McKendell Complaint v. DE Dept of Insurance

Case 1:19-cv-02063-UNA Document 1 Filed 10/30/19 Page 1 of 35 PageID #: 1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
FLEUR McKENDELL
Plaintiff,
Case No.:
vs.
THE DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF

INSURANCE; THE DELAWARE OFFICE
OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET;
COMMISSIONER TRINIDAD NAVARRO
IN HIS OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL
CAPACITIES; MITCHELL CRANE IN HIS
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY; STUART
SNYDER IN HIS OFFICIAL AND
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES; AMY
BONNER IN HER INDIVIDUAL
CAPACITY; AND PAUL MULLER IN HIS
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY
Defendants.
__________________________________/
VERIFIED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff, Fleur McKendell, brings this action and Complaint for damages and injunctive relief
and demand for jury trial against Defendants, the Delaware Department of Insurance, the Delaware
Office of Management and Budget, Commissioner Trinidad Navarro in his official and individual
capacities, Mitchell Crane in his individual capacity, Stuart Snyder in his official and individual
capacities, Amy Bonner in her individual capacity, and Paul Muller in his individual capacity, and
states as follows:
Introductory Statement
Plaintiff, Fleur McKendell, is an exemplary employee, who has worked in Delaware

government for seven years, and with the Department of Insurance (“DOI”) for nearly four. When
Trinidad Navarro became Insurance Commissioner, Ms. McKendell complained internally and to
external agencies of unlawful race and sex discrimination/harassment on the part of Commissioner
Navarro, Chief of Staff Stuart Snyder and Deputy Commissioner Mitchell Crane. Following these
reports, Commissioner Navarro, Chief of Staff Snyder, Deputy Commissioner Crane and other
cohorts of Commissioner Navarro, embarked on a campaign of daily harassment and retaliation,
creating an atmosphere of constant and tremendous stress and psychological pressure.
Despite the best efforts of Commissioner Navarro and his associates, Ms. McKendell’s work
remained beyond reproach. To this day, she has no write-ups or discipline in her work for the DOI.
However, she did develop, and has been treating for, a disability, due to the constant hostility,
heightened scrutiny, and inferior/retaliatory treatment to which she was subjected at work. Initially,
in 2017, she was allowed a reasonable accommodation for this disability, and was permitted to work
from her home four days per week, coming in as needed for meetings and other in-person duties.
While the DOI required Ms. McKendell to jump through more hoops than others had to, and she had
to push back against attempts to deny her accommodation, the accommodation continued without any
detriment to her performance for approximately one year. However, in September 2018, Ms.
McKendell spoke publicly regarding the matters alleged in her charges of discrimination, and about
racial inequality within Delaware government. Approximately one week after she spoke out on these
issues of public concern, her accommodation was abruptly cancelled, with Defendants offering
varying reasons over the ensuing months as to why it could not be reinstated. Thus, Ms. McKendell,
in order not to lose her job, must work under conditions which her doctor deems detrimental to her
health, at great psychological, emotional, and physical cost.
Ms. McKendell seeks through this action to redress the discriminatory and retaliatory
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treatment she has suffered at the hands of the Defendants, as described in detail below.
Parties/Jurisdiction/Venue
1. Plaintiff, Fleur McKendell, is an African-American woman, and a resident of
Kent County, Delaware. She has worked for the Delaware Department of Insurance as a
Director, Life and Health Consumer Services, from January 25, 2016, to the present.
2. Defendant, Delaware Department of Insurance (“DOI”) is a Delaware State
Agency.
3. Defendant DOI has been the recipient of federal funds at all times material to this
Complaint. By accepting these funds, Defendant has waived immunity under the Rehabilitation
Act.
4. Defendant Delaware Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) is a Delaware
State Agency.
5. Defendant Trinidad Navarro is the current Commissioner of the DOI and, upon
information and belief, resides in New Castle County.
6. Defendant Mitchell Crane is the former Deputy Commissioner of the DOI and, upon
information and belief, resides in Sussex County .
7. Defendant Stuart Snyder is Trinidad Navarro’s Chief of Staff and, upon information
and belief, resides in New Castle County.
8. Defendant Amy Bonner is the Deputy Director of the Delaware OMB and, upon
information and belief, resides in Kent County .
9. Defendant Paul Muller is a hearing officer working for the Delaware OMB and,
upon information and belief, resides in New Castle County.
10. The events described in this lawsuit primarily occurred in Kent County,
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Delaware.
11. The jurisdiction of this court is invoked pursuant to the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (“Title VII”),
42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“Section 1981”); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section
1983”); the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101; and Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Section 504”) 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. As such, the Court has
original jurisdiction over this complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337.
12. The Court has supplemental jurisdiction of Plaintiff’s claim under the Delaware
Discrimination in Employment Act (“DDEA”), 19 Del. Code Ann. § 710 et seq., and her claim
under the Delaware Persons With Disabilities Employment Protections Act (“DPDEPA”) 19
Del. C. § 720 et seq., pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, as these claims are so related to Plaintiff’s
Title VII Section 504 claims that they form part of the same case or controversy.
13. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391 because a substantial part
of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred within this judicial district.
14. At all times material hereto, Plaintiff was an “employee” of Defendant within the
meaning of Title VII, Section 504, the ADA, the DDEA and the DPDEPA.
15. At all times material hereto, Defendant was an “employer” within the meaning of
Title VII, Section 504, the ADA, the DDEA and the DPDEPA.
16. At all times material hereto, Plaintiff was an individual with a disability
within the meaning of Section 504, the ADA, and the DPDEPA.
17. Specifically, Plaintiff suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”),
induced by Defendants’ treatment of her after she filed formal complaints of harassment and
discrimination with Human Resources responsible for the DOI, the Delaware Department of
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Labor (“DDOL”) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Plaintiff
made her disability known to Defendants and requested accommodation for this disability.
18. Since she first requested accommodation, Plaintiff was a qualified individual with
a disability within the meaning of Section 504 and the DPDEPA because Plaintiff had a disability
and was perceived by Defendant as having a disability that substantially limited her in one or
more major life activities.
19. The DOI employs over fifty employees, and the OMB employs over fifteen
employees.
CONDITIONS PRECEDENT
20. Plaintiff has exhausted her administrative remedies by filing charges of
discrimination and retaliation with the EEOC, cross filed with the DDOL on March 23, 2017,
August 3, 2017, November 2, 2017, June 14, 2018, and January 17, 2019.
21. On August 27, 2019, the EEOC issued Plaintiff a Dismissal and Notice of Right
to Sue against the DOI and OMB with regard to her claims under the ADA/Rehabilitation Act
and Title VII.
22. Plaintiff files this action within the applicable period of limitations.
23. All conditions precedent to this action have been satisfied and/or waived.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
24. Plaintiff began her employment with the DOI on January 25, 2016.
25. Plaintiff has worked for Defendant as Director, Life and Health Consumer
Services, since January 25, 2016.
26. Plaintiff is the only African-American Director-level employee at the DOI.
27. Plaintiff competitively bid for her position, and was selected over other
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candidates during the tenure of the prior Commissioner of Insurance.
28. Plaintiff was and is qualified for her position with the DOI.
29. Plaintiff performed well and made no complaints regarding her employment prior
to Commissioner Navarro’s election in November 2016.
30. Upon information and belief, when Commissioner Navarro was elected as
Insurance Commissioner, Mitchell Crane, Deputy Commissioner, approached Jennifer Vaughn,
who was then the Human Resources Director for the DOI, and asked for a list of anyone who
was within one year of hire at the DOI.
31. All individuals who are within one year of hire in a department are considered
“on probation” and can be terminated more easily than employees who have reached one year of
employment with a department.
32. Upon information and belief, there were five to ten people on the list of
individuals who were within the one year cut-off, but Deputy Commissioner Crane inquired
further only about Ms. McKendell.
33. Ms. McKendell was the only African-American employee who was within one
year of hire at the DOI.
34. Upon information and belief, Deputy Commissioner Crane asked Ms. Vaughn
whether Ms. McKendell had any disciplinary violations or whether there were any other bases
upon which she could be terminated. Deputy Commissioner Crane did not ask these questions
about anyone else on the list, all of whom were white/Caucasian.
35. Upon information and belief, during Ms. Vaughn’s tenure as Director of Human
Resources at DOI, neither Deputy Commissioner Crane nor any other person associated with
Commissioner Navarro’s administration asked Ms. Vaughn for the personnel files of any other
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individuals who were transitioning past their one year tenure, other than that of Ms. McKendell.
36. Upon information and belief, Ms. Vaughn attributes the heightened scrutiny of
Ms. McKendell to the fact that Ms. McKendell is an African-American woman.
37. Two days after Commissioner Navarro took office, Chief of Staff Snyder called
Ms. McKendell’s supervisor, Frank Pyle, and questioned him about Ms. McKendell’s job
performance, stating that he had heard she was not qualified and had performance issues and that
Deputy Commissioner Crane had recommended that her probationary period be extended.
38. Upon information and belief, Deputy Commissioner Crane had not received any
negative performance feedback regarding Ms. McKendell, but rather targeted her because of her
status as an African-American woman.
39. Shortly thereafter, Ms. McKendell met Commissioner Navarro and much to her
surprise, Commissioner Navarro, without permission, touched Ms. McKendell’s hair, which she
was wearing in cornrows, and at the same time asked her what kind of hairstyle she was wearing.
40. Commissioner Navarro also made comments regarding Ms. McKendell’s height,
shoes, and heel height, which also made Ms. McKendell uncomfortable.
41. Deputy Commissioner Crane also commented on Ms. McKendell’s appearance,
asking her questions about why she was ‘all dressed up.’ During the same interaction, as Ms.
McKendell walked away, Deputy Commissioner Crane grabbed Ms. McKendell’s hand and said
“let me see those nails” and commented that her nails were “interesting.” Deputy Commissioner
Crane also made numerous other comments about Ms. McKendell’s clothing and shoes of a type
that he did not direct to other non-African-American employees.
42. Ms. McKendell was uncomfortable with this treatment. However, not wanting to
cause any waves with the incoming administration, she tried to ignore the incidents and moved
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forward with her work.
43. In late January 2017, an alleged anonymous letter, which contained unfavorable
comments regarding Deputy Commissioner Crane, was left in Commissioner Navarro’s office.
44. Deputy Commissioner Crane believed Ms. McKendell had written the note
because it used the phrase “off the chain,” which Deputy Commissioner Crane believed was a
phrase only used by ‘black people’ and was a reference to slavery and the chains placed on the
necks of slaves, and determined that Ms. McKendell was likely the author, as the only African-
American management employee.
45. Deputy Commissioner Crane, or another individual acting at his direction and/or
at the direction of Commissioner Navarro and Chief of Staff Snyder, searched Ms. McKendell’s
office without her knowledge or consent, in an effort to find evidence that she had written the
unfavorable anonymous letter.
46. Commissioner Navarro, Chief of Staff Snyder, and Deputy Commissioner Crane
had at least three other people that they suspected of writing the letter.
47. However, no other employee’s office was searched.
48. During the search of Ms. McKendell’s office, the perpetrator(s) took a hand
written document in an effort to compare it to the anonymous letter. The document taken from
Ms. McKendell’s office was not a work-related document, but rather was Ms. McKendell’s
personal to-do list.
49. On January 25, 2017, Commissioner Navarro and Chief of Staff Snyder, without
consulting Human Resources, pulled Ms. McKendell into a conference room, and proceeded to
interrogate her. When she denied writing the letter in question, they tried to confront her with
the writing allegedly being similar to sample that they had taken from inside of her desk. Upon
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her continued denial, Commissioner Navarro told Ms. McKendell that he “hates liars.”
50. Commissioner Navarro previously served as a New Castle County police officer
for over twenty years, and was elected New Castle County Sheriff in 2010.
51. Ms. McKendell felt that the interaction had the tone and tenor of an arrest
interrogation, rather than a workplace investigation, or much less a meeting between a
Commissioner and a Director to determine the provenance of a complaint.
52. No non-African-American employees were interrogated or called liars. In fact,
no other employees were questioned, despite Commissioner Navarro and Chief of Staff Snyder
having at least three other “suspects ” in the matter. The other suspects were not African-
American.
53. When Plaintiff inquired as to how Commissioner Navarro and Chief of Staff
Snyder had copies of notes from inside of her office, she was told that the notes were provided
to them anonymously.
54. In fact, Chief of Staff Snyder admitted later that he had received the notes from
Deputy Commissioner Crane by email the evening before Ms. McKendell was questioned.
55. Upon information and belief, when HR Director Vaughn stated that labor
relations should be involved, and that no one else had been treated as Ms. McKendell had been
treated, Ms. Vaughn was told to ‘stay out of it.’
56. Also on January 25, 2017, prior to Ms. McKendell being questioned in connection
with the letter, Deputy Commissioner Crane communicated that he believed Ms. McKendell had
written the letter because it used the phrase “off the chain,” which Deputy Commissioner Crane
believed was a phrase only used by ‘black people’ and was a reference to slavery and the chains
placed on the necks of slaves. As such, he had concluded that Ms. McKendell was likely the
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author, as the only African-American management employee.
57. On January 26, 2017, Ms. McKendell reported to Chief of Staff Snyder that she
felt targeted by the investigation, thought that it was improper for her office to have been
searched without her knowledge or consent, and was not comfortable with the treatment she was
receiving.
58. Chief of Staff Snyder assured Ms. McKendell that he would investigate who
searched her office without permission.
59. Of course, no investigation was done, as Chief of Staff Snyder already knew that
Deputy Commissioner Crane was the person who had made the search.
60. Because of Commissioner Navarro, Deputy Commissioner Crane and Chief of
Staff Snyder’s actions, Ms. McKendell had to leave work early on January 26, 2017, as she felt
nauseated, had an intense headache, and felt extreme anxiety.
61. Ms. McKendell visited the doctor the next day, the symptoms not having
subsided, and was diagnosed with anxiety and given medication.
62. On January 27, 2017, Ms. McKendell was informed by her supervisor, Frank
Pyle, that he had been told to watch out for Ms. McKendell because Deputy Commissioner Crane
was ‘out to get her.’
63. On January 30, 2017, Ms. McKendell complained to the State of Delaware
Department of Human Resources regarding the unlawful treatment she had experienced.
64. Ms. McKendell approached the DDOL about this incident on or about February
2, 2017, and signed a formal charge of discrimination and retaliation on March 23, 2017.
65. Ms. McKendell was retaliated against for her internal complaint, and for filing
her initial charge with the DDOL/EEOC.
