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A COMPARISON BETWEEN THE MALAYSIA AND VIETNAM

COUNTER INSURGENCY OPERATIONS: AN ANALYSIS

INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

1. The emergence of communist insurgency in Malaysia (formerly known

as Malaya) during the First Emergency 1948-1960 and the Vietnam War

1955-1975 occurred after the surrender of the Japanese during World War II.

The main objective of the communist insurgence was to liberate their country

by establishing a communist government by eliminating the colonists that had

been occupying their country. The emergence of insurgency in Malaysia and

Vietnam through their communist party had been influenced by the Cold War

where communism and democracy competed with each other to spread their

ideologies (Choong, 2007). Due to its strategic location between the North

China Sea and the Malacca Strait, Southeast Asia became an area of interest

to the communists. Inspired by Mao Tse-Tung’s doctrine of insurgency, the

communist party in both countries had used that doctrine to launch their arms

struggle (Barber, 1971). According to Nadl (2002) the adaptation of Mao Tse-

Tung’s doctrine, guerrilla warfare was used by the communist insurgents in

Malaya and Vietnam in order to achieve success in their arms struggle by

avoiding the enemy’s strong point, and attack their weakest point. Looking at

the capabilities of the British, French and United States Forces, we know that

they had an advantage in terms of firepower, when the insurgents did not. On

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the other hand, the insurgents were fully equipped with additional human

resource, knowledge on the terrain, and support from the local population. In

this paper, the counter insurgency operation in Vietnam will only emphasis on

the Vietnam War and for counter insurgency operation in Malaysian will cover

both operations that had been made by British and Malaysian government.

AIM

2. The aim of this paper is to study and compare the counter insurgency

operations that had been conducted in Malaysia and Vietnam where the

analysis of it can be used as a guide for the Malaysian Army to conduct

counter insurgency operations in the future.

SCOPE

3. The scope of this paper is as follows:

a. Introduction.

b. Discussion.

(1) Definition of Insurgency.

(2) Insurgency in Malaysia.

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(3) Insurgency in Vietnam.

(4) Malaysia and Vietnam Counter insurgency Comparison.

d. Recommendation.

e. Conclusion.

DISCUSSION

DEFINITION OF INSURGENCY

4. According to the Cambridge English Dictionary, insurgency can be

defined as an occasion when a group of people attempt to take control of their

country by force. The word ‘guerrilla’ originated from the Spanish term of

guerrilos, which is defined as “small war”. Nadl (2002) mentioned that in 1808,

the small Spanish guerrilos combined with British forces that totalled 60,000

men against 250,000 men from the French forces, and they managed to beat

the large force using guerrilla tactics. Based on both definitions, the

insurgents will rise against the government using the guerrilla tactics in order

to manipulate their opponent’s weaknesses, and at the same time, use the

advantages they have or own.

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INSURGENCY IN MALAYSIA

5. The communist insurgency in Malaysia was divided into two parts; the

First Emergency, which lasted for 12 years (from 1948 until 1960), and the

Second Emergency from 1969-1989. The First Emergency was declared by

British after the killings of several British plantation managers by the Malaya

Communist Party (MCP) members on 16th June 1948. The Second

Emergency occurred in 1969 after the ambush of Security Forces personnel

in Kroh-Bentong where they managed killed 17 security forces members

(Nazar, 2004). Nazar (2004) also mentioned that before the Second

Emergency was announced, the MCP Central Command had issued a

directive to their members as the sign for preparation to launch the arms

struggle against Malaysian government, which is “Hold High the Great Red

Banned of Armed Struggle and Valiantly March Forward”. The Second

Emergency was declared over when the MCP agreed to lay down their arms

on 2nd December 1989 through the Hat Yai Agreement between the

government of Malaysia and the MCP.

6. During both emergencies, the MCP operated from the thick jungles of

Malaysia where it gave them the advantage of being able to carry out their

operations freely and without any interference from security forces. The

reason why the MCP chose guerrilla warfare was because Mao Tse-tung’s

insurgency doctrine mentioned that the insurgency or revolution should begin

with a rural revolution by concentrating on peaceful areas until the city is

helpless in the centre while it is left alone (Barber, 1971). During this lull

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period from 1960 until 1969, the MCP sent their small unit elements called the

‘Shock Brigade’ to the south of peninsular Malaysia to gain support from the

local population through their propaganda, conduct a series of offensive

operations towards the security forces, recruit new members who were mostly

young people, and learn new tactics from the Vietnam War.

