What is hard law/soft law?

Hard law - the statutes, treaties, constitution. The laws itself.

Soft law - Guidelines/standards/policies
(Source: Ambassador Tolentino Lecture Notes)

Doctrine of Auto Limitation

-As cited in People v. Gozo, the principle of auto limitation states that the sovereignty may
be considered as a property right of a state, thus the state can enter into contract with another
state whereby it agrees to share or restrict the exercise of sovereignty.

Doctrine of Suspended Allegiance

-Political laws are deemed suspended because the rightful legal government is not in
control. Municipal laws remain in effect as it regulates the relationship between the people of the
state and shall remain in force even during the belligerent occupation. (Laurel v. Misa)

Precautionary Principle
Precautionary principle states that when human activities may lead to threats of serious and
irreversible damage to the environment that is scientifically plausible but uncertain, actions shall
be taken to avoid or diminish that threat.

Requirements for application of precautionary principle?

a. Uncertainty
b. Threat of environmental Damage
c. Serious or irreversible harm

Ex: Genetic Modification Organism. Foreign courts restrains research of GMO because there is no
material yet that indicates its harm. Another example is the issue on human cloning Courts can
step if the 3 conditions apply (Atty. Gabriel)

Treaty v. Executive Agreement

Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with the approval of two-thirds of the
Senate. Executive agreements become binding through executive action without the need of a
vote by the Senate or by Congress.

The right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent
Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our history,
we have entered into executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular
relations, most-favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyrights protection, postal
and navigation arrangements, and the settlement of claims.

International agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy and those
involving international arrangements of a permanent character usually take the form of treaties.
But international agreements embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well-established
national policies and traditions, and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary
nature usually take the form of executive agreements.
Doctrine of Specialty

Under the Rule of Specialty in International Law, a Requested State shall surrender to a
Requesting State a person to be tried only for a criminal offense specified in their treaty of
extradition. (Government of Hongkong Special Administrative Region vs. Juan Antonio Muñoz,
G.R. No. 207342 November 7, 2017)

The Doctrine of Specialty requires that a requesting state may not try the person extradited
for any other crime or offense other than for that crime or offense for which the alleged offender
is extradited. Moreover, the person extradited may not be punished more severely than required
by the crime for which the extradition was requested. No other punishment should be meted out
on the person except that punishment specified at the time of extradition.

The reason for this rule is that the extraditing State could have refused extradition had it known
the actual conditions for which the alleged offender is being extradited. The doctrine will not
apply if: 1) the extraditing State waives such requirement; 2) the extraditing State gives its consent
to the prosecution of the individual for crimes other than the crimes for which the alleged
offender is extradited; and 3) the alleged offender is prosecuted or if another offense was
committed after the extradition. (Hofileña, Jr., 2016)

Hofileña, Jr., S. (2016). International Law. Manila, Publishing. Baybayin Publishing.

Associative State

An associative state is one which enters into an association with another state of unequal
power. The concept of association is recognized in international law. As quoted in the case of the
Province of North Cotobato vs. The Government of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral
Doman, Keitner and Reisman stated that an association is formed when two states of unequal
power voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic model, one state, the associate, delegates
certain responsibilities to the other, the principal, while maintaining its international status as a
state. Free associations represent a middle ground between integration and independence.
Co Kim Chan vs Valdez Tan Keh
Source: AAA The Adonis Cases
THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE
75 PHIL 113, SEPTEMBER 17, 1945
FERIA, J:

FACTS:
Petitioner filed a motion for mandamus praying that the respondent judge be ordered to continue
the proceedings in civil case no. 3012 which was initiated under the regime of the so called
Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation of the islands.
The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of and continue the proceedings on
the following grounds:

(1) the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944 by Gen. Mac Arthur had the effect of invalidating
and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines under the
Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic established during the Japanese occupation;

(2) the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings
pending in the courts of the defunct Republic in the absence of enabling law granting such
authority;

(3) the government established in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation was not a de
facto government.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the government established during the Japanese occupation was a de facto
government.

2. Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts existing in the Philippines under the
Phil. Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines were good and valid and
remained so even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the US and Filipino
forces.

3. Whether the proclamation issued by Gen. Mac Arthur declaring ―all laws, regulations and
processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the Commonwealth are null
and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and
control‖ has invalidated al judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the said courts.

