The Road To Gaugamela and Arbela PDF

ANDREAS P.
PARPAS
ALEXANDER THE GREAT IN ERBIL
The Military Battle of Gaugamela

331 B.C.
The Political Victory at Arbela
Andreas P. Parpas
The Military Battle of Gaugamela

331 B.C.
The Political Victory at Arbela
To Alexandros and Irini
“So, 'except the Lacedaemonians' at Granicus,
then at Issus, then in the decisive battle
where the terrible army
the Persians mustered at Arbela was wiped out:
it set out for victory from Arbela, and was wiped out.”
Constantine P. Cavafy
In the year 200 B.C.
CONTENTS
P R E F A C E - 15
I N T R O D U C T I O N - 19
CHAPTER I
ALEXANDER IN HISTORY - 25
(1.1) The Greek civilization and the Mesopotamian
and other Eastern cultures and civilizations - 26
(1.2) Alexander: the king, military commander and statesman - 28
CHAPTER II
The Persian Empire - 33
(2.1) The Achaemenid dynasty - 33
(2.2) The last of the Achaemenids - 42
(2.3) Greco-Persian relations - 43
(2.4) The Persian army - 45
CHAPTER III
THE KINGDOM OF MACEDONIA - 55
(3.1) The Macedonians - 55
(3.2) King Philip II - 61
(3.3) The Macedonian army - 62
(3.4) The allied and mercenary armies - 70
(3.5) Alexander’s army that crossed the Hellespont
into Asia Minor in 334 B.C. - 75
CHAPTER IV
ARBELA IN ASSYRIA - 77
(4.1) Assyria - 77
(4.2) The city of Arbela and its patron goddess Ishtar of Arbela - 80
(4.3) The Greek foundation myths for Arbela,
the Kurds and the Kurdish mountains - 86
(4.4) Ancient Near East and Greek religious parallels.
Greek, Assyrian-Persian religious identification - 90
CHAPTER V
The road to Gaugamela and Arbela - 93
(5.1) The march from Tyre to Thapsacus - 95
(5.2) Darius’ generous offer for a negotiated settlement - 96
(5.3) Alexander’s strategy and the route
from Thapsacus to Tigris in Assyria - 98
(5.4) The march of the Persian army from Babylon to Arbela - 105
(5.5) The final march of Alexander the Great
and Darius to Gaugamela - 108
CHAPTER VI
THE MILITARY BATTLE OF GAUGAMELA - 119
(6.1) The Macedonian army - 123
(6.2) The Persian army - 127
(6.3) The position of the Kurds in the battle - 130
(6.4) The battle - 132
CHAPTER VII
The political victory at Arbela - 141
(7.1) The importance of the events that took place at Arbela - 142
(7.2) Arbela and the Hill of Nikatorion - 150
(7.3) Modern Erbil reconnects to its ancient history - 153
(7.4) From Arbela to Babylon - 155
CHAPTER VIII
ALEXANDER'S KINGSHIP OF ASIA - 161
(8.1) The Kingdom of Asia - 161
(8.2) The diplomatic negotiations between Alexander and Darius
and the evolution of the concept of Asia - 166
(8.3) Alexander’s kingship and the Iranians - 170
(8.4) The influence of Alexander’s kingship
and ideology on his successors - 173
(8.5) Traditional Persian romance and Alexander’s kingship - 177
N O T E S - 181
A B B R E V I AT I O N S O F A N C I E N T S O U R C E S - 215
A N C I E N T S O U R C E S - 217
B I B L I O G R A P H Y A N D A B B R E V I AT I O N S - 221
I N D E X - 237
P R E FAC E
My first trip to Iraq was in June 1975 when I was twenty-five years old.
I lived and worked there for the best part of the next fifteen years up until
July 1990, two months before the invasion of Saddam Hussein in Kuwait.
I am an engineer by profession but have always had a particular interest in
ancient history. Iraq at that time, especially in the seventies, was the perfect
place to combine work and history. I was fortunate to have visited places like
Babylon, Arbela, Nineveh, Ur, Ctesiphon, Seleukia on the Tigris and other
historical sites mentioned in the Bible, as well as the Baghdad Museum and
many important Islamic shrines. My only regret is that I did not have the
time to study these places closer during those years.
Since 2010, I have come back to Iraq again on business. Unfortunately,
forty years later, Iraq is a much different place from the country I knew back
in the late seventies. In spite of this, this time I was determined to spend
considerable time researching and studying all those historical places related to
my area of particular interest, which is Alexander the Great and the Hellenistic
presence in Mesopotamia and the Near East.
One place I visit quite regularly is the Iraqi Region of Kurdistan (IRK).
This prompted me to devote time to studying the battle of Gaugamela and
writing a book on the particular battle and Alexander’s presence in Erbil. IRK,
up until the recent turmoil, which was caused by the occupation of large
parts of Northern Iraq by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), was
a safe haven not only to work in but also to conduct archaeological surveys
and other historical studies. I hope soon enough it will become once again
the safe place everybody enjoyed to visit and work in.
15
I was very fortunate to have the support of the University of Cyprus and
especially of its Rector Dr. Costas Christofides as well as of Dr. Theodoros
Mavroyiannis, Associate Professor in the Department of History and
Archaeology, who provided me with a letter of introduction to the Salahaddin
University in Erbil. I am greatly indebted to the President of Salahaddin
University, Dr. Ahmed Anwar Dezaye, who firmly believed in my project
and brought me in contact with the University’s Department of Archaeology
with a recommendation to its staff to assist me in every way possible, as well
as to Dr. Zidan Bradosty, the Head of the Department of Archaeology, and
his team, who with their warm welcome and active support became a real
inspiration. I am wholeheartedly thankful for the visit they arranged to Tell
Gomel, the site of the battle, and the time we spent together to identify the
site and the interviews we had with officials and ordinary people from the
area. The workshop we conducted together, where the results of our visit were
presented, and the lively and interactive discussion that followed with more
than a hundred participants from the Salahaddin University was of great help
to me to understand the necessity to stop looking at Alexander’s campaign
and the presence of Hellenism in the East only from a Hellenocentric point
of view and to start considering the progress and the new findings of scholars
specializing in the history and culture of the Near East. Dr. Mavroyiannis’
presence during the visit to Gaugamela and his participation in the workshop,
as well as the lively discussions we had especially regarding the Erbil citadel
were very important for my work. The International Conference on Ancient
Arbela and the Pre-Islamic History of Erbil, which followed, was a big success
and gave me the opportunity to put together a lot of vital information for my
book. I wish to thank Mr. Ardalan Khwshnaw, lecturer of the Department
of Archaeology and a specialist on Akkadian language at the Salahaddin
University, for his support, as well as all those good friends I made in Erbil,
who assisted me during the preparation of this book. I am also thankful to
Dr. Panos Christodoulou and the University of Cyprus for their support.
16
PREFACE
Finally, I am greatly indebted to Stavros G. Lazarides for his detailed editing

work and Philppos Vassiliades for his graphic design and illustrations.
This is my second book on Alexander the Great. The first one was about the
Dissolution of the Persian Naval Supremacy 334-331 B.C. In this one, I chose
the subject of the battle of Gaugamela and the political victory at Arbela because
of their tremendous importance on the world history. On 1 October 331 B.C.,
the actual date of the battle, the first ever civilization, which expressed itself in
cuneiform writing, was overtaken by a second one, which expressed itself through
alphabets. I wrote this book on the principle that it is not always necessary to
have hard direct historical evidence for an event to have happened. The fact
that we do not have such evidence does not necessarily mean that nothing took
place. We need to look at circumstantial evidence and draw conclusions from
similar events and by applying a consistent methodology to come to reasonably
defendable proposals. I hope I did not abuse this fundamental principle.
Andreas P. Parpas
20 August 2014
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CHAPTER V
THE ROAD TO GAUGAMELA AND ARBELA
As we have seen, Alexander crossed the Hellespont and entered Asia with an
army of 35,000 men and a navy of 182 ships, 160 of which were provided
by his Greek allies. His first pitched battle against the Persians took place at
the Granicus River, where the Persian satrapal and mercenary armies proved
a poor match to the Macedonians. Most importantly, Alexander’s military
skills and his fearless habit to lead in person his unbeatable royal cavalry of
companions established his superiority against the enemy and an advantage
of higher morale amongst his troops that was characteristic of his entire
campaign. His victory at the Granicus gave him the much needed financial
power to finance the next steps of his campaign. He freed one after the
other the Greek cities of Asia Minor and placed them under his control. He
contained with great difficulty the Persian naval superiority in the Aegean
and the Southeastern Mediterranean. He initially disbanded his navy, which
was no match to the Persian imperial fleet that consisted mainly of ships and
crews provided by Phoenicia and Cyprus, and blockaded the Persian navy by
occupying and controlling the cities of the shores of Asia Minor. However,
the Persian presence and activities in the Aegean remained a real threat for
Alexander’s communications and supply routes.
Alexander’s second decisive battle against the Persians took place at Issus,
where this time Darius himself led the Persian army against Alexander. For
the second time, the Persians were defeated and Darius had to abandon the
battlefield in order to save his life. He also abandoned and left behind his
whole family, who accompanied him to the campaign. Darius’ mother, his
wife and children became Alexander’s prisoners. The whole Persian Empire
was evidently at Alexander’s mercy. He had shown exceptional bravery and
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unparalleled military talent. With characteristic military genius and strategic

