I. Introduction and General Principles of Criminal Law (JAN.
back to the proper
20, 2018)
A. Penological objectives
A.F Tadiar, Philosophy of a Penal Code, 52 Phil. L.J. 165 (1997)
1. Classical theory v. Positivist theory
Classical Theory
The basis of criminal
liability is that a person,
being a rational being,
has his own free will.
Accordingly, he is
given always the
opportunity to
overcome evil. So if he
chose the right path
our society would be
better of. But if he
chose the wrong path,
his act should be
punished because he
knew what he was
doing. He is a rational
being, he knows what
is right and wrong. If he
chose to do wrong,
then he should be
accountable for his
acts. Hence, in the
classical theory, we
don’t take a look at the
person but we take a
look at his actions and
the products of his
actions. That is why
there is 1:1
correspondence
between the crime and
punishment. We don’t
take a look at the
person. A person has
free will, so if he chose
to commit a crime, he
should be held
accountable. So what
does society primarily
focuses on is the crime
committed by the
person. If he
committed a crime, it
should be punished.
The primary import of
the positivist theory is
retributive
punishment. A person
should be punished for
his criminal actions.
path. That is why,
initially, in the
exempting
circumstances, minors
are given sufficient
leeway so that they will
not be put in prison.
Examples: Examples:
i. In classical theory, i. So minors who are
the State would want to 15 years of age and
Positivist lower the age of under are absolutely
Theory criminal responsibility. exempt. For over 15
In this theory, the basic Right now, the and under 18, there is
premise is that all of us exemption is 15 years privilege mitigating
are good persons. of age, and under. circumstance, but
However, sometimes, Before, 9 and under, even before they are
a person is swayed by and over 9 to 15 may punish, under RA
some mental or morbid already act with 9344, they is either an
predisposition to do discernment. Right initial diversion
wrong. now, 15 y.o. and under, proceeding, wherein
Notwithstanding the absolutely exempt. there will be no format
fact that he has free Over 15 and under 18, court proceeding
will or choice, there are they may, or may not because the state
certain circumstances act with discernment. wants the matter to be
wherein that person So the incumbent gov’t resolved without
may be led astray. But wants to lower again bringing the minor to
again, he may return to the age of criminal court, punishing him,
the proper route. liability, not over 15, and ultimately putting
because they are him in prison.
saying that those of ii. The Indeterminate
over 15 years old are Sentence law
already old enough to (ISLaw). Under the
now the consequences ISLaw, there is a
of their actions setting of minimum
sentence and a
maximum sentence.
The judge always sets
a minimum sentence
so that the convict may
be allowed apply and
go out of prison by
parole after serving the
minimum sentence,
and be allowed to
serve the remaining
sentence outside the
prison facility. The
rationale behind it is
that a person will be
able to better reform
outside the prison
facility.
iii. Probation Law.
The essence of the
said law is that for
Accordingly, the certain crimes (not
primary import of the exceeding 6 years),
positivist theory is the convict will be
reformation and allowed to serve the
rehabilitation. A sentence outside the
person, who is prison facility. The
naturally good, is just notion is that if he gets
led astray. Hence, inside, there will be a
society can come up greater tendency for
with activity/program him be influenced by
which will bring him
 and exposed to the
other criminals
Q: Is our criminal law justice system, is it classical or positivist?
A: The Philippine criminal justice system is what we call a mixed
or eclectic theory. It is a mixture of both the classical and
positivist theory. However, the Classical theory is more dominant
as evidenced by the retributive and deterrent objectives of criminal
law.
The Four Penological Objectives
i. Retributive or Punishment Theory- focuses on the
appropriateness of the penalty vis-à-vis the crime
committed.
ii. Preventive or Restrictive Theory- postulates about the
confinement and imprisonment of the criminal in order to
prevent such person from committing other crimes.
-Accordingly, a person who has committed a crime is put in prison
to be punished AND to prevent him from committing another
crime. Stated differently, there are two simultaneous objectives
being served by the imprisonment, namely, first, retributive
punishment, and second, the prevention of committing a crime. In
1 Art. 202. Vagrants and prostitutes; penalty. — The
following are vagrants:
1. Any person having no apparent means of subsistence,
who has the physical ability to work and who neglects to
apply himself or herself to some lawful calling;
2. Any person found loitering about public or semi-public
buildings or places or trampling or wandering about the
country or the streets without visible means of support;
3. Any idle or dissolute person who ledges in houses of ill
fame; ruffians or pimps and those who habitually
associate with prostitutes;
4. Any person who, not being included in the provisions
of other articles of this Code, shall be found loitering in
any inhabited or uninhabited place belonging to another
without any lawful or justifiable purpose;
5. Prostitutes.
just one act of imprisonment, the objectives of punishment and
prevention are achieved.
Examples.
a. Violation of the Vagrancy Law under Art. 2021 of
the RPC.
Q: How are these vagrants?
A: Basically, tambay.
-Note, other than the violation of vagrancy laws,
these vagrants are not actually committing a crime
but are merely loitering around.
Q: Is Art. 202 still good law? Is vagrancy still
punishable?
A: Art. 202 has already been amended and the
vagrancy portion has already been repealed by RA
10158.2 Prostitution under Art. 202 is still a crime,
but vagrancy is no longer punishable. This person,
who is loitering around, is not actually and really
committing a crime so it has been decriminalized.
For the purposes of this article, women who, for money
or profit, habitually indulge in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct, are deemed to be prostitutes.
Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by
this articles shall be punished by arresto menor or a fine
not exceeding 200 pesos, and in case of recidivism, by
arresto mayor in its medium period to prision
correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from
200 to 2,000 pesos, or both, in the discretion of the court.
2 Section 1. Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code is
hereby, amended to read as follows:
"Article 202. Prostitutes; Penalty. – For the purposes of
this article, women who, for money or profit, habitually
indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are
deemed to be prostitutes.
"Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered
by this article shall be punished by arresto menor or a
fine not exceeding 200 pesos, and in case of recidivism,
by arresto mayor in its medium period to prision
correctional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from
200 to 2,000 pesos, or both, in the discretion of the court.

