1.

SESBRENO VS CA
GR NO. 117438 JUNE 8, 1995

FACTS:
Fifty-two employees sued the Province of Cebu and Governor Rene Espina for reinstatement and backwages imploring Atty.
Pacquiao as counsel who was later replaced by Atty. Sesbreno. The employees and Atty. Sesbreno agreed that he is to be
paid 30% as attorney’s fees and 20% as expenses taken from their back salaries. Trial court decided in favor of the employees
and ordered the Province of Cebu to reinstate them and pay them back salaries. The same was affirmed in toto by the Court
of Appeals and ultimately the Supreme Court. A compromise agreement was entered into by the parties in April 1979. The
former employees waived their right to reinstatement among others. The Province of Cebu released P2,300,000.00 to the
petitioning employees through Atty. Sesbreno as “Partial Satisfaction of Judgment.” The amount represented back salaries,
terminal leave pay and gratuity pay due to the employees. Ten employees filed manifestations before the trial court asserting
that they agreed to pay Atty. Sesbreno 40% to be taken only from their back salaries. The lower court issued two orders, with
which petitioner complied, requiring him to release P10,000.00 to each of the ten private respondents and to retain 40% of
the back salaries pertaining to the latter out of the P2,300,000.00 released to him. On March 28, 1980, the trial court fixed the
attorney’s fees a total of 60% of all monies paid to the employees. However, trial court modified the award after noting that
petitioner’s attorney’s lien was inadvertently placed as 60% when it should have been only 50%. Atty. Sesbreno appealed to
the Court of Appeals claiming additional fees for legal services but was even further reduced to 20%.

ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals had the authority to reduce the amount of attorney’s fees awarded to petitioner Atty. Raul H.
Sesbreño, notwithstanding the contract for professional services signed by private respondents

HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court noted that the contract of professional services entered into by the parties 6 authorized petitioner to
take a total of 50% from the employees’ back salaries only. The trial court, however, fixed the lawyer’s fee on the basis of all
monies to be awarded to private respondents. Fifty per cent of all monies which private respondents may receive from the
provincial government, according to the Court of Appeals, is excessive and unconscionable, not to say, contrary to the
contract of professional services. What a lawyer may charge and receive as attorney’s fees is always subject to judicial
control. A stipulation on a lawyer’s compensation in a written contract for professional services ordinarily controls the amount
of fees that the contracting lawyer may be allowed, unless the court finds such stipulated amount unreasonable
unconscionable. A contingent fee arrangement is valid in this jurisdiction and is generally recognized as valid and binding
but must be laid down in an express contract. if the attorney’s fees are found to be excessive, what is reasonable under the
circumstances. Quantum meruit, meaning “as much as he deserves,” is used as the basis for determining the lawyer’s
professional fees in the absence of a contract. The Supreme Court averred that in balancing the allocation of the monetary
award, 50% of all monies to the lawyer and the other 50% to be allocated among all his 52 clients, is too lop-sided in favor of
the lawyer. The ratio makes the practice of law a commercial venture, rather than a noble profession. It would, verily be ironic
if the counsel whom they had hired to help would appropriate for himself 50% or even 60% of the total amount collectible by
these employees. 20% is a fair settlement.

2. Bautista vs Gonzales [A.M. No. 1625. February 12, 1990]

FACTS: Atty. Ramon Gonzales was charged with malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and violation of lawyer's oath by
Angel Bautista. The following acts constituting the charge were alleged: engaging into a champertous contract with client,
representing conflicting interests, transferring to himself one-half of the properties while litigation is still pending, inducement
of a complainant to enter a contract with him, falsifying documents, disloyalty and treachery to client, misleading the court,
harassment through filing several complaints. Atty. Gonzales denied all allegations. In 1983, the case was referred to the Office
of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. In 1988, Atty. Gonzales filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint since the long delay in the resolution violates his constitutional right to due process and speedy disposition of
cases. The Solicitor General then submitted his report and recommended Atty. Gonzales’s suspension for sixmonths. Atty.
Gonzales then filed a motion to refer the case to the IBP as per Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Gonzales’s case must necessarily be referred to the IBP?

RULING: No. The Supreme Court held that reference to the IBP of complaints against lawyers is not mandatory upon the
Court for it is not an exclusive procedure. Under Sections 13 and 14 of Rule 139-B, the Supreme Court may conduct
disciplinary proceedings without the intervention of the IBP by referring cases for investigation to the Solicitor General or to
any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court. The Court shall base its final action on the case on the report and
recommendation submitted by the investigating official and the evidence presented by the parties. Also, at the time of
the effectivity of Rule 139-B, the investigation conducted by the Office of the Solicitor General had been substantially
completed. Section 20 of Rule 139-B provides that only pending cases shall be transferred to IBP. The Supreme Court noted
that referral to IBP will result not only in duplication of the proceedings conducted by the Solicitor General but also to further
delay in the disposition of the present case which has lasted for more than thirteen (13) years. SUSPENDED for 6 months.

3. GAMILLA VS MARIÑO

Facts:
This is a disbarment case that emanated from the intra-union leadership dispute some 17years ago that spilled over
to the instant complaint alleging impropriety and double-dealing in the disbursement of sums of money entrusted by the UST
to respondent as president of the UST Faculty Union and his core of officers and directors for distribution among faculty
members of the university. The Court ruled that although the record showed that the Bureau of Labor Relations found
respondent as having adequately accounted for the disbursement of the funds which the UST Faculty Union received through
the series of agreements with the management of UST, the Court believes that respondent failed to avoid conflict of interests,
first, when he negotiated for the compromise agreement wherein he played the diverse roles of union president, union
attorney and interested party being one of the dismissed employees seeking his own restitution and thereafter when he
obtained the attorney's fees of P4,200,000 without full prior disclosure of the circumstances justifying such claim to the
members of the UST Faculty Union. Respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires every lawyer
to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his clients and thus, the Court deemed it proper
to reprimand respondent with warning against repetition of the same act.

Issue: WON Mariño be disbarred.