HELD:

1. YES. The government established under the names of Philippine Executive Commission and
Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese occupation was a civil government and a de facto
government of the second kind: that which is established and maintained by military forces who
invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war. The distinguishing characteristics
of this kind of de facto government are; (1) that its existence is maintained by active military
power within the territories, and against the rightful authority of an established and lawful
government; and (2) that while it exists it must necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private
citizens who, by acts of obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not become
responsible, as wrongdoers, for those acts, though not warranted by the laws of the rightful
government.

2. YES. Being a de facto government, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings
of the courts of justice of those governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good
and valid, and, by virtue of the well known principle of post liminium in international law,
remained good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American
and Filipino forces.

3. NO. The phrase ―processes of any other government‖ is broad and may refer not only to
judicial processes, but also to administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional processes of
the Republic of the Philippines or other governmental agencies established in the Islands during
the Japanese occupation. The only reasonable construction of the said phrase is that it refers to
governmental processes other than judicial processes, or court proceedings, for according to a
well-known statutory construction, statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of
nations if any other possible construction remains.

The Province of North Cotabato v Government of the Republic of the Philippines

Facts:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF,
through the Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a
Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF
Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The MOA-AD was then
questioned in this case on the ground that it violates numerous Constitutional provisions,
particularly that upon its signing he Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be
binding itself: a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state,
or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law, among others.

Issue:
Whether or not the MOA-AD is unconstitutional.

Ruling:
No. At first glance, the “associative principle” being imposed by the Bangsamoro Judicial
Entity and the Central Government is not recognized by the 1987 Constitution. No province, city,
or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an "associative"
relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond
anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the
recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any
state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory
status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence. It is not merely an
expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government being
fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets
the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention namely, a permanent population,
a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine
territory, the spirit animating it - which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association
- runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.

SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN (SPARK) V. QUEZON CITY, CITY

OF MANILA AND NAVOTAS CITY
G.R. No. 225442. August 8, 2017
Bill of Rights: Right to life, liberty and property: Void-for-vagueness: Police Power; Right to
travel; Preliminary Provisions and Basic Concepts: Declaration of Principles and State Policies

DOCTRINE:
As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the State may impose limitations on the exercise of the Right
to Travel, provided that they: (1)serve the interest of national security, public safety, or public
health; and (2)are provided by law.

FACTS:
Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to implement a nationwide curfew for
minors, several local governments in Metro Manila started to strictly implement their curfew
ordinances on minors through police operations which were publicly known as part of "Oplan
Rody." Among those local governments that implemented curfew ordinances were respondents:
(a) Navotas City through Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 99- 02; (b) City of Manila hrough Ordinance
No. 8046; and (c ) Quezon City through Ordinance No. SP- 2301. Petitioners,spearheaded by the
Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) - an association of young adults and minors
that aims to forward a free and just society, in particular the protection of the rights and welfare
of the youth and minors - filed this present petition, arguing that the Curfew Ordinances are
unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the said city ordinances is unconstitutional for: (A) Violating vague for vagueness
doctrine; (B) deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right to travel; and (C) Deprive parents
of their natural and primary right in rearing the youth.

HELD:
As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the State may impose limitations on the exercise of this right,
provided that they: (1) serve the interest of national security, public safety, or public health; and
(2) are provided by law. Philippine jurisprudence has developed 3 tests of judicial scrutiny to
determine the reasonableness of classifications. (1) The strict scrutiny test; (2) The intermediate
scrutiny test; and (3) the rational basis test. Under the strict scrutiny test, a legislative classification
that interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the disadvantage of a
suspect class is presumed unconstitutional. Thus, the government has the burden of proving that
the classification (1) is necessary to achieve a compelling State interest, and (i1) is the least
restrictive means to protect such interest or the means chosen is narrowly tailored to accomplish
the interest. But only the compelling state interest is met by all three cities as it is to keep
unsupervised minors during the late hours of night time off of public areas, so as to reduce their
exposure to potential harm, and to insulate them against criminal pressure and influences which
may even include themselves. But only Quezon City met the least restrictive means in order to
accomplish said interest. This Court observes that these two ordinances are not narrowly drawn
in that their exceptions are inadequate and therefore, run the risk of overly restricting the minors'
fundamental freedoms. The Quezon City Ordinance, on the other hand, stands in stark contrast
to the first two (2) ordinances as it sufficiently safeguards the minors' constitutional rights.