But it is true that the vagrancy provision is a
manifestation of the preventive or restrictive theory
of criminal law because, supposedly, these persons
who are loitering around have the propensity to
commit crimes.
b. The provision on Habitual Delinquency under Art.
62(5)3 of the RPC.
A Habitual Delinquent is a person who, within a
period of ten years from the date of his release or
last conviction of the crimes of
i. Serious physical injuries,
ii. Less serious physical injuries,
iii. Robbery,
iv. Theft,
v. Estafa,
3 5. Habitual delinquency shall have the following effects:
(a) Upon a third conviction the culprit shall be sentenced
to the penalty provided by law for the last crime of which
he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods;
(b) Upon a fourth conviction, the culprit shall be
sentenced to the penalty provided for the last crime of
which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of
prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods; and
(c) Upon a fifth or additional conviction, the culprit shall
be sentenced to the penalty provided for the last crime of
which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of
prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion
temporal in its minimum period.
vi. Falsification,
he is found guilty of any of said crimes a third
time or oftener.
In such cases, aside from the penalty for the last
crime, there would be an additional penalty imposed
on top of the penalty for the last crime he committed.
That means that the additional penalty is not a
punishment for a particular crime, but a mechanism
to hold the habitual delinquent inside the prison
facility to prevent him from committing another
crime.
NOTE: Other than those two, there are no mechanisms which
may be utilized in predicting who will commit a crime.
(Answer of Ms. Palad is the provision on possession of picklocks
in the RPC4). Nonetheless it may be stated that it is neither
scientifically nor psychologically possible to determine with
certainty who will commit a crime. Ultimately, the restrictive
purpose of criminal law is difficult to implement.
iii. Rehabilitative or Reformation Theory
Notwithstanding the provisions of this article, the total of
the two penalties to be imposed upon the offender, in
conformity herewith, shall in no case exceed 30 years.
For the purpose of this article, a person shall be deemed
to be habitual delinquent, is within a period of ten years
from the date of his release or last conviction of the
crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robo,
hurto, estafa or falsification, he is found guilty of any of
said crimes a third time or oftener.
4 Article 304. Possession of picklocks or similar tools. -
Any person who shall without lawful cause have in his
possession picklocks or similar tools especially adopted to
the commission of the crime of robbery, shall be
punished by arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its minimum period.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who
shall make such tools. If the offender be a locksmith, he
shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods.
 iv. Deterrence Theory- this theory suggests the prevention
of crimes through fear of punishment. The factors which
affect the efficacy of the law as a deterrent are:
i. Celerity or Swift action in imposing the
punishment
-in the Philippines, our justice system
is a snail-paced justice system (10 yrs
to complete the case). That is why
some people are saying that a justice
delayed is justice denied. If the speed
in which the person who committed a
crime is very slow, the criminals would
be boosted to commit crimes since
they would not punished in a swift
manner.
ii. Severity of the punishment
-the issue of reimposing death
penalty.
iii. Certainty of punishment that if a person
commits a crime, he would be punished.
-mayaman ka man or mahirap, you
would be punished if you commit a
crime.
-in the present administration, the
retribution may be considered swift
and severe since persons who are
suspected to be engaged in drug
crmes are killed even without proper
trial (NOTE: the sale of drugs is not
even punishable by death penalty, the
gravest punishment for such crime is
reclusion perpetua). Nonetheless, with
regard the certainty, there is where the
present administration has a failing
mark (e.g. the lack of interest of the
government regarding the issue of the
drugs smuggled the commission of
customs)-Selective justice.
Note: There are certain assumptions for the deterrent
theory to take effect, namely:
i. Free will- as a basic foundation of classical
theory, it is also one of the assumptions of
the deterrent theory. A persons knows
5 Article 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless
the contrary is provided.
6 Article 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. - Penal Laws
shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the
persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal,
what is right and wrong, he also knows the
consequences of his actions.
ii. That the person is aware of the criminal
sanctions.
iii. That the persons fear the sanctions.
Comment: The rebels, they don’t fear the
threats of the president, but for ordinary
Filipinos, you might fear the threats (e.g.
voluntary surrender of drug users- tokhang
operation).
Q: What is the ultimate aim of criminal law?
A: To prevent and control crimes is the ultimate aim of criminal
law. But that is not all, otherwise, such objective would be a short-
sighted objective. The State wants to prevent and control crimes
so that people will be able to live freely and for the enjoyment of
our capacities for happiness. Basically, the purpose is so that
each person will be able to enjoy life.
Law is a guide to conduct, and there are also factors affecting
the efficacy of law as guide to conduct, namely:
i. A law must be applied prospectively
-since the law guides future conduct, it cannot be a
proper legal guide if it governs past conduct.
Q: if a penal law is made to apply retroactive law, it
becomes what?
A: An ex post facto law.
Q: Is an ex post facto law prohibited by the
Constitution?
A: Yes, Section 22. of the Bill of rights provides that
no ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be
enacted.
Q: Why is it prohibited?
A: This prohibition proceeds for the rule in the civil
code5 that all laws should have prospective
application.
NOTE: Under Art. 226 of the RPC, there is an
instance when a penal law may be given retroactive
effect, and that is when the penal law is favourable
to the accused who is not a habitual criminal
In sum,
as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code,
although at the time of the publication of such laws a
final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is
serving the same.
 General rule: Penal laws must have
prospective application.
Exception: When the penal law is favourable
to the accused.
Exception to the Exception: When the
accused is a habitual delinquent. (NOTE: Habitual
Delinquent NOT merely recidivist)
Q: Who is a habitual delinquent?
A: a person shall be deemed to be habitual
delinquent, is within a period of ten years from the
date of his release or last conviction of the crimes of
serious or less serious physical injuries, robo, hurto,
estafa or falsification, he is found guilty of any of said
crimes a third time or oftener.7 So six crimes,
namely:
a. Serious physical injuries;
b. Less serious physical injuries;
c. Robbery;
d. Theft;
e. Estafa;
f. Falsification.
Only these six crimes may be considered for
a person to be considered as habitual
delinquent. If he is found guilty of any of said
crimes a third time or oftener within a period of
ten years from the date of his release or last
conviction.
Q: How about a recidivist, who is he?
A: A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial
for one crime, shall have been previously
convicted by final judgment of another crime
embraced in the same title of this Code.8
Q: Is a habitual delinquent necessarily a
recidivist also?
A: It depends (this is the correct answer) on
what crimes have been committed since if what
have been committed are robbery, theft, and
estafa, said crimes are embraced under the
same title, viz. crimes against property. On the
other hand, serious and less serious physical
injuries are also embraced in the same title
(crimes against person). Only falsification is the
crime against public interest. The three others
are crimes against property. So if the three
7 Art. 62, RPC
8 Art. 14, par. 9
9 Art. 3
10 E.O. 292 Section 18. When Laws Take Effect. - Laws
shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or
crimes which have been committed are
robbery, theft, and estafa, then he would be
considered a recidivist. Also, if he has
committed either less serious and serious
physical injuries at least three times, he would
also be considered a recidivist. So the correct
answer is it depends on what crimes he has
been convicted of.
ii. It must be widely disseminated
- This requirement is elementary. In fact, the civil
code9 provides that ignorance of the law
excuses no one from compliance therewith.
Hence, the law is required to be widely
disseminated so that the right to due process is
complied with. How can the said civil code
provision be imposed if the law is not widely
disseminated?
Q: How is the law disseminated?
A: Through Publication
Q: Must all the laws enacted by Congress be
disseminated? Even laws which rename a public
school?
A: Yes, since even laws of local application must be
published
Q: How must laws be published? (Two modes of
dissemination)
A: i. By publication in the Official Gazette10; ii. or in
a newspaper of general circulation.
Q: So, is it mandatory that all laws must be
published for them to take effect?
A: Yes.
NOTE: But it a different matter as to WHEN a
law takes effect. The law takes, unless
otherwise provided by the statute, after 15 days
following the completion of their publication.
Hence, the proviso in Art. 211 of the Civil
Code “unless it is otherwise provided”
refers to the effectivity date and not to the
requirement of publication since publication
is mandatory, it is a condition sine qua non.
Meaning to say it is an indispensable
requirement that all laws must be published,
and not just laws of public nature. In fact, all
laws enacted by congress are of public nature,
even those of local application. Hence, they
should all be published.
in a newspaper of general circulation, unless it is
otherwise provided.
11 Article 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code
shall take effect one year after such publication.
 To reiterate, the provision “unless it is otherwise
provided” qualifies the effectivity date of the law,
and not the requirement of publication. If the law
does not provide for a date, then it will be
effective after 15 days from publication.
12 EO 292 Section 24. Contents. - There shall be
published in the Official Gazette all legislative acts and
resolutions of a public nature; all executive and
administrative issuances of general application; decisions
or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals, or other courts of similar rank, as may
be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be
so published; such documents or classes of documents as
may be required so to be published by law; and such
documents or classes of documents as the President shall
determine from time to time to have general application
or which he may authorize so to be published.
The publication of any law, resolution or other official
documents in the Official Gazette shall be prima facie
evidence of its authority. lawphi1.net
13 COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 638
AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE UNIFORM PUBLICATION
AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE.
Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:
SECTION 1. There shall be published in the Official
Gazette (1) all important legislative acts and resolutions
of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines; (2)
all executive and administrative orders and
proclamations, except such as have no general
applicability; (3) decisions or abstracts of decisions of the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be
deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so
published; (4) such documents or classes of documents as
may be required so to be published by law; and (5) such
documents or classes of documents as the President of
the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have
general applicability and legal effect, or which he may
authorize so to be published: Provided, That for the
purpose of this section every order or document which
shall prescribe a penalty shall be deemed to have general
applicability and legal effect: And provided, further, That
the term “document” as used in this section shall include
Q: How about decisions of the SC and CA,
should all the decisions of SC and CA be
published?
A: No, not all the decisions of SC and CA.12
Only important decisions as may be deemed by
said courts. Supposedly in the OG13. But we
any order, regulation, rule, certificate, license, notice, or
similar instrument issued, prescribed, or promulgated by
any executive department, bureau, office, commission,
independent board, agency, or instrumentality of the
administrative branch of the Government, but not the
legislative or judicial branch of the Government.
SEC. 2. The Director of Printing is authorized to publish
the Official Gazette as frequently as the public interest of
the Government may require; to appoint, with the
approval of the proper department head, such personnel
as may be necessary, in addition to that at present
employed in the Bureau of Printing, for carrying out the
provisions hereof; and to make and collect charges for
subscriptions to the Official Gazette and for publications
published therein which shall by law be payable by the
person interested. The Official Gazette shall be edited in
the Executive Office and shall be published in the English
language, but edition in Spanish may also be issued if the
interest of the service to be determined by the President
of the Philippines so requires it. The sale and distribution
of the Official Gazette shall also be effected by the
Bureau of Printing which shall promptly mail copies
thereof to subscribers free of postage. At the end of each
quarter, an index shall be supplied as a part of the Official
Gazette. The index published at the end of the last
quarter shall be complete for the entire year.
SEC. 3. Each department, bureau, office, and agency or
instrumentality of the National Government, as well as
each provincial, city, and municipal government, shall
subscribe to the Official Gazette and pay for the same out
of their respective funds. The Official Gazette shall be
filed and properly kept with the public records of the
department, bureau, office, agency or instrumentality,
province, city, or municipality concerned for references.
SEC. 4. Such funds as may have been appropriated for the
publication of the Official Gazette are continued to be
available to carry out the provisions of this Act.
 have before, for the decisions of SC, the
Philippine Reports. (EXTRA: SCRA is not
official but a private publication)
iii. It must be clear and unambiguous
- The law must not be vague for it to be an
effective guide to conduct and so as for persons
to effectively follow the law.
Example:
Anti-distracted driving Act,14
supposedly this law was passed to prevent
drivers from texting while driving because such
will distract them, but then the regulatory
agencies of the country came up with IRR which
prevents people from putting rosaries near the
windshield or dashboard. The law was
interpreted vaguely by the LFTRB and such
caused confusion. Hence, the IRR was
suspended.
RATIONALE WHY THE LAW MUST BE
CLEAR: (two reasons)
i. Since the law will guide ordinary
persons who will comply with the
law. If the law is very clear, the
people will be able to follow it.
ii. It is also for the benefit of the
police officers who are in charge
of arresting violators. Basically, to
enable them to determine when to
enforce the law or not.
Illustrative case:
SEC. 5. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
14 RA 10913
15 RA 7080
16 "Sec. 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder;
Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by
affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or
acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series
of overt criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof
in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty
million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime
of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil. 290
(2001)
FACTS: In this case, the former president
questioned the constitutionality of plunder
law15. He contended the law was vague
allegedly because the words “combination” or
“series are ambiguous since he the plunder law
did not define these terms.
ISSUE: Does the lack of definition make the law
vague?
HELD: No, the lack of definition per se does not
make the law vague. The plunder law is not
unconstitutional. Contrary to the contention of
the former president, the law is not vague since
it provides “comprehensible standards”
which men of common intelligence may
understand. The Court defined the word
“vague” and stated that for a law to be
considered as such it must lack
comprehensible standards. (note: this is the
test in determining whether the law is vague or
not). The plunder law has comprehensible
standards and the Court went on to discuss the
elements of plunder.
ELEMENTS OF PLUNDER LAW:16
i. That the act be committed by a public
officer by himself or in connivance
with members of his family, relatives
by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other
persons;
ii. That he amassed the aggregate
amount or total value of at least Fifty
million pesos (P50,000,000.00);
iii. That amasses, accumulates or
acquires ill-gotten wealth through a
death. Any person who participated with the said public
officer in the commission of an offense contributing to
the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such
offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of
participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised
Penal Code, shall be considered by the court. The court
shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their
interests and other incomes and assets including the
properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit
or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State."
Section 2 of RA 7080 As amended by Section 12 of RA
No.7659
 combination or series of overt criminal
acts.
“Overt criminal acts” (six predicate
crimes)17
a. Misappropriation
b. Getting interest in commissions;
Bribery
c. By the illegal or fraudulent
conveyance or disposition of assets
belonging to the National
Government.
d. By obtaining, receiving or accepting
directly or indirectly any shares of
stock, equity or any other form of
interest or participation including
promise of future employment in any
business enterprise or undertaking
e. By establishing agricultural, industrial
or commercial monopolies or other
combinations and/or implementation
of decrees and orders intended to
benefit particular persons or special
interests
f. Unjustly enriching himself in office.
17 “Section 1. Definition of Terms: xxxx
d) Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, property, business
enterprise or material possession of any person within
the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him
directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents,
subordinates and/or business associates by any
combination or series of the following means or similar
schemes:
1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or
malversation of public funds or raids on the public
treasury;
2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission,
gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of
pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in
connection with any government contract or project or
by reason of the office or position of the public officer
concerned;
Based on the foregoing, it was stated that when
the law states “combination”, it refers to the
presence of at least two predicate crimes. While
the word “series” means the repetition of a
single predicate crime. Accordingly, the words
“combination” and “series” need not be defined
by the law for a person of common intelligence
to understand the said words.
THE CONCEPT OF FACIAL CHALLENGE v. AS APPLIED
CHALLENGE
-This challenges pertain to a statute being vague. There
is a provision in the law which is vague.
Q: You’re a law student. After reading the statute, you discovered
that there are very vague provisions. Can you now file a case in
court questioning the constitutionality of the provision on the basis
of it being vague?
A: NO, I cannot file a case even if the statute is undeniably vague.
If the statute is a penal statute, the mere fact that a statute is
vague is not enough for a person to have a standing to file an
action questioning the constitutional of a law on the ground of the
void for vagueness doctrine. For me to have a locus standi, I must
be an injured party or that the law must be directly applied to me.
In other words, if I’m arrested on the basis of the vague law and
now being prosecuted, I would now be able to question the
constitutionality of the law on the basis of the as applied
challenge.
On the other hand, I cannot facially challenge even if
there be vague provisions in the law just like what happened in
the case of Southern Hempishere. The only time when a facial
challenge may be allowed is in free speech cases. But in
declaring a criminal law as void for being vague, facial
3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition
of assets belonging to the National Government or any of
its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or
government-owned or -controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries;
4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or
indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of
interest or participation including promise of future
employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial
monopolies or other combinations and/or
implementation of decrees and orders intended to
benefit particular persons or special interests; or
6) By taking undue advantage of official position,
authority, relationship, connection or influence to
unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and
to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and
the Republic of the Philippines.”
challenge is not allowed since facial challenge is allowed
only in free speech cases.
The rationale behind the principle is that a penal law
should have an ad terrorem effect, because if a person has the
right to facially challenge it every time even without a pending
case, then the law will not have its desired effect of scaring the
people. The people will not be complying with statutes if people
will be able to seek facial challenge of a statute.
But with regard to free speech cases, facial challenge is
allowed since the freedom of expression is one of our fundamental
freedoms. The chilling effect must be avoided wherein the people
would deter from speaking because of the possible repercussions.
But for penal statutes, it is not allowed, because we should allow
penal statutes to be applied to its full effect, otherwise, if all can
challenge, it will make the penal statute be ineffective.
In sum, as discussed in Estrada and Southern
Hemisphere, ONLY AS APPLIED CHALLENGE MAY BE
ALLOWED IN QUESTIONING PENAL STATUTES. AND THE
AS APPLIED CHALLENGE CONNOTES THAT THE ONE WHO
QUESTIONS THE LAW WILL BE INJURED BY THE
APPLICATION OF THE PENAL STATUTE.
Illustrative case:
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v.
Anti-Terrorism Council18
FACTS: In this case, the constitutionality of the Human
Security Act19 was assailed by the petitioners but no one
has actually been prosecuted for the violation of the said
law.
HELD: There was no basis for an as applied challenge.
What was involved in this case was a facial challenge.
Accordingly, such action cannot be allowed by the SC.
SOURCES OF PHILIPPINE CRIMINAL LAW.
US v. Carson Taylor, 28 Phil. 599 (1914)
DOCTRINE: The Court discussed here that there are NO
COMMON LAW CRIMES IN THE PHILIPPINES. When
we say “common law crimes”, these crimes refer to those
which are judge-made pursuant to common law tradition.
In the tradition of common law, the judge is allowed to
enact laws in his decisions, but such is not allowed in the
Philippines because we follow the civil law tradition and
this is more pronounced in penal statutes. In penal
statutes, we follow the rule nullum crime nula poena
18 GR 178552
19 RA 9372
20 GR 180016, April 26, 2014
21 Article 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts
which should be repressed but which are not covered by
the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. - Whenever a
court has knowledge of any act which it may deem
proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it
shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the
Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the
sine lege, in other words, there is no crime when there
is no law punishing it.
Sources (4 Sources)
i. The Revised Penal Code
ii. Special Penal Laws
iii. Penal provisions in other laws
iv. Local ordinances
In US v. Carson Taylor, it was enunciated that there is no common
law crime in the Philippines. All laws emanate from the Congress,
and if the Congress decided not to enact a law punishing a
particular act, that act would not be punished.
This was exemplified in Lito Corpuz v. People,20 in this case,
there was a seeming disparity in the imposable penalty primarily
with regard the crimes against property. What has been
committed in this case was Estate. The SC said that the penalties
for estafa, taking into consideration that the RPC was enacted in
1932, and this case was decided in 2014, there is now great
disparity between the penalties which were prescribed in 1932
and its now 2017. So the threshold amounts are quite small(22000
pesos), but the scammers are more high-tech now and can
actually get millions of pesos.
Nonetheless, the SC, guided by the fact that it cannot enact penal
laws, refrained from amending the penalties for estafa, and
notified congress that it may be high time to amend the penalties
for crimes against property. This has in fact been amended by the
congress in RA 10951.
Quiz Discussion
Q5: Mary was the victim of rape. However, her rapist, Mario, was
acquitted during the trial. Maria thus decided to take the law in her
own hands and planned to kill Mario, which she was able to
successfully implement. During the trial, the trial court judge took
pity on Maria and believed that she should not be penalized and/or
that the penalty imposable is harsh and excessive. What is the
proper course of action for the trial court judge?
A: He should convict Maria and impose the proper penalty. The
Court, as held in Lito Corpuz, does not have the power to amend
the RPC. Under art. 521 of the RPC, if there is no law punishing
reasons which induce the court to believe that said act
should be made the subject of legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief
Executive, through the Department of Justice, such
statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending
the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement
of the provisions of this Code would result in the
imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into
an act, the court should render the proper decision, namely, to
acquit the accused. If the law provides for an excessive penalty,
the court should also impose the proper penalty and report to the
chief executive for the purpose of remitting (not reverse the
decision) the sentence if there be a final judgment already. The
chief executive has the pardoning power but under the
circumstances, maria actually committed the crime, so the
president may not pardon maria but he may commute the
sentence or reduce the sentence pursuant to his constitutional
power. The president cannot reverse the decision, what the
president can do is to commute or pardon the convict. If not, the
secretary of justice to report it to congress for the congress to
enact a law reducing the penalty.
Q12: The following, except one, are limitations on the State’s
authority to punish crimes: a. Double jeopardy, b. Bills of attainder,
c. Police power, d. Ex post facto laws.
A: C. Police power, Police power is not a limitation. In fact, police
power is the source of the power of the congress to enact penal
statutes. The state has three inherent powers, namely, police
power, eminent domain, and taxation. The police power is the
power of legislature to enact laws for the general welfare. It is the
most insistent and pervasive power. The clause “general welfare”
is a broad statement. Hence, the legislative branch can enact
statutes.
Q22: Tony was convicted of the complex crime of rebellion with
multiple murder, robbery, arson and kidnapping and was sentence
to reclusion perpetua. While serving sentence for 13 years
already, the SC ruled in a subsequent case with almost the same
factual circumstances that there is no such complex offense of
rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson and kidnapping. The
accused in the subsequent case was convicted of rebellion only
and sentenced only to a maximum of 12 years imprisonment.
Invoking such SC ruling, Tony filed a habeas corpus petition,
arguing that he is entitled to the benefit of the SC ruling in the latter
case and should thus be released as he has already served for 13
years. Select the best answer.
A: B. Tony is entitled to the benefit of Art. 22 of the RPC, which
was made applicable also to judicial decisions. The civil code
provides that laws should be applied prospectively. There is an
exception under art. 22 of the RPC which provides that a law
favourable to the accused may be applied retroactively. But take
note, art. 22 does not only refer to laws enacted by congress refers
to “law”. But in Gumabon v. Director of Prisons,22 the SC change
its ruling.
Initially, the SC ruled that rebellion would be complexed with other
crimes, so the penalty is around reclusion perpetua, but in People
v. Hernandez, the SC ruled that there is no complex crime of
rebellion, so the penalty is only prision mayor(6 years and one day
to twelve years). But in Gumabon, the convicts were already
serving their sentence which is for more than 13 years. Hence, in
consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused
by the offense.
22 G.R. No. L-30026, January 30, 1971
Gumabon, the court applied its ruling in People v. Hernandez
retroactively. This is a landmark case because it interprets art. 22
of RPC as to include not only enacted laws by congress, but also
judicial decisions which can be applied retroactively. But strictly,
art. 22 talks only of laws enacted by Congress.
Q25: When a penal law is absolutely repealed such that the
offense is decriminalized, a pending case charging the accused of
the repealed crime is to be:
A: B. Dismissed without any precondition. In the case of Tuates v.
Bersamin,23 the Anti-squatting law was absolutely repealed.
Since the law has been absolutely repealed, the act punished by
the repealed law is no longer criminal anymore. Hence, the person
charged with that repealed law should be unconditionally
acquitted. So the answer here is dismissed without any
precondition because there is no law any which penalizes the act
punished under the repealed law. It is a different matter if the
repeal/amendment is just partial. In this case, the law has been
absolutely repealed so the previous act which is penalized by it is
no longer a crime. It is an innocent act, hence, the person charged
shall be free to go. The answer is not letter c. “dismissed provided
the accused is not a habitual delinquent.” There is no such
requirement.
Q: Is there an exception to the rule?
A: Yes. The first exception is the concept of re-enactment. In
Benedicto v. CA,24 the Court discussed the effect of repeals. Both
express and implied. If express, there is no doubt that the previous
law is repealed. If implied, the previous law is totally contradictory
to the new law. But in Benedicto v. CA, there is such concept of
the re-enactment of the act penalized or the so-called “repeal by
re-enactment”. Under this doctrine, although the previous law is
repealed, the same act is still penalized in the new law. So there
is still a law which penalizes the act. That is what we call as re-
enactment.
The second exception is the repealing may have
what we call a “saving clause” or a reservation. A saving
clause means that the new law repeals but provides that all
pending cases filed already should be continued. Hence, the case
would not be dismissed but would be continued.
NOTE: In question number 25, it was stated that the law
was absolutely repealed.
Q15: Lt. Arnulfo Sanchez, a member of the Philippine Army, was
on sentry duty, along with five (5) other military officers, at the
military camp in Subic Bay Freeport, Olongapo City, on the night
of 15 October 2012. He surreptitiously left his men behind and
entered a bar in Subic Bay, where he got into trouble. He shot a
civilian, who died. He was charged with homicide. Who will have
jurisdiction over the case considering that he was officially on
duty?
A: B. Civilian court. Although the official in this case was on official
duty, what he has committed was a common crime. Accordingly,
23 G.R. 138962
24
under RA 7055, if a member of the armed forces commits any of
the crime under the RPC, it should be the civilian court which
should have the jurisdiction. Only in service connected crimes can
the court martial have jurisdiction.
Q: What are these service connected crimes?
A: These are the crimes or the offenses punished under
the Articles of War (Common Wealth Act. 408). Anyway, it is
mentioned in RA 7055 that only service connected crimes cases
can be charged under the court martial. In this case, what has
been committed was homicide, and not a service connected
offense, i.e. desertion, insubordination, fraudulent inducement,
and all those related to military operations. So if he commits any
of the crimes penalized under the RPC, the action is always within
the jurisdiction of the civilian courts.
Q: Philippine penal laws are enforced even outside the Philippine
territory in these instances, except: a. Offenses committed on
board a Philippine ship which is on the high seas; b. Offense
committed by public officers or employees while abroad in the
exercise of their functions; c. Terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism committed by individual persons who, although
physically outside the territorial limits of the Philippines, commit
said crimes directly against the Philippine government; d. In cases
of rebellion against the Philippine Government, a crime against
public order, committed by individuals located outside the
Philippine territory.
A: D. In cases of rebellion against the Philippine Government, a
crime against public order, committed by individuals located
outside the Philippine territory.
- a. Offenses committed on board a Philippine ship which
is on the high seas- this is one of the exceptions under
Art. 2 of the RPC wherein extraterritorial application is
allowed; b. Offense committed by public officers or
employees while abroad in the exercise of their
functions- exempt also under the 5 enumerated
instances under art. 2 of the RPC; c. Terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism committed by individual
persons who, although physically outside the territorial
limits of the Philippines, commit said crimes directly
against the Philippine government- also exempt under
the human security act. Extraterritorial application is
allowed.
Remember the 5 exceptions under Art. 2 of the RPC,
there are now many other special penal laws which allow
extraterritorial application. That includes the human
security (terrorism committed outside the Philippines so
long as directed against the Philippine government or
any in the citizens will be under the jurisdiction of the
Philippine courts.).
So the answer here is D. “In cases of rebellion against the
Philippine Government, a crime against public order, committed
by individuals located outside the Philippine territory.” Rebellion is
a crime against public order. Under Art. 2 of the RPC, only crimes
against national security and the law of nations will be allowed
extraterritorial application. Rebellion is not a crime against
25 G.R. No. L-13005, October 10, 1917
national security and the law of nations, but a crime against public
order. So I can never be committed outside Philippine territory.
Q21: What court has jurisdiction when an Indonesian crew
murders the Filipino captain on board a vessel of Russian registry
while the vessel is anchored outside the breakwaters of the Manila
bay?
A: C. The Philippine court. In this case, it is evident that the vessel
was in the Philippine territorial sea. The first rule is the territorial
characteristic of criminal law, so it happens in the Philippine
territory, so this should be your first answer. The second is the
Philippines has adopted the English rule. What was involved in
this case was a foreign merchant vessel (Russian registry). Being
of Russian registry and anchored within Phil. Territorial sea, then
there is a fine-tuning of your answer because there might be an
application of the English rule. But it is not really difficult because
the English rule follows the territoriality principle. Hence, even
though this is of foreign registry since it is in the Philippine territory,
both the territoriality principle and on the basis of the English rule
which follows the territoriality principle, the Philippine courts have
jurisdiction.
Q: Is there an exception to the English rule?
A: Yes, if it affects only the internal management of the
ship. But in this case, a person was killed. Definitely, it
affects the peace and order situation in the Philippines.
In the cases on territoriality in connection with foreign
merchant vessels, you remember if the opium or the
foreign merchant vessel is just in transit and the opium is
not landed in the Philippines. The SC said that the
person will not be liable for possession of opium. But it is
different if the opium is landed in the Philippines, the
English rule does not apply in such case because the
opium is landed in the Philippine territory. It is also
different when the drug is smoked on board the foreign
vessel while it the vessel is within 2 mile from manila bay
(I believe). In such case, the pernicious effects of the
drug are produced. If it is just possession, the person will
not be liable especially if the vessel is just in transit. In
transit, meaning, the Philippines is not its final
destination; it is just passing in the Philippines. But if the
drug is smoked, it produces the pernicious effect in the
Philippine territory. It affects the peace and order, so the
Philippines has jurisdiction.
But in US v. Ah Sing,25 what is involved is the
importation of drugs. Importation is different from
possession. In Ah Sing, the opium has not yet landed
and still on board, but the Philippines is its final
destination. Hence, even to though the drugs had not yet
landed but the final destination was the Philippines, the
accused was convicted for importation. In importation,
there is no requirement that the drug must have landed,
that requirement is that it should be brought in the