INSURGENCY IN VIETNAM

7. The insurgency in Vietnam was also conducted in two parts; the First

Insurgency (also known as The First Indochina War) from December 1946

until August 1954 and Second Indochina War (also known as Vietnam War)

from 1955-1975. The First Indochina War was between the Viet Minh and the

French colonial Forces in order to establish a government after the Japanese

surrendered in August 1945 (Fall, 1966). Leader of Viet Minh, Ho Chi Minh

took the opportunity to declare the Vietnam Independence on 2 nd September

1945, but the Chinese and British denied it due to their anti-communist policy

and both of the governments allowed the restoration of a French ruler in

Vietnam. After the restoration of French Vietnam, the French forces had

conducted a series of offensive operations on Saigon to annihilate

communists, but it was retaliated by Viet Minh. In December 1945, both

parties were openly at war.

8. Due to the lack of firepower, air support and supplies to conduct a

large-scale military operation, the Viet Minh used guerrilla warfare tactics by

operating in the jungles, countryside and mountains to establish their bases

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and retaliate against the French Forces. The terrains were an advantage for

them because the area was too remote for the French to conduct a military

operation. Besides that, the aim of the guerrilla warfare chosen by the Viet

Minh was to prolong the war and inflict heavy casualties among the French

soldiers, as it would demoralise the French troops. The Viet Minh did not only

rely on military tactics, as they also deployed their cadres to mingle with the

locals, especially peasants, to gain information, establish political support, and

get supplies for their arms struggle by promoting to the Vietnamese that the

war was the people’s war, and that it was important for the Vietnamese to

fight against the French Army. After they had failed from the military aspect,

the French government began to use political channels in order to establish a

moderate and pro French Vietnam government by selecting Emperor Bao Dai

as the ruler of South Vietnam. The French forces was defeated in the Battle of

Dien Bien Phu on 13th March 1954 where it marked the end of the French

occupation in Vietnam and turned the tide of the war. On 21 st July 1954, the

Geneva Conference had agreed to recognise the 17 th Parallel North line,

which divided Vietnam into two regions, North and South Vietnam.

9. After the separation of Vietnam, North Vietnam managed to rebuild

their country by having political and economic stability. However, the situation

in South Vietnam was difficult where the government was corrupted and weak

in terms of political administration that resulted in the pervasiveness of

insurgents to spread among the local population. The crisis in the government

became worst after Emperor Bao Dai was ousted by his own Prime Minister,

Ngo Dinh Diem. This turn of events only caused more damage to the

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economy and efficacy of the newly born Republic of Vietnam (Shari, 1987).

The North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Vietcong (VC) launched the Second

Indochina War (also known as the Vietnam War) with the aim to reunite

Vietnam under one communist ruler. This war lasted for 19 years, from 1st

November 1955 until 30th April 1975, which resulted in the fall of South

Vietnamese government.

MALAYSIA AND VIETNAM COUNTER INSURGENCY COMPARISON

10. The counter insurgency operations in Malaysia and Vietnam are crucial

for scholars and military researchers to study, as the findings can be used to

analyse and understand how a counter insurgency operation can fail or

succeed. Researches that have been made by Barber (1971), Ahmad (1987),

Yadi (2004), Nagl (2002) Nazar (2005) and many others have identified the

factors that contribute to the success of counter insurgency operations in

Malaysia and failures in Vietnam. According to Ahmad (1987), the communist

insurgents had the same objectives, but there were contrasts between the

operations in Malaysia and Vietnam that involved vast differences in political

perspectives, sovereignty and methods that were used by governments and

insurgents to gain supports from local populations. Based on available

references and sources, the comparison between the Malaysian and Vietnam

Counter insurgency operations are discussed below.

