Almeda V Villaluz

 Definition of bail (Sec. 1, Rule 114, ROC): The security required and given for the release of a person
who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be
required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance.

 Petitioner Leonardo Almeda + 5 others were charged w/ qualified theft of a motor vehicle in
presided by the respondent Judge Onofre Villaluz.
o The amount of the bond recommended for the provisional release of Almeda was
P15,000; this was approved by the judge directing it to be posted entirely in cash.

 At the hearing, Almeda asked the trial court to allow him to post a surety bond in lieu of the
cash bond required.
o This request + an oral motion for reconsideration were denied on the ground that the
amended information imputed habitual delinquency and recidivism on the part of
Almeda.
 At the same hearing, the respondent city fiscal reiterated his oral motion for amendment of
the information to include allegations of recidivism and habitual delinquency:
o Almeda vigorously objected, arguing that:
a) such an amendment was premature since no copies of prior conviction could
yet be presented in court,
b) the motion to amend should have been made in writing in order to enable him
to object formally, and
c) the proposed amendment would place him in double jeopardy considering
that he had already pleaded not guilty to the information.
o The TC nevertheless granted the respondent fiscal's motion in open court. An oral
motion for reconsideration was denied.
 Immediately thereafter, the assistant fiscal took hold of the original information and entered
his amendment by annotating the same on the back of the document.
o The petitioner moved for the dismissal of the charge on the ground of double
jeopardy, but this motion and a motion for reconsideration were denied in open
court.
 Hence, the present special civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction.

II. Issues
1. WON the respondent judge has the authority to require a strictly cash bond and disallow the
petitioner's attempt to post a surety bond for his provisional liberty – NO.

The order of the respondent judge denying the motion of the petitioner Almeda that he be
allowed to post a surety bond instead of a cash bond is hereby set aside, without prejudice,
however, to increasing the amount of the bail bond and/or the imposition of such conditions as
the respondent judge might consider desirable and proper for the purpose of insuring the
attendance of the petitioner at the trial, provided they are consistent with the views herein
expressed.
1. NO. The trial court may not reject otherwise acceptable sureties and insist that the accused obtain his
provisional liberty only thru a cash bond.
 In this case, the amount fixed for bail, while reasonable if considered in terms of surety or
property bonds, may be excessive if demanded in the form of cash.
 The condition that the accused may have provisional liberty only upon his posting of a cash
bond is abhorrent to the nature of bail and transgresses our law on the matter.
o The sole purpose of bail is to insure the attendance of the accused when required by the
court, and there should be no suggestion of penalty on the part of the accused nor
revenue on the part of the government.
o The allowance of a cash bond in lieu of sureties is authorized in this jurisdiction only
because our rules expressly provide for it since the very nature of bail presupposes the
attendance of sureties to whom the body of the prisoner can be delivered. And even
where cash bail is allowed, the option to deposit cash in lieu of a surety bond primarily
belongs to the accused. (See Sec. 14, Rule 114 ROC)
 But SC says it cannot fault the judge since based on the petitioner's past record, he may be likely
to jump bail or commit other harm to the citizenry. Fortunately, the court has the ff remedies:
1. It could increase the amount of the bail bond to an appropriate level.
2. The defendant could be required, as one of the conditions of his bail bond, to report in
person periodically to the court and make an accounting of his movements.
3. The accused might be warned that under the 1973 Constitution "Trial may proceed
notwithstanding his absence provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to
appear is unjustified."

MAGUDDATU VS. COURT OF APPEALS

For a human being who has been inside a prison cell, a bail bond represents his only ticket to
liberty, albeit provisional. But the right to bail is not always a demandable right. In certain
instances, it is a matter of discretion. This discretion, however, is not full and unfettered because
the law and the rules set the parameters for its proper exercise. Discretion is, of course, a delicate
thing and its abuse of such grave nature would warrant intervention of this Court by way of the
special civil action for certiorari.
THE FACTS:

 Aniceto Sabbun Maguddatu and Laureana Sabbun Maguddatu, Atty. Teodoro Rubino,
Antonio Sabbun Maguddatu and several other “John Does” were charged with murder
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati for the killing of Jose S. Pascual.
 On October 23, 1985, petitioners filed a motion to be admitted to bail on the ground that
the prosecution’s evidence is not strong. After partial trial on the merits, the trial court
issued an order, dated December 20, 1985, granting petitioner’s motion for bail and fixing
the amount at P30,000.00 each.
 On the same day, petitioners posted bail through AFISCO Insurance Corporation.
  On January 6, 1987, the AFISCO Insurance Corporation filed a motion before the trial
court praying for the cancellation of petitioner’s bail bond because of the latter’s failure to
renew the same upon its expiration on December 20, 1986.
 There is no showing, however, of any action by the court on said motion.
 On January 2, 1998, the trial court convicted petitioners of the crime of Homicide and
sentenced them to suffer an indeterminate prison term of EIGHT (8) YEARS to
FOURTEEN (14) YEARS of RECLUSION TEMPORAL. The judgment of conviction was
promulgated in absentia.
 Accordingly, on February 19,1998, the trial court issued an order for the immediate arrest
of petitioners and their commitment to the custody of proper authorities.
 On February 27, 1998, filed a Notice of Appeal from the order of conviction for homicide
with a motion to be granted provisional liberty under the same bail bond pending appeal.
 On June 23, 1999, the Court of Appeals issued the resolution under question denying
petitioners’ application for bail and ordering their arrest.
 Aggrieved by the foregoing resolution, petitioners brought the instant petition for certiorari
with this Court on August 30, 1999, contending that the Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion in denying their application for bail and their prayer to recall the order
of arrest issued by the trial court.

Issue:
Whether under the facts thereof petitioners are entitled to bail as a matter of right or on the
discretion of the trial court? Assuming it is a matter of discretion, whether the trial court in denying
bail committed grave abuse of discretion?

Ruling:

The Court of Appeals committed no error in denying petitioners’ plea to be granted bail. The
Constitution guarantees the right to bail of all the accused except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong.
This was stated in Sections 4, 5 and 7 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. Despite an order of arrest
from the trial court and two warnings from the Court of Appeals, petitioners had remained at large.
It is axiomatic that for one to be entitled to bail, he should be in the custody of the law, or otherwise,
deprived of liberty. The purpose of bail is to secure one’s release and it would be incongruous to
grant bail to one who is free. Petitioners’ Compliance and Motion, dated February 08, 1999, came
short of an unconditional submission to respondent court’s lawful order and to its jurisdiction. The
trial court correctly denied petitioners’ motion that they be allowed provisional liberty after their
conviction, under their respective bail bonds. Apart from the fact that they were at large, Section
5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended by Supreme Court Administrative Circular 12-
94, provides that:

The Court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional liberty
under the same bail bond during the period to appeal subject to the consent of the
bondsman.

The bail bond that the accused previously posted can only be used during the 15-day period “to”
appeal (Rule 122) and not during the entire period “of” appeal. This is consistent with Section
2(a) of Rule 114 which provides that the bail “shall be effective upon approval and remain in force
at all stages of the case, unless sooner cancelled, until the promulgation of the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court, irrespective of whether the case was originally filed in or appealed to
it.”

From the records of the case, petitioners are not entitled to bail. Firstly, petitioners violated the
conditions of their bail. Bail is defined as a security for the release of a person conditioned
upon his appearance before any court. The accused shall also appear before the proper court
whenever so required by the court or these Rules. Petitioners’ non-appearance during the
promulgation of the trial court’s decision despite due notice and without justifiable reason, and
their continued non-submission to the proper authorities as ordered by the Court of Appeals,
constitute violations of the conditions of their bail. Moreover, it appears that petitioners failed to
renew their expired bail bond, as shown by a Motion, dated January 06, 1987, filed by AFISCO
Insurance Corporation, praying for the cancellation of petitioners’ bail bond because of the latter’s
failure to renew the same upon its expiration. The petitioners complain that they were not informed
of the date of promulgation of the decision of conviction in the trial court and that their counsel of
record abandoned them. Even if we are to concede that these allegations are true, petitioners still
failed to surrender to the authorities despite two orders to that effect by the Court of Appeals.
Moreover, petitioners had no cause to expect that their application for bail would be granted as a
matter of course precisely because it is a matter of discretion. In fact, the filing of a notice of appeal
effectively deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to entertain the motion for bail pending appeal
because appeal is perfected by the mere filing of such notice. It has been held that trial courts
would be well advised to leave the matter of bail, after conviction for a lesser crime than the
capital offense originally charged, to the appellate court’s sound discretion.
Notes. —–Bail is unavailing with respect to an accused who has not
voluntarily surrendered or to one who has yet to be placed under legal
custody. (Guillermo vs. Reyes, Jr.,240 SCRA 154 [1995])