Held:
The test of conflict of interest among lawyers is "whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the
full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in
the performance thereof." In the same manner, it is undoubtedly a conflict of interests for an attorney to put himself in a
position where self-interest tempts, or worse, actually impels him to do less than his best for his client. Thus it has been held that
an attorney or any other person occupying fiduciary relations respecting property or persons is utterly disabled from acquiring
for his own benefit the property committed to his custody for management. This rule is entirely independent of whether fraud
has intervened as in fact no fraud need be shown; no excuse will be heard from an attorney because the rule stands on the
moral obligation to refrain from placing oneself in positions that ordinarily excite conflict between self-interest and integrity.
Necessarily, a lawyer cannot continue representing a client in an action or any proceeding against a party even with the
client's consent after the lawyer brings suit in his own behalf against the same defendant if it is uncertain whether the
defendant will be able to satisfy both judgments. No doubt, a lawyer is not authorized to have financial stakes in the subject
matter of the suit brought in behalf of his client.

4. VINSON PINEDA V. ATTY. DE JESUS, ATTY. AMBROSIO AND ATTY. MARIANO

Facts:
Aurora Pineda filed for declaration of nullity of marriage against Vinson Pineda. Aurora proposed a settlement
regarding visitation rights and the separation of properties which was accepted by Vinson. Settlement was approved by the
trial court and their marriage was declared null and void.
Throughout the proceedings the respondent counsels were compensated but they still billed petitioner additional
legal fees in amounting to P16.5M. Vinson refused to pay the additional fees but instead paid P1.2M.
Respondents filed a complaint with the same trial court.
Trial court ordered Vinson to pay a total of P9M. CA reduced the amount to a total of P2M.

Issues:
W/N the RTC had jurisdiction over the claim for additional legal fees?
W/N respondents were entitled to additional legal fees?

Held:
A lawyer may enforce his right to his fees by filing the petition as an incident of the main action. RTC has jurisdiction.
The respondents were seeking to collect P50M which was 10% of the value of the properties awarded to Vinson. What
respondents were demanding was additional payment for service rendered in the same case.
The professional engagement between petitioner and respondents was governed by quantum meruit.
Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility advises lawyers to avoid controversies with clients concerning their
compensation and to resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. Suits to collect fees should be
avoided and should be filed only when circumstances force lawyers to resort to it.
In this case, there was no justification for the additional legal fees sought by respondents. It was an act of unconscionable
greed!

5. ROXAS V. DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR

Facts:
The Zuzuarreguis engaged the legal services of Attys. Romeo G. Roxas and Santiago N. Pastor, to represent them in
the case. This was sealed by a Letter-Agreement, wherein it was contained that the attorneys would endeavor to secure just
compensation with the NHA and other government agencies at a price of 11pesos or more per square meter, and that any
lower amount shall not entitle them to any atty’s fees. They also stipulated that in the event they get it for 11pesos per square
meter, their contingent fee shall be 30% of the just compensation. They also stipulated that their lawyer’s fees shall be in
proportion to the cash/bonds ratio of the just compensation.
[…]
A Compromise Agreement was executed between the Zuzuarreguis and the NHA. The Compromise Agreement,
stipulated among other things, that the just compensation of the Zuzuarregui properties would be at P19.50 per square meter
payable in NHA Bonds. In a Decision dated 20 December 1985, the RTC, approved the Compromise Agreement submitted
by the parties.
The total amount in NHA bonds released to Atty. Romeo G. Roxas in behalf of the Zuzuarreguis amounted to
P54,500,000.00. Out of this amount, the records show that the amount turned over to the Zuzuarreguis by Atty. Roxas
amounted to P30,520,000.00 (representing the actual just compensation, although this amount is bigger) in NHA bonds.
Computed at P19.50 per square meter, the 1,790,570.36 square meters property of the Zuzuarreguis was expropriated
at a total price of P34,916,122.00. The total amount released by the NHA was P54,500,000.00. The difference of P19,583,878.00
is, undoubtedly, the yield on the bonds.
On 25 August 1987, a letter was sent by the Zuzuarreguis’ new counsel, Jose F. Gonzalez, to Attys. Roxas and Pastor,
demanding that the latter deliver to the Zuzuarreguis the yield corresponding to bonds paid by the NHA within a period of 10
days from receipt, under pain of administrative, civil and/or criminal action.

Issue:
The honorable court of appeals gravely erred on a question of law in holding that the letter-agreement re: contingent
fees cannot be allowed to stand as the law between the parties

Held:
A contract is a meeting of the minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to
give something or to render some service. Contracts shall be obligatory, in whatever form they may have been entered into,
provided all the essential requisites for their validity are present. The Zuzuarreguis, in entering into the Letter-Agreement, fully
gave their consent thereto. In fact, it was them (the Zuzuarreguis) who sent the said letter to Attys. Roxas and Pastor, for the
purpose of confirming all the matters which they had agreed upon previously. There is absolutely no evidence to show that
anybody was forced into entering into the Letter-Agreement. Verily, its existence, due execution and contents were admitted
by the Zuzuarreguis themselves.
In the presence of a contract for professional services duly executed by the parties thereto, the same becomes the
law between the said parties is not absolute but admits an exception – that the stipulations therein are not contrary to law,
good morals, good customs, public policy or public order.
Under the contract in question, Attys. Roxas and Pastor are to receive contingent fees for their professional services.
It is a deeply-rooted rule that contingent fees are not per se prohibited by law. They are sanctioned by Canon 13 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics.
A contract for contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all the circumstances of the
case including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to
its reasonableness.
Indubitably entwined with the lawyer’s duty to charge only reasonable fees is the power of this Court to reduce the
amount of attorney’s fees if the same is excessive and unconscionable.
Attorney’s fees are unconscionable if they affront one’s sense of justice, decency or reasonableness. It becomes
axiomatic therefore, that power to determine the reasonableness or the, unconscionable character of attorney's fees
stipulated by the parties is a matter falling within the regulatory prerogative of the courts.
In the instant case, Attys. Roxas and Pastor received an amount which was equal to forty-four percent (44%) of the
just compensation paid (including the yield on the bonds) by the NHA to the Zuzuarreguis, or an amount equivalent to
P23,980,000.00 of the P54,500,000.00. Considering that there was no full blown hearing in the expropriation case, ending as it
did in a Compromise Agreement, the 44% is, undeniably, unconscionable and excessive under the circumstances. Its
reduction is, therefore, in order.
It is imperative that the contingent fees received by Attys. Roxas and Pastor must be equitably reduced. In the opinion
of this Court, the yield that corresponds to the percentage share of the Zuzuarreguis in the P19.50 per square meter just
compensation paid by the NHA must be returned by Attys. Roxas and Pastor.
The yield on the NHA bonds amounted to P19,583,878.00. This amount must therefore be divided between the
Zuzuarreguis, on the one hand, and Attys. Roxas and Pastor, on the other. The division must be pro rata. Attys. Roxas and
Pastor, in the opinion of this Court, were not shortchanged for their efforts for they would still be earning or actually earned
attorney’s fees in the amount of P6,987,078.75
On the issue of moral and exemplary damages, we cannot award the same for there was no direct showing of bad
faith on the part of Attys. Roxas and Pastor, for as we said earlier, contingency fees are not per se prohibited by law. It is only
necessary that it be reduced when excessive and unconscionable, which we have already done.

