76589557000001111 he was denied due process when no hearing was conducted on his motion for
66. RACHO VS. MIRO reinvestigation. In De Ocampo v. Secretary of Justice, 480 SCRA 71 (2006), we ruled
G.R. Nos. 168578-79. September 30, 2008.*
NIETO A. RACHO, petitioner, vs. HON. PRIMO C. MIRO, in his capacity as Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas, HON. VIRGINIA PALANCA-SANTIAGO, in her
capacity as Ombudsman Director, and HON. ANTONIO T. ECHAVEZ, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court-Cebu City, Branch 8,
respondents.
Ombudsman; Ombudsman Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6770); Public Officers; The
discretion of the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) is freed from legislative, executive or
judicial intervention to ensure that the OMB is insulated from any outside pressure and
improper influence—the only ground upon which a plea for review of the OMB’s
resolution may be entertained is an alleged grave abuse of discretion.—The
prosecution of offenses committed by public officers is vested primarily in the OMB. For
this purpose, the OMB has been given a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory
powers under the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of
1989). Its discretion is freed from legislative, executive or judicial intervention to ensure
that the OMB is insulated from any outside
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
214
214 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Racho vs. Miro
pressure and improper influence. Hence, unless there are good and compelling
reasons to do so, the Court will refrain from interfering with the exercise of the
Ombudsman’s powers, and will respect the initiative and independence inherent in the
latter who, beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the guardian
of the integrity of the public service. The Ombudsman is empowered to determine
whether there exists reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed
and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding
information with the appropriate courts. Such finding of probable cause is a finding of
fact which is generally not reviewable by this Court. The only ground upon which a plea
for review of the OMB’s resolution may be entertained is an alleged grave abuse of
discretion. By that phrase is meant the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent
and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty; or to a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law; or to act at all in contemplation of law, as when the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.
Same; Preliminary Investigation; The determination of probable cause need not
be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing
absolute certainty of guilt.—The determination of probable cause need not be based
on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing absolute
certainty of guilt. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of
constitutes the offense charged. The trial of a case is conducted precisely for the
reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge. A finding of probable
cause merely binds the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.
Same; Same; Motions for Reinvestigation; Due Process; A clarificatory hearing
is not required during preliminary investigation—rather than being mandatory, a
clarificatory hearing is optional on the part of the investigating officer as evidenced by
the use of the term “may” in Section 3(e) of Rule 112—and this rule applies equally to
a motion for reinvestigation.—We are unable to agree with petitioner’s contention that
that a clarificatory hearing is not required during preliminary investigation. Rather215
VOL. 567, SEPTEMBER 30, 2008 215
Racho vs. Miro
than being mandatory, a clarificatory hearing is optional on the part of the
investigating officer as evidenced by the use of the term “may” in Section 3(e) of Rule
112, thus: (e) If the investigating officer believes that there are matters to be clarified,
he may set a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their
witnesses, during which the parties shall be afforded an opportunity to be present but
without the right to examine or cross-examine. This rule applies equally to a motion for
reinvestigation. As stated, the Office of the Ombudsman has been granted virtually
plenary investigatory powers by the Constitution and by law. As a rule, the Office of the
Ombudsman may, for every particular investigation, whether instigated by a complaint
or on its own initiative, decide how best to pursue such investigation. In the present
case, the OMB found it unnecessary to hold additional clarificatory hearings. Notably,
we note that a hearing was conducted during preliminary investigation where petitioner
invoked his right to remain silent and confront witnesses who may be presented against
him, although there was none presented.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Under the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman (Administrative Order No. 07), particularly Rule II, Section 7(a), in relation
to Section 4(f), a complainant’s active participation is no longer a matter of right during
reinvestigation; It is settled that administrative due process cannot be fully equated with
due process in its strict judicial sense.—Under the Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman (Administrative Order No. 07), particularly Rule II, Section 7(a),in
relation to Section 4(f), a complainant’s active participation is no longer a matter of right
during reinvestigation. Admittedly, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not
strictly applied in administrative proceedings. Thus, it is settled that administrative due
process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense.
