JusticePerlas-BERNABE CASES

Political Law

for Atty. Suarez, as compiled by VLC FLR

9/19/19
Table of Contents

1. GR No. 239521, Jan 28, 2019

2. AM No. RTJ-18-2520, Oct 09, 2018
3. GR No. 230651, Sep 18, 2018
4. G.R. No. 225442,
5. G.R. No. 227670. May 3, 2019, SEPARATE OPINION
6. G.R. No. 172393: October 20, 2010
7. G.R. No. 219501

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DIVISION
[ GR No. 239521, Jan 28, 2019 ]
PRIMO A. MINA v. CA +
DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this petition for certiorari[1] are the Resolutions dated May 22, 2017[2] and
March 12, 2018[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 150130 which
dismissed petitioners Primo A. Mina, Felix De Vera, Pompeyo Magali, Bernadette
Amor, and Purificacion Dela Cruz's (petitioners) petition for certiorari before it for
purportedly availing of a wrong remedy.
The Facts

This case stemmed from an Affidavit-Complaint[4] for Perjury, as defined and

penalized under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), filed by petitioners
against respondent Rodolfo C. Tandoc (Tandoc) before the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Pangasinan (OPP). After the requisite preliminary investigation
proceedings, the OPP dismissed petitioners' criminal complaint against Tandoc for lack
of probable cause.[5] Aggrieved, petitioners appealed before the Office of the Regional
State Prosecutor (ORSP) located in San Fernando City, La Union. However, the ORSP
affirmed the OPP's findings that no probable cause exists to indict Tandoc for the crime
of Perjury. Undaunted, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.[6]

The CA Ruling

In a Resolution[7] dated May 22, 2017, the CA dismissed the petition outright on the
ground that petitioners availed of a wrong remedy. It held that under Department of
3
Justice (DOJ) Department Circular No. 70-A, petitioners should have first appealed the
adverse ORSP ruling to the Secretary of Justice (SOJ) before elevating the matter to
the regular courts.[8]

Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the same was denied in a Resolution[9]
dated March 12, 2018; hence, this petition.[10]

The Issue Before the Court

Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari on the ground of
petitioners' supposed availment of a wrong remedy.

The Court's Ruling

To recapitulate, the CA ruled that petitioners should have first elevated the adverse
ORSP ruling to the SOJ before availing of judicial remedies. On the other hand,
petitioners maintain that the ORSP ruling is already final, and as such, it correctly
elevated the matter to the courts by filing a petition for certiorari. before the CA.

The Court finds for petitioners.

DOJ Department Circular No. 70[11] dated July 3, 2000, entitled the "2000 NPS Rule
on Appeal," which governs the appeals process in the National Prosecution Service
(NPS), provides that resolutions of, inter alia, the Regional State Prosecutor, in cases
subject of preliminary investigation/reinvestigation shall be appealed by filing a verified
petition for review before the SOJ.[12] However, this procedure was immediately
amended by DOJ Department Circular No. 70-A[13] dated July 10, 2000, entitled

4
"Delegation of Authority to Regional State Prosecutors to Resolve Appeals in Certain
Cases," which reads:

DEPARTMENT CIRCULAR NO. 70-A

SUBJECT: Delegation of Authority to Regional State

Prosecutors to Resolve Appeals in Certain Cases

In order to expedite the disposition of appealed cases governed by Department

Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000 ("2000 NPS RULE ON APPEAL"), all petitions for
review of resolutions of Provincial/City Prosecutors in eases cognizable by the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts,
except in the National Capital Region, shall be filed with the Regional State Prosecutor
concerned who shall resolve such petitions with finality in accordance with the
pertinent rules prescribed in the said Department Circular.

The foregoing delegation of authority notwithstanding, the Secretary, of Justice may,

pursuant to his power of supervision and control over the entire National Prosecution
Service and in the interest of justice, review the resolutions of the Regional State
Prosecutors in appealed cases.

x x x x (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

As may be gleaned above, DOJ Department Circular No. 70-A delegated to the
ORSPs the authority to rule with finality cases subject of preliminary
investigation/reinvestigation appealed before it, provided that: (a) the case is not filed
in the National Capital Region (NCR); and (b) the case, should it proceed to the courts,
is cognizable by the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTCs), Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs)
5
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) – which includes not only violations of city
or municipal ordinances, but also all offenses punishable with imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other
imposable accessory or other penalties attached thereto.[14] This is, however, without
prejudice on the part of the SOJ to review the ORSP ruling, should the former deem it
appropriate to do so in the interest of justice. The foregoing amendment is further
strengthened by a later issuance, namely DOJ Department Circular No. 018-14[15]
dated June 18, 2014, entitled "Revised Delegation of Authority on Appealed Cases,"
pertinent portions of which read:

DEPARTMENT CIRCULAR NO. 018-14

SUBJECT: Revised Delegation of

Authority on Appealed Cases

In the interest of service and pursuant to the provisions of existing laws with the
objective of institutionalizing the Department's Zero Backlog Program on appealed
cases, the following guidelines shall be observed and implemented in the resolution of
appealed cases on Petition for Review and Motions for Reconsideration:

1. Consistent with Department Circular No. 70-A, all appeals from resolutions of
Provincial or City Prosecutors, except those from the National Capital Region, in cases
cognizable by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts, shall be by way of a petition for review to the concerned province
or city. The Regional Prosecutor shall resolve the petition for review with finality, in
accordance with the rules prescribed in pertinent rules and circulars of this
Department. Provided, however, that the Secretary of Justice may, pursuant to the

6
power of control and supervision over the entire National Prosecution Service, review,
modify or reverse, the resolutions of the Regional Prosecutor in these appealed cases.

2. Appeals from resolutions of Provincial or City Prosecutors, except those from the
National Capital Region, in all other cases shall be by way of a petition for review to the
Office of Secretary of Justice.

3. Appeals from resolutions of the City Prosecutors in the National Capital Region in
cases cognizable by Metropolitan Trial Courts shall be by way of a petition for review to
the Prosecutor General who shall decide the same with finality. Provided, however,
that the Secretary of Justice may, pursuant to the power of control and supervision
over the entire National Prosecution Service, review, modify or reverse, the resolutions
of the Prosecutor General in these appealed cases.

4. Appeals from resolutions of the City Prosecutors in the National Capital Region in all
other cases shall be by way of a petition for review to the Office of the Secretary.

xxxx

This Circular supersedes all inconsistent issuances, takes effect on 01 July 2014 and
shall remain in force until further orders.

For guidance and compliance.

In Cariaga v. Sapigao,[16] the Court harmonized the foregoing DOJ Circulars, and
accordingly, interpreted the prevailing appeals process of the NPS as follows:

7
A reading of the foregoing provisions shows that the prevailing appeals process in the
NPS with regard to complaints subject of preliminary investigation would depend on
two factors, namely: where the complaint was filed, i.e., whether in the NCR or in the
provinces; and which court has original jurisdiction over the case, i.e., whether or not it
is cognizable by the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs. Thus, the rule shall be as follows:

(a) If the complaint is filed outside the NCR and is cognizable by the
MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, the ruling of the OPP may be appealable by way of petition for
review before the ORSP, which ruling shall be with finality;

(b) If the complaint is filed outside the NCR and is not cognizable by the
MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, the ruling of the OPP may be appealable by way of petition for
review before SOJ, which ruling shall be with finality;

(c) If the complaint is filed within the NCR and is cognizable by the
MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, the ruling of the OCP may be appealable by way of petition for
review before the Prosecutor General, whose ruling shall be with finality;

(d) If the complaint is filed within the NCR and is not cognizable by the
MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, the ruling of the OCP may be appealable by way of petition for
review before the SOJ, whose ruling shall be with finality;

(e) Provided, that in instances covered by (a) and (c), the SOJ may, pursuant to his
power of control and supervision over the entire National Prosecution Service, review,
modify, or reverse the ruling of the ORSP or the Prosecutor General, as the case may
be.[17] (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

8
In this case, records show that petitioners filed a criminal complaint before the OPP
accusing Tandoc of Perjury. The complaint was, however, dismissed by the OPP and
such dismissal was upheld by the ORSP. Since (a) the criminal complaint was filed
outside of the NCR; (b) perjury cases are cognizable by the first-level courts since the
maximum penalty therefor is imprisonment for less than six (6) years;[18] and (c) it
appears that the SOJ did not exercise its power of control and supervision over the
entire NPS by reviewing the ORSP ruling, the ORSP's affirmance of the OPP ruling
was with finality. As such, petitioners have already exhausted its administrative
remedies and may now go to the CA via a petition for certiorari.

In this light, the Court concludes that the CA gravely abused its discretion in dismissing
outright the petition for certiorari filed before it by petitioners. On this note, since the
Court recognizes that the dismissal of petitioners' petition for certiorari filed before the
CA was due to a mere technicality, it is only appropriate that this case be remanded to
the said appellate court for its resolution on the merits.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated May 22, 2017 and
March 12, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 150130 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, this case is REMANDED to the Court of
Appeals for its resolution on the merits.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Senior Associate Justice (Chairperson), Caguioa, J. Reyes, Jr., and

Hernando,[*] JJ., concur.

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[*] Designated Additional Member per Special Order Nos. 2629 and 2630 dated
December 18, 2019.
[1] Rollo, pp. 4-15.

[2] Id. at 17-18. Penned by Associate Justice Ramon A. Cruz with Associate Justices
Mario V. Lopez and Carmelita Salandanan-Manahan, concurring.

[3] Id. at 20-22.

[4] Dated August 2, 2016; CA rollo, pp. 102-108.

[5] See Resolution dated September 30, 2016; id. at 179-181.

[6] See rollo, p. 6.

[7] Id. at 17-18.

[8] Id.

[9] Id. at 20-22.

[10] Id. at 4-15.

[11] (September 1, 2000)

[12] See Sections 1 and 4 of DOJ Circular No. 70.

[13] (September 1, 2000)

10
[14] See Section 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled "AN ACT REORGANIZING
THE JUDICIARY, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES," otherwise known as "THE JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF
1980," as amended (August 14, 1981).

[15] (July 1, 2014)

[16] G.R. No. 223844, June 28, 2017, 828 SCRA 436.

[17] Id. at 446-447.

[18] See Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code.

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12
EN BANC
[ AM No. RTJ-18-2520, Oct 09, 2018 ]
BOSTON FINANCE v. GONZALEZ +
DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This administrative case arose from a verified complaint[1] for undue delay in rendering
an order amounting to gross dereliction of duty and violation of Administrative Matter
(A.M.) No. 99-10-05-0[2] relative to Civil Case No. 10-27-MY, entitled "Estate of Danilo
Y. Uy (deceased) and Thelma D. Uy and Heirs v. Boston Finance and Investment
Corporation," filed by Boston Finance and Investment Corporation (complainant)
against Presiding Judge Candelario V. Gonzalez (respondent) of the Regional Trial
Court of Bais City, Negros Occidental, Branch 45 (RTC).
The Facts

Complainant alleged that on November 19, 2010, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 10-27-
MY, the Estate of Danilo Y. Uy and Thelma D. Uy, et al. (plaintiffs), filed a Petition with
Application for Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)[3]
before the RTC, praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction/TRO to
enjoin the sale at public auction of the properties that served as collateral for the loans
they obtained from complainant. Respondent issued an Order[4] of even date directing
complainant to show cause why an injunctive writ should not be issued. In the same
order, however, respondent also directed the Clerk of Court, as Ex-Officio Sheriff, and
her Deputy Sheriff "to cease and desist from conducting the scheduled public auction
on November 19, 2010 pending the resolution of the instant petition"[5] without,
however, specifying the duration of its effectivity.

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On December 2, 2010, complainant filed its Compliance,[6] maintaining that no
injunctive writ should issue in favor of the plaintiffs, and that the petition should be
dismissed on the grounds of forum shopping and litis pendentia. It appears that the
plaintiffs had instituted a similar case before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC)
of Bacolod City seeking the enjoinment of the foreclosure sale.[7] Subsequently,
complainant also filed its Answer,[8] praying for the dismissal of the petition and
reiterating the affirmative defenses in its Compliance. Furthermore, in a Manifestation
with Motion[9] dated June 14, 2011, complainant alleged that there were other pending
incidents in the case that respondent needed to resolve.

Unfortunately, respondent failed to resolve all pending incidents in connection with the
case for a relatively long time. The scheduled hearings were also postponed several
times for various reasons, one of which was the information given to the court by
plaintiffs' counsel that the parties were in the process of negotiations for a final
settlement.[10]

Thereafter, or on March 18, 2013, complainant again moved[11] for the prompt
resolution of all pending incidents in the case. Although it denied that the parties were
currently undergoing amicable settlement,[12] complainant nonetheless expressed its
willingness to enter into a compromise agreement with plaintiffs.[13] However, no
compromise agreement was reached for failure of the plaintiffs to cooperate with
complainant. Finally, in an Order[14] dated July 24, 2013, respondent suspended the
proceedings in and archived Civil Case No. 10-27-MY "pending resolution of the other
related case in Bacolod City."[15]

In his defense,[16] respondent claimed that he issued the July 24, 2013 Order in the
honest belief that the parties were in the process of finalizing an amicable settlement,
especially since complainant's counsel did not object thereto.[17] He explained that the
14
suspension of the proceedings was not intended to delay the resolution of the case,
but to facilitate the parties' negotiations preparatory to a compromise agreement.[18]

In rebuttal,[19] complainant maintained that respondent's failure to promptly resolve all

pending incidents in the case, i.e., the motion to lift the cease and desist order and the
motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 10-27-MY, despite repeated pleas for their immediate
resolution, constituted gross dereliction of duty and violation of A.M. No. 99-10-05-
0.[20] Likewise, complainant pointed out that its several manifestations and motions
praying for the early resolution of the pending incidents should have been sufficient to
apprise respondent that it was no longer willing to enter into a compromise agreement
with plaintiffs. As such, respondent had no basis to assume that the parties were close
to having an amicable settlement.[21]

Finally, although respondent admitted[22] that there were several incidents which
remained unacted upon, he insisted that it was because the preliminary hearing on
complainant's affirmative defenses has not yet been terminated due to the latter's
failure to appear. He claimed that complainant actively participated in the similar case
pending before the MTCC in Bacolod City, where the parties were allegedly negotiating
for an amicable settlement.[23]

The OCA's Report and Recommendation

In a Memorandum[24] dated June 28, 2017, the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) recommended, inter alia, that respondent be found guilty of: (a) gross ignorance
of the law and be fined in the amount of P30,000.00; and (b) undue delay in resolving
pending incidents in Civil Case No. 10-27-MY and violation of Sections 3 and 5, Canon
6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary,[25] and additionally
be fined in the amount of P11,000.00.[26]
15
Citing the provisions of Section 5,[27] Rule 58 of the Rules of Court on the issuance of
a preliminary injunction, the OCA found that since respondent issued the "cease and
desist" Order dated November 19, 2010 – which was in the nature of a TRO – without
any justification or any indication of its effectivity, and that he also failed to conduct a
summary hearing within seventy-two (72) hours from its issuance to determine whether
the same should be extended, he should therefore be found guilty of gross ignorance
of the law and procedure.[28] The OCA held that while there was no finding of malice
or bad faith against respondent, the rules that the latter violated were so basic that all
magistrates are presumed to know.[29]

Gross ignorance of the law is a serious charge punishable by either dismissal from
service, suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three
(3) months but not exceeding six (6) months, or a fine of more than P20,000.00, but
not exceeding P40,000.00. Considering that this is respondent's first offense, the OCA
recommended that he be meted the penalty of a fine in the amount of P30,000.00.[30]

Similarly, the OCA observed that respondent's failure to expeditiously resolve the
pending incidents in the case resulted in the undue and inordinate delay in the
resolution thereof. Moreover, although a judge may order that a civil case be archived
under several circumstances,[31] the prescribed period should not exceed ninety (90)
days after which, the case should immediately be included in the trial calendar. In this
case, a period of two (2) years had already lapsed, displaying respondent's
lackadaisical treatment of the case.[32]

Under Item No. 1, Section 9,[33] Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in
rendering an order is a less serious charge punishable by suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) month nor more than three
16
(3) months, or a fine of more than P10,000.00, but not exceeding P20,000.00. Citing
jurisprudence, the OCA recommended that respondent be fined in the amount of
P11,000.00 for this particular offense.[34]

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue for the Court's determination is whether or not respondent should be
held administratively liable.

The Court's Ruling

After a punctilious review of this case, the Court finds respondent guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and undue delay in rendering an order.

"To be able to render substantial justice and maintain public confidence in the legal
system, judges should be embodiments of competence, integrity [,] and independence.
Judges are also expected to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural rules and to apply them properly in all good faith. Judges are
likewise expected to demonstrate mastery of the principles of law, keep abreast of
prevailing jurisprudence, and discharge their duties in accordance therewith."[35]

In this case, respondent's "cease and desist" Order issued on November 19, 2010
was, as the OCA had correctly pointed out, in the nature of a TRO. However, the
aforesaid order failed to justify the necessity for its issuance, as it merely issued the
directive to the Clerk of Court, acting as Ex-Officio Sheriff, and the Deputy Sheriff
without stating the reasons therefor. Likewise, it did not specify any period for its
effectivity, in essence making the same indefinite. These omissions on respondent's

17
part are contrary to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:

Section 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. — No

preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or
person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the
verified application that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before
the matter can be heard on notice, the court to which the application for preliminary
injunction was made, may issue a temporary restraining order to be effective only for a
period of twenty (20) days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined,
except as herein provided. Within the said twenty-day period, the court must order said
party or person to show cause, at a specified time and place, why the injunction should
not be granted, determine within the same period whether or not the preliminary
injunction shall be granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding order. (See
Resolution dated February 17, 1998 in Bar Matter No. 803 entitled "RE: CORRECTION
OF CLERICAL ERRORS IN THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WHICH
WERE APPROVED ON APRIL 8, 1997, EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 1997.)

However, and subject to the provisions of the preceding sections, if the matter is of
extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, the
executive judge of a multiple-sala court or the presiding judge of a single sala court
may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order effective for only seventy-two (72)
hours from issuance but he shall immediately comply with the provisions of the next
preceding section as to service of summons and the documents to be served
therewith. Thereafter, within the aforesaid seventy-two (72) hours, the judge before
whom the case is pending shall conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the
temporary restraining order shall be extended until the application for preliminary
injunction can be heard. In no case shall the total period of effectivity of the temporary
18
restraining order exceed twenty (20) days, including the original seventy-two hours
provided herein.

In the event that the application for preliminary injunction is denied or not resolved
within the said period, the temporary restraining order is deemed, automatically
vacated. The effectivity of a temporary restraining order is not extendible without need
of any judicial declaration to that effect and no court shall have authority to extend or
renew the same on the same ground for which it was issued.

However, if issued by the Court of Appeals or a member thereof, the temporary

restraining order shall be effective for sixty (60) days from service on the party or
person sought to be enjoined. A restraining, order issued by the Supreme Court or a
member thereof shall be effective until further orders. (Emphases supplied)

In issuing an indefinite cease and desist order, respondent clearly failed to observe the
rules and restrictions regarding the issuance of a TRO, which are basic tenets of
procedure, and hence, renders him administratively liable for gross ignorance of the
law. Case law states that "when a law or a rule is basic, judges owe it to their office to
simply apply the law."[36] It is of no moment that he was motivated by good faith or
acted without malice, as these affect his competency and conduct as a judge in the
discharge of his official functions. According to jurisprudence, gross ignorance of the
law or incompetence cannot be excused by a claim of good faith.[37]

Similarly, the Court finds respondent guilty of undue delay in rendering an order for his
failure to expeditiously resolve the pending incidents in Civil Case No. 10-27-MY
despite complainant's repeated motions for early resolution. In fact, it was only when
the case was transferred to another judge that it was finally acted upon.[38] Likewise,
his explanation for archiving the case on the ground that the parties were in the
19
process of entering into an amicable settlement does not justify the prolonged inaction
thereon, in light of the provisions of Administrative Circular No. 7-A-92 or the
"Guidelines in the Archiving of Cases," which provides that a case may be archived
only for a period not exceeding ninety (90) days, after which, it shall be immediately
included in the trial calendar after the lapse thereof. Respondent's failure to perform his
judicial duty with reasonable promptness in this respect clearly contravenes the
provisions of Sections 3 and 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary, to wit:

Section 3. Judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their
knowledge, skills and personal qualities necessary for the proper performance of
judicial duties, taking advantage for this purpose of the training and other facilities
which should be made available, under judicial control, to judges.

