SIOCHI vs GOZON,et al GR No.

169900, March 18, 2010

FACTS:

Elvira Gozon filed a case of LEGAL SEPARATION (LSEP) against her husband Alfredo. Later, she filed a notice of
lis pendens (a public notice informing the community that a particular property is subject to litigation and that
will prospective purchasers of the property will be bound by any judgment affecting it) over a 30, 000 sq.meters
lot in Malaiizbon registered in the name of “Afredo Gozon married to Elvira Gozon”.

While the LSEP case was pending, Alfredo entered into an agreement to sell said lot to Mario Siochi for 18M.
Mario gave a DP of 5M with an agreement that Alfredo as the exclusive owner of the property, will secure the
exclusion of the property in the LSEP case and secure the removal of notice of lis pendens. After giving the down
payment, Mario took possession of the property.

Later, the LSEP case was granted, the CPG (Conjugal Partnership of Gains) was
declared dissolved and liquidated; the land declared conjugal. Alfredo being the offending spouse, the net
profit of his share shall be forfeited in favor of their daughter, Winifred.

Alfredo later donated the land to Winifred. Through SPA, Alfredo sold the land to Inter-Dimensional Realty for
18M wherein the latter obtained the TCT in their name free from annotation of the notice of lis pendens. Mario
Siochi then filed a case for specific performance, damages and the annulment of the donation and sale.

The CA decided that sale between Mario and Alfredo is void. Share of Alfredo (offending spouse) was forfeited
in favor of his daughter Winifred. Alfredo must pay the 5m DP to Mario with damages. Winifred has the option
of either to dispose of the land or not.

ISSUE:

WON Alfredo’s (offending spouse) entire share of said conjugal property shall be deemed forfeited as effect of
the LSEP case.

HELD:

No. As provided under Art 63 (2) of Family Code— “The decree of legal separation shall have the ff effects:

(2) the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated but the offending
spouse shall have no right to any share of the NET PROFITS earned by the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership, which shall be forfeited in favor of common children , or if there are none, to the children of the
guilty spouse in previous marriage, if there are none, to the innocent spouse.

Pursuant to this Article, Alfredo’s share of the conjugal property is not entirely forfeited in favor of their common
child, but only his share of the NET PROFITS earned from said conjugal property.
Note: NET PROFITS refers to the increase in the market value of the property from the time of celebration of the
marriage until the time of its dissolution.

Thelma A. JADER-MANALO v. Norma Fernandez CAMAISA and Edilberto CAMAISA

GR No. 147978 January 23, 2002 Ponente: Justice Kapunan

FACTS:

Thelma A. Jader-Manalo (petitioner) allegedly came across an advertisement placed by respondents regarding
the sale of a ten-door apartment in Makati and Taytay, Rizal in the April 1992 issue of the Bulletin Today
newspaper. In a complaint filed against with the Regional Trial Court, Jader-Manalo stated that she was
interested in buying the two properties and negotiated for the purchase through Mr. Proseso Ereno (real-state
broker). The petitioner then met with the vendors (respondent-spouses) and expressed a definite offer to buy
the properties in the presence of the real estate broker. Edilberto then agreed upon the purchase price of P1.5
M and P2.1M to be paid on installment basis for the Taytay and Makati properties, respectively. When petitioner
pointed out the conjugal nature of the properties, Edilberto assured her of his wife’s conformity and consent to
the sale. A formal typewritten Contracts to Sell were thereafter prepared by the petitioner, and checks were
delivered. Edilberto’s wife Norma asked to meet with herein petitioner to discuss some provisions of the
contract, and some changes were noted which were to be incorporated to the contract. Petitioner was then
surprised when respondent spouses informer her that they were backing out of the agreement and needed
“spot cash” for the full amount of reconsideration. Petitioner then reminded the spouses that the contracts to
sell were already perfected and Norma’s refusal to sign would cause undue prejudice. Norma’s refusal to sign
prompted the petitioner to file a complaint for specific performance and damages against the respondent
spouses in the RTC Makati. The trial court rendered a summary judgment dismissing the complaint under Article
124 of the Family Code which states that the court cannot intervene to authorize the transaction in the absence
of the wife’s consent. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal by the trial court and explained
that the properties in question were conjugal properties and thus requires the consent of both of the spouses
to effect such sale. The petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred when it failed to consider that the
contract of sale is consensual and is perfected by the mere consent of the parties.

ISSUE:
- W/N raised in this case whether or not the husband may validly dispose of a conjugal property without the
wife’s written consent.

HOLDING/RATIONALE:
- NO. The properties of the contracts in this case were conjugal. Hence, for the contracts to sell to be effective,
the consent of both the husband and wife must concur. Being merely aware of a transaction is not consent.
- It must be noted that Article 124 of the Family Code is only resorted to in cases where the spouse does not
give consent is incapacitated.
- The petitioner failed to allege and prove that respondent Norma was incapacitated to give her consent to the
contracts.
- The Court does not find error in the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals.