patience he proceeded to put firmly under his control the Mediterranean
Sea and the islands in the Aegean, the Phoenician coast and cities, as well as
Cyprus and Egypt. Immediately after the victory at Issus, the Phoenicians and
the Cyprian navies abandoned the Persians and joined Alexander during the
siege of Tyre. The city of Tyre on the Phoenician coast put up a gallant fight
and resisted for a long time Alexander’s forces. Their resistance was part of the
grand Persian plan to obstruct Alexander’s strategy to conquer the Southeastern
Mediterranean coast and in essence turn the sea into a Macedonian lake.
According to Diodorus, their target was also to delay Alexander in order to
give breathing space to Darius to prepare his grand army:
“They would draw Alexander into a protracted and difficult siege and give
Darius time for his military preparations.”(1)
Eventually, they capitulated and surrendered their city to the victorious

Macedonians who soon afterwards proceeded to free the Egyptians from
the Persians and put them under their control. This way Alexander and his
Macedonian army put under their military and administrative control most
of Asia Minor, Phoenicia, Cyprus and Egypt. The Persian threat especially
with the alliance of Agis III, the king of Sparta, at the rear of Alexander’s army
was still a problem but one that was contained and eventually eliminated by
Antipater,(2) the Macedonian viceroy Alexander left behind to regulate the affairs
of Greece. Darius’ strategy to create a front at the rear of Alexander’s army
reveals a strategic mind and a thorough knowledge of military affairs and tactics.
The Persian king was unlucky because the Rhodian general Memnon, whom
he had appointed to execute the plan, died. Otherwise, if he had succeeded,
history might have declared Darius the brilliant strategist and not Alexander.
While in Egypt, Alexander gave instructions to build the city of Alexandria,
the best known of many cities he founded. In three short but intensive and
successful years, Alexander pushed back the Persians east of the river Euphrates
and laid the foundations to establish his Kingdom of Asia. He challenged
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CHAPTER V • THE ROAD TO GAUGAMELA AND ARBELA
and provoked Darius for one last decisive battle. He knew that as the gods
granted him the kingdom of Asia, a land won by his spear when he landed at
the Hellespont, they would also grant him victory in the final decisive battle
and thus make him the undisputed King of all Asia and King of the World.
Undoubtedly, he was a man who firmly believed in mission and destiny. In
spite of his young age he had shown exceptional leadership and a strategic
patience and brilliance that was characteristic in the way he proceeded and
approached the last and decisive battle against the Persian king and the massive
army he mustered at Babylon.
(5.1) The march from Tyre to Thapsacus (Fig. 1)
Alexander returned from Egypt to Tyre in around the beginning to mid-June

331 B.C.(3) About eighteen months had passed since the battle of Issus and
twelve months since the siege of Tyre. He had already received information
of the large army that Darius had mustered in Babylon and his preparations
for one last pitched decisive battle. While he was still waiting for the new
recruits from Greece, he ordered Arrimas, the satrap of Syria, to collect the
necessary grain and other food supplies and provisions from Syria and other
areas and to despatch them to Thapsacus for the army’s needs in the march
east of the Euphrates. He had two options from which to choose to march
his army. The first option was to go across Syria through Damascus, Holms,
Hamma, Aleppo all the way to Euphrates at the crossing at Thapsacus. The
second one(4) was to march along the Phoenician coast up to the coastal area
where Seleucia, the port of Antioch, was built later on. Use the port as a
gathering station of supplies, equipment and men and turn right through
the Orontes’ valley to Thapsacus. Both routes were well supplied. The first
route’s main disadvantage was that the army had to march through desert
and high temperatures. The second route had the possibility to use the fleet
to transport provisions, supplies and equipment to Seleucia. We are assisted
by Curtius to determine which route he had taken, who informs us that it
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took Alexander eleven days(5) to reach Thapsacus.(6) Considering a rest day

and a march rate of 20 km/day, this would represent about 200 km. This is
half the distance from Tyre to Thapsacus if he had taken the inland road via
Damascus. On the other hand, if we take Seleucia as the starting point the
200 km is of the right order. He had thus most probably taken the second
option: He marched from Tyre to Seleucia, used the old port as a gathering
centre and turned right and headed towards Thapsacus.
(5.2) Darius’ generous offer for a negotiated settlement
Alexander returned to Tyre from Egypt in around mid-June. Darius’ wife

Stateira passed away before Alexander left for Thapsacus. The exact date can
only be a matter of speculation. Following her death, Darius sent his final
offer for a negotiated settlement most probably when Alexander was at Tyre.
For the problem of the dates and number and contents of the peace offers,
as well as the different views among historians on the chronology of the
letter and Stateira’s death, the reader is referred to the summary given in the
notes.(7) For the purpose of this book, we will accept that Darius’ offer for a
negotiated settlement was made before the crossing at Thapsacus. Alexander
most probably received the offer while he was getting ready to commence
his journey that would bring him to Thapsacus and then to Gaugamela to
defeat Darius in battle and from there to Arbela where his army celebrated
his victory and proclaimed him King of Asia. The offer, which the Persian
ambassadors presented to Alexander, at first glance was a very generous one.
Darius offered him all the lands from the Hellespont to the Euphrates. In the
words of Parmenion that would have made him the owner of all the lands
from the Danube to the Euphrates. However, Alexander’s answer was based
on the fact that he already possessed the lands offered to him by the Persian
king. (8) Darius also offered Ochus, his younger son, as hostage and one of
his daughters as wife. The offer also included the handsome sum of 30,000
talents in gold in return of the freedom of Darius’ mother Sisigambis and his
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two unmarried young daughters. The offer was rejected outright in spite of
Parmenion’s advice to accept it.(9) To place the chronology of this final offer by
Darius just before the crossing of Thapsacus makes sense since by that time
the Persians were routed out of Asia Minor, Egypt and the Phoenician coast.
Their naval presence in the Mediterranean was eliminated.(10) Only Agis III of
Sparta(11) was still creating problems in the Aegean and the Peloponnese but
Alexander was confident that Antipater, the regent in charge of Macedonia and
Greece, would finally manage to handle this. Alexander was in control of all
territories up to the Euphrates and his ability to cross over into Mesopotamia
proper and take more lands was not in doubt. On the other hand, Darius was
feeling strong enough after he mustered the biggest army ever and was getting
ready to meet Alexander in a decisive pitched battle. In spite of this, he had
every reason to make this offer at that particular point of time in order to
prevent Alexander from conquering more lands and in this respect increase
his expectations and demands. If we accept to place Darius’s offer after the
crossing of the Euphrates, we do not have a credible answer to the argument
as to how Darius could expect Alexander to accept less land and power than he
already had in his possession. One should not disregard the personal element
behind Darius’ offer. Already his wife had passed away in captivity and in spite
of the fact that his mother and his two unmarried daughters under Alexander’s
custody were given a royal treatment, for which he was amply thankful,(12)
still he was anxious to set them free. With his blunt rejection of the Persian
terms of peace and his challenge and threat to Darius that he will claim and
win in battle the rest of his possessions, Alexander was provoking him for a
last decisive pitched battle. Alexander’s confidence was already riding high
after the decisive victories at Granicus and Issus and the elimination of the
Persians from Asia Minor and the destruction of their naval presence in the
Mediterranean, as well as the conquest of Tyre and the control of Egypt. He
was in no mood to compromise, and rightly so. He already decided that all
Asia was his for the taking as a “spear won land” and the only way to achieve
this was to destroy the Persian war machine and eliminate Darius, thus
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becoming King of all Asia. This is exactly what his army proclaimed him:
“King of all Asia”(13) in the magnificent celebrations that were held at Arbela
after the decisive victory at Gaugamela some two and a half months later.
(5.3) Alexander’s strategy and route from Thapsacus to Tigris in Assyria