Section 5. Judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved
decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.

Under Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, gross ignorance of the
law or procedure is a serious charge[39] punishable by either: (a) dismissal from
service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned and controlled corporation; or (b) suspension from office without
salary and other benefits for more than three (3) months, but not exceeding six (6)
months; or (c) a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.[40] On
the other hand, undue delay in rendering a decision or order is a less serious
charge[41] punishable by either: (a) suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for not less than one (1) month nor more than three (3) months; or (b) a fine of
more than P10,000.00, but not exceeding P20,000.00.[42]
20
Considering that this is the first time that respondent has been found administratively
liable for both offenses, and in light of relevant jurisprudence[43] where separate
penalties had been imposed on a respondent judge who is found guilty of two (2) or
more offenses, the Court metes upon respondent in this case the penalty of a fine in
the amount of P30,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law, as well as a fine of
P11,000.00 for undue delay in resolving pending incidents in Civil Case No. 10-27-MY.
Further, respondent is sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall
be dealt with more severely.

At this juncture, it may be ruminated: is not Section 50, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules
on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS)[44] — which provides that "[i]f
the respondent is found guilty of two (2) or more charges or counts, the penalty to be
imposed should be that corresponding to the most serious charge and the rest shall be
considered as aggravating circumstances" — applicable in meting out the penalties on
herein respondent"?

The Court is aware that in previous cases,[45] it had indeed applied Section 50, Rule
10 of the RRACCS in imposing penalties on erring judges who were found guilty of
multiple administrative charges or counts. In Hipe v. Literato[46] the Court found Judge
Rolando T. Literato liable for two (2) offenses, particularly gross ignorance of the law
and undue delay in rendering a decision. Applying Section 50, Rule 10 of the
RRACCS, it imposed a penalty of fine in the amount of P30,000.00, which corresponds
to the penalty for the most serious charge, while undue delay in deciding a case was
considered only as an aggravating circumstance.[47] In Spouses Crisologo v.
Omelio,[48] respondent judge was found guilty of four (4) counts of gross ignorance of
the law, for which the Court imposed the penalty for the offense "in its maximum, due
to the presence of aggravating circumstances."[49] In Re: Anonymous Complaints
21
Against Bandong,[50] retired Judge Dinah Evangeline B. Bandong was found liable for
gross misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service, and violation of
Supreme Court rules but the penalty imposed on her was a single fine of P40,000.00,
based on her most serious charge of gross misconduct, while the rest were only
considered as aggravating circumstances.

In contrast, in another set of cases (which were above-cited and applied herein),[51]
the Court had imposed separate penalties on respondent judges who were found guilty
of two (2) or more offenses. In Re: Evaluation of Administrative Liability of Lubao,[52]
the Court found Judge Antonio C. Lubao guilty of various offenses[53] under Rule 140
of the Rules of Court and separately penalized the judge for each violation. In Medina
v. Canoy,[54] Judge Victor A. Canoy was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law
and undue delay in rendering a decision under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and
accordingly, was meted separate fines for each offense.[55] Similarly, in Reyes v.
Paderanga,[56] Judge Rustico D. Paderanga was found guilty of two (2) offenses
under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court and was separately fined for each offense.[57]

Recognizing these diverging strands of jurisprudence, the Court finds it opportune to

herein settle the conflict by resolving that henceforth, in administrative cases involving
judges and justices of the lower courts, the respondent shall be charged and penalized
under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and accordingly, separate penalties shall be
imposed for every offense. The penalty provisions under the RRACCS shall not apply
in such cases. To avoid any confusion, the underlying considerations therefor shall be
explicated below.

Fundamentally, the setting of parameters pertaining to the discipline of all court

personnel, including judges and justices, clearly fall within the sole prerogative of the

22
Court. The Supreme Court's exclusive authority to set these parameters is based on no
other than the 1987 Constitution, which provides:

ARTICLE VIII

Section 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and
the personnel thereof. (Emphases supplied)

In this relation, Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution particularly states that "[t]he
Supreme Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or
order their dismissal x x x."[58]

Anchored on these constitutional mandates, the Court issued two (2) separate body of
rules to govern judicial discipline cases, to wit: (a) Rule 140 of the Rules of Court to
apply to judges and justices of lower courts; and (b) the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel (CCCP),[59] which incorporates the RRACCS, to apply to all judiciary
personnel "who are not justices or judges."[60] Each shall be discussed in turn.

In its present form, Rule 140[61] of the Rules of Court is entitled "Discipline of Judges
of Regular and Special Courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan." As its titular heading denotes, Rule 140 was crafted to specifically
govern the discipline of judges and justices of the lower courts, providing therein not
only a distinct classification of charges but also the applicable sanctions.[62] A perusal
of the offenses listed therein shows that they are broad enough to cover all kinds of
administrative charges related to judicial functions, as they even include violations of
the codes of conduct for judges, as well as of Supreme Court directives.[63] It is
likewise apparent that the list of offenses therein includes even violations of the civil
service rules, such as acts of dishonesty,[64] gambling in public,[65] and engaging in
23
partisan political activities.[66] The Court therefore holds that violations of civil service
laws and rules are subsumed under the charges enumerated in Rule 140 of the Rules
of Court. On this score, it is highly-instructive to echo the observations of retired
Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. in his Separate Opinion in the case of OCA
v. Chavez,[67] explaining the "non-application of administrative offenses under the
ordinary civil service rules with respect to judges by reason of them being covered by
another set of rules or law that specially deals with the grounds for their discipline,"
viz.:

1.
The RRACCS is intended to govern administrative proceedings in the entire civil
service, in general. Rule 140 of the Rules of the Court, on the other hand, is
specifically meant to govern the disciplinary proceedings against members of the
judiciary. Since the RRACCS could not possibly have repealed Rule 140, the latter rule
ought to be considered as an exception to the former rule. In other words, the
RRACCS must yield to Rule 140 with respect to matters specifically treated in the
latter.
Among those specifically treated under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court are the different
administrative offenses that a member of the judiciary may be charged with and held
liable under. Viewed thusly, the administrative offenses under RRACCS can have no
application to members of the judiciary.

2.
The above conclusion is supported by the 1982 case of Macariola v. Asuncion [199
Phil. 295 (1982)].

24
In Macariola, a judge, who associated himself with a private corporation as an officer
and a stockholder during his incumbency, was administratively charged of, among
others, violating a provision of the Civil Service Rules which was promulgated by the
CSC pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 2260 or the Civil Service Act of 1959. The
issue then was whether the judge may be held administratively liable under such a
charge.
Macariola answered the issue in the negative and dismissed the said charge. It ruled
that administrative charges under the Civil Service Act of 1959 and the rules that were
promulgated thereunder do not apply to judges, they being members of the judiciary
and thus covered by the Judiciary Act of 1948 as to matters pertaining to grounds for
their discipline.

3.
While the rules and laws referred to in Macariola had since been superseded by more
recent issuances and enactments, the doctrine established therein, i.e., the non-
application of administrative offenses under the ordinary civil service rules with respect
to judges by reason of them being covered by another set of rules or law that specially
deals with the grounds for their discipline, remains valid. Like it was during the time of
Macariola, the grounds for the discipline of members of the judiciary are still provided
for under a special set of rules distinct from the ordinary civil service rules promulgated
by the CSC.
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court are the set of rules especially promulgated by the Court
to govern disciplinary proceedings against members of the judiciary. Sections 8, 9[,]
and 10 of the said rule, in turn, provide the specific administrative charges that can be
applied against a member of the judiciary. These provisions are completely separate
from the administrative offenses under Section 46 of the RRACCS.

4.
25
There is also practical value in maintaining the Macariola doctrine. A contrary rule, i.e.,
allowing the administrative offenses under the RRACCS to be concurrently applied
with those under Rule 140, will only lead to confusion and even compromise the court's
ability, in administrative proceedings against members of the judiciary, to impose
uniform sanctions in cases that bear similar sets of facts. A couple of examples quickly
comes to mind:

a.
A judge who fails to render a decision within the reglementary period under the
Constitution is liable for the less serious charge of Undue Delay in Rendering Decision
under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. However, if the offenses under the RRACCS are
rendered applicable, then another judge who commits the same fault may instead find
himself charged with the grave offense of Gross Neglect of Duty under the said rule.

b.
A judge who is an alcoholic and a habitual drunk is liable for a serious charge under
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. However, should the RRACCS be made applicable, a
second judge who is every bit as alcoholic and drunk as the first may instead be held
accountable only for a less grave offense under the said rule.

The above examples, needless to state, are merely the proverbial tip of the iceberg of
confusion that may follow should we allow the administrative offenses under the
RRACCS to be applied against members of the judiciary.[68] (Emphases supplied)
26
Hence, in resolving administrative cases against judges or justices of the lower courts,
reference need only be made to Rule 140 of the Rules of Court as regards the
charges, as well as the imposable penalties. If the respondent judge or justice is found
liable for two (2) or more charges, separate penalties shall be imposed on him/her
such that Section 50 of the RRACCS shall have no application in imposing sanctions.

On the other hand, as regards other court personnel who are not judges or justices, the
CCCP governs the Court's exercise of disciplinary authority over them. It must be
pointed out that the CCCP explicitly incorporates civil service rules, viz.:

INCORPORATION OF OTHER RULES

Section 1. All provisions of law, Civil Service rules, and issuances of the Supreme
Court governing or regulating the conduct of public officers and employees applicable
to the Judiciary are deemed incorporated into this Code. (Emphases supplied)

Hence, offenses under civil service laws and rules committed by court personnel
constitute violations of the CCCP, for which the offender will be held administratively
liable. However, considering that the CCCP does not specify the sanctions for those
violations, the Court has, in the exercise of its discretion, adopted the penalty
provisions under existing civil service rules, such as the RRACCS, including Section 50
thereof.

Accordingly, in cases where a respondent court personnel had committed multiple

infractions, the Court has applied Section 50 of the RRACCS. To illustrate, in the
recent case of Paduga v. Dimson,[69] a sheriff was found guilty of three (3) offenses
amounting to conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, less serious
dishonesty, and simple neglect of duty under the RRACCS. Since there were multiple
27
violations, the Court applied Sections 50 of the RRACCS in imposing the penalty of
suspension for one (1) year. Similarly, in Anonymous Complaint Against Camay,
Jr.,[70] a utility worker of the Judiciary was found guilty of various serious offenses,
and applying Section 50 of the RRACCS, the Court dismissed him from service.

Consistent with these cases, the Court resolves that in administrative cases wherein
the respondent court personnel commits multiple administrative infractions, the Court,
adopting Section 50 of the RRACCS, shall impose the penalty corresponding to the
most serious charge, and consider the rest as aggravating circumstances.

Thus, to summarize the foregoing discussion, the following guidelines shall be

observed:

(a)
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court shall exclusively govern administrative cases involving
judges or justices of the lower courts. If the respondent judge or justice of the lower
court is found guilty of multiple offenses under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, the
Court shall impose separate penalties for each violation; and

(b)
The administrative liability of court personnel (who are not judges or justices of the
lower courts) shall be governed by the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, which
incorporates, among others, the civil service laws and rules. If the respondent court
personnel is found guilty of multiple administrative offenses, the Court shall impose the
penalty corresponding to the most serious charge, and the rest shall be considered as
aggravating circumstances.

28
The multiplicity of penalties to be imposed on judges and justices is consistent with the
higher level of decorum expected from them. Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that
the guidelines herein set forth are based on the prevailing legal framework in judicial
discipline cases, which the Court may, in its discretion, eventually revise through the
proper administrative issuance. After all, the power of supervision over all judiciary
personnel is exclusively vested in the Court.[71]

WHEREFORE, respondent Candelario V. Gonzalez, Presiding Judge of the Regional

Trial Court of Bais City, Negros Oriental, Branch 45 is hereby found GUILTY of Gross
Ignorance of the Law and accordingly, meted the penalty of FINE in the amount of
P30,000.00. Likewise, he is found GUILTY of Undue Delay in Rendering an Order and
accordingly, meted the penalty of FINE in the amount of P11,000.00. He is STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offenses shall be dealt with more
severely.

Furthermore, the Court hereby RESOLVES that the aforestated guidelines shall be
observed. These guidelines shall APPLY to all pending and future administrative cases
involving court employees, subject to revision by the Court through the pertinent
issuance therefor.

SO ORDERED.

Leonardo-De Castro, C.J., Carpio, Peralta, Del Castillo, Leonen, Jardeleza, Caguioa,
Tijam, and A. Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
Bersamin and Gesmundo, JJ., on official business.
J. Reyes, Jr., J., on official leave.

29
30
EN BANC
[ GR No. 230651, Sep 18, 2018 ]
ALLIANCE OF QUEZON CITY HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION v. QUEZON CITY
GOVERNMENT +
DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus[1] with a prayer for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction assails the
constitutionality and legality of Quezon City (QC) Ordinance No. SP-2556, Series of
2016,[2] otherwise known as "An Ordinance Approving the Schedule of Fair Market
Value of Lands and Basic Unit Construction Cost for Buildings, and Other Structures
for the Revision of Real Property Assessments in Quezon City, Pursuant to the
Provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991 [(LGC)] [Republic Act No. (RA)
7160],[3] and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, and For Other Purposes" (2016
Ordinance). The petition was filed against respondents the QC Government,
represented by Mayor Herbert Bautista, the QC Assessor's Office, and the QC
Treasurer's Office (respondents).

The Facts

In 2010, the Department of Interior and Local Government and the Department of
Finance (DOF) issued Joint Memorandum Circular No. 2010-01,[4] directing all local
government units to implement Section 219[5] of the LGC, which requires assessors to
revise the real property assessments in their respective jurisdictions every three (3)
years. In the said Memorandum, the assessors were also ordered to: (a) require all
31
owners or administrators of real properties, prior to the preparation of the revised
schedule of Fair Market Values (FMV), to file sworn statements declaring the true
value of their properties and the improvements thereon; and (b) comply with the DOF
issuances relating to the appraisal and assessment of real properties, particularly, DOF
Local Assessment Regulation No. 1-92, DOF Department Order No. 37-09 (Philippine
Valuation Standards), and DOF Department Order No. 2010-10 (Mass Appraisal
Guidebook).[6] Hence, given that the last reevaluation of real property assessment
values in QC was made way back in 1995 under Ordinance No. SP-357, Series of
1995 (1995 Ordinance), which thus rendered the values therein outdated,[7] the QC
Assessor prepared a revised schedule of FMVs and submitted it to the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of QC for approval pursuant to Section 212 of the LGC.[8]

On December 5, 2016, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of QC enacted the assailed 2016

Ordinance, which: (a) approved the revised schedule of FMVs of all lands and Basic
Unit Construction Cost for buildings and other structures, whether for residential,
commercial, and industrial uses;[9] and (b) set the new assessment levels at five
percent (5%) for residential and fourteen percent (14%) for commercial and industrial
classifications.[10] The revised schedule increased the FMVs indicated in the 1995
Ordinance to supposedly reflect the prevailing market price of real properties in
QC.[11] The 2016 Ordinance was approved on December 14, 2016, and pursuant to
Section 6 thereof, the General Revision of Real Property Assessment for lands shall
become demandable beginning January 1, 2017, while that for Buildings and other
Structures shall take effect beginning 2018.[12]

On April 7, 2017, petitioner Alliance of Quezon City Homeowners' Association, Inc.

(Alliance), allegedly a non-stock, non-profit corporation,[13] filed the present petition,
praying that: (a) a TRO be issued to restrain the implementation of the 2016
Ordinance; (b) the said Ordinance be declared unconstitutional for violating substantive
32
due process, and invalid for violating Section 130 of the LGC; and (c) the tax payments
made by the QC residents or individuals based on the 2016 Ordinance's revised
schedule of FMVs be refunded.[14]

In the petition, Alliance argued that the 2016 Ordinance should be declared
unconstitutional for violating substantive due process, considering that the increase in
FMVs, which resulted in an increase in the taxpayer's base, and ultimately, the taxes to
be paid, was unjust, excessive, oppressive, arbitrary, and confiscatory as proscribed
under Section 130 of the LGC.[15]

Moreover, it averred that the hike in the FMVs up to 500% of the previous values was
arbitrary and has no factual basis because the 2016 Ordinance contains no standard
or explanation on how the QC Assessor arrived at the new amounts in the Schedule of
FMVs.[16]

Alliance further pointed out that there was no real consultation prior to the enactment of
the 2016 Ordinance as required by law, noting that only a brief one (1)-day
consultation hearing was held in November 2016 before the approval of the 2016
Ordinance on December 14, 2016. The short timeframe from the consultation to the
approval reveals that the proceedings were fast-tracked.[17]

It likewise argued that the abrupt effectivity of the 2016 Ordinance merely a month after
its enactment, i.e., from December 2016 to January 2017, is unreasonable as it
compelled the QC residents to pay exorbitant real property taxes for the year 2017
without giving them sufficient time to prepare for the payment of the increased
taxes.[18] Thus, the 2016 Ordinance is confiscatory because their inability to pay the
real property taxes will result in their property being declared as delinquent, and

33
thereafter, auctioned to the public.[19] This scenario also amounts to restraint of trade
as applied to those properties used in businesses.[20]

On April 18, 2017, the Court issued a TRO [21] against the implementation of the 2016
Ordinance and required respondents to file their comment.

