er:
uestion 21:
tion 1:
to dismiss? Explain.
jer 21: In the CONCORDE HOTEL case (GR 144089, 09 August 2001),
the SC clarified that:
Petitioner is correct insofar as It considered the nature
of private respondent's position as assistant cook as a
position trust and confidence. As assistant cook, private
respondent is charged with the care of food preparation in
the hotel's coffee shop. He Is also responsible for the
custody of food supplies and must see to it that there is
sufficient stock in the hotel kitchen. He should not permit
food or other materials to be taken out from the kitchen
without the necessary order slip or authorization as these
are properties of the hotel. Thus, the nature of private
respondent's position as assistant cook places upon him the
duty of care and custody of Concorde’s property.
QUESTIONS ON REMEDIES IN ILLEGAL DISMISSAL
What are the remedies for illegal dismissal?
1. In the abovecited case of Al RODRIGUEZ (GR153947, 05
December 2002), it was reiterated that:
Under Art. 279 of the Labor Code, an employee
who is unjustly dismissed is entitled to reinstatement,
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges,
and to the payment of his full backwages, inclusive of
allowances, and other benefits or their monetary
equivalent, computed from the time his compensation
was withheld from him (which, as a rule, Is from the
time of his illegal dismissal) up to the time of his
actual reinstatement. “(Citing the following cases):
Bustamante v. National Labor Relations Commission,
265 SCRA 61 (19960, cited in Prudential Bank and
Trust Company v. Reyes, 352 SCRA 316 (2001),
Jardin v, National Labor Relations Commission, 326
SCRA 299 (2000), Phillppine Industrial Security
Agency Corporation v. Dapiton, 320 SCRA 124 (1999),
Rutaqulo v. National Labor Relations Commission, 317
SCRA 1 (1999), Pepsi Cola Products Philippines, Inc.
v, NLRC, 315 SCRA 587 (1999), Jardine Davies, Inc.
v. NLRC, 311 SCRA 289 (1999), Times Transit Credit
Cooperative, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 304 SCRA 11 (1999), Highway Capra
Traders v, National Labor Relations Commission, 293
SCRA 350 (1998)
Is a Hotel Assistant Cook occupying a position of trust for
purposes of the doctrine of loss of confidence as a just cause2. In ANFLO MGT. AND INVESTMENT Corp, v:
: . VS, BOLANDO
3 141608, 04 October 2002), it was held: : SS
Under Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, an
Employee who Is unjustly dismissed frorn work shall be
Entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and
3. In NATIONAL BOOKSTORE Vs, CA (GR 146741, 27 February
2002), the Court held:
Private respondents have been illegally dismissed.
Consequently, they are entitled to reinstatement to their
former positions without loss of seniority rights and payment
Of back wages. (De Guzman vs. NLRC, 312 SCRA 266, 11
August 1999),
Consequently private respondents, for having been
illegally dismissed after 21 March 1989, conformably with
established jurisprudence, (PCPPI v, NLRC, 315 SCRA 587,
30).125
’
UEST) Pi RES IN GENE!
What is the main purpose of technical rules of procedure in. labor,
cases?
In the case of AGAPITO CRUZ vs. KRIS SECURITY SYSTEM INC. (GR
155875, 03 April 2003), the Court held:
Once again, we must stress that the technical rules of procedure should
be used to promote, not frustrate, the cause of justice. While the swift
unclogging of court dockets 1s a laudable aim, the just resolution of cases, Oe
thelr wants, however, cannot be sacrificed merely in order to achieve that
objective (BA Savings vs. Sla, 336 SCRA 484) Rules of procedure, 9 tools
designed not to thwart but to facilitate the attainment of justice; thus, their strict
‘and rigld application may,.for good and deserving reasons, have to ave Wey to,
ar re subordinated by, the need to aptly dispense substantial justice In the
aaa e caret, (hen Neviggtion ww. CA 2 SCRA FE; Cadaver es CUR, 324
SCRA 619)
What are the vital importance of the rules of procedures to @ labor
litigations? Explain.
IN SEA POWER SHIPPING ENTERPRISES INC. VS. CA. (GR136270, 28
June 2001), the Court emphasized: .
It is true that a litigation is not a game of technicalities and that the rules
of procedure should not be strictly enforced at the cost of substantial justice.
However, It does not mean that the Rules of Court may be ignored at will and at
random to the prejudice of the orderly presentation and assessment of the issues
‘and their just resolution (Limpot vs. CA, 170 SCRA 367, 1989) It must be
Emphasized that procedural rules shou7ld not be bellttled or dismissed simply
because their non-observance may have resulted In prejudice to a party's
substantial rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for
the most persuasive of reasons. (Galang vs. CA, 199 SCRA 687) Thus in Tam vs.
