Rivera v. People, G.R. No.

166326
Subject Matter: Attempted v. Frustrated Murder, Art. 6 of the Revised Penal Code

Facts:
As Ruben Rodil went to a nearby store to buy food, Edgardo Rivera mocked him for
being jobless and dependent on his wife for support. Ruben resented the rebuke and
thereafter, a heated exchange of words ensued. In the following day, when Ruben and
his three year old daughter went to the store to buy food, Edgardo together with his
brother Esmeraldo and Ismael Rivera emerged from their house and ganged up on him.
Esmeraldo and Ismael mauled Ruben with fist blows. And as he fell to the ground,
Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow block on the parietal area. The Rivera
brothers fled when policemen came. The doctor declared that the wounds were slight
and superficial, though the victim could have been killed had the police not promptly
intervened.

Issues:
(1) WON there was intent to kill.

(2) WON the Court of Appeals was correct in modifying the crime from frustrated to
attempted murder.

(3) WON the aggravating circumstance of treachery was properly applied.

Held:
(1) Yes. The Court held that there was intent to kill as Esmeraldo and Ismael
pummeled the victim with fist blows, while Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow
block. Even though the wounds sustained by the victim were merely superficial and
could not have produced his death, intent to kill is presumed.

(2) Yes. The Court of Appeals was correct since based on Art. 6 of the RPC, there is an
attempt when the offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt
acts and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by
reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

(3) Yes. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack, which gives no
opportunity for the victim to repel it or defend himself. In the present case, the sudden
attack to the victim caused him to be overwhelmed and had no chance to defend
himself and retaliate. Thus, there was treachery
Baleros v. People
G.R. No. 138033 February 22, 2006

Lessons Applicable: Attempted Rape

Laws Applicable: Art. 6

FACTS:
• Martina Lourdes Albano (Malou), a medical student of the University of Sto. Tomas,
stayed at Room 307 with her maid Marvilou.
• December 12 10:30 pm: Malou slept. Her maid Marvilou slept on a folding bed right
in front of her bedroom door.
• December 13, 1991 1:00 am: Chito left the fraternity party with Robert Chan and
Alberto wearing a barong tagalog, with t-shirt inside, with short pants with stripes lent by
Perla Duran and leather shoes.
• December 13, 1991 1:30 am: Chito arrived at the Building wearing a white t-shirt
with fraternity symbols and black shorts with the brand name “Adidas” from a party. He
requested permission from S/G Ferolin to go up to Room 306 leased by Ansbert Co but
at that time only Joseph Bernard Africa was there. Although Chito could not produce
the required written authorization, he let him in because he will be a tenant in the
coming summer break. Joseph was awaken by Chito’s knock so he glanced the alarm
clock and let him. He saw him wearing dark-colored shorts and white T-shirt.
• December 13, 1991 1:50 am: Renato Baleros, Jr. y David (Chito) forcefully covered
the face of Martina Lourdes T. Albano with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical with
dizzying effects. This awakened Malou. She struggled but could not move because
she was tightly held and pinned down on the bed. She kicked him and got her right
hand free to squeeze his sex organ causing him to let her go. She went for the
bedroom door and woke up Marvilou. She also intercommed S/G Ferolin saying: "may
pumasok sa kuarto ko pinagtangkaan ako". Malou proceed to Room 310 where her
classmates Christian Alcala, Bernard Baptista, Lutgardo Acosta and Rommel Montes
were staying and seeked help. She saw her bed in a mess and noticed that her
nightdress was stained with blue. Aside from the window with grills which she had
originally left opened, another window inside her bedroom which leads to Room 306
was now open.
• December 13, 1991 3:30 pm: Christian and his roommates, Bernard and Lutgardo
were asked by the CIS people to look for anything not belonging to them in their Unit
when Rommel Montes went inside and found a grey bag.
o Christian knew right away that it belonged to Chito. It contained white t-shirt with
fraternity symbol, a Black Adidas short pants, a handkerchief , 3 white T-shirts, an
underwear and socks.
• Chito pleaded NOT Guilty
• 13 witnesses including Malou and her classmates, Joseph Bernard Africa, Rommel
Montes, Renato Alagadan and Christian Alcala
o Malou: Chito was her classmate whom he rejected a week before
o Chito: He only slept and at about 6 to 6:30, Joseph told him that something had
happened and asked him to follow him to Room 310 carrying his gray bag and since no
one was there they went to Room 401 where Renato Alagadan was. He left his grey
bag at Room 306 the day before.
• handkerchief and Malou’s night dress both contained chloroform, a volatile poison
which causes first degree burn exactly like what Malou sustained on that part of her
face where the chemical-soaked cloth had been pressed
• RTC: guilty of attempted rape
• CA: Affirmed

ISSUE: W/N Chito is guilty of attempted rape

HELD: NO. REVERSED and SET ASIDE. ACQUITTING Renato D. Baleros, Jr. of the
charge for attempted rape. GUILTY of light coercion and is accordingly sentenced to 30
days of arresto menor and to pay a fine of P200.00, with the accessory penalties thereof
and to pay the costs.

• Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by a man who has
carnal knowledge or intercourse with a woman under any of the following
circumstances: (1) By using force or intimidation; (2) When the woman is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) When the woman is under twelve years of
age or is demented.
• Under Article 6, in relation to the aforementioned article of the same code, rape is
attempted when the offender commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts
and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape
by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
o whether or not the act of the petitioner, i.e., the pressing of a chemical-soaked cloth
while on top of Malou, constitutes an overt act of rape.
o Overt or external act has been defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating
the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation,
which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without being
frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will
logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense
• Chito was fully clothed and that there was no attempt on his part to undress Malou,
let alone touch her private part
• Verily, while the series of acts committed by the petitioner do not determine
attempted rape, they constitute unjust vexation punishable as light coercion under the
second paragraph of Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code.
o As it were, unjust vexation exists even without the element of restraint or
compulsion for the reason that this term is broad enough to include any human conduct
which, although not productive of some physical or material harm, would unjustly annoy
or irritate an innocent person
o That Malou, after the incident in question, cried while relating to her classmates
what she perceived to be a sexual attack and the fact that she filed a case for attempted
rape proved beyond cavil that she was disturbed, if not distressed
Valenzuela v. People
G. R. No. 160188 June 21, 2007

Lessons Applicable: frustrated or consummated theft

Laws Applicable: Art. 6

FACTS:
• May 19, 1994 4:30 pm: Aristotel Valenzuela and Jovy Calderon were sighted outside
the Super Sale Club, a supermarket within the ShoeMart (SM) complex along North
EDSA, by Lorenzo Lago, a security guard who was then manning his post at the open
parking area of the supermarket. Lago saw Valenzuela, who was wearing an ID with the
mark “Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU)” who hauled a push cart with cases of
detergent of “Tide” brand and unloaded them in an open parking space, where Calderon
was waiting. He then returned inside the supermarket and emerged 5 minutes after with
more cartons of Tide Ultramatic and again unloaded these boxes to the same area in
the open parking space. Thereafter, he left the parking area and haled a taxi. He
boarded the cab and directed it towards the parking space where Calderon was waiting.
Calderon loaded the cartons of Tide Ultramatic inside the taxi, then boarded the vehicle.
As Lago watched, he proceeded to stop the taxi as it was leaving the open parking area
and asked Valenzuela for a receipt of the merchandise but Valenzuela and Calderon
reacted by fleeing on foot. Lago fired a warning shot to alert his fellow security
guards. Valenzuela and Calderon were apprehended at the scene and the stolen
merchandise recovered worth P12,090.
• Valenzuela, Calderon and 4 other persons were first brought to the SM security
office before they were transferred to the Baler Station II of the Philippine National
Police but only Valenzuela and Calderon were charged with theft by the Assistant City
Prosecutor.
• They pleaded not guilty.
• Calderon’s Alibi: On the afternoon of the incident, he was at the Super Sale Club to
withdraw from his ATM account, accompanied by his neighbor, Leoncio Rosulada. As
the queue for the ATM was long, he and Rosulada decided to buy snacks inside the
supermarket. While they were eating, they heard the gunshot fired by Lago, so they
went out to check what was transpiring and when they did, they were suddenly grabbed
by a security guard
• Valenzuela’s Alibi: He is employed as a “bundler” of GMS Marketing and assigned at
the supermarket. He and his cousin, a Gregorio Valenzuela, had been at the parking
lot, walking beside the nearby BLISS complex and headed to ride a tricycle going to
Pag-asa, when they saw the security guard Lago fire a shot causing evryon to start
running. Then they were apprehended by Lago.
• RTC: guilty of consummated theft
• CA: Confirmed RTC and rejected his contention that it should only be frustrated theft
since at the time he was apprehended, he was never placed in a position to freely
dispose of the articles stolen.

ISSUE: W/N Valenzuela should be guilty of consummated theft.

HELD: YES. petition is DENIED

• Article 6 defines those three stages, namely the consummated, frustrated and
attempted felonies.
o A felony is consummated “when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present.”
o It is frustrated “when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would
produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by
reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.”
o It is attempted “when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly
by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance.”
• Each felony under the Revised Penal Code has a:
o subjective phase - portion of the acts constituting the crime included between the
act which begins the commission of the crime and the last act performed by the offender
which, with prior acts, should result in the consummated crime
 if the offender never passes the subjective phase of the offense, the crime is merely
attempted
o objective phase - After that point of subjective phase has been breached
 subjective phase is completely passed in case of frustrated crimes
• the determination of whether a crime is frustrated or consummated necessitates an
initial concession that all of the acts of execution have been performed by the offender
• The determination of whether the felony was “produced” after all the acts of
execution had been performed hinges on the particular statutory definition of the felony.
• “actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea” - ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an
unlawful act for there to be a crime or there can be no crime when the criminal mind is
wanting
• In crimes mala in se, mens rea has been defined before as “a guilty mind, a guilty or
wrongful purpose or criminal intent” and “essential for criminal liability.”
• Statutory definition of our mala in se crimes must be able to supply what the mens
rea of the crime is and overt acts that constitute the crime
• Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code (Elements of Theft):
1. that there be taking of personal property - only one operative act of execution by
the actor involved in theft
2. property belongs to another
3. taking be done with intent to gain - descriptive circumstances
4. taking be done without the consent of the owner - descriptive circumstances
5. taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things - descriptive circumstances
• Abandoned cases:
o U.S. v. Adiao: failed to get the merchandise out of the Custom House -
consummated theft
o Diño: Military Police inspected the truck at the check point and found 3 boxes of
army rifles - frustrated theft
o Flores: guards discovered that the “empty” sea van had actually contained other
merchandise as well - consummated theft
o Empelis v. IAC: Fled the scene, dropping the coconuts they had seized - frustrated
qualified theft because petitioners were not able to perform all the acts of execution
which should have produced the felony as a consequence
 cannot attribute weight because definition is attempted
• The ability of the actor “to freely dispose of the articles stolen, even if it were only
momentary.”
o We are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the taking by the petitioner was
completed in this case. With intent to gain, he acquired physical possession of the
stolen cases of detergent for a considerable period of time that he was able to drop
these off at a spot in the parking lot, and long enough to load these onto a taxicab.
• Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, theft cannot have a frustrated stage. Theft
can only be attempted (no unlawful taking) or consummated (there is unlawful taking).
PEOPLE VS. DIO
G.R. No. L-36461. June 29, 1984|||
ABAD SANTOS, J p:

FACTS:
An information for robbery with homicide was filed on October 1, 1971, against Danilo
Tobias and a John Doe. The order to arrest Tobias was returned unserved and he is still
on the "Wanted Persons Files."
On December 7, 1971, the information was amended to name Hernando Dio as the
John Doe, the appellant herein.
||At about noontime, Crispulo Alega, a civil engineer by profession working at the Sugar
Construction Company, with a salary of more than P500.00 a month, went to the
Southeastern College, Pasay City to fetch his girlfriend, Remedios Maniti, a third year
high school student||.
They proceeded to the Pasay City Public Market. As they were going up the stairs
leading to the Teresa and Sons Restaurant, Remedios suddenly heard the dropping of
her folders and other things, being carried by Crispulo. When she looked back, she saw
a man (Danilo Tobias) twisting the neck of Crispulo, while the appellant(Hernando Dio)
was holding his (Crispulo's) two hands|.
The robbers tried to divest Crispulo of his 'Seiko' wrist watch, but Crispulo resisted their
attempt and fought the robbers which caused Danilo Tobias to stab him on the left side
of his chest.
The victim ran down the stairs but when they reached Pasay Commercial Bank,
Crispulo Alega fell down and expired. At the time of his death, the 'Seiko' watch was still
strapped to his wrist.|||
The appellant claims in his first assignment of error that he should not have been
convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide because the robbery
was not consummated. He states that there was only an attempted robbery.||
ISSUE
Whether or not the crime of robbery was not consummated
RULING:
||| The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the evidence adduced show that
the appellant and his companion were unsuccessful in their criminal venture of divesting
the victim of his wrist watch so as to constitute the consummated crime of robbery.
When the victim expired, the 'Seiko' watch was still securely strapped to his wrist. The
killing, of Crispulo Alega may be considered as merely incidental to and an offshoot of
the plan to carry out the robbery, which however was not consummated because of the
resistance offered by the deceased.|||
This case would properly come under the provision of Article 297 of the Revised Penal
Code which states that by reason or on occasion of an attempted robbery a homicide is
committed, the person guilty of such offenses shall be punished by reclusion temporal in
its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. unless the homicide committed shall deserve
a higher penalty under the provisions of this Code.|||
The crime committed by the appellant is attempted robbery with homicide and the
penalty prescribed by law is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua. Since there was no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the penalty
should be applied in its medium period. i.e. 18 years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years.
The Indeterminate Sentence Law has also to be applied.
judgment of the trial court is hereby modified; the appellant is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of attempted robbery with homicide and
he is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision
mayoras minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum, to indemnify the heirs
of Crispulo Alega in the amount of P30,000.00, and to pay one-half of the costs.
PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES vs LAMAHANG
G.R. No. L-43530
August 03, 1935

FACTS:

 The defendant Aurelio Lamahang is on appeal from a decision finding him guilt
y of attempted robbery.
 At early dawn on March 2, 1935, policeman Jose Tomambing, who was patrolling
his beat on Delgado and C.R. Fuentes streets of the City of Iloilo, caughtthe acc
used in the act of making an opening with an iron bar on the wall of a store
of cheap goods located on the last named street.
 At that time the owner of the store, Tan Yu, was sleeping inside with another Chi
naman.
 The accusedhad only succeeded in breaking one board and in unfastening a
nother from the wall, when the policeman showed up, who instantly arrested hi
m and placed him under custody.

ISSUE:

WON the accused was erroneously declared guilty of attempted robbery

RULING:

YES, he was erroneously declared guilty of attempted robbery. The accused is then hel
d guilty of attempted trespass to dwelling, committed by means of force, with the afores
aid aggravating and mitigating circumstances and sentenced to three months and one d
ay of arresto mayor.

RATIONALE:

It is necessary to prove that said beginning of execution, if carried to its complete termin
ation following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by t
he voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a con
crete offense. In the case of robbery, it must be shown that the offender clearly inte
nded to take possession, for the purpose of gain, of some personal property belo
nging to another. In the instant case, it may only be inferred as a logical conclusion tha
t his evident intention was to enter by means of force said store against the will of its ow
ner. That his final objective, once he succeeded in entering the store, was to rob, to cau
se physical injury to the inmates, or to commit any other offense, there is nothing in the r
ecord to justify a concrete finding.

It must be borne in mind (I Groizard, p. 99) that in offenses not consummated, as the
material damage is wanting, the nature of the action intended (accion fin) cannot ex
actly be ascertained, but the same must be inferred from the nature of the acts exe
cuted (accion medio). The relation existing between the facts submitted for appreciati
on and the offense which said facts are supposed to produce must be direct; the intentio
n must be ascertained from the facts and therefore it is necessary, in order to avoid regr
ettable instances of injustice.

Under article 280 of the Revised Penal Code, the Court is of the opinion that the fact un
der consideration does not constitute attempted robbery but attempted trespass to dwell
ing. Against the accused must be taken into consideration the aggravating circumstance
s of nighttime and former convictions, — inasmuch as the record shows that several fina
l judgments for robbery and theft have been rendered against him — and in his favor, th
e mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction.

PEOPLE VS. BORINAGA

Facts:
The victim Harry Mooney, an American who resided in Calubian Leyte, contracted with
Juan Lawaan for the construction of a fish corral. Lawaan attempted to collect the
whole amount of the contract even though the corral is not yet finished. Upon Mooney‘s
refusal to pay, Lawaan warned and threatened him that something would happen to
him.