In their Comment, [22] respondents countered that the petition is procedurally infirm
because Alliance: (a) failed to exhaust its administrative remedies under the LGC,
which were to question the assessments on the taxpayers' properties by filing a protest
before the City Treasurer, as well as to assail the constitutionality of the 2016
Ordinance before the Secretary of Justice;[23] (b) violated the hierarchy of courts when
it directly filed its petition before this Court; [24] (c) has no legal capacity to sue since
its Certificate of Registration as a corporation was revoked by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) in an Order dated February 10, 2004,[25] and it has no
separate juridical personality as a homeowners' association due to its non-registration
with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB);[26] and (d) is not a real
party-in-interest because it does not own any real property in QC to be affected by the
2016 Ordinance.[27]

On the substantive aspect, respondents posited that the 2016 Ordinance complied with
all the formal and substantive requisites for its validity. [28] In particular, they claimed
that twenty-nine (29) public consultations were conducted in barangay assemblies
throughout the six (6) districts of QC; in fact, Alliance's President, Gloria Soriano, was
present and had actively participated in two (2) of those assemblies.[29]

Further, respondents maintained that the resulting increase in tax due was reasonable
because the increase in FMVs was tempered by the decrease in the assessment
levels to minimize impact on the taxpayers. [30] They claimed that the assessment
34
levels were reduced from eighteen percent (18%) to five percent (5%) for residential
classification, and from forty-five (45%) to fourteen (14%) for commercial and industrial
classifications.[31]

They also stressed that the QC Assessor arrived at the new FMVs in the 2016
Ordinance using the approaches specified in DOF Local Assessment Regulation No.
1-92, which prescribes guidelines in assessing real properties.[32] Respondents
likewise averred that the assessment was not fast-tracked as it underwent an immense
study for three (3) years from 2013 and was subjected to numerous public
consultations.[33] They emphasized that the last adjustment in the schedule of FMVs
was in 1995 and no revisions were made since then until the 2016 Ordinance was
enacted.[34] They pointed out that the huge leap in FMVs of lands after twenty-one
(21) years was inevitable due to the interplay of economic and market forces,
highlighted by significant infrastructure and real estate development projects, as well
as the population growth in QC.[35] They further noted that the FMVs in the 2016
Ordinance are fair and equitable, considering that those values are even lower than the
FMVs of QC's neighboring cities in Metro Manila, i.e., Pasay, Caloocan, Manila, and
Mandaluyong.[36]

On July 14, 2017, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) likewise filed its
Comment,[37] arguing that the petition should be dismissed on the grounds of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies, non-observance of the hierarchy of courts, and
lack of locus standi.[38] It further alleged that the 2016 Ordinance was valid because
Alliance failed to: (a) overcome the presumption of constitutionality; (b) show that the
substantial increase in the assessed values of real properties violates the fundamental
principles of taxation; (c) prove that the public hearing required before passing an
ordinance was not complied with; and (d) submit evidence that the 2016 Ordinance

35
was abruptly implemented. The OSG added that Alliance failed to demonstrate its clear
legal right to enjoin the implementation of the subject ordinance.[39]

In the Reply, [40] Alliance argued, as regards its failure to exhaust administrative
remedies, that: first, the remedy of payment under protest as provided for in Sections
229 and 252 of the LGC is inapplicable in this case because such remedy requires
prior payment of taxes, which would be unfair and unreasonable on the part of its
members who cannot afford to pay the increased taxes;[41] and second, the remedy of
appeal to the Secretary of Justice would not have the effect of suspending the
effectivity of the 2016 Ordinance.[42]

Alliance also contended that its petition raised only a question of law (i.e., whether
respondents gravely abused its discretion in increasing the FMVs up to 500% as
contained in the 2016 Ordinance) which is cognizable by the Court. [43] In any event, it
maintained that the petition is of transcendental importance warranting the relaxation of
the doctrine on hierarchy of courts.[44]

Alliance further claimed that it has legal capacity to sue because it is merely
representing its trustees and members who filed the petition in their own personal
capacities as taxpayers and residents of QC. In fact, these trustees and members are
the ones who will suffer personal and substantial injury by the implementation of the
2016 Ordinance.[45]

On the merits, Alliance posited that the 2016 Ordinance failed to comply with both the
procedural and substantive requirements for a valid ordinance, considering that: (a) the
alleged twenty-nine (29) public consultation/hearings were conducted without the
required written notices as prescribed under Article 276 (b) of the LGC's Implementing
Rules and Regulations;[46] (b) the 2016 Ordinance is unjust, excessive, oppressive,
36
and confiscatory, and is not based on the taxpayer's ability to pay;[47] (c) it failed to
comply with the assessment calendar prescribed under Section 2 of DOF Local
Assessment Regulation No. 1-92;[48] and (d) there is no legal basis to increase the
FMVs based on the latest market developments.[49]

The Issues Before the Court

The main issues before the Court are: (1) on the procedural aspects, whether or not
the petition is infirm for violations of the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative
remedies and hierarchy of courts, as well as Alliance's lack of legal capacity to sue;
and (2) on the substantive aspect, whether or not the 2016 Ordinance is valid and
constitutional.

The Court's Ruling

I. Doctrines of Administrative Exhaustion and Hierarchy of Courts.

The exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine requires that before a party may
seek intervention from the court, he or she should have already exhausted all the
remedies in the administrative level.[50] The LGC provides two (2) remedies in relation
to real property tax assessments or tax ordinances. These are: (1) Sections 226 and
252[51] thereof which allow a taxpayer to question the reasonableness of the amount
assessed before the city treasurer then appeal to the Local Board of Assessment
Appeals;[52] and (2) Section 187[53] thereof which allows an aggrieved taxpayer to
question the validity or legality of a tax ordinance by duly filing an appeal before the
Secretary of Justice before seeking judicial intervention. In the present case, Alliance
37
admitted that these administrative remedies were not complied with, and that the
petition was immediately filed before the Court.[54]

However, the rule on administrative exhaustion admits of exceptions,[55] one of which

is when strong public interest is involved.

Although a petitioner's failure to exhaust the required administrative remedies has

been held to bar a petition in court,[56] the Court has relaxed the application of this rule
"in view of the more substantive matters,"[57] as in this case. In particular, a local
government unit's authority to increase the FMVs of properties for purposes of local
taxation is a question that indisputably affects the public at large. As for QC, the
widespread effect of the 2016 Ordinance to its constituents is glaringly apparent,
considering that QC has a land area of 16,112.8 hectares, which is almost one-fourth
of the entire Metro Manila. Moreover, QC holds 23.3% of Metro Manila's total
population.[58] While taxation is an inherent power of the State, the exercise of this
power should not be unjust, excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory as explicitly
prohibited under the LGC. As Alliance proffers, the alleged exorbitant increase in real
property taxes to be paid based on the assailed Ordinance triggers a strong public
interest against the imposition of excessive or confiscatory taxes.[59] Courts must
therefore guard the public's interest against such government action. Accordingly, the
Court exempts this case from the rule on administrative exhaustion.

Meanwhile, the hierarchy of courts doctrine prohibits parties from directly resorting to
this Court when relief may be obtained before the lower courts.[60] Nevertheless, this
doctrine is not an iron-clad rule; it also admits of exceptions,[61] such as when the
case involves matters of transcendental importance. In this case, Alliance argues that
the implementation of the 2016 Ordinance will directly and adversely affect the
property interests of around "3,085,786 million" residents of QC.[62]
38
In Ferrer, Jr. v. Bautista (Ferrer, Jr.),[63] the Court allowed the direct resort to it, noting
that the challenged ordinances would "adversely affect the property interests of all
paying constituents of (QC],"[64] and that it would serve as a test case for the guidance
of other local government units in crafting ordinances. It added that these
circumstances allow the Court to set aside the technical defects and take primary
jurisdiction over the petition, stressing that "[t]his is in accordance with the well-
entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder
or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed."[65] Considering the
circumstances of this case and the pronouncement in Ferrer, Jr., the Court also deems
it proper to relax the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

Notwithstanding the exemption of this case from the above-discussed procedural

doctrines, the Court is constrained to dismiss the petition due to Alliance's lack of legal
capacity to sue.

II. Legal Capacity to Sue.

The Rules of Court mandates that only natural or juridical persons, or entities
authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. Non-compliance with this
requirement renders a case dismissible on the ground of lack of legal capacity to
sue,which refers to "a plaintiff's general disability to sue, such as on account of
minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality or any other general
disqualifications of a party."[66]

39
Jurisprudence provides that an unregistered association, having no separate juridical
personality, lacks the capacity to sue in its own name.[67] In this case, Alliance
admitted that it has no juridical personality, considering the revocation of its SEC
Certificate of Registration and its failure to register with the HLURB as a homeowner's
association. Nevertheless, Alliance insists that the petition should not be dismissed
because it was filed by the members of the Board of Trustees in their own personal
capacities, as evidenced by a letter[68] dated March 10, 2017 (Authorization Letter)
authorizing its ostensible Treasurer, Danilo Liwanag (Liwanag), to file the petition in
their behalf.

The Court disagrees. A perusal of the petition readily shows that it was filed by
Alliance, and not by the individual members of its Board of Trustees in their personal
capacities. As it is evident from the title and "Parties"[69] section of the petition, the
same was filed solely in the name of "Alliance of Quezon City Homeowners'
Association, Inc.," as petitioner. Moreover, the Authorization Letter above-adverted to
clearly indicates that the signatories therein signed merely in their official capacities as
Alliance's trustees.[70] In fact, even assuming that the trustees intended to file the case
in their own behalf, Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court[71] requires that their
names as beneficiaries must be included in the title of the case, which was, however,
not done here. Thus, Alliance's claim that the petition was filed by the trustees in their
personal capacities is bereft of merit.

For another, Alliance argued that the status of its authorized representative, Liwanag,
as a taxpayer and resident of QC, is sufficient to correct the procedural lapse.

This contention is erroneous. In Association of Flood Victims (AFV) v. Commission on

Elections,[72] the Court dismissed the petition for certiorari and/or mandamus because
the petitioner therein – being an unincorporated association – had no capacity to sue in
40
its own name and accordingly, its representative who filed the petition in its behalf, had
no personality to bring an action in court.[73] Moreover, in Dueñas v. Santos
Subdivision Homeowners Association,[74] the Court held that the complaint filed by an
unregistered association cannot be treated as a suit by the persons who signed it.[75]

On these scores, the fact that Liwanag, a natural person, signed and verified the
petition did not cure Alliance's lack of legal capacity to file this case. By the same logic,
the signatures of the supposed trustees in the Authorization Letter did not confer
Alliance with a separate juridical personality required to pursue this case.

In the final analysis, there is no proper petitioner to the present suit. Should this case
proceed despite Alliance's legal non-existence, the Court will certainly remain in
continuous quandary as to who should the reliefs be granted to, since no other proper
party filed the case. It is noteworthy to mention that in the case of Samahan ng mga
Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) v. Quezon City,[76] the Court decided to give due
course to the petition despite the lack of legal capacity to sue of petitioner SPARK
(also an unincorporated association like Alliance) because individuals or natural
persons joined as co-petitioners in the suit, unlike in the present case.

All told, while this case falls under the exceptions to the doctrines of exhaustion of
administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts, the Court is still constrained to dismiss
the petition due to Alliance's lack of legal capacity to sue. Thus, the resolution of the
issues anent the validity and constitutionality of Quezon City Ordinance No. SP-2556,
Series of 2016, while indeed of great public interest and of transcendental importance,
must nonetheless await the filing of the proper case by the proper party. Accordingly,
the Court no longer deems it necessary to resolve the other issues raised in this case.

41
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED due to petitioner Alliance of Quezon City
Homeowners' Association, Inc.'s lack of legal capacity to sue. The Temporary
Restraining Order issued on April 18, 2017 is hereby LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

Leonardo-De Castro, C.J., Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Leonen, Jardeleza,

Caguioa, Tijam, A. Reyes, Jr., Gesmundo, and J. Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., on official leave.

42
43
EN BANC

August 8, 2017

G.R. No. 225442

SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN (SPARK),* JOANNE ROSE

SACE LIM, JOHN ARVIN NAVARRO BUENAAGUA, RONEL BACCUTAN, MARK
LEO DELOS REYES, and CLARISSA JOYCE VILLEGAS, minor, for herself and as
represented by her father, JULIAN VILLEGAS, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
QUEZON CITY, as represented by MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA, CITY OF
MANILA, as represented by MAYOR JOSEPH ESTRADA, and NAVOTAS CITY, as
represented by MAYOR JOHN REY TIANGCO,, Respondents,

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This petition for certiorari and prohibition1 assails the constitutionality of the curfew
ordinances issued by the local governments of Quezon City, Manila, and Navotas. The
petition prays that a temporary restraining order (TRO) be issued ordering respondents
Herbert Bautista, Joseph Estrada, and John Rey Tiangco, as Mayors of their
respective local governments, to prohibit, refrain, and desist from implementing and
enforcing these issuances, pending resolution of this case, and eventually, declare the
City of Manila's ordinance as ultra vires for being contrary to Republic Act No. (RA)
9344,2 or the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act," as amended, and all curfew

44
ordinances as unconstitutional for violating the constitutional right of minors to travel,
as well as the right of parents to rear their children.

The Facts

Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to implement a nationwide

curfew for minors, several local governments in Metro Manila started to strictly
implement their curfew ordinances on minors through police operations which were
publicly known as part of "Oplan Rody."3

Among those local governments that implemented curfew ordinances were

respondents: (a) Navotas City, through Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 99- 02,4 dated
August 26, 1999, entitled "Nagtatakdang 'Curfew' ng mga Kabataan na Wala Pang
Labing Walong (18) Taong Gulang sa Bayan ng Navotas, Kalakhang Maynila," as
amended by Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13,5 dated June 6, 2002 (Navotas
Ordinance); (b) City of Manila, through Ordinance No. 80466 entitled "An Ordinance
Declaring the Hours from 10:00 P.M. to 4:00 A.M. of the Following Day as 'Barangay
Curfew Hours' for Children and Youths Below Eighteen (18) Years of Age; Prescribing
Penalties Therefor; and for Other Purposes" dated October 14, 2002 (Manila
Ordinance); and (c) Quezon City, through Ordinance No. SP- 2301,7 Series of 2014,
entitled "An Ordinance Setting for a [sic] Disciplinary Hours in Quezon City for Minors
from 10:00 P.M. to 5:00 A.M., Providing Penalties for Parent/Guardian, for Violation
Thereof and for Other Purposes" dated July 31, 2014 (Quezon City Ordinance;
collectively, Curfew Ordinances).8

Petitioners,9 spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK)

- an association of young adults and minors that aims to forward a free and just
society, in particular the protection of the rights and welfare of the youth and minors10
45
- filed this present petition, arguing that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional
because they: (a) result in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and thus, fall
under the void for vagueness doctrine; (b) suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or
impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours; (c) deprive minors of the
right to liberty and the right to travel without substantive due process; and (d) deprive
parents of their natural and primary right in rearing the youth without substantive due
process.11 In addition, petitioners assert that the Manila Ordinance contravenes RA
9344, as amended by RA 10630.12

More specifically, petitioners posit that the Curfew Ordinances encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement as there are no clear provisions or detailed standards on
how law enforcers should apprehend and properly determine the age of the alleged
curfew violators.13 They further argue that the law enforcer's apprehension depends
only on his physical assessment, and, thus, subjective and based only on the law
enforcer's visual assessment of the alleged curfew violator.14

While petitioners recognize that the Curfew Ordinances contain provisions indicating
the activities exempted from the operation of the imposed curfews, i.e., exemption of
working students or students with evening class, they contend that the lists of
exemptions do not cover the range and breadth of legitimate activities or reasons as to
why minors would be out at night, and, hence, proscribe or impair the legitimate
activities of minors during curfew hours.15

Petitioners likewise proffer that the Curfew Ordinances: (a) are unconstitutional as they
deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right to travel without substantive due
process;16 and (b) fail to pass the strict scrutiny test, for not being narrowly tailored
and for employing means that bear no reasonable relation to their purpose.17 They

46
argue that the prohibition of minors on streets during curfew hours will not per se
protect and promote the social and moral welfare of children of the community.18

Furthermore, petitioners claim that the Manila Ordinance, particularly Section 419
thereof, contravenes Section 57-A20 of RA 9344, as amended, given that the cited
curfew provision imposes on minors the penalties of imprisonment, reprimand, and
admonition. They contend that the imposition of penalties contravenes RA 9344's
express command that no penalty shall be imposed on minors for curfew violations.21

Lastly, petitioners submit that there is no compelling State interest to impose curfews
contrary to the parents' prerogative to impose them in the exercise of their natural and
primary right in the rearing of the youth, and that even if a compelling interest exists,
less restrictive means are available to achieve the same. In this regard, they suggest
massive street lighting programs, installation of CCTV s (closed-circuit televisions) in
public streets, and regular visible patrols by law enforcers as other viable means of
protecting children and preventing crimes at night. They further opine that the
government can impose more reasonable sanctions, i.e., mandatory parental
counseling and education seminars informing the parents of the reasons behind the
curfew, and that imprisonment is too harsh a penalty for parents who allowed their
children to be out during curfew hours.22

The Issue Before the Court

The primordial issue for the Court's resolution in this case is whether or not the Curfew
Ordinances are unconstitutional.

The Court's Ruling

47
The petition is partly granted.

I.

At the onset, the Court addresses the procedural issues raised in this case.
Respondents seek the dismissal of the petition, questioning: (a) the propriety of
certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to assail the
constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances; (b) petitioners' direct resort to the Court,
contrary to the hierarchy of courts doctrine; and (c) the lack of actual controversy and
standing to warrant judicial review.23

A. Propriety of the Petition for

Certiorari and Prohibition.

Under the 1987 Constitution, judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice not
only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable," but also "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."24 Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
reads:

ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.

48
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Case law explains that the present Constitution has "expanded the concept of judicial
power, which up to then was confined to its traditional ambit of settling actual
controversies involving rights that were legally demandable and enforceable."25

In Araullo v. Aquino III,26 it was held that petitions for certiorari and prohibition filed
before the Court "are the remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government may be determined under the Constitution."27 It was explained that "[w]ith
respect to the Court, x x x the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily
broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to
correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or
officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, but also to set right,
undo[,] and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does
not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This application is expressly
authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, [Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution cited above]."28

In Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC Approved Medical
Centers Association, Inc.,29 it was expounded that "[ m ]eanwhile that no specific
procedural rule has been promulgated to enforce [the] 'expanded' constitutional
definition of judicial power and because of the commonality of 'grave abuse of
49
discretion' as a ground for review under Rule 65 and the courts' expanded jurisdiction,
the Supreme Court - based on its power to relax its rules - allowed Rule 65 to be used
as the medium for petitions invoking the courts' expanded jurisdiction[. ]"30

In this case, petitioners question the issuance of the Curfew Ordinances by the
legislative councils of Quezon City, Manila, and Navotas in the exercise of their
delegated legislative powers on the ground that these ordinances violate the
Constitution, specifically, the provisions pertaining to the right to travel of minors, and
the right of parents to rear their children. They also claim that the Manila Ordinance, by
imposing penalties against minors, conflicts with RA 9344, as amended, which
prohibits the imposition of penalties on minors for status offenses. It has been held that
"[t]here is grave abuse of discretion when an act is (1) done contrary to the
Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically, capriciously or
arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias. "31 In light of the foregoing, petitioners
correctly availed of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition, although these
governmental actions were not made pursuant to any judicial or quasi-judicial function.

B. Direct Resort to the Court.

Since petitions for certiorari and prohibition are allowed as remedies to assail the
constitutionality of legislative and executive enactments, the next question to be
resolved is whether or not petitioners' direct resort to this Court is justified.

The doctrine of hierarchy of courts "[r]equires that recourse must first be made to the
lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court. The Supreme
Court has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus. While this jurisdiction is shared with the Court of
Appeals [(CA)] and the [Regional Trial Courts], a direct invocation of this Court's
50
jurisdiction is allowed when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly
and especially set out in the petition[.]"32 This Court is tasked to resolve "the issue of
constitutionality of a law or regulation at the first instance [if it] is of paramount
importance and immediately affects the social, economic, and moral well-being of the
people,"33 as in this case. Hence, petitioners' direct resort to the Court is justified.

C. Requisites of Judicial Review.

"The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the

constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by
the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry,
namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question
the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very
lis mota of the case."34 In this case, respondents assail the existence of the first two
(2) requisites.

1. Actual Case or Controversy.

"Basic in the exercise of judicial power - whether under the traditional or in the
expanded setting - is the presence of an actual case or controversy."35 "[A]n actual
case or controversy is one which 'involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a
hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.' In other words, 'there must be a
contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing
law and jurisprudence."36 According to recent jurisprudence, in the Court's exercise of
its expanded jurisdiction under the 1987 Constitution, this requirement is simplified "by
51
merely requiring a prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion in the assailed
governmental act."37

"Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of

ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a
direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe
for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner
must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of
the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger
of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of."38

Applying these precepts, this Court finds that there exists an actual justiciable
controversy in this case given the evident clash of the parties' legal claims, particularly
on whether the Curfew Ordinances impair the minors' and parents' constitutional rights,
and whether the Manila Ordinance goes against the provisions of RA 9344. Based on
their asseverations, petitioners have - as will be gleaned from the substantive
discussions below - conveyed a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion, which
perforce impels this Court to exercise its expanded jurisdiction. The case is likewise
ripe for adjudication, considering that the Curfew Ordinances were being implemented
until the Court issued the TRO39 enjoining their enforcement. The purported threat or
incidence of injury is, therefore, not merely speculative or hypothetical but rather, real
and apparent.

2. Legal Standing.

"The question of locus standi or legal standing focuses on the determination of whether
those assailing the governmental act have the right of appearance to bring the matter
52
to the court for adjudication. [Petitioners] must show that they have a personal and
substantial interest in the case, such that they have sustained or are in immediate
danger of sustaining, some direct injury as a consequence of the enforcement of the
challenged governmental act."40 "' [I]nterest' in the question involved must be material
- an interest that is in issue and will be affected by the official act- as distinguished from
being merely incidental or general."41

"The gist of the question of [legal] standing is whether a party alleges such personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his
constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing."42

As abovementioned, the petition is anchored on the alleged breach of two (2)

constitutional rights, namely: (1) the right of minors to freely travel within their
respective localities; and (2) the primary right of parents to rear their children. Related
to the first is the purported conflict between RA 9344, as amended, and the penal
provisions of the Manila Ordinance.