Court of Appeals (295 SCRA 755 1998) we have held that:
“Liberal construction of this rule has been allowed by this Court in
the following cases: (1) where a rigid application will result In manifest
fallure or miscarriage of justice, especially If a party successfully shows
that the alleged defect In the questioned final and executory judgment Is
not apparent on Its face or from the recitals contained therein; (2) where
the Interest of substantial justice will be served; (3) where the resolution
of the motion Is addressed solely to the sound and judicious discretion of
the court; and (4) where the Injustice to the adverse party is not
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness In not complying
with the procedure prescribed.”
The reason cited by petitioners’ counsel, to wit, that she failed to attach
the required documents to the petition considering that It was her first time to
ONsuch petition before the Col
i yurt of Al
Hification to forego established rules of peel at ile
As a member
he Lal contenant itis incumbent upon counsel to familiarize herself
R oversies In an ee on to settle pending legal disputes and
Basal to comply with ee ies co eee ies even a further step ot
5 not loosely Invoke the
same are not clearly applicable in the particular case uae ae!
iat is the role of TECHNICAL RULES in labor proceedings? Explain.
y
the case of CECILIO P. DELOS SANTOS v5
. 5. NLRC (GR 121327, 20
pec 2002), it was stressed by the High Tribunal that:
A fortior, administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers are
gttered by the rigidity of certain procedural requirements subject to the
ance of fundamental and essential requirements of due process.
Mable cases presented before them. In \abor cases, 2 punctlious adherence
ringent technical rules may Be velaxed in the interest of the workingman. A
re of fie psa, Wes He LAL ets ne uid. compel petitioner, 2 towhy
Fvxer, to tread once again the calvary Sf a protracted litigation and flagellate
im into submission with the lash of technicality.
Fynat are the roles of technicalities in labor cases? Explain.
4, The High Court held in A. ROQUERO vs PAL (GR 152329, 22 April
that technicalities Nave. no room in abor cases
ry manner and only
applied only in a suppleto
‘ot to defeat them.
“e Labor Arbiter is reversed
cin the part of the employer tO reinstate and Pay
Guring the period of appeal until
nd, if the employee has been
Nc reinstatement order Is
reimburse whatever
so if he actually
We reiterate the rule
where the Rules of Court are
Splary he received for hy
sendered services during the period.”
65 VS. MAXIM'S TEA HOUSE (GR 140853, 27 Feb- 2003), it
>, in ARIEL TRES REY!
: W8S held by the Supreme Court that:
yp tabor cases, rules of procedures should not De applied in 2 very
227 SCRA 571, 1993) They
sense, (Kunting v5. NLRC,
te the attainment rather 2)
rigid and technical
gre merely tools “resigned to facilitate the
emotion _of substantial justice, _technicalltes must be avoided.
Wied to stand In the way of equitably
Kies should not be perm
Ing the rights: and obligations: of the parties. (Lopez
justice shall be better served, the
technical rules of procedure may DE relaxed. (Samahan 19
VS. 324 SCRA 242, 2000)pS: Does the Labor Arbiter of the NLRC have jurisdiction over disputes
involving the wages and terms and conditions of employment of
COOPERATIVE employees? Explain.
YES. In the case of PERPETUAL HELP CREDIT COOP INC. VS.
Hobe FABURADA (GR 121948, 08 Oct 2001) It was clarified that
while:
“Article 121 of Republic Act No. 6938 (Cooperative Code of the
Philippines) provides the procedure how cooperative disputes are to be resolved,
thus:
“ART. 121. Settlement of Disputes. ~ Disputes among members,
officers, directors, and committee members, and intra-cooperative
Gisputes shall, as far as practicable, be settled amicably accordance
wwith the condliation or mediation mechanism embodied In the bylaws of
the cooperative, and in applicable laws.
Should such a concillation/mediation proceeding fall, the matter
shall be settled in a court of competent jurisdiction.”
“Complementing this Articie 1s Section 8 of R.A. No. 6939 (Cooperative
Development Authority Law) which reads:
SEC. 8 Mediation and Conciliation: — Upon request of either or both
parties, the Authority shall mediate and conciliate disputes within:
Pooperative or between cooperatives: Provided, That If no mediation of
conutation succeeds within three (3) months from request thereof, @
cortifcate of nor-resolution shall be Issued by the Commission prior to the
filing of appropriate action before the proper court.
“The above provisions apply to members, officers and directors of the
cooperative involved in disputes within a cooperative or between cooperatives.
There is no evidence that private respondents are members of petitioner
PHCCI and even if they are, the dispute Is about payment of wages, overtime
pay, rest day and termination of employment. Under Art. 217 of the Labor ode,
these disputes are within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiter.
Are all damages suffered by employees cognizable by the Labor
arbiters and NLRC? Explain.