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66. For example, in February 2017, Ms. McKendell was denied a request to travel to
a conference in April 2017, despite having attended the prior year. When she asked why, she
was told that it was due to budget constraints; however, travel was approved for other Caucasian
employees who had not complained of discrimination who did not have any business purpose
for attending the conference.
67. Specifically, travel was approved for Jennifer Vaughn, who did not initially even
request to attend the conference, and had never attended the conference because it did not pertain
to her job, without any detriment to the DOI. Rather Deputy Commissioner Crane told Ms.
Vaughn to request the travel and that it would be approved.
68. Further Ms. McKendell was excluded from and/or not informed of meetings, in
favor of her subordinates attending.
69. While Ms. McKendell was permitted to travel to a conference in May, she was
subjected to an audit of her food purchases when she returned. Upon information and belief, no
other employees were selected for audit.
70. In addition, Deputy Commissioner Crane began a campaign of harassment, in
which he canvassed Ms. McKendell’s subordinates, seeking negative feedback on Ms.
McKendell.
71. For example, in mid-February, a subordinate from another workgroup
approached her and informed Ms. McKendell that Deputy Commissioner Crane had been asking
her whether she believed Ms. McKendell could handle her job, what she knew about Ms.
McKendell, and what she thought of Ms. McKendell.
72. Deputy Commissioner Crane also subjected Ms. McKendell to heightened
scrutiny, and pressured Ms. McKendell’s supervisor to find fault with Ms. McKendell’s job
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performance.
73. Deputy Commissioner Crane also requested that Ms. McKendell’s subordinates
blind-copy him on emails sent to Ms. McKendell, even though she was not his direct report, and
her own supervisor had no such request or requirement.
also engaged in concerted, improper and unlawful efforts to access documents containing Ms.
McKendell’s personally protected health information (“PHI”), in violation of Delaware internal
Human Resources policies, and HIPAA, and despite being repeatedly advised that such access
was not permitted.
were provided an unredacted copy of Ms. McKendell’s file with the Delaware Human Resources
agency (“DHR”), despite it containing PHI.
76. Upon information and belief, between February 2017 and the present,
Commissioner Navarro, Chief of Staff Snyder, and Deputy Commissioner Crane, themselves or
through their agents, have repeatedly accessed Ms. McKendell’s PHI, over the objections of HR
Director Jennifer Vaughn and despite explicit instructions that same was improper.
77. Two Deputy Attorneys General were assigned to the matter, to represent the
interests of the DOI in the grievance process. These were Deputy Attorney General (“DAG”)
Jessica Willey, and DAG Kevin Slattery.
78. Ms. McKendell worked closely with DAG Willey as part of her regular job, and
was not comfortable with DAG Willey’s involvement in the resolution of this HR matter which
involved sensitive PHI.
79. Ms. McKendell raised these concerns, as DAG Willey’s involvement created
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more stress as Ms. McKendell continued to have to interact with her on regular business.
80. Ms. McKendell was told that DAG Willey was being taken off of the
investigation. However, Ms. McKendell later learned that DAG Willey was not removed from
the investigation.
81. DAG Willey conducted numerous interviews of DOI employees inquiring about
Ms. McKendell, whether she had an attorney, searching out complaints about Ms. McKendell,
and instructing certain employees not to speak to Ms. McKendell unless absolutely necessary.
82. DAG Willey also played an active role in making decisions related to Ms.
McKendell’s requests for accommodations regarding her disability.
83. Upon information and belief, in no other instance has a DAG had involvement
with making determinations as to accommodations requested under Section 504.
84. The OMB scheduled a “Step 3 hearing” for August 4, 2017, to discuss the internal
complaint Ms. McKendell had made regarding the interrogation regarding the anonymous letter
on January 25, 2017.
85. Although Ms. McKendell was represented by counsel at the time, all parties
understood that Ms. McKendell’s counsel would not be able to attend the hearing.
86. However, Ms. McKendell did bring with her, a representative from the NAACP,
as well as her supervisor, Frank Pyle.
87. Commissioner Navarro attended the hearing, along with Deputy Commissioner
Crane and Chief of Staff Snyder, among other participants.
88. Representing them and the DOI was DAG Slattery.
89. At the commencement of the hearing, the Hearing Officer, Paul Muller of the
OMB, suggested that he would like to see if the parties had any interest in settling the matter.
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90. Hearing Officer Muller assured the parties that he would not use anything
discussed in settlement in his consideration of the matter at the hearing, and would be able to
remain neutral.
91. Ms. McKendell was taken into another room, and the proceeding was converted
from a hearing to a proceeding to try to get Ms. McKendell to drop her claims and leave her job.
92. Similarly, Hearing Officer Muller, allegedly the ‘neutral’ in the proceeding,
pressured Ms. McKendell to make and consider settlement offers, even though she repeatedly
objected that her attorney was not present. Hearing Officer Muller, repeatedly suggested terms
to Ms. McKendell that she should consider presenting to the other side as something she was
willing to consider.
93. Each and every suggestion Hearing Officer Muller made included Ms.
McKendell agreeing to leave the DOI.
94. Hearing Officer Muller is an experienced attorney, and mentioned, multiple
times, that he had experience as a plaintiffs’ attorney.
95. Hearing Officer Muller also expressed incredulity at Ms. McKendell’s allegations
of discrimination, appearing to believe she was of Spanish descent, and implied that it was
unlikely she had been discriminated against by someone with the ‘last name Navarro – Spanish,’
asking her “I don’t even know what you… are you Sp…[implying Spanish]?” When Ms.
McKendell responded that she is not Spanish, as he implied, but Black, he stated: “oh, you’re
Black, ok, ok.”
96. At one point, Hearing Officer Muller, the “neutral” who had not heard any of the
evidence or witnesses, and had stated that he did not know anything about the matter,
affirmatively concluded that he did not think that Commissioner Navarro and Deputy
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Commissioner Crane had engaged in the conduct complained of due to Ms. McKendell’s race or
gender, but rather only because of the anonymous letter.
97. After over an hour, Ms. McKendell was extremely stressed by the negotiations
without her attorney present, and asked if there might be a continuance of the hearing. Hearing
Officer Muller indicated that he would deny any request for continuance unless it was to consider
a settlement offer that Ms. McKendell would agree to take back to her attorney.
98. Hearing Officer Muller and the OMB were not acting as neutrals in the matter, as
their conduct showed a clear agenda to settle the matter in a way that would have Ms. McKendell
leave the DOI, agreeing not to “disparage” the DOI after her departure, as the DOI wanted.
99. In furtherance of this goal, Amy Bonner, Deputy Director of the OMB, arrived at
the end of the ‘negotiations,’ to discuss with Ms. McKendell her recommendation that Ms.
McKendell find a placement in a different department.
100. Upon information and belief, Deputy Director Bonner and Hearing Officer
Muller subverted the hearing process in order to create a high-pressure situation in which Ms.
McKendell would feel pressured to agree to a general release of her claims and/or to leave the
DOI, working with the DOI, Commissioner Crane, and his associates, to further their retaliatory
efforts to force Ms. McKendell from her employment.
101. Ms. McKendell stated many times during the conference that she did not want
paid leave, because she wants to work, and that she did not want to leave the DOI, because she
loves the work that she does, but none of the proposed resolutions would have allowed Ms.
McKendell to remain with the DOI for more than one year, and none of the proposed resolutions
addressed in any manner the misconduct alleged or made any effort to remediate same.
102. The impromptu ex parte ‘negotiation’ lasted over two hours.
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103. In early August 2017, Ms. McKendell requested a reasonable accommodation for
her qualifying disability.
104. The DOI, after review by HR and the legal department, approved the reasonable
accommodation.
105. The reasonable accommodation was for Ms. McKendell to work from home four
days per week, with one day in the office, coming in as needed for meetings.
106. Ms. McKendell received regular extensions of this accommodation over the
course of one year.
107. Upon information and belief, in several instances between August 2017 and the
present the DOI violated its own procedures, as well as the State’s procedures for reviewing and
approving accommodation requests, making changes solely in Ms. McKendell’s case which
made the process more arduous for Ms. McKendell than it was for other employees who had
requested accommodations, or who had arrangements to work from home for other reasons.
108. The DOI also shared Ms. McKendell’s PHI with individuals not authorized to
receive same, in violation of Delaware’s own laws, rules and policies, as well as HIPAA.
109. Chief of Staff Snyder repeatedly requested copies of Ms. McKendell’s requests
for accommodations, even though he had no right to access her PHI, and despite being told by
HR that he could not access the information.
110. Upon information and belief, Chief of Staff Snyder and/or agents acting on his
behalf, made concerted and unlawful efforts to secure copies of Ms. McKendell’s PHI by seeking
out files containing same when they knew Jennifer Vaughn was not in the office to stop them.
111. Deputy Commissioner Crane separated from the Department in February of 2018.
112. By September 2018, Ms. McKendell had worked her way back to three days of
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working from home, and two days in the office, as her condition was improving.
113. In September 2018, Ms. McKendell spoke with a news publication and a radio
station about racial discrimination and retaliation in Delaware government, including her own
situation. Her interview was published.
114. Approximately one week after the publication of the interview, Ms. McKendell
was abruptly informed that the reasonable accommodation documentation she had submitted and
had been approved for over a year was no longer sufficient, and that she would have to provide
additional proof regarding her disability and accommodation.
115. Ms. McKendell was told she would have to undergo an IME with a particular
provider.
116. Ms. McKendell was not comfortable with that provider, because he had a
complaint against him for mishandling PHI. She also was not comfortable because this request
for IME was not conducted in the manner she understood such requests were to be conducted.
She further objected because prior to seeking an IME, the DOI should have, but refused to
identify what information from her own provider was lacking, so that she could attempt to
remedy any deficiency.
117. The DOI would not provide response to her concerns, but rather simply insisted
that she undergo the IME, or report to work full-time.
118. The DOI did not require an IME to confirm Ms. McKendell’s well-documented
medical condition, or her need for accommodation.
119. Upon information and belief, the reason for the IME request was to further
discriminate and retaliate against Ms. McKendell, and to interfere with her ability to work, in
the hopes that she would leave the DOI, as they have been trying to get her to do for over two
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years.
120. The DOI denied Plaintiff’s request for accommodation, and has denied it
subsequently several times.
121. Against the orders of her doctor, but as required by the DOI, Ms. McKendell
began to report to work full-time, exacerbating her condition.
122. Defendants’ abrupt cancellation of her accommodation caused, and continues to
cause, extreme emotional distress to Ms. McKendell, and has undone the progress she had made
over the course of the preceding year, which had allowed her to work her way back to two days
per week in the office, and other meetings as needed.
123. Ms. McKendell has requested multiple times, with provider documentation, to
have her accommodation reinstated, so that she can begin again to progress toward maintaining
a schedule which is full time in the office.
124. The DOI did not engage in the interactive process in good faith when it sought an
IME for a condition that it is already well aware Ms. McKendell has and which rises to the level
of a disability.
125. The DOI did not engage in the interactive process in good faith when it sought an
IME despite having all of the information necessary to determine that (1) Ms. McKendell is a
qualifying individual with a disability, and (2) her requested accommodation, which had worked
successfully for a year without issue, was reasonable and effective.
126. The DOI subsequently changed its reasoning for the denial from requiring an IME
to stating that it was an undue burden and/or that it had a policy against telework.
127. Other employees who were not African-American women were permitted to
work remotely, and without the additional burdens the DOI sought to impose upon Ms.
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McKendell.
128. Other employees who do not have any disability were permitted to work
remotely, and without the additional burdens the DOI sought to impose upon Ms. McKendell.
129. Other employees who had not filed EEOC charges or other complaints of
discrimination or retaliation were permitted to work remotely, and without the additional burdens
the DOI sought to impose upon Ms. McKendell.
130. Chief of Staff Snyder, who is the subject of several of Ms. McKendell’s
complaints, was put in charge of approving her requests for reasonable accommodation.
131. Upon information and belief, no chief of staff in the DOI has ever been tasked
with making determinations regarding requests for reasonable accommodation.
132. During the entire time she worked remotely, Ms. McKendell did not receive any
written discipline, and received a meets expectations on her performance evaluation.
133. Plaintiff objected to the DOI concerning the discrimination/retaliation resulting
from her disability and/or request for accommodation.
134. Had Plaintiff been allowed to continue her reasonable accommodation, she would
have been able to continue working increased amounts of time in the office, as the goal of the
accommodation was to return Plaintiff to a full-time schedule in the office.
135. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff will be able to show that, had she been
allowed to continue her reasonable accommodation, she would have returned to working a full
time schedule in the office.
136. Plaintiff never sought a permanent accommodation to work from her home.
137. All of Defendants’ actions in this matter as described herein have been taken for
the purpose of getting Ms. McKendell to leave her job with the DOI. While a reasonable person
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would be justified in leaving such a hostile work environment, Ms. McKendell cannot do so for
economic reasons, and because she truly loves her work and does not want to be forced from it
because of the unlawful actions of others.
138. The acute emotional distress which Ms. McKendell suffers in the form of her
diagnosed medical condition/disability, was caused entirely by Defendants’ conduct, and
exacerbated by their continuing conduct, including, but not limited to the unlawful additional
burdens imposed to get an accommodation, and then the abrupt discontinuation of that
accommodation, is an extreme psychological and emotional hardship for Ms. McKendell.
139. Defendants knew or reasonably should have known that their conduct would
cause, and subsequently exacerbate the extreme psychological trauma Ms. McKendell has
experienced in her work environment from January 2017 to the present. Defendants deliberately
engaged in the acts which caused, and then exacerbated, Ms. McKendell’s disability.
140. Ms. McKendell has suffered discrimination and retaliation, and has been singled
out and ostracized, on an ongoing basis for nearly two years. State of Delaware Agencies, the
DOI and the OMB, have been complicit in the discriminatory and retaliatory acts, and the failure
to remedy same.
141. From January 2017 to the present, Ms. McKendell has been subjected to
escalating discrimination and retaliation based on her race, sex, disability, request for
accommodation, and complaints both in administrative charges and the press, regarding unequal
treatment. This treatment has fundamentally altered the terms and conditions of her
employment, created a hostile work environment, has interfered with her opportunities for
growth and advancement, has undermined her with her subordinates, has created and exacerbated
20

