Toward an Idiothetic Psychology
of Personality
JAMES T. LAMIELL
ABSTRACT: Because individual differences research
fails to confront the most basic problem of all in the
scientific study of personality—that of providing an
adequate framework for personality description—such
research is fundamentalhj inadequate for the purposes
of a science of personality. The author therefore pro-
poses that a clear distinction be maintained between
differential psychology and personality psychology and
that individual differences research be recognized as
relevant to the concerns of the former. An alternative
to the individual differences paradigm, termed idio-
thetic, is suggested as a general framework for the sci-
entific study of personality. Within this framework, the
basic problem of personality description would be ap-
proached in an explicitly idiographic manner, while the
search for nomothetic principles would center around
questions of personality development.
Within the introductory pages of most personality
texts, one often finds some statement to the effect
that consensus is lacking in the field on many issues.
The mere existence of personality texts, however,
and thus of an identifiable subdiscipline of psy-
chology, suggests that at least some very basic con-
cerns are shared by all or most personality theorists,
concerns that therefore define the overriding (i.e.,
metatheoretical) objectives of the scientific study
of personality. Based on his consideration of a wide
variety of personality theories, Levy (1970) sug-
gests that these basic concerns might reasonably
be defined as follows:
Colloquially, it might be said that in personality we are
interested in learning the best way to describe what kind
of a person a man is, how he got that way, what keeps
him that way, what might make him change, and how
we might use all this to explain why he behaves as he
does and predict how he will behave in the future,
(p. 29)
This article is predicated on the assumption that
Levy's remarks do indeed identify a set of basic
concerns that are (and have long been) widely
shared among personality theorists. With this in
mind, I argue below that the individual differences
research paradigm, which has thoroughly domi-
nated empirical personality research throughout
276 • AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST « MARCH 1981
University of Illinois
at Urbana-Champaign
the present century, is fundamentally inadequate
for the purposes of a science of personality. The
argument, in a nutshell, is that the assessment of
differences between individuals on various com-
mon attributes, and the study of the stabilities (and
instabilities) of those differences over time and
across situations, fails to confront what is clearly
the most basic problem of all within the discipline:
the development of a framework for empirically
describing the personality of any given individual.
Failing in this regard, it is difficult to see how
individual differences research could possibly be
adequate for addressing the remaining metathe-
oretical issues identified by Levy (1970), however
useful it may be for other purposes.
After developing this argument below, I propose
an alternative paradigm for the scientific study of
personality. For lack of a better term, but for rea-
sons that will become apparent, this proposed al-
ternative has been labeled idiothetic. Without
overly anticipating the later discussion, it suffices
to note here that this term is intended to suggest
an orientation in which (a) the problem of per-
sonality description would be approached in an
explicitly idiographic manner (cf. Allport, 1962)
and in which (b) nomothetic principles would be
sought with respect to questions of personality de-
velopment.
The Need for an Alternative to the
Individual Differences Paradigm
As just mentioned, the most basic (though clearly
not the only) problem for a science of personality
For their reactions to countless earlier versions of this work, the
author is especially grateful to the following individuals: Gerald
Clore, Michael Coles, Donald Fiske, Mark Foss, Leslie Lamiell,
Frank Landy, Thomas Lapic, Joseph McGrath, Leon Rappo-
port, Joseph Rychlak, Edward Seidman, Harry Triandis, Steve
Trierweiler, and Robert Wyer. He is also grateful to the anon-
ymous reviewers of earlier versions, many of whose criticisms
were very helpful.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Jarnes T. Lamiell,
Department of Psychology, University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, Champaign, Illinois 61820.
Vol. 36, No. 3, 276-289
Copyright 1981 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.
0003-066X/8l/3603-0276$OG.75
is that of empirically describing the personalities
of individuals, that is, identifying those qualities,
attributes, or characteristics which are manifested
by individuals at certain levels with some degree
of regularity or consistency over time and across
situations. To see why individual differences re-
search does not and cannot resolve this basic prob-
lem, it will be helpful to review briefly the essential
features of such research. This discussion will also
facilitate the later presentation of the proposed
alternative framework for the study of personality.
BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES
STRATEGY
Individual differences research typically begins
with the investigator's attempt to measure the sta-
tus of each of a number of persons on some un-
derlying attribute of a set of empirical observa-
tions. This process can be formally described in
terms of the following general model:
(1)
where Spn refers to the raw score assigned to person
p to represent his or her status on some underlying
attribute a, V,,, refers to a variable i in terms of
which some empirical statements about person p
can be expressed, and Rla refers to the relevance
of the information contained in variable i to at-
tribute a. Equation 1 thus states that the score as-
signed to person p to represent his or her status on
attributed is some function (traditionally additive)
of m empirical statements about person p, each
of which is weighted by its presumed relevance
to a.
The number and nature of the V,s depends, of
course, on the particular assessment procedure in
use. For example, they might consist of coded re-
sponses to projective test stimuli, check marks on
the items of a self-report inventory, observer rat-
ings on m different Variables, or direct observations
on those variables. Moreover, observations on the
V,s might be recorded categorically (e.g., true/
false, occurred/did not occur) or continuously
(e.g., on scales ranging from "strongly agree" to
"strongly disagree" or from "occurred very fre-
quently" to "did not occur at all").
As Equation 1 indicates, there must also be some
implicit or explicit definition of the relevance of
the information contained in each Vt to the at-
tribute being measured (cf. Bern & Allen, 1974;
Bern & Funder, 1978; Funder, 1980). These "rel-
evance values" can be determined intuitively, de-
duced rationally from a theory, or defined ac-
cording to strictly empirical criteria (cf. Hase &
Goldberg, 1967). Examples of the latter would in-
clude the loadings denned for the V,s on the basis
of a factor analysis of their intercorrelations or the
scale values of the V,s defined on the basis of a
multidimensional scaling analysis of pairvvise
(dis)similarity judgments (cf. Shweder, 1975). In
essence, the Rla values of Equation 1 reflect the
process of abstraction that is normally an integral
part of personality measurement (cf. Goldfried
& Kent, 1972). That is, they indicate the degree
to which a given V,- is presumed to "contain" or
"reveal" the underlying attribute being measured.