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11. The Aim of Insurgency.

a. Tomer (1972) had identified that the objectives of the MCP, NVA

and VC were completely different. In both Emergencies, the MCP

aimed to establish a communist government by overthrowing the

British government and Malay Sultanate during the First Emergency,

although there (were negotiations/was a negotiation) between Britain

and Malaya about Malaya gaining its independence. Despite Malaya

becoming the Independent Federation of Malaya and freeing itself from

Britain on 31st August 1957, the MCP continued its insurgency

operation. The MCP continued their resistance against the legitimate

government of Malaysia that was led purely by Malaysians. The

resistance of the MCP during the First Emergency failed to gain

support from the local population, especially among the Malays,

because anti-colonialism in Malaya was not a major issue as the

country was in the middle of gaining independence. During the Second

Emergency, the MCP was still unpopular because they were against

the government and their cause lost the support from the majority race

of the country, the Malay people due to the religious and customs

belief.

b. Meanwhile in Vietnam, the Viet Minh, NVA and VC were fighting

for their independence from the French colonisation in the First Indo

China War and the reunification for Vietnam in the Second Vietnam

War (Andarde and Willbanks, 2006). Those were the reasons the

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communist insurgents had used to gain the support of the local

population against the French and the US. According to Andarde and

Willbanks (2006), the number of communist insurgent members during

the Vietnam War increased from 230,000 (in 1965) to 685,000 (in

1975).

12. The Enemy.

a. The counter insurgency operation in Malaysia took 41 years to

end when it had been fought by the British, the British Commonwealth

and the Malaysia security forces (Yadi, 2000). During both

Emergencies, the MCP used tactics of guerrilla warfare by conducting

attacks and ambushes on the security forces using the hit and run

method. Besides that, the MCP created terror among the population

and sabotaged the source of economy, such as mines and plantations.

According to Yadi (2000) and Nazar (2005), the MCP used three

phases for their operations based on the success of Mao Tse-tung’s

campaign in defeating Chiang Kai Shek in the China Civil War. The

CPM withdrew to the north of peninsular Malaysia to reorganise and

establish their bases to launch another operation after the First

Emergency was declared over in 1960. During the lull period (1960 to

1969) before the Second Emergency, the MCP reorganised and

developed a new guerrilla training they learned from Vietnam that

achieved lot of success during the initial phase. After the internal crisis

within the MCP in the early 1970s and the action taken by the

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Malaysian government to isolate the communist insurgents from the

population through KESBAN and military operation, the MCP became

weaker and on 2nd December 1989, the MCP signed the Peace Accord

with the Malaysia Government in Hat Yai, Thailand that officially ended

their resistance toward the Malaysian government.

b. The situation in Vietnam was very different compared to

Malaysia. The counter insurgency operation in Vietnam was not

completely counter insurgency warfare, however it was more of a mix

of conventional and guerrilla warfare that involved a combination of

guerrillas, political cadres and modern military forces that were capable

of retaliating against any US military operation (Andrade and Willbanks,

2006). After having gained experience and winning the fight against the

French forces, the NVA has the capabilities to conduct conventional

warfare where the army was organised into regiments and divisions.

The task to conduct guerrilla warfare fell to the VC. The capabilities of

the NVA and VC were proven during three major military operations

that were launched by the communist insurgents during the Tet

Offensive (1968), Easter Offensive (1972) and the final offensive that

marked the fall of South Vietnam (1975).

13. Organisational Culture.

a. Back then, the British Army was a learning institution where it is

a part of their organisational culture until now (Nagl, 2002). Based on

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the previous battles that had been involved by the British Army in

policing their empire and the two World Wars, this enabled the officers

to study and successfully develop a counter insurgency doctrine in

Malaya and shared their knowledge with Malaysian Security Forces

personnel. The extent of their colonies that had spread around the

globe had caused the British to use the minimum military force when

conducting operations to fight insurgents. This resulted in the

techniques against the insurgents to be developed and taught to the

British Army. For example, in 1896, the unofficial counter insurgency

manual written by Major Charles Callwell entitled, ‘Small War’ was

used to teach Staff College students in 1920 on how to handle and

face the guerrilla and insurgents (Nadl, 2002). O’Neill (1996) cited by

Nadl (2002) mentioned that based on their experience in the Burma

Campaign during World War II, the British Army had developed a

doctrine that is vital for fighting insurgents in the future, such as

understanding the nature of people and the politics in the area of

operations, and working with the local population to gain their support

while denying it to the insurgents and other parties. Based on that, the

British forces have come up with the Five Principles of Counter

insurgency, and they are as follows:

(1) The government must have a clear political aim, to

establish and maintain an independent and united country,

which is politically and economically stable and viable.