a painful psychological condition, and has resulted in extreme emotional distress to Ms.
McKendell.
142. The actions of the DOI, the OMB, and the individual defendants are part of an
ongoing campaign which willfully seeks to subject Ms. McKendell to a hostile work
environment, in the hopes that Ms. McKendell will either quit, or her disability will become
exacerbated to the point that she physically cannot continue to work.
143. Ms. McKendell loves the work that she does, and will not be forced out of a
position that she competed to secure, because of the unlawful actions of others. Instead, she
seeks the aid of this Court to redress the significant harm she has suffered due to unlawful
discrimination and retaliation.
COUNT I - RETALIATION
(First Amendment/Section 1983)
(DOI, Trinidad Navarro, Stuart Snyder, in their official and individual capacities)
144. Plaintiff re-alleges and adopts the allegations of paragraphs 1-143 above as if fully
set forth herein.
145. Plaintiff was afforded a reasonable accommodation for her disability between
August 2017 and September 2018.
146. Plaintiff spoke out in the press on a matter of public concern, specifically,
disparate treatment of African-American employees within Delaware government.
147. Plaintiff spoke out in a manner which was not disruptive to the DOI.
148. Plaintiff was retaliated against by the State of Delaware and State actors acting
under color of law for exercising her free speech rights to speak out on a matter of public concern.
149. Plaintiff’s reasonable accommodation was abruptly terminated, on pretextual
grounds, approximately one week after she exercised the free speech rights protected by the First
21