(Figures 1 and 2)
While Darius was still at Babylon, where his army had concentrated to prepare
for the forthcoming decisive battle with the Macedonians,(14) Alexander and
his army arrived at Thapsacus,(15) the most frequently used crossing point
between Mesopotamia and Syria on the Euphrates. According to Arrian,
drawing on Ptolemy and Aristobulus, Alexander arrived with his 47,000 strong
army,(16) consisting of 40,000 infantry and 7,000 cavalry during the month of
Hecatombaeon, when Aristophanes was the ruler of Athens, i.e. between 10
July to 9 August 331 B.C. This was the strongest army he had ever fielded in all
his battles up to that time. From the turn of events, distances and chronology
as shown in Fig. 2, Alexander’s army arrived at Thapsacus in around the last
week of July. Earlier, on his way,(17) he replaced Arrimas, the satrap of Syria,
with Asclepiodorus, son of Eunicus, because he failed in his duties. This is the
first and only time Arrimas’ name appears in historical sources and evidently
he was not one of Alexander’s better appointments. Arrimas appears to have
failed to collect well in advance the necessary food supplies and provisions for
the campaign in Mesopotamia as instructed. Evidently, among other orders,
he failed, during June, the month of harvest, to collect enough grain and to
have it transported and delivered as ordered. So until Alexander sorted this
important logistical headache and gathered enough supplies for his army and
the necessary baggage trains to accompany him to his trip he most probably
delayed his crossing up to around the 1st of August. Given that the army could
not have lived wholly of the land Alexander must have needed at least 2,000
wagons for support.(18) This was a logistical operation of immense importance
since the total food and water supplies required were substantial.(19)
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Thapsacus, mentioned in the ancient sources, is most probably close to

ancient Carchemish.(20) It is located on the western bank of the Euphrates
on the border between Turkey and Syria. It is most probably in the vicinity
of the modern neighbouring cities of Karkamis in Turkey and Jarablus in
Syria. In Strabo, it is described as the old crossing point and bridge on the
Euphrates.(21) It is also reported by Xenophon as the crossing place(22) which
Cyrus the Younger used on his way to the battle at Cunaxa some seventy
years back in 401 B.C. Darius also used the same crossing, which took him
five days to go through on his way to the battle of Issus.(23)
Darius sent Mazeus to guard the crossing at Thapsacus with instructions
to observe Alexander’s movements and report back which way he had taken
after the crossing. Mazeus had with him some 3,000 cavalry and infantry,
which included 2,000 Greek mercenaries.(24) Mazeus was there long enough
to distract Alexander’s engineers, who under the command of Hephaestion(25)
were trying to complete a double bridge for Alexander to cross over. Evidently,
his military strength at Thapsacus was enough to stop the engineers of
Alexander’s army from completing the bridge but too little to stage any kind
of fight against the might of Alexander’s entire army. The strength of the
cavalry and infantry he had with him points out to another mission: The one
of burning any vegetation and laying waste all lands along the Euphrates in
case Alexander had taken that route to Babylon.
So when Alexander appeared at Thapsacus, Mazeus and his men withdrew
from the river to a safe distance and when they realized that the Macedonians,
instead of taking the short route to Babylon along the Euphrates, had taken
the road up north, along the old Royal Road and caravan route through
the Armenian mountains towards the Tigris, they turned around and left.
They galloped in a hurry to report the matter to Darius at the royal army
headquarters in Babylon. In such a case there was no reason to burn and
lay waste the land along the Euphrates since the Macedonians had opted to
take that that particular route. This is the reason none of the ancient sources
mention such action along the Euphrates.
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When Mazeus withdrew from the banks east of the Euphrates and stopped
harassing them, the engineers were able to finish the construction of the
bridges and Alexander crossed over within five days and was on his way to
the Tigris taking the road up north through the Armenian mountains on or
about the 5th of August. The river at the crossing point was about four stadia
or about 750 metres(26) and quite deep that could only be crossed by ship or
on bridge.(27) Most probably the Macedonians constructed a floating pontoon
bridge, which was the usual way of crossing rivers in antiquity. One of Mazeus’
missions might have been to destroy any existing bridging facilities and for
this purpose Alexander’s engineers built a new one. Thapsacus was used again
by Alexander shortly before his death, as a gathering station to assemble the
ships he had ordered to be constructed in Phoenicia and Cyprus.(28) These
ships, which sailed down the river all the way to Babylon, were supposed to
be used in his campaign to conquer Arabia. Evidently, the Euphrates was deep
enough for ship sailing. This is perhaps another of Arrimas’ failures: To gather
small boats and rafts to carry food and supplies along the Euphrates in case
Alexander had chosen to take that route. So instead of taking the 4,800 stadia
road(29) from Thapsacus to Babylon, through the Mesopotamian plain along
the Euphrates, Alexander headed north to cross the Tigris River having the
Euphrates and the Armenian mountains to his left.(30) This means he headed
north as far as Karcali Dag(31). In actual fact, Alexander did exactly the opposite
the Persians were hoping he would do. Darius mustered his enormous army
at Babylon and prepared himself for a set-piece final decisive battle in the
wide and open level terrain plains somewhere north of Babylon. His choice
was a battlefield close to Babylon, which was his headquarters and centre of
communication. In Babylon he had plenty of food and supplies and ample
logistic and support facilities. This way he could have taken the initiative and
eliminate the possibility of the element of surprise from any of Alexander’s
tactics. He was well prepared for this and his military commanders trained
their armies accordingly. This is exactly what Alexander wanted to avoid.
He was not prepared to enter into such a decisive battle at a place of Darius’
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choice, where the initiative rested solely with the Persians and where he was
deprived of using the element of surprise in his favour. The road up north,
with the Armenian mountains to the left, entailed additional difficulty due to
the crossing of fast flowing tributary rivers flowing into the Euphrates from
the Armenian mountains. In spite of this, Alexander had chosen to take the
route because temperatures were lower than down at the Mesopotamian valley
but most importantly he could be assured of easily obtainable food supplies
and other provisions for the men and grass and fodder for the animals.(32)
The northeast road Alexander took was intended to bring him eventually
close to the old military Royal Road and caravan route and from there to
a convenient crossing at the Tigris River. The Persian Royal Road, which
was intended to facilitate efficient communications and transport as well as
orderly moves of military forces, was an attractive route for Alexander. It was
paved with stone or bricks and at about every 30 km intervals (about one
day travel) there were “royal stages”. The road was well kept and supervised
with road watchmen. This well maintained road system, which was a basic
element of the Persian Empire infrastructure, gave the opportunity for fast
and efficient transport and communication.(32a) The road ran from Sardis in
Western Anatolia to Susa in Elam with several royal staging-posts and inns,
where messengers and travellers could get supplies and fresh horses. Alexander
was also hoping to provoke Darius to meet him in the mountainous areas,
where he would lose much of the advantage due to the numerical superiority
of his army.
He made the 2,400 stadia trip(33) (approximately 450 km) to Tigris in about
42 days (see Fig. 2) at an average pace of 11 km/day. No doubt his “bematists”
(land surveyors) measured precisely the distance, which was entered in the
King’s military journal. Normally under forced march conditions, which is
about 32 km per day,(34) such a trip could have been made in less than two
weeks. Evidently, it took Alexander more than twice as long as it should have
normally taken him. Taking into consideration that he forced marched his
army at the last part of the way since he wanted to cross the river before Darius
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would try to prevent his crossing, his pace was a real slow one. A possible
reason for the delay is that he wanted to make sure that the people of the area
were subjugated and his supply lines and communications were secured and
in that way he would not run any risk of having a hostile crowd at his rear.
Since he knew that a battle at the mountainous areas was to his advantage, he
was going at slow pace to give Darius time to come and confront him there.
One thing is for sure: Alexander was not in a hurry. He wanted to exhaust the
Persian king’s mental stamina before confronting him in battle. Most of these
areas are located in the modern Northern Syrian Kurdistan region bordering
Southern Turkey with cities like Nisibis, Carrhae and Resaina. Today’s Syrian
city Qamishli is basically an extension of ancient Nisibis, which is located
inside the Turkish border.(34a) Ras al-Ain forms a divided city with the city
Ceylanpinar on the Turkish side. Carrhae is the modern city of Harran in
Turkey. It is the place where a decisive battle between the Parthians and the
Romans took place. The Roman Marcus Licinus Crassus suffered a crushing
defeat in the hand of the Parthian general Surena. The Roman infantry was
outmanoeuvred by the outnumbered Parthian cavalry and suffered one of
the most humiliating defeats in Roman history, which resulted in the death
of Crassus and a civil war between Julius Ceasar and Pompeii.
It has been suggested by some contemporary historians that Alexander did
not take the road south along the Euphrates because the area could not provide
for an army of the size of Alexander’s military machine. Personally, I cannot
agree with such a view. I lived in Iraq between 1975 and 1998 and travelled that
area extensively. My impression was of a very fertile place, especially all along
the river. It is also well known that in the ancient times and particularly in the
4th century B.C. there was even more vegetation and plantations in that area
than today. This is why the Akkadian name of Euphrates was “Puratu”, which
means “the fruitful one” The flow of Euphrates was leisurely and most of the
times level with its banks. This made settling and farming along its banks more
easy and plentiful. Instead, the Tigris Sumerian name was “Idigina”, which
meant “swift river” because of its fast flows between high banks.
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Alexander must have known from Xenophon’s Anabasis that the road down
south along the Euphrates could sustain his army as far as food and water
supplies were concerned. Xenophon reported that on his way to the battle of
Cunaxa, Cyrus the Younger took that road where he must have used the river
to transport supplies and food. The Mesopotamian valley was fertile and rich
in vegetation and plantations. Grain had already been harvested since June
and stored within the walls of the various cities. There were plenty of cities
and villages on the way where his army could, admittedly with difficulty, get
enough food.(35) In the area where the river Araxes, today’s Balikh river, meets
the Euphrates there were small villages where one could get grain and wine.(36)
This is where Seleucus II founded the eponymous Hellenistic city of Callinicus,
the modern Syrian city of Raqqah.(36a) Further down, where the Khabur meets
the Euphrates, near modern Dar Al Zour, Cyrus’ army stayed for three days for
resupply purposes.(37) Furthermore, according to Xenophon, at the confluence
of the Khabur and the Euphrates there was an old deserted city called Koropi
which could be the old Assyrian city of Sirhi. This is close to where the Roman
city Circesium was founded by Emperor Diocletian. Not far on the western
banks of the river, Nicanor, a Seleucid general, built Dura Europos. In between
these areas, Xenophon reports the existence of plenty of wild animals and game
which the army could hunt for its meat supplies.(38) Although further down
part of the route was desert with relatively high temperatures where food
supplies were scarce as a result of which the army of Cyrus the Younger lost
most of their animals,(39) evidently still the route along the Euphrates could
have sustained Alexander’s army like it did for Cyrus the Younger as well as
Darius on his way to Issus and the Roman legions later on. Even if Mazeus
had burned the villages and laid waste of the land along the river like in the
case of Cyrus the Younger,(40) Alexander could still use the river to resupply
the army. Evidently, he chose not to take the road to the south not because of
the scarcity of food and provisions for the army and the animals but because
he did not want to fight Darius at a place where his enemy was much stronger
and where he could not have the initiative in his military moves.
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Fig. 1 Map showing the march of Alexander the Great and Darius to Gaugamela
(5.4) The march of the Persian army from Babylon to Arbela
Darius assembled a massive army at Babylon, one that was much better
equipped than at the battle of Issus.(41) Learning from his army deficiencies at
Issus, he introduced many improvements especially in the army’s weaponry.
He replaced the javelins, which the cavalry was carrying, with lances. He
introduced the long sword in replacement of the Persian scimitar. In spite
of their unproven record, he built scythed chariots capable of penetrating
through infantry or cavalry and theoretically destroying the enemy’s orderly
positions. His first preference and plan for place of battle was to fight Alexander
at the familiar open and level terrain near Babylon. From Mazeus’ report
this was not possible any more. Alexander ruined his plans by moving
northeast to cross the Tigris River presumably near or north of Nineveh.
The distance from Thapsacus to Babylon in the ancient times is reported by
Strabo at about 4,800 stadia (approximately 900 km). Presumably, Mazeus
sent mounted messengers, who must have galloped back as fast as they could,
to break the news to Darius. It should have taken them about seven days.
Since we determined that Alexander departed Thapsacus on or about the
5th of August, (Fig. 2) then Darius was firmly aware of the new situation
on or about the 12th of August. All his plans became obsolete. By refusing
to meet him in the Mesopotamian plain near Babylon, Alexander had taken
the initiative away from the Persians and was calling the shots himself. In
actual fact, with his tactical moves later on he seized the element of surprise
as well. Darius had no choice but to march his army immediately up north
to meet Alexander and look for a place with enough space and level terrain
to take full advantage of his numerical superiority. Diodorus, most probably
using the “mercenaries’ source”, informs us that Darius decided that such
place was Nineveh since there were enough places around the old Assyrian
capital suitable enough for his plans.
“His intention was to give the battle at Nino (Nineveh) because the surrounding
flat areas were spacious and suitable for the large army he had mustered.”(42)
105
Arrian also informs us that he intended to encamp on the Tigris, possibly

