10000:
From the tables in Appendix 2
From the tables in Appendix 2
Rw(T) = f(t) dt = 0.5199 Rw(T) = f(t) dt = 0.5199

Rw(T + t) = f(t) dt = 0.5 Rw(T + t) = f(t) dt = 0.5

Therefore from Equation Therefore from Equation
( + 1) ( + 1)
Rw(t) = Rw(t) =
Rw(T) Rw(T)

0.5 0.5
Rw(t) = = 0.961723 Rw(t) = = 0.961723
0.5199 0.5199

and from Equation and from Equation

R (0 + t ) R (0 + t )
R(t) = e R(t) = e
R (0) R (0)
R(t) = e Rw (t) R(t) = e Rw (t)
R(t) = Rc (t). Rw (t) R(t) = Rc (t). Rw (t)
= 0.990050 x 0.961723 = 0.990050 x 0.961723
= 0.952154 = 0.952154
(b) Using the same technique as in (a) above, we can ‫ ﯾﻤﻜﻨﻨﺎ أن ﻧﺴﺘﻨﺘﺞ‬، ‫( أﻋﻼه‬A) ‫(ﺑﺎﺳﺘﺨﺪام ﻧﻔﺲ اﻷﺳﻠﻮب ﻛﻤﺎ ﻓﻲ‬b)
deduce
Rc(t) = 0.990050 (unchanged) Rc(t) = 0.990050 (unchanged)
. .
Rw(t) = = 0.945159 Rw(t) = = 0.945159
. .

and R(t) = 0.990050 x 0.945159 = 0.935755 and R(t) = 0.990050 x 0.945159 = 0.935755