Amendment of the United States Constitution.
150. Upon information and belief, Defendants were aware of Plaintiff’s protected
speech, and were motivated, in whole or in part, to retaliate against Plaintiff because of that
speech.
151. Upon information and belief, Commissioner Trinidad Navarro and Chief of Staff
Stuart Snyder were directly involved in the decision to retaliate against Plaintiff for exercising
her protected rights, Moreover, Commissioner Navarro and Chief of Staff Snyder have chosen
to direct continued hostility and heightened scrutiny toward Plaintiff in the subsequent months,
and have sought to isolate, ostracize, and undermine Plaintiff, as well as to deny her opportunities
for growth and advancement.
152. The conduct of Commissioner Trinidad Navarro and Chief of Staff Stuart Snyder
violated Plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional rights, of which a reasonable person would
have known.
153. The conduct in which Defendants engaged would deter a reasonable person from
exercising her right to protected speech.
154. Defendants have denied Plaintiff the right of free speech.
155. Plaintiff’s request for relief as to the DOI in this Count is limited to prospective
injunctive relief, as she requests the reinstatement of her reasonable accommodation, a
prohibition on further requests for an IME to establish her disability or need for accommodation,
and requests for prospective training and analysis with the goal of addressing discrimination,
retaliation and disability accommodation.
COUNT II – DISCRIMINATION
(Rehabilitation Act and DPDEPA)
(Against the DOI)
22