Philippine territory.
Ex post facto law and Bill of Attainder (Q8, Q9, Q10, Q11)
Q: What is an ex post facto law?
A: As a rule, an ex post facto law is a penal law enacted by
congress which is prejudicial to the accused and is being applied
retroactively.
That is why in one of the questions (Q9) the right to bail was
denied but the same was to be applied in the future (after its
effectivity), this is not a retroactive application of the law. Hence,
it is not an ex post facto law.
Kinds of Ex Post Facto Law (In re: kay Villegas
Kami26)
An ex post facto law is one which:.
(1) makes criminal an act done before the passage
of the law and which was innocent when done, and
punishes such an act;
(2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it
was, when committed;
(3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when
committed;
(4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and
authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony
than the law required at the time of the commission of the
offense; (e.g. the 2-witnesses rule in treason, future law
requiring only 1)
(5) assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies
only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right
for something which when done was lawful;(e.g. the right
to peaceably assemble but then BP 880 requires certain
permit before one can conduct rallies, in effect it
punished the exercise of one’s civil right, so that is an ex
post facto law if applied retroactively)
(6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some
lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such
as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of amnes y. (e.g. deprivation of the defense
against double jeopardy)
Q: What is a Bill of Attainder?
A: The bill of attainder is also a legislative act (Both ex post facto
and bill of attainder are legislative acts). A bill of attainder is a
statute which inflicts punishment without the benefit of judicial trial.
Q: What is wrong with the Bill of Attainder?
A: It violates the separation of powers. Supposedly, the
body which tries and sentences the accused is the
judicial body, and not the congress. But in the Bill of
attainder, the congress identifies already the group of
persons as committing a crime and inflicts already
punishment on those group of persons.
NOTE: One questioned law in this connection is the Anti-
Subversion Act.27 This is the subject of People v.
Ferrer.28 The title of the act is “AN ACT TO OUTLAW
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
SIMILAR ASSOCIATIONS, PENALIZING
MEMBERSHIP THEREIN, AND FOR OTHER
26 G.R. No. L-32485, October 22, 1970
27 REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1700, (This law has been repealed
by Republic Act No. 7636)
PURPOSES.” When the organization is declared illegal,
the members thereof are necessarily committing a crime.
Nonetheless, in Pp v. Ferrer, the SC said that it is not a
Bill of Attainder.
Comments of Atty. Calica: I do not agree with the
decision in this case. But apparently, the SC based the
decision in this case on the fact that there was still a
triable issue, namely, whether the person joined the
communist party, if so, knowingly. But we all know that
those who joined the communist party knowingly joined
it.
CHARACTERISTICS OF CRIMINAL LAW
There are three characteristics of criminal law, namely:
1. Generality
- This is provided for in Art. 14of the Civil code,
viz. “Article 14. Penal laws and those of public
security and safety shall be obligatory upon all
who live or sojourn in the Philippine territory,
subject to the principles of public international
law and to treaty stipulations.” Hence, Penal
laws are applicable to those who reside in the
Philippine territory and to those who merely
sojourn (e.g. Tourists). Accordingly, all these
persons are subject to penal law. Some of you
may have the impression that the president is
exempt, but he is not. He is just immune from
suit during his term of office (e.g. former
president Aquino has been charged with
usurpation of authority; former president
Estrada was charged with and convicted of
plunder but after he was removed from office).
Hence, all those categorized as impeachable
officials, while they are in office, they cannot be
charged with criminal offense because they are
immune from suit but that does not mean that
they are not subject to philippine criminal law.
On the contrary, they are, and the only thing
that is granted to them is that while in office,
they cannot be charged. But after their term of
office, or if after removal, a criminal case may
now be filed against them.
- On the other hand, the rep. Farenas said that if
congressmen commit traffic violation, they
should be immune from arrest. In fact, if the
congress is in session, members of congress
are immune from arrest if the crime they commit
is punishable by not more than 6 years. So if it
is just a simple traffic infraction, then by all
means, they should not be arrested. They are
also immune in connection with any statement
they made while the congress is in session.
28 48 SCRA 382 (1972)
 This is to not deter them from speaking their
minds. Hence, no libel charge against them for
speech inside the walls of congress. This is also
a sort of immunity on the part of the members
of congress. But for immunity from arrest, only
for crimes punishable by not more than 6 years.
If it is more than 6 years(e.g. Homicide/Murder),
then the police officer can arrest him.
Exceptions to the generality principle (3 exceptions)
i. General principles of public international
law
-e.g. Sovereign, heads of state (if Donald
trump commits a crime, we cannot
prosecute him here in the Philippines)
Q: What is our remedy?
A: We declare him persona non grata then
deport him. And it will be his own state
which would take care of him. Whether
they would impeach him. But with regard
the Phil, we cannot prosecute Donald
trump here as he is the head of state of US.
Q: Who are the sovereigns?
A: The emperor, the kings,(monarchys).
But for the Philippines (a democratic and
republican state), the people are the
29 AN ACT TO PENALIZE ACTS WHICH WOULD IMPAIR
THE PROPER OBSERVANCE BY THE REPUBLIC AND
INHABITANTS OF THE PHILIPPINES OF THE IMMUNITIES,
RIGHT, AND PRIVILEGES OF DULY ACCREDITED FOREIGN
DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR AGENTS IN THE
PHILIPPINES
Section 1. Any person who shall falsely assume and take
upon himself to act as a diplomatic, consular, or any
other official of a foreign government duly accredited as
such to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
with intent to defraud such foreign government or the
Government of the Philippines, or any person, or in such
pretended character shall demand or obtain, or attempt
to obtain from person or from said foreign government or
the Government of the Philippines, or from any officer
thereof, any money, paper, document, or other thing, of
value, shall be fined not more than five thousand pesos,
or shall be imprisoned for not more than five years, or
both, in addition to the penalties that may be imposed
under the Revised Penal Code.
sovereigns here. But all of use cannot be
exempt, hence, who is exempt is the chief
of state when he goes to other state.
Q: who are the other officials who are
exempt?
A: The foreign ministers, ministers
president, Chargé d'affaires, but consuls
are not exempt on the basis of general
principles of international law
Q: Why are consuls not exempt?
A: Because they are commercial
representatives. They are not diplomatic
representatives of the foreign state. The
purpose is for the furtherance of the
commercial interest of the state. NOTE:
connect this with the principle of state
immunity where governmental function
must be distinguished from proprietary
function.
-Remember, it should be public
international law, not private international
law.
ii. Laws of preferential application
-We only have one, RA 75,29 but this only
implements the immunity we provide to
Section 2. Any person, other than a diplomatic or
consular officer or attaché, who shall act in the Republic
of the Philippines as an agent of a foreign government
without prior notification to, and registration with, the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs shall be fined not more than
five thousand pesos, or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both, aside from other penalties that may be
imposed by law.
Section 3. Any person, who with intent to deceive or
mislead, within the jurisdiction of the Republic, wear any
naval, military, police, or other official uniform,
decoration, or regalia of any foreign State, nation or
government with which the Republic of the Philippines is
at peace, or any uniform, decoration or regalia so nearly
resembling the same as to be calculated to deceive,
unless such wearing thereof be authorized by such State,
nation, or government, shall upon conviction, be
punished by a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or
 diplomatic official. But there should be
reciprocity, meaning, the same immunity is
granted to Philippine diplomats by the state
of that diplomat. In RA 75, even the
domestic servants of diplomats are
exempt. But there’s a requirement, his
name should be submitted to the DFA and
imprisonment not exceeding six months, or by both such
fine and imprisonment.1awphil-itc-alf
Section 4. Any writ or process sued out or prosecuted by
any person in any court of the Republic of the Philippines,
or by any judge or justice, whereby the person of any
ambassador or public minister of any foreign State,
authorized and received as such by the President, or any
domestic or domestic servant of any such ambassador or
minister is arrested or imprisoned, or his goods or
chattels are distrained, seized, or attached, shall be
deemed void, and every person by whom the same is
obtained or prosecuted, whether as party or as attorney,
and every officer concerned in executing it, shall upon
conviction, be punished by imprisonment for not more
than three years and a fine of not exceeding two hundred
pesos in the discretion of the court.
Section 5. The provisions of section four hereof shall not
apply to any case where the person against whom the
process is issued is a citizen or inhabitant of the Republic
of the Philippines, in the service of an ambassador or a
public minister, and the process is founded upon a debt
contracted before he entered upon such service; nor shall
the said section apply to any case where the person
against whom the process is issued is a domestic servant
of an ambassador or a public minister, unless the name of
the servant has, before the issuing thereof, been
registered in the Department of Foreign Affairs, and
transmitted by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the
Chief of Police of the City of Manila, who shall upon
receipt thereof post the same in some public place in his
office. All persons shall have resort to the list of names so
posted in the office of the Chief of Police, and take copies
without fee.
should be submitted to the chief of police
so his name should be posted and there’s
a requirement of reciprocity.
iii. Treaties
- Before, we have the Military Bases Agreement,
now, we have the Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA).30 Certain exceptions are granted to
Section 6. Any person who assaults, strikes, wounds,
imprisons or in any other manner offers violence to the
person of an ambassador or a public minister, in violation
of the law of nations, shall be imprisoned not more than
three years, and fined not exceeding two hundred pesos,
in the discretion of the court, in addition to the penalties
that may be imposed under the Revised Penal Code.
Section 7. The provisions of this Act shall be applicable
only in case where the country of the diplomatic or
consular representative adversely affected has provided
for similar protection to duly accredited diplomatic or
consular representatives of the Republic of the
Philippines by prescribing like or similar penalties for like
or similar offenses herein contained.itc-alf
Section 8. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved: October 21, 1946
30 Article V
Criminal Jurisdiction
1. Subject to the provisions of this article:
(a) Philippine authorities shall have jurisdiction over
United States personnel with respect to offenses
committed within the Philippines and punishable under
the law of the Philippines.
(b) United States military authorities shall have the right
to exercise within the Philippines all criminal and
disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the military
law of the United States over United States personnel in
the Philippines.
2. (a) Philippine authorities exercise exclusive jurisdiction
over United States personnel with respect to offenses,
including offenses relating to the security of the
Philippines, punishable under the laws of the Philippines,
but not under the laws of the United States.
(b) United States authorities exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over United States personnel with respect to
offenses, including offenses relating to the security of the
United States, punishable under the laws of the United
States, but not under the laws of the Philippines.
(c) For the purposes of this paragraph and paragraph 3 of
this article, an offense relating to security means:
(1) treason;
(2) sabotage, espionage or violation of any law relating to
national defense.
3. In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is
concurrent, the following rules shall apply:
(a) Philippine authorities shall have the primary right to
exercise jurisdiction over all offenses committed by
United States personnel, except in cases provided for in
paragraphs l (b), 2 (b), and 3 (b) of this Article.
(b) United States military authorities shall have the
primary right to exercise jurisdiction over United States
personnel subject to the military law of the United States
in relation to:
(1) offenses solely against the property or security of the
United States or offenses solely against the property or
person of United States personnel; and
(2) offenses arising out of any act or omission done in
performance of official duty.
(c) The authorities of either government may request the
authorities of the other government to waive their
primary right to exercise jurisdiction in a particular case.
(d) Recognizing the responsibility of the United States
military authorities to maintain good order and discipline
among their forces, Philippine authorities will, upon
request by the United States, waive their primary right to
exercise jurisdiction except in cases of particular
importance to the Philippines. If the Government of the
Philippines determines that the case is of particular
importance, it shall communicate such determination to
the United States authorities within twenty (20) days
after the Philippine authorities receive the United States
request.
(e) When the United States military commander
determines that an offense charged by authorities of the
Philippines against United States personnel arises out of
an act or omission done in the performance of official
duty, the commander will issue a certificate setting forth
such determination. This certificate will be transmitted to
the appropriate authorities of the Philippines and will
constitute sufficient proof of performance of official duty
for the purposes of paragraph 3(b)(2) of this article. In
those cases where the Government of the Philippines
believes the circumstances of the case require a review of
the duty certificate, United States military authorities and
Philippine authorities shall consult immediately.
Philippine authorities at the highest levels may also
present any information bearing on its validity. United
States military authorities shall take full account of the
Philippine position. Where appropriate, United States
military authorities will take disciplinary or other action
against offenders in official duty cases, and notify the
Government of the Philippines of the actions taken.
(f) If the government having the primary right does not
exercise jurisdiction, it shall notify the authorities of the
other government as soon as possible.
(g) The authorities of the Philippines and the United
States shall notify each other of the disposition of all
cases in which both the authorities of the Philippines and
the United States have the right to exercise jurisdiction.
4. Within the scope of their legal competence, the
authorities of the Philippines and the United States shall
assist each other in the arrest of United States personnel
in the Philippines and in handing them over to authorities
who are to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with the
provisions of this article.
5. United States military authorities shall promptly notify
Philippine authorities of the arrest or detention of United
States personnel who are subject to Philippine primary or
exclusive jurisdiction. Philippine authorities shall
promptly notify United States military authorities of the
arrest or detention of any United States personnel.
6. The custody of any United States personnel over whom
the Philippines is to exercise jurisdiction shall
immediately reside with United States military
authorities, if they so request, from the commission of
the offense until completion of all judicial proceedings.
United States military authorities shall, upon formal
notification by the Philippine authorities and without
delay, make such personnel available to those authorities
in time for any investigative or judicial proceedings
relating to the offense with which the person has been
charged. In extraordinary cases, the Philippine
Government shall present its position to the United
States Government regarding custody, which the United
States Government shall take into full account. In the
event Philippine judicial proceedings are not completed
within one year, the United States shall be relieved of any
obligations under this paragraph. The one year period will
not include the time necessary to appeal. Also, the one
year period will not include any time during which
scheduled trial procedures are delayed because United
States authorities, after timely notification by Philippine
authorities to arrange for the presence of the accused,
fail to do so.
7. Within the scope of their legal authority, United States
and Philippine authorities shall assist each other in the
carrying out of all necessary investigations into offenses
and shall cooperate in providing for the attendance of
witnesses and in the collection and production of
evidence, including seizure and, in proper cases, the
delivery of objects connected with an offense.
8. When United States personnel have been tried in
accordance with the provisions of this article and have
been acquitted or have been convicted and are serving,
or have served their sentence, or have had their sentence
remitted or suspended, or have been pardoned, they may
not be tried again for the same offense in the Philippines.
Nothing in this paragraph, however, shall prevent United
States military authorities from trying United States
personnel for any violation of rules of discipline arising
from the act or omission which constituted an offense for
which they were tried by Philippine authorities.
9. When United States personnel are detained, taken into
custody, or prosecuted by Philippine authorities, they
shall be accorded all procedural safeguards established
by the law of the Philippines. At the minimum, United
States personnel shall be entitled:
 military and civilian personnel. Remember, not
only military personnel but also civilian
personnel accompanying the military force of
the US here in the Philippines for an activity
which is approved by the Philippine
government. If they are just here for R&R31 and
recreation that is not covered by the VFA. But if
they are here for an activity approved by the
Philippine government, then they will be exempt
in some instances
Q: What are these instances?
A: An offense involving the military law of U.S.;
offenses which are punished under U.S. law but
not under Phil. Law- this will be subject to the
jurisdiction of U.S. even if committed here in the
Phil.
(a) To a prompt and speedy trial;
(b) To be informed in advance of trial of the specific
charge or charges made against them and to have
reasonable time to prepare a defense;
(c) To be confronted with witnesses against them and to
cross examine such witnesses;
(d) To present evidence in their defense and to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses;
(e) To have free and assisted legal representation of their
own choice on the same basis as nationals of the
Philippines;
(f) To have the services of a competent interpreter;
(g) To communicate promptly with and to be visited
regularly by United States authorities, and to have such
authorities present at all judicial proceedings. These
proceedings shall be public unless the court, in
2. Territoriality
-This means that criminal laws should be applied
only within the Philippine territory. In this connection,
you should know what “national territory” connotes,
and that is provided for in Art. I of the Constitution.32
The national territory comprises the Philippine
archipelago, (this is w with all the islands and waters
embraced therein), and all other territories over
which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction,
( There might be a question regarding… because
there is a dispute in the spratlys and the same is part
of the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Phil.).
Remember, the territorial sea expands only up to12
nautical miles. consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial,
and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the
seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other
submarine areas. So if we go by the territorial sea
accordance with Philippine law, excludes persons who
have no role in the proceedings.
10. The confinement or detention by Philippine
authorities of United States personnel shall be carried out
in facilities agreed on by appropriate Philippine and
United States authorities. United States personnel serving
sentences in the Philippines shall have the right to visits
and material assistance.
11. United States personnel shall be subject to trial only
in Philippine courts of ordinary jurisdiction, and shall not
be subject to the jurisdiction of Philippine military or
religious courts.
31 R & R refers to time that members of the armed forces
spend relaxing, away from their usual duties.
32 The national territory comprises the Philippine
archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced
therein, and all other territories over which the
Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of
its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains, including its
territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular
shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around,
between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago,
regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of
the internal waters of the Philippines.
 which is 12 nautical miles from the lowest water
mark. That is strictly, part of Philippine territory.
But note, the Exclusive Economic zone extends up
to 200 nautical miles. That is quite far already from
the Philippines. But under the UNCLOS, we have
the exclusive right to explore economically the EEZ.
We have the right to fish there.
Q: If a crime has been committed within that 200
nautical miles, is it within the jurisdiction of the
Philippines?
A: There is no decided case yet, but according to J.
Carpio, because we exclusively exploit the natural
resources in that territory, it is territory which is
under article 1 of the constitution (The national
territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, and
all other territories over which the Philippines has
sovereignty or jurisdiction), of course we don’t have
sovereignty over EEZ, but we have jurisdiction over
EEZ. So according to J. Carpio, it is still part of our
national territory. That is an expansive definition of
our national territory.
Exceptions to the territoriality principle (2 kinds)
i. Even if the act is committed within Philippine
territory, they are exempt on the basis of treaty, laws
of preferential application or general principles of
international law.
ii. Even if committed outside of the Philippine territory
as listed in art. 2 of the RPC33 and other special
penal laws which penalize acts committed even
outside Philippine territory (e.g. terrorism, violation
of data privacy act, cyber crime- facebook post in las
vegas but it affects Filipino, we have jurisdiction over
such libellous statement).
33 ARTICLE 2. Application of Its Provisions. — Except as
provided in the treaties and laws of preferential
application, the provisions of this Code shall be enforced
not only within the Philippine Archipelago, including its
atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone, but
also outside of its jurisdiction, against those who:
1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or
airship;
2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note
of the Philippine Islands or obligations and securities
issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands;
3. Prospectivity
-discussed already.
JANUARY 27, 2018
PHILOSOPHY OF A PENAL CODE (A.F. TADIAR): Although this
was written circa 1977, it gives us an idea on the requirements for
a law as an effective guide of conduct.
 REQUIREMENTS:
(1) The law must be clear and unambiguous;
 Related to some of our topics: due process,
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan and Southern
Hemisphere vs. Anti-Terrorism Council.
ESTRADA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (2001): the former
President Estrada wanted to declare the Plunder Law as
unconstitutional on the basis that it is vague—that its
provisions are not clear. How so? Because he said he did not
understand the terms combination or series.
o SC: The law is considered to be unclear or ambiguous
if it lacks comprehensible standards → that is the test.
o If a person wants a law declared as null and void for
being vague, that is the void for vagueness doctrine.
o The law may also be questioned for being
overbreadth.
o But our concern for penal laws is that it is VAGUE.
o If you still remember in your Constitutional Law, Rubi
vs. Provincial Board, the law there was declared null
and void for being vague.
o Here in this case, the former President wants it
declared unconstitutional for being vague.
o FIRST ISSUE: Can that be done?
o SC: As we learned in this case and in the subsequent
case Southern Hemisphere, the facial challenge of a
3. Should be liable for acts connected with the
introduction into these islands of the obligations and
securities mentioned in the preceding number;
4. While being public officers or employees, should
commit an offense in the exercise of their functions; or
5. Should commit any of the crimes against national
security and the law of nations, defined in Title One of
Book Two of this Code.
 law—meaning to say, the law on its face and its entire
provisions will be examined by the court—that
CANNOT be done, especially when the law involves a
penal law or statute.
 That is applicable only to free speech cases.
 REASON: In free speech, that is one of the top
freedoms of every Filipino → that cannot be
subject to a chilling effect. If a law produces a
chilling effect to Filipinos, then they may be
afraid to speak up. That should not be
countenanced.
 But when it comes to penal statutes, it would be
difficult to allow facial statutes because the
penal law produces its effect precisely
because people fear the law and non-
compliance therewith.
 If any person can just question on its face the
penal statute, then it would not be an effective
penal law.
 Its ad terrorem effect will put to naught—it will
be useless if everyone can object to the
constitutionality of the law for being vague. So
not allowed in penal statutes.
o But why did the SC in this case proceeded to review
the law?
 Because President Estrada himself was being
charged for violating the said law.
 So it now becomes an as applied challenge
with regard to the former President.
 So as an applied challenge—meaning to say
there is a possible direct, personal injury to the
person involved—then the court will allow an as
applied challenge to the constitutionality of the
law.
 And in fact, the SC proceeded to examine the
validity of the objections of the former President.
o SECOND ISSUE: Are the terms combination and
series vague?
o SC: NO. Just look at JaDine and Kathniel, that is a
combination.34 Series, Shake, Rattle and Roll 1, 2, 3.
So a combination is a combination of two or more of
the six predicate crimes, whereas a series is several
instances of one of the predicate crimes.
 According to the former President, there was no
definition of these terms in the Plunder Law →
so we understand these terms in their ordinary
signification.
 Meaning to say, combination: two or more
together; series: repetition of one, of the same
predicate crimes.
 In fact, the Plunder Law provides for very clear,
comprehensible standards.
 ELEMENTS:
(1) Committed by a public officer in
connivance with members of his family,
friends, etc.;
(2) Accumulates ill-gotten wealth through a
combination or series of any of the six (6)
predicate crimes;
(3) The amount is Fifty Million Pesos.
o So very clear comprehensible standards under the
Plunder Law.
o Therefore, the Plunder Law is NOT vague according to
the SC.
34 Good example, mas madaling tandaan 
SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE VS. ANTI-TERRORISM
COUNCIL (2010): the law being questioned here is the
Human Security Act of 2007.
o Although the SC dismissed the case on a technical
ground: petitioners lacked standing, and there was no
actual case or controversy.
o But the SC reiterated this distinction between a facial
challenge and an as applied challenge.
o With regard to penal statutes, only as applied
challenges are allowed.
(2) The law must be widely disseminated;
 REASON: under the Civil Code, no one may
excuse himself because of ignorance of the
law.
 Meaning to say, that person cannot say that
he cannot be arrested because he did know
there is a law penalizing his act → that is
ignorance of the law.
 That requires the State to widely disseminate
the laws.
 REASON: due process requirements. Under
the Constitution, before we are deprived of
life, liberty or property, there must be due
process.
 So before we can be arrested and
detained, and that due process is
ensured first through publication of the
penal statutes. No law can be made
effective, especially penal statutes if
they are not published in the Official
Gazette, or in a newspaper of general
circulation, pursuant to ART. 2, Civil
Code, later amended by EO 200.
 That is in compliance with the
requirement of due process.
 It is a condition sine qua non → no law can
take effect without publication.
 The only thing that can be changed by the
Congress is the date it will take effect,
because without any statement from the law,
ART. 2 of the Civil Code will apply, and the
law will take effect fifteen (15) days after the
completion of their publication.
  ART. 2 of the Civil Code talks of laws, and
we are referring there to laws enacted by
Congress.
 But you know that rules and regulations
enacted by the Executive branch has also the
force and effect of law.
 You also know under ART. 8 of the Civil
Code, decisions of the Supreme Court form
part of the legal system of the Philippines →
so they have the force and effect of law also.
 Q: So they need to be published also, similar
to laws as required under ART. 2 of the Civil
Code?
 A: The case of:
TANADA VS. TUVERA (1985, 1986): clarified that all laws,
regardless of whether it is of general or local application, it
should be published.
o There is a law enacted by Congress naming a
particular street: many would say that that is not a law
of general application and does not affect the public at
all.
 But in fact, that is NOT entirely correct.
 It will still affect all individuals.
o But in this case, the SC, clearly, that ALL laws enacted
by Congress should be published, regardless if it of
general or local application.
o Even a law granting citizenship to a particular person
needs to be published.
PESIGAN VS. ANGELES (1984): re: EOs issued by the
Republic of the Philippines.
o What about the decisions of the SC? In this case, if you
notice, there is a CA No. 638, the law governing the
Official Gazette.
o That has been amended by EO 292, the Revised
Administrative Code of the Philippines.
 Sections 18 and 24 provide that all laws should
be published in the OG or in a newspaper of
general circulation and in Sec. 24, it specifies
that not only laws enacted by Congress, but
also executive or presidential issuances of
general applicability shall be published in the
OG or newspaper.
35 CONTINUING CRIMES:
(1) REBELLION: a rebel, even when he is taking a bath, is committing
rebellion. But in one of the cases assigned, it only applies to the
rebels in the countryside raging a protracted war. But in one case,
Pres. GMA was the subject of the rebellion of Oakwood mutineers,
GMA declared a state of rebellion. According to a separate opinion
o In this case, this involves the transfer of cattle from one
province to another. It imposes penalties.
o As a rule, if an EO imposes penalties, then it has
general applicability, so it has to be published in the
Official Gazette.
o But not all executive issuances should be published.
o Q: How about decisions of the SC and the CA?
 A: Not all decisions. Only those decisions those
courts determine to be of importance should be
published in the OG or in a newspaper, or in the
Philippine Reports.
o For cases, it is the Philippine Reports which is the
official publication of the government, not the SCRA →
SCRA is not official.
o CA decisions in the Official Gazette.
o Certain documents may also be allowed to be
published in the OG.
o Finally, the President may also order documents to be
published in the OG.
o This is all provided for under Sec. 24 of EO 292.
o So as a requirement for the wide dissemination of laws,
the laws should be published → MANDATORY
REQUIREMENT, no law can take effect without
publication.
o And because we are a representative democracy, we
have our Hon. Congressmen and Senators, after hey
enact a law, they inform us of these new laws.
(3) It must be prospective in character.
 All laws should have a prospective
application, most especially with regard to
penal statutes.
 RE: NBI’s new theory in cyber libel when they
found probable cause in Rappler because of
an article released in May 2012. The
Cybercrime Law was enacted on Sept. 2012,
but the NBI would want to charge Rappler
due to defamatory article against the former
Chief Justice → Q: Can we apply the
Cybercrime Law retroactively? A: NO,
because that is an ex post facto law.
 But the theory of the NBI is the
continuous publication when an article
is posted online, which is accessible
even years after its initial posting.
Thus, it is continuously published, and
a case can be filed → this runs counter
to our established rule in Criminal
Law, because how many continuing
crimes35 are there?
in that case, when we talk of a continuing crime of rebellion, we
are talking of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the New
People’s Army, because they have been there for the longest time.
Until they succeed, that will be a continuing rebellion. But for
Oakwood mutineers, it was a fleeting rebellion—coup d’état, which
is NOT a continuing crime.
  Let us monitor its progress because
this may be asked in your Bar Exams.
 With regard to libel, it is reckoned from
its printing or first publication, and its
prescriptive period is one (1) year. If a
defamatory article is printed in the
newspaper now, ten years later, the
newspaper is still there, right? Can
you file a libel case is 2028? NOT
ANYMORE, because the action has
already prescribed. This is despite the
fact that the newspaper is still
accessible to you. This is precisely the
concept of the NBI. Written libel is not
a continuing crime, and we cannot
amend the RPC. Otherwise, written
libel will not anymore have a
prescriptive period.
 EXCEPTION TO RETROACTIVITY: if the
law is favorable to the accused.
 BASIC PRINCIPLE: nullum crimen nulla
poena sine lege → there is no crime when
there is no law punishing the act.
 This rule is incorporated in ART. 5,
RPC.
 So if an act is not covered by a law, the
court should render the proper
decision: acquit the accused, in line
with the above-mentioned principle.
 Then the judge will report to the
executive branch, through the DOJ for
the purpose of relaying and
recommending to Congress the
enactment of a law punishing that act;
NOT by EO as that cannot be done.
 So if you want to cite a particular
provision, that is ART. 5, RPC.
(2) TERRORISM: this is a fairly recent law and no decided case yet,
so we CANNOT say for now that it is a continuing crime or not.
(3) VIOLATION OF B.P. Blg. 22: transitory crime, and NOT a
continuing crime. A transitory crime is not a continuing crime, but
it is when any of the essential elements of the crime are committed
in two or more venues. It may filed in either of these venues. Just
like KIDNAPPING, which can be filed in the place where the
essential elements of the crime were committed → where the
victim is taken, where detained, where killed subsequently. The
concept of a transitory crime is a remedial law concept: it tells us
US VS. CARSON TAYLOR (1914): this is a libel case where
the SC said there are no common law crimes in the
Philippines. Common law crimes are judgment-made crimes.
CORPUZ VS. PEOPLE (2014): the penalty for crimes against
property, and the basis thereof were obtained from figures
from 1932. The SC was of the opinion that it should be
amended already, but it stop short of declaring that the RPC
should be amended, because it had no power to do so. If it
shall be the one which will amend by virtue of a judgment, it
would be resorting to judicial legislation → that will be a
violation of the separation of powers. What it did in that case
was to report to the Chief Executive, so that the latter may
refer the matter to Congress. In fact, the Congress has
passed a law, amending the fines and the imposable
penalties for many crimes against property in R.A. No.
10951.
 SOURCES OF PENAL STATUTES:
(a) The Revised Penal Code;
(b) Special penal laws;
(c) Penal provisions in other laws;
 For example, if one violates the
Securities Regulation Act, there
would be penalties.
(d) Local ordinances.
 Pursuant to the delegated
power of LGUs to enact
ordinances.
 So in:
PEOPLE VS. SANTIAGO (1922) and UNITED STATES VS.
PABLO (1916): it was declared by the SC that punishing
crimes is an attribute of sovereignty. The state punishes the
crimes and prescribes punishment thereof pursuant to its
police power. Police power, being one of the inherent powers
of the state, is exercised by the legislative branch.
where to file the criminal complaint because in criminal law, venue
is jurisdictional. Unlike murder, which is NOT a transitory crime.
(4) ADULTERY: the fact that there can be as many counts as there
are sexual intercourse show that it is not a continuing crime.
(5) CONCUBINAGE: three modes: (a) cohabitation in the conjugal
house; (b) sex in scandalous circumstances; (c) keeps the
mistress in a house other than the conjugal home. What if he keeps
the mistress in the conjugal house for one year, does that make
concubinage a continuing crime? There is NO decided case
regarding this.
  That is why in:
IN RE: KAY VILEGAS KAMI, INC. (1970): An ex post facto
law is one which:

BUSTOS VS. LUCERO (1948): the SC distinguished
between SUBSTANTIVE LAW and PROCEDURAL LAW.
SUBSTANTIVE LAW PROCEDURAL LAW
Creates and regulates Method in enforcing our
crimes, which is the domain rights or seeking redress
of the legislature. for its violation (RULE-
MAKING), which is the
domain of the Supreme
Court.
o So with regard to punishing acts, categorizing them as
crimes, this is part of substantive law.
o Thus, criminal law is part of substantive law, because
criminal law as it has been defined as that branch or
division of law which defines crimes, treats of their
nature, and provides for their punishment.
o Q: What is procedural law with regard to crimes?
 A: It would be criminal procedure.
o So police power is the basis for defining and punishing
crimes.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS TO THE EXERCISE OF
POLICE POWER:
THREE (3) CHARACTERISTICS OF CRIMINAL LAW:
(1) SEC. 1, ART. III: No one can be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law.
(1) Makes criminal an act done before the passage of the
law and which was innocent when done, and punishes
such an act;
(2) Aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was,
when committed;
(3) Changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when
committed;
(4) Alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes
conviction upon less or different testimony than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offense;
 For example, in treason, it requires two (2)
witnesses to the same overt act to convict the
person. But in the subsequent law, only one (1)
witness is required → that is prejudicial to the
accused and cannot be done.
(5) Assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in
effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for
something which when done was lawful; and
 For example, the right to peaceably assemble
→ the state imposes certain regulations, and a
person is penalized for exercising his civil right.
(6) Deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful
protection to which he has become entitled, such as
the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of amnesty.
(1) GENERALITY:

 That is where we relate also the requirement of (2) TERRITORIALITY:

publication of penal statutes.
(3) PROSPECTIVITY:
(2) SEC. 2, ART. III: right against unreasonable searches and
seizure.
ART. 3
(3) SEC. 14, ART. III: right of the accused in criminal
prosecution. Q: What is a felony?

(4) Right against cruel and unusual punishment.  A: FELONIES are acts and omissions punishable under
the Revised Penal Code only.
(5) SEC. 22, ART. III: Congress cannot pass an ex post facto
law or a bill of attainder.  The more precise answer is this.

 Because if it is punished by a special penal law,

those crimes are called OFFENSES.
EX POST FACTO LAW BILL OF ATTAINDER
 This is also correct: acts and omissions punishable by law
A law enacted by Congress It is a legislative act which are felonies (delitos).
prejudicial to accused and inflicts punishment without
given retroactive application. judicial trial.  So we have TWO (2) CLASSIFICATIONS OF CRIMES:
EXAMPLE: an act which was
innocent when done then a
subsequent law is passed
penalizing that act, and that CRIMES FELONIES OFFENSES
law is applied retroactively.
Acts or omission Acts or omissions Act or omission
 Note that there are six (6) species of ex post facto prohibited by law. punished by the punished by
laws discussed in: RPC. special penal laws.
A crime. A crime.
 Apparently, ART. 3 of the RPC defines both offenses and
felonies, because acts or omissions punished by law are
crimes.
 REASON: RPC is a law, and special penal laws are
also law.
 So ART. 3 of the RPC is NOT a precise definition of
felonies.
 The precise definition is provided in the case of:
PEOPLE VS. GONZALES (1990): the SC said these are acts
and omissions punished by the RPC.
o FACTS: the accused was convicted of murder on the
basis of the testimony of the lone eye witness of the
prosecution, who saw the accused stabbing the
victims. There were several accused. The young ones
already applied for probation. But the accused old man
went up to the SC, on the ground that there was no act
which can be attributed to him because the witness
found all of them hitting or stabbing the victim.
However, the witness did not know who did the
stabbing, and he cannot affirm whether it was actually
the old man accused who hit or stabbed the victim.
o The accused was ACQUITTED.
o SC: The testimony was not sufficient to convict the
accused because it failed to impute any specific act
committed by the accused.
o In that case, the SC defined an act as "any bodily
movement tending to produce some effect in the
external world."
 When one thinks of committing a crime, it is not
act.
o In our definition of act as defined by the SC, a mental
act is NOT considered an act, because it does not
produce an effect in the external world.
 That is why conspiracy—mere planning—is not
punishable as a rule.
o There must be an act committed or an omission.
o The elements of felonies in general are:
(1) There must be an act or omission;
 Committing an act is one of an element
of a felony.
 Omission is inaction where a law
requires the performance of an act.
 Not studying for Criminal Law Review is
not an omission, right?
(2) The act or omission must be punishable under
the Revised Penal Code; and
(3) The act is performed or the omission incurred
by means of deceit (dolo) or fault (culpa).
 So that act or omission must be punished by the RPC in
order to be considered as a felony.
PEOPLE VS. SILVESTRE (1931): there was an omission on
the part of Silvestre, when she failed to do something when
her paramour was committing arson.
o If we failed to report the burning of a thing, to prevent
the accused from burning the thing, to shout “sunog,
sunog!” are we criminally liable? NO.
o SC: For an omission to be punishable, there must be a
positive duty.
o If a crime is ongoing, one has no positive duty to report
it to the authorities, or to prevent the accused, or to do
anything else which will stop the accused from
performing such act.
o Since there is no positive duty, there could be no
criminal liability for omitting to do an act.
o Of course, it is a different matter if she is an
accomplice, or a co-principal.
a) If she is a co-conspirator, she will be punished
on the basis of conspiracy;
b) If she assisted, the paramour through previous
or simultaneous acts, then she will considered
as an accomplice.
But all of these are all absent.
So no omission on the part of Silvestre in that case, right?
 So remember, these omissions should be punished by the
RPC, pursuant to the principle of nullum crimen nulla poena
sine lege.
UNITED STATES VS. APOSTOL (1909): After the accused
asked the people inside a house if they’ve seen carabaos, he
(Apostol) set the house in fire and committed arson. He was
convicted in the lower court for arson. On appeal, he argued
as a defense that the prosecution failed to prove his criminal
intent in perpetrating the act of burning the house. It was not
discussed at all the proceedings.
o This was REBUTTED by the SC because criminal
intent is presumed when a person performs an
unlawful act.
o When a person performs an unlawful act, then it is
presumed that he committed it criminal intent, because
criminal intent is a state of mind.
o Can we know for certain that a person acted with
criminal intent? NO. It is only on the basis of his acts.
 If he stabs a person, that is unlawful act. It is
now presumed that he has an intent to kill.
 Because it is a mental process, this criminal
intent, we cannot really take a look at into the
mind of a person and determine whether he
acted with criminal intent.
 We take a look at his actions, and if he
committed an unlawful act, then the Rules of
Court (SEC. 3, RULE 131) provides a
presumption that he committed the unlawful act
with criminal intent.
o So the defense of the accused that his criminal intent
was not proved that he committed the arson with
criminal intent, was NOT sustained by the SC.
 The SC said his act of burning down the house,
that is presumed because that is an unlawful act
that he committed, to cause damage to the
property.
 Criminal intent is essential in intentional felonies. But intent
is not required in culpable felonies and statutory offenses.
 ANOTHER CLASSIFICATION OF CRIMES:
MALA IN SE MALA PROHIBITA
Crimes GENERALLY Crimes GENERALLY
defined and punished under defined and punished under
the RPC. special penal laws.
According to Sir, this is the They are NOT inherently
most important difference wrong, evil or immoral, but
between the two: They are are prohibited by law by
inherently wrong, evil, or reason of public policy and
immoral. convenience.
Good faith is a defense. Good faith is NOT a defense.
Intent is an essential Intent is NOT an essential
element. element, because the mere
performance of the
prohibited act makes the
person liable.
 As for smoking, that is not mala in se, otherwise, it
would have been prohibited since long ago. The
State just do not want to die its citizens at a young
age, and to protect others from second-hand smoke.
It is by reason of public policy and convenience that
it is now being punished → it is not inherently evil.
 NOTE the word “GENERALLY” above → the reason
for that is some offenses punishable under special
laws are mala in se, like the Plunder Law, as I the
case of ESTRADA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (2001).
 In plunder, pandarambong, but even the
predicate crimes discussed in the above case
are crimes punished under the RPC.
 Q: How about election offenses?
 A: Mala in se, as held in GARCIA VS.
COURT OF APPEALS (2006), which
involved the dagdag of the votes of Senator
Pimentel. According to the SC, it is inherently
evil, that act of dagdag-bawas, although it is
punished under the Omnibus Election Code
of the Philippines.
 In contrast, there are crimes punished under the
RPC which may be considered as mala prohibita,
the technical malversation under ART. 220.
 There is a decided case by the SC, where the
Mayor advanced the defense of good faith in
transferring the public funds for a particular
purpose to another.
 The SC ruled that good faith cannot be a
defense in technical malversation, because
although it is punished under the RPC, it is a
mala prohibita crime.
 So in the case of UNITED STATES VS. GO CHICO
(1909), the SC said that what is required there is the
intent to perpetrate the act, or simply the mere
performance or commission of the prohibited act
makes the person liable.
 Therefore, if it is mala prohibita, you cannot
say that you issued the check because you
needed to bring your mother out of the
hospital, and that you are in good faith in
issuing the bouncing check.
 Since the issuance of a bouncing
check is punishable under BP 22, it is
mala prohibita, therefore, good faith is
not a defense.
 In mala in se, good faith is a defense because
criminal intent is required.
DOLO (CRIMINAL INTENT): it is the state of mind when it is
committed by means of deceit or malice on the part of the
offender.
 Q: In our ordinary lives, when do we say that a person acts
with dolo, with deliberate intent?
 A: Doing an act with the intent to cause damage to
another person.
 So deceit is not appropriate translation for dolo, as
deceit connotes fraud or misrepresentation.
 Dolo is the intent to cause damage to another
person.
 If a person performs an act with the purpose of
causing damage to another, then he acts with dolo,
or with deliberate intent.
 Q: Are deceit and malice the same?
 There is deceit when your boyfriend says he was
watching a movie, when in fact he is with his ex-
girlfriend 
 TWO (2) KINDS OF INTENT:
GENERAL INTENT SPECIFIC INTENT
The mental attitude or Intent to kill in homicide,
purpose to cause damage or murder, and parricide; intent
injury to another. to gain in theft and robbery;
intent to deprive a person of
his liberty in kidnapping.
 A person who commits a crime has the general
intent of causing damage or injury to another
person, and NOT to do wrong.
 “To do wrong” is quite a broad concept.
  Like, to do wrong by saying bad things about
another person, the purpose of which is to damage
the reputation of that person → libel.
 So the purpose of the action is to cause damage to
another person → that is general intent, or simply
intent.
 Q: Do all crimes have specific intent? Are all crimes
specific intent crimes?
 A: NO. There are only specific intent crimes.
 So not all crimes are specific intent crimes,
but in scenarios where there are VARIANT
CRIMES, intent will help a lot in determining
what crime was actually committed, as well
as motive.
UNITED STATES VS. CATOLICO (1911): the presumption
(of criminal intent) was NOT applied in the case, right.
o REASON: the act of the judge was NOT unlawful.
o The presumption only arises if the act performed is
unlawful.
o So the judge here was performing his judicial functions
→ he was in fact hearing the case and he just decided
to award the bonds posted to the winning party, as part
of the execution of judgment.
 So he was just performing his judicial function
as a judge → he is performing a perfectly legal
act.
 He was not performing an unlawful act like
stabbing a person or burning a house.
o It is clear in this case that the presumption does not
arise if the person is committing an unlawful act.
o Q: So if there is no such presumption, how do we now
prove that he acted with deliberate intent?
 A: Present evidence, like he gave the money,
not in the performance of his duty, but to favor
the other party, or that he appropriated the
money for himself.
 But here, the money was actually given to the
prevailing party, and did not appropriate for
himself the money.
o Here, according to the SC, he just committed a
MISTAKE / ERROR in the performance of his lawful
duties → so the presumption that he committed the act
with criminal intent does NOT arise.
PEOPLE VS. PUNO (1993): The accused Isabelo Puno, who
is the personal driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband, told Mrs.
Socorro that her own driver Fred had to go to Pampanga on
an emergency. She got into the Mercedes Benz of her
husband with Isabelo. After the car turned right in a corner of
Araneta Avenue, a young man, accused Enrique Amurao,
boarded the car beside the driver. Once inside, Enrique
poked a gun at her. Isabelo, who earlier told her that Enrique
is his nephew announced, "ma’am, you know, I want to get
money from you." The bag contained P7,000.00 and was
taken. Ma. Socorro agreed to give them more but they had to
drop her at her gas station in Kamagong St., Makati where
the money is. The car sped off north towards the North
superhighway. There Isabelo, Beloy as he is called, asked
Ma. Socorro to issue a check for P100,000.00. Ma. Socorro
complied. The accused were arrested while they were
encasing the checks. They were charged with kidnapping for
ransom (ART. 267), but were convicted by the lower court of
P.D. No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law).
o PROF.: if you are criminals, do not ask for checks,
because they were caught while they were encasing
the checks. And even when you get to be a lawyer, do
not ask for checks when you are coercing someone to
give money.
o SC: convicted them of SIMPLE ROBBERY (ART. 294).
o We have here a case where there are three possible
crimes committed by the accused → they are what we
call VARIANT CRIMES.
o Q: So how do we determine what crime was really
committed because there seems to be a confusion as
to what kind of crime was committed? What was the
guidepost of the SC in resolving what crime was
actually committed?
 A: They determined their specific intent.
 Q: Are their motive important also?
 A: YES, because this case involved
variant crimes.
o So in case of variant crimes, it would be helpful for the
court in determining what crime was committed to
consider the specific intent and the motive.
o Therefore, there are two possible guidepost for the SC
in what crime was committed: intent and motive.
o Q: What is MOTIVE?
 A: Motive is the reason which prompts the
accused to engage in a particular criminal
activity.
 EXAMPLE: jealousy, hatred.
 Those examples are NOT intent.
 GENERAL RULE: intent is required in
intentional felonies, while motive is NOT.
 EXCEPTIONS: Instances when motive is
looked into:
(a) When there are variant crimes;
(b) When the identity of the accused is of
doubt;
(c) When the evidence is inconclusive;
(d) When there is no positive identification of
the accused.
o So here in variant crimes, we take a look at specific
intent and motive.
(1) Kidnapping: to deprive a person of his liberty.
(2) Highway robbery: special penal law, which is
indiscriminate robbery in the highway.
(3) Robbery: intent to gain, through violence or
intimidation, or force upon things.
o Going back to the actions of the accused, they
specifically targeted the victim, and took money from
the accused using violence and intimidation on the
person of the victim, with intent to gain because the
accused told the victim that he needed money.
 Q: Was there intent to deprive her of her liberty?
Didn’t they actually deprive her of her liberty in
this case?
 A: YES, from Araneta Avenue to NLEX.
During that time, she was deprived of her
liberty. She cannot do anything at gun
point.
 If kidnapping is deprivation of one’s
liberty, then the accused did commit that
 crime when the victim was deprived of
her liberty for that period.
 But they did NOT commit kidnapping, as
the deprivation of her liberty was merely
incidental to their actual purpose, which
is to gain.
o The same principle in the next case was used in this
case, as well, because the accused immediately
released the victim after they have already her money.
Thus, her deprivation of liberty was merely incidental
to gain.
o So if their real purpose is either to kill or to gain money,
then the temporary deprivation of liberty will not lead to
the fact of kidnapping, because it is just incidental to
the real purpose.
o The specific intent really of the offenders was to gain
money from the victim.
 In fact, they did not ask for ransom.
 For kidnapping, they would necessarily
ask for ransom.
o In this case, there is a discussion of motive, and here,
the motive of the accused is that he needed the money
because he was sick, hence, the intent to gain was
present.
PEOPLE VS. DELIM (2003): the same thing happened in this
case, as they took the victim from his house, then after
several days, the victim was found dead.
o ISSUE: W the accused committed kidnapping or
murder?
o SC: The accused committed HOMICIDE.
o It is evident on the face of the Information that the
specific intent of the malefactors in barging into the
house of Modesto was to kill him and that he was
seized precisely to kill him with the attendant modifying
circumstances.
 The act of the malefactors of abducting Modesto
was merely incidental to their primary purpose
of killing him.
o Although the accused here actually deprived the victim
of his liberty by taking him forcibly, hogtying him – but
that is NOT their real purpose. Eventually, the victim
was found dead.
o Therefore, according the SC, the intent of the accused
was to kill the victim.
o But take note that there was no evidence that they
actually killed the victim, that is why there was a debate
among the SC justices whether they should convict the
accused of kidnapping or homicide – homicide,
because there are not qualifying circumstances.
 No one testified on how the victim was killed, so
it can never be murder.
o So it was homicide, according to the SC.
 REASON: the deprivation of liberty was merely
incidental to their real purpose of killing the
victim.
 That is specific intent.
PEOPLE VS. TEMBLOR (1988): the accused is admittedly a
member of the NPA. He shot the accused. His defense was
that he has no motive in killing the victim, and he interposed
the defense of alibi. At the trial, he was positively identified by
the wife of the victim as the person who shot her wife.
o SC: the lack of motive is not a ground for the acquittal
of the accused, especially if he was positively
identified.
o The reverse is true then: if the accused is not positively
identified, there was doubt as to his identification, then
motive will play an important role.
o NOTE: important, but NOT essential.
What is essential is intent.
Motive will just assist the judge in determining whether
he actually committed the crime, but it is NOT
essential.
 So in two instances: (1) if the identification of the accused
is not positive, and there is (2) doubt as to the identity, then
motive becomes an aid in determining in what crime was
committed, and whether the accused is criminally liable.
 Motive is also important as an aid in variant crimes, in
determining what crime was actually committed.
 Q: For instance, in rebellion, the rebel killed a person. Will
he be charged with rebellion, right?
 A: YES.
 Q: What if he killed that person due to a personal
grudge? What will you charge that person? Will we
look at his intent or his motive?
 A: We take a look at the accused’s motive,
because if he killed the victim for personal
reasons, he will be charged with
murder/homicide. But if his motive is in
pursuance of his rebel activity, he will be
charged with rebellion.
 So we take a look motive, NOT intent.
 In that case, motive will be an important guide what
crime was committed, but not the intent.
PEOPLE VS. HASSAN (1988): the happened also in this
case: there was no proper police line-up. The identification of
the accused was stated by the SC as highly suggestive. Only
one person was shown to the alleged eye witness, and there
was a confrontation rather than a police line-up. The
identification was highly suggestive, and it was established
that Hassan had no motive in killing the victim.
o So the SC ruled that he will be acquitted.
UNITED STATES VS. AH CHONG (1910): the accused and
a victim shared a room in their workplace at a time there were
prevalent robberies in that area. The door only has a latch
and the room only has one window. While Ah Chong was
sleeping he heard someone trying to break open his door.
The intruder did not identify himself, and when he opened the
door successfully, Ah Chong stabbed him using the knife he
kept under his pillow. He was charged for the killing of his
roommate.
o SC: Mistake of fact is attendant in this case.
o What was the defense of Ah Chong? If the person is
an intruder, under our criminal justice system, what is
his defense? Self-defense, which is a justifying
circumstance.
o In establishing the justifying circumstance of self-
defense, he committed a mistake in fact, and that is the
fact that the person who was trying to come in was not
really a robber, but his roommate.
o What are the requirements of self-defense?
a. Unlawful aggression;
b. Reasonable means to prevent or repel it;
c. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself.
o In ignorance of the law, or mistake in law, that is NOT
a justifying or exempting circumstance.
 But here, we are talking about a mistake of fact.
o Apparently, it was appreciated by the SC as an
extenuating circumstance, or a circumstance that will
lead to a valid defense of self-defense on the part of
Ah Chong.
o There are certain REQUIREMENTS FOR ONE TO
INVOKE THIS MISTAKE OF FACT according to this
case:
a. The act done would have been lawful had the
facts turn out to be true;
b. He had no evil intent; and
c. There was no fault or carelessness on his part.
o Ah Chong believed the victim was a robber, and if his
belief was true, then he would have been justified to
kill that person, using the theory of self-defense.
o He was also not at fault or negligent.
o There was unlawful aggression because he was hit by
the chair.
o His means employed were reasonable.
o There was also no provocation as he was sleeping, so
how can he provoke the entry of that person?
 So the mistake of fact in:
INTENTIONAL FELONIES CULPABLE FELONIES
ELEMENTS: ELEMENTS:
(1) Freedom; (1) Freedom;
(2) Intelligence; (2) Intelligence;
(3) Intent. (3) Imprudence,
negligence, lack of
foresight, or lack of skill.
 On the part of Ah Chong, he had freedom → he freely
committed the act.
 He also had intelligence.
 Q: Did he have intent? NO, because this intent is
negative by the mistake of fact.
 So what is missing in the case of US VS. AH
CHONG (1910), intent was missing.
PEOPLE VS. OANIS (1943): In this case, the police officers
also invoked mistake of fact, but the SC did not allow such
invocation.
o REASON: there was fault and carelessness on his
part.
o In this case, the accused are performing their duties:
they are in the lawful performance of their duties.
o There was allegedly fault or negligence or
carelessness on their part, so they CANNOT invoke
mistake of fact.
o Q: Did they commit a culpable felony? NO, because if
they acted with imprudence, negligence, it will be a
culpable felony.
o The conviction was for murder, which is an intentional
crime.
o So they were actually in the process of performing their
duty when they are arresting the escaped convict.
o But in this case, they did NOT follow the procedure:
instead of asking the sleeping person, and just
arresting him, they immediately fired at the person.
o There was also a mistake in the identity of the victim
because they were in violation of the operational
standards of the police officers in effecting the arrest.
o So it is an INTENTIONAL crime of murder, and NOT a
culpable crime, because if they committed it with fault
and carelessness, precisely they are committing a
culpable felony.
o But if the facts are what the accused believed them to
be would constitute a lawful act, then the mistake of
fact, as what happened in the first case, is a possible
defense.
 But in this case, mistake of fact was not
appreciated.
QUIZON VS. JUSTICE OF THE PEACE (1955): the
respondents were charged with damage to property through
reckless imprudence before the Justice of the Peace, with the
alleged damage amounting to P125.00. (If the amount is less
than P200.00, the jurisdiction is vested with the Justice of the
Peace, the penalty thereof being from P125.00 to P375.00.
So if the crime charged is reckless imprudence resulting to
damage to property, the amount of damage is P125.00, the
amount will be thrice, to P375.00). The accused filed a Motion
to Quash, because according to him, pursuant to the
Judiciary Act of 1948, malicious mischief is within the
jurisdiction of the CFI, and that the Justice of the Peace is
bereft of jurisdiction. The complainant opposed the motion on
the ground that the Justice of the Peace jurisdiction has
jurisdiction over malicious mischief, and although the crime
charged is reckless imprudence, it should also be with the
Justice of the Peace because malicious mischief is within the
jurisdiction of the said court. This arose from the definition of
felony under ART. 3, as there are two modes of committing a
felony. The argument raised is the culpable felony is a variant
of committing an intentional felony, in this case of malicious
mischief.
o SC: the contention is without merit because it implies
that reckless imprudence is a variant of malicious
mischief.
 Under ART. 365, reckless imprudence is a
crime itself, and we cannot give support to the
 position that culpa is just a means of committing
a felony.
 It is posited that culpa is just a means of
committing a crime; that culpable felonies are
just means of committing a felony, as in fact
ART. 3, felonies may be committed by means
of dolo or culpa.
 The above is NOT correct.
 In fact, under the RPC, a quasi-offense, or
reckless imprudence is also considered as a
SEPARATE AND DISTINCT crime.
 So we consider imprudence and negligence in
two (2) senses:
(a) As a means of committing a crime;
(b) As a separate felony by itself under ART.
365.
 For every culpable crime, there is an intentional
felony (i.e. reckless imprudence resulting to
homicide, to homicide).
 But if you follow ART. 3, a felony is committed
by means of dolo or culpa: homicide, then
homicide by negligence; treason, then treason
to negligence.
o Here, the SC acknowledged that a felony may be
committed by means of negligence, but there is NO
ONE TO ONE CORRESPONDENCE.
o It is NOT the same as a crime of omission, as that can
still be either deliberate or by negligence.
o Thus, malicious mischief cannot be committed by
means of negligence, as deliberate intent in the former
to damage property.
o Although the SC acknowledged that indeed, ART.
3 says that felony may be committed by dolo or
culpa, they CANNOT give its unqualified assent to
the proposition that there is one to one
correspondence between intentional crimes and
culpable crimes.
o In fact, there is a separate crime for itself, which is
ART. 365 → this is the catch basin of all crimes
committed that way.
 What is punished there is the MENTAL
CONDITION, because imprudence may also
lead to the death of a person (RIRT homicide),
but definitely NOT MURDER.
 The condition here is that he is reckless or
imprudent.
 REASON: if we go about negligent people
recklessly go about their business, then it will
lead to dangerous consequences.
 That is why our RPC punishes imprudence or
negligence, so that is a mental condition so he
puts regard to his standard of care.
 Even if leads to death of the victim, the
imposable penalty is NOT afflictive → that is
how lightly this crime is punished, as compared
to intentional felonies.
 If it is an intentional felony of homicide, the
penalty is 12 years, and 1 day to 20 years
(reclusion temporal); but if it is caused by
reckless imprudence resulting to homicide, it is
just from 6 month and 1 day to around 2 years.
 So if you can prove that the crime committed is
reckless imprudence, your client can go out
because your client can apply probation,
because it is less than six years. He cannot
apply for probation for homicide.
 In fact, there are CRIMES COMMITTED THROUGH
NEGLIGENCE IN THE RPC: (other than those enumerated
in ART. 365)
(1) ART. 205: Judgment Rendered Through
Negligence.
(2) ART. 217: Malversation of Public Funds or Property:
can be committed deliberately or by negligence.
(3) ART. 224: Evasion Through Negligence.
(4) ART. 218: Failure of Accountable Officer to Render
Accounts: can be intentional or culpable.
 Looking at the RPC, it will be difficult in finding there
committed by means of negligence → not probably
exceeding ten.
 Q: Can there be murder committed by means of negligence
or imprudence?
SEVILLA VS. PEOPLE (2014): the charge here was
falsification. He is a councilor. He signed a Personal Data
Sheet. In one question there, a box was not checked, but he
was in fact already charged before. So he committed
falsification in his PDS. His defense was that his staff who
prepared the sheet, and that he merely signed it without
reading it. That is a classic admission of negligence on the
part of the accused.
o Q: Is that an INTENTIONAL felony? It can be, as held
by the SC.
o He may not have deliberately falsified the PDS, but he
committed reckless imprudence resulting to
falsification of a public document.
 So falsification may also result from reckless
imprudence, despite it being an intentional
felony, but NOT falsification by means of
negligence.
 It is violation of ART. 365.
o According to the SC here, the proper crime is NOT
falsification resulting from reckless imprudence, but
reckless imprudence, because it is the mental
condition of being reckless that is punished under
ART. 365.
o So from here on, if we talk of ART. 365, you
property term it as reckless imprudence resulting
to homicide; never homicide resulting from
reckless imprudence.
o Here, the first thing that the SC noticed was the way
the crime here was called, because the
Sandiganbayan convicted the accused of falsification
by means of reckless imprudence.
o The property name should be reckless imprudence
resulting to falsification of public documents.
o From now on, let us follow that, although if you look at
some cases by the SC, they do not follow their own
ruling.
o
 Q: A vehicular (jeepney) accident causes the death of ten
persons because of the reckless driving of the driver of a
 truck. Will the truck driver be liable to ten counts of
homicide? Because at the very least, he will then be
sentenced to suffer imprisonment for 120 years (12 x 10).
 A: He will be charged with only reckless imprudence
resulting to multiple homicide, with the penalty of
arresto menor, but not 120 years.
 REASON: what is being punished in ART. 365 is the
mental condition; the result does NOT matter.
 It only matters in the penalty that will be imposed,
because if it is a grave felony, then arresto mayor to
prision correccional; if it is less grave and light, much
lower.
 Take note of the discussions because this shall have
significant ramifications to the penalty imposable on
the accused.
PEOPLE VS. CARMEN (2001): the faith healer who allegedly
performed medical treatment to a boy who was possessed
with an evil spirit. By doing so, they tied the boy, dunked him
inside a drum full of water and stabbed him.
o SC: Mother Perpetuala and her cohorts were guilty of
reckless imprudence resulting to homicide because
they did not have the expertise to cure the child, and
yet they proceeded to conduct measures to do so.
o So they are negligent or imprudent.
o NOT an intentional felony → they did not intend to kill
the child; their intention was to cure the child.
PEOPLE VS. PUGAY (1988): The accused here were
making fun of the victim. Pugay poured gasoline on the
victim. Then the other lighted him on fire using match.
o SC: Pugay was recklessly imprudent in pouring
gasoline, because by doing so, it could lead to
dangerous consequences, like in this case: someone
lighting the person of the victim.
o Pugay was convicted of reckless imprudence, but the
guy who lighted the person was convicted of an
intentional felony of homicide.
o REASON FOR THE CONVICTION OF HOMICIDE:
because he knew that gasoline was poured already on
the body of the victim, so when he lighted him, that lead
to the burning and the killing of the victim.
 He did not intent to kill: probably the purpose
was to make fun of the victim.
 But according to ART. 4, even if the result is
different from what he intended, he will be liable
for the result: the killing.
 Of course, he will be given the mitigating
circumstance of no intention to commit so grave
a wrong (PAR. 3, ART. 13).
CULPABLE FELONIES
 Felony may be committed by means of intent or culpa.
 In culpa, there is no intent.
Q: Is negligence a crime by itself?
A: In Art 365, imprudence or negligence is a crime itself.
Q: Can imprudence be a modality also?
A: Yes.
Q: In what instances may it be considered as a mode?
Q: When you look at the title of Art 365, it says, quasi-
offenses. What is a crime again?
A: An act or omission punishable by law.
Q: Is imprudence an act or an offense punishable by law?
A: Yes. It’s punished under Art 365. Does that make it a crime?
Yes.
Q: Is Impossible Crime a crime? Is it an act or omission
punishable by law?
A: Yes. Under Art 59. Art 4(2) states only that a person commits
an impossible crime. It is under Art 59 wherein Impossible crime
is being punished, the penalty is arresto mayor or a fine ranging
from 200-500 pesos.
Article 59. Penalty to be imposed in case of failure to commit the
crime because the means employed or the aims sought are
impossible. - When the person intending to commit an offense has
already performed the acts for the execution of the same but
nevertheless the crime was not produced by reason of the fact
that the act intended was by its nature one of impossible
accomplishment or because the means employed by such person
are essentially inadequate to produce the result desired by him,
the court, having in mind the social danger and the degree of
criminality shown by the offender, shall impose upon him the
penalty of arresto mayor or a fine from 200 to 500 pesos.
TWO WAYS OF LOOKING AT NEGLIGENCE:
There are two ways of looking at negligence, as discussed in
Quizon vs Justice of the Peace:
1) as a mode of committing a felony or modality
 How should we take a look at it? What do you mean
by modality?
 It is a means of committing a crime.
 Does the RPC tell us how a crime is committed?
A: Art 3 provides that felonies may be committed by
means of dolo and by means of culpa. It doesn’t say
that culpa is a separate crime but as a mode of
committing a felony. It is a different perspective. If
the act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of
foresight or lack of skill, we call that culpable
felony. If it is with deliberate intent, we call it
intentional felony.
2) As a separate crime under Art 365
  What is punished under this provision is the state of
mind of the person. The mental condition of the
person.
 We don’t want our fellow human being to be always
careless. Would you like our drivers to drive
carelessly in our streets? Is that a good society?
Definitely not. Hence, we punish these persons for
having this mental condition. For being careless in
his actions. Punishing him not only civilly. So that he
cannot injure his fellow human beings, so his
mental condition is being punished under Art 365.
Examples of crimes committed by means of negligence:
1. Art 205- Judgment rendered through negligence; ( it is
an act, he renders a decision. How does he commit it?
Unjust judgment by reason of negligence. For e.g he did
not study criminal law and renders judgment)
2. Art 206 – unjust interlocutory order;
3. Evasion of service of sentence by negligence
4. Art 209 – Betrayal of trust by an attorney;
 Murder can never be committed by means of
negligence.
 Arson can never be committed by means of
negligence.
 Because if we take a look at it, as in the
perspective of modality or mode of committing
a felony, then there should be an intentional
felony and a corresponding culpable felony.
That’s not the way how it works.
 There are only a few crimes which may be
committed by means of negligence. But in Art
365, imprudence and negligence are
considered as crimes themselves.
Misprision of Treason is not included. How is it committed?
A: When a person who owes an allegiance to the Philippines,
having knowledge of any conspiracy against the government
conceals or does not disclose and make known the same. (Art
116)
This is not negligence. When one fails to report, there is only
omission – the failure to do positive an act, mandated by law.
Again, we go back to the definition of a crime.
An act or omission punishable by law.
* Omission requires a positive duty, required by law and the
person fails to perform the act. Such failure is punishable by law.
In Pp vs Silvestre, the paramour was charged for her omission of
not shouting fire. Was there duty for her to shout? No. There
36 Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice,
doing or falling to do an act from which material damage results by
reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing of failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition
and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
should be a law which requires that. Yes, there is omission but
such must also be punished by law.
The omission to report a conspiracy is punishable by Art 116. That
is an omission.
There is confusion with omission and negligence because they
are somehow cousins.
Reason: There is some sort of similarities.
Q: If one commits an act, does it necessarily mean that one
commits negligence? NO. It may also be intentional. In
Misprision of Treason, it is a deliberate act if you conceal. You
have the intent to conceal. Omission may be committed either
through an intentional deliberate act or through negligence. That’s
why under Art 3, it says, crimes may be committed by means of
dolo or culpa. Omission does nt necessarily mean a negligent act
– there is only failure to do something. And the reason for
failure to do so may be intentional or a negligent act.
Q: Are Imprudence and Negligence the same?
A: They are siblings (not twins nor cousins). So they came from
the same parent.
Who is older? What is their similarity? It punishes the mental
condition – the degree of carelessness.
Q: Which is more careless, the person who is imprudent or
the person who is negligent?
A: They are similar because both are culpa. But then they are
differentiated from each other by their degrees. Both of them do
not take the necessary precautions. Imprudence is graver in a
sense that :
IMPRUDENCE NEGLIGENCE
 lack of skill;  lack of foresight;
 higher degree of  lesser degree of
culpa; culpa;
To illustrate:
This person driving a vehicle, when is he imprudent? Even though
he knows the traffic rules, he did not stop during the red light. If he
injures another person he commits a culpa. If you look at Art
36536, imprudence and negligence are actually defined. If he see
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those
cases in which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate
nor the danger clearly manifest.
a red light and he proceeds, you see danger, that there might be
an accident.
If there’s an intersection and no traffic light he proceeds, does he
see a danger? A: If you fail to check all sides, it is lack of foresight.
There’s no danger but you have to look at all sides because you
have foresight. But danger is not imminent. That is negligence.
But then, if there’s red light already, that’s lack of skill. In Pp vs
Carmen, she is not a doctor and does not have a capacity to cure,
is that lack of foresight or lack of skill? A: Lack of skill. Because
she does not have education to cure. He is imprudent.
morning the next day, it is true that they get tired, especially our
teachers.
H: MALA IN SE. Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b)
are mala in se. For otherwise, even errors and mistakes
committed due to overwork and fatigue would be punishable.
Given the volume of votes to be counted and canvassed within a
limited amount of time, errors and miscalculations are bound to
happen. And it could not be the intent of the law to punish
unintentional election canvass errors. However, intentionally
increasing or decreasing the number of votes received by a
candidate is inherently immoral, since it is done with malice
and intent to injure another.