Among the five (5) individual petitioners, only Clarissa Joyce Villegas (Clarissa) has
legal standing to raise the issue affecting the minor's right to travel,43 because: (a) she
was still a minor at the time the petition was filed before this Court,44 and, hence, a
proper subject of the Curfew Ordinances; and (b) as alleged, she travels from Manila to
Quezon City at night after school and is, thus, in imminent danger of apprehension by
virtue of the Curfew Ordinances. On the other hand, petitioners Joanne Rose Sace
Lim, John Arvin Navarro Buenaagua, Ronel Baccutan (Ronel), and Mark Leo Delos
Reyes (Mark Leo) admitted in the petition that they are all of legal age, and therefore,

53
beyond the ordinances' coverage. Thus, they are not proper subjects of the Curfew
Ordinances, for which they could base any direct injury as a consequence thereof.

None of them, however, has standing to raise the issue of whether the Curfew
Ordinances violate the parents' right to rear their children as they have not shown that
they stand before this Court as parent/s and/or guardian/s whose constitutional
parental right has been infringed. It should be noted that Clarissa is represented by her
father, Julian Villegas, Jr. (Mr. Villegas), who could have properly filed the petition for
himself for the alleged violation of his parental right. But Mr. Villegas did not question
the Curfew Ordinances based on his primary right as a parent as he only stands as the
representative of his minor child, Clarissa, whose right to travel was supposedly
infringed.

As for SPARK, it is an unincorporated association and, consequently, has no legal

personality to bring an action in court.45 Even assuming that it has the capacity to sue,
SPARK still has no standing as it failed to allege that it was authorized by its members
who were affected by the Curfew Ordinances, i.e., the minors, to file this case on their
behalf.

Hence, save for Clarissa, petitioners do not have the required personal interest in the
controversy. More particularly, Clarissa has standing only on the issue of the alleged
violation of the minors' right to travel, but not on the alleged violation of the parents'
right.

These notwithstanding, this Court finds it proper to relax the standing requirement
insofar as all the petitioners are concerned, in view of the transcendental importance of
the issues involved in this case. "In a number of cases, this Court has taken a liberal
stance towards the requirement of legal standing, especially when paramount interest
54
is involved. Indeed, when those who challenge the official act are able to craft an issue
of transcendental significance to the people, the Court may exercise its sound
discretion and take cognizance of the suit. It may do so in spite of the inability of the
petitioners to show that they have been personally injured by the operation of a law or
any other government act."46

This is a case of first impression in which the constitutionality of juvenile curfew

ordinances is placed under judicial review. Not only is this Court asked to determine
the impact of these issuances on the right of parents to rear their children and the right
of minors to travel, it is also requested to determine the extent of the State's authority
to regulate these rights in the interest of general welfare. Accordingly, this case is of
overarching significance to the public, which, therefore, impels a relaxation of
procedural rules, including, among others, the standing requirement.

That being said, this Court now proceeds to the substantive aspect of this case.

II.

A. Void for Vagueness.

Before resolving the issues pertaining to the rights of minors to travel and of parents to
rear their children, this Court must first tackle petitioners' contention that the Curfew
Ordinances are void for vagueness.

In particular, petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are void for not containing
sufficient enforcement parameters, which leaves the enforcing authorities with
unbridled discretion to carry out their provisions. They claim that the lack of procedural
guidelines in these issuances led to the questioning of petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo,
55
even though they were already of legal age. They maintain that the enforcing
authorities apprehended the suspected curfew offenders based only on their physical
appearances and, thus, acted arbitrarily. Meanwhile, although they conceded that the
Quezon City Ordinance requires enforcers to determine the age of the child, they
submit that nowhere does the said ordinance require the law enforcers to ask for proof
or identification of the child to show his age.47

The arguments are untenable.

"A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it,
fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion
in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle."48

In this case, petitioners' invocation of the void for vagueness doctrine is improper,
considering that they do not properly identify any provision in any of the Curfew
Ordinances, which, because of its vague terminology, fails to provide fair warning and
notice to the public of what is prohibited or required so that one may act accordingly.49
The void for vagueness doctrine is premised on due process considerations, which are
absent from this particular claim. In one case, it was opined that:

[T]he vagueness doctrine is a specie of "unconstitutional uncertainty," which may

involve "procedural due process uncertainty cases" and "substantive due process
uncertainty cases." "Procedural due process uncertainty" involves cases where the
statutory language was so obscure that it failed to give adequate warning to those
56
subject to its prohibitions as well as to provide proper standards for adjudication. Such
a definition encompasses the vagueness doctrine. This perspective rightly integrates
the vagueness doctrine with the due process clause, a necessary interrelation since
there is no constitutional provision that explicitly bars statutes that are "void-for-
vagueness."50

Essentially, petitioners only bewail the lack of enforcement parameters to guide the
local authorities in the proper apprehension of suspected curfew offenders. They do
not assert any confusion as to what conduct the subject ordinances prohibit or not
prohibit but only point to the ordinances' lack of enforcement guidelines. The
mechanisms related to the implementation of the Curfew Ordinances are, however,
matters of policy that are best left for the political branches of government to resolve.
Verily, the objective of curbing unbridled enforcement is not the sole consideration in a
void for vagueness analysis; rather, petitioners must show that this perceived danger
of unbridled enforcement stems from an ambiguous provision in the law that allows
enforcement authorities to second-guess if a particular conduct is prohibited or not
prohibited. In this regard, that ambiguous provision of law contravenes due process
because agents of the government cannot reasonably decipher what conduct the law
permits and/or forbids. In Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 51 it was ratiocinated
that:

A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and
juries for resolution on ad hoc and subjective basis, and vague standards result in
erratic and arbitrary application based on individual impressions and personal
predilections.52

As above-mentioned, petitioners fail to point out any ambiguous standard in any of the
provisions of the Curfew Ordinances, but rather, lament the lack of detail on how the
57
age of a suspected minor would be determined. Thus, without any correlation to any
vague legal provision, the Curfew Ordinances cannot be stricken down under the void
for vagueness doctrine.

Besides, petitioners are mistaken in claiming that there are no sufficient standards to
identify suspected curfew violators. While it is true that the Curfew Ordinances do not
explicitly state these parameters, law enforcement agents are still bound to follow the
prescribed measures found in statutory law when implementing ordinances.
Specifically, RA 9344, as amended, provides:

Section 7. Determination of Age. - x x x The age of a child may be determined from the
child's birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the
absence of these documents, age may be based on information from the child
himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of the child and
other relevant evidence. (Emphases supplied)

This provision should be read in conjunction with · the Curfew Ordinances because RA
10630 (the law that amended RA 9344) repeals all ordinances inconsistent with
statutory law.53 Pursuant to Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630,54
minors caught in violation of curfew ordinances are children at risk and, therefore,
covered by its provisions.55 It is a long-standing principle that "[c]onformity with law is
one of the essential requisites for the validity of a municipal ordinance."56 Hence, by
necessary implication, ordinances should be read and implemented in conjunction with
related statutory law.

Applying the foregoing, any person, such as petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo, who was
perceived to be a minor violating the curfew, may therefore prove that he is beyond the
application of the Curfew Ordinances by simply presenting any competent proof of
58
identification establishing their majority age. In the absence of such proof, the law
authorizes enforcement authorities to conduct a visual assessment of the suspect,
which - needless to state - should be done ethically and judiciously under the
circumstances. Should law enforcers disregard these rules, the remedy is to pursue
the appropriate action against the erring enforcing authority, and not to have the
ordinances invalidated.

All told, petitioners' prayer to declare the Curfew Ordinances as void for vagueness is
denied.

B. Right of Parents to Rear their

Children.

Petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because they
deprive parents of their natural and primary right in the rearing of the youth without
substantive due process. In this regard, they assert that this right includes the right to
determine whether minors will be required to go home at a certain time or will be
allowed to stay late outdoors. Given that the right to impose curfews is primarily with
parents and not with the State, the latter's interest in imposing curfews cannot logically
be compelling.57

Petitioners' stance cannot be sustained.

Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution articulates the State's policy relative to
the rights of parents in the rearing of their children:

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect
59
the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

As may be gleaned from this provision, the rearing of children (i.e., referred to as the
"youth") for civic efficiency and the development of their moral character are
characterized not only as parental rights, but also as parental duties. This means that
parents are not only given the privilege of exercising their authority over their children;
they are equally obliged to exercise this authority conscientiously. The duty aspect of
this provision is a reflection of the State's independent interest to ensure that the youth
would eventually grow into free, independent, and well-developed citizens of this
nation. For indeed, it is during childhood that minors are prepared for additional
obligations to society. "[T]he duty to prepare the child for these [obligations] must be
read to include the inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of
good citizenship."58 "This affirmative process of teaching, guiding, and inspiring by
precept and example is essential to the growth of young people into mature, socially
responsible citizens."59

By history and tradition, "the parental role implies a substantial measure of authority
over one's children."60 In Ginsberg v. New York,61 the Supreme Court of the United
States (US) remarked that "constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized
that the parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their
children is basic in the structure of our society."62 As in our Constitution, the right and
duty of parents to rear their children is not only described as "natural," but also as
"primary." The qualifier "primary" connotes the parents' superior right over the State in
the upbringing of their children.63 The rationale for the State's deference to parental

60
control over their children was explained by the US Supreme Court in Bellotti v. Baird
(Bellotti),64 as follows:

[T]he guiding role of parents in their upbringing of their children justifies limitations on
the freedoms of minors. The State commonly protects its youth from adverse
governmental action and from their own immaturity by requiring parental consent to or
involvement in important decisions by minors. But an additional and more important
justification for state deference to parental control over children is that "the child is not
[a) mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations."65 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, it should be stressed that "when
actions concerning the child have a relation to the public welfare or the well-being of
the child, the [Sltate may act to promote these legitimate interests."66 Thus, "[i]n cases
in which harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to public safety, peace,
order, or welfare is demonstrated, these legitimate state interests may override the
parents' qualified right to control the upbringing of their children."67

As our Constitution itself provides, the State is mandated to support parents in the
exercise of these rights and duties. State authority is therefore, not exclusive of, but
rather, complementary to parental supervision. In Nery v. Lorenzo,68 this Court
acknowledged the State's role as parens patriae in protecting minors, viz. :

[Where minors are involved, the State acts as parens patriae. To it is cast the duty of
protecting the rights of persons or individual who because of age or incapacity are in
an unfavorable position, vis-a-vis other parties. Unable as they are to take due care of
what concerns them, they have the political community to look after their welfare. This
61
obligation the state must live up to. It cannot be recreant to such a trust. As was set
forth in an opinion of the United States Supreme Court: "This prerogative of parens
patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, x x x."69 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)

As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right and duty to aid parents in the moral
development of their children,70 and, thus, assumes a supporting role for parents to
fulfill their parental obligations. In Bellotti, it was held that "[I]egal restriction on minors,
especially those supportive of the parental role, may be important to the child's
chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a free
society meaningful and rewarding. Under the Constitution, the State can properly
conclude that parents and others, teachers for example, who have the primary
responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to the support of the laws designed
to aid discharge of that responsibility."71

The Curfew Ordinances are but examples of legal restrictions designed to aid parents
in their role of promoting their children's well-being. As will be later discussed at greater
length, these ordinances further compelling State interests (particularly, the promotion
of juvenile safety and the prevention of juvenile crime), which necessarily entail
limitations on the primary right of parents to rear their children. Minors, because of their
peculiar vulnerability and lack of experience, are not only more exposed to potential
physical harm by criminal elements that operate during the night; their moral well-being
is likewise imperiled as minor children are prone to making detrimental decisions
during this time.72

At this juncture, it should be emphasized that the Curfew Ordinances apply only when
the minors are not - whether actually or constructively (as will be later discussed) -
accompanied by their parents. This serves as an explicit recognition of the State's
62
deference to the primary nature of parental authority and the importance of parents'
role in child-rearing. Parents are effectively given unfettered authority over their
children's conduct during curfew hours when they are able to supervise them. Thus, in
all actuality, the only aspect of parenting that the Curfew Ordinances affects is the
parents' prerogative to allow minors to remain in public places without parental
accompaniment during the curfew hours. 73 In this respect, the ordinances neither
dictate an over-all plan of discipline for the parents to apply to their minors nor force
parents to abdicate their authority to influence or control their minors' activities.74 As
such, the Curfew Ordinances only amount to a minimal - albeit reasonable -
infringement upon a parent's right to bring up his or her child.

Finally, it may be well to point out that the Curfew Ordinances positively influence
children to spend more time at home. Consequently, this situation provides parents
with better opportunities to take a more active role in their children's upbringing. In
Schleifer v. City of Charlottesvillle (Schleifer),75 the US court observed that the city
government "was entitled to believe x x x that a nocturnal curfew would promote
parental involvement in a child's upbringing. A curfew aids the efforts of parents who
desire to protect their children from the perils of the street but are unable to control the
nocturnal behavior of those children."76 Curfews may also aid the "efforts of parents
who prefer their children to spend time on their studies than on the streets."77 Reason
dictates that these realities observed in Schleifer are no less applicable to our local
context. Hence, these are additional reasons which justify the impact of the nocturnal
curfews on parental rights.

In fine, the Curfew Ordinances should not be declared unconstitutional for violating the
parents' right to rear their children.

C. Right to Travel.
63
Petitioners further assail the constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances based on the
minors' right to travel. They claim that the liberty to travel is a fundamental right, which,
therefore, necessitates the application of the strict scrutiny test. Further, they submit
that even if there exists a compelling State interest, such as the prevention of juvenile
crime and the protection of minors from crime, there are other less restrictive means for
achieving the government's interest.78 In addition, they posit that the Curfew
Ordinances suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of
minors during curfew hours.79

Petitioner's submissions are partly meritorious.

At the outset, the Court rejects petitioners' invocation of the overbreadth doctrine,
considering that petitioners have not claimed any transgression of their rights to free
speech or any inhibition of speech-related conduct. In Southern Hemisphere
Engagement Network, Inc. v. AntiTerrorism Council(Southern Hemisphere),80 this
Court explained that "the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial
kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only
to free speech cases,"81 viz.:

By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of
invalidation in order to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost always under
situations not before the court, that are impermissibly swept by the substantially
overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for
being substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as applied to the
litigants.

64
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception
to some of the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant
claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails,
the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its
improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not
permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can only assert their own interests. In
overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights
of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as
applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly
authorized court construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart
from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of
the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court
assumes that an overbroad law's "very existence may cause others not before the
court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression." An overbreadth
ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third
parties.82 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In the same case, it was further pointed out that "[i]n restricting the overbreadth
doctrine to free speech claims, the Court, in at least two [(2)] cases, observed that the
US Supreme Court has not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited
context of the First Amendment,83 and that claims of facial overbreadth have been
entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only
spoken words. In Virginia v. Hicks,84 it was held that rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth
challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is not specifically addressed to
speech or speech-related conduct. Attacks on overly broad statutes are justified by the
'transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression. "'85

65
In the more recent case of SpousesImbong v. Ochoa, Jr.,86 it was opined that "[f]acial
challenges can only be raised on the basis of overbreadth and not on vagueness.
Southern Hemisphere demonstrated how vagueness relates to violations of due
process rights, whereas facial challenges are raised on the basis of overbreadth and
limited to the realm of freedom of expression."87

That being said, this Court finds it improper to undertake an overbreadth analysis in
this case, there being no claimed curtailment of free speech. On the contrary, however,
this Court finds proper to examine the assailed regulations under the strict scrutiny
test.

The right to travel is recognized and guaranteed as a fundamental right88 under

Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:

Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed
by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the
right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or
public health, as may be provided by law. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Jurisprudence provides that this right refers to the right to move freely from the
Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines.89 It is a right embraced within
the general concept of liberty.90 Liberty - a birthright of every person - includes the
power of locomotion91 and the right of citizens to be free to use their faculties in lawful
ways and to live and work where they desire or where they can best pursue the ends
of life.92

The right to travel is essential as it enables individuals to access and exercise their
other rights, such as the rights to education, free expression, assembly, association,
66
and religion.93 The inter-relation of the right to travel with other fundamental rights was
briefly rationalized in City of Maquoketa v. Russell,94 as follows:

Whenever the First Amendment rights of freedom of religion, speech, assembly, and
association require one to move about, such movement must necessarily be protected
under the First Amendment.

Restricting movement in those circumstances to the extent that First Amendment

Rights cannot be exercised without violating the law is equivalent to a denial of those
rights. One court has eloquently pointed this out:

We would not deny the relatedness of the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment to
freedom of travel and movement. If, for any reason, people cannot walk or drive to their
church, their freedom to worship is impaired. If, for any reason, people cannot walk or
drive to the meeting hall, freedom of assembly is effectively blocked. If, for any reason,
people cannot safely walk the sidewalks or drive the streets of a community,
opportunities for freedom of speech are sharply limited. Freedom of movement is
inextricably involved with freedoms set forth in the First Amendment. (Emphases
supplied)

Nevertheless, grave and overriding considerations of public interest justify restrictions

even if made against fundamental rights. Specifically on the freedom to move from one
place to another, jurisprudence provides that this right is not absolute.95 As the 1987
Constitution itself reads, the State96 may impose limitations on the exercise of this
right, provided that they: (1) serve the interest of national security, public safety, or
public health; and (2) are provided by law.97

67
The stated purposes of the Curfew Ordinances, specifically the promotion of juvenile
safety and prevention of juvenile crime, inarguably serve the interest of public safety.
The restriction on the minor's movement and activities within the confines of their
residences and their immediate vicinity during the curfew period is perceived to reduce
the probability of the minor becoming victims of or getting involved in crimes and
criminal activities. As to the second requirement, i.e., that the limitation "be provided by
law," our legal system is replete with laws emphasizing the State's duty to afford
special protection to children, i.e., RA 7610,98 as amended, RA 977599 RA 9262100
RA 9851101RA 9344102 RA 10364103 RA 9211104 RA8980,105 RA9288,106 and
Presidential Decree (PD) 603,107 as amended.

Particularly relevant to this case is Article 139 of PD 603, which explicitly authorizes
local government units, through their city or municipal councils, to set curfew hours for
children. It reads:

Article 139. Curfew Hours for Children. - City or municipal councils may prescribe such
curfew hours for children as may be warranted by local conditions. The duty to enforce
curfew ordinances shall devolve upon the parents or guardians and the local
authorities.

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As explicitly worded, city councils are authorized to enact curfew ordinances (as what
respondents have done in this case) and enforce the same through their local officials.
In other words, PD 603 provides sufficient statutory basis - as required by the
Constitution - to restrict the minors' exercise of the right to travel.

68
The restrictions set by the Curfew Ordinances that apply solely to minors are likewise
constitutionally permissible. In this relation, this Court recognizes that minors do
possess and enjoy constitutional rights,108 but the exercise of these rights is not co-
extensive as those of adults.109 They are always subject to the authority or custody of
another, such as their parent/s and/or guardian/s, and the State.110 As parens patriae,
the State regulates and, to a certain extent, restricts the minors' exercise of their rights,
such as in their affairs concerning the right to vote,111 the right to execute
contracts,112 and the right to engage in gainful employment.113 With respect to the
right to travel, minors are required by law to obtain a clearance from the Department of
Social Welfare and Development before they can travel to a foreign country by
themselves or with a person other than their parents.114 These limitations
demonstrate that the State has broader authority over the minors' activities than over
similar actions of adults,115 and overall, reflect the State's general interest in the well-
being of minors.116 Thus, the State may impose limitations on the minors' exercise of
rights even though these limitations do not generally apply to adults.