On that evening, Mooney was in the store of his neighbor, sitting with his back towards
a window when suddenly Basilio Borinaga struck him with a knife. The knife imbedded
on the back of the seat though. Mooney fell off from the impact but was not injured.
Borinaga left the scene but after ten minutes, he returned to have another attempt at
Mooney but was warded off by Mooney and his neighbor frightening him by turning a
flashlight on him.

Issue:
Whether or not the crime is frustrated murder.

Held:
YES. As an essential condition of a frustrated crime, Borinaga performed all the acts of
execution, attending the attack. There was nothing left that he could do further to
accomplish the work. The cause resulting in the failure of the attack arose by reason of
forces independent of his will. Borinaga also voluntarily desisted from further acts. The
subjective phase of the criminal act was passed.

Dissenting opinion, J. Villa-Real:

“The acts of execution perfomed by [Borinaga] did not produce the death of Mooney as
a consequence not could they have produced it because the blow did not reach his
body; therefore, the culprit did not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the felony. There was lacking the infliction of the deadly wound upon a vital
spot of the body of Mooney.”
What the back of the chair prevented was the wounding of Mooney, not his death. It is
the preventing of death by causes independent of the will of the perpetrator, after all the
acts of execution which should produce the felony as a consequence had been
performed, that constitutes a frustrated felony, according to the law, and not the
preventing of the performances of all the acts of execution which constitute a felony, as
in the present case.
Attempted murder only.

People vs Felipe Kalalo, et.al.

G.R. Nos. 39303-39305
March 17, 1934

Facts:

On November 10, 1932, the appellants namely, Felipe Kalalo, Marcelo Kalalo, Juan
Kalalo, and Gregorio Ramos, were tried in the Batangas jointly with Alejandro Garcia,
Fausta Abrenica and Alipia Abrenica in criminal cases Nos. 6858, 6859 and 6860, the
first two for murder, and the last for frustrated murder. Upon agreement of the parties
said three cases were tried together and after the presentation of their respective
evidence, the said court acquitted Alejandro Garcia, Fausta Abrenica and Alipia
Abrenica, and sentenced the other appellants.

Issue:

W/O accused-appellants are liable of the crimes of murder and discharge of firearms?

Held:

The first case is, for the alleged murder of Marcelino Panaligan, to seventeen years,
four months and one day of reclusion temporal, with the corresponding accessory
penalties, and to indemnify the heirs of the said deceased Marcelino Panaligan in the
sum of P1,000, with the costs.

The second case is, for the alleged murder of Arcadio Holgado, to seventeen years,
four months and one day of reclusion temporal, with the corresponding accessory
penalties, and to indemnify the heirs of the aforesaid victim, the deceased Arcadio
Holgado, in the sum of P1,000, with the costs.

In the third case, that is, the court held that the crime committed was simply that of
discharge of firearm, not frustrated murder, the appellant Marcelo Kalalo was sentenced
to one year, eight months and twenty-one days of prision correccional and to pay the
proportionate part of the costs of the proceedings. Felipe Kalalo and Juan Kalalo, as
well as their co-accused Fausta and Alipia Abrenica, Gregorio Ramos and Alejandro
Garcia, were acquitted of the charges therein.

In all other respects, the appealed sentences in the said three cases are hereby
affirmed without prejudice to crediting the appellants therein with one-half of the time
during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment, in accordance with article
29 of the Revised Penal Code. So ordered.

PEOPLE V. TRINIDAD
GR No. 79123-25/ 9 January 1989/ Second Division/ Appeal
People of the Philippines - plaintiff-appellee
Emeliano Trinidad - accused-appellant
Decision by J. Melencio-Herrera, Digest by Joeyboy Lacas

Short Version: Lolito Soriano is a fish dealer. His helpers were Ricardo Tan and Marcial
Laroa. While the three were driving on their way to Davao City to sell fish, accused
Emeliano Trinidad asked for a ride to Agusan del Norte. Tan, the driver at that time,
suddenly heard two gunshots -- Soriano and Laroa slumped dead for both were hit on the
head. Trinidad had used his carbine in killing the two victims. Tan was able to get off the
car and hail a jeepney passing by. However, he noticed that Trinidad was also seated at
the back of the said jeepney. Tan immediately got off the jeepney, followed by Trinidad.
When the jeepney started to drive away, Tan suddenly clung to its side, but Trinidad fired
two shots, one of which hit Tan on his right thigh. Tan jumped from the jeep and
fortunately a Philippine Constabulary member chanced upon him and helped him board
a bus for Butuan. Trinidad was charged with FRUSTRATED murder in relation to the
shooting of Tan.

Facts: Lolito Soriano is a fish dealer. His helpers were Ricardo Tan and Marcial Laroa.
While the three were driving on their way to Davao City to sell fish, accused Emeliano
Trinidad asked for a ride to Agusan del Norte. Trinidad, a member of the Integrated
National Police, was in uniform and had two firearms, a carbine and a .38 caliber revolver.
 Tan was driving the car at that time, and he was instructed by Trinidad to slow
down because they were treading dangerous territory. Tan suddenly heard two gunshots
-- Soriano and Laroa slumped dead for both were hit on the head. Trinidad had used his
carbine in killing the two victims. Tan was able to get off the car and hail a jeepney passing
by. However, he noticed that Trinidad was also seated at the back of the said jeepney.
Tan immediately got off the jeepney, followed by Trinidad. When the jeepney started to
drive away, Tan suddenly clung to its side, but Trinidad fired two shots, one of which hit
Tan on his right thigh. Tan jumped from the jeep and fortunately a Philippine Constabulary
member chanced upon him and helped him board a bus for Butuan.