B- A control system consists of three main components: a ‫ ﻣﺣول طﺎﻗﺔ‬:‫ ﯾﺗﻛون ﻧظﺎم اﻟﺗﺣﻛم ﻣن ﺛﻼﺛﺔ ﻣﻛوﻧﺎت رﺋﯾﺳﯾﺔ‬-B
transducer, an amplifier and an actuator, having failure ‫ و‬0.05 ‫ و‬0.35 ‫وﻣﻛﺑر ﺻوت وﻣﺷﻐل ﻟﮫ ﻣﻌدﻻت ﻓﺷل ﺗﺑﻠﻎ‬
rates of 0.35, 0.05 and 0.02 f/yr, respectively. All
components operate in their useful life period. ‫ ﺟﻣﯾﻊ اﻟﻣﻛوﻧﺎت ﺗﻌﻣل ﻓﻲ ﻓﺗرة‬.‫ ﺳﻧﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺗواﻟﻲ‬/ f 0.02
i. Evaluate the probability of this system .‫ﺣﯾﺎﺗﮭﺎ اﻟﻣﻔﯾدة‬
surviving for 1 year without failure and its ‫ ﻗم ﺑﺗﻘﯾﯾم اﺣﺗﻣﺎل ﺑﻘﺎء ھذا اﻟﻧظﺎم ﻟﻣدة ﻋﺎم واﺣد دون‬.I
MTTF.
.‫ اﻟﺧﺎص ﺑﮫ‬MTTF ‫ﻓﺷل و‬
ii. What is the minimum number of
transducers that must be connected in ‫ ﻣﺎ ھو اﻟﺣد اﻷدﻧﻰ ﻟﻌدد ﻣﺣوﻻت اﻟطﺎﻗﺔ اﻟﺗﻲ ﯾﺟب‬.II
parallel redundancy to increase the ‫ﻣواز ﻟزﯾﺎدة اﺣﺗﻣﺎل ﺑﻘﺎء‬
ٍ ‫أن ﺗﻛون ﻣﺗﺻﻼً ﺑﺗﻛرار‬
probability of the system surviving for 1 ‫؟‬0.9 ‫اﻟﻧظﺎم ﻟﻣدة ﻋﺎم واﺣد دون إﺧﻔﺎق أﻛﺑر ﻣن‬
year without failure to greater than 0.9?
iii. Evaluate the new probability of surviving ‫ﻗم ﺑﺗﻘﯾﯾم اﻻﺣﺗﻣﺎل اﻟﺟدﯾد ﻟﻠﺑﻘﺎء ﻋﻠﻰ ﻗﯾد اﻟﺣﯾﺎة ﻟﻣدة‬ .III
for 1 year and the MTTF after the ‫ ﺑﻌد اﻟﺗﺣﺳن ﻓﻲ )ب( ﺗم اﻟﻘﯾﺎم‬MTTF ‫ﻋﺎم واﺣد و‬
improvement in (b) has been done.259 ‫ﺑﮫ‬
Answers:
i. 0.657047
ii. 2.38 hr
iii. 3
iv. 0.908381
v. 4.14 hr
Question Five Question Five
A- The state space diagram and transition rate in f/hr of a ‫ ﻟﻌﻣﻠﯾﺔ ﻣﺎرﻛوف‬f / hr ‫ ﻣﺧطط ﻣﺳﺎﺣﺔ اﻟﺣﺎﻟﺔ وﻣﻌدل اﻻﻧﺗﻘﺎل ﻓﻲ‬Fig.Q51‫ﯾوﺿﺢ اﻟﺷﻛل‬
continuous Markov process is shown in Fig.Q51. :‫ اﺣﺳب‬.‫اﻟﻣﺳﺗﻣرة‬
Calculate:
.‫)أ( اﻻﺣﺗﻣﺎﻻت اﻟﻣﻘﯾدة ﻟﻛل وﻻﯾﺔ‬
(a) The limiting probabilities of each state. .‫)ب( ﺗواﻓر اﻟﻧظﺎم‬
(b) The availability of the system. ‫ ﻟظروف ﺗﺷﻐﯾل اﻟﻧظﺎم اﻟﺗﺎﻟﯾﺔ ؛‬MITF (‫)ج‬
(c) The MITF for the following system operating
‫ ھﻲ‬3 ‫ ھﻲ ﺣﺎﻟﺔ اﻻﺳﺗﻌداد واﻟدوﻟﺔ‬2 ‫ واﻟدوﻟﺔ‬، ‫ ھﻲ اﻟﺣﺎﻟﺔ اﻟﻌﺎدﯾﺔ‬1 ‫( اﻟﺣﺎﻟﺔ‬1)
conditions;
(1) state 1 is the normally up state, state 2 is a ‫ﺣﺎﻟﺔ اﻟﻔﺷل ؛ و‬
standby state and state 3 is the failure state; and .‫ ﺣﺎﻻت ﻓﺷل‬3 ‫ و‬2 ‫ ھﻲ ﺣﺎﻟﺔ اﻟﺗﺷﻐﯾل واﻟﺣﺎﻻت‬1 ‫( اﻟﺣﺎﻟﺔ‬2)
(2) State 1 is the operating state and states 2 and 3
are failure states. 306

Fig.Q51
Fig.Q51
Answers:-
0.9615, 0.0189 , 0.0196;0.9804,0.9615;100 hr, 50 hr

B- Use the frequency balance approach to evaluate the ‫ اﺳﺗﺧدم ﻧﮭﺞ ﺗوازن اﻟﺗردد ﻟﺗﻘﯾﯾم ﺗواﺗر اﻟﻣواﺟﮭﺔ وﻣدة‬-B
frequency of encountering and duration of residing in Q52 ‫اﻹﻗﺎﻣﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻛل ﺣﺎﻟﺔ ﻣن اﻟﺣﺎﻻت اﻟﻣوﺿﺣﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺷﻛل‬
each of the states shown in Fig Q52 where rates are .‫ ﺳﻧﺔ‬/ ‫ﺣﯾث ﯾﺗم اﻟﺗﻌﺑﯾر ﻋن اﻟﻣﻌدﻻت ﻓﻲ ﺣوادث‬
expressed in occurrences/yr. 337

Fig. 52
Fig. 52
Answers
0.9591, 0.0204, 0.0195, 0.001; 2.97 x 10-2 , 1.06 X 10-2 , 1.97 X 10-
2,
1.51 X 10-3 oce/yr, 32.3, 1.92, 0.99, 0.66 yr

