Voidable Marriages: General Provisions-Grounds

Sarao vs Guevara, 40 OG 15 Suppl 263

FACTS:

Plaintiff and defendant were married in Manila, on June 3, 1936. In the afternoon of the same day plaintiff
tried to have carnal knowledge of the defendant, but the latter showed reluctance and begged him to
wait until evening. When night came plaintiff again approached the defendant, but though he found the
orifice of her vagina sufficiently large for his organ, she complained of pains in her private parts and he
noticed oozing therefrom some purulent matter offensive to the smell. Because of this, coitus was not a
success, and after that first night every attempt on plaintiff’s part to have carnal act with his wife proved
a failure because she complained of pains in her genital organs and he did not want her to suffer.

Upon the advice of a physician, defendant submitted to an operation on August 7, 1936, and as the
medical verdict was the removal of the uterus and ovaries affected by tumor. The removal of the said
organs rendered the defendant incapable of procreation but not copulation. Plaintiff declares that having
witnessed the operation, he lost all desire to have access with his wife and has not tried to do it since
then. Under marriage law, marriage may be annulled if either party was, at the time of marriage, physically
incapable of entering into the married state and such incapacity continues, and appears to be incurable.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage can be annulled on grounds of physical impotency. (Article 45,par 5)

RULING:

No, Plaintiff-appellant wants to construe the phrase “physically incapable of entering into the married
state” as meaning incapacity to procreate. Test impotency is not the ability to procreate, but the ability
to copulate” the defect must be one of copulation, not of reproduction. Barrenness will not invalidate the
marriage. It should be noted in the first place that the defendant was not impotent at the time she married
the plaintiff. For, according to the doctor who operated on her, the existence of a fibrous tissue did not
necessarily render her incapable of copulation or even procreation. The removal of the deceased parts
did render her sterile, but by no means made her unfit for sexual intercourse. If the plaintiff was not able
to consummate the carnal act, it was due to his own voluntary desistance.

Appellant contends that his consent was procured by fraud in that the defendant did not reveal him that
she was afflicted with disease in her sex organs. But this contention is untenable since fraud is not alleged
in the complaint and has not been proved by the trial.

We find no reason for disturbing the decision appealed from, and we, therefore, confirm it with costs
against the appellant.