Pavón-Cuéllar, D. (2014). ‘Extimacy’, in Thomas Teo (Ed.

), Encyclopedia of Critical
Psychology. New York: Springer.

Extimacy
David Pavón-Cuéllar

Introduction
The term “extimacy”, an English translation of the French neologism (extimité) coined by the
psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan (1959-1960), may be used in critical psychology for the
purpose of problematizing, questioning, challenging, and even rejecting and going beyond the
traditional psychological distinction between exteriority and psychic interiority or intimacy.
Instead of this fundamental distinction and the resultant fixed conceptual dualities that cross
and constitute psychology, extimacy indicates the non-distinction and essential identity
between the dual terms of the outside and the deepest inside, the exterior and the most
interior of the psyche, the outer world and the inner world of the subject, culture and the core
of personality, the social and the mental, surface and depth, behaviour and thoughts or
feelings. All expressions of the duality exteriority-intimacy would be hypothetically
replaceable by the notion of “extimacy”, which precisely joins ex-teriority with in-timacy,
and states explicitly the interpenetration and mutual transformation of both spheres. These
spheres are no longer what they were in conventional psychology. They actually fade away.
Exteriority is rather intimacy, but intimacy, as exteriority, is rather an “extimacy” that is no
longer either intimacy or exteriority.
Although the origin of the idea of extimacy can be traced to Saint Augustine and his
conception of God as “more interior than my most interior being” (Confessions, III, VI), the
dominating intellectual concerns in French structuralism and post-structuralism seem to be
the decisive condition for the appearance and development of the notion of “extimacy”.
Today, this notion can be conceived as just one of the best and most radical examples of the
systematic assimilation of interiority to exteriority that we find, not only in Jacques Lacan,
but also in Michel Foucault (1969) and Gilles Deleuze (1986).

Definition
In Lacanian theory and the uses of this theory in critical psychology (e.g. Parker, 2004,
2005), the term “extimacy” refers primarily to the presence of exteriority in the intimacy, or
deepest interiority, of the subject, and secondarily to the resultant non-distinction and identity
of the exterior and the intimate or most interior. The term may also designate, in a non-
critical psychological-psychoanalytical perspective (e.g. Tisseron, 2001), the human desire to
show or exteriorize the intimate life.

Keywords
Exteriority, extimacy, interiority, intimacy, object a, Other, psychoanalysis, real, Thing.
Traditional Debates
The notion of “extimacy” was coined by Lacan (1959-1960), on February 10th 1960, to
designate “this central place, this intimate exteriority, this extimacy, which is the Thing” (p.
167). Lacan identifies extimacy with the Thing after enigmatically describing this “Thing” as
the “excluded interior” (p. 122), the “subject’s inside” that becomes “the first outside”, the
“first exteriority around which the subject orients his way” (p. 65), the “first landmark” (p.
68) that “returns always to the same place” (p. 92). Since the Thing is always there, it
becomes a sort of landmark for our journey through life. It is the fixed centre of our
movements. This point of reference is extimate, which means that it is intimate to us while
being exterior at the same time. In reality, this extimacy does not simply reside in our outside
world, but is the navel, the source of this world, as it is for us. The Thing becomes our first
outside because it has been excluded from our inside. Indeed, its exclusion is what creates our
exteriority. We may see, then, that in the Lacanian perspective, all things considered, the
extimacy of the Thing is –temporally speaking– at the origin of the subject’s exteriority and –
spatially speaking– at the fixed centre of the subject’s life.
The Thing is extimate since it constitutes the subject’s intimate experience that gives
meaning and existence to the external things; the “personal” interior, origin and horizon of
the “impersonal” exterior, the “subjective” beginning and the end of the “objective”
environment. Lacan explains this by conceiving the Thing, on the one hand, as the “mythical
mother’s body” that is “always searched for” (Lacan, 1959-1960, pp. 82-85, 127), and, on the
other, as the “first thing that separates from that which is named and articulated” (p. 100),
“the primordial real which suffers the signifier” (p. 142), but also “the signifier” itself and
“the emptiness” inherent in the signifier (pp. 144-145), “the emptiness in the centre of the
real” (p. 146), the central cavity of “the vacuole” (p. 179). This vacuole is that around which
everything revolves. Though everything is organized by the signifying structure of language,
there is still something real in the heart of everything.