Same; Same; Same; Even if a preliminary investigation resembles a realistic
judicial appraisal of the merits of the case, public prosecutors could not decide whether
there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the person charged; To ask
prosecutors to recuse themselves on reinvestigation upon every unfavorable ruling in
a case would cause unwarranted delays in the prosecution of actions.—There was no
manifest abuse of discretion on the part of Director Palanca-Santiago for her refusal to
inhibit herself in the216
216 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Racho vs. Miro
reinvestigation. Even if a preliminary investigation resembles a realistic judicial
appraisal of the merits of the case, public prosecutors could not decide whether there
is evidence beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the person charged. They are not
considered judges, by the nature of their functions, but merely quasi-judicial officers.
Worth-stressing, one adverse ruling by itself would not prove bias and prejudice against
a party sufficient to disqualify even a judge. Hence, absent proven allegations of
specific conduct showing prejudice and hostility, we cannot impute grave abuse of
discretion here on respondent director. To ask prosecutors to recuse themselves on
reinvestigation upon every unfavorable ruling in a case would cause unwarranted
delays in the prosecution of actions.
Certiorari; Pleadings and Practice; The requirement of providing appellate courts
with certified true copies of the judgments or final orders that are the subjects of review
is indispensable to aid them in resolving whether or not to give due course to
Page 1 of 6
petitions.—We note that petitioner failed to attach a certified true copy of the assailed
Resolution in OMB-C-C-03-0729-L in disregard of paragraph 2 of Section 1, Rule 65
on certiorari. As previously ruled, the requirement of providing appellate courts with
certified true copies of the judgments or final orders that are the subjects of review is
indispensable to aid them in resolving whether or not to give due course to petitions.
This necessary requirement cannot be perfunctorily ignored, much less violated. In
view, however, of the serious matters dealt with in this case, we opted to tackle the
substantial merits hereof with least regard to technicalities.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Mandamus.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
A. Tan, Zoleta & Partners Law Firm for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for public respondents.
Renato L. De La Fuente for private respondent Enrique Zobel.
Arsenio R. Reyes for intervenors Heirs of Guillermo Mercado.
217
VOL. 567, SEPTEMBER 30, 2008 217
Racho vs. Miro
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
seeks the annulment of the Joint Order1 dated April 1, 2005 of the Office of the
Ombudsman (OMB) in the Visayas. The OMB had denied reconsideration of its
Reinvestigation Report2 in OMB-V-C-02-0240-E and its Resolution in OMB-C-C-03-
0729-L, both dated January 10, 2005. Petitioner herein also assails both issuances of
the OMB.
The factual antecedents of this case are as follows.
On November 9, 2001, DYHP Balita Action Team (DYHP) of the Radio Mindanao
Network, Inc. addressed a letter3 on behalf of an anonymous complainant to Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas Primo C. Miro. The letter accused Nieto A. Racho, an
employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)-Cebu, of having accumulated wealth
disproportionate to his income. Photocopied bank certifications disclosed that Racho
had a total deposit of P5,793,881.39 with three banks.
Pio R. Dargantes, the Graft Investigation Officer I (GIO) assigned to investigate the
complaint, directed DYHP to submit a sworn statement of its witnesses. Instead, the
latter filed a Manifestation4 dated October 16, 2002 withdrawing its complaint for lack
of witnesses. Consequently, GIO Dargantes dismissed the case. He ruled that the
photocopied bank certifications did not constitute substantial evidence required in
administrative proceedings.5
Then, in two separate Memoranda dated May 30, 2003, 6Ombudsman Director
Virginia Palanca-Santiago disapproved GIO Dargantes’s Resolution. In OMB-V-A-02-
0214-E, Director
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 32-37.
2 Id., at pp. 55-71.
3 Records, p. 4.
4 Id., at p. 41.
5 Id., at pp. 59-61.
6 Rollo, pp. 90-97 and 98-105.
218
218 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Racho vs. Miro
Palanca-Santiago held Racho administratively liable for falsification and dishonesty,
and meted on him the penalty of dismissal from service with forfeiture of all benefits
and perpetual disqualification to hold office.7 In OMB-V-C-02-0240-E, Director
Palanca-Santiago found probable cause to charge Racho with falsification of public
document under Article 171(4)8 of the Revised Penal Code.9 The latter moved for
reconsideration but it was denied by the Deputy Ombudsman.