MARCELO G. SALUDAY v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 215305, April 03, 2018
Reasonable Search; Consented Search

DOCTRINES:
A reasonable search arises from a reduced expectation of privacy, for which reason
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution finds no application.
The constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal
right, which may be waived. However, to be valid, the consent must be voluntary such that it is
unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion.

FACTS:
Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was flagged down in a military checkpoint in Ilang,
Davao City. All male passengers were requested to disembark the bus while all female passengers
remained. SCAA Junbert M. Buco boarded and checked all the baggage and personal effects of
the passengers, but a small, gray-black pack bag owned by Marcelo Saluday caught his attention
He requested Saluday to board the bus and open the bag. Saluday obliged and revelead the
contents of the bag which were a 30-caliber firearm with one magazine loaded with three live
ammunitions, and a hand grenade. Saludo failed to produce proof of his authority to carry
firearms and explosives. Hence, he was arrested and later on charged with illegal possession of
high-powered firearm, ammunition, and explosive under PD 1866. RTC found him guilty. CA
affirmed. Hence, he filed this petition.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not there was reasonable search
2) Whether or not there was consented search

HELD:
1) Yes, there was reasonable search. Section 2, Article III of the Constitution is not a blanket
prohibition. Rather, it operates against "unreasonable" searches and seizures only. Conversely,
when a search is "reasonable," the provision does not apply. The prohibition of unreasonable
search and seizure ultimately stems from a person's right to privacy. A person's expectation of
privacy is diminished whenever he or she enters private premises that are accessible to the public.
A bus used for public transportation is a private property whose owner has every right to exclude
anyone from entering. At the same time, however, because it is accessible to the public, the State,
much like the owner, can impose non-intrusive security measures and filter those going in. The
only difference in the imposition of security measures by an owner and the State is, the former
emanates from the attributes of ownership under Article 429 of the Civil Code, while the latter
stems from the exercise of police power for the promotion of public safety. In view of the
foregoing, the bus inspection conducted by Task Force Davao at a military checkpoint constitutes
a reasonable search. Bus No. 66 was a vehicle of public transportation where passengers have a
reduced expectation of privacy. Further, SCAA Buco merely lifted Saluday’s bag. This is a visual
and minimally intrusive inspection. Considering the reasonableness of the bus search, Section 2,
Article III of the Constitution finds no application.

2) Yes, there was consented search. The constitutional immunity against unreasonable
searches and seizures is a personal right, which may be waived. However, to be valid, the consent
must be voluntary such that it is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated
by any duress or coercion. In the case, Saluday consented to the baggage inspection done by
SCAA Buco. When SCAA Buco asked if he could open petitioner's bag, petitioner answered "yes,
just open it" based on Saluday’s own testimony. This is clear consent by petitioner to the search
of the contents of his bag.

Note: To emphasize, a reasonable search, on the one hand, and a warrantless search, on the other,
are mutually exclusive. While both State intrusions are valid even without a warrant, the
underlying reasons for the absence of a warrant are different. A reasonable search arises from a
reduced expectation of privacy, for which reason Section 2, Article III of the Constitution finds no
application. Examples include searches done at airports, seaports, bus terminals, malls, and
similar public places. In contrast, a warrantless search is presumably an "unreasonable search,"
but for reasons of practicality, a search warrant can be dispensed with. Examples include search
incidental to a lawful arrest, search of evidence in plain view, consented search, and extensive
search of a private moving vehicle.
NICANOR T. JIMENEZ, ET AL. v. BARTOLOME CABANGBANG
G.R. No. L-15905 August 3, 1966
Privileged Communication

DOCTRINE:
The phrase “speech and debate therein” considered as privileged communication under
Section 15 Article VI of the Constitution refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the
performance of their official functions.

FACTS:
Bartolome Cababang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its
Committee on National Defense. He caused the publication of an open letter to the President.
Nicanor Jimenez, et. al. Filed an action for damages against Cababang alleging that the
publication was libelous. Cababang moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that that the
letter is not libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a privileged communication.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the publication in question is a privileged communication

HELD:
NO. Section 15 Article VI of the Constitution provides that the Senators and Members of
the House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be
privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to
and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned
in any other place.