It is settled that a person applying for bail should be in the custody of the
law or otherwise deprived of his liberty. (De los Santos-Reyes vs. Montesa,
Jr., 247 SCRA 85 [1995])
 BANGAYON S BUTACAN

Complainant Antonio M. Bangayan filed charges of grave threats against Antonio Cauilan, Sr. and
Antonio Cauilan, Jr. The cases, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 5944 and 5945, were assigned to
respondent.

Complainant alleges that respondent issued two warrants of arrest on April 23, 1999 in Criminal
Case Nos. 5944 and 5945 for the apprehension of Antonio Cauilan, Sr. and Antonio Cauilan, Jr.
and set the bail for the provisional liberty of the accused at P24,000.00 each. By virtue of these
warrants, Antonio Cauilan, Sr. was arrested on April 29, 1999, while Antonio Cauilan, Jr. was
apprehended on April 30, 1999. Both were, however, ordered released by respondent judge on
April 30, 1999.
It is further alleged that on May 7, 1999, another order was issued by respondent for the release of
Antonio Cauilan, Sr. in connection with Criminal Case No. 5945; that on May 11, 1999, Antonio
Cauilan, Jr. filed a Motion for the Reduction of Bail in Criminal Case Nos. 5944 and 5945; and that
the motion was approved by respondent and Antonio Cauilan, Jr. was ordered released.

Complainant Antonio M. Bangayan filed charges of grave threats against Antonio Cauilan, Sr. and
Antonio Cauilan, Jr. The cases, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 5944 and 5945, were assigned to
respondent.

Complainant alleges that respondent issued two warrants of arrest on April 23, 1999 in Criminal
Case Nos. 5944 and 5945 for the apprehension of Antonio Cauilan, Sr. and Antonio Cauilan, Jr.
and set the bail for the provisional liberty of the accused at P24,000.00 each. By virtue of these
warrants, Antonio Cauilan, Sr. was arrested on April 29, 1999, while Antonio Cauilan, Jr. was
apprehended on April 30, 1999. Both were, however, ordered released by respondent judge on
April 30, 1999.

Respondent says that the charges against him are “irresponsible, and without any basis” and
“should not be given the least degree of consideration.”[2] He admits issuing the two warrants of
arrest on April 23, 1999 and fixing the bail at P24,000.00 for each of the accused in the two
criminal cases. He states, however, that when Antonio Cauilan, Sr. was arrested on April 29, 1999,
it was only with respect to Criminal Case No. 5944 but not also with respect to Criminal Case No.
5945. Consequently, he claims that when Antonio Cauilan, Sr. posted bail on that day, it was only
for his arrest in Criminal Case No. 5944 and that he approved the bail after finding it in order.

In his report, Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo recommends that respondent be found
guilty of grave misconduct and ordered to pay a fine of P3,000.00 with a warning that a repetition
of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.[6]

We find the recommendation to be well taken.

First. With respect to the arrest and release of Antonio Cauilan, Sr., it is not disputed that two
warrants of arrest were issued on April 23, 1999 against him in connection with Criminal Case
Nos. 5944 and 5945. Under the rules, these warrants must be executed within 10 days from its
receipt. Otherwise, a report must be made by the officer concerned to the judge who issued the
warrant.[7] In this case, respondent judge would have us believe that the arresting officer served
two warrants issued on the same day and against the same person on different dates. This is
disputed by the warrant server himself in a certification presented to this Court by the
complainant.