6. (CANON 20)
G.R. No. 169298 July 9, 2008
LAW FIRM OF TUNGOL & TIBAYAN, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES RENATO M. INGCO & MA. LUISA S. INGCO, Respondents.

FACTS:

Ingcos hired the petitioner law firm to enforce delivery of a land title. Complaint was filed by the law firm in behalf of
the Ingcos before the HLURB against Villa Crista alleging that the Ingcos had paid P5.1M for a lot but Villa Crista failed to
deliver the title thereto. The Ingcos and Villa Crista entered into a compromise whereby the latter was bound to refund P4.8M
provided that in case of breach of such obligation, an additional P200k would be paid by way of liquidated damages.

Villa Crista failed to pay. Writ of execution issued. Sheriff levied and auctioned 10 lots belonging to Villa Crista. The
Ingcos bought 3 lots, the payment of which includes P5.1M contract price for the initial lot they primarily bought, P1.35M
attorney’s fees and other expenses. The Ingcos then terminated the services of the law firm.

The law firm filed with the HLURB to recover 25% of the excess of the existing prevailing selling price or the fair market
value of the 3 lots. It also filed for damages in the RTC.

The law firm argued that the spouses still owed P4.5M; that in their contract the law firm was entitled to 25% of the
excess of the total bid price.

HLURB arbiter ruled for the law firm. HLURHB Board reversed. The Office of the President reversed, affirming the HLURB
arbiter’s decision. CA reversed the OP.

ISSUE:

W/N lawyers are still entitled for additional fees?

HELD:

SC ruled that the lawyers are not entitled to additional fees, thus, it provides: “In our view, the law firm had been
adequately paid its lawyer’s fees and is no longer entitled to additional fees on top of the ₱1.5 million it had received. In fact,
the 25% attorney’s fees based on the value of the lot, which is ₱5.1 million, multiplied by 25%, will only amount to ₱1,275,000.
Thus, the firm had a bonus of ₱225,000, since they received ₱1,500,000 from the clients”. The spouses acquired the 3 lots as
the highest bidder at the auction sale. It can be said that the lots had been acquired not through the recovery efforts of the
law firm.

Moreover, during the negotiations with Villa Crista, it was Renato Ingco who was actually negotiating, not the lawyers.

When the auction sale was made, the attorney-client relationship no longer existed, hence the lawyers are not entitled to
the additional fees
7. Regala v Sandiganbayan GR. No. 105938 9.20.96

Facts: Corporation clients of petitioner consulted them regarding corporate structure and financial matters upon which
legal advice were given by petitioners. Said corporation is subject to investigation by the PCGG involving ill gotten wealth.
Petitioner refuses to provide information on fear that it may implicate them in the very activity from which legal advice was
sought from them and it may breach the fiduciary relationship of the petitioner with their client.

ISSUE
Whether or not client’s identity in a case involving and acquiring companies allegedly sourced from ill-gotten wealth is privileged and
disclosure of such is unethical.

RULING
The court held that the client identity in this case is privileged. As a matter of public policy, a client's identity should not be shrouded
in mystery. This general rule is however qualified by some important exceptions:
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client's name would implicate that client in the
very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice.
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability
3) Where the government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's name, the said
name would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime.

The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at bench, therefore, clearly reveal that the instant case falls
under the first and third exception.

The attorney-client privilege, as currently worded in the Rules of Court provides the disqualification by reason of privileged
communication. Rule 138 of the Rules of Court further emphasizes the importance of maintaining client confidence. Furthermore, this
duty is explicitly mandated in Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 15 of the Canons of Professional Ethics also
demands a lawyer's fidelity to client.

The Resolutions of respondent Sandiganbayan are hereby annulled and set aside.

8. PFLEIDER v PALANCA

FACTS: Palanca is the lawyer of Pfleider. Pfleider leased to Palanca an agricultural land, Hacienda Asia in Negros Occidental
for a period of 10 years .It is stipulated in the lease agreement that a specified portion of the lease rentals would be paid to
Pfleider and the remainder would be delivered by Palanca to the listed creditors of Pfleider . Pfleider filed a suit for the
rescission of the lease agreement of the ground of alleged default in the payment of rentals of Palanca. Pfleider also filed for
the disbarment of Palanca on the grounds of: Palanca did not follow the instructions of Pfleider to settle his estafa case against
Matiao in 1965 and the latter also failed to deposit the sum of P5,000 with the court . Palanca has fraudulently charged the
P5,000 as part of the lease rental of the Hacienda Asia . Palanca also falsely represented having paid one Guintos the sum
of P866 for the account of Pfleider when in truth and in fact, Guintos only received P86 .The list of creditors which Pfleider has
confidentially supplied Palanca was disclosed by Palance in violation of their attorney-client relationship .

ISSUE: W/N Palanca committed a breach of fidelity owing form a lawyer to his client.