The phrase “speech and debate therein” refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the
performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast
in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress,
whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in
Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as
members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions
as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question.

The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. The open letter to the
President was dated November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not in session, and
Cababang caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in the
Philippines, on or about said date. Thus, in causing the communication to be so published,
Cababang was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer or
any Committee thereof.
ARVIN R. BALAG v. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al.
G.R. No. 234608, 3 July 2018, EN BANC (Gesmundo, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The interests of the Senate and the witnesses appearing in its legislative inquiry are balanced. The Senate
can continuously and effectively exercise its power of contempt during the legislative inquiry against
recalcitrant witnesses, even during recess. Such power can be exercised by the Senate immediately when
the witness performs a contemptuous act, subject to its own rules and the constitutional rights of the said
witness. However, the Senate will be prevented from effectively conducting legislative hearings during
recess - shall be duly addressed because it is expressly provided herein that the Senate may still exercise its
power of contempt during legislative hearings while on recess provided that the period of imprisonment
shall only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry, specifically, upon the approval or disapproval
of the Committee Report. Thus, the Senate's inherent power of contempt is still potent and compelling even
during its recess. At the same time, the rights of the persons appearing are respected because their detention
shall not be indefinite.

FACTS

This is a case of petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer of an issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction seeking to annul, set aside and
enjoin implementation of the Senate P.S. Resolution No. 504 and October 18, 2017 Order of
Complaint by the Senate Committee on Public Order and Dangerous Drugs filed by Arvin R.
Balag (petitioner) against the Senate of the Philippines, et. al. (respondent). On September 17,
2017, a first-year law student from the University of Santo Tomas named Horacio Castillo III,
allegedly died due to hazing-related activities conducted by the Aegis Juris Fraternity. On
September 20, 2017, the senate released Senate Resolution No. 504 entitled “a Resolution
Directing the Appropriate Senate Committees to Conduct an Inquiry, In Aid of Legislation, into
the Recent Death of Horacio Castillo III Allegedly due to Hazing-Related Activities” filed by Sen.
Paolo Benigno Aquino IV.

When the petitioner attended the hearing dated on October 18, 2017, Sen. Grace Poe asked the
petitioner if he was the president of Aegis Juris Fraternity however, the petitioner refused to
answer and invoked his right to self-incrimination. Sen. Panfilo Lacson reminded that it was just
a “simple question” to invoke self-incrimination and warned the petitioner that he may be cited
in contempt, but the petitioner still refused to answer. According to Sen. Grace Poe, the
petitioner’s signature appeared on the document for the application of the Aegis Juris Fraternity
in the organizational sheet submitted in the school administration and it was indicated therein
that the petitioner was the President, yet he still refuses to answer the simple question asked. The
petitioner was then cited in contempt and was ordered to place in detention under the Senate
Sergeant at Arms’ supervision after the senate hearing. Sen. Panfilo Lacson gave the petitioner a
chance to purge out of contempt, however, the petitioner still refused to answer and invoked his
right to self-incrimination. When the petitioner was asked of the question of whose decision it
was to bring the victim to the hospital, the petitioner submitted a plea to lift his contempt and
stated that he was a member of the Aegis Juris Fraternity, however, he does not know who the
president was because he was enrolled at another university at the time of the incident. The
question asked before his plea was again repeated and the petitioner invoked again his right to
self-incrimination.

ISSUE:
Did the Senate Committee acted with grave abuse of discretion in conducting the
legislative inquiry and citing petitioner in contempt?

RULING:

YES. However, the court denied the petition for being moot and academic. In the present
case, the Court finds that there is no more justiciable controversy to be decided up since in its
resolution dated December 12, 2017, the Court ordered in the interim the immediate release of
petitioner pending resolution of the instant petition. Thus, petitioner was no longer detained
under the Senate's authority.
However, the court still resolved the case despite being moot and academic. The court ruled that
the period of imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt of the Senate during inquiries
in aid of legislation should only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry. The court
stated that the interests of the Senate and the witnesses appearing in its legislative inquiry should
be balanced. The Senate can continuously and effectively exercise its power of contempt during
the legislative inquiry against recalcitrant witnesses, even during recess. Such power can be
exercised by the Senate immediately when the witness performs a contemptuous act, subject to
its own rules and the constitutional rights of the said witness. However, during recess, the Senate
will be prevented from effectively conducting legislative hearings. But the Senate may still
exercise its power of contempt during legislative hearings while on recess provided that the
period of imprisonment shall only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry upon the
approval or disapproval of the Committee Report. Thus, the Senate's inherent power of contempt
is still potent and compelling even during its recess. At the same time, the rights of the persons
appearing are respected because their detention shall not be indefinite.