It should be noted here that while several pos-
sibilities exist for interpreting the Spa value as-
signed to any one individual (Cattell, 1944; Nor-
man, 1967), the interpretation implicit in individual
differences research is that "all meaning for a
given score of a person derives from comparing
his score with those of other persons" (Kleinmuntz,
1967, p. 45). Although slightly oversimplified, this
means that single Spa values are interpreted in
terms of contrasts of the general sort (Spa —- Sp.0),
where Sp.a refers, collectively, to the measured sta-
tus of persons other than person p on attribute a.1
Contrasts of this kind are greatly facilitated by (if
not strictly dependent on) the use of standardized
"tests," that is, procedures whereby all of the per-
sons in one's sample are scored on the same V,s
and whereby the R(a values applied to the V(s are
held constant across persons.
Having generated data that reflect differences
between individuals along some common attribute
a, an investigator normally seeks to determine the
stability of those differences over time and across
situations. Empirical evidence that speaks to this
question, which might be presented in the form
of reliability and validity coefficients, omega-
square ratios, and/or coefficients of generalizabil-
ity (cf. Golding, 1975), has long been widely ac-
1
On infrequent occasions, some investigators have explored
the possibilities offered by "ipsative" measurement, in which
the score assigned to an individual on a given attribute is in-
terpreted by contrasting it either with the scores assigned to
that same individual on other attributes (cf. Block, 1957; Ed-
wards, 1959; Heilbrun, 1963) or with the scores assigned to that
individual on the same attribute at different points in time (cf.
Baldwin, 1942, 1946). However, ipsative measurement has
never been widely accepted as an adequate basis for scientific
personality research (cf. Beck, 1953; Eysenck, 1954; Falk, 1956;
Nunnally, 1967) and, as a result, has never played a very prom-
inent role in the literature.
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST • MARCH 1981 • 277
cepted as (a) grounds for generalizations about the
degree of temporal/transsituational consistency
with which the individuals assessed have mani-
fested the attribute in question and, thus, as (b)
grounds for an inference concerning the relevance
or irrelevance of that attribute to a description of
the personalities of those individuals.
There can be little doubt that this orientation
toward the basic problem of personality descrip-
tion has been and continues to be widely endorsed
by personality investigators. 2 The rationale just
described was, after all, precisely the one on which
Mischel (1968) based his highly influential discus-
sion of the evidence relevant to the critical pre-
sumption inherent within the very concept of per-
sonality: the "consistency of particular pre-
dispositions within any individual" (Mischel, 1968,
p. 9, italics added).
Similarly, and with explicit reference to the va-
lidity coefficients that Mischel (1968) and many
others have brought to bear on the issue, Bern and
Allen (1974) comment on the "sharp discrepancy
between our intuitions, which tell us that individ-
uals do in fact display pervasive cross-situational
consistencies in their behavior, and the vast em-
pirical literature, which tells us that they do not"
(pp. 507-508, italics added). Bern and Allen go on
to suggest that findings more consonant with our
intuitions—that is, higher validity coefficients—
can be obtained in individual differences research,
provided that the investigator is willing to abandon
the assumption that any single attribute will be
relevant to a description of the personalities of all
individuals. An extension of this line of thinking
can be found in the recent work by Kenrick and
Stringfield (1980).
The Bern and Allen proposal has not, of course,
been the only major response to the issues raised
by Mischel (1968). Some personologists have em-
phasized the need for improved theorizing and
more sophisticated procedures for assessing indi-
vidual differences (see, e.g., Alker, 1972; Block,
1968,1971, 1977; Epstein, 1979; Hirschberg, 1978;
Hogan, DeSoto, & Solano, 1977; McGowan &
Gormly, 1976; Block, Note 1). Others have stressed
the importance of studying the interactive effects
of individual differences and situational variables
on behavior (e.g., Argyle & Little, 1972; Bowers,
1973; Buss, 1977; Ekehammar, 1974; Endler &
Magnusson, 1976; Magnusson & Endler, 1977;
Mischel, 1973, 1977, 1979).
Whatever improvements of or departures frorn
classical personology might be reflected in the rel-
atively recent developments just discussed, there
278 • MARCH 1981 • AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST
is no indication in the current literature of any real
departure from the basic notion that gave rise to
those developments in the first place, namely, that
empirical evidence concerning the stability of dif-
ferences between individuals on common attri-
butes (a) will adequately support generalizations
about the degree to which individuals are consis-
tent in their manifestations of those attributes and
(b) therefore is directly relevant to the problem of
describing the personalities of individuals. Indeed,
the arguments developed in the above-cited lit-
erature would seem, if anything, to have rein-
forced most personality investigators' beliefs in the
essential correctness of this notion.
THE NEED FOR AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES STRATEGY
One important assumption on which traditional
individual differences research has been based is
that it will ultimately lead to the isolation of those
(presumably few) attributes that are necessary and
sufficient to describe the personality of any given
individual (cf. Mehrabian & O'Reilly, 1980). As
is well-known, the validity of this assumption has
been called into question from time to time during
the past several decades (Allport, 1937,1962,1966,
1967; Bern & Allen, 1974; Kenrick & Stringfield,
1980; Rosenzweig, 1950, 1951, 1952, 1958; Tyler,
1959, 1978).
I make no attempt in the present article, how-
ever, to recapitulate the arguments developed by
those authors. The vast majority of personality in-
vestigators have been "unimpressed" (Sanford,
1963, p. 547) by the arguments in the past (cf.
Beck, 1953; Eysenck, 1954; Falk, 1956; Holt, 1962;
Kleinmuntz, 1967; Nunnally, 1967), and there is
no compelling reason to suspect any imminent re-
versal of this trend. The discussion that follows
focuses instead on a much more serious problem,
namely, the previously discussed rationale for de-
termining the relevance of particular attributes to
a description of the personalities of individuals.
- It is worth noting here that even those studies which have
used individualized assessment devices, such as role construct
repertory (REP) tests and Q-sorts, have tended to end in the
assessment and study of individual differences. For example,
the information contained in REP test protocols has been used
to define individual differences in such attributes as cognitive
complexity (Crockett, 1965} and cognitive differentiation/in-
tegration (Landfield, 1976). Similarly, Q-sort protocols have
been used in personality research as the basis for identifying
typological or dimensional differences between persons (cf.
Block, 1961; Stephenson, 1953). An excellent discussion of this
literature can be found in Tyler (1978).
 It was noted earlier that for most personologists
the problem of describing an individual's personality
is essentially one of identifying those qualities or at-
tributes that he or she manifests with some degree