On May 30, 2003, Racho was charged with falsification of public document,
docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-66458 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cebu City, Branch 8. The Information alleged:
“That on or about the 7th day of February, 2000, and for sometime subsequent
thereto, at Cebu City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
above-named accused NIETO A. RACHO, a public officer, being the Chief, Special
Investigation Division, Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), Regional Office No. 13, Cebu
City, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to [his] office, with
deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsify a public document, consisting of his Statement of Assets, Liabilities
and Networth, Disclosure of Business Interest and Financial Connections; and
Identification of Relatives In The Government Service, as of December 31, 1999, by
stating therein that his cash in bank is only FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P15,000.00), Philippine Currency and that his assets minus his liabilities amounted
only to TWO HUNDRED THREE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY EIGHT
_______________
7 Id., at p. 97.
8 ART. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic
minister.—The penalty of prisión mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be
imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his
official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:
xxxx
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
xxxx
9 Rollo, pp. 104-105.
219
VOL. 567, SEPTEMBER 30, 2008 219
Racho vs. Miro
PESOS (P203,758.00), Philippine Currency, when in truth and in fact, said accused
has BANK DEPOSITS or cash in banks amounting to FIVE MILLION SEVEN
HUNDRED NINETY THREE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED ONE PESOS and 39/100
(P5,793,801.39),10 Philippine Currency, as herein shown:
1) Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company – Cebu, Tabunok Branch:
Unisa No. Amount
3-172-941-10 P1,983,554.45
3-172-941-11 949,341.82
Total - P2,932,896.27
2) Philippine Commercial International Bank – Magallanes Branch, Cebu City:
Account No. Amount
Equalizer – 29449-29456 P1,000,000.00
PCC Fund – 99-0095-0-0020-clf.b 200,000.00
Optimum Savings – 00-8953-06860-9 28,702.53
Total - P1,228,702.53
3) Bank of the Philippine Islands – Cebu (Mango) Branch, Gen. Maxilom Avenue,
Cebu City:
Account No. Amount
Page 2 of 6
 Gold Savings – 1023-2036-49 P1,632,282.59
thus deliberately failed to disclose an important fact of which he has the legal obligation
to do so as specifically mandated under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6713 (The Norms
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees) and Section 7 of
Republic Act No. 3019, As Amended (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act),
thereby making untruthful statement in a narration of facts.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”11
Racho appealed the administrative case and filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals to
_______________
10 The total amount should be five million seven hundred ninety three thousand
eight hundred eighty one pesos (P5,793,881.39).
11 Records, pp. 71-72.
220
220 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Racho vs. Miro
question the ruling in OMB-V-C-02-0240-E. In a Decision12dated January 26, 2004, the
appellate court annulled both Memoranda and ordered a reinvestigation of the cases
against petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss 13 dated July 21, 2004.
The same was denied for lack of merit in an Order14 dated August 24, 2004.
On reinvestigation, petitioner submitted a Comment 15dated January 4, 2005 along
with supporting documents. On January 10, 2005, the OMB issued the assailed
Reinvestigation Report, the dispositive portion of which states:
“With all the foregoing, undersigned finds no basis to change, modify nor reverse
her previous findings that there is probable cause for the crime of FALSIFICATION OF
PUBLIC DOCUMENT, defined and penalized under Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code, against respondent Nieto A. Racho for making untruthful statements in a
narration of facts in his SALN. As there are additional facts established during the
reinvestigation, re: failure of Mr. Racho to reflect his business connections, then the
Information filed against him should be amended to include the same. Let this Amended
Information be returned to the court for further proceedings.
SO RESOLVED.”16
Petitioner sought reconsideration but was denied by the OMB in the Joint Order
dated April 1, 2005. It decreed:
“The Motion for Reconsideration of respondent did not adduce any new evidence,
which would warrant a reversal of our findings; neither did it present proof of errors of
law or irregularities being committed.