, in this case, the warrant server should serve two warrants for the arrest of the same person on
different dates when he could do this on the same occasion.
Second. Did respondent order the release of Antonio Cauilan, Sr. even if the latter did not post
bail? The order of release dated April 30, 1999 on Criminal Case No. 5944 is proper. Antonio
Cauilan, Sr. posted bail on that day, on the basis of which respondent issued an order of release.
However, in Criminal Case No. 5945, no bail was posted by the accused, yet he was released. This
is a violation of the rules on the part of respondent judge.

Even if Antonio Cauilan, Sr. was arrested on April 29, 1999 in Criminal Case No. 5944 and posted
bail, still respondent should not have ordered the release of the accused. Respondent knew very
well that there was another case against Antonio Cauilan Sr. Even if the arresting officer did not
serve the warrant in Criminal Case No. 5945, respondent should not have allowed the release on
bail of the accused in that case.

The records show, however, that respondent ordered the release of Antonio Cauilan, Jr. on April
30, 1999. If Antonio Cauilan, Jr. was not arrested until his voluntary surrender on May 11, 1999,
then respondent had no basis for ordering the release of the accused on April 30, 1999.

reduction of bail of Antonio Cauilan, Jr. did not contain a notice of hearing to the prosecution.
Indeed, the records disclose that no hearing was even conducted by respondent before granting
reduction of the bail. This is contrary to Rule 15, §4 which requires written motions to be heard
and “served in such a manner as to ensure receipt by the other party at least three days before
the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.

In this case, the failure to give notice to the prosecution may be due to the fact that there was no
written motion filed but only, as respondent judge himself admitted, an oral request by Dumlao
and his father that the amount of the bail be reduced. What respondent judge should have done
was to have Dumlao put his request in writing and then schedule the incident for hearing with
notice to the prosecution.

, a hearing is required in granting bail whether it is a matter of right or discretion.[11] A motion to

reduce the amount of bail likewise requires a hearing before it is granted in order to afford the
prosecution the chance to oppose it. Respondent’s haste in granting Antonio Cauilan, Jr.’s
motion for reduction of bail certainly makes his act suspect
 GARCIA-PADILLA V ENRILE

FACTS
● nine (9) of the fourteen (14) detainees herein were arrested when three (3) teams of the PC/INP of
conducted a raid at the residence of Dra. Aurora Parong who were having a conference. 4 other detainess
were arested the next day
● the (14) detainees were all detained at the PC/INP Command Headquarters, Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya
until their transfer to an undisclosed places.
● petition for the writ of habeas corpus and mandamus filed by Josefina Garcia-Padilla, mother of detained
petitioner Sabino G. Padilla, Jr.
● The mandamus aspect of the instant petition has, however, become moot and academic, the whereabouts
of petitioners having already become known to petitioner Josefina Garcia-Padilla.
● Petitioner: “arrest of petitioners was patently unlawful and illegal since it was effected without any warrant
of arrest; that the PC/INP raiding team which made the arrest were only armed with a search warrant “
o nowhere in said warrant was authority given to make arrests, much less detention; that the search
warrant which authorized respondents to seize "subversive documents, firearms of assorted
calibers, medicine and other subversive paraphernalia" in the house and clinic of Dra. Aurora
Parong was a roving and general warrant and is, therefore, illegal per se because it does not state
specifically the things that are to be seized
o no criminal charges have as of yet been filed against any of the detainees; there is no judgment,
decree, decision or order from a court of law which would validate the continued detention of the
petitioner; that while it is true that a purported telegram stating the issuance of a Presidential
Commitment Order (PCO) was shown to the detainees on or about July 11 and 12, 1982, but
counsel and the detainees have not yet been given a copy of such PCO, nor notified of its contents,
raising a doubt whether such commitment order has in fact been issued.
o respondents are denying the detainees their constitutional right to counsel, averring that the
detainees were allowed regular visits by counsel and relatives during their period of detention