of regularity over time and across situations. The
reliability and validity coefficients (as well as omega-
square ratios and generalizability coefficients) gen-
erated by individual differences research do not con-
front this problem, and it is this basic fact that un-
dermines the adequacy of such research for the
purposes of a science of personality.
All of the so-called personality coefficients just
mentioned index, in one way or another, the de-
gree of consistency with which selected attributes
are manifested by groups of individuals. In the last
analysis, it is the simple fact that all of those coef-
ficients are aggregate indices, computed on the
basis of data summed across individuals, that vir-
tually precludes their appropriateness as grounds
on which to infer anything about the consistency
or inconsistency of any one individual (cf. Epstein,
1980). Indeed, such an inference could be justified
only under the rare (if not altogether nonexistent)
circumstances when the personality coefficient is
perfect (i.e., unity) because it is only then that the
degree of consistency (in relative position on some
attribute) manifested by the group of individuals
happens to directly reflect the degree of consis-
tency (in relative position) manifested by any
given individual in the group.
Obviously, the personality coefficients generated
in individual differences research are rarely, if ever,
perfect, and there is little reason to believe that their
deviations from unity can be entirely attributed to
error in the measurement of the attribute(s) in ques-
tion. However, personality investigators have long
maintained the view that whatever its size, a con-
ventional personality coefficient serves as grounds for
a generalization about the consistency or inconsis-
tency of the individuals in one's sample with respect
to the attribute(s) studied.
This view is simply erroneous. In fact, a per-
sonality coefficient that deviates for any systematic
reason from 1.00 is prima facie evidence that the
individuals in one's sample were not equally con-
sistent (or inconsistent) in their manifestations of
the attribute(s) in question. Consequently, such a
coefficient could not possibly support any infer-
ence about the consistency or inconsistency of those
individuals in general. It merely reflects the
(in)consistency of the individuals in the aggre-
gate—as a group—which is an entirely different
matter (for a concrete empirical illustration of this
point, see Lamiell & Trierweiler, Note 2).
If one agrees that (a) the most basic problem in
the science of personality is to develop an adequate
means of describing the personality of any given
individual and that (b) to describe an individual's
personality is to identify those qualities or attri-
butes that he or she manifests at certain levels with
some degree of regularity over time and across
situations, then it should be clear why individual
differences research fails to confront the most basic
problem in the science of personality. Given a re-
liability coefficient, validity coefficient, omega-
square ratio, or generalizability coefficient that
deviates from unity for any systematic reason, it
is simply not possible to tell how consistent or
inconsistent any one individual was in the levels
at which he or she has manifested the underlying
attribute in question. Consequently, it is not pos-
sible to determine, for any one individual, whether
or not (or to what degree) the attribute in question
is relevant to a description of his or her personality.
It is interesting to note that the ambiguities of
conventional personality coefficients in this regard
have been hinted at in the past in the writings of
other authors (Baldwin, 1942, 1946; Block, 1971;
Carlson, 1971; Epstein, 1979). Unfortunately, the
problem has yet to be satisfactorily resolved. Con-
temporary personality researchers continue to in-
terpret these coefficients as if they were based on
or conveyed information about (in)consistency at
the level of the individual (see, e.g., Epstein, 1979,
pp. 1105-1106; Kenrick & Stringfield, 1980, p. 93;
Zanna, Olson, & Fazio, 1980, pp. 437-438). More-
over, the few departures from the use of such coef-
ficients that can be found in the literature actually
change the original question in subtle but impor-
tant ways.
For example, in his recent study of stability in
behavior, Epstein (1979) reports (in addition to
conventional reliability coefficients) correlations
between attributes within individuals over time.
Such intrasubject correlations can, as Epstein points
out, reveal the pattern of covariation between pairs
of attributes within an individual. They do not,
however, reflect (in)consistencies in the degree to
which that individual manifests any one of the
attributes, which was the original question.
A high intrasubject correlation is, by definition,
evidence of variability—not consistency—within
an individual on two attributes over measurement
occasions (on what grounds, therefore, can one
claim that either of the two attributes is pertinent
to a description of that individual's personality?).
Moreover, a low intrasubject correlation could
mean that an individual was highly variable on
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST • MARCH 1981 • 279
two attributes in ways that did not happen to co-
incide or that the individual was highly consistent
on one or both attributes. In the limiting case, per-
fect consistency in the manifestation of one or both
attributes would result in a zero intrasubject cor-
relation for that pair of attributes.
In short, intrasubject correlations such as those
reported by Epstein (1979) are no more adequate
than conventional (i.e., intersubject) personality
coefficients for the purpose of identifying those
attributes that are manifested by individuals with
some degree of consistency over time and across
situations,3
Given the inadequacy of the individual differ-
ences paradigm with respect to the basic problem
of personality description, 4 it is difficult to see how
research conducted within this paradigm can ad-
equately address the remaining metatheoretical
issues identified by Levy (1970). How can empir-
ical research that does not even describe the per-
sonalities of individuals possibly illuminate the
process of personality development or, conse-
quently, the way in which an understanding of
that process could be used to explain and predict
an individual's behavior? Based on what I have
presented thus far, I believe that individual dif-
ferences research is fundamentally ill suited for
the pursuit of these objectives and that some al-
ternative paradigm for the scientific study of per-
sonality is therefore needed.
KEDISTINGUISHING DIFFERENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY
FROM PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY
Does the above discussion imply that individual
differences research has no utility whatsoever?
Certainly not. The information contained in reli-
ability, validity, and generalizability coefficients
(as well as omega-square ratios) can be of great
utility when one's objective is specifically to ac-
count for individual differences in various do-
mains of human activity. This was precisely the
objective in the early days of mental testing, at
which time and for which purposes the technology
of individual differences research was originally
developed (cf. Mischel, 1976; Tyler, 1978).
The above discussion does suggest, however, that
it would be very worthwhile to revive a distinction
which has unfortunately become rather obscured
over the years: that between differential psychol-
ogy (cf. Anastasi, 1976) and personality psychol-
ogy. The basic task of the former can be viewed
as one of identifying and validating individual