Negligence then is the lesser degree of culpa. Imprudence is the Criminal intent is presumed to exist on the part of the person who
higher degree of culpa. They are siblings, imprudence is the older. executes an act which the law punishes, unless the contrary shall
Because there is imminent danger and still he does not act with appear.Thus, whoever invokes good faith as a defense has the
the requisite skill. burden of proving its existence.
CRIMES MALA IN SE vs CRIMES MALA PROHIBITA Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the
Revised Penal Code. When the acts complained of are inherently
immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished
Crimes Mala In Crimes Mala by a special law.8Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly
Se Prohibita established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no
As to the moral trait Inherently evil or Prohibited by law crime is committed. On the other hand, in crimes that are mala
of the offender immoral prohibita, the criminal acts are not inherently immoral but become
As to intent Intent is essential Intent is not punishable only because the law says they are forbidden. With
essential; these crimes, the sole issue is whether the law has been
performance of the violated.9Criminal intent is not necessary where the acts are
act is required prohibited for reasons of public policy.
As to the defense of Good faith37 is a Good faith is not a
good faith defense defense Q: What are crimes considered as mala prohibita under RPC?
As to source of law Generally Generally
punishable by punishable by A; Technical Malversation
RPC Special Laws
As to mitigating and Taken account of Not taken account  NOTE: Violation election laws are usually mala in se
even though punished by special law.
aggravating of
 Q: But what should be our guideline if it is a special
circumstances penal law and in determining whether it is mala in se
or mala prohibita? A: The words used in the law (or
triggered words as Atty. Calica would like to classify) are
GARCIA vs COURT OF APPEALS (2006) “intentionally, maliciously, deliberately, willfully”
E.g maliciously performs an act.. this connotes intent.
F: Accused was charged within the canvassing period during the
Q: Crimes committed by culpa, are they mala in se or mala
May 8, 1995 elections for the violation of Sec 27(b) of RA 6646 by
prohibita?38
unlawfully decreasing the votes received by senatorial candidate
Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. from 6,998 to 1,921 votes. Accused A: (not settled)
contend that there was no intent to decrease the votes because
of overwork. For instance, the crimes committed by means of culpa
enumerated above, are they mala in se or mala prohibita?
ISSUE: Is a violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646,
classified under mala in se or mala prohibita? Could good faith A: (not settled)
and lack of criminal intent be valid defenses?

Atty. Calica: Because that is possible right? In previous elections,

they manually count. Election takes from 7am to 5pm to finally be Back to the case of Garcia…Violation of Election Code in the case
done. After that, they count the votes from 5pm to the early of Garcia vs CA is mala in se.

37 Because in intentional felonies, good faith can be raised if the act 38TRANSCRIBER’S GENTLE REMINDER: When there is no
committed is not intentional. corresponding answer to the question, it means that the question is not
settled in the class. So kindly research research ihihih :D
In Dungo vs People, what is being punished is the crime of hazing
which is a crime mala prohibita. By itself, the crime of hazing is
not inherently immoral but we’re looking at Hazing as a procedure
before an entry into an organization/fraternities. Hazing per se or
the requirement of certain qualifications is not mala in se per se.
DUNGO vs PEOPLE (2015)
F: Accused were charge for the death of Marlon Villanueva during
an initiation rite and being then members of Alpha Phi Omega
fraternity. RTC convicted them for violating Section 4 of the Anti-
Hazing Law and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA. They argue that said law was violative
of the Constitution “which stated that mere presence in the hazing
was prima facie evidence of participation therein”, because it
violates the constitutional presumption of innocence of the
accused.
ISSUE: WON SAID LAW IS MALUM PROHIBITUM
H: YES. R.A. No. 8049, or the Anti-Hazing Law of 1995, has been
enacted to regulate hazing and other forms of initiation rites in
fraternities, sororities, and other organizations. It was in response
to the rising incidents of death of hazing victims.
Criminal law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in
themselves called acts mala in se; and acts which would not be
wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids them, called
acts mala prohibita. This distinction is important with reference to
the intent with which a wrongful act is done. The rule on the
subject is that in acts mala in se, the intent governs; but in
acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law been
violated? When an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is
immaterial.64 When the doing of an act is prohibited by law, it is
considered injurious to public welfare, and the doing of the
prohibited act is the crime itself.65redarclaw
A common misconception is that all mala in se crimes are found
in the Revised Penal Code (RPC), while all mala prohibita crimes
are provided by special penal laws. In reality, however, there may
be mala in se crimes under special laws, such as plunder under
R.A. No. 7080, as amended. Similarly, there may be mala
prohibita crimes defined in the RPC, such as technical
malversation.
The better approach to distinguish between mala in se and mala
prohibita crimes is the determination of the inherent immorality or
vileness of the penalized act. If the punishable act or omission is
immoral in itself, then it is a crime mala in se; on the contrary, if it
is not immoral in itself, but there is a statute prohibiting its
commission by reasons of public policy, then it is mala prohibita.
In the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral
turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends
on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute.
The crime of hazing under R.A. No. 8049 is malum
prohibitum. The Senate deliberations would show that the
lawmakers intended the antihazing statute to be malum
prohibitum xxx When a person or group of persons resort to
hazing as a requirement for gaining entry into an
organization, the intent to commit a wrong is not visible or is not
present, Mr. President. Whereas, in these specific crimes, Mr.
President, let us say there is death or there is homicide,
mutilation, if one files a case, then the intention to commit a
wrong has to be proven. But if the crime of hazing is the basis,
what is important is the result from the act of hazing.
Q: In the case of the UST student who died in Hazing, is it
murder or homicide if there’s no violation of Anti Hazing
Law?
A: Since an applicant is blindfolded, there will be treachery that
would qualify the crime to murder.
But note: The act of inflicting violence to a neophyte– is that a
felony? No, because the act of inflicting of injuries is to instill a
doctrine to a member in an organization. There’s no intention of
killing the neophyte. Without the Hazing Law, the fraternity
members would be penalized only for reckless imprudence. Just
like in Pp vs Carmen – there’s no intent to kill the child, the intent
was to cure.
Without the Hazing Law, there are several possibilities. If it is an
intentional felony, and the applicant dies. What crime would it be?
A: Homicide or Murder, as the case may be.
Three Possible Scenarios in a Hazing Incident:
(1) punished under Anti Hazing Law
(2) reckless imprudence
(3) death
In the UST case, they were suggesting that the members should
only be liable for physical injuries, because the victim is already
suffering from heart ailment and that the physical injuries are
merely contributory. Because the student, initially lost his
consciousness (because of his heart condition) and when he
regained his composure, the members started inflicting injuries
again. So, there’s negligence on the part of the members or if they
inflicted the injuries they said that they are only liable up to
physical injuries.
What if for instance, after the act of inflicting injuries, the student
took his own life (suicide), is suicide considered as an efficient
intervening cause?
A: NO. There is no more imminent danger when he is in the
hospital. In US vs Valdez, although he did not inflict an injury
because he created fear in the mind of the victim , the accused is
criminally held liable. This is also the same ruling in PP vs William
Page, wherein the victim jumped out of the jeepney on the
occasion of robbery, and since he instilled the fear to the mind of
the passenger that he will kill her, he was held liable for her death.
In those instances, the accused were committing felonies and
the proximate cause of the jumping was the fear that they created.
In the cited cases (Us vs Valdez and PP vs Page), are they the
same with the scenario in the applicant subject of hazing, and then
he was brought to hospital but the applicant because of the fear
that was instilled in his mind took his own life?
A: NONE. The fraternity members are not anymore present to hit
him, there’s no more imminent danger. Because in US vs Valdez,
what is involved is when the crime committed is different from what
he intended. The accused was not trying to kill the victim.
NOTE: Hazing is a mala prohibita crime. In Pp vs Lozano, the
bouncing checks law is mala prohbita. In Us vs Go Chico, the
display of flags or symbols of Philippine insurrection, is also mala
prhobita.
The important lessons in these case are (1) good faith is not a
defense (2) intent to commit a felony is immaterial.
Go Chico in displaying the emblems did not have the purpose to
display the flags or emblems in furtherance of insurrection. What
will consummate the offense in mala prohibita is by the doing of
the act that is prohibited by law. The mere commission to
perpetrate the act prohibited consummates already the offense.
Whether or not he had the purpose of arousing the insurrection
objectives does not matter.
In Estrada vs Sandiganbyan, Plunder is a crime mala in se. Why?
What are the predicate crimes in the crime of plunder?
ESTRADA vs SANDIGANBAYAN (2001)
F: Pres Estrada was charged for the violation of Plunder Law (RA
8080: An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) He
assailed the constitutionality of the said law on the ground that it
suffers from the vice of vagueness and that it eliminates the
requirement of mens rea.
PREDICATE CRIMES punished under PLUNDER LAW
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or
malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share,
percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from
any person and/or entity in connection with any government
contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the
public office concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets
belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions,
agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any
shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation
including the promise of future employment in any business
enterprise or undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial
monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of
decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or
special interests; or
(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship,
connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at
the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino
people and the Republic of the Philippines.
PLUNDER LAW, EVEN THOUGH A SPECIAL LAW IT IS A
CRIME MALUM IN SE
Plunder is a malum in se which requires criminal
intent. Constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens
rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy
that the amended information alleges that the crime of plunder
was committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges
guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.
NOTE: The predicate crimes of Plunder are all punished under the
Revised Penal Code. Plunder is one of those considered as
heinous crime, it is provided under RA 7659 as one of heinous
crime. If a crime is considered as heinous, it is inherently evil. That
is the most important reason by SC in the Estrada vs
Sandiganbayan, why it ruled that plunder is ma la in se.
REVISED PENAL CODE RELATIONSHIP TO SPECIAL
PENAL LAWS
Article 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. -
Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under
special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This
Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter
should specially provide the contrary.
Offenses not subject to this code is the title of this provision.
Offenses are those punishable by special penal laws. We have
the general term Crime.
Crime – is an act and omissions punishable by law.
1) We classify first crime as whether mala in se or mala
prohibita.
2) Second, we classify them as felonies and offenses.
Offenses are those punished under special penal laws.
3) Two classifications of felonies – intentional or culpable
4) In this provision, we are talking about offenses punishable
under special penal laws.
The first sentence actually states that the RPC does not apply
to the offenses punishable by special penal laws.
The second sentence provides that RPC shall be
supplementary to special penal laws, unless the special penal law
provides the contrary. So that the RPC shall not apply, the special
penal law shall specifically provide that the RPC shall not apply.
If the special penal law is silent whether or not RPC shall apply,
you apply RPC suppletorily.
LADONGA vs PEOPLE
F: This involves a crime of BP 2239 wherein both spouses were
charged for violation of the said law. It was only the husband who
signed the bounced check, but the wife was also being
prosecuted.
It was alleged that the spouses conspired together in issuing the
bounced checks. The basis of the prosecution was conspiracy so
that the wife may be included in the crime charged because
remember criminal liability is personal. In BP 22,the involved
person is the one who issued the check.
.The argument of the wife is that Conspiracy shall not apply to
them. RTC convicted them both. Only the wife appealed to the
Supreme Court to insist her innocence. The husband applied for
probation.
H: Conspiracy shall apply. However, the wife was still
ACQUITTED because the prosecution failed to prove that
petitioner performed any overt act in furtherance of the alleged
conspiracy..
Conspiracy is applicable in the RPC. Is there a provision in BP 22
that conspirators shall be liable? None. So being charged in
conspiracy under BP 22, the wife contends that she cannot be
held liable because she is not a signatory.
Conspiracy is applicable in violations of BP 22 in accordance with
Art. 10 of RPC; B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the
suppletory application of the provisions of the RPC. Thus, in the
absence of contrary provision in B.P. Blg. 22, the general
provisions of the RPC which, by their nature, are necessarily
applicable, may be applied suppletorily.
Q: What happened under the first clause of Art 10, is it applied
in this case?
The article is composed of two clauses. The first provides
that offenses which in the future are made punishable under
special laws are not subject to the provisions of the RPC, while
the second makes the RPC supplementary to such laws. While it
seems that the two clauses are contradictory, a sensible
interpretation will show that they can perfectly be reconciled.
The first clause should be understood to mean only that the
special penal laws are controlling with regard to offenses therein
specifically punished. Said clause only restates the elemental rule
of statutory construction that special legal provisions prevail over
general ones. Lex specialis derogant generali. In fact, the clause
can be considered as a superfluity, and could have been
eliminated altogether. The second clause contains the soul of
the article. The main idea and purpose of the article is embodied
in the provision that the "code shall be supplementary" to special
laws, unless the latter should specifically provide the contrary.
Q: Is there a contradiction between the two clauses?
39 (Atty. Calica: What is being punished under BP 22? The issuance of
the worthless check. If we look at BP 22 – the issuance, the one involved
is the person who issued the check)
A: None. You look at the title of the provision of Art 10 – Offenses
not subject to the provisions of the code. The first sentence is
just a mere reiteration of the title. The Supreme Court is telling us
that there is no contradiction between the two clauses and in a
way it is also telling us that “You know, we should do away with
the first sentence” The second sentence is actually the soul of Art
10. And it provides that unless the special penal code specially
provides the contrary, RPC shall apply.
GR: RPC shall apply to special penal laws. If the Congress wants
the RPC shall not apply then it shall state so in the special penal
law that the RPC shall not apply.
Going back to the case
In the case at bar, the principle of Conspiracy was applied.
However, the overt act that the wife conspired with her husband
was not proven.
SIDE ISSUE: This is a good case because take note that the
husband applied for probation while the wife appealed. Good thing
the wife is acquitted. Can the wife still apply for probation? NO,
because she filed an appeal. Application for probation and appeal
are mutually exclusive remedies, probation is akin to admission of
guilt, it is contrary to the concept of perfection of appeal. Because
if you appeal, you insist your innocence.
Q: How about graduation of penalties, does it apply in Special
Penal Laws?
A: No, because stages of commission does not apply in special
penal laws.
Q: How about the exempting circumstance of Minority?
A: (not settled)
Q: How about the exempting circumstance of Insanity?
A: (not settled)
Q: If a law was passed by Congress and it amends the RPC,
do we consider it a Special Penal Law or not?
A: NO, it forms part of the RPC because it amends the RPC. It
becomes an integral component of RPC. When we talk of
Special Penal Laws, these are laws passed by Congress which
punishes distinct acts from RPC.
In Ladonga vs People, the SC is trying to tell us that the first
sentence of Art 10, that a crime punished by special penal laws
is governed by that law. do you agree what the SC is telling us?
What we are trying to establish here, when you are reading Art 10
of RPC, you forget about the first sentence of Art 10. Because the
heart and soul of Art 10 is second sentence.40. xxx “ This Code
shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should
40 Transcriber’s Note: Transcriber is quite confused with the discussion
of Atty. Calica. See 2:20:00-2:30:00
specially provide the contrary.” It is very clear that RPC shall apply
supplementary capacity to Special Penal Laws. That is, when a
special penal law does not provide for a certain provision, RPC
shall apply. (As what happened in the case of Ladonga. There is
no provision of Conspiracy in BP 22. Do we apply it? Yes.)
Q: When a minor, 15 y-o below, possessed a drugs, can he
avail the exempting circumstance of minority under
Dangerous Drugs Law?
A: Yes, if there is no contrary provision under Dangerous Drugs
Law.
SUMMARY:
Atty Calica: What is not provided in the Special Penal Laws but
provided in the RPC may be applicable.
For example, Stages of Commission found in RPC. In a Special
Penal Law, it does not provide for Attempted, Frustrated or
Consummated. Should we then apply the RPC in the suppletory
capacity?
A: NO. Because the Graduation of Penalties only apply in the
RPC. It is only under Art 70 which provides with the list of penalties
to be used in Graduating Penalties. In Special Penal Law, we
cannot apply stages of commission because it would require us to
graduate penalties. Penalties under Special Penal Laws are
already specified.
Q: How about aggravating and mitigating circumstances?
A: NO.
What we are discussing is, if we follow what we have learned that
RPC shall apply in a suppletory capacity, it shall apply unless the
Special Penal Law does not provide. But there are some sorts of
hindrance. In Stages of Commission, even if we apply, we cannot
do so because there are no graduation of penalties in Special
Penal Laws. The same concept applies in Circumstances
Affecting Criminal Liability. For instance, Special Penal Laws
usually provide a penalty from 5 years to 8 years. If there’s one
mitigating circumstance, will you impose 5 years? Do we divide 5
to 8 years into three periods? NO.
Because in the Rule of Appreciating Mitigating and Aggravating
Circumstances, if there’s neither mitigating and aggravating.
Medium. If there’s one aggravating, no mitigating. Maximum. So
for example, the law in Illegal Possession of Firearms provides a
penalty for 5 years to 8 years, the division to three periods cannot
apply.
RESEARCH ON THE PRINCICPLES OF RPC WHICH APPLY
IN SUPPLETORY CAPACITY.
SETTLED ARE: the Stages of Commission and Circumstances
Affecting Criminal Liability DON’T apply in Special Penal Laws,
even if in supplementary capacity.
PP vs ENRIQUEZ (1997)
F: There was a buy-bust operation conducted by the PNP and one
of the policewomen acted as poseur-buyer. The sale of marijuana
was consummated. Accused and the poseur-buyer were only
walking together while the accused was carrying the sack of
marijuana when the policewoman arrested the accused before the
latter could give the sack of marijuana. So he was just carrying the
marijuana. He was not able to give yet the marijuana when the
policewoman declared she was arresting the accused. Accused
contends that he should only be punished for Attempted Delivery
(for a crime punished under special penal law)because he was
arrested before he could deliver the Marijuana. He believes that
his act of carrying the sack of marijuana is a mere attempt to
deliver the prohibited drug. In other words, the sack being still
within his control, he could, he states, have easily refused to
deliver the item to the poseur-buyer. Here, he seeks to capitalize
on his being supposedly still in the subjective phase of the crime.
ISSUE: WON the stages of commission is applicable in special
penal laws
H: NO, these rules are inapplicable to offenses governed by
special penal laws. Unfortunately for the accused, the crime with
which he is being charged is penalized by a special law. The
incomplete delivery claimed by him, granting that it is true, is thus
inconsequential. The act of conveying prohibited drugs to an
unknown destination has been held to be punishable, and it is
immaterial whether or not the place of destination of the prohibited
drug is reached. he sale and delivery of marijuana constituted
punishable acts under Section 4, Article II, of R.A. No. 6425, as
amended. Appellants Enriquez and Rosales should bear the
consequences of their trifling with the law. The two evidently
confederated towards the common purpose of selling and
delivering marijuana. Conspiracy could be inferred from the acts
of the accused, whose conduct before, during and after the
commission of the crime would show its existence. It was
appellant Rosales who brought the poseur-buyer to appellant
Enriquez for the purchase of marijuana. It was upon the instruction
of appellant Enriquez, apparently to retain control of the unpaid
portion of the six-kilogram contraband, that appellant Rosales was
to carry the sack to the supposed residence of the poseur-
buyers. In conspiracy, the act of one conspirator could be held to
be the act of the other.
Note: This was decided in 1997. There is now a new law the RA
9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 which
penalizes mere attempt to commit any crimes penalized under the
said law. But the rule is Stages of Commission do not apply to
special penal laws. I am just emphasizing that under the new law,
mere attempt to commit the acts listed in the law and Conspiracy
are punishable under Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.
In crimes punished under Special Penal Laws, the crime is
consummated when the act prohibited is performed. Hence there
can be no frustrated and attempted stage. Because if you attempt,
is there attempt to display medallion in the case of Go Chico? Is
there attempt to issue a bouncing check? In special penal laws,
the act prohibited shall always be consummated? Later on, we will
be discussing in Financing Terrorism, mere attempt is being
punished. And that is a special penal law.
REMEMBER: Otherwise, People vs Enriquez tells us that Stages
of Commission do not apply to special penal laws. That’s why
these special penal laws must specifically state whether or not
mere attempt is punishable already just like in RA 9165.
HOW CRIMINAL LIABILITY SHALL BE INCURRED
Article 4. Criminal liability. - Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense
against persons or property, were it not for the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment or an account of the
employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
Par 1 by a person committing a felony although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended
 Par 1 refers to a person who is committing a felony, he
is made liable although the wrongful acts done be
different from that he intended;
 Par 1 is wrongfully titled. It says “Criminal Liability”, and
we know that Criminal Liability is incurred. What if the
person commits the intended felony? Can he be made
liable? Yes, but it is not stated in Art 4. Apparently, it tells
us in Art 4 that Criminal Liability is incurred only in these
two instances. That is not so. If he commits the crime he
intended, he is LIABLE. If he commits the violation of
special penal laws, he is criminally LIABLE.
 Par 1 refers only to intentional felony.
Elements:
i. that an intentional felony has been committed;
ii. the wrongful act done to the aggrieved party be
direct, natural and logical consequence of the
felony committed;
ATTY. CALICA: Element number 2 refers to an intentional felony
and not only just an act. That’s why I was telling you a while ago
in Hazing, if one inflicts Physical injuries, that is an intentional
felony of Physical injuries whether Serious or Less Serious
Physical Injuries. Even though they did not intend to kill, when the
infliction of physical injuries result to the death. Are the fraternity
members responsible for the death of a neophyte? Basing on Art
4, because the requirement is that they are committing an
41 In all of these situations the results are different from what the
offender intended to commit.
42 Article 49. Penalty to be imposed upon the principals when the crime
committed is different from that intended. - In cases in which the felony
committed is different from that which the offender intended to
commit, the following rules shall be observed:
1. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be higher than that
corresponding to the offense which the accused intended to commit,
the penalty corresponding to the latter shall be imposed in its maximum
period.
intentional felony – not a culpable felony nor offense punishable
by special penal law.
Q: Can Art 4 be applied in Special Penal Laws? NO. Because
the obvious reason is that one should commit an intentional
felony.
NOTE:
What triggers par 1 of Art 4 is INTENTIONAL FELONY. It can
never be offenses or culpable felony. So this intentional felony
results to a different result from what he intended. There are hree
possible situations41:
THREE POSSIBLE SITUATIONS under Par 1 of Art 4:
(1) Error in personae – refers to mistake in the identity of the
victim
Effect: Art 4942 – penalty for lesser crime in its maximum
period
Art 49 should only apply in mistake of identity. If the felony he
intended has a penalty lower than the resulting felony, the
penalty intended shall be imposed because it is lower. If the
resulting felony is lower than that he intended, the penalty for
resulting felony shall be applied. REMEMBER: ALWAYS
THE LOWER PENALTY whether it be intended or the
resulting felony.
To illustrate: if he intended to kill a third person but killed his
wife because of mistake of the blow, then that is Parricide.
Between Homicide as against Parricide, Parricide has higher
penalty. The penalty for Homicide shall be imposed. Now we
reverse, he intended to kill his wife but in the course of killing,
he killed a third person. The penalty for Homicide shall be
applied.
(2) Aberratio ictus –mistake in the blow which may result into:
EFFECT:
i. when the act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies, there is COMPLEX CRIME under Art 48
“When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime
shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum
period.”
Illustration: A shot B but because of lack of
precision it was C who was hit, which killed him.
2. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be lower than that
corresponding to the one which the accused intended to commit, the
penalty for the former shall be imposed in its maximum period.
3. The rule established by the next preceding paragraph shall not be
applicable if the acts committed by the guilty person shall also
constitute an attempt or frustration of another crime, if the law
prescribes a higher penalty for either of the latter offenses, in which
case the penalty provided for the attempted or the frustrated crime
shall be imposed in its maximum period.
 There is a complex crime of
Attempted/Frustrated Homicide (MHIP, as the
case may be) and Homicide (MHIP, as the case
may be)
RE PENALTY: subject to penalty under Art 48
which have two effects (1) Impose the penalty for
the grave felony and (2) shall be applied in the
maximum period
ii. when the act constitutes two felonies, one grave
felony and the other is LIGHT felony, TWO SEPARATE
DISTINCT CRIMES– in such case separate felonies
(Illustration: If C in the above example did not die but
sustained injuries, there’s still a crime of homicide AND slight
physical injuries (which is punished by arresto menor, this is
a light penalty) Here, there is no complex crime.
RE PENALTY: subject to separate penalties
NOTE: In aberratio ictus, the offender delivers the blow upon
the intended victim, but because of poor aim the blow landed
on somebody else. You have a complex crime, unless the
resulting consequence is not a grave or less grave felony.
You have a single act as against the intended victim and also
giving rise to another felony as against the actual victim.
(3) Praeter Intentionem – injurious result is greater than that he
intended.
Effect: mitigating circumstance under Art 13 par 3
(Illustration: A intended only to box B but due to lost of
balance B fell causing his instantaneous death, A is liable for
Homicide with a mitigating circumstance of praeter
intentionem – because he merely intends to inflict physical
injuries to B and not kill him)
Q: In Hazing, when the neophyte dies from the physical
injuries inflicted, what is the result?
A: Liable for Homicide. How about the intent to kill? It matters.
It will become a mitigating circumstance. They are liable for
Homicide but their criminal liability will be mitigated by Par 3
of Art 13, they did not intend to commit so grave wrong. Liable
for resulting death but mitigated.
Par 2 Impossible Crime
-- END of 02/03/18--
February 10, 2018
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
1. How Incurred
a. Wrongful act done be different from what
was intended
i. Rev. Penal Code, Art. 4(1), 13(3), 48,
49
PEOPLE vs. ILIGAN
G.R. No. 75369, November 26, 1990
FACTS:
The accused hacked the head of the victim. Weakened by the
hacking blow, the victim was sent to the highway where he was
run over by a car, which caused his death. The accused was
charged with murder. His contends that the victim’s death is
caused by an accident.
ISSUE: WON the hacking of the head’s victim was the proximate
cause of his death.
HELD: Yes.
Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability
shall be incurred "by any person committing a felony (delito)
although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended."
Based on the doctrine that "el que es causa de la causa es
causa del mal causado" (he who is the cause of the cause is the
cause of the evil caused), the essential requisites of Article 4 are:
(a) that an intentional felony has been committed, and (b) that the
wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct, natural and
logical consequence of the felony committed by the offender.
The intentional felony committed was the hacking of the head
of Quiñones, Jr. by Iligan. That it was considered as superficial by
the physician who autopsied Quiñones is beside the point. What
is material is that by the instrument used in hacking Quiñones, Jr.
and the location of the wound, the assault was meant not only to
immobilize the victim but to do away with him as it was directed at
a vital and delicate part of the body: the head.
The hacking incident happened on the national highway
where vehicles are expected to pass any moment. One such
vehicle passed seconds later when Lukban and Zaldy Asis,
running scared and having barely negotiated the distance of
around 200 meters, heard shouts of people. Quiñones, Jr.,
weakened by the hacking blow which sent him to the cemented
highway, was run over by a vehicle. Under these circumstances,
we hold that while Iligan’s hacking of Quiñones, Jr.’s head might
not have been the direct cause, it was the proximate cause of the
latter’s death. Proximate legal cause is defined as "that acting first
and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other
events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the
injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first
acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for
the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent
person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his
act or default that an injury to some person might probably result
therefrom.
In other words, the sequence of events from Iligan’s assault
on him to the time Quiñones, Jr. was run over by a vehicle is,
considering the very short span of time between them, one
unbroken chain of events. Having triggered such events, Iligan
cannot escape liability.
Q: How is criminal liability incurred?
A: Criminal liability is incurred:
1) By any person committing a felony although the wrongful
act done be different from that which he intended;
2) By any person performing an act which would have been
an offense against persons or property were it not for the
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or the
account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual
means.