In Bellotti,117the US Supreme Court identified three (3) justifications for the differential
treatment of the minors' constitutional rights. These are: first, the peculiar vulnerability
of children; second, their inability to make critical decisions in an informed and mature
manner; and third, the importance of the parental role in child rearing:118

[On the first reason,] our cases show that although children generally are protected by
the same constitutional guarantees against governmental deprivations as are adults,
the State is entitled to adjust its legal system to account for children's vulnerability and
their needs for 'concern, ... sympathy, and ... paternal attention.x x x.

[On the second reason, this Court's rulings are] grounded [on] the recognition that,
during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the
69
experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be
detrimental to them. x x x.

xxxx

[On the third reason,] the guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their children
justifies limitations on the freedoms of minors. The State commonly protects its youth
from adverse governmental action and from their own immaturity by requiring parental
consent to or involvement in important decisions by minors. x x x.

xxxx

x x x Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may
be important to the child's chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual
participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding.119 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)

Moreover, in Prince v. Massachusetts,120 the US Supreme Court acknowledged the

heightened dangers on the streets to minors, as compared to adults:

A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth
of young people into full maturity as citizens, with all that implies. It may secure this
against impeding restraints and dangers within a broad range of selection. Among evils
most appropriate for such action are the crippling effects of child employment, more
especially in public places, and the possible harms arising from other activities subject
to all the diverse influences of the [streets]. It is too late now to doubt that legislation
appropriately designed to reach such evils is within the state's police power, whether

70
against the parent's claim to control of the child or one that religious scruples dictate
contrary action.

It is true children have rights, in common with older people, in the primary use of
highways. But even in such use streets afford dangers for them not affecting adults.
And in other uses, whether in work or in other things, this difference may be
magnified.121 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

For these reasons, the State is justified in setting restrictions on the minors' exercise of
their travel rights, provided, they are singled out on reasonable grounds.

Philippine jurisprudence has developed three (3) tests of judicial scrutiny to determine
the reasonableness of classifications.122 The strict scrutiny test applies when a
classification either (i) interferes with the exercise of fundamental rights, including the
basic liberties guaranteed under the Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect classes.123
The intermediate scrutiny test applies when a classification does not involve suspect
classes or fundamental rights, but requires heightened scrutiny, such as in
classifications based on gender and legitimacy.124 Lastly, the rational basis test
applies to all other subjects not covered by the first two tests.125

Considering that the right to travel is a fundamental right in our legal system
guaranteed no less by our Constitution, the strict scrutiny test126 is the applicable
test.127 At this juncture, it should be emphasized that minors enjoy the same
constitutional rights as adults; the fact that the State has broader authority over minors
than over adults does not trigger the application of a lower level of scrutiny.128 In
Nunez v. City of San Diego (Nunez),129 the US court illumined that:

71
Although many federal courts have recognized that juvenile curfews implicate the
fundamental rights of minors, the parties dispute whether strict scrutiny review is
necessary. The Supreme Court teaches that rights are no less "fundamental" for
minors than adults, but that the analysis of those rights may differ:

Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one
attains the state-defined age of majority.1âwphi1 Minors, as well as adults, are
protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights. The Court[,] indeed,
however, [has long] recognized that the State has somewhat broader authority to
regulate the activities of children than of adults. xxx. Thus, minors' rights are not
coextensive with the rights of adults because the state has a greater range of interests
that justify the infringement of minors' rights.

The Supreme Court has articulated three specific factors that, when applicable,
warrant differential analysis of the constitutional rights of minors and adults: x x x. The
Bellotti test [however] does not establish a lower level of scrutiny for the constitutional
rights of minors in the context of a juvenile curfew. Rather, the Bellotti framework
enables courts to determine whether the state has a compelling state interest justifying
greater restrictions on minors than on adults. x x x.

x x x Although the state may have a compelling interest in regulating minors differently
than adults, we do not believe that [a] lesser degree of scrutiny is appropriate to review
burdens on minors' fundamental rights. x x x.

According, we apply strict scrutiny to our review of the ordinance. x x x.130 (Emphases
supplied)

72
The strict scrutiny test as applied to minors entails a consideration of the peculiar
circumstances of minors as enumerated in Bellotti vis-a-vis the State's duty as
parenspatriae to protect and preserve their well-being with the compelling State
interests justifying the assailed government act. Under the strict scrutiny test, a
legislative classification that interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or
operates to the disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional.131
Thus, the government has the burden of proving that the classification (1) is necessary
to achieve a compelling State interest, and (i1) is the least restrictive means to protect
such interest or the means chosen is narrowly tailored to accomplish the interest.132

a. Compelling State Interest.

Jurisprudence holds that compelling State interests include constitutionally declared

policies.133 This Court has ruled that children's welfare and the State's mandate to
protect and care for them as parenspatriae constitute compelling interests to justify
regulations by the State.134 It is akin to the paramount interest of the state for which
some individual liberties must give way.135 As explained in Nunez, the Bellotti
framework shows that the State has a compelling interest in imposing greater
restrictions on minors than on adults. The limitations on minors under Philippine laws
also highlight this compelling interest of the State to protect and care for their welfare.

In this case, respondents have sufficiently established that the ultimate objective of the
Curfew Ordinances is to keep unsupervised minors during the late hours of night time
off of public areas, so as to reduce - if not totally eliminate - their exposure to potential
harm, and to insulate them against criminal pressure and influences which may even
include themselves. As denoted in the "whereas clauses" of the Quezon City
Ordinance, the State, in imposing nocturnal curfews on minors, recognizes that:

73
[b] x x x children, particularly the minors, appear to be neglected of their proper care
and guidance, education, and moral development, which [lead] them into exploitation,
drug addiction, and become vulnerable to and at the risk of committing criminal
offenses;

xxxx

[d] as a consequence, most of minor children become out-of-school youth,

unproductive by-standers, street children, and member of notorious gangs who stay,
roam around or meander in public or private roads, streets or other public places,
whether singly or in groups without lawful purpose or justification;

xxxx

[f] reports of barangay officials and law enforcement agencies reveal that minor
children roaming around, loitering or wandering in the evening are the frequent
personalities involved in various infractions of city ordinances and national laws;

[g] it is necessary in the interest of public order and safety to regulate the movement of
minor children during night time by setting disciplinary hours, protect them from
neglect, abuse or cruelty and exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial or
detrimental to their development;

[h] to strengthen and support parental control on these minor children, there is a need
to put a restraint on the tendency of growing number of youth spending their nocturnal
activities wastefully, especially in the face of the unabated rise of criminality and to
ensure that the dissident elements of society are not provided with potent avenues for
furthering their nefarious activities[.]136
74
The US court's judicial demeanor in Schleifer,137 as regards the information gathered
by the City Council to support its passage of the curfew ordinance subject of that case,
may serve as a guidepost to our own eatment of the present case. Significantly, in
Schleifer, the US court recognized the entitlement of elected bodies to implement
policies for a safer community, in relation to the proclivity of children to make
dangerous and potentially life-shaping decisions when left unsupervised during the late
hours of night:

Charlottesville was constitutionally justified in believing that its curfew would materially
assist its first stated interest-that of reducing juvenile violence and crime. The City
Council acted on the basis of information from many sources, including records from
Charlottesville's police department, a survey of public opinion, news reports, data from
the United States Department of Justice, national crime reports, and police reports
from other localities. On the basis of such evidence, elected bodies are entitled to
conclude that keeping unsupervised juveniles off the streets late at night will make for
a safer community. The same streets may have a more volatile and less wholesome
character at night than during the day. Alone on the streets at night children face a
series of dangerous and potentially life-shaping decisions. Drug dealers may lure them
to use narcotics or aid in their sale. Gangs may pressure them into membership or
participation in violence. "[D]uring the formative years of childhood and adolescence,
minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid
choices that could be detrimental to them." Those who succumb to these criminal
influences at an early age may persist in their criminal conduct as adults. Whether we
as judges subscribe to these theories is beside the point. Those elected officials with
their finger on the pulse of their home community clearly did. In attempting to reduce
through its curfew the opportunities for children to come into contact with criminal

75
influences, the City was directly advancing its first objective of reducing juvenile
violence and crime.138 (Emphases and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

Similar to the City of Charlottesville in Schleifer, the local governments of Quezon City
and Manila presented statistical data in their respective pleadings showing the
alarming prevalence of crimes involving juveniles, either as victims or perpetrators, in
their respective localities.139

Based on these findings, their city councils found it necessary to enact curfew
ordinances pursuant to their police power under the general welfare clause.140 In this
light, the Court thus finds that the local governments have not only conveyed but, in
fact, attempted to substantiate legitimate concerns on public welfare, especially with
respect to minors. As such, a compelling State interest exists for the enactment and
enforcement of the Curfew Ordinances.

With the first requirement of the strict scrutiny test satisfied, the Court now proceeds to
determine if the restrictions set forth in· the Curfew Ordinances are narrowly tailored or
provide the least restrictive means to address the cited compelling State interest - the
second requirement of the strict scrutiny test.

b. Least Restrictive Means/ Narrowly Drawn.

The second requirement of the strict scrutiny test stems from the fundamental premise
that citizens should not be hampered from pursuing legitimate activities in the exercise
of their constitutional rights. While rights may be restricted, the restrictions must be
minimal or only to the extent necessary to achieve the purpose or to address the
State's compelling interest. When it is possible for governmental regulations to be more

76
narrowly drawn to avoid conflicts with constitutional rights, then they must be so
narrowly drawn. 141

Although treated differently from adults, the foregoing standard applies to regulations
on minors as they are still accorded the freedom to participate in any legitimate activity,
whether it be social, religious, or civic.142 Thus, in the present case, each of the
ordinances must be narrowly tailored as to ensure minimal constraint not only on the
minors' right to travel but also on their other constitutional rights.143

In In Re Mosier,144 a US court declared a curfew ordinance unconstitutional impliedly

for not being narrowly drawn, resulting in unnecessary curtailment of minors' rights to
freely exercise their religion and to free speech.145 It observed that:

The ordinance prohibits the older minor from attending alone Christmas Eve Midnight
Mass at the local Roman Catholic Church or Christmas Eve services at the various
local Protestant Churches. It would likewise prohibit them from attending the New
[Year's] Eve watch services at the various churches. Likewise it would prohibit
grandparents, uncles, aunts or adult brothers and sisters from taking their minor
relatives of any age to the above mentioned services. x x x.

xxxx

Under the ordinance, during nine months of the year a minor could not even attend the
city council meetings if they ran past 10:30 (which they frequently do) to express his
views on the necessity to repeal the curfew ordinance, clearly a deprivation of his First
Amendment right to freedom of speech.

xxxx
77
[In contrast, the ordinance in Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown (supra note 52)] was
[a] very narrowly drawn ordinance of many pages with eleven exceptions and was very
carefully drafted in an attempt to pass constitutional muster. It specifically excepted
[the] exercise of First Amendment rights, travel in a motor vehicle and returning home
by a direct route from religious, school, or voluntary association activities. (Emphases
supplied)

After a thorough evaluation of the ordinances' respective provisions, this Court finds
that only the Quezon City Ordinance meets the above-discussed requirement, while
the Manila and Navotas Ordinances do not.

The Manila Ordinance cites only four (4) exemptions from the coverage of the curfew,
namely: (a) minors accompanied by their parents, family members of legal age, or
guardian; (b) those running lawful errands such as buying of medicines, using of
telecommunication facilities for emergency purposes and the like; (c) night school
students and those who, by virtue of their employment, are required in the streets or
outside their residence after 10:00 p.m.; and (d) those working at night.146

For its part, the Navotas Ordinance provides more exceptions, to wit: (a) minors with
night classes; (b) those working at night; (c) those who attended a school or church
activity, in coordination with a specific barangay office; (d) those traveling towards
home during the curfew hours; (e) those running errands under the supervision of their
parents, guardians, or persons of legal age having authority over them; (j) those
involved in accidents, calamities, and the like. It also exempts minors from the curfew
during these specific occasions: Christmas eve, Christmas day, New Year's eve, New
Year's day, the night before the barangay fiesta, the day of the fiesta, All Saints' and All
Souls' Day, Holy Thursday, Good Friday, Black Saturday, and Easter Sunday.147
78
This Court observes that these two ordinances are not narrowly drawn in that their
exceptions are inadequate and therefore, run the risk of overly restricting the minors'
fundamental freedoms. To be fair, both ordinances protect the rights to education, to
gainful employment, and to travel at night from school or work.148 However, even with
those safeguards, the Navotas Ordinance and, to a greater extent, the Manila
Ordinance still do not account for the reasonable exercise of the minors' rights of
association, free exercise of religion, rights to peaceably assemble, and of free
expression, among others.

The exceptions under the Manila Ordinance are too limited, and thus, unduly trample
upon protected liberties. The Navotas Ordinance is apparently more protective of
constitutional rights than the Manila Ordinance; nonetheless, it still provides insufficient
safeguards as discussed in detail below:

First, although it allows minors to engage in school or church activities, it hinders them
from engaging in legitimate non-school or nonchurch activities in the streets or going to
and from such activities; thus, their freedom of association is effectively curtailed. It
bears stressing that participation in legitimate activities of organizations, other than
school or church, also contributes to the minors' social, emotional, and intellectual
development, yet, such participation is not exempted under the Navotas Ordinance.

Second, although the Navotas Ordinance does not impose the curfew during
Christmas Eve and Christmas day, it effectively prohibits minors from attending
traditional religious activities (such as simbang gabi) at night without accompanying
adults, similar to the scenario depicted in Mosier.149 This legitimate activity done
pursuant to the minors' right to freely exercise their religion is therefore effectively
curtailed.
79
Third, the Navotas Ordinance does not accommodate avenues for minors to engage in
political rallies or attend city council meetings to voice out their concerns in line with
their right to peaceably assemble and to free expression.

Certainly, minors are allowed under the Navotas Ordinance to engage in these
activities outside curfew hours, but the Court finds no reason to prohibit them from
participating in these legitimate activities during curfew hours. Such proscription does
not advance the State's compelling interest to protect minors from the dangers of the
streets at night, such as becoming prey or instruments of criminal activity. These
legitimate activities are merely hindered without any reasonable relation to the State's
interest; hence, the Navotas Ordinance is not narrowly drawn. More so, the Manila
Ordinance, with its limited exceptions, is also not narrowly drawn.

In sum, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances should be completely stricken down since
their exceptions, which are essentially determinative of the scope and breadth of the
curfew regulations, are inadequate to ensure protection of the above-mentioned
fundamental rights. While some provisions may be valid, the same are merely ancillary
thereto; as such, they cannot subsist independently despite the presence150 of any
separability clause.151

The Quezon City Ordinance stands in stark contrast to the first two (2) ordinances as it
sufficiently safeguards the minors' constitutional rights. It provides the following
exceptions:

Section 4. EXEMPTIONS - Minor children under the following circumstances shall not
be covered by the provisions of this ordinance;

80
(a) Those accompanied by their parents or guardian;

(b) Those on their way to or from a party, graduation ceremony, religious mass, and/or
other extra-curricular activities of their school or organization wherein their attendance
are required or otherwise indispensable, or when such minors are out and unable to go
home early due to circumstances beyond their control as verified by the proper
authorities concerned; and

(c) Those attending to, or in experience of, an emergency situation such as

conflagration, earthquake, hospitalization, road accident, law enforcers encounter, and
similar incidents[;]

(d) When the minor is engaged in an authorized employment activity, or going to or

returning home from the same place of employment activity without any detour or stop;

(e) When the minor is in [a] motor vehicle or other travel accompanied by an adult in no
violation of this Ordinance;

(f) When the minor is involved in an emergency;

(g) When the minor is out of his/her residence attending an official school, religious,
recreational, educational, social, community or other similar private activity sponsored
by the city, barangay, school, or other similar private civic/religious organization/group
(recognized by the community) that supervises the activity or when the minor is going
to or returning home from such activity, without any detour or stop; and

81
(h) When the minor can present papers certifying that he/she is a student and was
dismissed from his/her class/es in the evening or that he/she is a working student.152
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)

As compared to the first two (2) ordinances, the list of exceptions under the Quezon
City Ordinance is more narrowly drawn to sufficiently protect the minors' rights of
association, free exercise of religion, travel, to peaceably assemble, and of free
expression.

Specifically, the inclusion of items (b) and (g) in the list of exceptions guarantees the
protection of these aforementioned rights. These items uphold the right of association
by enabling minors to attend both official and extra-curricular activities not only of their
school or church but also of other legitimate organizations. The rights to peaceably
assemble and of free expression are also covered by these items given that the
minors' attendance in the official activities of civic or religious organizations are allowed
during the curfew hours. Unlike in the Navotas Ordinance, the right to the free exercise
of religion is sufficiently safeguarded in the Quezon City Ordinance by exempting
attendance at religious masses even during curfew hours. In relation to their right to
ravel, the ordinance allows the minor-participants to move to and from the places
where these activities are held. Thus, with these numerous exceptions, the Quezon
City Ordinance, in truth, only prohibits unsupervised activities that hardly contribute to
the well-being of minors who publicly loaf and loiter within the locality at a time where
danger is perceivably more prominent.

To note, there is no lack of supervision when a parent duly authorizes his/her minor
child to run lawful errands or engage in legitimate activities during the night,
notwithstanding curfew hours. As astutely observed by Senior Associate Justice
Antonio T. Carpio and Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen during the deliberations
82
on this case, parental permission is implicitly considered as an exception found in
Section 4, item (a) of the Quezon City Ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their
parents or guardian", as accompaniment should be understood not only in its actual
but also in its constructive sense. As the Court sees it, this should be the reasonable
construction of this exception so as to reconcile the juvenile curfew measure with the
basic premise that State interference is not superior but only complementary to
parental supervision. After all, as the Constitution itself prescribes, the parents' right to
rear their children is not only natural but primary.

Ultimately, it is important to highlight that this Court, in passing judgment on these

ordinances, is dealing with the welfare of minors who are presumed by law to be
incapable of giving proper consent due to their incapability to fully understand the
import and consequences of their actions. In one case it was observed that:

A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on the rationale
that she can easily be the victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully understanding or
knowing the nature or import of her actions. The State, as parenspatriae, is under the
obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are as
yet unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its
protection.153

Under our legal system's own recognition of a minor's inherent lack of full rational
capacity, and balancing the same against the State's compelling interest to promote
juvenile safety and prevent juvenile crime, this Court finds that the curfew imposed
under the Quezon City Ordinance is reasonably justified with its narrowly drawn
exceptions and hence, constitutional. Needless to say, these exceptions are in no way
limited or restricted, as the State, in accordance with the lawful exercise of its police
power, is not precluded from crafting, adding, or modifying exceptions in similar
83
laws/ordinances for as long as the regulation, overall, passes the parameters of
scrutiny as applied in this case.

D. Penal Provisions of the Manila Ordinance.

Going back to the Manila Ordinance, this Court deems it proper - as it was raised - to
further discuss the validity of its penal provisions in relation to RA 9344, as amended.

To recount, the Quezon City Ordinance, while penalizing the parent/s or guardian
under Section 8 thereof,154 does not impose any penalty on the minors. For its part,
the Navotas Ordinance requires the minor, along with his or her parent/s or guardian/s,
to render social civic duty and community service either in lieu of - should the parent/s
or guardian/s of the minor be unable to pay the fine imposed - or in addition to the fine
imposed therein.155 Meanwhile, the Manila Ordinance imposed various sanctions to
the minor based on the age and frequency of violations, to wit:

SEC. 4. Sanctions and Penalties for Violation. Any child or youth violating this
ordinance shall be sanctioned/punished as follows:

(a) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and below, the sanction shall consist of a
REPRIMAND for the youth offender and ADMONITION to the offender's parent,
guardian or person exercising parental authority.

(b) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and under Eighteen (18) years of age,
the sanction/penalty shall be:

1. For the FIRST OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition;

84
2. For the SECOND OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition, and a warning about the
legal impostitions in case of a third and subsequent violation; and

3. For the THIRD AND SUBSEQUENT OFFENSES, Imprisonment of one (1) day to
ten (10) days, or a Fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (Php2,000.00), or both at the
discretion of the Court, PROVIDED, That the complaint shall be filed by the
PunongBarangay with the office of the City Prosecutor.156 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied).