156. Plaintiff realleges and reincorporates paragraphs 1 to 143 as if fully set forth
herein.
157. Defendant is an entity that receives federal financial assistance and is covered
entity for purposes of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. As such, Defendant is prohibited from
discriminating against any “qualified individual with a disability.”
158. Plaintiff is, and was at all relevant times a qualified individual with a disability.
159. Plaintiff was qualified to perform the essential functions required for her position,
with or without a reasonable accommodation.
160. Plaintiff’s particular disability is PTSD, which substantially limit one or more of
her major life activities and/or major bodily functions.
161. Plaintiff engaged in a protected activity under the Rehabilitation Act.
162. Under the Rehabilitation Act, the Defendant was legally obligated to refrain from
discriminating against Plaintiff because of her disability.
163. Defendant subjected Plaintiff to disparate treatment, discrimination, harassment,
hostile work environment, and failed to accommodate Plaintiff because of her disability, or
record of impairment, in violation of the Rehabilitation Act.
164. Defendant violated the Rehabilitation Act, by, inter alia, the following acts:
a. Limiting, segregating, interfering with or classifying Plaintiff in a way that
adversely affected the opportunities or status of Plaintiff because of her disability and/or
requests for accommodation;
b. Denying employment opportunities to Plaintiff because of her disability and/or
requests for accommodation;
c. Subjecting Plaintiff to disparate treatment and harassment on the basis of her
23