Question Six Question Six

A- The probability of success in a single trial is 0.1. 10 ‫ اﺣﺳب اﺣﺗﻣﺎﻟﯾﺔ ﺣدوث‬.0.1 ‫ اﺣﺗﻣﺎل اﻟﻧﺟﺎح ﻓﻲ ﺗﺟرﺑﺔ واﺣدة ھو‬-‫أ‬
Calculate the probability that in 10 trials there will be ‫ و )ب( ﺗوزﯾﻊ‬، ‫ ﺗﺟﺎرب ﺑﺎﺳﺗﺧدام )أ( اﻟﺗوزﯾﻊ ذي اﻟﺣدﯾن‬10 ‫ﻧﺟﺎﺣﺎت ﻓﻲ‬
exactly two successes using (a) the binomial
distribution, and (b) the Poisson distribution.173
.‫ﺑواﺳون‬
2
(a) P(2) = 10C20.1 x 0.98
!
0.12x0.98 (a) P(2) = 10C20.12 x 0.98
! ! !
= 0.1937 0.12x0.98
! !
(b) np=10x0.l=1.0 = 0.1937
1.02 (b) np=10x0.l=1.0
 ! 1.02
therefore P(2) =
! ! !
=0.1839 therefore P(2) =
! !
=0.1839
A random data sample is taken from a number of pieces of ‫ ﺗم ﺗﺳﺟﯾل‬.‫ﯾﺗم أﺧذ ﻋﯾﻧﺔ ﺑﯾﺎﻧﺎت ﻋﺷواﺋﯾﺔ ﻣن ﻋدد ﻣن اﻟﻘطﻊ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﻠﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺣﻘل‬
^ ^ ^ ^
i fi Fi R(ti) -lnR i fi Fi R(ti) -lnR
1 35 0.1 0.9 0.10536 1 35 0.1 0.9 0.10536
2 105 0.3 0.7 0.35667 2 105 0.3 0.7 0.35667
3 230 0.5 0.5 0.69315 3 230 0.5 0.5 0.69315
4 420 0.7 0.3 1.20397 4 420 0.7 0.3 1.20397
5 730 0.9 0.1 2.30259 5 730 0.9 0.1 2.30259
equipment operating in the field. Five times-to-failure were ‫ و‬230 ‫ و‬105 ‫ و‬35 ‫ ھذه اﻟﺑﯾﺎﻧﺎت ﻓﻲ ﺗرﺗﯾب اﻟﻣرﺗﺑﺔ‬.‫ﺧﻣس ﻣرات إﻟﻰ اﻟﻔﺷل‬
recorded. These data in rank order are 35, 105, 230, 420 ‫ ﺗﻘدﯾر ﻣﻌدل اﻟﻔﺷل ﻣن ھذه اﻟﺑﯾﺎﻧﺎت‬.‫ ﺳﺎﻋﺔ‬730 ‫ و‬420
and 730 hr. Estimate the failure rate from these data.211 ‫ رﺳم اﻟﺑﯾﺎﻧﺎت‬2 ‫اﻟﺟدول‬
Table 2 Plotting data
‫ﯾﺗم اﻟﺣﺻول ﻋﻠﻰ ﻧﻘﺎط اﻟﻣﺧطط ﺑﺎﺳﺗﺧدام ھذه اﻟﻣﻌﺎدﻟﺔ‬
The plotting points are obtained using this Equation ^ ( . )
^ ( . ) Fi =
Fi =
:‫ ﺑﺎﻟﻧﺳﺑﺔ ﻟﻠﻧﻘطﺔ اﻷوﻟﻰ‬.2 ‫وﺗرد ﻓﻲ اﻟﺟدول‬
and are shown in Table 2. For the first point: ^ ( . )
^ ( . ) Fi = = 0.1, i.e., 10%
Fi = = 0.1, i.e., 10%
and
and ^
^ R(ti) = 1- ^Fi =0.9, i.e., 90%
R(ti) = 1- ^Fi =0.9, i.e., 90% ‫ ﻣﻌدل اﻟﻔﺷل اﻟﻣﻘدر‬.61 ‫ﺗظﮭر ﻧﻘﺎط اﻻﺣﺗﻣﺎل ﻓﻲ اﻟﺷﻛل‬
The probability plot is shown in Figure 61. The estimated failure rate