Q: Do you think Art. 4 is properly enumerated?
A: SIR: It is not properly written because it talks of, “how criminal
liability is incurred.” We relate that to Art. 89,43 on how criminal
liability is extinguished.
 If Art. 4 apparently tells us that there are only two modes
of incurring criminal liability.
 In fact, a person incurs criminal liability if he commits a
crime. But, Art. 4 pars. 1 and 2 tells us that if the result is
different, then the person still incurs criminal liability,
meaning there is already a presumption that we know
that a person commits criminal liability if his intended
purpose was achieved (intended criminal purpose). This
is not written in Art. 4, but the title is “how criminal liability
incurred.”
Criminal liability is incurred:
1) If one commits a crime;
2) If one intended to commit a crime but the result is
different; and
3) If he commits an impossible crime.
So, there are three manners by which criminal liability may be
incurred.
 We relate that to Art. 89 – how criminal liability is
extinguished.
So, there is no question that if he commits a felony, there is a
corresponding criminal liability already.
 If he commits murder, there is a penalty.
 But here, we are confronted with a scenario, wherein
there are different results.
 Q: Will that person still be criminally liable?
 A: Yes.
There are three possible reasons why the result may be different:
1) Error in personae (mistake in identity);
2) Praeter intentionem (the result is so grave than that
which he intended);
3) Aberratio ictus (aberration ictus)
We are discussing cases. The facts would be relevant if essential
to our understanding of the legal rule.
43 Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal
liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties and as to
pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death
of the offender occurs before final judgment.
2. By service of the sentence;
3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its
effects;
Q: For example, in Iligan, what legal rule do we learn from
here?
A: It is herein defined what a proximate legal cause here.
Q: What do we learn from here?
A: The victim was hacked by the accused.
Q: What kind of injury was caused? Was it grave?
A: Superficial only, which will not result in the death of the victim.
Q: If we stop at that instant, what would be his criminal
liability?
A:
Pineda: Physical Injuries
Bantay: Two options, either physical injuries or attempted
homicide
Dayrit: Attempted homicide
[To Dayrit:]
Q: Why not physical injuries?
A: Because there was an intent to kill.
[To Dayrit and Bantay:]
Q: Why do you say there was an intent to kill?
A: Relied on the ruling of the Supreme Court that it was homicide.
[To Pineda:]
Q: Why do you say that there was no intent to kill.
A: Changed his answer. It was attempted homicide because there
was an intent because of the location of the injury.
Q: Aside from the location?
A: Because of the weapon used (bolo) by the perpetrator, the
location of the wound, the injury caused.
 If that is the weapon used and the location of the injury,
although the injury caused is only superficial, it makes
the crime only in the attempted stage. But, it is homicide.
It cannot be physical injuries if we stopped there – he
hacked and then caused a superficial wound.
 So, that was the only act committed by Mr. Asis.
 The rest, according to the medico-legal expert, the victim
died because of the vehicular accident.
 We’re trying now to determine if we stop there, he would
be liable for attempted homicide, but not because of the
hacked wound but because of the vehicle running over
the victim.
Q: Is he still liable for the running over by the vehicle?
A: Yes, because the running over of the vehicle does not
constitute an efficient intervening cause, and following the
4. By absolute pardon;
5. By prescription of the crime;
6. By prescription of the penalty;
7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in Article 344 of
this Code.
unbroken chain of events, the natural and logical consequence of
the act which was the hacking in the head of the victim will result
in his death.
Q: Who should argue that there is an efficient intervening
cause?
A: It is the accused. So, we are still at the stage of determining
criminal liability. Let us leave that to the accused to argue that
there was an efficient intervening cause.
[To Bantay]
Q: As the prosecutor, how would you lay the blame on Asis
the death of the victim when in fact, Asis’ act stopped only
there at the hacking and the injury caused only superficial
wound?
A: Under Art. 4, paragraph 1, criminal liability is incurred by a
person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended. The act of hacking and
hitting the head of the victim with a bolo constitutes a felony. And
although the result thereof was not what the accused intended, he
will still be liable to such act.
The accused really intended to kill, right? Only that he was not the
one who caused the wound that killed him. Is that an application
of Art. 4, because he really intended to kill. In fact, the result is the
same as his intention. He hacked. I’m not confusing everyone of
you, because we discussed earlier, there are three possible
reasons or different result.
Q: Was there mistake in blow here?
A: None.
Q: Was there mistake in identity?
A: None.
Q: Praeter Intentionem?
A: None.
Q: So, none of the three circumstances is present in this
case?
A: Yes.
Q: Because, he intended to kill, and in fact, the victim died.
But, his act was short of killing the victim. But we are now
still attributing to him the death of the victim. Why is that so?
A: Because of PROXIMATE CAUSE.
Q: What is proximate cause?
A: That which causes the injury which is the natural, logical
consequence of the act, without which the injury or result
would not have occurred.
 We will have a problem in this case because the injury
caused by Mr. Iligan was just the acting, that superficial
wound.
 So, we go to Iligan, also cited in Bataclan v. Medina,
Court came up with a longer definition.
Q: What is proximate legal cause?
A: PROXIMATE LEGAL CAUSE is defined as "that acting first
and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other
events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the
injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first
acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for
the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent
person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his
act or default that an injury to some person might probably result
therefrom.
“That acting first”
 So, there should be an action first.
 Before there should be a sequence, there should first be
an initial action.
“Producing the injury”
Q: Let us say, if you make an act, and the wound caused was
fatal, would that immediately produce the desired purpose of
killing?
A: Yes.
 But, in this case (Iligan), it did not produce
immediately.
Q: If the hack produced a fatal wound, and victim was killed,
will that be the direct cause? Will that also be the proximate
cause?
A: Yes.
Q: So, a direct cause may also be a proximate cause?
A: Yes, because a proximate cause may immediately produce
the injury.
Q: What is the direct cause of the death here?
A: The running over by the vehicle.
Q: In People v. Mananquil, what was the direct cause?
A: The direct cause was pneumonia, but the proximate cause was
the burning.
Q: Here in, Iligan, what is the proximate cause?
A: The hacking.
Q: The direct cause?
A: The running over.
“Either immediately or by setting other events in motion”
 In Iligan, it is not immediate.
“All constituting a natural and continuous chain of events”
“Each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor”
 So, it triggers a chain of events, natural and continuous
sequence. There should be no break because here is
where the efficient intervening cause will come in.
 If this natural and continuous sequence is broken by an
efficient intervening cause, the act will not anymore be
the efficient intervening cause. So, it should be natural
and continuous sequence or chain of events.
“The final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury
as a natural and probable result of the cause which first
acted”
 This is a surplusage already, because it is a natural and
continuous sequence, so naturally, it was the first act
 which caused the injury. But they want to give us a clear
definition.
 The natural and probable result of the cause which first
acted is the proximate cause.
“Under such circumstances that the person responsible for
the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent
person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of
his act or default that an injury to some person might
probably result therefrom.”
 He expected that this result would be produced from his
action.
 As an ordinary and prudent reasonable person, we would
expect that the result would happen because of his
action.
Q: Did Iligan expect that to happen? Or should he have
expected it? He may not know it, but should an ordinary
prudent person expect that?
A: Yes. Because the hacking was done in a highway. If the
hacking happened inside the classroom, he would not have
expected the victim to be run over by a vehicle. But it happened
on a highway, so he would expect that vehicles would be passing
through the highway. So, Iligan was held liable although the direct
cause was the vehicle running over the victim. As a prudent
person, he should have expected that vehicles would be running
or passing through and he would be killed.
Q: Suppose the incidence happened in this classroom. He
stopped after inflicting the superficial wound. And then the
victim went outside and was run over, will Iligan be still held
criminally liable?
A: Yes, but not anymore for consummated homicide, only for the
hacking. He could not have expected that that person would go
out this building and have himself run over by a vehicle. He could
have used the overpass.
Q: So, in the case of Iligan, what would be an efficient
intervening cause, if you would add additional facts, which
will stop the natural and continuous chain of events?
A: The ISIS bombed the hospital where the victim was confined.
 That is not part of the natural and continuous sequence.
Q: Why should we consider the bombing as an efficient
intervening cause?
A: It is a remote cause. It is foreign from the scene of events.
Note that delay in provision of medical attendance is not an
efficient intervening cause. It is only natural for a person injured to
seek medical assistance.
Note also, that if another person from among the group of the
accused pushed the victim after the hacking by the accused, that
would not be an efficient intervening cause since they are
companions, so it is natural that they would help each other.
Q: What else would be an efficient intervening cause?
A: If a third person, not a party to the group of Iligan, shot the
victim.
Q: How about if in the hospital, the victim committed suicide
A: Yes.
So, the proximate cause may directly cause the death or injury,
then it becomes also the direct cause. But if the proximate cause
just triggers a chain of events, the direct cause is the final event
which causes the injury. The direct cause will be different from the
proximate cause.
You always take a look at this efficient intervening cause. There
are always foreign or remote causes from the natural and
continuous chain. Or, it may also arise from the active act of the
victim himself.
TALAMPAS v. PEOPLE
November 23, 2011
FACTS:
On July 5, 1995 at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening, he
together with Eduardo Matic (Eduardo) and Ernesto Matic
(Ernesto) were infront of his house, along the road in Zona Siete
(7), Wawa, Malaban, Bian, Laguna, repairing his tricycle when he
noticed the appellant who was riding on a bicycle passed by and
stopped. The latter alighted at about three (3) meters away from
him, walked a few steps and brought out a short gun, a revolver,
and poked the same to Eduardo and fired it hitting Eduardo who
took refuge behind Ernesto. The appellant again fired his gun
three (3) times, one shot hitting Ernesto at the right portion of his
back causing him (Ernesto) to fall on the ground with his face
down. Another shot hit Eduardo on his nape and fell down on his
back (patihaya). Thereafter, the appellant ran away, while he
(Jose) and his neighbors brought the victims to the hospital. On
June 6, 1995, Jose executed a Sworn Statement at the Bian
Police Station.
Talampas was convicted with Homicide by the RTC.
Talampas interposed self-defense and accident as defenses.
ISSUE: WON Talampas should be held liable even if the one who
died was not his intended target.
HELD: YES.
The petition for review is denied for lack of merit.
Firstly, the elements of the plea of self-defense are: (a)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful
aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
accused in defending himself.
In the nature of self-defense, the protagonists should be the
accused and the victim. The established circumstances indicated
that such did not happen here, for it was Talampas who had
initiated the attack only against Eduardo; and that Ernesto had not
been at any time a target of Talampas attack, he having only
happened to be present at the scene of the attack. In reality,
neither Eduardo nor Ernesto had committed any unlawful
aggression against Talampas. Thus, Talampas was not repelling
any unlawful aggression from the victim (Ernesto), thereby
rendering his plea of self-defense unwarranted.
Secondly, Talampas could not relieve himself of criminal
liability by invoking accident as a defense. Article 12(4) of
the Revised Penal Code, the legal provision pertinent to accident,
contemplates a situation where a person is in fact in the act of
doing something legal, exercising due care, diligence and
prudence, but in the process produces harm or injury to someone
or to something not in the least in the mind of the actor an
accidental result flowing out of a legal act. Indeed, accident is an
event that happens outside the sway of our will, and although it
comes about through some act of our will, it lies beyond the
bounds of humanly foreseeable consequences. In short, accident 2) To be imposed in its maximum period.
presupposes the lack of intention to commit the wrong done.