next to Nineveh, and obstruct Alexander to cross:
“Darius was in position on the river Tigris, determined to check Alexander

if he crossed.”(43)
We could assume then that the Persian king left Babylon on or about
the 12th of August by keeping the Tigris to his right, therefore taking full
advantage of the fertile grounds of that area. It would make no sense to have
started his march up north before learning that Alexander was heading that
direction otherwise he would have left Babylon, the soul and financial and
commercial centre of his empire, to the mercy of his enemy. He crossed the
Tigris heading up north but instead of going straight to Nineveh, which was
his initial plan, he headed for Arbela, where he set up his headquarters and
assembled his entire army for the final preparations to confront Alexander.
We don’t know at what stage and for which particular reasons he changed his
mind and headed for Arbela instead. Arbela was previously a military city used
by the Assyrian kings to start many victorious campaigns. While Nineveh was
destroyed by the Medes, Arbela evidently was spared and the Persians used
the city as the capital of the region and retained the city’s commercial and
political military as well as religious importance. Therefore, one credible reason
might be the city’s military reputation and facilities. We also know that Arbela
was well irrigated and from there Darius could have better communication
facilities, as well as logistical support for supplying his large army. Therefore,
another reason could be Arbela’s capacity and abundance with respect to food
and supplies for his army. On his way to Arbela he sent advance scouts to
monitor Alexander’s movements with instructions when they sighted Alexander
to immediately report back of his whereabouts. These are the scouts(44) that
Alexander arrested in mid-September. It is from them that he had learned that
Darius was heading for Arbela to set up his headquarters and probably of his
initial plans and his intention to obstruct Alexander to cross the Tigris most
probably near Nineveh. Darius made the 450 km march to Arbela in about
106
Fig. 2 The march of Alexander the Great and Darius to Gaugamela (5 August - 1 October 331 B.C.)
33 days and reached the city on or about the 15th of September. He must
have marched at an average pace of 13.5 km/day. Considering the size of his
slow moving army, its resupply and logistical support, as well as the fact that
the trip included a five-day crossing of the Tigris River, the pace was above
average. Darius set up camp at Arbela where he set up his headquarters. Most
probably he knew of Alexander’s approximate whereabouts and he realized
he did not have enough time to march to Nineveh and challenge Alexander
during the crossing and engage in the final decisive battle. His strong and
large army was not mobile enough for quick decisive moves. While he was
looking for another suitable ground for the battle, he took advantage of the
few days at Arbela to complete the training of his army by conducting military
drills and thus bring the operational readiness of his military forces to the new
requirements. Darius was not used to last minute change of plans and tactical
moves. The fact that he moved up north and instead of heading directly to
Nineveh he went first to Arbela it upset his entire planning and surrendered
the whole initiative and element of surprise to Alexander. Alexander’s strategic
genius was no match to Darius’ static and set piece tactics.
(5.5) The final march of Alexander the Great and Darius to Gaugamela
Upon receiving, around mid-September, the information from Darius’ scouts