‫ ﺳﺎﻋﺔ‬، ‫وﻗت اﻟﻔﺷل‬

Time to failure, hr ‫ ﻧﻘﺎط اﻻﺣﺗﻣﺎﻻت اﻻﺳﯾﺔ‬61 ‫اﻟﺷﻛل‬
Fig.61 Exponential probability plot
‫ أي‬، ‫ھو ﻣﯾل اﻟﺧط‬
is the slope of the line, i.e., ^ ( )
^ ( ) =-
=- .
. =
= = 0.00311 f/hr
= 0.00311 f/hr = 27.26f/yr
= 27.26f/yr ‫ وﯾﻣﻛن ﺗﺣﺳﯾﻧﮫ ﺑﺎﺳﺗﺧدام‬، ‫ ھو ﺗواﻓﻖ ﺑﺻري ﺗﻘرﯾﺑﻲ‬61 ‫اﻟﺧط اﻟﻣﺳﺗﻘﯾم اﻟﻣوﺿﺢ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺷﻛل‬
The straight line shown in Figure 61 is an approximate visual fit, .‫ﺗﺣﻠﯾل اﻟﻣرﺑﻌﺎت اﻟﺻﻐرى‬
which could be improved using least squares analysis. The fit, ‫ ﯾﺑدو أن ﺗﻛون ﺟﯾدة ﺟدا‬، ‫ وﻣﻊ ذﻟك‬، ‫اﻟﻣﻼءﻣﺔ‬
however,
appears to be quite good.

B- What are the conditions for the function shown in ‫ ﻟﺗﻛون داﻟﺔ ﻛﺛﺎﻓﺔ‬6 ‫ ﻣﺎ ھﻲ ﺷروط اﻟوظﯾﻔﺔ اﻟﻣوﺿﺣﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺷﻛل‬-‫ب‬
Fig.Q6 to be a probability density function? Under :‫اﻻﺣﺗﻣﺎل؟ ﻓﻲ ظل ھذه اﻟظروف ﺗﻘﯾﯾم‬
these conditions evaluate: .‫)أ( ﺗوزﯾﻊ اﻟﻔﺷل اﻟﺗراﻛﻣﻲ‬
(a) The cumulative failure distribution.
.‫)ب( وظﯾﻔﺔ اﻟﻧﺎﺟﻲ‬
(b) Survivor function.
(c) Hazard rate. .‫)ج( ﻣﻌدل اﻟﺧطر‬
(d) Expected value. .‫)د( اﻟﻘﯾﻣﺔ اﻟﻣﺗوﻗﻌﺔ‬
 (e) Standard deviation. .‫)ھـ( اﻻﻧﺣراف اﻟﻣﻌﯾﺎري‬
219

Fig.Q6
Answers
a, b/V6, 0.75

Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) is a very basic measure ‫( ھو ﻣﻘﯾﺎس أﺳﺎﺳﻲ ﻟﻠﻐﺎﯾﺔ ﻣن اﻟﻣوﺛوﻗﯾﺔ اﻟﻣﺳﺗﺧدﻣﺔ‬MTTF) ‫ﻣﺗوﺳط وﻗت اﻟﻔﺷل‬
of reliability used for non-repairable systems. It represents the
length of time that an item is expected to last in operation until it
‫ ﯾﻣﺛل طول اﻟﻔﺗرة اﻟزﻣﻧﯾﺔ اﻟﺗﻲ ﯾُﺗوﻗﻊ أن ﯾﺳﺗﻣر ﻓﯾﮭﺎ‬.‫ﻟﻸﻧظﻣﺔ ﻏﯾر اﻟﻘﺎﺑﻠﺔ ﻟﻺﺻﻼح‬
fails ‫ﻋﻧﺻر ﻣﺎ ﺣﺗﻰ ﯾﻔﺷل‬