HELD: NO! There is no substantial blame against Palanca inasmuch as the latter’s services were implicitly terminated by
Pfleider when he sued his lawyer. While the object of the suit is the rescission of the lease contract, the conflict of interest
became incompatible with the mutual confidence and trust essential to every lawyer client relationship. Also, Pfleider
delivered the list of creditors to Palanca not because of the professional relation then existing between them, but on account
of the lease agreement. A violation thereof would partake more of a private and civil wrong than of a breach of fidelity
owing from a lawyer to his client.

9. MERCADO V. ATTY. VITRIOLO

Facts:
Atty. Vitriolo was the counsel of Mercado in a case for annulment of marriage filed by the latter’s husband. Vitriolo
filed a criminal action for falsification of public documents against Mercado alleging that the latter made false entries in the
certificates of live birth of her children which were presented in the annulment case.
Mercado filed this complaint alleging that due to the criminal case filed against her by Vitriolo, information relating to her civil
case for annulment was divulged. Hence, Vitriolo breached the privilege and confidence reposed within a lawyer-client
relationship. Mercado prayed the Vitriolo be disbarred.

Issue:
W/N Vitriolo violated the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client when he filed a criminal
case against his former client?

Held:
SC provided the factors which are essential to establish the existence of the communication privilege between an
attorney and his client.
There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship, and it is by reason of this
relationship that the client made the communication.
The client made the communication in confidence.
The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity.
SC ruled that in applying all there rules, the evidence on record fails to substantiate Mercado’s allegations. Mercado
did not even specify the alleged communication. all her claims were couched in general terms and lacked specificity.
10. GENATO V. ATTY SILAPAN

Facts:
Atty. Silapan was leasing office space in Genato’s building. Atty. Silapan handled some of Genato’s cases. After a
while, Atty. Silapan borrowed money from Genato to buy a car. Atty. Silapan bought the car, and issued a postdated check
to Genato. The check was dishonored.
Genato filed a case against Atty. Silapan under BP 22. In his defense, he alleged that Genato was in the business of
“buying an selling deficiency taxed imported cars, shark loans and other shady deals” and that he was also involved in bribery
cases.
Genato claimed that Atty. Silapan was guilty of breaking their confidential lawyer-client relationship.

Issue:
Was Atty. Silapan guilty of the breach?
Held:
No. While Canon 17 provides that a lawyer shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him, especially
with privileged communication – the protection is only limited to communications which are legitimately and properly within
the scope of a lawful employment of a lawyer. It does not extend to those made in contemplation of a crime or perpetration
of a fraud. Thus, here, the attorney-client privilege does not attach, there being no professional employment in the strictest
sense.
However, the disclosures were not indispensable to protect Atty. Silapan’s rights as they were not pertinent to the
case. It was improper for him to disclose those information as they were not the subject matter of litigation at hand. His
professional competence and legal advice were not being attacked in the said case. A lawyer must conduct himself with
integrity.
He is therefore suspended for 6 months.

11. HADJULA V. ATTY MADIANDA

Facts:
Hadjula claimed that she asked legal advice from her friend, Atty. Madianda. She disclosed confidential information
during that period. However, after the confidential information was given by Hadjula, Atty. Madianda referred her to another
lawyer.
Hadjula filed a complaint against Atty. Madianda because of this, claiming the lawyer just wanted to hear her secrets.
In answering the complaint, Atty. Madianda filed a counter complaint against Hadjula for falsification of public documents
and immorality – using the disclosures as basis for the charges.

Issue: What is to become of Atty. Madianda?

Held:
Reprimanded.
The moment complainant approached the then receptive respondent to seek legal advice, a veritable lawyer-client
relationship evolved between the two. Atty. Madianda should have kept the information secret and confidential, under the
attorney-client privilege rule.
However, the seriousness of the respondent’s offense notwithstanding, the Court feels that there is room for
compassion, absent compelling evidence that she (Atty. Madianda) acted with ill-will. It appears that she was actuated by
the urge to retaliate without perhaps realizing that in the process of giving bent to a negative sentiment, she was violating
the rule of confidentiality.

12. PALM V. ATTY. ILEDAN

Facts:
Palm is the president of Comtech, which hired Atty. Iledan as its retained counsel. She filed a case of disbarment
against Atty. Iledan for breach of the attorney-client privilege and conflict of interests.
The basis of the claim of breach occurred during a meeting. Atty. Iledan claimed that the stockholders’ meeting
cannot take place via teleconferencing because they have yet to amend the by-laws of the corporation to allow such mode
of communications. Palm claims this was a breach of the attorney-client privilege of confidentiality.
The basis of the conflict of interests stemmed from Atty. Iledan being the counsel of Soledad who was filed with an
estafa case by Comtech.

Issue:
Was Atty. Iledan guilty of breach? How about conflict of interests?

Held:
No. Although the information about the necessity to amend the corporate by-laws may have been given to
respondent, it could not be considered a confidential information. The amendment, repeal or adoption of new by-laws may
be effected by “the board of directors or trustees, by a majority vote thereof, and the owners of at least a majority of the
outstanding capital stock, or at least a majority of members of a non-stock corporation.”It means the stockholders are aware
of the proposed amendments to the by-laws. Further, whenever any amendment or adoption of new by-laws is made, copies
of the amendments or the new by-laws are filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and attached to the
original articles of incorporation and by-laws.The documents are public records and could not be considered confidential.
It is settled that the mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality. The client must
intend the communication to be confidential. Since the proposed amendments must be approved by at least a majority of
the stockholders, and copies of the amended by-laws must be filed with the SEC, the information could not have been
intended to be confidential. Thus, the disclosure made by respondent during the stockholders’ meeting could not be
considered a violation of his client’s secrets and confidence within the contemplation of Canon 21 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
 The Court also finds no conflict of interest when respondent represented Soledad in a case filed by Comtech. The
case where respondent represents Soledad is an Estafa case filed by Comtech against its former officer. There was nothing
in the records that would show that respondent used against Comtech any confidential information acquired while he was
still Comtech’s retained counsel. Further, respondent made the representation after the termination of his retainer agreement
with Comtech. A lawyer’s immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyer’s
employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the client’s interests only
on matters that he previously handled for the former client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship
has terminated

13. WACK WACK GOLF V. CA, PETRONILO ARCANGEL AND ANTONINO BERNARDO

Facts:
Wack-wack was in a labor case against Arcangel. During the pendency of the case, Wack-wack wanted to change
their counsel from Balcoff, Poblador and Cruz to the Law Office of Juan Chudian.
During the hearing, neither Wack-wack nor their original counsels showed up, so Arcangel was allowed to present his
evidence without Wack-wack. The court awarded judgment to Arcangel. The law firm of Chuidian then filed a petition to set
aside the judgment on the ground of misunderstanding. This petition was denied by the lower court. Wack-wack assails the
denial of the petition.
It has to be taken note of that the court did not know of the change of counsel because Chudian only entered his
appearance after the judgment was rendered against Wack-wack.