Trinidad was charged with FRUSTRATED murder in relation to the shooting of

Tan, and he was found guilty by the RTC. On appeal, Trinidad claims that the RTC erred
in convicting him of the crime of frustrated murder.

Issues: W/N Trinidad is correct in contending that he can only be convicted of

attempted murder? YES

Ruling: Trinidad should only be held criminally liable for attempted murder.

Ratio: Trinidad had commenced the commission of the felony directly by overt acts but
was unable to perform all the acts of execution which would have produced it by reason
of causes other than his spontaneous desistance, such as, that the jeep to which TAN
was clinging was in motion, and there was a spare tire which shielded the other parts of
his body.

Moreover, the wound on his thigh was not fatal and the doctrinal rule is that where the
wound inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is only
ATTEMPTED murder, the accused not having performed all the acts of execution that
would have brought about the death (citing, People v. Pilones)

G.R. No. 123547

FR. MARTINES v CA

FACTS:
Petitioner, then Assistant parish priest of Cabanatuan City, entered into an oral contract
with private respondents Godofredo De la Paz and his sister Manuela De la Paz
regarding the sale of Lot No. 1337-A-3 at the Villa Fe Subdivision in Cabanutan City for
the sum of P15,000.00. The aforesaid lot is located along Maharlika Road near the
Municipal Hall of Cabanatuan City.
At the same time of the sale, the lot was still registered in the name of Claudia De la
Paz, mother of private respondents, although the same had already sold it to private
respondent Manuela De la Paz by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 26,
1976. Private respondent Manuela subsequently registered the sale in her name on
October 22, 1981.
When the land was offered for sale to petitioner, private respondents De la Paz were
accompanied by their mother, since petitioner dealt with the De la Paz’ as a family and
not individually. He was assured that petitioner would give a downpayment of P3,000.00
to private respondents De la Paz and that the balance would be payable by installment.
After giving the P3,000.00 downpayment, petitioner started the construction of a house
on the lot after securing a building permit from the City Engineers Office on April 23,
1981, with the written consent of the then registered owner, Claudia de la Paz.
Consequently, petitioner also began paying the real estate taxes on said property.
Issues:
Petitioner's argument that he should be acquitted because the criminal complaint
against him was not supported by the victim's sworn statement or by an affidavit
Petitioner next argues that should he be convicted of any crime, it should be of less
serious physical injuries only, absence the element of intent to kill.
Ruling:
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Petitioner is guilty of frustrated murder under Article 248 in relation to Article 6, first
paragraph of the Revised Penal Code which reads
For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the following requisites should be present:
(1) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a
person in authority or the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender was voluntary. The
surrender must be... spontaneous, made in such a manner that it shows the interest of
the accused to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because he
acknowledged his guilt or he wishes to save them the trouble and expenses that would
necessarily be incurred in the search and... capture.
In the case at bar, SPO1 Salutre testified that petitioner did not voluntarily surrender but
was forcibly apprehended by Barangay Captain
We agree with the trial court that the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation
has not been adequately shown. To properly appreciate the same
The trial court awarded Dean the amount of P92,000.00 representing his hospitalization
and medical expenses which was increased by the CA to P92,715.68.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the assailed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATION. Petitioner is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Frustrated Murder under Article 248 in relation to Article 6... prision mayor... to...
eclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.
Principles:
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts
of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, do not produce... it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator.
The essential elements of a frustrated felony are as follows:
The offender performs all the acts of execution;
All the acts performed would produce the felony as a consequence;
But the felony is not produced;
By reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
A crime is frustrated when the offender has performed all the acts of execution which
should result in the consummation of the crime. The offender has passed the subjective
phase in the commission of the crime.

……………..
*Not enough proof of intent to kill for homicide
MONDRAGON V. PEOPLE (1966) ZALDIVAR, J. RIA
NO. L-17666
Petition for review by certiorari
Isidoro Mondragon v. The People of the Philippines

Summary of Proceedings:
Court of First Instance of Iloilo - Guilty of attempted homicide
Court of Appeals - affirmed
Supreme Court - modified to less serious physical injuries

Facts:
On July 11, 1954, complainant Serapio Nacionales was opening the dike of his ricefield
in Antandan, Miagao, Iloilo, when petitioner Mondragon told him, 'Don't you dare open
the dike.' Nacionales told Mondragon that he needed to open the dike because he had
to plant the next morning, but Mondragon tried to hit him. When Nacionales dodged the
blow, Mondragon drew his bolo and hit Nacionales in several parts of his body. The
complainant hacked Mondragon with his bolo in self-defense, after which, Mondragon
backed down.

The complainant had a medical exam the following day, and the government medical
officer certified that his wounds would heal in less than 30 days.
During his trial, Mondragon admitted that he would do everything to stop Nacionales
from opening the dike. From this admission, the Court of Appeals held the Court of First
Instance's conviction of attempted homicide.

Issue:
1. WON the petitioner should be convicted with less serious physical injuries, instead of
attempted homicide. - YES

Ratio:
1. The intention of the petitioner to kill was not conclusively shown, as intent to kill must
be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Firstly, it was not manifest in the fight
between the petitioner and the complainant, as the petitioner backed away when the
complainant struck him with a bolo.

Secondly, his statement that 'he will do everything' to stop Nacionales from opening the
dike was made almost five years after the incident. Such statement should be
considered as an opinion at most, in addition to the fact that the phrase 'will do
everything' has a broad meaning.

Lastly, intent to kill duly established, as the injuries inflicted by the petitioner were not
necessarily fatal; in fact, they could be healed in less than 30 days.