Critical Debates
Lacan conceives the extimate Thing as the real vortex of the human symbolic universe. Thus,
the extimacy of the Thing refers to the position of the Lacanian real as such, first the real
carved out by symbolization, and then the real empty centre of the subject’s world structured
by the symbolic system of language. According to Lacan (1959-1960), this extimate real
centre of the gravity of our action, which is neither inside nor outside, would be concealed by
“the imaginary” underlying “every psychology”, which “is nothing more than a mask, and
sometimes even an alibi, for the effort to focus on the problem of our own action, something
that is the essence and the very foundation of all ethical reflection” (p. 27).
By simplistically distinguishing the mental inside and the material outside, or individual
intimacy and social or cultural exteriority, traditional and conventional psychology would
already be disguising that which is always at stake in our action, namely, something
“extimate” that Lacan (1968-1969) would later name “object a”, something that will always
“join the intimate to the radical exteriority”, something that would have an “edge structure”
(pp. 248-249). The Lacanian extimate object a would not only be at the edge of ourselves, it
would also be the edge itself, the edge between our intimacy and an exteriority conceived as
that which is excluded from our intimacy.
The edge would be something in itself, something decisive, even the most decisive, which
would always be hidden by the psychological distinction between the inside and the outside.
This distinction would conceal that which has traditionally been illustrated, in
psychoanalysis, by the orifices of our body, as the paradigm of a logical place where the
inside meets the outside, though the outside is still inside for it springs up from the inside.
Here, at the edge, there is an immanent connection, an inherent intersection, a Möbius-strip
continuum between the inside and the outside, an identity between the “psychic inner world”
and the “physical outer world”. The non-problematized psychological distinction between the
two worlds would simply ignore an identity of this nature. This distinction would even exist
for the purpose of overlooking the edge and what it reveals, that is, “the vacuole, the
interdiction at the centre”, what is “closer to us but nevertheless exterior to us”, and for which
we require “the word extimate” (Lacan, 1968-1969, p. 224).
The French Lacanian psychoanalyst Jacques-Alain Miller (1986) considers, explicitly, that
the “expression ‘extimacy’ is necessary in order to escape the common ravings about a
psyche supposedly located in a bipartition between interior and exterior” (p. 75). In addition
to recognizing this bipartition as “unsatisfactory”, we should also “slide into this interior-
exterior bipartition that we need, for our own use, to substitute for it another relation” (pp.
75-76). This relation, according to Miller, is the one designated by the term “extimacy”,
which “says that the intimate is Other –like a foreign body, a parasite” (p. 76)–, the
parasitical presence of language, the “unconscious” that would be concealed, not only by
psychological masks, but also by “religious covers” like that of the Augustinian God (p. 77).
Behind this God who resides in the inside of the inside, in the intimum cordis, or the intimate
heart of man, would stand the intimate presence of the outside inside us, the extimacy of
language and culture, and the religious alienation of the believer from her/himself.
Millerian extimacy refers to the alienated heart of a subject whose deepest identity lies in the
Other of language and culture. Lacanian extimacy, on the contrary, designated the
“subjective” heart of an “objective” external world whose centre, that which is furthest from
the subject, paradoxically lies in that which is most intimate to her/him. Hence, Lacan
focused on the presence of the inside in the outside, while Miller points out the presence of
the outside in the inside. It seems, however, that both places are the same. They are the same
edge between the inside and the outside. If the heart of the outer world is that of the subject,
then this heart will logically be alienated in the outer world.
Ian Parker draws on Lacan’s and Miller’s conceptualizations of extimacy to realize the
importance of this notion for both critical work and discourse analysis. In the latter case, this
British critical psychologist explains the relevance of “extimacy” by redefining it as the
“intimate exteriority of the subject in discourse”, a discourse that includes “the most intimate