280 • MARCH 1981 • AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST
differences constructs, that is, concept-measure-
ment method units (Campbell & Fiske, 1959). To
the extent that the differential psychologist can
show that an individual differences construct is
both reliable and valid (or generalizable), he or she
succeeds in demonstrating that within some spec-
ified domain of behavior, it is possible to predict
or "postdict," with a degree of error that can be
specified only in the aggregate (i.e., "the long
run"), the relative performances of "some, most,
or all of the people some, most, or 'an awful lot'
of the time" (cf. Bern & Allen, 1974; Epstein, 1979;
Kenrick & Stringfield, 1980). Note that to the dif-
ferential psychologist, the concepts of reliability,
validity, and generalizability refer to properties of
the individual differences constructs, and one es-
tablishes these properties with data aggregated
across persons.
To address the basic problem of empirical per-
sonality description, however, an investigator must
be able to detect temporal and transsituational con-
sistencies within persons, that is, at the level of the
individual. By mistaking empirical evidence that
reflects the properties of individual differences
constructs for evidence concerning consistencies
and inconsistencies at the level of the individual,
personality investigators have completely under-
mined their ability to detect the latter.
The central metatheoretical concerns of person-
ality psychology cannot be addressed with empir-
ical research aimed at determining the properties
of individual differences constructs. The mere la-
beling of these constructs with personalitylikc
terms (e.g., friendliness, dominance, etc.) in no
way alters this fact. It is for this reason that a clear
distinction between differential psychology and
personality psychology should be maintained.
The individual differences research paradigm
is well suited to the concerns of differential psy-
chology. The remainder of this article is devoted
J
Nor can this problem be satisfactorily resolved in terms of
Q-correlations based on attribute profiles obtained for single
individuals on different measurement occasions (cf. Block, 1961,
1971; Harris, 1980). Such correlations can be used to address
the question of (in)consistency at the level of the individual
with respect to a set of attributes or characteristics. Again, how-
ever, this is rather different from the question of (in)consistency
at the level of the individual with respect to any one attribute
or characteristic.
^ As a way of emphasizing my point, the reader is invited to
reflect briefly on the results of three major studies recently re-
ported in the personality literature (Epstein, 1979; Harris, 1980;
Kenrick & Stringfield, 1980). As carefully as these studies were
designed, executed, and reported, it is still not possible to tell
on the basis of the results presented how (in)consistent any one
of the subjects in any of the studies was with respect to any one
of the attributes investigated.
to the presentation of an alternative research par- simplified, example may help to clarify what is
adigm that is at least formally suited to the con- being argued here (an application of this approach
cerns of scientific personality psychology. to more complex data has been presented by Lam-
iell & Trierweiler, Note 2).
Suppose that the 11 items shown in Table 1 have
Toward an Idiothetic Psychology of been sampled by an investigator to represent a
Personality domain of activities that adolescents of high school
age engage in. (Note that the term sampled is used
The framework for personality research to be pro- here. It is extremely unlikely that an investigator
posed here is grounded in the basic notion that an would ever be able to deal, in practice, with a
individual's personality is best described in terms complete domain of alternative possible activities.)
of information about what that person tends to In the context of Equation 1, this set of 11 items
do—not in direct contrast with what others tend would constitute the V, component.
to do, but in direct contrast with what that person Suppose further that in the view of either the
tends not to do but could do (cf. Lamiell, 1980; investigator or a given adolescent (depending on
Lamiell, Foss, & Cavenee, 1980; Shweder, 1980). whose perspective is being taken in the research),
In the discussion that follows, a formal measure- the activities referred to in these 11 items were
ment rationale consistent with this basic notion is construed in terms of the attribute "compliant ver-
presented. Subsequently, I consider the major im- sus rebellious" and that the coordinates of the ac-
plications of adopting this general orientation as tivities on this underlying attribute have been de-
the basis for scientific personality research. fined (e.g., on the basis of a multidimensional
scaling of pairwise similarity judgments) as in the
A FORMAL RATIONALE FOR IDIOGRAPHIC middle column of Table 1. These coordinates
MEASUREMENT would operationally define the Rla component of
Equation 1.
1 noted earlier that any empirically based proce- Finally, suppose that some hypothetical adoles-
dure for operationally defining an individual's sta- cent I shall call "Mary" reports her activity over
tus on some underlying attribute of a set of ob- a given week as in the third column of Table 1.
servations can be described in terms of the following By arbitrarily coding Mary's yes responses as 1
general model: and her no responses as 0, the obtained information
about Mary with respect to the 11 activities can
- / (Vpl)(Ria (1) be quantitatively represented. Applying Equation
1 to these data (and assuming the traditional ad-
This model is applicable in the present context as ditive integration function), one can see that
well. No less here than in individual differences Mary's protocol yields in this instance an Sftl value
measurement, one's measured status on some at- of .61. In effect, this value summarizes the ob-
tribute a is empirically defined as some function tained information about Mary with respect to a
of m empirical statements about person p, each set of empirical referents for the attribute "com-
of which is weighted by its presumed relevance pliant versus rebellious."
to a. Nothing in what has been said thus far runs con-
It is at this point, however, that the present ap- trary to the conventions of individual differences
proach and the individual differences view part measurement. Under the rationale proposed here,
company. The crucial difference between the two however, the meaning of the .61 value obtained
lies in the nature of the contrasts by which single by Mary would not be defined with reference to
Sp,, values are given meaning. As we saw earlier, the values obtained by other persons using the
the logic of individual differences measurement same measurement operations. Rather, the value's
is such that the meaning of the score assigned to meaning would be defined with reference to the
any one person depends in part on the scores as- extreme alternative Spa values (denoted S'pa mai and
signed to other persons. Under the present ratio- S'pa mtn) that could possibly have been assigned to
nale, however, the meaning of a single Spa value Mary within the constraints imposed by the mea-
is directly dependent on the extreme alternative surement operation itself.
values that could possibly be assigned to person p Given (a) the sample of activities, (b) the di-
within the constraints imposed by the measure- chotomous scoring of available information re-
ment operation itself. A concrete, if greatly over- garding these activities, (c) the specification of

AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST • MARCH 1981 • 281

TABLE 1 length of the scale. The ratio of these two differ-
Illustrative Application of Proposed ences thus provides a quantitative expression of the
Measurement Rationale degree to which an individual's protocol reflects
Conceptualization Recorded
some attribute a, relative to how much that pro-
of perceived behavior tocol could have reflected attribute a given the
behavioral over a given constraints imposed by the measurement operation
Perceived behavioral alternatives alternatives week
itself. In short, Equation 2 expresses the status of
1. Drinking beer/liquor -.24 No(0) an individual on a given measurement occasion
2. Engaging in premarital sex -.20 No (0) with respect to attribute a—not in contrast with
3. Studying/reading .18 Yes (1)
the status of others on attribute a, but instead with
4. Participating in
extracurricular activities .32 Yes (1) reference to what his or her measured status could
5. Engaging in acts of possibly have.been given the procedure for mea-
vandalism -.26 No (0) suring attribute a.
6. Doing nothing in In this example, the absolute difference between
particular -.23 Yes (.1)
Mary's obtained Spa value (.61) and S'pa min (-1.78)
7. Smoking marijuana -.28 No(0)
8. Participating in church- is equal to 2.39. This quantity expresses the de-
related activities .36 No (0) viation of Mary's reported activity pattern from
9. Skipping school -.28 No (0) the functional zero point of the scale. The absolute
10. Shoplifting -.29 No(0) difference between S'pa max and S'pa „„„ is 2.98, and
11. Participating in volunteer this quantity defines the length of the scale. The
work in community .34 Yes (1)
ratio of these two quantities is .802, and it is this
Note. Assuming an additive integration function, (lie application of value that would be used in the present perspective
Equation 1 to these data yields an Spa value of .61 (see text for details).
The data are based on a study by Lamiell, Foss, and Cavenee (1980). to define Mary's status over the week in question
with respect to the attribute "compliant versus re-
particular relevance values for these activities, and bellious."
(d) the use of an additive integration function, one In effect, what has just been presented is a for-
can see that in the present example Mary might mal rationale for idiographic personality measure-
have been as "compliant" as 1.20 or as "rebellious" ment (cf. Allport, 1962; see also Cattell's [1944]
as —1.78. The former value would have been ob- discussion of "interactive measurement," which he
tained had Mary reported yes for Activities 3, 4, distinguishes from both normative and ipsative
8, and 11 and no for Activities 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 9, and measurement). It is a rationale by which the mea-
10. The latter value would have been obtained for sured status of an individual on a single attribute
the exact opposite response pattern. at a given point in lime hinges entirely on infor-
Having defined the maximum and minimum mation available for that individual at that point
values that can possibly be obtained on a measure in time with respect to a set of empirical referents
of some underlying attribute of a set of empirical for that attribute.
observations, an individual's status with respect to With the above discussion as "spadework," we
that attribute on any given measurement occasion are now in a position to consider the major im-
can be formally expressed as follows: plications of adopting idiographic measurement as
the foundation for a science of personality.
'-'pa pa mtn

C' _ C'
(2)
^ pa mai " pa min
where 7)M refers to the idiographically defined sta-
tus of person p on attribute a, Spa is defined ac-
cording to Equation 1, and S'pa max and S'pa ,„,„ are
defined in the manner just discussed.
Under the terms of this measurement model,
S',,a mtn serves as the functional zero point on the
scale used to operationally define attribute a. The
absolute difference between Spa and S'pa mln thus
defines the deviation of an individual's protocol
from the functional zero point, and the absolute
difference between S'pa max and S'pa min defines the
DISPENSING WITH THE COMPARISON OF
INDIVIDUALS ALONG COMMON ATTRIBUTES
Perhaps the most obvious implication of the mea-
surement rationale illustrated above is that it would
enable an investigator to dispense completely with
the comparison of individuals along common at-
tributes. Technically, the reason for this is that the
meaning of the Spa value assigned to an individual
at a given point in time is not derived by com-
paring it with SpVl values, that is, with the measured
status of other persons on the same attribute. Con-
sequently, there is no need to assume that attribute