disability and/or requests for accommodation;
d. Creating and subjecting Plaintiff to a hostile work environment on the basis of
Plaintiff’s disability and/or requests for accommodation;
e. Denying Plaintiff a reasonable accommodation; and/or
f. Requiring Plaintiff to undergo medical examination concerning her disability
without any demonstrated job-related business necessity.
165. As a result of Defendant’s actions, Plaintiff has experienced and will continue to
experience economic damages, including the cost of medical treatment, and other forms of
economic and non-economic damages, including emotional distress, anguish, and pain and
suffering.
166. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s violation of Section 504 Plaintiff
has suffered aggravation of her disability and its symptoms, depression, anxiety, emotional and
physical distress, mental and physical anguish, loss of reputation, humiliation and
embarrassment and the physical effects associated therewith, and will so suffer in the future.
167. Plaintiff is entitled to her attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in this matter.
168. Plaintiff is further entitled to any and all relief permitted under the Rehabilitation
Act, including reinstatement of her reasonable accommodation, compensatory damages, punitive
damages, attorneys’ fees, costs, and other equitable relief.
COUNT III - DISCRIMINATION

(ADA)
(Against the DOI)
herein.
170. Plaintiff is a qualified individual under 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (8) in that she has
PTSD, Defendant perceives her to have a disability, she has the requisite education to perform
24

and can perform the essential functions for her position, and holds a position with Defendant.
171. Defendant is an “employer” within the meaning of the ADA.
172. Plaintiff was a qualified employee of Defendant.
173. Plaintiff engaged in a protected activity under the ADA.
174. Defendant wrongfully discriminated against, harassed, failed to accommodate,
and made Plaintiff endure a hostile work environment on the basis of her disability, in violation
of the ADA and 42 U.S.C. § 12112.
175. Plaintiff has been damaged by Defendant’s violation of the ADA through
Defendant’s removal of Plaintiff’s reasonable accommodation.
176. Plaintiff is entitled to her attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in this matter pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 12205.
177. Plaintiff is further entitled to any and all relief permitted under the ADA, 42
U.S.C. § 12117(a), including equitable relief. As Defendant is immune to suit under the ADA
for any relief which is not equitable, Plaintiff brings this claim only for the equitable relief of
reinstatement of her reasonable accommodation, in accordance with her medical documentation
substantiating the need for same, such that she can work her way back to being in the office full-
time.
COUNT IV - DISCRIMINATION
(DPDEPA)
(Against the DOI)
herein.
179. Plaintiff is a qualified individual under DPDEPA in that she has PTSD, Defendant
perceives her to have a disability, she has the requisite education to perform and can perform the
essential functions for her position, and holds a position with Defendant.
25

180. Defendant is an “employer” within the meaning of the DPDEPA.
181. Plaintiff was a qualified employee of Defendant.
182. During the time Plaintiff was employed by Defendant, Plaintiff engaged in
protected activity under the DPDEPA, Plaintiff opposed acts and practices made unlawful by
DPDEPA including, but not limited to, failing to accommodate Plaintiff’s disability,
withdrawing previous accommodation(s) for Plaintiff’s disability, and/or subjecting Plaintiff to
disparate treatment, harassment, hostile work environment and/or discrimination on the basis of
her disability, as set forth herein.
183. Defendant subjected Plaintiff to disparate treatment, and harassment, as set forth
herein, in whole or in part because of her disability and/or her request for reasonable
accommodations for her disability, said acts being made unlawful by DPDEPA.
184. Under DPDEPA, the Defendant was legally obligated to refrain from
discriminating against Plaintiff because of her disability.
185. Notwithstanding this obligation under the DPDEPA and in willful violation
thereof, Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff because of her disability, her record of
disability, and/or because it perceived Plaintiff as disabled.
186. Defendant violated the aforementioned DPDEPA by, inter alia, the following
acts:
a. Subjecting Plaintiff to disparate treatment and harassment on the basis of
her disability and/or requests for accommodation;
b. Denying Plaintiff’s request for reasonable accommodation or withdrawing
a previously granted accommodation;
c. Requiring Plaintiff to submit to an IME without any legitimate business
26