to the subject”, which is “outside” or “extimate to the subject, not reducible to it” (Parker,
2005, p. 172). As for critical work in general, “extimacy” would explain, for instance, the
critical potential of psychoanalysis, which “was able to develop simultaneously as something
‘inside’ Western culture and as something ‘outside’ and critical of it” (Parker, 2004, p. 159).
This critical extimacy, this simultaneity of being inside something as well as outside it, and
critical of it, would be the same position that Parker and others assign to critical psychology,
such that we may say that critical psychology, from this point of view, should be extimate to
psychology, as it should simultaneously be outside the discipline and inside it.
The word “extimacy” has recently been used with different meanings by other critical authors
in psychology. Watson (2009) finds in Lacan an approach to gender that is neither
exclusively “biologistic” nor “constructivist”, since “not all of the body can be symbolized
and it remains partly extimate (and therefore highly influential!) to the system of language”
(p. 133). Here the body is partly extimate to language since it comes to be something
“biological” or “external” to it, while remaining inside language and being intimately
constructed by it.
Watson’s corporeal extimacy, like Parker’s critical extimacy, refers to something –body or
psychoanalysis– that is extimate to something else –language or culture– such that it is no
longer the Lacanian-Millerian extimacy of something –the Thing or language– extimate to
someone –the subject. This first notion of extimacy is recovered by Hook (2011) to refute the
“the inner/outer distinction”, the “stringent separations between external objects and the
subject’s ostensibly ‘internal’ emotions”, that would disregard “what Lacan refers to as
extimacy; that is, a relation of intimate exteriority in which that most foreign or objectionable
element in the other is a function of the subject’s own excluded interior” (pp. 111-114). This
clear definition helps to show the close relationship between Lacanian extimacy and Freudian
projection or Kleinian projective identification. However, unlike these mechanisms, extimacy
is neither a specific psychic process nor a relationship between the subject and the other.
Rather, it is a logical space that would be involved in all psychic processes and relationships
with the others, with oneself, with language, with the world, between things, between
concepts, etc. These relationships include scientific and theoretical connections and
reflections, as in Parker’s critical extimacy, or in the way Malone and Kelly (2012) use
extimacy to “inform the research practices with science considered as feminism” by
“reflexively seeking to reform the relation of subject to object and attempting to represent an
encounter with that which has been excluded, and that which, rather than being Law-like, is
Other” (p. 98).
Independently of the critical uses of the notion of extimacy in a Lacanian tradition, and with
no explicit reference to them, the French psychologist and psychoanalyst Serge Tisseron
(2001, 2003) recently offered a completely new definition of the term, one that is becoming
increasingly influential in non-critical academic environments (e.g. Mateus, 2010; Puyuelo,
2010). Extimacy is here confined to the designation of a “tendency” that is “essential to the
human being”, and “consists in the desire to communicate the inner world”, a communication
that would then “enrich intimacy” (Tisseron, 2001, pp. 52-53). The traditional distinction
between intimacy and exteriority is thus preserved. Extimacy becomes just a question of
communicating an inner world that remains different from the outer world. This is, at the
very least, a good example of the simplification, trivialization, domestication and ideological
neutralization of a complex and critical notion, which thus becomes just another
commonplace that can then be reabsorbed into mainstream psychology.

References
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Online resources
Extimité (2011). Le Garde-mots. Retrieved February 3, 2013, from :
http://blog.legardemots.fr/post/2011/03/28/Extimité
Extimité (n.d.). Wikipedia. Retrieved February 3, 2013, from
http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extimité
Taubes, I. (2012). Entretien avec Serge Tisseron: cet obscur désir de s’exposer.
Psychologies.com. Retrieved February 3, 2013, from:
http://www.psychologies.com/Planete/Societe/Articles-et-Dossiers/Entretien-avec-Serge-
Tisseron-cet-obscur-desir-de-s-exposer
Tisseron, S. (2013). Personal website of Serge Tisseron. Retrieved February 3, 2013, from
http://www.sergetisseron.com/