ISSUES
1. Whether or not petitioners' detention is legal
2. (1) Yes:
a. Prior thereto to the arrest, the detainees were identified as members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CCP) engaging in subversive activities and using the house of
detainee Dra. Aurora Parong in Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya, as their headquarters.
b. Caught in flagrante delicto, the nine (9) detainees mentioned scampered
towards different directions leaving on top of their conference table numerous subversive
documents, periodicals, pamphlets, books, correspondence, stationaries, and other papers,
including a plan on how they would infiltrate the youth and student sector (code-named YORK).
c. Also found were one (1) .38 cal. revolver with eight (8) live bullets, nineteen (19)
rounds of ammunition for M16 armalite, eighteen thousand six hundred fifty pesos (P18,650.00)
cash believed to be CPP/NPA funds, assorted medicine packed and ready for distribution, and
sizeable quantity of printing paraphernalia, which were then seized.
d. There is no doubt that circumstances attendant in the arrest of the herein
detainees fall under a situation where arrest is lawful even without a judicial warrant as specifically
provided for under Section 6(a), Rules 113 of the Rules of Court and allowed under existing
 jurisprudence on the matter. As provided therein, a peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person when the person to be arrested has committed or actually committing,
or is about to commit an offense in his presence.
e. The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed
elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of
capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of
immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not
follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by
a judge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and
the granting of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no
legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against
goarrest and detention of persons ordered by the President through the issuance of Presidential
Commitment Order (PCO) is merely preventivevernment forces, or any other milder acts but
equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement.
3. This ruling was abrogated by Sec 18, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution which expressly
constitutionalized the Lansang Doctrine. Note as well that under Art 3 (Sec 13) of the Constitution it is
stated that “the right to bail shall not be impaired even if the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended.”
 Aswat v Golido

petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the General Court-Martial which was convened by then
respondent Brigadier General Alejandro Galido[1] as Commanding General of the Southern Luzon
Command ("SOLCOM") to try petitioner for a specifica-tion (offense) committed outside a military
reservation or installation.

Petitioner Eduardo N. Aswat and victim Felix B. Nebres were both enlisted men of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines ("AFP") respectively holding the ranks Private First Class and Corporal. Aswat and Nebres
were assigned to the SOLCOM but Aswat was detailed as caretaker of Brigadier General Galido's Baguio
resthouse while Nebres was assigned to act as a personal driver of Brigadier General Galido's wife. On
29 December 1988, petitioner was involved in a shooting incident at Dominican Hills, Baguio City, which
resulted in the death of Nebres.

Records disclose that petitioner voluntarily surrendered to the Baguio City police authorities and was
briefly incarcerated at the Baguio City Jail until he was transferred to a SOLCOM detention cell on 31
December 1988. Petitioner has been detained at the SOLCOM Headquarters in Camp Guillermo Nakar,
Lucena City since then.

On 20 April 1989, petitioner was charged before a SOLCOM General Court-Martial ("SOLCOM-GCM")
with violation of Article 94 of the Articles of War ("A.W."), the specification being homicide.

Petitioner contends he is entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right pursuant to Section 13, Article
III of the Constitution;

Although the right to bail applies to "all," the Court has very recently ruled that the guarantee is
not without any exception. In Commendador vs. De Villa, et al.,[7] the Court en banc, speaking
through Mr. Justice Cruz, held:

"We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 has
traditionally not been recognized and is not available the military, as an exception to the general
rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. This much was suggested in Arula, where We observed that
the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not
exist.

'The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men from the
constitutional coverage on the right to bail.

Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that mutinous soldiers operate within the
framework of the democratic system, are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the government
for the discharge of their duties and responsibilities and are paid out of revenues collected from
the people.

'The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the
equal protection clause is not acceptable. This guarantee requires equal treatment only of
persons or things similarly situated and does not apply where the subject of the treatment is
substantially different from others. The accused officers can complain if they are denied bail and
other members of the military are not. But they cannot say they have been discriminated against
because they are not allowed the same right that is extended to civilians.
Manotoc Jr VS C.A