need for same; and/or
d. Creating and subjecting Plaintiff to a hostile environment on the basis of
Plaintiff’s disability and/or requests for accommodation.
187. Defendant engaged in said discriminatory practices with malice or reckless
indifference to the protected rights of Plaintiff.
188. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s violation of the DPDEPA
Plaintiff has suffered aggravation of her disability and its symptoms, depression, anxiety,
emotional and physical distress, mental and physical anguish, loss of reputation, humiliation and
189. As a result of the disability discrimination, Plaintiff has experienced and will
continue to experience economic damages, including medical bills, and other forms of economic
and non-economic damages, including emotional distress, anguish, and pain and suffering.
COUNT V – RETALIATION
(Rehabilitation Act and DPDEPA)
(Against the DOI)
herein.
191. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [“Section 504,” 29 USC 701 et
seq.], requires that Defendant provide reasonable accommodations to otherwise qualified
employees, such as Plaintiff with disabilities.
192. During the time Plaintiff was employed by Defendant, Plaintiff engaged in
protected activity under the Rehabilitation Act.
193. Plaintiff also opposed acts and practices made unlawful by the Rehabilitation Act
including, but not limited to, failing to accommodate Plaintiff’s disability, objecting to
discrimination based on her disability, objecting to withdrawing previous accommodation(s) for

27

Plaintiff’s disability, and/or objecting to being subject to disparate treatment, harassment, and/or
discrimination on the basis of her disability, as set forth herein.
194. Defendant retaliated and discriminated against Plaintiff for engaging in said
protected activity.
195. During the time Plaintiff was employed by Defendant, she exercised and/or
enjoyed rights granted and/or protected by the Rehabilitation Act, including, but not limited to,
requesting and making use of reasonable accommodations for her disability.
196. Defendant coerced, intimated, and/or threatened Plaintiff on account of her
having exercised and/or enjoyed rights granted and/or protected by the Rehabilitation Act.
197. Defendant interfered with Plaintiff in the exercise and/or enjoyment of rights
granted and/or protected by the Rehabilitation Act.
198. Under the Rehabilitation Act, Defendant was legally obligated to refrain from
retaliating against Plaintiff because of her request for accommodation for disability.
199. Under the Rehabilitation Act, Defendant was legally obligated to refrain from
retaliating against Plaintiff because of her objection to unlawful practices in connection with her
requests for accommodation, or objection to discrimination on the basis of disability.
200. Notwithstanding this obligation under the Rehabilitation Act and in willful
violation thereof, Defendant retaliated against Plaintiff because she requested a reasonable
accommodation, and/or because she objected to discrimination based on her disability.
201. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s retaliation, interference, coercion
and/or intimidation in violation of the Rehabilitation Act, Plaintiff has suffered aggravation of
her disability and its symptoms, depression, anxiety, emotional and physical distress, mental and
physical anguish, loss of reputation, humiliation and embarrassment and the physical effects
28

associated therewith, and will so suffer in the future.
202. As a further direct and proximate result of Defendant’s retaliation, interference,
coercion and/or intimidation in violation of the Rehabilitation Act, Plaintiff has suffered a loss
of earnings due to increased costs of medical care, as well as other economic and non-economic
damages.
COUNT VI – DISCRIMINATION/HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT

(Title VII and DDEA)
(Against the DOI)
herein.
204. From the time Commissioner Navarro began his term, Plaintiff has been subjected
to disparate and discriminatory treatment because of her status as an African American woman.
205. Plaintiff has had comments made about her hair and clothing and has been
physically touched by both Commissioner Navarro and Deputy Director Crane; has been denied
growth opportunities and career development; has been undermined with her own staff, and the
subject of a ‘witch hunt’ to find something wrong with her performance; has been falsely accused
of writing a critical letter; has been interrogated, scrutinized, and denied work-related travel
requests where other white employees have been able to attend; has been denied attendance at
meetings which her white subordinates have been asked to attend in her stead; and has been
pressured on multiple occasions, including in a supposedly neutral setting, to find employment
elsewhere. This list is illustrative, rather than exhaustive.
206. White employees have not been subjected to any of the treatment to which
Plaintiff has been subjected.
207. Plaintiff developed PTSD as the result of the disparate treatment and hostile
29

environment she suffered, and continues to suffer.
208. Plaintiff’s request for accommodation for her PTSD was denied, citing a policy
against accommodations allowing work from home. However, white employees have been
granted the ability to work from home, even where not required to do so by any disability.
209. The requirement that Plaintiff work in the office, against her doctor’s orders, is
exacerbating her PTSD symptoms and is affecting her health.
210. A reasonable person would find it intolerable to continue working in these
conditions.
211. Plaintiff, because she has engaged in no misconduct, loves the actual work she
performs, and cannot afford to lose her benefits, will not leave her employment, even though
Defendants are trying to effect a constructive discharge.
212. Defendant’s discriminatory treatment of Plaintiff violates Title VII and the
DDEA.
213. Despite Plaintiff’s repeated requests for assistance from the DOI and OMB, no
steps were taken to remedy the discriminatory behavior. Instead, agents of the DOI and OMB
acted in a concerted effort to get Plaintiff to leave her position (DOI and OMB), and to undermine
her with her staff and supervisor, trying to dig up “dirt” to get rid of Plaintiff, as Commissioner
Navarro, Deputy Director Crane, and Chief of Staff Snyder had sought to do since January 3,
2017 (DOI).
214. As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s discrimination and creation
of/failure to remedy a hostile work environment, in violation of Title VII and the DDEA, Plaintiff
has suffered aggravation of her disability and its symptoms, depression, anxiety, emotional and
physical distress, mental and physical anguish, loss of reputation, humiliation and
30

215. As a further direct and proximate result of Defendant’s discrimination and
creation of/failure to remedy a hostile work environment, in violation of Title VII and the DDEA,
Plaintiff has been placed in financial distress and has suffered a loss of earnings in the form of
increased medical costs, as well as other economic and non-economic damages.
COUNT VII –RETALIATION

(Title VII and DDEA)
(Against the DOI and OMB)
set forth herein.
217. Defendants willfully and intentionally subjected Plaintiff to unlawful retaliation,
including, but not limited to, through the concerted creation of a hostile work environment, for
her opposition to, reporting of, and lodging of complaints regarding race and sex discrimination.
218. Plaintiff has been materially damaged by this retaliatory conduct, which have
impacted Plaintiff’s dignity, health, rights, reputation, livelihood and working conditions.
Plaintiff has been caused extreme emotional distress due to Defendants’ conduct.
COUNT VIII – RETALIATION