Thus springs the question of whether local governments could validly impose on
minors these sanctions - i.e., (a) community . service; (b) reprimand and admonition;
(c) fine; and (d) imprisonment. Pertinently, Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344, as
amended, prohibit the imposition of penalties on minors for status offenses such as
curfew violations, viz.:

SEC. 57. Status Offenses. - Any conduct not considered an offense or not penalized if
committed by an adult shall not be considered an offense and shall not be punished if
committed by a child.

SEC. 57-A. Violations of Local Ordinances. - Ordinances enacted by local

governments concerning juvenile status offenses such as but not limited to, curfew
violations, truancy, parental disobedience, anti-smoking and anti-drinking laws, as well
as light offenses and misdemeanors against public order or safety such as, but not
limited to, disorderly conduct, public scandal, harassment, drunkenness, public
intoxication, criminal nuisance, vandalism, gambling, mendicancy, littering, public
urination, and trespassing, shall be for the protection of children. No penalty shall be
imposed on children for said violations, and they shall instead be brought to their
residence or to any barangay official at the barangay hall to be released to the custody
85
of their parents. Appropriate intervention programs shall be provided for in such
ordinances. The child shall also be recorded as a "child at risk" and not as a "child in
conflict with the law." The ordinance shall also provide for intervention programs, such
as counseling, attendance in group activities for children, and for the parents,
attendance in parenting education seminars. (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)

To clarify, these provisions do not prohibit the enactment of regulations that curtail the
conduct of minors, when the similar conduct of adults are not considered as an offense
or penalized (i.e., status offenses). Instead, what they prohibit is the imposition of
penalties on minors for violations of these regulations. Consequently, the enactment of
curfew ordinances on minors, without penalizing them for violations thereof, is not
violative of Section 57-A.

"Penalty"157 is defined as "[p]unishment imposed on a wrongdoer usually in the form

of imprisonment or fine";158 "[p ]unishment imposed by lawful authority upon a person
who commits a deliberate or negligent act."159 Punishment, in tum, is defined as "[a]
sanction - such as fine, penalty, confinement, or loss of property, right, or privilege -
assessed against a person who has violated the law."160

The provisions of RA 9344, as amended, should not be read to mean that all the
actions of the minor in violation of the regulations are without legal consequences.
Section 57-A thereof empowers local governments to adopt appropriate intervention
programs, such as community-based programs161 recognized under Section 54162 of
the same law.

In this regard, requiring the minor to perform community service is a valid form of
intervention program that a local government (such as Navotas City in this case) could
appropriately adopt in an ordinance to promote the welfare of minors. For one, the
86
community service programs provide minors an alternative mode of rehabilitation as
they promote accountability for their delinquent acts without the moral and social
stigma caused by jail detention.

In the same light, these programs help inculcate discipline and compliance with the law
and legal orders. More importantly, they give them the opportunity to become
productive members of society and thereby promote their integration to and solidarity
with their community.

The sanction of admonition imposed by the City of Manila is likewise consistent with
Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344 as it is merely a formal way of giving warnings and
expressing disapproval to the minor's misdemeanor. Admonition is generally defined
as a "gentle or friendly reproof' or "counsel or warning against fault or oversight."163
The Black's Law Dictionary defines admonition as "[a]n authoritatively issued warning
or censure";164 while the Philippine Law Dictionary defines it as a "gentle or friendly
reproof, a mild rebuke, warning or reminder, [counseling], on a fault, error or oversight,
an expression of authoritative advice or warning."165 Notably, the Revised Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS) and our jurisprudence in
administrative cases explicitly declare that "a warning or admonition shall not be
considered a penalty."166

In other words, the disciplinary measures of community-based programs and

admonition are clearly not penalties - as they are not punitive in nature - and are
generally less intrusive on the rights and conduct of the minor. To be clear, their
objectives are to formally inform and educate the minor, and for the latter to
understand, what actions must be avoided so as to aid him in his future conduct.

87
A different conclusion, however, is reached with regard to reprimand and fines and/or
imprisonment imposed by the City of Manila on the minor. Reprimand is generally
defined as "a severe or formal reproof."167 The Black's Law Dictionary defines it as "a
mild form of lawyer discipline that does not restrict the lawyer's ability to practice
law";168 while the Philippine Law Dictionary defines it as a "public and formal censure
or severe reproof, administered to a person in fault by his superior officer or body to
which he belongs. It is more than just a warning or admonition."169 In other words,
reprimand is a formal and public pronouncement made to denounce the error or
violation committed, to sharply criticize and rebuke the erring individual, and to sternly
warn the erring individual including the public against repeating or committing the
same, and thus, may unwittingly subject the erring individual or violator to unwarranted
censure or sharp disapproval from others. In fact, the RRACCS and our jurisprudence
explicitly indicate that reprimand is a penalty,170 hence, prohibited by Section 57-A of
RA 9344, as amended.

Fines and/or imprisonment, on the other hand, undeniably constitute penalties - as

provided in our various criminal and administrative laws and jurisprudence - that
Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, evidently prohibits.

As worded, the prohibition in Section 57-A is clear, categorical, and unambiguous. It

states that "[n]o penalty shall be imposed on children for x x x violations [of] juvenile
status offenses]." Thus, for imposing the sanctions of reprimand, fine, and/or
imprisonment on minors for curfew violations, portions of Section 4 of the Manila
Ordinance directly and irreconcilably conflict with the clear language of Section 57-A of
RA 9344, as amended, and hence, invalid. On the other hand, the impositions of
community service programs and admonition on the minors are allowed as they do not
constitute penalties.

88
CONCLUSION

In sum, while the Court finds that all three Curfew Ordinances have passed the first
prong of the strict scrutiny test - that is, that the State has sufficiently shown a
compelling interest to promote juvenile safety and prevent juvenile crime in the
concerned localities, only the Quezon City Ordinance has passed the second prong of
the strict scrutiny test, as it is the only issuance out of the three which provides for the
least restrictive means to achieve this interest. In particular, the Quezon City
Ordinance provides for adequate exceptions that enable minors to freely exercise their
fundamental rights during the prescribed curfew hours, and therefore, narrowly drawn
to achieve the State's purpose. Section 4 (a) of the said ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose
accompanied by their parents or guardian", has also been construed to include
parental permission as a constructive form of accompaniment and hence, an allowable
exception to the curfew measure; the manner of enforcement, however, is left to the
discretion of the local government unit.

In fine, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances are declared unconstitutional and thus, null
and void, while the Quezon City Ordinance is declared as constitutional and thus, valid
in accordance with this Decision.

For another, the Court has determined that the Manila Ordinance's penal provisions
imposing reprimand and fines/imprisonment on minors conflict with Section 57-A of RA
9344, as amended. Hence, following the rule that ordinances should always conform
with the law, these provisions must be struck down as invalid.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLYGRANTED. The Court hereby declares

Ordinance No. 8046, issued by the local government of the City of Manila, and
Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. No. 99-02, as amended by Pambayang Ordinansa Blg.
89
2002-13 issued by the local government of Navotas City, UNCONSTITUTIONAL and,
thus, NULL and VOID; while Ordinance No. SP-2301, Series of 2014, issued by the
local government of the Quezon City is declared CONSTITUTIONAL and, thus, VALID
in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

90
91
G.R. No. 227670 -ALYANSA PARA SA BAGONG PILIPINAS, INC. (ABP),
represented by Evelyn v. Jallorina and Noel Villones, Petitioner, v. ENERGY
REGULATORY COMMISSION, represented by its Chairman JOSE VICENTE B.
SALAZAR, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, represented by Secretary ALFONSO G.
CUSI, MERALCO, CENTRAL LUZON PREMIERE POWER CORPORATION, ST.
RAPHAEL POWER GENERATION CORPORATION, PANAY ENERGY
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, MARIVELES POWER GENERATION
CORPORATION, GLOBAL LUZON ENERGY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
ATIMONAN ONE ENERGY, INC., REDONDO PENINSULA ENERGY, INC., and
PHILIPPINE COMPETITION COMMISSION, Respondents. Promulgated: Mly3,
2019 ~ x----------------------------------------------~-----------------x

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: I concur with the

ponencia to the extent that the respondent Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC)
gravely abused its discretion when it issued ERC Resolution No. 01, Series of 2016, 1
which "restated" the date of effectivity of ERC Resolution No. 13, Series of 2015,2
entitled "A Resolution Directing All Distribution Utilities (DUs) to Conduct a Competitive
Selection Process [(CSP)] in the Procurement of their Supply to the Captive Market."3
As will be herein discussed, absent the approval of and coordination with the
Department of Energy (DOE), the ERC cannot suspend the effectivity of the CSP,
which process was originally mandated under DOE Department Circular No. DC2015-
06-0008, 4 entitled "Mandating All Distribution Utilities to Undergo Competitive
Selection Process (CSP) in Securing Power Supply Agreements (PSA)" (DOE
Circular). However, as will be elaborated upon below, I qualify my concurrence in that:
(a) only ERC Resolution No. 01, Series of 2016 - and not the first paragraph of
Section 4 ofERC Resolution No. 13, Series of2015 - should be declared null and void;
and (b) pursuant to the doctrine of operative fact, the effects of the PSAs already
approved prior to the invalidity of ERC Resolution No. 01, Series of 2016,
92
notwithstanding their CSP non-compliance, should be recognized. As backgrounder,
the CSP is essentially a regulation on the "procurement of PSAs by the DUs [to
ensure] security and certainty of Entitled "A RESOLUTION CLARIFYING THE
EFFECTIVITY OF ERC RESOLUTION No. 13, SERIES OF 2015,,, issued on March
15, 2016. Issued on October 20, 2015. See ponencia, pp. 12-13. Issued on June 11,
2015. ~

electricity prices of electric power to end-users in the long term."5 As presently defined
in DOE Department Circular No. DC2018-02-00036 issued on February 1, 2018:7 3.8.
"Competitive Selection Process" or "CSP" refers to the process wherein a Generation
Company or, in the case of off-grid areas, New Power Provider, is awarded to supply
electric power requirements of a DU through transparent and competitive bidding
undertaken by a DU or by Aggregated DUs to secure supply of electricity based on the
evaluation of criteria adopted by the DUs in accordance with the requirements of this
Policy. For purposes of, and throughout the Policy, the terms "Competitive Bidding"
and "CSP" shall have the same meaning and shall be used interchangeably. The CSP
traces its roots to the policies mandated under Republic Act No. 9136,8 otherwise
known as the "Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001" (EPIRA ). Under the
EPIRA, both the DOE and the ERC are authorized by law to issue and implement the
proper rules in order to - among other policy objectives -"ensure transparent and
reasonable prices of electricity in a regime of free and fair competition and full public
accountability to achieve greater operational and economic efficiency and enhance the
competitiveness of Philippine products in the global market. "9 In particular, the DOE is
tasked to formulate the rules "necessary to implement the objectives of [EPIRA],"10
whereas "[p ]ursuant to Sections 43 and 45 of the [EPIRA], the ERC shall promulgate
such rules and regulations as authorized thereby, including but not limited to
Competition Rules and limitations on recovery of system losses xx x."11 As headlined
in this case, the inaugural issuance meant to put the CSP in force is DOE Department
93
Circular No. DC2015-06-0008, issued in June 2015. Section 3 thereof pertinently
states that "[a]fter the effectivity of this circular [(which was on June 30, 2015 following
its publication12)], all DUs shall procure PSAs only through CSP conducted through a
Third Party duly recognized by the ERC and the DOE."13 In this regard, the same
section provides that "[w]ithin one hundred twenty (120) days from the effectivity of this
Circular, the ERC and DOE shall jointly issue the guidelines and procedures for the
aggregation of the [uncontracted] demand requirements of the DUs and the process of
recognition or accreditation of the Third Party that conducts the CSP xx x."14 6 DOE
Circular, Section I. Entitled "ADOPTING AND PRESCRIBING THE POLICY FOR THE
COMPETITIVE SELECTION PROCESS IN THE PROCUREMENT BY THE
DISTRIBUTION UTILITIES OF POWER SUPPLY AGREEMENT FOR THE CAPTIVE
MARKET." Section 3.8 of Depaitment of Energy Circular No. DC2018-02-0003, Annex
"A". Entitled "AN ACT ORDAINING REFORMS IN THE ELECTRIC POWER
INDUSTRY, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE CERTAIN LAWS AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES," approved on June 8, 2001. 9 EPIRA, Chapter l, Section 2 (c); emphasis
and underscoring supplied. 10 EPIRA, Chapter lll, Section 37 (p). 11 Section 4 (b ),
Rule 3 of the EPIRA IRR. 12 See ponencia, p. 5. 13 Emphases supplied. 14
Emphases and underscoring supplied. ~

Related thereto, Section 415 of DOE Department Circular No. DC2015-06-0008

confers unto the ERC the power to issue supplemental guidelines and procedures to
properly guide the DUs and the Third Party in the design and execution of the CSP.
Section 4, however, makes clear that still, the ERC shall exercise such power "upon its
determination and in coordination with the DOE."16 In addition, Section 617 of the
DOE Circular also provides that monitoring of the compliance with the conditions of the
CSPs will be exercised jointly by both the DOE and the ERC. Based on the foregoing,
it is therefore apparent that DOE Circular No. DC2015-06-0008 provides for the
adoption of the CSP, but leaves the issuance of supplemental guidelines and
94
procedures for its design and execution to the ERC after it has coordinated with the
DOE. On October 20, 2015, or within one hundred twenty (120) days from the
effectivity of the DOE Circular, the DOE and ERC issued Joint Resolution No. 1, which
provides that the ERC, by agreement of the DOE and the ERC, "shall issue the
appropriate regulations to implement the [CSPJ."18 Given (1) the rule-making authority
of the DOE and the ERC under the EPIRA, and (2) the circumstantial trajectory of the
issuances on the CSP, it is thus fairly apparent that the term "appropriate regulations"
under Section 1 of Joint Resolution No. 1 should only pertain to the supplemental
guidelines and procedures for the design and execution of the CSP19 that the ERC is
empowered to issue in coordination with the DOE. To my mind, Section 1 should not
be construed as a blanket grant of authority by the DOE to the ERC to issue whatever
guidelines the latter deems fit for the implementation of the CSP. To adopt this latter
view would be tantamount to an isolated reading of a provision that is impervious to
the context under which it was formulated. Worse, this construction tends to effectively
undermine the DOE 's role in the process of promulgating rules to advance the EPIRA
's policy objectives on fair competition. In fact, it deserves pointing out that the ERC
issued Resolution No. 13, Series of 2015 on the same day (i.e., October 20, 2015) that
Joint Resolution No. 1 was passed. To recall, ERC Resolution No. 13, Series of 2015
is the resolution whose effectivity was "restated" by the assailed issuance herein, ERC
Resolution No. 01, Series of 2016. In the "whereas clauses" of ERC Resolution No. 13,
Series of 2015, DOE Circular No. DC2015-06-0008, which had originally set the
parameters of authority of the 15 Repealed under Section 16. I of DOE Depm1ment
Circular No. DC2018-02-0003. 16 Underscoring supplied. 17 Section 6. Monitoring,
Enforcement and Compliance. The DOE through the Electric Power Industry
Management Bureau (EPIMB), together with the ERC, shall monitor compliance with
the conditions of the CSPs and the compliance with the provisions of PS As. 18 Joint
Resolution No. l, Section l; emphasis and underscoring supplied. 19 Notably, however,

95
as discussed in the ponencia, this authority has already been revoked under DOE
Circular No. DC2018-02-0003; seep. 36 of the ponencia. ~

DOE and the ERC anent the implementation of the CSP, was explicitly recognized,
viz.: WHEREAS, on June 11, 2015, the Department of Energy (DOE) issued
Department Circular No. [DC2015-06-0008], Mandating All Distribution Utilities to
Undergo Competitive Selection Process (CSP) in Securing Power Supply Agreements
(PSA); WHEREAS, on October 20, 2015, the DOE and the ERC approved the
issuance of a Joint Resolution embodying their agreement on the CSP, particularly,
that the ERC shall issue the appropriate regulations requiring the DUs to undertake a
CSP for the PSAs they will enter into for the supply to their captive market; WHEREAS,
the ERC and the DOE are convinced that there is an advantage to be gained by
having a CSP in place, in terms of ensuring transparency in the DUs' supply
procurement and providing opportunities to elicit the best price offers and other PSA
terms and conditions from suppliers; xx xx As per its terms, ERC Resolution No. 13,
Series of 2015 not only sets the guidelines for the design and execution of the CSP,
but also clearly supplements DOE Department Circular No. DC2015-06-0008. Thus, it
stands to reason that ERC Resolution No. 13, Series of 2015 is the embodiment of the
phrase "appropriate regulations" contemplated under the Joint Resolution issued by
both agencies to implement the CSP. In this case, it is apparent that both the DOE
and the ERC are intent on implementing the CSP. DOE Department Circular No.
DC2015-06-0008 already mandated that upon its effectivity on June 30, 2015, all DUs
shall procure PSAs only through the CSP. However, as noted in the ponencia, the
ERC, unilaterally postponed the date of effectivity of the CSP from June 30, 2015 to
November 7, 2015, marking the first postponement by the ERC of the effectivity of the
mandatory CSP. 20 This appears to be in pursuance of the first paragraph of Section 4
of ERC Resolution No. 13, Series of 2015, which reads: Section 4. Applicability. - The
CSP requirement herein mandated shall not apply to PSAs already filed with the ERC
96
as of the effectivity of this Resolution [(i.e., November 7, 2015)]. For PSAs already
executed but are not yet filed or for those that are still in the process of negotiation, the
concerned DUs are directed to comply with the CSP requirement before their PSA
applications will be accepted by the ERC. The implementation of the CSP requirement
was further stalled by the ERC for another five (5) months, particularly, up until April
30, 2016, through 20 See ponencia, p. 24. ~

the issuance ofERC Resolution No. 01, Series of2016.21 The main reason for this
subsequent postponement was the "several letters from stakeholders"22 received by
the ERC expressing certain reservations anent the implementation thereof. As I see it,
ERC Resolution No. 01, Series of 2016 cannot qualify as a supplemental guideline for
the design and execution of the CSP as contemplated under the ERC's delegated
authority pursuant to Section 4 of DOE Department Circular No. DC2015-06-0008.
Contrary to the very nature of a supplemental guideline, ERC Resolution No. 01,
Series of 2016 does not merely add or clarify the existing regulations on the CSP, but
rather completely halts its implementation. Accordingly, it cannot fall under the phrase
"appropriate regulations" under Section 1 of Joint Resolution No. 1, as agreed upon by
the DOE and the ERC. To reiterate, the ERC was not given sole discretion under Joint
Resolution No. 1 to promulgate whatever rules it deems fit to implement the CSP. This
is, in fact, further confirmed by the Comment of the DOE itself wherein it denied any
responsibility in the ERC 's restatement of the CSP's date of effectivity: 15. DOE is not
aware of the cut-off date shift. There is nothing on record that ERC, contrary to
Section 4 of the [2015] DOE Circular, coordinated with DOE in "restating" the date of
the effectivity to a later date, or from 7 November 2015 to 30 April 2016 for a period of
one-hundred and seventy-five (175) days.23 In fine, since the ERC had no authority to
suspend the implementation of the CSP on its own, it gravely abused its discretion in
issuing ERC Resolution No. 01, Series of 2016 and hence, ought to be declared void.
The ponencia, however, proceeds to also invalidate the first paragraph of Section 4 of
97
ERC Resolution No. 13, Series of 2015, as the said provision marked the first
postponement of the CSP implementation from June 30, 2015 (as per the original DOE
Circular) to November 7, 2015. As the dispositive of the ponencia reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The first
paragraph of Section 4 of the Energy Regulatory Commission Resolution No. 13,
Series of 2015 (CSP Guidelines), and the Energy Regulatory Commission Resolution
No. 1, Series of 2016 (ERC Clarificatory Resolution), are hereby declared VOID ab
initio. Consequently, all Power Supply Agreement applications submitted by
Distribution Utilities to the Energy Regulatory Commission on or after 30 June 2015
shall comply with the Competitive Selection Process in accordance with the
Department of Energy Circular No. DC2018-02-0003 (2018 DOE Circular) and its
Annex "A". Upon compliance with the Competitive Selection Process, the power
purchase cost resulting from such compliance shall retroact to the date of effectivity of
the complying Power 21 See id. 22 See 7th Whereas Clause, Resolution No. 0 I,
Series of 2016. 23 See ponencia, p. 26; emphasis supplied.