282 • MARCH 1981 • AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST

a is applicable to all—or even to any—other per-
sons (cf. Bern &-Allen, 1974; Kenrick & Stringfield,
1980). It is interesting to note the compatibility of
this view with Tyler's (1978) recent observation
that "in a developed technology for assessing in-
dividuals, we will not give everybody the same
test" (p. 113, italics added).
In principle, any subset of the 18,000 or so per-
sonality adjectives identified by Allport and Od-
bert (1936) could be used to characterize the ac-
tions of an individual in a given situation. Which
subset is in fact applied will be directly dependent
on the perception and construal of that individual's
alternative possibilities for action in that situation.
Thus, for example, an individual would be char-
acterized as "friendly" if, in a given situation, he
or she engaged in actions construed by the char-
acterizer as "friendly" when actions construed by
the characterizer as "unfriendly" were perceived
as viable alternative possibilities.5
Now it is certainly true that the alternative pos:
sibilities for action which occur to an individual
(or to an observer of that individual) in a given
situation depend in a large part on his or her
knowledge (and memory) of how other persons
have acted under similar circumstances. As the
above example makes clear, however, it does not
follow that the degree to which an individual man-
ifests some underlying attribute of a set of possible
actions either must be or is most usefully defined
in direct contrast to the degree to which identified
others manifest that same attribute. Within the
framework being proposed here, knowledge about
individual differences in action can—indeed
should—serve as the basis for defining the V,s of
Equation 1, that is, the alternative possibilities for
action. However, once those V(s (and their corre-
sponding relevance values) have been specified,
one has all the information one needs to charac-
terize an individual's actions in a given situation,
that is, to interpret meaningfully the Spa value as-
signed to an individual on a given measurement
occasion.
Before leaving this topic, I should emphasize
that there is nothing in the logic of idiographic
measurement that precludes the comparability of
persons along common attributes. It seems per-
fectly reasonable to assume that under certain con-
ditions, different persons will perceive essentially
the same alternative possibilities for action and
will, as a result of cultural norms and other factors,
construe those alternative possibilities in essentially
the same way. Under these conditions, a single set
of "items" and "relevance values" might reason-
ably be applied to all of the individuals being stud-
ied. Moreover, under these specific conditions, dif-
ferences between two individuals in their actions
might well reflect differences in their personalities.
The point is that the comparability of persons
along common attributes is not critical to the sys-
tematic, empirical characterization of any one per-
son's actions at a given point in time. The essence
of idiographic measurement is not that it rejects
the assumption of universal applicability (cf. Bern
& Allen, 1974; Kenrick & Stringfield, 1980) but
that it renders this assumption immaterial.
IDIOGRAPHIC MEASUREMENT AND THE PROBLEM OF
PERSONALITY DESCRIPTION
In the long run, a matter of far greater significance
than that just discussed is the fact that idiographic
measurement provides an investigator with a
means of empirically identifying those qualities or
attributes that are manifested by an individual
with some degree of regularity or consistency over
time and across situations. This is, of course, the
essence of personality description. In the light of
the earlier discussion of personality coefficients,
the importance of this topic is no doubt apparent.
To illustrate how an investigator would actually
approach this task from an idiographic perspective,
consider the data shown in Figure 1, obtained as
part of a recent study by Lamiell and Trierweiler
(Note 2), The specific purpose and procedural de-
tails of that study need not concern us here. It is
sufficient to note that the data in Figure 1 are
based on a straightforward application of the mea-
surement rationale illustrated previously. In this
case, however, four underlying dimensions (rather
than just one) were identified for a set of 18 ac-
tivities through multidimensional scaling proce-
dures. Self-reports of activity frequencies during
specified two-day intervals (recorded on continu-
ous 10-point scales rather than dichotomously, as
in the above example) were then obtained from
each of 19 undergraduate respondents on three
separate occasions. Figure 1 presents the data for
three of those respondents.
Glancing at Figure 1, one can see that Respon-
dent 1 (left panel) tended to be relatively consistent
over time with respect to Attribute II and relatively
5
If no viable alternative possibilities are perceived for (or by)
an individual in a given situation, then his or her actions in that
situation are not likely to be regarded as informative about (or
indieative of) his or her personality. This deduction is, of course,
consistent with findings reported in the attribution literature
(cf. Kruglanski, 1980).
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST • MARCH 1981 • 283
 I.UU i i t i i i i i i
to RESPONDENT *l RESPONDENT #10 RESPONDENT #17
LJ
>_ _J .80
j ^J

_ Attributes Attributes Attributes

<£

° LJ fin m« —^
*~-\«
X r! '"X ^ .'"

. s-^_.;
*I>\_-3
S 3
<[ *—'
g « .40 /

2 3
- UJL: -20
V
-

Q -
npi
.uu 1 1 I
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
TIME TIME TIME

MEASUREMENT OCCASIONS
Figure 1. Idiographic measures for three respondents on four attributes at three points in time.

inconsistent with respect to Attributes I, III, and
IV; that is, shifts in the idiographically defined
status of Respondent 1 on Attribute II across the
three measurement occasions were small in com-
parison with shifts in the idiographically defined
status of that same respondent on Attributes I, III,
and IV. Applying this same rationale, one can see
that Respondent 10 (center panel) was relatively
consistent over time with respect to Attributes I
and IV and relatively inconsistent with respect to
Attributes II and III. Finally, Respondent 17 (right
panel) was most consistent with respect to Attribute
I and quite inconsistent with respect to Attributes
II, III, and IV.
Obviously, one would not seriously attempt to
draw firm conclusions about the personalities of
any one of these three respondents on the basis of
such a limited set of observations. The intent here
is merely to illustrate how one would apply the
formal measurement rationale outlined above to
the problem of personality description. In connec-
tion with this illustration, two matters deserve spe-
cial comment.
First, in data of the sort shown in Figure 1, the
observed shifts in any one respondent's status on
a given attribute do not depend in any way on the
shifts of the other respondents with respect to that
attribute. This could not be assumed had the data
in Figure 1 been derived in accordance with the
normative measurement rationale employed in in-
dividual differences research.
By the logic of a normative measurement ratio-
nale, an individual's measured status on a given
attribute could change over time despite perfect
consistency on the part of that individual with re-
spect to the set of empirical referents for that at-
tribute, that is, the [(Vp,)(R,a)] units of Equation 1.
This could happen merely as a result of inconsis-
tencies on the part of others with whom that in-
dividual happens to be compared. Similarly, an
individual's status on a given attribute could, by
the logic of individual differences measurement,
remain constant over time despite marked changes
in that individual with respect to the set of em-
pirical referents for that attribute. This could hap-
pen if the others with whom the person is com-
pared happen to change in the same way.
In idiographic measurement, ambiguities of this
sort are eliminated; that is, the degree of consis-
tency with which an individual manifests various
attributes is completely independent of the
(in)consistencies of other individuals with respect
to those attributes and hinges entirely on the
(in)consistencies of that individual with respect to
the set(s) of empirical referents for those attributes.
A second point is that in the last analysis, the
nature of the knowledge produced in the scientific
study of personality will depend in part on the