Issue:
Was the trial court correct in denying the petition to set aside the judgment?

Held:
Yes. As such counsel of record, Balcoff, Poblador and Cruz must have known that, its impending relief as counself for
the defendant notwithstanding, it is still under obligation to protect the client’s interest until its final release from the
professional relationship with such client. The court could recognize no other representation on behalf of the client except
such counsel of record until a formal substitution of attorney is effected.
Any agreement or arrangement such counsel of record and its client may reach regarding the presentation of the
client’s case in court is purely their private concern. Proceedings in court cannot be made to depend on them.

14. VENTEREZ V. ATTY COSME

Facts:
Venterez and friends hired Atty. Cosme as counsel for a land title dispute. The court rule against Venterez and friends.
They wanted to file a motion for reconsideration but Atty. Cosme failed or refused to do so. Because of this, Venterez was
constrained to contract another lawyer to prepare the MR.
Atty. Cosme claims that the son of one of the complainants informed him that he was withdrawing the case from him
because he (the son) already engaged another lawyer to take over the case. Atty. Cosme explained that he even turned
over the records of the case to the son and thus, ceased to be counsel any longer.

Issue:
Is Atty. Cosme guilty of culpable negligence in handling the case?

Held:
Yes. Once a lawyer agrees to take up the cause of a client, he owes fidelity to such cause and must be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed on him. An attornery who undertakes an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its
termination – that is, until the case becomes final and executory. Any dereliction of duty affects the client.
The Court cannot accept Atty. Cosme’s defense that he had already withdrawn from the case. A lawyer may retire
at any time with the written consent of his client fileed in court and with a copy thereof served upon the adverse party. Should
the client refuse to give his consent, the lawyer must file an application with the court. The application must be based on a
good case.
What constitutes good cause? See Rule 22.01, Canon 22.
There was no proper revocation in this case. He is suspended for 3 months.

15. SANTECO V. ATTY. AVANCE

Facts:
Santeco got Atty. Avance to handle a case for her in a civil suit. She paid her P12,000 as acceptance money.
Losing in the first instance, Atty. Avance made representations that she was going to file a petition for certiorari with the CA.
She didn’t.
She also didn’t appear during scheduled hearings, causing the case to get dismissed for failure to prosecute.

Issue:
Is Atty. Avance grossly remiss in the performance of her duties?

Held:
Yes. Aggravating her gross negligence in the performance of her duties, she abruptly stopped appearing as
complainant’s counsel even as proceedings were still pending – with neither a withdrawal nor an explanation for doing so.
This violated Canon 22.
Suspended for 5 years.
16. FRANCISCO VS. PORTUGAL

Facts:
Atty was counsel for complainants in a criminal case. Atty was retained After judgment was rendered convicting
appellants. Atty filed an MR and another Motion and Petition for review of the judgment of conviction. But after the filing, Atty
disappeared and was nowhere to be found.
Later, the complainants found out that their petitions were denied for being filed out of time and for failure to pay
the docket fees. The decision became final and warrants of arrest were issued.
Atty argues that he had decided to withdraw as counsel. He wrote a letter to one of the complainants giving them
instructinos to sign and file with the Court the Notice to Withdraw. But the complainant didn’t file it with the court because
they were aware that it would be difficult to find another counsel.

Issue:
Is Atty guilty of negligence in handling the case?

Held:
Yes! 3 month suspension. Atty should have filed the notice of withdrawal himself if he truly wanted to withdraw. At the
very least, he should have informed the court. For failure to do so, Atty was negligent. Atty was also negligent in filing the
petition out of time. eventually he would have known that the petition was denied but still he failed to informe the convicts
and return their calls.
One of the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action
impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. He is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause. A lawyer’s right to
withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises only from the client’s written consent or from a good cause.
After agreeing to take up the cause of a client, a lawyer owes fidelity to both cause and client, even if the client
never paid any fee for the attorney-client relationship. Lawyering is not a business; it is a profession in which duty of public
service, not money, is the primary consideration.

17. Metrobank v. CA
G.R. Nos. 86100-03. January 23, 1990.

FACTS:
This petition for review on certiorari impugns the decision of the COurt of Appeals in CA-G.R. Nos. 08265-08268 affirming the
order of Branch 168, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, in Civil Cases Nos. 19123-128, 19136, and 19144,
fixing attorney’s fees and directing herein petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank), as defendant in said
civil cases, to pay its attorneys, herein private respondent Arturo Alafriz and Asosciates, movant therein, the amount of
P936,000.00 as attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit basis.

Issue:
Is Atty. entitled to a charging lien? Is a separate suit necessary for enforcement of the lien?

Held:
Yes! Yes! CA reversed without prejudice to proper to the bringing of proper proceedings. A charging lien, to be
enforceable as security for the payment of attorney's fees, requires as a condition sine qua non a judgment for money and
execution in pursuance of such judgment secured in the main action by the attorney in favor of his client. A lawyer may
enforce his right to fees by filing the necessary petition as an incident in the main action in which his services were rendered
when something is due his client in the action from which the fee is to be paid.
Here, there was no money judgment. Thus there is no charging lien. And court has no authority to fix a charging lien.
A petition for recovery of attorney's fees, either as a separate civil suit or as an incident in the main action, has to be
prosecuted and the allegations therein established as any other money claim.