Belgica, et al. vs. Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. Nos. 208566, 208493 & 209251, November 19,
2013

FACTS:

PORK BARREL MISUSE

In 1996, Marikina City Representative Romeo Candozo revealed that huge sums of money
regularly went into the pockets of legislators in the form of kickbacks. In 2004, several concerned
citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF but the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for
lack of evidentiary basis regarding illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks. In July 2013,
the National Bureau of Investigation probed the allegation that a syndicate defrauded the
government of P10 billion using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various
government agencies for scores of ghost projects. In August 2013, the Commission on Audit
released the results of a three-year audit investigation detailing the irregularities in the release of
the PDAF from 2007 to 2009. Whistle-blowers also alleged that at least P900 million from the
Malampaya Funds had gone into a dummy NGO.
ISSUE/S

Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel laws are
unconstitutional for violating the constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers, (b) non-
delegability of legislative power, (c) checks and balances, (d) accountability, (e) political
dynasties, (f) local autonomy.

RULING

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES ON CONGRESSIONAL PORK BARREL

(a) The separation of powers between the Executive and the Legislative Departments has been
violated.

The post-enactment measures including project identification, fund release, and fund
realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators
to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution, which
belongs to the executive department. Any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its
members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle
of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. That the said authority to identify projects
is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the
prohibition covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law.

(b) The principle of non-delegability of legislative powers has been violated

The 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to

individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are
effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which – as settled in
Philconsa – is lodged in Congress.

(c) Checks and balances

Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation
limit since the said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who would
then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively
appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment
legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a ―budget within a budget
which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the
President‘s power of item veto.

(d) The Congressional Pork Barrel partially prevents accountability as Congress is incapable of
checking itself or its members.
 The fact that individual legislators are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the
budget makes it difficult for them to become disinterested observers when scrutinizing,
investigating or monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law. The conduct of
oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority,
would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate.

(e) The constitutional provision regarding political dynasties is not self-executing.

Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that the state shall prohibit
political dynasties as may be defined by law, is not a self-executing provision. Since there appears
to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the
Court must defer from ruling on this issue.

(f) The Congressional Pork Barrel violates constitutional principles on local autonomy

The Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the constitutional principles on local autonomy
since it allows district representatives, who are national officers, to substitute their judgments in
utilizing public funds for local development. The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is
based solely on the fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests and
peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities
whose functions are essentially geared towards managing local affairs, their programs, policies
and resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are
national officers that have no law-making authority except only when acting as a body.

IN MATTER OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF AMPARO v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO,

GR No. 191805, 2011-11-15

Facts:

Rodriguez claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the Oplan Bantay
Laya, making its members targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.

On 7 December 2009, Rodriguez filed before this Court a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and
Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and
Production of Documents and Personal Properties dated 2 December 2009. The petition prayed
for the following reliefs:

a. The issuance of the writ of amparo ordering respondents to desist from violating Rodriguez's
right to life, liberty and security.

b. The issuance of an order to enjoin respondents from doing harm to or approaching Rodriguez,
his family and his witnesses.

c. Allowing the inspection of the detention areas of the Headquarters of Bravo Co., 5th Infantry
Division, Maguing, Gonzaga, Cagayan and another place near where Rodriguez was brought.
d. Ordering respondents to produce documents submitted to them regarding any report on
Rodriguez, including operation reports and provost marshall reports of the 5th Infantry Division,
the Special Operations Group of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), prior to, on and...
subsequent to 6 September 2009.

e. Ordering records pertinent or in any way connected to Rodriguez, which are in the custody of
respondents, to be expunged, disabused, and forever barred from being used.

The court granted the respective writs after finding that the petition sufficiently alleged that
Rodriguez had been abducted, tortured and later released by members of the 17th Infantry
Battalion of the Philippine Army.