Held:
Mondragon is convicted with the crime of less serious physical injuries, with the penalty
of 3 mos. and 15 days of arresto mayor, with costs.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SY PIO

G.R. NO. L-5848 APRIL 30, 1954

FACTS:
Note: This is an appeal of the Court of First Instance of Manila’s judgement
finding Sy Pio guilty of frustrated murder against Tan Siong Kiap, and
sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate sentence of 6 years, 1 month,
and 11 days of prision mayor, to 14 years, 8 months, and 1 day of reclusion
temporal, to indemnify Tan Siong Kiap in the sum of P350, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. Sy Pio
shot three people on September 3, 1949.

The prosecution’s evidence shows:

September 3, 1949, early morning, Sy Pio entered a store at 511 Misericordia, Sta Cruz,
Manila and started firing with a .45 caliber pistol. First to be shot was Jose Sy. Tan Siong
Kiap, who saw Sy Pio enter and fire at Jose Sy, asked, “What is the idea?” Sy Pio then
turned around and fired at him as well. Tan was shot in his right shoulder and then ran to
a room behind the store to hide. Tan heard a few more gunshots before Sy Pio ran away.
Tan Sion Kiap was brought to the Chinese General Hospital, where his wound was treated
from September 3 to 12. Tan was requested to return for further treatment, and in a span
of 10 days and after five visits, his wound was completely healed. He spent P300 for
hospital and doctor’s fees.
Sy Pio shot two other people that day – Ong Pian and Jose Sy – before shooting and
wounding Tan Siong Kiap.
September 5, the Manila Police Department received information that Sy Pio was in
custody of the Constabulary in Tarlac, so Captain Daniel V. Lomotan of the Manila police
proceeded there. The two had a conversation and Sy Pio admitted to shooting Tan Siong
Kiap, Ong Pian, and Jose Sy. The Constabulary in Tarlac delivered to Lomotan the pistol
Sy Pio had used, which the Constabulary had confiscated beforehand. Lomotan then
brought Sy Pio to Manila, where his statement – detailing the assaults against Tan, Ong
Pian, and Jose Sy – was taken down in writing.

Sy Pio’s declaration:
Some months prior to the incident, he was employed as an attendant in a restaurant
owned by Ong Pian. Sy Pio’s wife, Vicenta, was also employed by On Pian’s partner, Eng
Cheng Suy. When Sy Pio tried to borrow money from Ong Pian for Vicenta’s sick father,
Ong Pian could only lend him P1. Vicenta was able to borrow P20 from her employer.
Afterwards, Sy Pio was dismissed from his work and became a peddler. Ong Pian
presented a list of Sy Pio’s debts, which was deducted from Vicenta’s monthly salary. Sy
Pio could not remember incurring such debts, and so he resented Ong Pian’s conduct.
A few months before September 3, Sy Pio was able to realize the sum of P70 from
peddling medicine, and he kept the money in his room. The following morning, Sy Pio
found that the money was gone. Tan Siong Kiap and Jose Sy told Sy Pio that he must
have given the money to his wife. Thereafter, Sy Pio overheard hear Tan Siong Kiap and
Jose Sy say that Sy Pio had actually lost the money gambling. Because of these
accusations against him, Sy Pio nurtured resentment against the two.
September 3, early morning, while Ngo Cho, a Chinaman and the owner of a caliber .45
pistol, was away from his room, Sy Pio took the gun and tucked it in his belt. Sy Pio
proceeded to Ong Pian’s restaurant in Ongpin and shot him. Afterwards, Sy Pio went to
the store in Misericordia, Sta Cruz, Manila and shot Jose Sy and Tan Siong Kiap. From
there, he went to his mother’s house in Malabon and told her that he had killed two people.
 Sy Pio disowned the confession and explained that he signed it without having
read its contents during the trial, however.
  Sy Pio alleged that he did not shoot the three men, but that Chua Tone – with
whom he had previously connived to kill the three – did. Sy Pio did not introduce
any witnesses to support his denial. Neither did he deny that he admitted before
Captain Lomotan having killed the three persons, or having been found in
possession of the caliber .45 pistol.
 The trial court refused to believed his testimony and found him guilty of the crime
charged.

On appeal, Sy Pio’s contentions:

1. The trial court erred in not finding that Tan Siong Kiap received the shot
accidentally from the same bullet that had been fired at Jose Sy (TF?) and in
finding that Sy Pio had committed a crime separate from that of Jose Sy’s murder.
The court found no merit in this contention. Tan Siong Kiap’s testimony – that Sy Pio
turned around and fired at him instead of answering when he asked why Sy Pio was
shooting – was uncontradicted by Sy Pio.
2. The evidence is not sufficient to sustain the judgment of conviction.
The court found no merit in this contention. Against Tan Siong Kiap’s uncontradicted
testimony; Sy Pio’s admissions before Captain Lomotan in Tarlac; and Sy Pio possession
of the .45 caliber pistol, plus testimony of the physician who examined and treated Tan
Siong Kiap’s wounds, matching his wounds to the caliber .45 bullet, Sy Pio “has only
made a very unbelievable story.”
3. Sy Pio should be found guilty only of less serious physical injuries instead of
frustrated murder.
While intent to kill was proven, the wound inflicted was not fatal because it did not touch
any of Tan Siong Kiap’s vital organs. Additionally, Tan Siong Kiap’s physician’s medical
certification stated that the wound was to heal within a period of fourteen days.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sy Pio can be convicted of frustrated murder. (Did he perform all the acts
of execution necessary to produce the death of his victim?)