18. GATCHALIAN PROMOTIONS V. NALDOZA

Facts:
Atty. convinced his clients to appeal a case from the POEA to the SC. Atty asked from complainants $2.5K which he
said were to be used for payment of docket fees and that the court could take cognizance of the case. Later, complainant
corporation came to know that the fees to be paid to the SC consisted only of nominal fees for such kind of appeal. Atty in
order to cover up presented complainant a fake xerox copy of an alleged Supreme Court receipt representing payment of
$2.5K.
A criminal case was filed for estafa. Atty was acquitted but was held civilly liable for $2.5K.

Issue:
Should Atty be disbarred? Should the case be dismissed because of his acquittal?

Held:
Yes disbarred! No, complaint shouldn’t be dismissed. Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their
own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. The burden of proof is clearly
preponderant evidence.
A finding of guilt in a criminal case or liability in a civil case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the
administrative case and vice versa. Neither will a favorable disposition in the civil action absolve the administrative liability of
the lawyer. The basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that
the disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa. Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are
sui generis
Respondent's acts are more despicable. Not only did he misappropriate the money entrusted to him; he also faked
a reason to cajole his client to part with his money. Worse, he had the gall to falsify an official receipt of this Court to cover
up his misdeeds. Clearly, he does not deserve to continue being a member of the bar.
19. SANTOS V. LLAMAS

Facts:
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against respondent Atty.
Francisco R. Llamas.
In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a member of
the bar, alleged that:
On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate sanction the matter of Atty. Francisco
R. Llamas who, for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of
issuance) in his pleadings
This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that only a duly admitted member of
the bar "who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law". There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides
that "default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and
default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll
of Attorneys."

Issues:
W/N counsel is guilty of misrepresentation? YES
W/N he is exempt from paying his dues? YES

Held:
Rule 139-A provides:
Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors
shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collections from
each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of
deceased members thereof.
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment
of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for
one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.
In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by paying his dues, and it
does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, §4 grants senior citizens "exemption from the
payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not exceed the poverty level as
determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does not include
payment of membership or association dues.
Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public and the courts that
he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND
SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. Esmso
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; nor shall he mislead or allow
the court to be misled by any artifice.
Respondent’s failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed merit the
most severe penalty. However, in view of respondent’s advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a
more temperate application of the law, we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law or until he
has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.

20. VICTORIA BARRIENTOS V. TRANSFIGURACION DAAROL

FACTS:
This is a disbarment case filed by Barrientos against Atty Daarol, on grounds of deceit and grossly immoral conduct.
Barrientos first knew Daarlo in 1969. She was a college student, single. Atty. Daarol went to her house because he
was a friend of her sister, hence they also became friends. She knew Daarol to be a single and as a General Manager of
ZANECO (electic cooperative).
On June 1973, Daarol went to Barrientos’ house and asked her to be one of the usherettes in the Mason’s convention
so the latter said he should ask for the permission of her parents. They consented and so she served as an usherette, Daarol
picking her up and taking her home everyday.
In July 1973, Daarol came to petitioner’s house and invited her for a joy ride, with the permission of her mother (who
was Daarol’s former classmate). They went to the beach and Daarol proposed his love for Barrientos and told her that if she
would accept him, he would marry her within 6 months from her acceptance. After a few days of courting, she accepted
the offer of love. Visitations continued and they agreed to get married in Dec 1973.
In Aug 1973, he took Barrientos to a party and when they left, he took her for a joy ride to an airport in Sicayab where
there were no houses around. There, he pressured her into having sexual intercourse reiterating that he loved her, and that
he would marry her and that December was very near anyway they would marry soon. She gave in after much hesitation
because she loved him. She cried after the deed.
This event happened frequently thereafter during August to October 1973, where she consented because she loved
him. Eventually, she became pregnant and informed Daarol. He however suggested that she have the baby aborted. She
refused. He told her that she didn’t have to worry because they were getting married soon anyway.
In late October 1973, Daarol came to see Barrientos and her mother and told them that he could not marry her
because he was already married. He reassured them though that he has been separated from his wife for 16 years and that
he would work for the annulment of his marriage and subsequently marry her. So Barrientos waited and delivered the baby
but eventually wasn’t able to contact Daarol anymore (he went MIA).

ISSUE:
W/N Daarol should be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct.

HELD/RATIO:
 YES. The fact of his previous marriage was disclosed by respondent only after the complainant became pregnant.
Even then, respondent misrepresented himself as being eligible to re-marry for having been estranged from his wife for 16
years and dangled a marriage proposal on the assurance that he would work for the annulment of his first marriage. It was a
deception after all as it turned out that respondent never bothered to annul said marriage.
Respondent resorted to deceit in the satisfaction of his sexual desires at the expense of the gullible complainant. He
is perverted. He says that: "I see nothing wrong with this relationship despite my being married." Worse, he even suggested
abortion.
Finally, respondent even had the temerity to allege that he is a Moslem convert and as such, could enter into multiple
marriages and has inquired into the possibility of marrying complainant. As records indicate, however, his claim of having
embraced the Islam religion is not supported by any evidence save that of his self-serving testimony.
By his acts of deceit and immoral tendencies to appease his sexual desires, respondent Daarol has amply
demonstrated his moral delinquency. Hence, his removal for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar on the grounds of
deceit and grossly immoral conduct is in order.