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(2) The government must function in accordance with the

law.

(3) The government must have an overall plan.

(4) The government must give priority to defeating the

political subversion, not the guerrillas.

(5) In the guerrilla phase of an insurgency, a government

must secure its base areas first.

b. The Americans, on other hand, was quite different in terms of

their opinions on counter insurgency operations. The US Army concept

of warfare emphasises that warfare must be won quickly by using

heavy firepower to defeat the enemy (Nadl, 2002). Andrade &

Willbanks (2006) mentioned that the US Army focuses more on the

method of defeating the enemy quickly. This can be seen from General

Westmorland’s strategy in Vietnam where it emphasised on chasing

the enemy and forcing them to fight or flee. This is also known as

search and destroy. By focusing a large scale of forces to fight

insurgents using conventional tactics, this had caused the counter

insurgency to not become a main subject to be taught nor considered

by military personnel. Nadl (2002) stated that in 1956 before the direct

involvement of the US military in Vietnam, there was no study

conducted on guerrilla warfare. As a result, it had caused the US

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military to not have enough troops to fight the NVA and VC, and the

communist had the upper hand when it came to infiltrating Vietnam by

bringing in logistic supplies and weaponry. Although the US military

was involved in the war as military advisors to the Army of the Republic

of Vietnamese (ARVN) from 1950 until 1964 under the United States

Military Assistance Advisory Group (USMAAG), it was still unprepared

in terms of training or understanding everything there was to know

about insurgency warfare in Vietnam. Nadl (2002) cited Major General

John Wilson quoted that the USMAAG tried to build ARVN as the

conventional forces where it seemed unsuitable with the nature (of

what?), and this had caused them to lose the Vietnam War and

exposing themselves to annihilation by the NVA and VC.

14. Unity in Management and Command.

a. The British forces did not just rely on the military to fight the

communist insurgents, but it also involved the civil authorities in the

fight against communism, because according to General Templar,

fighting insurgency is more about fighting ideologies, and the

authorities must be involved and take actions to deny it (Komer, 1972.,

Nadl, 2002., and Nazar., 2005). Civil authority had a close relationship

with the security forces because they conduct counter insurgency

operations, military operations and defeat ideology wars to gain the

population's trust towards the government. Therefore, in order to reject

the MCP propaganda and stop the Min Yuen from getting supplies,

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such as money, food and medicine, the local authorities worked

together with the police to cease the Min Yuen’s operations and isolate

it from the population. The military conducted an offensive operation

deep in the jungle to search and destroy the insurgents as well as their

bases and supplies. This unity of command that was introduced by the

British involved the War Executive Committee (WEC) system at

Federal (FWC), state (SWC) and District (DWC) based on the

hierarchy, as the effort of fighting communist insurgents involved the

participation of all levels of authority (Komer, 1972). When facing the

MCP during the Second Emergency, the Malayan government adopted

the methods that were introduced by the British.

b. In Vietnam, the scenario was entirely different compared to

Malaysia. Unlike Malaysia, the British had colonised Malaya since the

19th century, meanwhile in Vietnam, the US was only involved in the

capacity of Military Assistance, and not getting involved in political and

administration matters of the South Vietnamese government. The US

Army was more focused on the military operations rather than

conducting a unified command between the military and civil authority.

Based on the comparisons made, Nadl (2002) mentioned that in the

matter of counter insurgency operations, the US military emphasised

on the military domination of politics and solving the problem by using

the military. The lack of unity in command in Vietnam had caused a

political turbulence in the South Vietnamese government, and the

government’s weaknesses will provide the insurgents with an

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opportunity to control the conflict by gaining the support and trust from

the government (Nazar, 2005).