_______________
12 Rollo, pp. 73-79. Penned by Associate Justice Arsenio J. Magpale, with
Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Bienvenido L. Reyes concurring.
13 Records, pp. 82-83.
14 Id., at p. 94.
15 Id., at pp. 110-112.
16 Rollo, p. 71.
221
VOL. 567, SEPTEMBER 30, 2008 221
Racho vs. Miro
This being so, this Motion for Reconsideration of respondent is hereby DENIED.
The findings of this Office as contained in the two (2) REINVESTIGATION REPORTS
(in OMB-V-C-02-0240-E and OMB-V-A-02-0214-E) and RESOLUTION (in OMB-C-C-
03-0729-L) stand.
SO ORDERED.”17
In the instant petition, Racho cites the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN DIRECTOR, AS WELL AS
RESPONDENT DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE VISAYAS WHO SANCTIONED
HER DEED, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION EQUIVALENT TO LACK
OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN SHE REFUSED OR FAILED TO INHIBIT
HERSELF FROM CONDUCTING THE SUPPOSED “REINVESTIGATION”;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT HEREIN PETITION[ER] WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW
IN THE SUPPOSED “REINVESTIGATION”;
III.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN DIRECTOR, AS WELL AS
RESPONDENT DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE VISAYAS WHO SANCTIONED
HER DEED, COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION EQUIVALENT TO LACK
OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN SHE HELD THAT PETITIONER’S
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DID NOT ADDUCE PROOF OF ANY
IRREGULARITY IN THE “REINVESTIGATION”; AND
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT BY REASON OF THIS HONORABLE COURT’S INHERENT
POWER TO DO ALL THINGS REASONABLY NECESSARY FOR THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, EVEN IF NOT PRAYED FOR IN THE INSTANT
PETITION, THE
_______________
17 Id., at pp. 36-37.
222
222 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Racho vs. Miro
SUBJECT OMBUDSMAN CASES OMB-V-C-02-0240-E AND OMB-C-C-03-0729-L
CAN BE DISMISSED.18
Stated simply, the issues now for determination are as follows: (1) Whether
Ombudsman Director Palanca-Santiago gravely abused her discretion when she did
not inhibit herself in the reinvestigation; (2) Whether petitioner was denied due process
of law on reinvestigation; and (3) Whether there was probable cause to hold petitioner
liable for falsification under Article 171(4) of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioner ascribes grave abuse of discretion on the part of Ombudsman Director
Palanca-Santiago since she did not inhibit herself in the reinvestigation. He claims a
denial of due process because of the fact that Director Palanca-Santiago handled the
preliminary investigation as well as the reinvestigation of the cases. In both instances,
the latter found probable cause to indict petitioner for falsification. For this reason,
petitioner believes that Director Palanca-Santiago has turned hostile to him. He insists
that respondent director had lost the cold neutrality of an impartial judge when she
found probable cause against him on preliminary investigation. Petitioner penultimately
questions the haste with which the reinvestigation was concluded and the lack of
hearing thereon. In essence, he insists on the dismissal of his cases before the OMB.
On November 6, 2006, the OMB thru the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP)
filed a Memorandum19 dated October 23, 2006 for respondents. The OSP avers that
the instant petition stated no cause of action since it did not implead the Hon.
Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo as a respondent. That Director Palanca-Santiago
resolved the investigation adverse to petitioner, the OSP contends, did not necessarily
indicate partiality. The OSP explains that the Reinvestigation Report was merely
recommendatory and the finding of probable
Page 3 of 6
_______________
18 Id., at pp. 223-224.
19 Id., at pp. 247-266.
223
VOL. 567, SEPTEMBER 30, 2008 223
Racho vs. Miro
cause was done in line with official duty. It points out further that petitioner failed to cite
specific acts by which Director Palanca-Santiago showed hostility towards him. Finally,
the OSP charges petitioner with forum shopping since he had already raised the issue
of respondent director’s impartiality in his petition assailing the Memorandum dated
May 30, 2003, before the Court of Appeals.
After considering the contentions and submissions of the parties, we are in
agreement that the instant petition lacks merit.