Issues:

Whether the interim reliefs prayed for by Rodriguez may be granted after the writs of amparo
and habeas data have already been issued in his favor.

Whether former President Arroyo should be dropped as a respondent on the basis of the
presidential immunity from suit.

Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo and habeas data cases.

Ruling:

First issue: Grant of interim reliefs

In the petition in G.R. No. 191805, Rodriguez prays for the issuance of a temporary protection
order. It must be underscored that this interim relief is only available before final judgment.

The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private institutions that shall extend temporary
protection to the petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the immediate family, in
accordance with guidelines which it shall issue.

The accredited persons and private institutions shall comply with the rules and conditions that
may be imposed by the court, justice or judge.

Being interim reliefs, they can only be granted before a final... adjudication of the case is made. In
any case, it must be underscored that the privilege of the writ of amparo, once granted, necessarily
entails the protection of the aggrieved party. Thus, since we grant petitioner the privilege of the
writ of amparo, there is no... need to issue a temporary protection order independently of the
former. The order restricting respondents from going near Rodriguez is subsumed under the
privilege of the writ.

Second issue: Presidential immunity from suit

In Estrada v. Desierto,[73] we clarified the doctrine that a non-sitting President does not enjoy
immunity from suit, even for acts committed during the latter's tenure. We emphasize our ruling
therein that courts should look with disfavor upon the... presidential privilege of immunity,
especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right

This is in accord with our ruling in In Re: Saturnino Bermudez that "incumbent Presidents are
immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and
tenure" but not beyond.

Applying the foregoing rationale to the case at bar, it is clear that former President Arroyo cannot
use the presidential immunity from suit to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess
whether, within the context of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or... accountable for the
abduction of Rodriguez.

Third issue: Command responsibility in amparo proceedings

The doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine whether respondents are
accountable for and have the duty to address the abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the
courts to devise remedial measures to protect his rights.

As earlier pointed out, amparo proceedings determine (a) responsibility, or the extent the actors
have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or
omission, in an enforced disappearance, and (b) accountability, or the measure of... remedies that
should be addressed to those (i) who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance
without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or (ii)
who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and... who carry the
burden of disclosure; or (iii) those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of
extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. Thus, although there
is no determination of criminal, civil or administrative liabilities, the... doctrine of command
responsibility may nevertheless be applied to ascertain responsibility and accountability within
these foregoing definitions.

 Command responsibility of the President

Having established the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo

proceedings, it must now be resolved whether the president, as commander-in-chief of the
military, can be held responsible or accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced...
disappearances. We rule in the affirmative.

The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses control
over the military that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the command
responsibility doctrine.

On the issue of knowledge, it must be pointed out that although international tribunals apply a
strict standard of knowledge, i.e., actual knowledge, such may nonetheless be established
through circumstantial evidence
MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO v. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, GR No. 209287,
2014-07-01
Facts:
For resolution are the consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of the Disbursement
Acceleration Program (DAP), National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 541, and related issuances of
the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) implementing the DAP.
At the core of the controversy is Section 29(1) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, a provision
of the fundamental law that firmly ordains that "[n]o money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."

RULING OF THE COURT:

1.) The Court’s power of judicial review

Argument: The respondents argue that the Executive has not violated the GAA because savings
as a concept is an ordinary species of interpretation that calls for legislative, instead of judicial,
determination.

Held: Untenable. The interpretation of the GAA and its definition of savings is a foremost
judicial function. This is because the power of judicial review vested in the Court is exclusive.

Endencia and Jugo v. David: The interpretation and application of said laws belong exclusively
to the Judicial department. And this authority to interpret and apply the laws extends to the
Constitution. Before the courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have
to interpret and ascertain the meaning not only of said law, but also of the pertinent portion of
the Constitution in order to decide whether there is a conflict between the two, because if there
is, then the law will have to give way and has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional.

2.) Strict construction on the accumulation and utilization of savings

The exercise of the power to augment shall be strictly construed by virtue of its being an exception
to the general rule that the funding of PAPs shall be limited to the amount fixed by Congress for
the purpose. Necessarily, savings, their utilization and their management will also be strictly
construed against expanding the scope of the power to augment.15 Such a strict interpretation is
essential in order to keep the Executive and other budget implements within the limits of their
prerogatives during budget execution, and to prevent them from unduly transgressing Congress’
power of the purse.
Pertinent provisions

Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution, Section 38 and Section 39, Chapter 5, Book VI of
the Administrative Code

Although the withdrawal of unobligated allotments may have effectively resulted in the
suspension or stoppage of expenditures through the issuance of negative Special Allotment
Release Orders (SARO), the reissuance of withdrawn allotments to the original programs and
projects is a clear indication that the program or project from which the allotments were
withdrawn has not been discontinued or abandoned.