284 • MARCH 1981 • AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST

quality of the "raw" observations that are accu-
mulated (cf. Fiske, 1978a, 1978b, 1979) as well as
on the perspective from which they are accumu-
lated (i.e., the investigator's or the subject's; cf.
Golding, 1978; Harre & Secord, 1973; Kelly, 1955;
Rychlak, 1968). However, the nature of that
knowledge will also depend to a considerable de-
gree on how those observations are organized once
they are obtained, that is, on the way in which raw
data are transformed into data (Coombs, 1964).
Unlike the personality coefficients generated
within the individual differences paradigm, data
of the sort shown in Figure 1 would permit an
investigator to identify those qualities or attributes
that are manifested by individuals with some de-
gree of regularity or consistency; that is, they
would provide the investigator with an empirical
basis for personality description. If the present ar-
ticle has but one point to stress, it is that the cre-
ation of such data—by one means or another—is
absolutely necessary for the purposes of a science
of personality.
IDIOGRAPHIC MEASUREMENT AND THE SEARCH FOR
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF PERSONALITY
Historically, the single most persistent response to
previous proponents of idiography has been that
whatever descriptive advantages idiography might
have, it would ultimately undermine the overrid-
ing objective of establishing general principles of
personality (cf. Beck, 1953; Eysenck, 1954; Falk,
1956; Holt, 1962; Kleinmuntz, 1967). Nunnally,
(1967) has provided perhaps the most forceful
expression of this view:
The idiographists may be entirely correct, but if they
are it is a sad day for psychology. Idiography is an an-
tiscience point of view: it discourages the search for gen-
eral laws and instead encourages the description of par-
ticular phenomena (people).
Efforts to measure personality traits are based on the
hypothesis that the idiographists are not entirely correct,
that there are some general traits of human personality.
The nomothetic point of view should be tested to the
limit; otherwise, to accept an idiographic point of view
in advance is to postulate that only chaos prevails in the
description of human personalities, (p. 472)
Because this view has so thoroughly dominated
empirical personality psychology for so long, very
little research of a truly idiographic nature has
been reported in the literature—even by those who
have advocated such research most earnestly (cf.
Hall & Lindzey's [1978] discussion of Gordon All-
port's career). Moreover, it has never been made
clear how to reconcile what little idiographic re-
search has been done (cf. Allport, 1965; Levinson,
Darrow, Klein, Levinson, & McKee, 1978; White,
1972, 1975) with the nomothetic objectives of a
science of personality.
The key to any such reconciliation lies in un-
derstanding that there is nothing in the search for
general principles of personality which logically
requires that the status of an individual on a given
attribute be defined relative to the measured status
of others on the same attribute. Indeed, one might
argue, on the basis of what has been said thus far,
that the nearly exclusive reliance by personality
researchers on a normative measurement rationale
is impeding rather than facilitating the search for
general principles of personality,
In any event, there is nothing inherently "an-
tiscientific" about an orientation which presumes
that certain basic principles govern the emergence
of, maintenance of, and changes in the personal-
ities of individuals in general without presuming
that the particular attributes which define the per-
sonalities of individuals must be common to all of
those individuals (cf. Tyler, 1978). Stated other-
wise, there is no logical a priori reason to reject a
paradigm for the scientific study of personality in
which generality is sought with reference to the
process of personality development but in which
comparability in the substance of individuals' per-
sonalities is neither presumed nor precluded.
Suppose, for example, that data of the sort il-
lustrated in Figure 1 had been carefully accu-
mulated for numerous individuals over extended
periods of time. Unlike the differential psycholo-
gist, the personality investigator might reasonably
be quite uninterested in determining the degree
of consistency with which certain common attri-
butes were manifested by subjects in the aggregate.
To the best of my knowledge, there is no person-
ality theorist who is particularly concerned with
that issue one way or the other. However, the per-
sonality investigator might well be very interested
in whatever each individual's data might reveal
about the basic process of personality development.
This is an issue with which most personality the-
orists are directly concerned (cf. Hall & Lindzey,
1978; Levy, 1970). Moreover, as a means of for-
mally testing hypotheses relevant to this issue with
data of the kind envisioned here, time series anal-
ysis (Glass, Willson, & Gottman, 1975; Gottman,
1973) comes readily to mind.
To the extent that theoretically derived hy-
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST • MARCH 1981 • 285
potheses pertinent to questions of personality de-
velopment could repeatedly be confirmed in (the-
oretically relevant portions of) the data of single
individuals, one could very well accumulate em-
pirical support for general principles of personal-
ity, the (in)comparability of individuals on sub-
stantive attributes notwithstanding. By its very
nature, such research would be logically compat-
ible with the objectives of learning the best way
to describe what kind of a person a given individ-
ual is, how he or she got that way, what keeps him
or her that way, what might make him or her
change, and how an understanding of all of this
might contribute to the explanation and prediction
of the behavior of individuals.
Programmatic research of the type just de-
scribed would be idiographic in the sense that it
would be predicated on an idiographic measure-
ment rationale and would literally involve the
study of single individuals over time. It would also
be nomothetic, however, in that it would seek to
confirm, across individuals, the applicability of
certain basic principles to an understanding of the-
oretically relevant phenomena. In a word, the re-
search would be idiothetic.
Obviously, no one can claim that such research
would lead unfailingly to general principles of
personality. No one knows for certain that general
principles of personality can convincingly be es-
tablished by any means. The reader can be certain,