NO. In TOLOSA VS. NLRC (GR 149578, 10 April 2003), the Court held:
“Claims for damages under paragraph 4 of Article 217 must have a
reasonable causal connection with any of the claims provided for in the
article In order to be cognizable by the labor arbiter. Only if there Is such a
connection with the other claims can the claim for damages be considered
as arising from ‘employer-employee relations. (Daich! vs. Villarama, 238
SCRA 267, 21 Nov. 1994) In the present case, petitioner's claim fordamages Is not related to any other clalm ur _
inder Article 217, oth
statues, or collective bargaining agreements. other ler
Petitioner cann®t anchor her claim for damages to Article 161 of
the Labor Code, which does not grant or specify a claim or relief. This
provisions Is only a safety and health standard under Book IV of the same
Code, The enforcement of this labor standard rests with the labor
secretary. Thus, claims for an employer's violation thereof are beyond the
jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. In other words, petitioner cannot enforce
tthe labor standard provided for in Article 161 by suing for damages before
the labor arbiter.
ular courts that have jurisdiction over
actions for damages, in which the employer-employee relation Is merely
incidental, and in which the cause ‘of action proceeds from a different
source of obligation such as a tort. Since petitioner's claim for damages is
predicated on a quasi delict or tort that has ne reasonable causal
connection with any of the claims provided for in Article 217, ‘other labor
Statutes, or collective bargaining agreements, jurisdiction over the action
Pees, the regular courts — not with the NLRC or the labor arbiters,
It is not the NLRC but the regl
‘Are all dispute between employers and employees under the
jurisdiction of the Labor Tribunal? Why?
NO. In TOLOSA VS. NLRC (GR 149578, 10 April 2003), the Court
stressed: '
We stress that the case does not involve the adjudication oF 8 labor
dispute, but the recovery of damages based on a quasi delict. The jurisdiction of
labor tribunals Is limited to disputes arising from employer-employce. relations, 2s
labor ied in Georg Grotiahn GMBH & Co. v. Ismant: (235 SCRA 216, 10 August
1994):
‘Not every dispute between an employer and employee Involves
matters that only labor arbiters and the NLRC can resolve in the exe's se
Oe thelr adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. The jurisdiction of labor
Stbiters and the NLRC under Article 217 of the Labor Code 1s {imited to
isputes arising from an employer-employee relationship which can only
be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or thelr
collective bargaining agreement.”
‘The plvotal question Is whether the Labor Code has any relevance to the
rellef sought by petitioner. From her paper, it is evident that the primary reliefs
She seeks are as follows: (a) loss of earning capacity denominated therein as
actual damages” or “lost Income" and (b) blacklisting, The loss she claims does
rat refer to the actual earning of the deceased, but to his earning capaclty based
pata life expectancy of 65 years. This emount Is recoverable if the action Is
based on a quasi delict as provided for In Article 2206 of the Civil Code, (Art.
2202 Civil Code) but not In the Labor Code.
While It is true that labor arbiters and the NLRC have jurisdiction to award
not only reliefs provided by
Code, (Bafiez vs. Valderila,
labor laws, but also damages governed by the Civil
331 SCRA ‘584, 9 May 2000) these rellefs must stilNi fl bet!
199
be based on an action that has a reasonable causal
connection with
Code, other labor statutes, or collective bargaining agreements. (Ibid) the lator
When a worker's claim is based on QUASI-DELICT
I TORT under Art.
2176 of the Civil Code, have a‘ juris
Bo cease? the Labor Arbiter and NLRC jurisdiction
NO. The Court held in EVELYN TOLOSA VS. NI Gi il
M003), thats LRC (GR 149578, 10 April
Petitioner also alleges that the "reasonable causal connection: rule should
be applied in her favor. Citing San Miguel Corporation v. Etcuban (349 SCRA 704,
3 Dec. 1999). She Insists that 2 reasonable causal connection between the claim
asserted and the employer-employee relation ‘confers jurisdiction upon labor
tribunals. She adds that she has satisfied the required conditions: 1) the dispute
arose from an employer-employee relation, Considering that the claim was for
damages based on the fallure of private respondents to comply with thelr
obligation under Article 161 of the Labor Code; and 2) the dispute car be
aescived by reference to the Labor Code, because the material issue Is whether
private respondents complied with ‘hair legal obligation to_ provide timely,
adequate and competent medical services to guarantee Captain “Tolosa’s
occupational safety’.
We disagree. We affirm the CA's ruling that the NLRC and the labor arbiter
had no jurisdiction over petitioner's claim for gamages, because the ruling was
par an 2 cpanel dec or oat pa Artic 2178 the Civil Code.
‘rime and time agaln, we have held that the allegations {n the complaint
determine the nature of the action and, consequently, the jurisdiction of the
courts. After carefully examining the