regarding the Persian army’s actual whereabouts and intentions, Alexander
forced marched his soldiers so that he could reach the Tigris before Darius
would have the chance to send his army to block his passage. He reached
the Tigris after a long 42-day march on or about the 17th of September and
crossed over between the 18th and 20th of September. He passed the Tigris by
fording the river(45) north of Nineveh in order to avoid the reported intention
of Darius to obstruct him there. The crossing was done either near Abu Dhahir
or Abu Wajnam but most likely he crossed north of the latter. From an account
given by Sultan Murad IV, we know that the Turkish army, in their march of
conquest upon Baghdad, crossed the Tigris at a point which lay at a distance
108
of ten hour journey from Eski Mosul. This distance agrees closely with the
crossing north of Abu Wajnam.(46) The crossing of the river by the Macedonian
army, although unopposed, was done with great difficulty due to its fast
flowing current.(47) In actual fact, if the Macedonian army had attempted to
cross during winter or spring, when much more water was flowing, the task
might have proven much more difficult. Darius was not there with his army
to meet Alexander’s forces. When Alexander approached Abu Wajnam, Darius
and his army were just leaving Arbela for Gaugamela (see Fig. 2). No doubt
he was immediately notified of Alexander’s arrival at the particular crossing
on the Tigris but evidently he could not be there on time to obstruct his
passage. Furthermore, after the bad experience at the Granicus, he might not
have been interested in a battle on the river bank after all. Therefore, on or
about the 18th of September, when Alexander’s army started the crossing of
the river, Darius’ army started their march out of Arbela and moving along
the Royal Road headed northwest towards Gaugamela. Clearly the initiative
was firmly in the hands of Alexander. Whatever the reasons, Darius missed
his chance to be at the crossing on the river. In his mind he was interested
in a set piece battle, where he would take advantage of his army’s numerical
superiority and greater mobility, primarily due to the much bigger cavalry,
rather than risk another defeat like the one at the river at Granicus. Instead,
he sent Mazeus with orders to harass and try to prevent Alexander from
crossing the Tigris.(48) Mazeus had with him 6,000 cavalry while another
cavalry commander Satropates with another 1,000 cavalry was already sent
ahead to meet the Macedonians. From the number of horses at his disposal,
it was clear that Mazeus’ task was to harass and disrupt Alexander, perhaps,
even to guide him to Gaugamela –Darius’s last choice of battle– rather than
force him into a decisive battle at the river. Instead of engaging Alexander
during the crossing, the two Persian commanders relied on the depth and
strong current of the river itself to make it difficult for the Macedonians to
cross. Meanwhile, they spent their time burning the areas to the east of the
river ahead of the Macedonians, so they could not get the necessary supplies
109
for their army and food for the animals. According to Curtius, if Mazeus
had attacked the Macedonians while they were in the water he would have
defeated them easily there and then. This criticism, most probably, comes
from the “mercenaries’ source” that was generally very critical of Mazeus’
conduct and tactics.
Evidently, while he was at Arbela, Darius dismissed his initial plan to
have the decisive battle with the Macedonians when they were about to
cross the Tigris near Nineveh.(49) At Arbela, where Darius set the royal army’s
headquarters, he kept under secure guard most of his royal furniture, including
his mobile throne, and his baggage, including the treasury, which he was
carrying with him. He moved his army out on or about the 18th of September
and headed northwest towards Gaugamela,(50) where he thought it was the best
site to fight Alexander. Gaugamela was a wide open spacious plain with level
terrain along the river Bumelus, a branch of the river Khazir, giving him the
military advantage he was seeking due to the numerical superiority of his army
and mobility of his cavalry. It is located near the modern city of Kalakchi.(51)
The distance between Arbela and Gaugamela is reported by Arrian at about
500 to 600 stadia,(52) which is a little longer than today’s distance of about
85-90 km. Darius followed the Royal Road and marched for Gaugamela by
crossing the bridge at the river Lycus which today is called Great Zab, on or
about the 25th September (see Fig. 2). The march to the point of crossing
took him about two days and the actual crossing itself another five days(53)
and then, according to Curtius,(54) after proceeding about 80 stadia, he came
across the river Bumelus. This distance is an underestimate since the actual
distance today from the site of Gaugamela to the existing bridge at Great Zab
is more than double. The actual distance is 35-40 km depending on which
road one takes. The river Bumelus today is called Gomel and is the western
branch of the river Khazir, which is a tributary of the river Great Zab. After
crossing the Lycus river, the Persian army marched for two days and then
set up camp at Gaugamela along the river, which is close to the mound of
Tell Gomel, on or about 27th September, three full days before the battle,
110
and prepared his army for the final showdown.(55) According to Plutarch
and Strabo,(56) Tell Gomel means “the house of the camel” where, according
to tradition, Hystaspes gave home to the camel that took him through the
Scythian desert. From there, Darius knew of the whereabouts of Alexander’s
camp, some 150 stadia away, and he was expecting him to arrive and be ready
for battle earlier than the 30th of September. For this reason he did not fortify
his positions accordingly. Professor Herzfeld identified the name Tell Gomel
as being derived from Gaugamela.(57) The site of Gaugamela or Tell Gomel,
which is close to the modern city of Kalakchi, is some 10 km north of Jabal
Maqlub mountain. Tell Gomel, lies near the old Royal Road from Nineveh
to Arbela and is located on the banks along the river Gomel. At the site today
there is a small village that the locals call Telljomel. It features an elevated
upper part with a few houses at an elevation of about 40 metres overlooking
a much bigger lower part of the village. It is just outside the Bardarash district
and is opposite a large fertile level plain area where the battle took place.
Bardarash is a rich agricultural district north of Erbil, which is crossed by
the three tributary rivers of Great Zab: Khazir, Gomel and Nardush.(58)
At this point we should consider what Alexander was doing in the
meantime. He crossed the Tigris, most probably north of Abu Wajnam, which
today is about 85-90 km from where the battle took place at Gaugamela.(59)
There, he rested and reassembled his army. There was a lunar eclipse mentioned
by all of Alexander’s major ancient sources,(60) which occurred on the night of
20 September 331 B.C. Plutarch(61) mentions that the night before the actual
battle was the 11th night from the eclipse. This determines the actual date
of the battle as the 1st of October 331 B.C. There is a discrepancy between
Arrian’s narrative and Plutarch’s eleven nights which has been the cause of
disagreement among contemporary historians as to the exact date of the
battle..(62) For the purpose of this book we will follow Plutarch who places
the battle on October 1st. The date of the eclipse as well as the date of the
battle are also backed by the Babylonian Astronomical Diaries, which makes
the case of October 1st undisputable.
111
The river Gomel (Bumelus)

and the Tell Gomel
(Telljomel) village in
the background
The iron bridge crossing