The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers is vested primarily in the
OMB. For this purpose, the OMB has been given a wide latitude of investigatory and
prosecutory powers under the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770 20 (The
Ombudsman Act of 1989). Its discretion is freed from legislative, executive or judicial
intervention to ensure that the OMB is insulated from any outside pressure and
improper influence.21 Hence, unless there are good and compelling reasons to do so,
the Court will refrain from interfering with the exercise of the Ombudsman’s powers,
and will respect the initiative and independence inherent in the latter who, beholden to
no one, acts as the champion of the people and the guardian of the integrity of the
public service.22
The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists reasonable
grounds to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate
courts.23 Such finding of probable cause is a find-
_______________
20 An Act Providing for the Functional and Structural Organization of the Office of
the Ombudsman, and for Other Purposes, approved on December 13, 1989.
21 Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) v. Desierto, G.R. No.
139675, July 21, 2006, 496 SCRA 112, 121.
22 Id.
23 Id.
224
224 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Racho vs. Miro
ing of fact which is generally not reviewable by this Court.24 The only ground upon
which a plea for review of the OMB’s resolution may be entertained is an alleged grave
abuse of discretion. By that phrase is meant the capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must
be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty; or to a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law; or to act at all in contemplation of law, as
when the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
or hostility.25
Considering the facts and circumstances of this case, we find no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondents. As already well-stated, as long as substantial
evidence supports the Ombudsman’s ruling, his decision will not be overturned. 26 Here,
the finding of the Ombudsman that there was probable cause to hold petitioner liable
for falsification by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts rests on
substantial evidence.
The OMB evaluated petitioner’s Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Networth
(SALN) for the year 199927against certified true copies of his bank deposits during the
same year. In his SALN, petitioner declared P15,000 cash in bank as of December 31,
1999. The bank certifications of petitioner’s deposits, however, confirmed that he had
an aggregate balance of P5,793,881.39 in his accounts with three banks. Original
certifications dated June 17, 1999 issued by the Bank of the Philippine Islands
(BPI)28 and Equitable PCI
_______________
24 Galario v. Office of the Ombudsman (Mindanao), G.R. No. 166797, July 10,
2007, 527 SCRA 190, 205.
25 Peralta v. Desierto, G.R. No. 153152, October 19, 2005, 473 SCRA 322, 337.
26 Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) v. Desierto, supra note
21, at p. 122.
27 Records, p. 12.
28 Id., at p. 7.
225
VOL. 567, SEPTEMBER 30, 2008 225
Racho vs. Miro
Bank (Equitable PCIB)29 revealed accounts for P1,632,282.59 and P1,228,702.53,
respectively. A photocopied certification dated June 16, 1999 from
Metrobank30 indicated a deposit of P2,932,896.27.
The OMB did not accord weight to the Joint Affidavit31submitted by petitioner. In
said Affidavit, Vieto and Dean Racho, petitioner’s brothers, stated that they entrusted
to petitioner P1,390,000 and P1,950,000 respectively. On the other hand, petitioner’s
nephew, Henry Racho, claimed that he delivered the amount of P1,400,000 to
petitioner. These sums were purportedly their contribution as stockholders of
Angelsons Lending and Investors, Inc. (Angelsons) and Nal Pay Phone Services
(NPPS) - businesses managed by the spouses Racho. Ironically, Dean Racho was not
listed as a stockholder of the lending company. Moreover, the Articles of
Incorporation32 of Angelsons reflected that Vieto, Henry and the spouses Racho
individually paid only P12,500 of the subscribed shares of P50,000 each. Petitioner did
not present proofs of succeeding contributions made and their amounts. Curiously,
affiants allegedly tendered their additional contributions during family
reunions.33 Neither did the affiants describe the extent of their interest in NPPS.
Petitioner merely presented NPPS’ Certificate of Registration of Business
Name34 secured by his wife Lourdes B. Racho. Yet, said certificate did not operate as
a license to engage in any kind of business, much more a proof of its establishment
and operation. Even assuming that said businesses exist, petitioner should have
similarly reported his interests therein in his SALN.