15. Resettlement.

a. This was considered to be the most important and reliable step

that needed to be done by the government in conducting counter

insurgency operations. The government is required to separate the

locals, especially the villagers that live near jungle fringe or in remote

areas, from the insurgents. The local population was considered as

important for the insurgents to get their supplies and logistic support

from. Both countries’ counter insurgency operations used the similar

method of preventing the population from interacting with the

communist insurgents, and only (this) one method seemed to have

succeeded. In Malaysia, General Sir Harold Briggs initiated the

resettlement programme through the Briggs Plan. In this plan, most of

the Chinese squatters who live near the jungle fringe were relocated to

the new resettlement known as the new village or kampung baru where

the number of squatters was around 400,000 people (Nadl, 2002).

b. The resettlement programme was based on Briggs’ counter

insurgency experience in Palestine. The New Village was guarded to

prevent any communication between the local population and the

communist insurgents, and the food supply was controlled. Besides

resettlement, Briggs had also implemented the Black and White area.

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The black area normally faced curfew and it limited the movement of

the population, and according to Komer (1972) and Nadl (2002), it was

mentioned that it is important for the government to dominate

populated areas in order to create a feeling of security among the

people, breaking the communist supporters, stopping information from

spreading and the supply of communist insurgents, and lastly, forcing

the communist insurgents to conduct offensive operations on our own

ground/territory.

c. The US Army and the South Vietnam government understood

and recognised the importance of isolating the population from the

communist. This is known as pacification. The pacification programme

was adapted from the implementation of the Briggs Plan in Malaya.

The resettlement programme in Vietnam, known as Strategic Hamlet,

was quite different compared to the Briggs Plan. The pacification

through Strategic Hamlet programme became unpopular to the South

Vietnam population because they needed to move out and relocate to

a new place. According to Shari (1987), the South Vietnamese

protested against the programme because they will lose the village or

hometown where they grew up for generations, and were uncertain

about what will happen to their villages in the future. According to

Pinnard (1996), from the very beginning, the strategic hamlet

programme seemed weak, as many of the strategic hamlets faced the

logistic shortcoming of not being constructed properly, well protected,

and not much attention was given to the population in the early stages.

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Those issues had resulted in mistrust between the villagers and the

South Vietnamese government on the programme. Because of that,

the US military and the South Vietnamese government isolated the

communists from gaining information and getting supplies from the

local population, and it was the essential factor in the failure of the

counter insurgency.

16. Heart and Mind.

a. To get the support of the population, it is important for the

government to win the hearts and minds of the people. In order to do

that, during First and Second Emergency in Malaysia, the British and

Malaysian government concentrated on providing the development and

modernisation plans for the benefit of the population and the country.

This will provide a sense of security, comfort and safety where these

three elements are important to deny any subversion among the

population. This Malaysian government continued this by developing

the Security and Development Programme or Keselamatan dan

Pembangunan (KESBAN) that was introduced by the late Tun Abdul

Razak. Both governments conducted a number of developments,

especially in the rural areas, such as road construction, new schools,

hospitals, clinics and other amenities in order to protect the population

from insurgents and build up the economy of the country. The gist of

KESBAN, for example, the development and security must be

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balanced in order to ensure the population’s support for the

government and deny it to the insurgents.

b. On the other hand, the US Army developed its own heart and

mind programme known as the Civil Operations and Revolutionary

Development Support (CORDS) as a part of their pacification

programme. The aims of this programme were to improve the

economic, health and educational facilities, the condition in South

Vietnam, and at the same time, increase nationalism among the South

Vietnamese with the hope to revoke the NVA and VC resistance.

Although the CORDS was established, it failed to win the hearts and

minds of the South Vietnamese population because it had failed to

prevent the VC propaganda towards the people, and the gap between

the locals and the South Vietnamese government grew even more,

especially after Strategic Hamlet programme. For example, the

torturing of the VC and the killing of innocent South Vietnamese

villagers during the My Lai Massacre by the US forces and AVRN

caused the population to turn their support from South Vietnam to

North Vietnam.

17. Military Tactics.

a. In both counter insurgency operations, the approach, in terms of

military tactics, was different from each other. According to Chong

(2007), the British and Malaysian Armed Forces avoided the use of a

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large-scale military operation while conducting counter insurgency

operations where it concentrated on the more effective system of a

small unit patrol, which was the same tactic that was used by the MCP.