RULING:
The court had previously held (U.S. vs. Eduave, People vs. Dagman, and People vs.
Borinaga) that it is not necessary that the accused actually commit all the acts of
execution necessary to produce the death of his victim, that it is sufficient that he believes
that he has committed all said acts. In these cases, the court held that the crimes
committed were frustrated murder, because there was full and complete belief on the part
of the assailant that he had committed all the acts of execution necessary to produce the
death of the intended victim.
In the case at bar, Sy Pio fired at Tan Siong Kiap, and the latter was hit, but was able to
escape and hide in another room. Sy Pio must have seen that Tan Siong Kiap was able
to escape; Sy Pio knew that he had not performed all the acts of execution necessary to
kill his victim. It cannot be said that the subjective phase had been completed. But
because Sy Pio ran away after the incident, there was reasonable doubt in the court that
Sy Pio may have actually believed that he had committed all the acts of execution. This
doubt must be resolved in Sy Pio’s favor.
Sy Pio was found guilty of attempted murder.

ART. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies.

A felony is […] frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will
of the perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a
felony directly or over acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution
which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other
than this own spontaneous desistance.

The Stages of Acts of Execution: 1. Attempted; 2. Frustrated; and 3. Consummated

Elements of Attempted Felony:

1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;
2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony;
3. The offender’s act is not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;
4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other
than his spontaneous desistance.
In attempted felony, the offender never passes the subjective phase of the offense – the
portion of the acts constituting the crime. If the offender is stopped by any cause outside
of his own voluntary desistance, the subjective phase has not been passed and it is an
attempt.
Elements of Frustrated Felony:
1. The offended performs all the acts of execution;
2. All the acts performed would produce the felony as a consequence;
3. But the felony is not produced;
4. By reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
People v. Orita

G.R. No. 88724 April 3, 1990

Lessons Applicable: No frustrated rape

Laws Applicable: Art. 6

FACTS:
• March 20, 1983 Early Morning: Cristina S. Abayan, 19-year old freshman student at
the St. Joseph's College, arrived at her boarding house after her classmates brought
her home from a party. She knocked at the door of her boarding house when a frequent
visitor of another boarder held her and poked a knife to her neck. Despite pleading for
her release, he ordered her to go upstairs with him. Since the door which led to the 1st
floor was locked from the inside, they used the back door to the second floor. With his
left arm wrapped around her neck and his right hand poking a "balisong" to her neck, he
dragged her up the stairs. When they reached the second floor, he commanded herwith
the knife poked at her neck, to look for a room. They entered Abayan's room. He then
pushed her hitting her head on the wall. With one hand holding the knife, he undressed
himself. He then ordered her to take off her clothes. Scared, she took off her T-shirt,
bra, pants and panty. He ordered her to lie down on the floor and then mounted her. He
made her hold his penis and insert it in her vagina. Still poked with a knife, she did as
told but since she kept moving, only a portion of his penis entered her. He then laid
down on his back and commanded her to mount him. Still only a small part of his penis
was inserted into her vagina. When he had both his hands flat on the floor. She dashed
out to the next room and locked herself in. When he pursued her and climbed the
partition, she ran to another room then another then she jumped out through a window.
• Still naked, she darted to the municipal building, 18 meters in front of the boarding
house and knocked on the door. When there was no answer, she ran around the
building and knocked on the back door. When the policemen who were inside the
building opened the door, they found her naked sitting on the stairs crying. Pat.
Donceras, took off his jacket and wrapped it around her. Pat. Donceras and two other
policemen rushed to the boarding house where they heard and saw somebody running
away but failed to apprehend him due to darkness. She was taken to Eastern Samar
Provincial Hospital where she was physically examined.
• Her vulva had no abrasions or discharges.
• RTC: frustrated rape
ISSUE: W/N there is frustrated rape.

HELD: NO. RTC MODIFIED. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua as well as to indemnify the victim in the amount of
P30,000
• Correlating Art. 335 and Art. 6, there is no debate that the attempted and
consummated stages apply to the crime of rape.
• Requisites of a frustrated felony are:
o (1) that the offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce
the felony
o (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator's
will
• attempted crime the purpose of the offender must be thwarted by a foreign force or
agency which intervenes and compels him to stop prior to the moment when he has
performed all of the acts which should produce the crime as a consequence, which acts
it is his intention to perform
o If he has performed all of the acts which should result in the consummation of the
crime and voluntarily desists from proceeding further, it can not be an attempt.
• in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his
victim he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential
elements of the offense have been accomplished. Any penetration of the female organ
by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, without
rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction.
Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ
• The fact is that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted even on the
sole basis of the victim's testimony if credible. Dr. Zamora did not rule out penetration of
the genital organ of the victim.
PEOPLE V. CAMPUHAN
G.R. NO. 129433 MARCH 30, 2000

Lessons Applicable: Attempted rape

Laws Applicable:

FACTS:
• April 25, 1996 4 pm: Ma. Corazon P. Pamintuan, mother of 4-year old Crysthel
Pamintuan, went to the ground floor of their house to prepare Milo chocolate drinks for
her 2 children. There she met Primo Campuhan, helper of Conrado Plata Jr., brother of
Corazon, who was then busy filling small plastic bags with water to be frozen into ice in
the freezer located at the second floor.
• Then she heard Crysthel cry, "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" so she went upstairs and saw Primo
Campuhan inside her children's room kneeling before Crysthel whose pajamas or
"jogging pants" and panty were already removed, while his short pants were down to his
knees and his hands holding his penis with his right hand
• Horrified, she cursed "P - t - ng ina mo, anak ko iyan!" and boxed him several times.
He evaded her blows and pulled up his pants. He pushed Corazon aside who she tried
to block his path. Corazon then ran out and shouted for help thus prompting Vicente,
her brother, a cousin and an uncle who were living within their compound, to chase the
Campuhan who was apprehended. They called the barangay officials who detained.
• Physical examination yielded negative results as Crysthel ‘s hymen was intact
• Campuhan: Crysthel was in a playing mood and wanted to ride on his back when
she suddenly pulled him down causing both of them to fall down on the floor.
• RTC: guilty of statutory rape, sentenced him to the extreme penalty of death
• Thus, subject to automatic review

ISSUE: W/N it was a consummated statutory rape

HELD: NO. MODIFIED. guilty of ATTEMPTED RAPE and sentenced to an

indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision
mayor medium as minimum, to fourteen (14) years ten (10) months and twenty (20)
days of reclusion temporal medium as maximum. Costs de oficio.