Supply Agreement, but in no case earlier than June 30, 2015, for purpose of passing
on the power purchase cost to consumers. 24 Respectfully, I disagree with the holding
anent the first paragraph of Section 4 of ERC Resolution No. 13, Series of 2015
because the validity of ERC Resolution No. 13, Series of 2015 was not questioned in
the present petition. In any case, it is my view that there was nothing infirm about the
failure to implement the CSP by June 30, 2015 and postponing the same to November
7, 2015. This is because the CSP could not have been implemented by the time the
original DOE Circular took effect on June 30, 2015 given that there were no proper
implementing guidelines at that time. Based on the records, it was only upon the
issuance of ERC Resolution No. 13, Series of 2015 (which took effect later on
November 7, 2015) that concrete guidelines on the CSP were set. Notably, this latter
ERC Resolution was issued on the same day Joint Resolution No. 1 was issued by
98
both the DOE and the ERC, and in this joint resolution, the authority of the ERC to
issue the appropriate guidelines to implement the CSP, by agreement of the DOE and
the ERC, was recognized. In fact, there is an express statement by the DOE in the
original DOE Circular that the ERC was still to issue supplemental guidelines and
procedures for the design and execution of the CSP to properly guide the DUs; hence,
the immediate effectivity of the CSP requirement could not be reckoned as of June 30,
2015. Accordingly, for these reasons, only ERC Resolution No. 01, Series of 2016 -
and not the first paragraph of Section 4 ofERC Resolution No. 13, Series of2015 -
should be declared null and void. Also, albeit not explicitly expressed in the ponencia, I
caution against the wholesale invalidation of PSAs which were non-compliant with the
CSP requirement at the time the said process should have been carried out, which
date the ponencia pegs on June 30, 2015. Being in the nature of a selection and
qualification requirement, compliance with the CSP to already existing -more so,
implemented -PSAs appears to be impossible, unless one invalidates the entire
contract. Logically speaking, it is highly impracticable to reverse the consummation of
acts already done. This being the case, it may be prudent to recognize the validity of
the effects of the PSAs already approved prior to the invalidity of ERC Resolution No.
01, Series of 2016, notwithstanding their CSP non-compliance. Lest it be
misunderstood, this does not necessarily mean that the approved PSAs25 shall be
valid and effective for their entire full 20 or 21-year term. The compromise to this
matter is to only recognize these contracts' validity up until a new DU, selected under
the applicable CSP process, has qualified to take-over the obligations for the remaining
period in accordance with the appropriate transitory regulations to be issued by the
proper governing agency/agencies. To my mind, this approach balances out the
legalistic attribution of the questioned issuance with the practical impact that the afore-
discussed declaration would have on the power industry and on a larger scale, the
consuming public in general. 24 Id. at 36. 25 See id. at. 29. \

99
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petition based on the qualifications stated
above. Energy Regulatory Commission Resolution No. 01, Series of 2016 should be
declared INVALID for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. Power
Supply Agreements approved on or after November 7, 2015, despite non-compliance
with the Competitive Selection Process (CSP) requirement, should not per se be
invalidated, but shall be subject to the appropriate transitory regulations on the CSP to
be issued by the proper governing agency/agencies. J&. !Lw./ ESTELA M.vi}ERLAS-
BERNABE Associate Justice

100
101
G.R. No. 172393 : October 20, 2010

BANK OF COMMERCE, Petitioner, v. HON. ESTELA PERLAS-BERNABE, in her

capacity as Presiding Judge of the REGIONAL TRIAL OF MAKATI CITY, BRANCH
142; BANCAPITAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION; and EXCHANGE CAPITAL
CORPORATION, Respondents.cralaw

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

A multimillion-peso treasury bill scam shook the Philippine financial markets in the mid-
1990s. At the center of the fiasco lies respondent Bancapital Development Corporation
(Bancapital) whose series of alleged fraudulent and unauthorized dealings in securities
had left several other financial institutions almost in shamblesamong them was herein
petitioner Bank of Commerce. Bancapital was suspected of having funneled its funds
to Exchange Capital Corporation (Excap) allegedly to insulate its assets from creditors
stung by its scheme. The magnitude of the fraud had caught the attention of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which immediately launched an investigation
into the matter. Petitioner, it appears, was the only one that instituted an action to
retrieve its rather scandalous losses.

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the June 22,
2004 Decision1cra1aw and the April 21, 2006 Resolution2cra1aw of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 67488. The challenged Decision denied due course to
and dismissed petitioners petition for certiorari from the September 7, 2001 Order of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 142 in Civil Case No. 01-855.
The said Order, in turn, had denied petitioners motion to consolidate Civil Case No. 01-
855 with Case No. 01-974 pending with Branch 138 of the same court. These two
cases had found their way to the RTC from the Securities and Exchange Commission
102
(SEC) by operation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8977. The assailed Resolution denied
reconsideration.

The facts follow.

On February 7, 1996, petitioner filed with the SEC a petition for involuntary dissolution,
liquidation and receivership,3cra1aw docketed as SEC Case No. 02-96-5259 (the
Receivership Case), alleging that Bancapital had defrauded it in unauthorized trading
in government securities and had deliberately transferred its assets to Excap to keep
them beyond reach of its creditors.4cra1aw Bancapital was declared in default for lack
of an answer despite service of summons by publication,5cra1aw whereas Excap was
allowed to intervene in the case. The SEC, thereafter, constituted a Receivership
Committee of three members.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the course of the proceedings, petitioner submitted to the Receivership Committee

the NBI Report,7cra1aw as well as the copies of the checks mentioned
therein.8cra1aw In a nutshell, the report seemed to validate the supposed transactional
anomalies staged by Bancapital and Excap consisting of a series of questionable
movement of funds from the former to the latter which had not been properly
documented and accounted for in the books of Excap.9cra1aw This finding led the NBI
to conclude, albeit tentatively, that respondents had indeed arranged for Bancapitals
assets to be insulated from the prospect of creditor claims.10cra1aw Expectedly, Excap
defended its transactions mentioned in the report and explained that the same were all
but regular and legitimate dealings with Bancapital.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

After an evaluation of the parties evidence, the Receivership Committee submitted its
report12cra1aw to the SEC. This committee report found Bancapital to be insolvent and
admitted that the Receivership Committee had thus been unable to take custody or
control of any assets.13cra1aw Commenting on the report, Excap, on the one hand,
advanced that the hearing officer must only affirm the Committees finding that it had
103
never been in possession of Bancapitals assets.14cra1aw On the other hand, petitioner
emphasized that contrary to Excaps understanding, the Committee Report did not
make a categorical finding that Excap was, in fact, not in possession of Bancapitals
assets.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On October 22, 1999, Hearing Officer Marciano Bacalla, Jr. issued an

Order16cra1aw accepting the Committee Report and holding in explicit terms that
Excap was not in possession of Bancapitals assets as indeed the money trail into
Excaps accounts, as alluded to by the NBI, had been sufficiently explained to be
regular, well-documented legitimate transactions.17cra1aw Petitioner sought
reconsideration,18cra1aw but it was denied in an Order19cra1aw dated December 16,
1999 which reiterated that in view of the Committees finding that Bancapital was
insolvent and had no more assets that could be accounted for, it would also mean that
Bancapital had no funds in possession even of Excap which might otherwise be taken
custody of by the Receivership Committee.20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the hearing officer in issuing these
twin orders, petitioner, on January 18, 2000, filed a Petition for Certiorari21cra1aw with
the SEC En Banc, docketed as SEC EB Case No. 692 (the Certiorari Petition).
Pending this petition and with no hint yet that the same had been submitted for
decision, Hearing Officer Bacalla issued yet another Order22cra1aw on April 19, 2000
dismissing the Receivership Case based on the Committee Report while taking judicial
notice that Bancapital had long since ceased from operations and had been unable to
comply with its mandatory reportorial obligations to the Receivership
Committee.23chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the meantime, on August 8, 2000, R.A. No. 8799, otherwise known as the Securities
Regulation Code,24cra1aw came in place and transferred jurisdiction over the

104
Receivership Case and the Certiorari Petition from the SEC to the courts of general
jurisdiction.

On the basis of this statutory development, the SEC En Banc in SEC EB Case No. 692
issued an Order25cra1aw dated November 23, 2000 expressly declaring that it should
not be acting on the Certiorari Petition and supposedly denying due course to it on the
ground that the Commissions oversight functions relative to the acts of its hearing
officers had become functus officio with the jurisdictional transfer thereof to the
regional trial courts and hence. Forthwith, SEC EB Case No. 692 (Certiorari Petition)
was transferred to the RTC of Makati, Branch 14226cra1aw and was docketed as Civil
Case No. 01-974; whereas SEC Case No. 02-96-5259 the Receivership Casewas
transferred to Branch 138 of the same Court and was docketed as Civil Case No. 01-
855.

Petitioner sought the consolidation of Civil Case No. 01-974 (Certiorari Petition) with
the Receivership Case and, for that purpose, filed a Motion to
Consolidate27cra1aw before Branch 142 of the RTC of Makati. The RTC, however,
denied the motion in an Order28cra1aw dated September 7, 2001, holding that
consolidation would serve no purpose in view of the November 23, 2000 Order of the
SEC En Banc denying due course to the Certiorari Petition, and ordering that the
records of the case must nevertheless be transferred to Branch 138 for inclusion in the
main records in the interest of orderly procedure.29chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a Rule 65 petition ascribing
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to the presiding
judge of Branch 142 in declining to consolidate the Certiorari Petition with the
Receivership Case pending before Branch 138.30chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In its Decision31cra1aw dated June 22, 2004, the Court of Appeals denied due course
to and dismissed the petition. Finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
105
trial court, it held that in view of the hearing officers dismissal of the Receivership
Case, there was indeed nothing more to consolidate with the Certiorari Petition,
especially since no appeal was taken from said dismissal to the Court of Appeals
which had jurisdiction to entertain the same. The Court of Appeals, likewise, stated that
even the November 23, 2000 Order of the SEC En Banc in the Certiorari Petition had
itself attained finality for the exact same reason as the April 19, 2000 Order. A Rule 65
petition, it said, could not substitute for petitioners lost right to
appeal. 32chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.33cra1aw Hence, the instant petition
which bears the unrelenting issue of whether the Court of Appeals was correct in
upholding the denial by the RTC of Makati, Branch 142 of petitioners motion for the
consolidation of the Certiorari Petition with the Receivership Case pending before
Branch 138.

Petitioner posits that the Court of Appeals erroneously upheld the trial courts denial of
its motion to consolidate and it invokes three reasons why: (a) first, Rule 31 of the
Rules of Court sanctions consolidation thereof; (b) second, the SEC En Bancs denial
of due course to the petition for certiorari in SEC EB Case No. 692 [Civil Case No. 01-
974] was based on lack of jurisdiction which, however, would not preclude the
consolidation of the two cases that eventually found their way to the trial court of
different branches; and (c) third, the denial of the motion for consolidation has given
rise to the inequitable situation where the hearing officers grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the Receivership Case would as it did remain unchecked thereby leaving
the aggrieved party with no more remedy to pursue.34chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Excap differs.35cra1aw In its Comment36cra1aw on the petition, it posits that as the

Court of Appeals discussed in the assailed decision, there was nothing more to
consolidate with the Certiorari Petition, because the dismissal of this case, as well as

106
of the Receivership Case, had long attained finality without an appeal being taken from
them. It also points out that, as affirmed by the September 7, 2001 Order of the trial
court, the SEC En Bancs denial of due course to the petition for certiorari in SEC EB
Case No. 692 operates as a complete disposition of the petition from which the proper
remedy would have been an ordinary appeal to the Court of Appeals. It, thus, believes
that the Court of Appeals has correctly upheld the denial of the consolidation of the
cases.

Petitioner insists in its Reply37cra1aw that the SEC En Bancs dismissal of the Certiorari
Petition was perched on the fact that Section 52 of R.A. No. 8799 had transferred
jurisdiction over the cases to the appropriate RTCs. Petitioner theorizes that it is
because of this statutory development that the SEC did not act on the petition thereby
failing to make a definitive ruling on whether indeed Excap was keeping some of
Bancapitals assets and funds or not. Thus, since this question has yet to be resolved
by the SEC En Banc and in view of the transfer of the case to the RTC of Makati,
Branch 142, petitioner asserts that the latter would, in any event, still have to finally
resolve said question; but since the main case the Receivership Case has been
transferred to Branch 138, it is crucial that the cases be consolidated before Branch
138.

There is merit in the petition.

Before we proceed to determine whether the Court of Appeals was correct in affirming
the trial courts denial of petitioners Motion to Consolidate, it is imperative to establish
whether indeed the SEC hearing officers April 19, 2000 Order dismissing the
Receivership Case has attained finality especially since this consideration seems to
have informed both courts below that consolidation under the given circumstances
would not be practically nor legally feasible. In the same way, we must also determine
whether the November 23, 2000 Order of the SEC En Banc had the effect of

107
dismissing with finality petitioners Certiorari Petition, because this was likewise
considered by the Court of Appeals in affirming the denial of petitioners prayer for
consolidation.

First, recall that with respect to the dismissal of the Receivership Case, the Court of
Appeals and the trial court noted that the hearing officers April 19, 2000 Order was
never appealed from by petitioner, which lapse resulted in said Order attaining finality.
Second, with respect to the November 23, 2000 Order, the Court of Appeals
emphasized that the SEC En Banc had already denied due course to the Certiorari
Petition and in effect, had dismissed the case even before it was transferred to the
RTC of Makati, Branch 142. With these observations, the Court of Appeals ruled that
consolidation indeed was unwarranted, since there were no more cases to be
consolidated in the first place.

We are not convinced.

Tucked in the records of the case is the fact that shortly after the issuance by Hearing
Officer Bacalla of the April 19, 2000 Order dismissing the Receivership Case, petitioner
immediately moved to recall the said Order. In its Motion (to Recall the April 19, 2000
Order)38cra1aw filed on May 4, 2000, petitioner lamented that whether the Committee
Report had indeed made a clear finding that Excap was not holding any of Bancapitals
assets was a question yet to be decided by the SEC En Banc in the Certiorari Petition
pending before it. Hence, petitioner believes that as a matter of course, the hearing
officer, as a measure of courtesy to the Commission, should have deferred action on
the Receivership Case unless and until the SEC En Banc has reached a resolution in
the Certiorari Petition.39cra1aw We reproduce the pertinent portions of the said Motion,
to wit:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

3. The [October 22, 1999 and December 16, 1999 Orders of the Hearing Officer] and
the erroneous reasoning on which they were based, were precisely made the subject
108
of a PETITION filed by BANCOM with the Securities & Exchange Commission En Banc
on January 6, 2000. x x x

3.1. As argued by BANCOM in its PETITION, the Honorable Hearing Officer gravely
erred in ruling that EXCAP does not hold any assets for BANCAP when nothing in the
Report of the Chairman of the Receivership Committee makes a finding to this effect.
Nothing in said Report foreclosed the possibility that there may still be assets of
BANCAP that can be recovered. Furthermore, even assuming that the Honorable
Hearing Officer could rule on the issue absent a conclusive finding by the Committee,
his rulings in the above-mentioned Orders were not based on substantial evidence.

4. Because these issues are now before the Commission En banc, the Hearing Officer
has no authority to cause the dismissal of this case, especially considering that the
basis of the dismissal is precisely what the Commission is asked to consider. Surely,
the Hearing Officer does not mean to pre-empt any favorable decision that BANCOM
might obtain from the Commission En Banc in SEC EB Case No. 692. But this is
precisely what he did by dismissing this case. x x x

xxxx

6. In the same manner, having received a copy of BANCOMs PETITION, the

Honorable Hearing Officer should give due respect to the Commission En Banc and
not trifle with its authority by trying to render useless the possible reversal by the
Commission En Banc of his Orders dated October 22 and December 16, 1999.

7. In the premises, the Hearing Officer should recall his Order dated April 19, 2000 and
instead await the Commissions resolution of SEC EB Case No. 692.

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Hearing Officer recall his Order dated
April 19, 2000 and await the Commissions resolution of SEC EB Case No. 692. x x
x40chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
109
An Opposition41cra1aw and a Reply,42cra1aw in fact, ensued thereafter, yet it appears
that no definitive action was ever taken by the hearing officer on the motion. To our
mind, this is very consequential.

Elemental is the rule of procedure that the nature of a pleading is to be determined by

the averments in it and not by its title.43cra1aw Hence, while petitioners Motion (to
Recall the April 19, 2000 Order) was so denominated, it is not difficult to see that the
remedy it was seeking was actually a reconsideration of the dismissal of the
Receivership Case. This Motion, to reiterate, does not appear to have been acted upon
by the hearing officer at any time during the interim that the subject order was issued
and the two cases were eventually transferred to Branches 138 and 142 of the RTC of
Makati. In particular, when the Receivership Case was transferred to Branch 138,
petitioners Motion to Recall was still a pending incident in the case. With the transfer of
the records to the said court, the accompanying duty to resolve the motion likewise had
devolved on the said court. In other words, contrary to the findings of the Court of
Appeals, the Receivership Case has not yet attained finality, as indeed the motion
seeking reconsideration of its dismissal had not been acted upon by the hearing officer
himself and had not yet, in fact, been acted upon by Branch 138 of the RTC of Makati.

Moreover, the November 23, 2000 Order of the SEC En Banc reads in
full:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Under the Revised Rules of Procedure of the Securities and Exchange Commission,
parties in an intra-corporate dispute are allowed to file a petition for certiorari
questioning interlocutory orders of the Hearing Officer based on grave abuse of
discretion. Such remedy was allowed by the Commission in order for it to have
oversight power over the acts of the Hearing Officer. With the passage [of] Republic
Act 8799 otherwise known as the "Securities Regulation Code," the jurisdiction of the
Commission over intra-corporate dispute was transferred to the regular courts. With

110
the transfer of this function to the regular courts, the oversight power of the
Commission en banc over the acts of their Hearing Officers, has now become functus
officius. Therefore, the present petition for certiorari herein shall no longer be acted
upon by the Commission and denied due course. A copy of this order, together with
the records of the case, [is] hereby forwarded to the Regional Trial Court where the
main case shall be heard for their consideration.

SO ORDERED.44chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

As can be gleaned from the aforequoted order, the SEC En Banc has chosen not to
act on the Certiorari Petition which principally assailed the October 22 and December
16, 1999 Orders of Hearing Officer Bacalla respectively accepting the Committee
Report and denying reconsideration, precisely because it acknowledged that it has lost
jurisdiction over the petition as a result of the supervening transfer of jurisdiction over
the case to the trial court. This is evident in its recognition of the fact that by virtue of
the enactment of R.A. No. 8799, it has thereby also lost the oversight power to correct
abuses of discretion in the issuance of interlocutory orders by its hearing officers. More
to the point, it likewise ordered the transfer of the records of the case to the trial court
where it may supposedly be heard for further consideration. On these observations, it
is clear that this Order could not have written finis to the Certiorari Petition for the basic
reason that the SEC En Banc, at that given point, could no longer validly act on the
same much less to rule on the merits of the petition.

At this juncture, considering that both the Receivership Case and the Certiorari Petition
have yet to be resolved, we now come to terms with the central issue of whether the
consolidation of these cases is proper under the circumstances.