(Section 1981/Section 1983)
(against all Individual Defendants in their individual capacities, DOI)
set forth herein.
220. Defendants willfully and intentionally subjected Plaintiff to unlawful retaliation,
including, but not limited to, through the concerted creation of a hostile work environment, for
her opposition to, reporting of, and lodging of complaints regarding race discrimination.
221. Plaintiff’s right to be free and secure in her person from unlawful retaliation by
31

the Defendants under Section 1981 is secured under Section 1983, and Defendants acted under
color of state law when they took the discriminatory and retaliatory actions alleged in this
Complaint.
222. Plaintiff has been materially damaged by this retaliatory conduct, which have
impacted Plaintiff’s dignity, health, rights, reputation, livelihood and working conditions.
Plaintiff has been caused extreme emotional distress due to Defendants’ conduct.
223. Plaintiff’s request for relief as to the DOI in this Count is limited to prospective
injunctive relief, as she requests the reinstatement of her reasonable accommodation, a
prohibition on further requests for an IME to establish her disability or need for accommodation,
and requests for prospective training and analysis with the goal of addressing discrimination,
retaliation and disability accommodation.
REQUEST FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for damages in an amount to be determined at trial, together
with interest, cost of suit, attorneys’ fees, and all such other relief as the court deems just and
proper which include:
a. entry of judgment for Plaintiff and against Defendants for the violations of
law alleged herein;
b. entry of an injunction requiring Defendant DOI to reinstate Plaintiff’s
reasonable accommodation as requested by her healthcare provider;
c. entry of an injunction prohibiting Defendant DOI from requiring that
Plaintiff undergo an IME to establish her medical condition, entitlement to
reasonable accommodation, or need for reasonable accommodation;
d. entr of an order requiring Defendants DOI and OMB to require
32

comprehensive training for all employees regarding harassment on the basis
of race and sex, retaliation, and disability accommodation.
e. Entry of an order requiring that the DOI retain an outside consulting firm to
undertake an analysis of race and gender bias within the DOI;
f. Entry of an order requiring the DOI and OMB to analyze and revise their
procedures for addressing employee grievances regarding race, gender, and
disability accommodation, in order to make the process more transparent
and more fair to employees, including but not limited to make revisions to:
ensure proper protection of PHI; eliminate influence of decision-makers
over the grievance process; and eliminate the possibility that an individual
conducting a settlement conference is also the person making rulings at
hearings on the matter;
g. award Plaintiff compensatory damages, including but not limited to
damages for medical expenses which have reduced her effective
compensation; emotional distress, humiliation, embarrassment and injury to
reputation;
h. award Plaintiff punitive damages;
i. award Plaintiff reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in this matter,
as well as all available pre and post-judgment interest;
j. any and all other relief in law or equity which this Court deems just under
the circumstances.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury.
33

Dated this 30th day of October, 2019.
Respectfully submitted,
THE NORMAN LAW FIRM
/s/Stephen P. Norman
Stephen P. Norman, Esquire, Bar No. 29202
30838 Vines Creek Road; Unit 3
Dagsboro, DE 19939
302-537-3788
SNorman@TheNormanLawFirm.com
Attorney for Plaintiff
DATE: October 30, 2019
34


McKendell Complaint v. DE Dept of Insurance

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McKendell Complaint v. DE Dept of Insurance

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Case 1:19-cv-02063-UNA Document 1 Filed 10/30/19 Page 1 of 35 PageID #: 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

THE DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF

VERIFIED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff, Fleur McKendell, is an exemplary employee, who has worked in Delaware

cohorts of Commissioner Navarro, embarked on a campaign of daily harassment and retaliation,

creating an atmosphere of constant and tremendous stress and psychological pressure.

health, at great psychological, emotional, and physical cost.

1. Plaintiff, Fleur McKendell, is an African-American woman, and a resident of

2. Defendant, Delaware Department of Insurance (“DOI”) is a Delaware State

4. Defendant Delaware Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) is a Delaware

information and belief, resides in New Castle County.

information and belief, resides in Sussex County .

and belief, resides in New Castle County.

information and belief, resides in Kent County .

upon information and belief, resides in New Castle County.

17. Specifically, Plaintiff suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”),

more major life activities.

20. Plaintiff has exhausted her administrative remedies by filing charges of

and Title VII.

Services, since January 25, 2016.

26. Plaintiff is the only African-American Director-level employee at the DOI.

candidates during the tenure of the prior Commissioner of Insurance.

to Commissioner Navarro’s election in November 2016.

Insurance Commissioner, Mitchell Crane, Deputy Commissioner, approached Jennifer Vaughn,

was within one year of hire at the DOI.

employment with a department.

further only about Ms. McKendell.

year of hire at the DOI.

about anyone else on the list, all of whom were white/Caucasian.

Ms. McKendell to the fact that Ms. McKendell is an African-American woman.

status as an African-American woman.

41. Deputy Commissioner Crane also commented on Ms. McKendell’s appearance,

that he did not direct to other non-African-American employees.

forward with her work.

American management employee.

unfavorable anonymous letter.

47. However, no other employee’s office was searched.

personal to-do list.

interrogation, rather than a workplace investigation, or much less a meeting between a

Commissioner and a Director to determine the provenance of a complaint.

52. No non-African-American employees were interrogated or called liars. In fact,

treated, Ms. Vaughn was told to ‘stay out of it.’

author, as the only African-American management employee.

searched her office without permission.

60. Because of Commissioner Navarro, Deputy Commissioner Crane and Chief of

nauseated, had an intense headache, and felt extreme anxiety.

subsided, and was diagnosed with anxiety and given medication.

was ‘out to get her.’

her initial charge with the DDOL/EEOC.

for attending the conference.

Vaughn to request the travel and that it would be approved.

favor of her subordinates attending.

other employees were selected for audit.

70. In addition, Deputy Commissioner Crane began a campaign of harassment, in

which he canvassed Ms. McKendell’s subordinates, seeking negative feedback on Ms.

71. For example, in mid-February, a subordinate from another workgroup

McKendell, and what she thought of Ms. McKendell.

72. Deputy Commissioner Crane also subjected Ms. McKendell to heightened

her own supervisor had no such request or requirement.

McKendell’s personally protected health information (“PHI”), in violation of Delaware internal

was not permitted.

agency (“DHR”), despite it containing PHI.

Jessica Willey, and DAG Kevin Slattery.