_______________
29 Id., at p. 6.
30 Id., at p. 5.
31 Id., at pp. 113-115.
32 Id., at pp. 117-123.
33 Id., at p. 114.
34 Id., at p. 133.
226
226 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Racho vs. Miro
Petitioner argues that his culpability should not be ascertained on the basis of
photocopied bank certifications. Apparent from the records, however, is the
Page 4 of 6
Order35 dated August 27, 2004 of the OMB which required petitioner to comment on
the certified true copies of bank certifications issued by BPI and Equitable PCIB. All the
same, even if we exclude his deposit in Metrobank, a significant disparity between his
declared cash on hand of P15,000 and cash in bank of P2,860,985.12 subsists when
compared to his total bank deposits duly certified for the same year.
Indeed, the determination of probable cause need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing absolute certainty of
guilt.36 It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes
the offense charged. The trial of a case is conducted precisely for the reception of
evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge. 37 A finding of probable cause
merely binds the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt. 38
Moreover, we are unable to agree with petitioner’s contention that he was denied
due process when no hearing was conducted on his motion for reinvestigation. In De
Ocampo v. Secretary of Justice,39 we ruled that a clarificatory hearing is not required
during preliminary investigation. Rather than being mandatory, a clarificatory hearing is
optional on the part of the investigating officer as evidenced by the use of the term
“may” in Section 3(e) of Rule 112, thus:
_______________
35 Id., at p. 95.
36 Galario v. Office of the Ombudsman (Mindanao), supra note 24, at p. 204.
37 Raro v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 108431, July 14, 2000, 335 SCRA 581, 605.
38 Galario v. Office of the Ombudsman (Mindanao), supra note 36.
39 G.R. No. 147932, January 25, 2006, 480 SCRA 71.
227
VOL. 567, SEPTEMBER 30, 2008 227
Racho vs. Miro
“(e) If the investigating officer believes that there are matters to be clarified, he
may set a hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses,
during which the parties shall be afforded an opportunity to be present but without the
right to examine or cross-examine.”40
This rule applies equally to a motion for reinvestigation. As stated, the Office of the
Ombudsman has been granted virtually plenary investigatory powers by the
Constitution and by law. As a rule, the Office of the Ombudsman may, for every
particular investigation, whether instigated by a complaint or on its own initiative, decide
how best to pursue such investigation.41 In the present case, the OMB found it
unnecessary to hold additional clarificatory hearings. Notably, we note that a hearing
was conducted during preliminary investigation where petitioner invoked his right to
remain silent and confront witnesses who may be presented against him, although
there was none presented.
Besides, under the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman
(Administrative Order No. 07), particularly Rule II, Section 7(a), 42 in relation to Section
4(f),43 a complainant’s
_______________
40 Id., at p. 80.
41 Dimayuga v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 129099, July 20, 2006, 495
SCRA 461, 469.
42 Sec. 7. Motion for reconsideration.—
a) Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation of an approved
order or resolution shall be allowed, the same to be filed within five (5) days
from notice thereof with the Office of the Ombudsman, or the proper Deputy
Ombudsman as the case may be, with corresponding leave of court in cases
where the information has already been filed in court. (As amended by
Administrative Order No. 15 entitled “Re: Amendment of Section 7, Rule II of
Administrative Order No. 07,” signed by Tanodbayan Aniano A. Desierto on
February 16, 2001.)
xxxx
43 Sec. 4. Procedure.—The preliminary investigation of cases falling under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and Regional
228
228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Racho vs. Miro
active participation is no longer a matter of right during reinvestigation. Admittedly,
technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied in administrative
proceedings. Thus, it is settled that administrative due process cannot be fully equated
with due process in its strict judicial sense.44
Petitioner complains of how quickly the reinvestigation proceedings were
terminated. The OMB issued the Reinvestigation Report on January 10, 2005, barely
a week after petitioner filed his Comment dated January 4, 2005. Thus, the latter
surmises that no reinvestigation was actually made. However, a review of the facts
would reveal that after the Court of Appeals directed a reinvestigation of the case, the
OMB issued an Order dated August 27, 2004 requiring petitioner to submit a comment
within 10 days from receipt. The latter failed to comply. On December 1, 2004, petitioner
filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Comment 45 of 30 days; the OMB granted
the same for 15 days. On December 17,
_______________
Trial Courts shall be conducted in the manner prescribed in Section 3, Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court, subject to the following provisions:
xxxx
f) If, after the filing of the requisite affidavits and their supporting
evidences, there are facts material to the case which the investigating officer
may need to be clarified on, he may conduct a clarificatory hearing during which
the parties shall be afforded the opportunity to be present but without the right
to examine or cross-examine the witness being questioned. Where the
appearance of the parties or witnesses is impracticable, the clarificatory
questioning may be, conducted in writing, whereby the questions desired to be
asked by the investigating officer or a party shall be reduced into writing and
served on the witness concerned who shall be required to answer the same in
writing and under oath.