21. FELICITAS BERBANO V. ATTY. WENCESLAO BARCELONA

FACTS:
This is a disbarment case filed by Berbano against Atty. Barcelona for Malpractice and Gross Misconduct
Unbecoming of a Lawyer, Dereliction of Duty and Unjust Enrichment.
Berbano was one of the heirs of a certain Hilapo, who owned a lot in Alabang. Said lot was being claimed by FIlinvest
Development Corp so Berbano and her co-heirs appointed a certain Mr. Daen as attorney-in-fact. However, Mr. Dane was
arrested in Jan 1999 and was detained so he needed the assistance of a law for his release. Someone recommended Atty.
Barcelona to them. So later that month, Atty. Barcelona went to see Mr. Daen in jail. The latter engaged the services of Atty.
Barcelona for his release. Atty. Barcelona told them that they (Berbano and Co.) had to produce P50,000 at that time so that
he could secure Daen’s release the following day. Berbano didn’t have enough money and time to immediately come up
with such big amount but they were able to come up with P15,700. She handed Atty. Barcelona the money. He said that he
would go to the SC to talk to someone regarding the release of Daen, and that they should just meet tomorrow.
The day after, they met again. Berbano handed over another check worth P24,000. The day after, they gave another
P10,000 to Atty. Barcelona (through his wife and daughter). There were other payments of money, the total amounting to
P64,000. After much time wasted, and promises reiterated of the release of Daen, Atty. Barcelona wasn’t seen again and he
didn’t return their calls. Daen was still in jail.
Atty. Barcelona failed to file an answer. Commissioner on Bar Discipline found Barcelona guilty of malpractice and
serious breach of CPR. He recommended disbarment and return of the P64,000. IBP Board of Governots adopted such findings
but recommended only suspension.

ISSUE:
W/N Atty. Barcelona should be disbarred.

HELD/RATIO:
Yes. The object of a disbarment proceeding is not so much to punish the individual attorney himself, as to safeguard
the administration of justice by protecting the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court, and to remove
from the profession of law persons whose disregard for their oath of office have proved them unfit to continue discharging
the trust reposed in them as members of the bar.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and for the court to exercise its
disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.
Considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held
that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.
Complainant’s evidence consists solely of her Affidavit-Complaint and testimony before the Commission attesting to
the truth of the allegations laid down in her affidavit. The act of respondent in not filing his answer and ignoring the hearings
set by the Investigating Commission, despite due notice, emphasized his contempt for legal proceedings.
Respondent collected money from the complainant and the nephew of the detained person in the total amount of
P64,000.00 for the immediate release of the detainee through his alleged connection with a Justice of the Supreme Court. He
deserves to be disbarred from the practice of law. Respondent has demonstrated a penchant for misrepresenting to clients
that he has the proper connections to secure the relief they seek, and thereafter, ask for money, which will allegedly be given
to such connections. In this case, respondent misrepresented to complainant that he could get the release of Mr. Porfirio
Daen through his connection with a Supreme Court Justice. In so doing, respondent placed the Court in dishonor and public
contempt. He is disbarred.

22. HILDA D. TABAS V. ATTY. BONIFACIO B. MANGIBIN

FACTS:
This is a disbarment case filed by Tabas against Atty. Mangibin for allegedly having committed forgery.
Tabas claims that in March 2001, a certain Galvan mortgaged to her a piece of real property to secure a P48,000
loan. The deed of the REM was registered and annotated. On October 2001 however, a certain Castillejos, falsely representing
herself as Tabas, appeared before Atty. Mangibin and asked him to prepare a discharge of the said mortgage and then
notarize it afterwards.
Atty. Mangibin prepared the said discharge but he didn’t ask Castillejos for any other document other that a
Community Tax Certificate. He later on notarized the said deed. Subsequently, the mortgagor Galvan was able to mortgage
the same property again with Rural Bank of Nauilian. When Tabas learned of the cancellation, she promptly informed Atty.
Mangibin that her signature in the deed was forged. However, he did not help her.
Atty. Mangibin admits of the discharge deed but denies liability for the falsification under a claim of good faith. He
says he did not know of Castillejos’ fraudulent intent and so, he cannot be faulted. He claims it is beyond the realm of his futy
to investigate the identity of persons appearing before him. And that as a matter of routine, he only requires the CTCs of
persons appearing before him.
IBP recommended to give respondent merely a warning, to be more careful in the preparation of legal documents
so that such situations may me avoided in the future. Bar Confidant however recommended suspension. He was found guilty
of gross negligence.
ISSUE: W/N Atty. Mangibin is liable for violating the Notarial Law and should be suspended from the practice of law.

HELD/RATIO:
Yes, suspended for 2 years.
A notarial document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies, and the
public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private
instrument.
For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their
duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public in the integrity of public instruments would be undermined. A notary public
should not notarize a document unless the person who signed the same is the very same person who executed and personally
appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of matters stated in the document. The purpose of this requirement
is to enable the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signature of the acknowledging party and to ascertain that the
document is the party's free act and deed.
The circumstances in this case indubitably show that respondent did not take even ordinary precautions required in
the premises. Respondent’s conduct showed serious lack of due care in the performance of his duties as a notary
public. Because of his carelessness, respondent failed to notice the glaring difference in the signature of mortgagee in the
deed of real estate mortgage from her purported signature in the questioned discharge of real estate mortgage. Hence, he
breached Canon I of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers to promote respect for the law and legal
processes as well as to uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land.

23. MANALANG V. ANGELES

FACTS:
Manalang and Cirillo alleged that they were the complainants in a case for overtime and separation pay filed against
their employer, the Philippine Racing Club Restaurant, before the National Labor Relations. Respondent was their counsel.
Judgment was rendered in their favor, in the amount of P6,500. After the decision became final, a writ of execution issued.
However, without authority from his clients, respondent compromised the award and was able to collect P5,500 only.
Complainants said they made several demands upon respondent to turn over to them the amount collected minus
the agreed upon attorney's fees of thirty percent (30%), but Atty. Angeles refused and offered to give them only the sum of
P2,650.
Respondent counsel stated that he offered to give complainants their money, but they insisted that he "deduct from
this attorney's fees the amount of P2,000, representing the amount discounted by the counsel of the Philippine Racing Club
Restaurant, together with sheriff legal fees and other administrative expenses." Respondent claimed that to accept
complainants' proposition meant that he "would not be compensated for prosecuting and handling, the case.”

ISSUE:
Whether respondent Atty. Francisco F. Angeles should be suspended from the practice of law because of grave
misconduct related to his clients' funds.