At this point, it is likewise important to underscore that the reversion to the General Fund of
unexpended balances of appropriations – savings included – pursuant to Section 28 Chapter
IV, Book VI of the Administrative Code does not apply to the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy
Group (CFAG), which include the Judiciary, Civil Service Commission, Commission on Audit,
Commission on Elections, Commission on Human Rights, and the Office of the Ombudsman.

On the other hand, Section 39 is evidently in conflict with the plain text of Section 25(5), Article
VI of the Constitution because it allows the President to approve the use of any savings in the
regular appropriations authorized in the GAA for programs and projects of any department,
office or agency to cover a deficit in any other item of the regular appropriations. As
such, Section 39 violates the mandate of Section 25(5) because the latter expressly limits the
authority of the President to augment an item in the GAA to only those in his own Department
out of the savings in other items of his own Department’s appropriations. Accordingly, Section 39
cannot serve as a valid authority to justify cross-border transfers under the DAP.

Augmentations under the DAP which are made by the Executive within its department shall,
however, remain valid so long as the requisites under Section 25(5) are complied with.

3.) The power to augment cannot be used to fund non-existent provisions in the GAA

Argument: The respondents assert, however, that there is no constitutional requirement for
Congress to create allotment classes within an item. What is required is for Congress to create
items to comply with the line-item veto of the President.

Held: Tenable. The Court reversed its ruling.

Accordingly, the item referred to by Section 25(5) of the Constitution is the last and indivisible
purpose of a program in the appropriation law, which is distinct from the expense category or
allotment class. There is no specificity, indeed, either in the Constitution or in the relevant GAAs
that the object of augmentation should be the expense category or allotment class. In the same
vein, the President cannot exercise his veto power over an expense category; he may only veto
the item to which that expense category belongs to.

Further, in Nazareth v. Villar, we clarified that there must be an existing item, project or activity,
purpose or object of expenditure with an appropriation to which savings may be transferred for
the purpose of augmentation. Accordingly, so long as there is an item in the GAA for which
 Congress had set aside a specified amount of public fund, savings may be transferred thereto for
augmentation purposes.

Nonetheless, this modified interpretation does not take away the caveat that only DAP projects
found in the appropriate GAAs may be the subject of augmentation by legally accumulated
savings. Whether or not the 116 DAP-funded projects had appropriation cover and were validly
augmented require factual determination that is not within the scope of the present consolidated
petitions under Rule 65.

4. Cross-border transfers are constitutionally impermissible

Argument: Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution prohibits only the transfer of
appropriation, not savings.

Held: Section 25(5) is clear. The Court stood by its previous pronouncement.

5. Equal protection, checks and balances and public accountability challenges

The denial of equal protection of any law should be an issue to be raised only by parties who
supposedly suffer it, and, in these cases, such parties would be the few legislators claimed to
have been discriminated against in the... releases of funds under the DAP. The reason for the
requirement is that only such affected legislators could properly and fully bring to the fore
when and how the denial of equal protection occurred, and explain why there was a denial in
their situation. The requirement was not... met here. We have already held that the DAP and its
implementing issuances were policies and... acts that the Executive could properly adopt and
do in the execution of the GAAs to the extent that they sought to implement strategies to ramp
up or accelerate the economy of the country.

6. Doctrine of operative fact was applicable

The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or executive act prior to the
determination of its unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced consequences that
cannot always be erased, ignored or disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law or...
executive act but sustains its effects. It provides an exception to the general rule that a void or
unconstitutional law produces no effect.
In that context, as Justice Brion has clarified, the doctrine of operative fact can apply only to the
PAPs that can no longer be undone, and whose beneficiaries relied in good faith on the validity
of the DAP, but cannot apply to the authors, proponents and implementors of the
DAP, unless there are concrete findings of good faith in their favor by the proper tribunals
determining their criminal, civil, administrative and other liabilities.