JUDGMENT:

- The petition is hereby DENIED, and the decision of Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
RAVINA V VILLA-ABRILLE G.R. NO 160708 OCTOBER 16, 2009
FACTS: Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro Villa Abrille are husband and wife. In 1982, the spouses acquired
lot 7 in Davao City with TCT T-88674 in their names. Said lot was adjacent to lot 8 which Pedro acquired when
he was still single and was registered solely under his name (TCT T-26471)
 Spouses used their conjugal funds and loan from DBP to build a house on 7 and Pedro’s lot.
Consequently, they made improvements, including a poultry house and an annex
 1991 – The husband got a mistress and started to neglect his family. The wife was forced to sell or
mortgage their movables to support the family.
 On his own, the husband wanted to dispose of the house and two lots to the petitioners Patrocinia and
Wilfredo Ravina. The wife opposed but the husband still sold the property without the wife’s consent
and signature
 July 5, 1991 – While the wife and children were out, the husband and some CAFGU members transferred
all their belongings from the house to an apartment. When they got home, the were prevented from
entering the house. Thus, the wife filed a complaint for the annulment of sale with damages against the
husband and the petitioners.
 During the trial, the husband alleged that the house was built from his exclusive funds
 September 26, 1995 – RTC ruled in favor of the wife, declaring that the sale of lot 8 was void, being a
conjugal property while the sale of lot 7 was valid since it was the husband’s exclusive property
 CA declared that: sale of lot 7 to petitioners is valid but the sale of lot 8 is null and void; that the husband
is ordered to return the value of the consideration for lot 8 to petitioners; that petitioners are ordered
to reconvey the house and lot to the wife

ISSUE: Whether or not the husband can sell a property which is part exclusive and part conjugal

HELD: Art. 160 NCC provides that “all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it is proven that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.” Lot 7 is an exclusive
property of the husband since it was acquired prior to his marriage with the respondent. However lot 8 was
acquired in 1983 during the marriage of the spouses. There is no evidence proving that the subject property
was acquired through exchange or barter. The presumption of the conjugal nature of the property subsists in
the absence of and convincing evidence to over come the presumption.

A sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988
is governed by Art. 124 FC which states that a disposition or encumbrance is void if done a. without the consent
of both the husband and wife , or; b. in case of one spouse’s inability, the authority of the court.
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to
both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s deciwision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy which must be availed of within five years
from the date of the contract implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which
must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence
of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the
transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the
third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Unlike in the NCC which gives the wife 10 years to annul the alienation or encumbrance, any alienation or
encumbrance under the FC without the consent of both spouses is NULL AND VOID. Just like in ACP, if the
husband, without the knowledge and consent of the wife, sells conjugal property, the sale is void. If the sale
was with knowledge the not consent of the wife, the wife has 5 years from the date of the contract to annul the
sale.

In the present case, the wife filed within the prescribed period. However, her action to annul the sale pertains
only to the conjugal house and lot which does not include lot 7 which is an exclusive property of the husband.

The petitioners cannot argue that they were buyers of good faith since they knew that at the time of the sale,
Pedro was married to Mary Ann and her signature did not appear in the deed. Even if they were to argue that
the property is an exclusive property of the husband, that they proceeded with the sale regardless of the wife’s
contention and that the she was in actual and public possession of the house at the time of the sale, clearly
indicates that they are not purchasers in good faith. CA DECISION AFFIRMED.