at the Great Zab (Lycus)
(photos by author)
112
“The 13th (20 September 331), moonset to sunrise: 8o... [...lunar] eclipse
in its totality covered: 10o of the night [totality...],<broken> Jupiter set;
Saturn [...] Throughout the total eclipse the west wind was blowing, as
it cleared the east wind [...] the fourth (?)... During the eclipse [...] death
and plague [...] That month (UIulu), on the 11th (18 September 331):
panic broke out in the camp of the king. [...] lay/encamped (?) opposite
the king. On the 24th (1 October 331), in the morning: the king of the
world [...] the standard (?). They fought with each other, and a severe
(?) defeat of the troops of [...] The troops of the king deserted him and to
their cities [...] They fled [to the l] and to Gutium [...]”(63)
The Babylonian Astronomical Diaries tablet(63a)
113
It is worth noting the position of the two armies at the night of the eclipse:
Alexander just crossed the Tigris north of Abu Wajnam, while Darius was
about to cross the Lycus river.
With the help of Aristander, Alexander sacrificed to the moon, the sun
and the earth. This proves that he knew very well the physical reasons of
the lunar eclipse. No wander this was due to the teachings of Aristotle. The
Macedonian army took it as a favourable omen identifying the eclipse with
the demise of the Persian Empire. By contrast, according to the Babylonian
Astronomical Diaries, the Persians and their allies did not regard its occurrence
as a positive sign for them.
After resting his army, Alexander marched through Assyria and on the fourth
day from crossing the river and after four days of marching,(64) the Macedonian
scouts sighted the first enemy troops, which were the 1,000 advance cavalry
under Satropates.(65) The date must have been the 25th of September. While
the rest of the army followed in regular march, ready for battle, Alexander rode
against the Persian advance cavalry with the royal squadron, one squadron of
companions and the Paeonian cavalry under Ariston. In the battle that followed,
Satropates was killed with most of his cavalry.(66) The Persian horsemen that
were captured alive confirmed that Darius and his army were close by but still
marching to their final preferred position for the battle. Alexander decided to
stay at the place where he received this information and rested his army for
four days,(67) that is until the 29th of September. There, he set up a fortified
camp, which he protected with a ditch and palisade, and put in the army’s
baggage train,(68) animals and injured soldiers. He extinguished the fires set by
the men of Mazeus and collected whatever supplies and provisions were still
available from the surrounding area. Evidently, before moving his own army
he wanted Darius’ army to reach and set up camp at the intended place of
battle. He sent advance scouts to locate and reconfirm the position of Darius.
The place he set camp was about 150 stadia (about 28 km)(69) from Gaugamela
where Darius was approaching with his large army. This is southwest of Jabel
Maqlub. Alexander was definitely not in a hurry. Since he left Thapsacus he
114
did not rush his army. Evidently, he was not going to do it on the final days
before the battle. On the night of the fourth day of rest, which was the 29th
of September, Alexander marched out of the camp at midnight (second night
watch) and after a march of about 90 stadia (about 17 km)(70) he brought his
army closer to Darius, who, realizing that the time for the confrontation was
approaching, ordered his army to get ready for battle.
At that time, the two opposing armies were 60 stadia (about 11 km),
between each other(71) but did not have visual contact because of hills in
between. Alexander was still at the southwestern foothills, which are part of
the Jabal Maqlub range. His plan was to march his army over the hills for
the decisive battle against the Persians on the next day. This he did. After a
good night’s rest, he and his army in the following morning of the 30th of
September climbed down the Jabel Maqlub northern foot hills and as they
positioned themselves on the north side of Jabel Maqlub, they sighted the
Persian army at about 30 stadia away (about 5.5 km).(72) Darius moved his
army already some 10 stadia (about 1.9 km) closer to Alexander and got
himself ready for battle.
Alexander called immediately his companions and other senior military
officials, including the leaders of the allied armies and mercenary forces, in
a war council.(73) Although most of his officers and military commanders
recommended to enter immediately into battle, Alexander agreed with
Parmenion to spend the day to thoroughly reconnoitre the battleground and
evaluate the enemy’s battle positions and arrangements.(74) Alexander personally
inspected the battleground and disposition and strength of Darius’ army and
got a personal idea of the terrain. Upon his return to the Macedonian camp he
had a pretty good idea of the Persian king’s battle strategy and from the way
he positioned his army he could reasonably deduce his tactics and estimate
his possible moves. He therefore planned his response and military tactics
accordingly. He reconvened his war council and exchanged information and
re-evaluated the last details of the next day’s battle.(75) Tactics and individual
orders and deployment of each and every commander were summarized and
115
reconfirmed making sure everybody knew his role. He gave orders to the army
to have a hearty supper and an early good night’s sleep. While Darius, being
afraid of a night attack, stood at battle positions all night, the Macedonian
army had rested and entered battle the next day in the best possible physical
condition, a fact that had a deciding contribution in the final outcome
of the battle. According to Curtius,(76) Darius in person together with his
generals did the round of the troops during the night and made sacrifices to
the Sun, to god Mithras and the eternal fires(77) to encourage and strengthen
his men. The sacrifices to Mithras were significant for Darius since, as we
have mentioned earlier, he was regarded the god of treaties, and Alexander’s
campaign was considered by Darius as a violation of a treaty between Persia
and Macedonia.(78) Mithras was also considered the protector of the king in
battle and the eternal fires represented the king’s royal power. According to
Curtius, eternal fire altars were erected in front of the Persian army.(78a) They
symbolized the royal power of the king and his army. These are the altars the
Macedonians must have extinguished and destroyed when they defeated the
Persian army, symbolizing in this way the termination of Darius' reign as well
as the defeat of the Persian army and the dissolution of the Persian Empire.
The fact that the Macedonians advanced so close was an added reason for the
Persians to spend the night in full battle order.(79) So the two armies spent
the night of 30th of September some 30 stadia (about 5.6 km) apart, seeing
from their camps each other’s fires and even hearing each other’s noise. At
night Parmenion visited Alexander’s tent. In Arrian’s writings, Parmenion is
alone and the incident is reported as a “legomenon”.(80) The same incident is
reported in Plutarch(81) and Curtius(82) but the two historians have Parmenion
being accompanied by other senior Macedonian commanders. During this
visit, Parmenion supported for an immediate night attack claiming that
such a move would take the enemy by surprise and would certainly bring
victory to the Macedonians. Alexander rebuked the suggestion and addressing
Polyperchon(83) he said: “I shall not steal a victory”,(84) and asked everybody to
withdraw to their quarters and rest for the battle the next day.
116
Alexander had a unique brilliant strategic patience. He knew what he

wanted from the battle and how he was going to achieve it. Since the crossing
at Thapsacus, his strategy had been one of indirect approach, whereby he
had Darius guessing which might be his next move. Using deception and
making visionary and daring decisions, he burned out Darius’ energy and
strengthened his position. He knew that the location of the battle was not
offering his opponent any insurmountable advantage. Although he was not
a text book general and Parmenion’s plan was still plausible(85) he was not
going to be pushed into last minute risky improvisations. Alexander’s slow
meticulous approach in the last four-five days was particularly designed
to keep the Persians vigilant during the nights and wear out their physical
strength and morale. With all these discussed and settled, he himself rested
and got ready for the big battle.
In the following morning, Alexander called his closest military
commanders for last minute consultations. He told them that he was not
anxious about the outcome of the battle since the way things developed
Darius had concentrated all his forces together in one place, whereby all would
be decided in one day. This way, a cumbersome and dangerous protracted
war would be avoided.(86) He also addressed individual selected units, like
the Thessalian and allied cavalry, and rode up and down the ranks to boost
the morale of the army.(87) He claimed for his divine origins and prayed to
the gods and asked for their help for victory. When he rode along the front
line and passed in front of the Thessalians and the other participants of the
Corinthian League he took his spear to his left hand and by lifting his right
hand to heaven he prayed that if he was really the son of Zeus, the gods
should assist the Greeks to achieve victory. Similarly, he raised the moral of
his Macedonian troops to the centre and right of his line, who cried to him
to lead them against the enemy. He then gave the command for the battle
to commence.