however, that such research would be neither log-
ically incompatible with the search for such prin-
ciples nor in any other way "antiscientific."
A NOTE ON THE ROLE OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
SITUATION
During the past decade, considerable attention has
been given to the problem of specifying the role
of the psychological situation in the scientific study
of personality (see, e.g., Bern & Funder, 1978; Buss,
1977; Ekehammar, 1974; Endler, 1975; Endler &
Magnusson, 1976; Frederiksen, 1972; Howard,
1979; Magnusson & Ekehammar, 1975; Magnusson
& Endler, 1977; Mischel, 1973,1977,1979; Pervin,
1977; Wachtel, 1977).
Space limitations preclude a thorough discussion
of this topic here. It is worth noting, however, that
from an idiothetic perspective, a psychological sit-
uation would be defined in empirical research in
terms of the attribute (or, possibly, the attributes)
that is central to the construal of one's perceived
alternative possibilities for action within a given
interval of time.
286 • MARCH 1981 • AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST
Thus, for example, a "competitive" psycholog-
ical situation would be defined as an interval of
time during which the attribute "competitiveness
versus noncompetitiveness" is central to the con-
strual of the individual's perceived alternative pos-
sibilities for action. Similarly, a "love and affec-
tion" situation (cf. Rotter, 1955) would be defined
as an interval of time during which the attribute
"affectionate versus nonaffectionate" is central to
the construal of one's perceived alternative possi-
bilities for action. From this perspective, an indi-
vidual would be said to remain in the same psy-
chological situation to the extent that there is
constancy in the attribute(s) that is central to the
construal of his or her perceived alternative pos-
sibilities for action, whether or not there is con-
stancy in the perceived alternative possibilities
themselves.
This perspective on the role of the psychological
situation in the scientific study of personality seems
to be quite compatible with the approach recently
taken by Bern and Funder (1978) and, more gen-
erally, with what some authors have termed an
organismic-—-as contrasted with mechanistic—in-
teractionism (cf. Bowers, 1973; Buss, 1977; Endler,
1975; Howard, 1979). Its utility, of course, remains
to be firmly established.
Concluding Remarks
In his recent discussion of the past, present, and
future (?) of personality theory, Rychlak (1976b)
notes that a distinguishing feature of the person-
ality theorist has always been his or her concern
with the identity of the individual. He elaborates
this point as follows:
It is the ability to both have an idea or be doing some-
thing and yet at the same time grasp transcendentally
that one is thinking and doing these things, to comment
on them, and to know that one could be doing and
thinking otherwise, that leads a personality theorist to
postulate the identity factor, (p, 220, latter italics added)
Rychlak's conception of the individual identity
seems quite similar to Tyler's (1978) recent dis-
cussion of individuality:
Through encounters with a very large number of situ-
ations and persons exemplifying different possibilities for
structuring reality, one puts together one's own reper-
toire of possibility-processing structures, (p. 232)
What characterizes an individual is the pattern of re-
sponses, the likelihood that different tasks and situations
will be dealt with in one way rather than another, (pp.
159-160, italics added)
More than on anything else, one's individuality depends sonality research (cf. Epstein, 1980; Mischel, 1977,
on the choices one makes, (p. 204) 1979). As the reader is doubtless well aware, the
Both Rychlak and Tyler emphasize the general, field of personality psychology is currently beset
failure of personality research to come to grips with numerous difficulties and controversies (Fiske,
with the concepts of identity and individuality. As 1978b), and I certainly make no pretense here to
a result, Rychlak argues, the research has simply have resolved them all.
not served the personality theorist very well at all, This much seems clear, however: If the overrid-
a point seemingly corroborated by Sechrest's (1976) ing metatheoretical concerns of a science of per-
observation that despite the proliferation of em- sonality are at all well represented by the quotation
pirical research, personality psychology has failed of Levy (1970) cited at the outset of this article,
to achieve any major theoretical advances in de- then some viable alternative to the individual dif-
cades. The present article has attempted to clarify ferences paradigm is going to have to be devel-
the fundamental reason for this problem and to oped. Above all else, a viable alternative will be
outline one possible approach to its resolution. one within which the search for general principles
To recapitulate, it has been noted that most per- of personality can proceed without simultaneously
sonality theorists are concerned with describing the compromising the fidelity with which the inves-
personalities of individuals and, subsequently, with tigator can address theoretically relevant questions
understanding how personalities develop, are at the level of the individual.
maintained, and change. The presumption of per- Although its empirical utility obviously awaits
sonality theorists is that an understanding of these systematic documentation, the framework pro-
matters would (a) contribute importantly to the posed here seems to provide at least a reasonable
explanation of why any given individual acts the starting point. As this paradigm develops, the sci-
way he or she does and (b) provide a means of entific study of personality will likely become less
anticipating how any given individual will behave and less synonymous with the assessment and study
in the future. of individual differences (which is the business of
Unfortunately, the vast majority of personality differential psychology) and increasingly synony-
researchers have long been working within the mous with the search for the general principles
constraints of a paradigm which, however useful that govern the development of personal identi-
it may be for other purposes, is inherently ill suited ties (cf. Breger, 1974; Rychlak, 1976a). There are
to the most fundamental of the above concerns: good reasons for believing that this is what most
describing the personalities of individuals. Con- personality theorists have wanted to understand all
sequently, research conducted within this para- along.
digm cannot possibly adequately address the re-
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