• People v. De la Peña: labia majora must be entered for rape to be consummated

• Primo's kneeling position rendered an unbridled observation impossible
• Crysthel made a categorical statement denying penetration but her vocabulary is yet
as underdeveloped
• Corazon narrated that Primo had to hold his penis with his right hand, thus showing
that he had yet to attain an erection to be able to penetrate his victim
• the possibility of Primo's penis having breached Crysthel's vagina is belied by the
child's own assertion that she resisted Primo's advances by putting her legs close
together and that she did not feel any intense pain but just felt "not happy" about what
Primo did to her. Thus, she only shouted "Ayo'ko, ayo'ko!" not "Aray ko, aray ko!
• no medical basis to hold that there was sexual contact between the accused and the
victim

US VS. CALIXTO VALDEZ

G.R No. L-16486 22 March 1921

FACTS: Sometime in November 1919, a small boat was sent out to raise the anchor.
The crew of this boat consisted of the accused, Calixto Valdez and six others among
who was the deceased, Venancio Gargantel. During their work, the accused began to
abuse the men with offensive words. Gargantel complained, saying that it would be
better if he would not insult them. The accused took this as a display of insubordination,
thus, he moved towards Gargantel, with a big knife in hand, threatening to stab him. At
the instant when the accused had attained to within a few feet of Gargantel, the latter,
evidently believing himself in great and immediate peril, threw himself into the water and
disappeared beneath its surface to be seen no more.
As alleged in the information, that said Gargantel had died by drowning, as a
consequence of having thrown himself into the water and upon seeing himself
threatened and attacked by the accused. The Judgment rendered against the accused.
Having been convicted as the author of the homicide, the accused alleged on appeal
that he was only guilty of the offense of inflicting serious physical injuries, or at most of
frustrated homicide.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is liable for the death of Venancio Gargantel.
HELD:
The Supreme Court disallowed the appeal of the accused, enunciated the following
doctrine:
“ That even though the death of the injured person should not be considered as the
exclusive and necessary effect of the very grave wound which almost completely
severed his axillary artery , occasioning a hemorrhage impossible to stanch under the
circumstances in which that person was placed, nevertheless as the persistence of the
aggression of the accused compelled his adversary, in order to escape the attack, to
leap into the river, an act which the accused forcibly compelled the injured person to do
after having inflicted, among others, a mortal wound upon him and as the aggressor by
said attack manifested a determined resolution to cause the death of the deceased, by
depriving him of all possible help and putting him in the very serious situation narrated
in the decision appealed from, the trial court, in qualifying the act prosecuted as
consummated homicide, did not commit any error of law, as the death of the injured
person was due to the act of the accused.”

The accused must, therefore, be considered the responsible author of the death of
Venancio Gargantel, and he was properly convicted of the offense of homicide. The trial
judge appreciated as an attenuating circumstance the fact that the offender had no
intention to commit so great a wrong as that committed. ( Par.3, Art 9 Penal Code)

DUNGO V. PEOPLE G.R. No. 209464, July 01, 2015 R. A. No. 8049 Anti-Hazing Law
of 2018, Malum Prohibitum
MARCH 13, 2019
FACTS:

Villanueva, a UP Los Baños student, was a neophyte of the APO – Theta Chapter
Fraternity and that Dungo and Sibal, as members of the said fraternity, together with the
other fraternity members, officers and alumni, brought and transported Villanueva and
two other neophytes to Villa Novaliches Resort at Barangay Pansol, Calamba City, for
the final initiation rites conducted inside the resort, performed under the cover of
darkness and secrecy.

Due to the injuries sustained by Villanueva, the fraternity members and the other two
neophytes haphazardly left the resort, while Dungo and Sibal boarded a tricycle and
brought the lifeless body of Villanueva to JP Rizal Hospital, where Villanueva was
pronounced dead.

The RTC found Dungo and Sibal guilty of the crime of violating Section 4 of the Anti-
Hazing Law and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Upon appeal, the CA ruled that the appeal of Dungo and Sibal was bereft of merit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the absence of proof of intent to kill the victim will affect the liability of
the accused.

RULING:

The crime of hazing under R.A. No. 8049 is malum prohibitum.

R.A. No. 8049, or the Anti-Hazing Law of 1995, has been enacted to regulate hazing
and other forms of initiation rites in fraternities, sororities, and other organizations. It
was in response to the rising incidents of death of hazing victims.

Criminal law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in themselves called acts mala in
se; and acts which would not be wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids them,
called acts mala prohibita. This distinction is important with reference to the intent with
which a wrongful act is done. The rule on the subject is that in acts mala in se, the intent
governs; but in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law been violated? When
an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial. When the doing of an act is
prohibited by law, it is considered injurious to public welfare, and the doing of the
prohibited act is the crime itself.

The study of the provisions of R.A. No. 8049 shows that it is complete and robust in
penalizing the crime of hazing.

It was made malum prohibitum to discount criminal intent and disallow the defense of
good faith. It took into consideration the different participants and contributors in the
hazing activities.

Recognizing the malum prohibitum characteristic of hazing, the law provides that any
person charged with the said crime shall not be entitled to the mitigating circumstance
that there was no intention to commit so grave a wrong.