117
When the battle finished and the Macedonians won at the end of the day:
“The first half of all history ended and the second half began. The first ever
civilization, which expressed itself in cuneiform writing, was overtaken
by a second, which expressed itself through alphabets (and towards the end
of which we ourselves live).”(88)
118
30) (Plut. Artax. 3, 1-2): “A little while after the death of Dareius, the new king made
an expedition to Pasargadae, that he might receive the royal initiation at the hands
of the Persian priests. Here there is a sanctuary of a warlike goddess whom one might
conjecture to be Athena. Into this sanctuary the candidate for initiation must pass,
and after laying aside his own proper robe, must put on that which Cyrus the Elder
used to wear before he became king; then he must eat of a cake of figs, chew some
turpentine-wood, and drink a cup of sour milk. Whatever else is done besides this
is unknown to outsiders.”
31) FGrH 680 F11. Clem. Alex. Protr. 5, 65.2: Reference to Artaxerxes, who
erected statues of Aphrodite Anahita at Ecbatana, Babylon, Susa, Persis, Bactria,
Damascus and Sardis. This has been attested by the Babylonian scholar Berosus
who, writing seventy years after the reign of Artaxerxes II, records that the king
erected cult statues of Aphrodite Anaitis in these cities.
32) See Walter Burkert (1984).
33) Karageorghis, Stambolides (2003), pp. 356-357
CHAPTER V
THE ROAD TO GAUGAMELA AND ARBELA
1) (Diod. 17, 40.3): “[...] διδόντες δ’ ἄνεσιν τῷ Δαρείῳ πρὸς τὰς παρασκευάς.”
2) Antipater (c. 397-319 B.C.), son of Iolaus, a Macedonian nobleman, was,
together with Parmenion and Attalus, among the three most trusted generals
of Philip II. Although Antipater’s family was of no royal blood, they faithfully
served the royal house of the Argeads. During the crucial period after the
assassination of Philip II, Antipater supported Alexander’s succession, and
following Attalus’ execution on charges of treason, he was appointed regent
of Macedonia and general (strategos) of all Europe. Acknowledging Antipater’s
political and military skills, Alexander entrusted him with an army of 13,000
Macedonian soldiers: “[...] having entrusted the affairs of Macedonia and Greece to
Antipater,” (Arr. 1, 11.4) the Macedonian king set out on his Asiatic expedition
against the Persians. Besides Antipater, Alexander also left his mother Olympias
with the duties of “prostasias” (protector), which was considered as the most
prestigious office in the Macedonian kingdom [Hammond (1989)]. She had a
great influence and often caused great trouble to Antipater. She represented the
190
NOTES
king in his capacity as religious leader and was in charge of the royal treasury.
Antipater was in charge of all military matters and finances of the kingdom. In
that capacity, he undertook to assemble a fleet, under the command of Proteus,
in order to protect the Central and Western Aegean. He defeated the Spartans
at the battle of Megalopolis and killed Agis III. Thus, he eliminated completely
and irrevocably all threat by the Persians in Europe. He played a major role in
the Wars of the Successors and, after his death, his son Cassander eliminated
the dynasty of the Argeads and became the ruler of the Macedonian kingdom.
3) Engels (1978), p. 64
4) This option is supported by Engels (1978), p. 65, Atkinson (1980), p. 382 and
Nawotka (2012), map facing p. 1.
5) (Curt. 4, 9.12): “eleven days later he arrived at the Euphrates.”
6) Thapsacus was the old crossing point on the Euphrates. Later on, when Alexander’s
successors established their Hellenistic dynasties, and especially when Seleucus
moved his capital from Babylon to Seleucia on the Tigris, a second bridge was
built further down on the Euphrates at Kommagini (Str. 16, 2.1-3).
7) The ancient sources disagree not only on the number of offers made by Darius
but also on their content. Arrian refers to two offers: The first at Marathus
(Arr. 2, 14), made in the spring of 332 B.C., in which Darius asks for the return
of his family and offers an alliance treaty. The second offer was made at Tyre
(Arr. 2, 25) in the summer of 332 B.C. Darius makes territorial concessions by
surrendering all lands up to the Euphrates and offers Alexander 10,000 talents
for the release of his family. On the other hand, Curtius mentions three offers:
The first (Curt. 4, 1.7-4) at Marathus of same dates and contents as Arrian’s
first offer by Darius. The second (Curt. 4, 5.1-8) made during the siege of Tyre
in 332 B.C., in which Darius offers his daughter Stateira for marriage and all
lands between the Hellespont and Halys. The third offer (Curt. 4, 11.4) is
made before the battle of Gaugamela in the summer of 331 B.C. In this offer,
the Persian king proposes that his six or seven-year-old son Ochus be kept as
hostage and offers 30,000 talents for his mother and daughters. He also cedes
the territories between the Hellespont and the Euphrates. Diodorus, on the
other hand, mentions two offers. In the first offer, he is in broad agreement
with the other historians. The second offer (Diod. 17, 54.1-6) is placed before
the battle of Gaugamela and refers to 30,000 talents ransom, the hand of
Darius’ daughter and all territories up to the Euphrates. All these different
191
accounts leave open to debate the number, time and content of the offers
[see Atkinson (1980), pp. 395-399 and Bosworth (1980), pp. 227-233]. We
have already stated that for the purpose of this book we will put Darius’ third
offer before Alexander crossed Thapsacus, while he was still at Tyre making
his last preparations for the campaign. For the contents of the offer, we will
use Curtius as our base. According to Curtius (Curt. 4, 11.4), the envoys who
conveyed Darius’ third offer said to Alexander: “Were you not now delayed for the
supervision of her funeral, you would at this time be standing in battle formation.”
This refers to the death of Darius’ wife, Stateira, and from this statement one
can deduce this happened before Alexander’s departure from Tyre. We will not
take into consideration Plutarch’s story that she died while giving birth because
this would either suggest an eighteen-month pregnancy or that during her
captivity she was not properly treated or protected. However, this is not what
the envoys suggest, since they thanked Alexander for the royal attendance and
care of Darius’ family.
8) (Curt. 4, 11.19): “I am already across the Euphrates and my camp stands beyond
the boundary of the land he generously promises me.” This must be a manner of
speaking or even Curtius’ oratory addition. Alexander knew that there was
nothing to stop him from crossing the Euphrates so in his response, in order
to strengthen his argument, he assumed that he did.
9) Parmenion’s disagreement and Alexander’s reaction is a well-known incident
in antiquity. It is one of the most famous exchanges between them and it is
reproduced in almost all sources. Its historicity is in dispute. Perhaps, there
was a discussion on the merits of the proposal but most probably Alexander’s
historians, like Callisthenes, who were hostile to Parmenion, distorted what
really transpired during the debate.
10) Cf. A. P. Parpas, Alexander the Great: The Dissolution of the Persian Naval
Supremacy 334-331 B.C., Publisher: CreateSpace Independent Publishing
Platform, 2013.
11) King Agis III succeeded to the throne of Sparta upon his father’s death in
338 B.C. He refused to join the Corinthian League, and as a sworn enemy
of the Macedonians, he worked methodically all the years of Macedonian
sovereignty to rebuild the Spartan military machine, which was greatly
weakened with the failure of the campaign in Italy, where Agis’ father met
his death. In the summer of 333 B.C., he openly allied with the Persian naval
192
NOTES
forces in the Aegean and after the defeat of the Persians at Issus, he undertook
unsuccessfully to make Crete a Persian naval base. He took into his service
the 8,000 mercenaries who escaped after the battle of Issus and transferred
the war to the Peloponnese, where, after some initial successes, he sought
without any response the help of Athens. The Athenians refused to give him
the requested naval support. In 331-330 B.C., after he crushed the rebellion
of Memnon in Thrace, Antipater gathered a large army of about 40,000 men
and in a battle near Megalopolis, with the help of the Corinthian League, he
gained a complete victory over Agis III. He was killed during the battle of
Megalopolis as befits a Spartan king. The Spartans had to surrender like the
rest of Greek cities to the Macedonians.
12) (Curt. 4, 11.3)
13) (Plut. Alex. 34, 1)
14) (Diod. 17, 53.1-3)
15) (Arr. 3, 7.1)
16) (Arr. 3, 12.5)
17) (Arr. 3, 6.8)
18) Lane Fox (1973), p. 225
19) Engels (1978), pp. 11-25
20) Engels (1978), p. 64. However, Nawotka [Nawotka (2012), p. 215] suggests
that ancient Thapsacus might be today’s Dibse, which is situated by Asad Lake
Qa’lat Najim, about 80 km up river. Both sides are now in modern Syria.
21) (Str. 16, 1.21)
22) (Xen. Anab. 1, 4.11), Engels (1978), p. 64
23) (Curt. 4, 9.9)
24) (Arr. 3, 7.1), (Curt. 4, 9.12). Mazeus was a Persian noble and an important
military figure during the reign of Darius. He was one of Darius’ trusted men
(Diod. 17, 55.1). According to Diodorus and numismatic evidence, he was
satrap of Cilicia between 361-333 B.C. In 346-345, when Sidon surrendered
through the treachery of Tennes, Mazeus appears as satrap of both Cilicia and
Abarnahara in the reign of Artaxerxes III. He became later satrap of Mesopotamia
and Syria. Alexander appointed him as satrap of Babylonia (Arr. 3, 16.4). He
was the first Persian to receive such high office. [Atkinson (1980), p. 379,
Bosworth (1980), p. 286 and Heckel (2006), pp. 156-157]
25) Marsden (1964), p. 11
193
26) (Xen. Anab. 1, 4.11)

27) (Xen. Anab. 1, 4.18)
28) (Str. 16, 1.11)
29) (Str. 16, 1.22)
30) (Arr. 3, 7.3)
31) Hammond (1980), p. 133
32) (Arr. 3, 7.3)
32a) Wiesehöfer (2014), pp. 76-77
33) (Str. 16, 1.21)
34) Lane Fox (1973), p. 228
34a) Resaina is modern Ras al-Ain, where in 2013 the Syrian Kurds staged fierce
battles for its control against Al-Qaeda.
35) Engels (1978), p. 67
36) (Xen. Anab.1, 4.19)
36a) During the Syrian civil war in 2013, Raqqah fell into the hands of Al-Qaeda
and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, and according to the BBC it was
at that time the largest Al-Qaeda held city in the world.
37) (Xen. Anab. 1, 5.4)
38) (Xen. Anab. 1, 5.1-3 and 5-6)
39) (Xen. Anab. 1, 5.5-6)
40) (Xen. Anab. 1, 6.1)
41) (Diod. 17, 53.1-4), (Curt. 4, 9.2-4)
42) (Diod. 17, 53.4)
43) (Arr. 3, 7.4)
44) (Arr. 3, 7.4)
45) (Arr. 3, 7.5)
46) Stein (1942), pp. 156-158
47) (Curt. 4, 9.15-22), (Diod. 16, 55.3-6)
48) (Curt. 4, 9.7-8), (Diod. 17, 55.1-2)
49) (Arr. 3, 7.4)
50) (Arr. 3, 8.7)
51) This location, supported by Marsden, Engels, Bosworth, Schachermyer and
others, is against Sir Aurel Stein’s earlier proposal near Keramlais and Qarakosh.
In his paper “Notes on Alexander’s Crossing of the Tigris and the Battle of
Arbela”, published in The Geographical Journal (1942), Stein proposed that
194
NOTES
Gaugamela or Tell Gommel is six miles southeast of Keramlais, west of the

