EN BANC

[A.C. No. 2756. March 15, 1988.]

PRUDENTIAL BANK , complainant, vs. JUDGE JOSE P. CASTRO and

ATTY. BENJAMIN M. GRECIA , respondents.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM , : p

Acting on the "Petition for Redress and Exoneration and for Voluntary Inhibition"
led by respondent Benjamin M. Grecia himself, dated February 8, 1988, praying that
the decision of November 12, 1987, and the resolution of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration of the said decision be set aside and a new one entered by this Court
dismissing the administrative complaint and exonerating the respondent, the Court
RESOLVED (1) to EXPUNGE said Petition, it being in the nature of a second motion for
reconsideration led without leave of Court, besides the fact that the rst motion for
reconsideration led by the same respondent had already been denied with nality on
January 12, 1988; (2) to STRIKE OUT Annex "1" of the Petition and its enclosures, Annex
"1" being a xerox copy of a letter dated 04 August 1986 written by Judge Dionisio N.
Capistrano to an unknown addressee, for being immaterial and impertinent to this case
for disbarment (Sec. 5, Rule 9, Rules of Court). The Court will not allow the ling of such
kinds of Petitions/Annexes that are not only irrelevant to the issue and presented out of
time as hereinafter explained, but are also scurrilous and defamatory.
Certain points raised in the Petition, however, call for separate treatment and
determination.
1) The "Petition for Voluntary Inhibition" of Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee and
Justice Teodoro R. Padilla is DENIED there being no legal nor factual basis therefor. It is
settled jurisprudence that after a member has given an opinion on the merits of the
case, a motion to disqualify a member of the Supreme Court cannot be considered
because a litigant cannot be permitted to speculate upon the action of the Court and
raise an objection of this sort after decision has been rendered (Araneta vs. Dinglasan,
84 Phil. 368, citing Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Heirs of Abella, 49 Phil.
374).
The decision to disbar respondent lawyer was the collective judgment of the
Court, with the exception of Justice Sarmiento who had inhibited himself, with no
member in the least bit attempting to in uence one or the other. In fairness to the Chief
Justice, and to disabuse the fears and suspicions of respondent Grecia, it should be
made of record that at no time during the deliberations on the case did the Chief
Justice show any illwill nor any signs of "vindictiveness" much less any attempt to
"exact vengeance for past affront" against respondent lawyer. All discussions were
characterized by judicial objectivity dictated only by the highest interests of the
profession and public welfare.
Similarly, the plea for the inhibition of Justice Padilla has to be DENIED for being
devoid of any valid reason. Justice Padilla was counsel for Cityland Development
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2019 cdasiaonline.com
 Corporation in the case of Manchester Development Corporation, et al. vs. Court of
Appeals, Cityland Development Corporation, et al. (G.R. No. 75919, May 7, 1987, 149
SCRA 562), for which reason he took no part in the said suit. Cityland, however, is not a
party in this administrative case.
2) The challenge hurled against this Court's decision as violative of the 1987
Constitution due to lack of certi cation by the Chief Justice that the conclusions of the
Court were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to a member for the
writing of the opinion of the Court, is bereft of basis. The certi cation requirement
refers to decisions in judicial, not administrative cases. From the very beginning,
resolutions/decisions of the Court in administrative cases have not been accompanied
by any formal certi cation. In fact, such a certi cation would be a super uity in
administrative cases, which by their very nature, have to be deliberated upon
considering the collegiate composition of this Court. The certi cation in AM No. R-510-
P entitled "Apolinario de Sarigumba vs. Deputy Sheriff Pasok," cited in the Petition, is
but an oversight.
But even if such a certi cation were required, it is beyond doubt that the
conclusions of the Court in its decision were arrived at after consultation and
deliberation. The signatures of the members who actually took part in the deliberations
and voted attest to that. Besides, being a per curiam decision, or an opinion of the
Court as a whole, there is no ponente although any member of the Court may be
assigned to write the draft. In such cases, a formal certi cation is obviously not
required.
3) No constitutional provision has been disregarded either in the Court's Minute
Resolution, dated January 12, 1988, denying the motion for reconsideration "for lack of
merit, the issues raised therein having been previously duly considered and passed
upon." It bears repeating that this is an administrative case so that the Constitutional
mandate that "no . . . motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be . . .
denied without stating the legal basis therefor" is inapplicable. And even if it were, said
Resolution stated the legal basis for the denial and, therefore, adhered faithfully to the
Constitutional requirement. "Lack of merit," which was one of the grounds for denial, is
a legal basis (see Sec. 3, Rule 45).
SO ORDERED.
Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Bidin, Cortes and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Sarmiento, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

As the Court's unanimous Resolution states, respondents' so-called petition for

redress dated February 8, 1988 (in effect a second motion, led without leave of Court,
for reconsideration of the disbarment decision of November 12, 1987 and the
Resolution of January 12, 1988 denying reconsideration) has been led out of time and
has been expunged. Aside from the fact that the petition for my voluntary inhibition is
devoid of factual and legal basis, there is nothing left before the Court for
determination on the merits. Be that as it may, I had refrained from taking part in the
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2019 cdasiaonline.com
 deliberation on this incident and had wanted to abstain even as a beau geste but
submitted the question to the judgment of my peers. Bowing to their collective
judgment against my inhibition, I herewith express my full concurrence with the Court's
action.

PADILLA, J., concurring:

I concur. In addition, I wish to make this brief statement. I do not personally know
respondent Benjamin M. Grecia. As far as my memory can recall, I have not dealt with
said respondent, personally or professionally at any time. There is therefore absolutely
no basis for respondent's claim that I have acted with bias or prejudice against his
cause.
In Manchester Development Corporation, et al., petitioners, vs. Court of Appeals,
City Land Development Corporation, et al., respondents, G.R. No. 75919, I took no part
simply because I was a retained counsel of the respondent City Land Development
Corporation before my appointment to the Court. In this administrative case, I have not
been related, personally or professionally, with any party or counsel. There is thus
absolutely no reason for me not to take part in this case. In fact, I consider it a part of
my sworn duty to take part therein since there is absolutely no legal, moral or ethical
ground which would justify my inhibition.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2019 cdasiaonline.com