HELD
Where a member of the bar stands charged with malpractice, the proceedings are not meant solely to rule on his
culpability but also to determine if the lawyer concerned is possessed of that good moral character, which is a condition
precedent to the privilege of practicing law and continuing in the practice thereof.
Money claims due to workers cannot, as a rule, be the object of settlement or compromise effected by counsel
without the consent of the workers concerned . A client has every right to expect from his counsel that nothing will be taken
or withheld from him, save by the rules of law validly applied. By compromising the judgment without the consent of his clients,
respondent not only went against the stream of judicial dicta, he also exhibited an uncaring lack of devotion to the interest
of his clients as well as want of zeal in the maintenance and defense of their rights. In so doing, he violated Canon 17 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession. In the instant case,
the records clearly and abundantly point to respondent's receipt of and failure to deliver upon demand, the amount of P4,550
intended for his clients. This is a clear breach of Rule 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Moreover, his excuse in his answer, that he should be allowed to deduct sheriff's fees and other administrative
expenses before delivering the money due his clients, is unsatisfactory. Respondent clearly failed to comply with the Rules of
Court in the enforcement of an attorney's liens. The records of this case are barren of any statement of respondent's claims
for lien or payment of his alleged disbursements. Nor did respondent present any showing that he caused written notices of
his lien on the money judgment to be served upon his clients and to the losing party
His act of holding on to his clients' money without their acquiescence is conduct indicative of lack of integrity and
propriety. He was clinging to something which was not his, and to which he had no right. He appears oblivious of the
admonition that a member of the legal fraternity should refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and
confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession.
This is the first case on record against him, a fact which could be taken into account by way of mitigation. Considering
further the amount involved, the penalty of six (6) months suspension appears to us in order.

24. ATTY. GEORGE C. BRIONES V. ATTY. JACINTO D. JIMENEZ

FACTS:
The complainant in this disbarment case is Atty. Briones. The respondent is Atty. Jimenez. Complainant Briones is the
Special Administrator of the Henson Estate, while respondent Jimenez is the counsel for Heirs of Henson.
The root of herein administrative complaint for Disbarment is an RTC Order (2002). The RTC Order directed
complainant Briones to deliver the residue of the estate to the Heirs in proportion to their shares. Complainant Briones did not
reply to the demand, so respondent Jimenez opted to file a criminal complaint in behalf of his clients for refusal to obey the
lawful order of the court.
Complainant Briones now claims that respondent Jimenez is guilty of violation of Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional
responsibility by filing the unfounded criminal complaint against complainant to obtain an improper advantage:
Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not
present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in
any case of proceeding.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Atty. Jimenez should be administratively liable.

HELD:
Yes. Atty. Jacinto D. Jimenez is found guilty of and REPRIMANDED [since no evidence of malice or bad faith] for
violation of Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Fair play demands that respondent should have filed the
proper motion with the RTC to attain his goal of having the residue of the estate delivered to his clients and not subject
complainant to a premature criminal prosecution.
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins a lawyer to represent his client with zeal. However, the
same Canon provides that a lawyer’s performance of his duties towards his client must be within the bounds of the law. Rule
19.01 of the same Canon requires, among others, that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his client. To permit lawyers to resort to unscrupulous practices for the protection of the supposed rights of their
clients is to defeat one of the purposes of the state – the administration of justice. While lawyers owe their entire devotion to
the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their client’s right, they should not forget that they are, first and foremost,
officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.

25. PENA V. APARICIO

FACTS
Atty. Aparicio was the legal counsel for Grace Hufana in an alleged dismissal case before the NLRC against Pena,
President of MOF Company. Atty. Aparicio prayed that his client be given separation pay. Peña rejected the claim.
Thereafter, Peña sent notices to Hufana to return to work. Atty. Aparicio replied with a letter reiterating the claim of his client.
The letter also contained threats against the company stating that if the claim is not paid on Aug. 10, 2005, they will file multiple
charges such as, criminal charges for tax evasion, falsification of documents, and for the cancellation of the company’s
business license.
Peña filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Aparicio with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP for
violating Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. Aparicio in turn filed counterclaims for the
defamatory charges against him. The IBP dismissed the complaint because Peña had allegedly failed to file his position paper
and the certification against forum shopping. The IBP transmitted the records of the case to the SC.
Atty. Aparicio filed an MR with the SC reiterating his claim for damages against Peña in the amount of P400M for filing
false, malicious, defamatory, fraudulent suit against him. Peña likewise filed this Petition for Review alleging that he submitted
his position paper and that the dismissal denied him of due process.

ISSUE
W/N Atty. Aparicio is guilty of violating Rule 19.01?

HELD
Yup!
First of all, the SC found that Peña actually submitted his position paper. In addition, disbarment proceedings are sui
generis, hence, the requirement of a certification of forum shopping is not to be strictly complied with in such a case. At any
rate, Peña actually submitted a certification against forum shopping after Atty. Aparicio filed the motion to dismiss, curing the
supposed defect in the original complaint.
Now to the merits…
Canon 19, “a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law,” this shows that a lawyer’s duty
to his client is subordinate to his duty in the administration of justice.
Rule 19.01, “a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not
present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in
any case or proceeding.” Under such Rule, a lawyer should not file or threaten to file baseless criminal cases against the
adversaries of his client to secure a leverage to compel the adversaries to yield to the claims of the lawyer’s client. This is
exactly what Atty. Aparicio did in this case.
Furthermore, his threats were not only unethical, but they amounted to blackmail – extortion of money by threats of
accusation or exposure in the public prints. Blackmail and extortion would not only entail disbarment but also possible criminal
prosecution. Worse yet, Atty. Aparicio actually admitted and even found it his obligation to tell the truth of the offenses he
imputed against Peña. He also stated that the writing of demand letters is standard practice.
SC ruled that Atty. Aparicio’s assertions are misleading because the fact of the matter is, he used such threats to gain
leverage against Peña and force the latter to accede to his client’s claims. The letter even implied a promise to “keep silent”
about the said violations if the claim is met.
While it is true that writing demand letters is standard practice in the profession of law, such letters must not contain
threats such as those found in this case.
Nevertheless, SC held that disbarment is too severe a penalty considering that Atty. Aparicio wrote the letter out of
his overzealousness to protect his client’s interests. Therefore, the SC reprimanded him with a stern warning.