Khazir river, about six miles north of the confluence of the Great Zab and
the Khazir. Historical and recent geographical evidence no longer support
this location.
52) (Arr. 6, 11.5)
53) (Curt, 4, 9.9)
54) (Curt. 4, 9.10)
55) (Curt. 4, 9.10), (Arr. 3, 8.7)
56) (Plut. Alex. 3, 13), (Str. 16, 1.3)
57) Stein (1942), p. 164
58) The author is greatly indebted to Dr. Zidan Bradosty, Head of Archaeology
Department of Salahaddin University and his team for their invaluable help
and their escort to the site of Gaugamela. During our visit, we passed from the
office of the Mayor of Bardarash where we met and talked with local people,
who were born and had been living in villages close to Tell Gomel. They told
us that the villagers carried out excavations at the top of the mountain where
they found human skeletons. Most probably, the Macedonians buried at the top
of the mound the 100 men of the Royal Companion Cavalry (πολυάνδρειον),
who are reported to have been killed during the battle. We also met a retired
general of the Iraqi army, Jamil Mohamed Mustafa, who wrote a book in
Arabic on the battle of Gaugamela. He told us that when the US forces invaded
Iraq in 2003, they visited together the same Tell Gomel site and inspected
the ground. There is a strong tradition locally that this is the site of the battle
and as we are told all along the river one of the most common male names is
Iskander (Alexander).
59) Against Robin Lane Fox, who claims it was 76 miles. [Lane Fox (1973), p. 229]
60) (Arr. 3, 7.6), (Curt. 4, 10.2), (Plut. Alex. 31, 4). For the Babylonian Astronomical
Diaries, see Kuhrt (2010), p. 447.
61) (Plut. Alex. 31, 4)
62) In his paper “Notes on Alexander’s Campaigns 332-330”, Burn places the date
of the battle on the 27th September [Burn (1952), pp. 84-85]. Marsden gives
the 30th of September as the date of the battle. [Marsden (1964), p. 75]
63) Kuhrt (2010), p. 447
63a) The tablet is at the Louvre Museum in Paris.
64) (Arr. 3, 7.7)
195
65) (Arr. 3, 7.7), (Curt. 4, 9.24-25)

66) Curtius’ praise of Ariston’s bravery is an indication of the competency in
reconnaissance of the scouts regiments and other such dangerous missions
that required speed and multidiscipline fighting skills.
67) Quoting Aristobulus, Athenaeus writes: “In Anchiale, which was built by
Sardanapalus, did Alexander, when he was on his expedition against the Persians,
pitch his camp. And at no great distance was the monument of Sardanapalus, on
which there was a marble figure putting together the fingers of its right hand, as
if it were giving a fillip.” (Ath. 12, 39). The monument of Sardanapalus was
supposed to have been built in Nineveh. As it is established, Alexander put his
camp southwest of Jabel Maqlub. The distance from Nineveh must have been
of the order of 45 km, which is about one and a half day's march. This might
be the distance that Aristobulus considers “at no great distance”. None of the
other historians mention this. Possibly, they did not think it was important to
give such information. Sardanapalus is not attested as a historical figure, which
makes Athenaeus’ reference quite problematic.
68) (Arr. 3, 9.1)
69) (Curt. 4, 10.15). See Bosworth (1980), p. 294 for further comments on this
distance being probably too long.
70) For Alexander to cover 17 km over a short night march it means a rather fast pace,
especially for somebody intending to go into the most decisive battle of his life.
71) (Arr. 3, 9.2). When Arrian refers to the two “στρατόπεδα” being 60 stadia apart,
he means the two armies themselves were 60 stadia apart and not the two camp
sites. [See the translation in Sarikakis (1998), p. 295 and cf. Bosworth (1980),
p. 294]
72) (Arr. 3, 9.3)
73) (Arr. 3, 9.3)
74) Darius did prepare the ground to suit his plans. Arrian mentions that Alexander
used the oblique formation and moved to the right coming close to the ground
prepared by the Persians (“τὸν ὡδοποιημένον πρὸς τῶν Περσῶν χῶρον”) (Arr. 3, 13.2).
There is a tradition supported by Curtius in (Curt. 4, 13.36-37) that Darius
implanted spiked mines in order to restrict Alexander’s movements. The news
was supposed to be conveyed to Alexander by a deserter named Bion. However,
the existence of such spikes seems unlikely. [Atkinson (1980), p. 428]
75) (Arr. 3, 9.5-8)
196
NOTES
76) (Curt. 4, 13.11-12)

77) These are typical Iranian religious rituals.
78) See Atkinson (1980), p. 417
78a) (Curt. 4, 14.24)
79) See Atkinson (1980), p. 416
80) (Arr. 3, 13.1-4)
81) (Plut. Alex. 31, 5-8)
82) (Curt. 4, 13.4-10)
83) See Atkinson (1980), p. 415
84) (Arr. 3, 10.2)
85) See Atkinson (1980), p. 414
86) (Diod. 16, 56.3-4)
87) (Plut. Alex. 33, 1), (Curt. 4, 13.38), (Diod. 17, 56.4)
88) Kriwaczek (2010), p. 278
CHAPTER VI
THE MILITARY BATTLE OF GAUGAMELA
1) (Arr. 3, 12.5)
2) (Curt. 4, 12.12)
3) (Arr. 3, 8.6)
4) (Diod. 17, 53.3)
5) Marsden (1964), p. 37
6) Bessus was a relative of Darius and satrap of Bactria and, as such, he was quite
an important individual, who considered himself worthy to replace Darius
himself. After the defeat at Gaugamela, he joined Darius at Media with 3,300
cavalry. He had more than 8,000 cavalry with him at Gaugamela. The fact that
only 3,300 survived is a measure of the total defeat the Bactrians suffered in
Alexander’s hands. He plotted with Nabarzanes and Barsaentes to overthrow
Darius and are both considered responsible for Darius’ death. He was arrested
by fellow Persian noblemen and handed over to Alexander. He was tortured
and sent to Ecbatana where he was executed by the assembly of Medeans and
Persians (Arr. 4, 7.3).
7) (Arr. 3, 11.8-18), (Arr. 3, 12.1-5)
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ANDREAS P.

ALEXANDER THE GREAT IN ERBIL

The Military Battle of Gaugamela

ALEXANDER THE GREAT IN ERBIL

The Military Battle of Gaugamela

Finally, I am greatly indebted to Stavros G. Lazarides for his detailed editing

unparalleled military talent. With characteristic military genius and strategic

Eventually, they capitulated and surrendered their city to the victorious

(5.1) The march from Tyre to Thapsacus (Fig. 1)

Alexander returned from Egypt to Tyre in around the beginning to mid-June

took Alexander eleven days(5) to reach Thapsacus.(6) Considering a rest day

(5.2) Darius’ generous offer for a negotiated settlement

Alexander returned to Tyre from Egypt in around mid-June. Darius’ wife

(5.3) Alexander’s strategy and route from Thapsacus to Tigris in Assyria

Thapsacus, mentioned in the ancient sources, is most probably close to

(5.4) The march of the Persian army from Babylon to Arbela

Arrian also informs us that he intended to encamp on the Tigris, possibly

“Darius was in position on the river Tigris, determined to check Alexander

Upon receiving, around mid-September, the information from Darius’ scouts

The river Gomel (Bumelus)

The iron bridge crossing

The Babylonian Astronomical Diaries tablet(63a)

Alexander had a unique brilliant strategic patience. He knew what he

26) (Xen. Anab. 1, 4.11)

Gaugamela or Tell Gommel is six miles southeast of Keramlais, west of the

65) (Arr. 3, 7.7), (Curt. 4, 9.24-25)

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