Consolidation of cases is governed by Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, which

materially states:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

111
Section 1. Consolidation. When actions involving a common question of law or fact are
pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in
issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such
orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or
delay.

It is well recognized that consolidation of cases avoids multiplicity of suits, guards

against oppression and abuse, prevents delay, clears congested court dockets,
simplifies the work of the courts and seeks to attain justice with the least expense and
vexation to litigants.45cra1aw Generally, consolidation applies only to cases pending
before the same judge and not to cases pending in different branches of the same
court or in different courts.46chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Yet in appropriate instances and in the interest of justice, cases pending in different
branches of the court or in different courts may be consolidated, consistent with the
rule in our jurisdiction that leans towards permitting consolidation of cases whenever
possible and irrespective of the diversity of the issues for resolution. 47cra1aw Hence,
consolidation of cases is proper when the actions involve the same reliefs or the same
parties and basically the same issues,48cra1aw or when there is real need to forestall
the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered in the cases, 49cra1aw provided
that the measure will not give one party an undue advantage over the other, or
prejudice the substantial rights of any of the parties.50chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Indeed, the objectives of judicial economy and simplicity sit well with the prospect of
consolidating the two subject cases. We take note that the Certiorari Petition in this
case is only a pending incident in the Receivership Case, which is the main action and
in which a motion for the recall of the April 30, 2000 Order of the hearing officer is still
awaiting resolution before Branch 138 of the RTC of Makati, where the case was
transferred. Thus, the outcome of the Certiorari Petition will definitely have a bearing

112
on the Receivership Case, involving as they do the same focal issue of whether or not
Excap had been found in possession of Bancapitals assets and requiring substantially
the same evidence on that matter. In other words, conducting separate trials of the
cases would only entail substantial duplication of time and effort not only by the parties
but also by the courts51cra1aw and could terminate in the two courts rendering
conflicting decisions.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The June 22, 2004 Decision and the April
21, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67488, affirming the
September 7, 2001 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 142 in Civil
Case No. 01-855, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Civil Case
No. 01-855 is ordered CONSOLIDATED with Civil Case No. 01-974 before Branch 138
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Let the records of Civil Case No. 01-855 be
transferred to Branch 138 for disposition.

SO ORDERED.

113
114
G.R. No. 219501

POLICE DIRECTOR GENERAL ALAN LA MADRID PURISIMA, Petitioner

vs.
HON. CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, in her official capacity as the
OMBUDSMAN OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner former Police
Director General Alan La Madrid Purisima (Purisima), assailing the Decision2 dated
July 29, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 138296 and CA-G.R.
SP No. 138722, which affirmed the Order3 dated December 3, 2014 issued by
respondent Conchita Carpio Morales, in her capacity as the Ombudsman, preventively
suspending Purisima during the pendency of the consolidated cases against him
before the Office of the Ombudsman.

The Facts

In 2011,4 the Philippine National Police (PNP) entered into a Memorandum of

Agreement5 (MOA) with WER FAST6 Documentary Agency, Inc. (WER FAST) without
going through any public bidding. Under the MOA, the PNP undertook to allow WER
FAST to provide courier services to deliver firearm licenses to gun owners.7 In turn,
WER FAST agreed to donate equipment for an online application system for the
renewal of firearm licenses.8 PCSupt. Napoleon R. Estilles (Estilles), then Chief of the
Firearms and Explosives Office (FEO) under the Civil Security Group (CSG), signed
115
the MOA on behalf of the PNP. Based on the records, the incumbent PNP Chief
approved the signing of the MOA on August 24, 2011.9

Subsequently, the PNP's Legal Service (LS) was instructed to review the signed MOA
vis-a-vis a proposed revised MOA, noting that the signed MOA had not been
implemented. In a Memorandum10 dated August 7, 2012, the LS opined that the FEO
should first formulate rules for accreditation, by which to evaluate any company
offering courier services, including WER FAST. It further suggested that the rules
should include the qualifications of the company to be accredited, the required scope
of courier services, the creation of an accreditation committee, provisions on strict
confidentiality, disclaimer, and grounds to terminate accreditation.11

Consequently, on November 19, 2012, the FEO Courier Services Accreditation Board
(Accreditation Board) was constituted.12 In an undated memorandum13 entitled
"Policy on Accreditation of FEO Courier Service" (Accreditation Policy), then CSG
Director Police Director Gil Calaguio Meneses (Meneses) laid down the criteria and
procedure for the accreditation of courier service providers, as follows:

5. QUALIFICATIONS/CRITERIA FOR ACCREDITATION

A Courier Service provided may be accredited under the following conditions:

5.1 Applicant must be a local entity with appropriate business permits and is duly
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)[;]

5.2 It has completed and submitted all its reportorial requirements to the [SEC];

116
5.3 It has updated permits from [the local government unit (LGU)] where its main office
is located[;]

5.4 It has paid all its income taxes for the year, as duly certified by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR);

5.5 It must have secured clearances from Directorate for Intelligence (DI)[;]

5.6 It must have an extensive network all over the Philippines; and

5. 7 The application shall be made in the name of the company represented by its
President or any of its key directors as duly authorized in a board resolution for that
purpose.14 (Emphases supplied)

On December 18, 2012, Purisima was appointed as PNP Chief.15 Thereafter, or on

February 12, 2013, Meneses issued a Memorandum16 addressed to Purisima
(Meneses Memo), stating that the CSG has accredited WER FAST as the courier
service to deliver the approved firearms license cards to gun owners, and more
importantly, recommended that the delivery of license cards via courier be made
mandatory:

7. In compliance [with] the policy guidance of the then TACDS, now the Chief, PNP, to
implement the delivery of the approved firearms license cards to the addresses
supplied by the applicants, this office has accredited WER FAST Documentation
Agency for the purpose, after complying with all the documentary requirements
stipulated in the FEO Policy on Accreditation.

RECOMMENDATION
117
8. Recommend that the delivery of firearms licenses cards of gun owners to their
registered addresses, whether newly purchased firearms or renewed firearm licenses
be made mandatory, to give force and effect to this new intervention to monitor and
control firearms in the hands of gun owners.

9. Approval of para 8 above.17 (Emphases supplied)

Purisima approved this memorandum on February 17, 2013.18 It was only more than a
month after the Meneses Memo was issued, or on April 1, 2013, that the Accreditation
Board issued Resolution Number 2013- 027,19 accrediting WER FAST as a courier
services provider to all FEO clients relative to the licensing of firearms (FEO
Resolution).

The Proceedings Before the Ombudsman

In 2014, two (2) complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman against
Purisima, WER FAST, and other PNP officials relative to the PNP's directive for gun
owners to avail of the courier delivery of firearm licenses via WER FAST. The first
complaint20 filed by a private complainant charged Purisima, Estilles, and WER FAST
of violating Republic Act (RA) Nos. 6713,21 3019,22 7080,23 and 9184.24 He alleged,
among others, that: the MOA was not procured through competitive bidding; it was
executed before WER FAST obtained its SEC certificate of registration; WER FAST is
not authorized by the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) to
deliver mails/ parcels to the public; Purisima has close personal ties with WER FAST's
incorporator and high ranking officer; Purisima made mandatory the use of courier
service for license delivery in favor of WER FAST; and WER FAST was inefficient in
delivering the license cards.25 He later filed a Manifestation and Motion26 with
118
attached Joint-Affidavit27 executed by several PNP officials positively identifying
Purisima as the one who directed FEO-CSG to accommodate WER FAST as the sole
courier delivery service of the firearms license cards.28 Purisima filed his Counter-
Affidavit29 on July 25, 2014.

On October 9, 2014, the second complaint30 was filed by the Fact-Finding

Investigation Bureau (FFIB) - Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and
Other Law Enforcement Offices (MOLEO) against several PNP officers involved in the
MOA's execution and WER FAST's accreditation as a courier service provider.
Attached to the complaint were certifications from various government agencies
attesting that WER FAST failed to meet the qualifications for accreditation under the
Accreditation Policy.31 As regards Purisima, FFIB-MOLEO prayed that he be
administratively charged for gross negligence and/or gross neglect of duty, with a
prayer for preventive suspension. It alleged that Purisima is administratively liable "for
approving the recommendation of Meneses without verifying or checking the records
and capability of [WER FAST]."32

Purisima requested33 for additional time to file his counter-affidavit and was granted
an inextendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of the Order34 dated December 1,
2014.

On December 3, 2014, without waiting for Purisima's counter-affidavit, the

Ombudsman issued the assailed Order,35which preventively suspended Purisima and
other PNP officers, for six (6) months without pay.36

Purisima and another PNP official37 filed their respective petitions for certiorari before
the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 138296 and CA-G.R. SP No. 138722,38 which
were consolidated in a Resolution dated January 30, 2015.39 While these consolidated
119
cases were pending before the CA, Purisima resigned as PNP Chief40 and the
preventive suspension period had lapsed.41

The CA Ruling

In a Decision42 dated July 29, 2015, the CA dismissed the petitions and affirmed the
Ombudsman's assailed Order.1âwphi1 On the procedural aspect, the CA held that the
petitions are moot in view of the lapse of the six-month period of preventive
suspension. In particular, the CA noted that Purisima received the Order on December
4, 2014. Counting from this date, his period of preventive suspension lapsed on June
4, 2015. Nevertheless, the CA proceeded to discuss the merits of the case.43

On the merits, the CA held that the Ombudsman is authorized under Section 24 of RA
677044 to preventively suspend without pay any public officer or employee during the
pendency of an investigation. It added that the power to issue preventive suspension
order is undoubtedly a part of the Ombudsman's investigatory and disciplinary
authority.45

The CA further held that the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse her discretion in
preventively suspending Purisima for irregularly accrediting WER FAST as courier
service provider, noting that the two (2) requisites46 for the validity of a preventive
suspension order were present.47 First, the Ombudsman made a prior determination
that the evidence was strong based on the documents submitted to them and the
following circumstances: (a) BIR certificate; (b) Director of Intelligence certificate; and
(c) Department of Science and Technology (DOST) certificate.48 Particularly, WER
FAST was accredited despite non-payment of taxes for the years 2011 to 2013 as
shown by the BIR certification. The Director of Intelligence likewise issued a
certification that it has not given clearances to WER FAST. Additionally, WER FAST's
120
business permits for the years 2011 to 2012 indicated "consultancy" as its business,
while its Articles of Incorporation stated that the corporation's primary purpose is to act
as a business consultant, engage in providing assistance in documentation and
registration. The DOST Postal Regulation Committee also issued a certification that it
has not accredited WER FAST as a courier service provider. Notably, WER FAST had
no proven track record in courier service. It even engaged the services of LBC
Express, Inc. precisely because the former lacked the capacity to deliver firearms
licenses. Furthermore, it was not compliant with the DOTC's paid-up capital
requirement of ₱500,000.00 to be accredited to operate as a courier service in two or
more administrative regions in the country. To highlight, WER FAST was accredited by
PNP nationwide despite having a paid-up capital of only ₱65,000.00.49 Second, the
charge filed against Purisima was Gross Negligence and/or Gross Neglect of Duty,
which if proven true, would constitute a ground for his removal from public office.50
Thus, the CA concluded that the concurrence of the foregoing elements rendered the
preventive suspension order valid.

Aggrieved, Purisima filed the present petition.

The Issues Before the Court

The issues before the Court are: (a) whether or not the petition has been rendered
moot and academic; and, (b) if in the negative, whether or not the CA correctly held
that the Ombudsman did not gravely abuse her discretion in preventively suspending
Purisima.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is denied.

121
I.

In Ombudsman v. Capulong51 (Capulong), the Court ruled that a case questioning the
validity of a preventive suspension order is not mooted by the supervening lifting of the
same:

In the instant case, the subsequent lifting of the preventive suspension order against
Capulong does not render the petition moot and academic. It does not preclude the
courts from passing upon the validity of a preventive suspension order, it being a
manifestation of its constitutionally mandated power and authority to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
(Emphasis supplied)

As held in Capulong, the Court, in the exercise of its expanded judicial power, may not
be precluded from passing upon the order's validity so as to determine whether or not
grave abuse of discretion attended the issuance of the same. The result of a finding of
a grave abuse of discretion means that the issuance is null and void from its very
inception, and thus, bars the same from producing any legal effects. Indeed, "[n]o legal
rights can emanate from a resolution that is null and void."52 As such, a public officer
improperly placed under preventive suspension should be restored to his original
position, and accordingly, should have earned his salaries as if he was not preventively
suspended for the pertinent period.

"A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a
justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the
case or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use."53 In Osmeña
122
v. Social Security System of the Phils.,54 the Court explained the consequence of a
finding of mootness:

In such instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be

entitled to, and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. Courts
generally decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness -
save when, among others, a compelling constitutional issue raised requires the
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public; or when
the case is capable of repetition yet evading judicial review.55

In this case, since the propriety or impropriety of Purisima's preventive suspension

would essentially determine his entitlement to back salaries during the six-month
period therefor, the Court holds that despite the lapse of the period of his preventive
suspension, there remains some practical value or use in resolving his petition
assailing the Ombudsman's December 3, 2014 Order. Thus, by the same logic in
Capulong, this case cannot be considered as moot and academic so as to obviate the
Court from resolving its merits.

II.

The Ombudsman is explicitly authorized to issue a preventive suspension order under

Section 24 of RA 6770 when two (2) conditions are met. These are: (a) the evidence of
guilt is strong based on the Ombudsman's judgment; and (b) any of the three (3)
circumstances are present - (I) the charge against such officer or employee involves
dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (2)
the charges would warrant removal from service; or (3) the respondent's continued
stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him. Section 24 reads:

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Section 24. Preventive Suspension. - The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively
suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his
judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or
employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the
respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.

x x x x (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In this case, the Court need not belabor on the presence of the second condition,
considering that (a) one of the charges against Purisima is gross neglect of duty; and
(b) the criminal and administrative charges (i.e., violations of RAs 6713, 3019, 7080,
and 9184, as well as gross neglect of duty) against Purisima, if proven, would indeed
warrant his removal from office. Since Section 24 uses the disjunctive "or",56 then the
presence of any of the three (3) stated situations would be sufficient to comply with this
condition.

As regards the first condition, case law states that the strength of the evidence is left to
the determination of the Ombudsman by taking into account the evidence before her;
hence, the deliberate use of the words "in his judgment." In Yasay, Jr. v. Desierto:57

The rule is that whether the evidence of guilt is strong, as required in Section 24 of
R.A. No. 6770, is left to the determination of the Ombudsman by taking into account
the evidence before him. In the very words of Section 24, the Ombudsman may
preventively suspend a public official pending investigation if "in his judgment" the
evidence presented before him tends to show that the official's guilt is strong and if the
further requisites enumerated in Section 24 are present. The Court cannot substitute

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its own judgment for that of the Ombudsman on this matter, absent clear showing of
grave abuse of discretion.58 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Court's deference to the Ombudsman's judgment regarding this condition not only
stems from its policy of non-interference with the Ombudsman's exercise of her
prosecutorial and investigatory powers;59 it is also a conscious recognition of the
preliminary nature and purpose of a preventive suspension order. It is well-established
that:60

Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in an

administrative investigation. The purpose of the suspension order is to prevent the
accused from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to
influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the
prosecution of the case against him. If after such investigation, the charge is
established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his
suspension or removal, then he is suspended, removed or dismissed. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Being a preventive measure essentially meant to ensure the proper course of a still
ongoing investigation, the Ombudsman should thus be given ample discretion to
determine the strength of the preliminary evidence presented before her and
thereafter, decide whether or not to issue such order against a particular respondent.
In Buenaseda v. Flavier,61 this Court explained:

Under the Constitution, the Ombudsman is expressly authorized to recommend to the

appropriate official the discipline or prosecution of erring public officials or employees.
In order to make an intelligent determination whether to recommend such actions, the
Ombudsman has to conduct an investigation. In turn, in order for him to conduct such
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investigation in an expeditious and efficient manner, he may need to suspend the
respondent.

The need for the preventive suspension may arise from several causes, among them,
the danger of tampering or destruction of evidence in the possession of respondent;
the intimidation of witnesses, etc. The Ombudsman should be given the discretion to
decide when the persons facing administrative charges should be preventively
suspended.62 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

However, as in any governmental power, the Ombudsman's authority to preventively

suspend is not unlimited. When a complaint is virtually bereft of any supporting
evidence or the evidence so cited is, on its face, clearly inadmissible, then no
deference ought to be accorded. Under these instances, the Ombudsman may be said
to have gravely abused her discretion in finding that the first condition was met.

In the present case, the Ombudsman found that the evidence of guilt against Purisima
was strong enough to place him under preventive suspension. Said finding cannot be
said to be tainted with grave abuse of discretion as it was based on supporting
documentary evidence,63 none of which were questioned to be inadmissible.1avvphi1
For one, the Ombudsman considered the PNP officials' Joint Affidavit,64 expressing
that Purisima exerted pressure and coercion over his subordinates to coordinate with
WER FAST in relation to the courier delivery service. The Ombudsman also cited
several circumstances sourced from the documentary evidence that should have
prodded Purisima to verify WER FAST' s credentials and. capability to provide courier
services for the delivery of firearms licenses before he insisted on the implementation
of the MOA. These circumstances are: (a) the absence of a public bidding before the
MOA was executed; (b) the absence of accreditation from the Accreditation Board
when Purisima approved the Meneses Memo; (c) the Meneses Memo failed to mention
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the resolution supposedly accrediting WER FAST; (d) the Accreditation Board
accredited WER FAST despite the latter's lack of proof of compliance with the
Accreditation Policy; (e) WER FAST had no proven track record in courier services and
lacked the capacity to deliver the firearms licenses; (j) WER FAST failed to obtain the
DOTC's accreditation for authority to operate courier services; and (g) WER FAST's
failure to donate the equipment for the online system as stated in the MOA, among
others.65

Since both conditions for the issuance of a preventive suspension order against
Purisima are present in this case, the Court therefore holds that the Ombudsman acted
within her powers when she issued the assailed December 3, 2014 Order. In
consequence, Purisima is not entitled to back salaries during the period of his
preventive suspension.

As a final point, the Court clarifies that - contrary to Purisima's stance - the
Ombudsman did not violate his right to due process nor did she prejudge the case
when she issued the preventive suspension order before he was able to file his
counter-affidavit for the second complaint.66

Lastimosa v. Ombudsman67 already settles that the Ombudsman may issue a

preventive suspension order prior to the filing of an answer or counter-affidavit,
considering that the same is but a preventive measure:

Prior notice and hearing is not required, such suspension not being a penalty but only
a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. As held in Nera v. Garcia [(106
Phil. 1031, 1034 [1960])]:

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In connection with the suspension of petitioner before he could file his answer to the
administrative complaint, suffice it to say that the suspension was not a punishment or
penalty for the acts of dishonesty and misconduct in office, but only as a preventive
measure. Suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If after
such investigation, the charges are established and the person investigated is found
guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is removed or dismissed. This is the
penalty. There is, therefore, nothing improper in suspending an officer pending his
investigation and before the charges against him are heard and be given an
opportunity to prove his innocence.

xxxx

As held in Buenaseda v. Flavier [(G.R. No. 106719, September 21, 1993, 226 SCRA
645, 655)], however, whether the evidence of guilt is strong is left to the determination
of the Ombudsman by taking into account the evidence before him. A preliminary
hearing as in bail petitions in cases involving capital offenses is not required. In
rejecting a similar argument as that made by petitioner in this case, this Court said in
that case:

The import of the Nera decision is that the disciplining authority is given the discretion
to decide when the evidence of guilt is strong. This fact is bolstered by Section 24 of
R.A. No. 6770, which expressly left such determination of guilt to the "judgment" of the
Ombudsman on the basis of the administrative complaint. x x x68 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)

Ultimately, it should be borne in mind that the issuance of a preventive suspension

order does not amount to a prejudgment of the merits of the case.69 Neither is it a

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demonstration of a public official's guilt as such pronouncement can be done only after
trial on the merits.70

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 29, 2015 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 138296 and CA-G.R. SP No. 138722 is hereby
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

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