xxxx
44 Espinosa v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 135775, October 19, 2000, 343
SCRA 744, 753.
45 Records, pp. 96-98.
229
VOL. 567, SEPTEMBER 30, 2008 229
Racho vs. Miro
2004, petitioner asked for another extension of 30 days reckoned from December 19,
2004 within which to submit a comment; the OMB gave him up to December 28, 2004.
On December 28, 2004, petitioner moved for a third extension. Then, without waiting
for the OMB’s resolution of his latest motion, petitioner filed his Comment on January
4, 2005. But with his repeated motions for extensions, he already contributed to
palpable delay in the completion of the reinvestigation.
Clearly, the requirements of due process have been substantially satisfied in the
instant case.46 In its Order47dated December 22, 2004, the OMB warned petitioner that
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no further extension will be given such that if he fails to file a comment on December 54 Go v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163745, August 24, 2007, 531 SCRA 158,
28, 2004, the cases against him will be submitted for resolution. Even so, the OMB 166.
considered petitioner’s belatedly-filed Comment and the documents attached therewith
in its Reinvestigation Report. In our view, petitioner cannot successfully invoke © Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
deprivation of due process in this case, where as a party he was given the chance to
be heard, with ample opportunity to present his side.48
Equally clear to us, there was no manifest abuse of discretion on the part of Director
Palanca-Santiago for her refusal to inhibit herself in the reinvestigation. Even if a
preliminary investigation resembles a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the
case,49 public prosecutors could not decide whether there is evidence beyond
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the person charged.50 They are not considered judges,
by the nature of their functions, but merely quasi-judicial
_______________
46 Filipino v. Macabuhay, G.R. No. 158960, November 24, 2006, 508 SCRA 50,
59.
47 Records, pp. 100-101.
48 Filipino v. Macabuhay, supra note 46, at p. 58.
49 Sales v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 143802, November 16, 2001, 369 SCRA
293, 301.
50 Gallardo v. People, G.R. No. 142030, April 21, 2005, 456 SCRA 494, 507.
230
230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Racho vs. Miro
officers.51 Worth-stressing, one adverse ruling by itself would not prove bias and
prejudice against a party sufficient to disqualify even a judge.52 Hence, absent proven
allegations of specific conduct showing prejudice and hostility, we cannot impute grave
abuse of discretion here on respondent director. To ask prosecutors to recuse
themselves on reinvestigation upon every unfavorable ruling in a case would cause
unwarranted delays in the prosecution of actions.
Finally, we note that petitioner failed to attach a certified true copy of the assailed
Resolution in OMB-C-C-03-0729-L in disregard of paragraph 253 of Section 1, Rule 65
on certiorari. As previously ruled, the requirement of providing appellate courts with
certified true copies of the judgments or final orders that are the subjects of review is
indispensable to aid them in resolving whether or not to give due course to petitions.
This necessary requirement cannot be perfunctorily ignored, much less violated. 54 In
view, however, of the serious matters dealt with in this case, we opted to tackle the
substantial merits hereof with least regard to technicalities.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 8 is hereby ORDERED to proceed with the trial of
Criminal Case No. CBU-66458 against petitioner.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
_______________
51 Sales v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 49, at p. 302.
52 Republic v. Gingoyon, G.R. No. 166429, December 19, 2005, 478 SCRA 474,
543.
53 SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari.—….
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment,
order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents
relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping
as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46.

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