In this type of operation, the military operated in the dense jungle

where the battalion dispersed; the battalion commanders hand over

tactical control to their companies, and the company commander

hands over the control to the platoon commander. Each of the platoon

had their own area of operations and each of their Sergeants and

Corporals conducted small patrols for two or three days. The

advantages of this tactic are that there is a better flow of information,

and it also gave the young officers an opportunity to learn to react

quickly and effectively. This shows that the British Army realised the

importance of key personnel to fight the communist insurgents like the

enemy does. This type of military operation was continued by

Malaysian Army during the Second Emergency where a small unit

operation was conducted to cut the enemy line of communication and

supply in the jungle, and also, to gain information in the jungle.

b. Compared to the US Army regarding aerial bombardments, the

British and Malaysian Army conducted air bombings only on known

enemy positions that provided intelligence. The counter insurgency in

Malaysia did not only concentrate on the use of military force in an

offensive operation, but it also depended on the good use of

intelligence services and Special Branch in which they have managed

to infiltrate into the MCP and provide information to the security forces.

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Nadl (2002) cited General Templar’s statement that said the

Emergency in Malaya would be won by the intelligence system and

Special Branch.

c. The US Army in Vietnam concentrated on the use of

conventional warfare, which had been taught to the AVRN as

mentioned by Andrade and Willbank (2006). This type of tactic had

caused the use of a large numbered force to deny the NVA and VC

infiltrations, especially on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The use of large-scale

forces by the US Army was to end the counter insurgency operation in

Vietnam as soon as possible. The use of heavy firepower by the US

forces when they had been attacked or ambushed caused the

destruction of the villages, property and even the life of the villagers

where it tarnishes the US force reputation. The use of massive aerial

bombardment by the US Air Force, such as Operation Linebacker I and

II on suspected areas had also caused devastating destruction where

2,865,808 tonnes of bomb and air ammunition were dropped on

Indochina during Vietnam War.

d. The massive bombardments by the US was used as the main

reason to resist the attack and reunite the South and North Vietnamese

to fight the colonisation of America by the North Vietnamese

propaganda (Chong, 2007). The US Army had also questioned the

competency of the AVRN where most of the AVRN did not fight

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wholeheartedly against their enemy but depend on US Army to defeat

the enemy.

RECOMMENDATION

18. Based on the discussion that have been made about the counter

insurgency operation in Malaysia and Vietnam, the recommendations are as

follow:

a. Counter insurgency syllabus need to be enhance and review

from MCP type of guerrilla warfare to the modern-day guerrilla warfare

for example in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq and others. This is important

for the Malaysian Army to prepare to conduct counter insurgency

operation just not only in jungles area but also in other types of

scenarios such as town, modern and organised insurgents and the use

of the current technologies.

b. The concept and importance of KESBAN in counter insurgency

operation are require to be expose among the Young Officers and

soldiers for their knowledge and understanding. The successful of

Malaysian Army in fighting MCP insurgency not only due to military

operation but also the close cooperation by local authorities.

c. Besides Malaysia and Vietnam counter insurgency operation,

the other counter insurgency operation such as in Iraq, Afghanistan,

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Syria and other counter insurgency operation. By study and making

comparison with other countries counter insurgency operation, the

weaknesses and successful can be study and analyse. The concept

and gist of guerrilla war still same but it had evolved in term of

weaponry, political and interference of superpower such as Russia and

United States.

CONCLUSION

19. Based on the discussion that has been discussed in this paper, counter

insurgency operation is an operation that military operation and civil authority

can’t stand on their own. Looking at the comparison of counter insurgency

operation in Malaysia and Vietnam, it shows that counter insurgency

operation requires close relationship and cooperation between local

authorities and military. This is important because counter insurgency

operation just not only emphasise on how to defeat the enemy but it is also

related how to overcome the subversive ideology penetrate local population.

Security and development (KESBAN) also plays important roles in counter

insurgency operation and it is still relevant until now. KESBAN has shown it

effectiveness especially during the Second Emergency. Having balance in

economy and security will ensure the confidence and support of local

population towards government and at the same time will isolate the

insurgents from getting their support and supply.

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