MELECIO DOMINGO v. SPS. GENARO MOLINA AND ELENA B. MOLINA, GR No. 200274, 2016-04-20
Facts:
The spouses Anastacio and Flora Domingo bought a property in Camiling, Tarlac, consisting of a one-half
undivided portion over an 18,164 square meter parcel of land. During his lifetime, Anastacio borrowed money
from the respondent spouses Genaro and Elena Molina (spouses Molina). On September 10, 1978 or 10 years
after Flora's death, Anastacio sold his interest over the land to the spouses Molina to answer for his debts. The
sale to the spouses Molina was annotated at the OCT of the subject property. In 1986, Anastacio died.
On May 19, 1995, the sale of Anastacio's interest was registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
272967... and transferred the entire one-half undivided portion of the land to the spouses Molina. Melecio, one
of the children of Anastacio and Flora, learned of the transfer and filed a Complaint for Annulment of Title and
Recovery of Ownership (Complaint) against the spouses Molina on May 17, 1999. Melecio claims that Anastacio
gave the subject property to the spouses Molina to serve as collateral for the money that Anastacio borrowed.
Anastacio could not have validly sold the interest over the subject property without Flora's consent, as Flora
was already dead at the time of the sale.
Melecio also claims that Genaro Molina must have falsified the document transferring Anastacio and Flora's
one-half undivided interest over the land. Finally, Melecio asserts that he occupied the subject property from
the time of Anastacio's death up to the time he filed the Complaint.
Melecio presented the testimonies of the Records Officer of the Register of Deeds of Tarlac, and of Melecio's
nephew, George Domingo (George). The Records Officer testified that he could not locate the instrument that
documents the transfer of the subject property ownership from Anastacio to the spouses Molina. The Records
Officer also testified that the alleged sale was annotated at the time when Genaro Molina's brother was the
Register of Deeds for Camiling, Tarlac.
George, on the other hand, testified that he has been living on the subject property owned by Anastacio since
1986. George testified, however, that aside from himself, there were also four other occupants on the subject
property, namely Jaime Garlitos, Linda Sicangco, Serafio Sicangco and Manuel Ramos.
The spouses Molina asserted that Anastacio surrendered the title to the subject property to answer for his debts
and told the spouses Molina that they already own half of the land. The spouses Molina have been in possession
of the subject property before the title was registered under their names and have religiously paid the property's
real estate taxes. The spouses Molina also asserted that Melecio knew of the disputed sale since he
accompanied Anastacio several times to borrow money. The last loan was even used to pay for Melecio's
wedding. Finally, the spouses Molina asserted that Melecio built his nipa hut on the subject property only in
1999, without their knowledge and consent.
The spouses Molina presented Jaime Garlitos (Jaime) as their sole witness and who is one of the occupants of
the subject lot.Jaime testified that Elena Molina permitted him to build a house on the subject property in 1993.
Jaime, together with the other tenants, planted fruit bearing trees on the subject property and gave portions of
their harvest to Elena Molina without any complaint from Melecio. Jaime further testified that Melecio never
lived on the subject property and that only George Domingo, as the caretaker of the spouses Molina, has a hut
on the property.
Meanwhile, the spouses Molina died during the pendency of the case and were substituted by their adopted
son, Cornelio Molina.
Issues:
(1) whether the sale of a conjugal property to the spouses Molina without Flora's consent is valid and legal
Ruling:
Melecio argues that the sale of the disputed property to the spouses Molina is void without Flora's consent.We
do not find Melecio's argument meritorious.Anastacio and Flora's conjugal partnership was dissolved upon
Flora's death.
There is no dispute that Anastacio and Flora Domingo married before the Family Code's effectivity on August 3,
1988 and their property relation is a conjugal partnership. The conjugal partnership of Anastacio and Flora was
dissolved when Flora died in 1968.
Article 130 of the Family Code requires the liquidation of the conjugal partnership upon death of a spouse and
prohibits any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property prior to the conjugal partnership
liquidation,... Article 130. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the conjugal partnership property
shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.If no judicial
settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnership property either
judicially or extra-judicially within one year from the death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six
month period no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the conjugal partnership
property of the terminated marriage shall be void. x x x
While Article 130 of the Family Code provides that any disposition involving the conjugal property without prior
liquidation of the partnership shall be void, this rule does not apply since the provisions of the Family Code shall
be "without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
An implied co-ownership among Flora's heirs governed the conjugal properties pending liquidation and
partition.
An implied ordinary co-ownership ensued among Flora's surviving heirs, including Anastacio, with respect to
Flora's share of the conjugal partnership until final liquidation and partition; Anastacio, on the other hand, owns
one-half of the original conjugal partnership properties as his share, but this is an undivided interest.
Article 493 of the Civil Code on co-ownership provides:Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership
of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage
it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect
of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Thus, Anastacio, as co-owner, cannot claim title to any specific portion of the conjugal properties without an
actual partition being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Nonetheless, Anastacio had the right
to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest in the subject property.
The spouses Molina became co-owners of the subject property to the extent of Anastacio's interest.
At the time of the sale, Anastacio's undivided interest in the conjugal properties consisted of: (1) one-half of the
entire conjugal properties; and (2) his share as Flora's heir on the conjugal properties.
Anastacio, as a co-owner, had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the interest
of his co-owners. Consequently, Anastactio's sale to the spouses Molina without the consent of the other co-
owners was not totally void, for Anastacio's rights or a portion thereof were thereby effectively transferred,
making the spouses Molina a co-owner of the subject property to the extent of Anastacio's interest.
Melecio's recourse as a co-owner of the conjugal properties, including the subject property, is an action for
partition under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court. As held in the case of Heirs of Protacio Go, Sr., "it is now
settled that the appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases where their consent were not secured in a sale of
the entire property as well as in a sale merely of the undivided shares of some of the co-owners is an action for
PARTITION under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court."