Slide based on Boeing’s MCAS “Preliminary Design Decision Memo”, November 8, 2012Slide based on Boeing’s MCAS “Coordination Sheet” June 11, 2018 “A slow reaction time scenario (>10 seconds) found the failure to be StA catastrophic jtem D) were performed. These failures were arrested by use ‘hen th®pilot recognized and reacted to the runaway. as the item C finding. A typical reaction time was observed 76 be appro Nimately 4 seconds. ool due to the inability to plane overspeed. arrest theSlide based on Boeing Internal E-mail from Cus OUe Tete Aero-Stability & Control group employee December 17, 2015 subject: ReemeAs sab Rap Reversal on PSIM mode “Are we vulnerable Attachments: image001 jg; image00? jog to single AOA i i sensor failures with the MCAS orsteesonecn\ - 7Mplementation or is ‘Thus | don’t see aff AOA oscillatory mode as a concern with what | know now. That being said, | wo there some checking way if there was a way to improve this while not adversely impacting other aspects of the system/syster we will have to see if/how the results change after the stab motor deceleration characteristics are made m that occurs?” ol, 737MAN & AR Advisor esSlide based on Boeing’s “737 MAX Transportation & Infrastructure Software Update” Web-Page Perea aye ' “Flight control system will now compare inputs from both AOA sensors.”