The records eliminate the intervention of accident. Talampas
brandished and poked his revolver at Eduardo and fired it, hitting
Eduardo, who quickly rushed to seek refuge behind Ernesto. At
that point, Talampas fired his revolver thrice. One shot hit Ernesto
at the right portion of his back and caused Ernesto to fall face
down to the ground. Another shot hit Eduardo on the nape,
causing Eduardo to fall on his back. Certainly, Talampas acts
were by no means lawful, being a criminal assault with his revolver
against both Eduardo and Ernesto.
And, thirdly, the fact that the target of Talampas assault was
Eduardo, not Ernesto, did not excuse his hitting and killing of
Ernesto. The fatal hitting of Ernesto was the natural and direct
consequence of Talampas felonious deadly assault against
Eduardo. Talampas poor aim amounted to aberratio ictus, or
mistake in the blow, a circumstance that neither exempted him
from criminal responsibility nor mitigated his criminal liability. Lo
que es causa de la causa, es causa del mal causado (what is the
cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused). [13] Under
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code,[14] criminal liability is incurred
by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done
be different from that which he intended
If we talk of complex crime, this is just one crime.
SECOND: If one of the two offenses produced is a light felony,
then there would be two distinct, separate offenses.
Q: What happens in Talampas, how many crimes was he
convicted of?
A: Only one – homicide.
There is something problematic here, because the SC convicted
Talampas only of homicide and they forgot about Eduardo.
Q: What happened to Eduardo?
A: We don’t know what injury was caused to him, but he was hit.
The first shot hit Eduardo. So, if the injury was not fatal, it should
be attempted homicide already. And then, he killed Ernesto in the
subsequent shots – homicide.
Q: Is homicide a grave felony?
A: Yes. (See Art. 24945)
Q: Is attempted homicide a grave or less grave felony?
A: Two degrees lower than homicide. (See Art. 5146)

We’re discussing mistake in the blow. Q: What is the penalty for homicide?
A: Under Art. 249, it is reclusion temporal.
Q: Was someone killed here?
A: Yes, but not the target of accused. Eduardo was the target but Q: What is two degrees lower than reclusion temporal?
Ernesto was the one killed.

Q: Was Eduardo injured?

A: Yes. He was also hit. But he hid behind Ernesto, and it was
Ernesto who died.

Q: What was the criminal liability of Talampas?

A: Homicide.

Q: Against who?
A: Ernesto.

Q: What happened to Eduardo? Was he not held criminally

liable against Eduardo?
A:

Q: What will happen if there is a mistake in the blow?

A: There are two options:
FIRST: If a single act produces two offenses which are either less
grave or grave felonies, then it would be a complex crime
punished under Art. 4844 of the RPC;

Q: Which means that? What will be the penalty?

A: The penalty for the most serious offense in its
maximum period.

So, this is two-pronged:

1) The penalty for the most serious offense; and

44 Article 48. Penalty for complex crimes. - When a single act constitutes
two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious
crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
45 Article 249. Homicide. - Any person who, not falling within the
provisions of Article 246, shall kill another without the attendance of any of
the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be
deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal.
46 Article 51. Penalty to be imposed upon principals of attempted
crimes. - A penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for
the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principals in an
attempt to commit a felony.
A: Prision correcional (See Art. 7147 in relation to Arts. 948 and just closed his speech, was being congratulated by Ambassador
2549) Romulo and was about to leave the platform.

Q: Is that grave or less grave?
A: Less grave.
So, there is one one grave and one less grave felony. That is a
complex crime, right? But in Talampas, he was convicted only of
homicide. But that is mistake in the blow. The facts will show that
he actually shot and injured Eduardo. As we have learned here, if
there is a mistake in the blow, it will lead to either two options:
1) Complex crime; or
2) Two distinct and separate offenses
Unless, of course, he was convicted separately against Eduardo
because the felony committed against Eduardo is a light felony.
But we have no idea whether he was also charged and convicted
for the injury caused to Eduardo.
The RTC found Guillen guilty of murder for the death of
Simeon Varela and of the complex crime of murder and multiple
frustrated murder. The RTC also applied sub-section 1 of article
49 of the Revised Penal Code in determining the penalty to be
imposed upon the accused.
Guillen argued that he should be guilty only of homicide
through reckless imprudence in regard to the death of Simeon
Varela and of less serious physical injuries in regard to Alfredo
Eva, Jose Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang, and that he
should be sentenced to the corresponding penalties for the
different felonies committed, the sum total of which shall not
exceed three times the penalty to be imposed for the most serious
crime in accordance with article 70 in relation to article 74 of the
Revised Penal Code.

PEOPLE vs. GUILLEN ISSUE: WON Guillen should be liable for homicide through
G.R. No. L-1477, January 18, 1950 reckless imprudence

FACTS:
Disappointed in President Roxas for his alleged failure to
redeem the pledges and fulfill the promises made by him during
the presidential election campaign, Guillen conceived the idea of
killing President Roxas. In one of the latter’s speeches, Guillen
decided to carry out his evil purpose. He stood on the chair on
which he had been sitting and, from a distance of about seven
meters, he hurled the grenade at the President when the latter had
HELD: NO
In throwing hand grenade at the President with the intention
of killing him, the appellant acted with malice. He is therefore liable
for all the consequences of his wrongful act; for in accordance with
article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by
any person committing felony (delito) although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended. In criminal
negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional,

47 Article 71. Graduated scales. - In the case in which the law 2. Temporal absolute disqualification
prescribed a penalty lower or higher by one or more degrees than
another given penalty, the rules prescribed in Article 61 shall be 3. Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for, the
observed in graduating such penalty. right to follow a profession or calling,

The lower or higher penalty shall be taken from the graduated scale in 4. Public censure,
which is comprised the given penalty.
5. Fine.
The courts, in applying such lower or higher penalty, shall observe the
following graduated scales: 48 Article 9. Grave felonies, less grave felonies and light felonies.

SCALE NO. 1 xxx

1. Death, Less grave felonies are those which the law punishes with penalties which
in their maximum period are correctional, in accordance with the above-
2. Reclusion perpetua, mentioned article.

3. Reclusion temporal, xxx

4. Prision mayor, 49 Article 25. Penalties which may be imposed. - The penalties which
may be imposed according to this Code, and their different classes, are
5. Prision correccional, those included in the following:

6. Arresto mayor, Scale

7. Destierro, xxx

8. Arresto menor, Correctional penalties:

9. Public censure, Prision correccional,

Arresto mayor,
10. Fine. Suspension,
Destierro.
SCALE NO. 2
xxx
1. Perpetual absolute disqualification,
it being simply the incident of another act performed without
malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939.)
In the words of Viada, "in order that an act may be qualified
as imprudence it is necessary that either malice nor intention to
cause injury should intervene; where such intention exists, the act
should qualified by the felony it has produced even though it may
not have been the intention of the actor to cause an evil of such
gravity as that produced.' (Viada's Comments on the Penal Code,
vol. 7, 5th ed., p.7.) And, as held by this Court, a deliberate intent
to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of
reckless imprudence. (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232.) Where
such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the
intended victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence.
(People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605)
Q: In Mananquil, there are two requisites for the application
of Art. 4, what are those?
A: First, one must commit an intentional felony. Second, the injury
was the natural, direct, and logical consequence of the felony
committed.
 So, it must be an intentional felony. It cannot be a crime
punished under special penal laws or a culpable felony.
That is the first requirement.
Q: In People v. Guillen, classic mistake in the blow – there is
one single act. What was that single act?
A: The throwing of the grenade which caused grave or less grave
felonies.
 These deaths were considered grave felonies, whereas
the attempted homicide, considered as less grave
felonies, which now constitutes a complex crime
punished under Art. 48.
 Based on Art. 48, the penalty to be imposed upon is the
penalty for the graver crime and to be applied in its
maximum period.
Q: How about mistake in identity?
A: People v. Gona
PEOPLE v. GONA
G.R. No. L-32066, March 15, 1903
FACTS:
The accused voluntarily, illegally, and criminally and with a
bolo which he then carried, assaulted the Mansaca Mapudul,
causing him a mortal wound on the left side of the neck and that
as a consequence of said wound, the said Mapudul died.
50 Article 49. Penalty to be imposed upon the principals when the crime
committed is different from that intended. - In cases in which the felony
committed is different from that which the offender intended to commit, the
following rules shall be observed:
1. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be higher than that
corresponding to the offense which the accused intended to commit, the
penalty corresponding to the latter shall be imposed in its maximum
period.
It appears from the evidence that on the evening of October
26, 1928, a number of Mansacas celebrated a reunion in the
house of the Mansaca Gabriel. There seems to have been liberal
supply of alcoholic drinks and some of the men present became
intoxicated, with the result that a quarrel took the place between
the Mansaca Dunca and the defendant. Dunca and his son
Aguipo eventually left the house and were followed by Mapudul
and one Award. The defendant left the house about the same time
with intention of assaulting Dunca, but in the darkness of the
evening and in the intoxicated condition of the defendant, the
mistook Mapudul for Dunca and inflicated on him a mortal wound
with a bolo.
He was charged and was found guilty of homicide.
ISSUE: WON Gona should be held liable for the death of
Mapuldul.
HELD: YES.
There can no doubt that the defendant killed Mapudul and
that he is guilty of the crime charged, but his attorney argues that
in view of the fact that said defendant had no intention to kill the
deceased and committed the crime by mistake, he should have
been found guilty of homicide through negligence under
paragraph 1 of article 568 of the Penal Code and not of the graver
crime of intentional homicide.
This is an intentional felony, not reckless imprudence.
Q: Did he commit mistake in identity?
A: Yes.
Q: What will be the criminal liability of a person who commits
mistake in identity?
A: His liability will be based on Art. 49.50 But mistake in the blow
is Art. 48, if it is a complex crime. So, for mistake in identity, it
would be Art. 49.
Apparently, the penalty to be imposed is lesser.
Q: If he intended to kill his spouse (parricide), but he killed
another person (homicide), the penalty for homicide being
lower, what will be imposed? His intended crime or actual
crime?
A: The actual crime.
Q: Suppose it is the reverse? The actual crime committed has
penalty graver than the intended crime, what will be the
penalty?
A: That which is provided for the intended crime.
Q: Does it mean that in mistake in the blow and mistake in
identity, the penalty imposed is always favorable to the
accused?
2. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be lower than that
corresponding to the one which the accused intended to commit, the
penalty for the former shall be imposed in its maximum period.
3. The rule established by the next preceding paragraph shall not be
applicable if the acts committed by the guilty person shall also constitute
an attempt or frustration of another crime, if the law prescribes a higher
penalty for either of the latter offenses, in which case the penalty provided
for the attempted or the frustrated crime shall be imposed in its maximum
period.
A: Both are favorable to the accused. Were it not for Art. 48, there
would have been two offenses, then two penalties.
Let us count: homicide and attempted homicide. The penalties
are reclusion temporal and prision correcional, respectively.
If two distinct and separate crimes:
Reclusion temporal: 12 years and 1 day to 20 years
Prision correcional: 6 months and 1 day to 6 years
Total : 18 years, 6 months, and 1 day to 20 years
If complex crime:
Reclusion temporal in its maximum: 17 years, 4 months and 1 day
to 20 years
So, the penalty for complex crime is less than the penalty for two
distinct crimes.
So, Art. 48 is always favorable to the accused. With more reasons
is praeter intentionem more favorable to the accused.
Q: Why is praeter intentionem also favorable?
A: Because it will be considered as a mitigating circumstance
under Art. 13 par. 3.51 He will be liable for the crime committed
but it will be mitigated. This is what happened in People v.
Albuquerque and U.S. v. Brobst.
In People v. Albuquerque, the accused just wanted to convince
the lover of his daughter to support his daughter. Because of his
paralysis, he hit the victim in the neck, causing the latter’s death
albeit not intending to kill him. The accused was held liable for
homicide but the liability was mitigated.
WACOY v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 213792, June 22, 2015
DOCTRINE: Art. 49 applies only to mistake in identity.
FACTS:
Accused killed the victim by kicking the latter in the stomach
twice. When the victim got up, he was punched further. Wacoy
and Quibac were charged with the crime of Homicide, defined and
penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). In
their defense, they contended that the victim was drunk and
became unruly, for which reason, the accused pacified him.
The RTC convicted them of death in tumultuous affray under
Art. 251, which the CA affirmed.
The accused appealed and argued that they should be held
liable for the lower penalty on the basis of Art. 49.
HELD:
On this note, the Court does not find merit in Wacoy's
contention that in view of their intent only to inflict slight physical
injuries on Aro, they should only be meted the corresponding
penalty therefore in its maximum period,28pursuant to Article 49 of
the RPC. The said provision reads:
Art. 49. Penalty to be imposed upon the principals when the crime
committed is different from that intended. - In cases in which the
felony committed is different from that which the offender intended
to commit, the following rules shall be observed.
51 Article 13. Mitigating circumstances. - The following are mitigating
circumstances;
xxx
1. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be higher than
that corresponding to the offense which the accused intended to
commit, the penalty corresponding to the latter shall be imposed
in its maximum period.
2. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be lower than
that corresponding to the one which the accused intended to
commit, the penalty for the former shall be imposed in its
maximum period.
3. The rule established by the next preceding paragraph shall not
be applicable if the acts committed by the guilty person shall also
constitute an attempt or frustration of another crime, if the law
prescribes a higher penalty for either of the latter offenses, in
which case the penalty provided for the attempt or the frustrated
crime shall be imposed in the maximum period.
Jurisprudence instructs that such provision should only apply
where the crime committed is different from that intended and
where the felony committed befalls a different person (error in
personae); and not to cases where more serious consequences
not intended by the offender result from his felonious act (praeter
intentionem), as in this case.
It is well-settled that if the victim dies because of a deliberate
act of the malefactors, intent to kill is conclusively presumed. 30 In
such case, even if there is no intent to kill, the crime is Homicide
because with respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal law
looks particularly to the material results following the unlawful act
and holds the aggressor responsible for all the consequences
thereof.31
Be that as it may, the penalty for the crime of Homicide must
be imposed in its minimum period due to the presence of the
mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a
wrong under Article 13 (3) of the RPC in favor of Wacoy and
Quibac, as correctly appreciated by the CA. In determining the
presence of this circumstance, it must be considered that since
intention is a mental process and is an internal state of mind, the
accused's intention must be judged by his conduct and external
overt acts.32 In this case, the aforesaid mitigating circumstance is
available to Wacoy and Quibac, given the absence of evidence
showing that, apart from kicking and punching Aro on the
stomach, something else had been done; thus, evincing the
purpose of merely maltreating or inflicting physical harm, and not
to end the life of Aro.
Art. 49 applies only to mistake in identity. If you look at it, its title
states, “Penalty to be imposed upon the principal when the crime
committed is different from that intended,” which is Art. 4,
paragraph 1, when the crime committed is different from that
intended.
If you relate that to another article, that would be Art. 4, par. 1. So,
you will get the impression that if it happened under Art. 4, par. 1,
it will be punishable under Art. 49. So, this case of Wacoy tells us
expressly that Art. 4 applies only if there is mistake in identity. If it
is mistake in the blow, either Art. 48 or two distinct separate crimes
will result. If it is praeter intentionem, it will be mitigated by Art. 13,
par. 3. So, Art. 49 applies only in one instance – mistake in
identity. That much is made clear in Wacoy v. People.
U.S. vs. VALDEZ
G.R. No. L-16486, March 22, 1921
3. That the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed.
DOCTRINE: If a man creates in another man's mind an immediate
sense of dander which causes such person to try to escape, and
in so doing he injuries himself, the person who creates such a
state of mind is responsible for the injuries which result.
FACTS:
The victim, who was then on a boat, jumped into the water
believing he was in great peril after the accused threatened to stab
him, causing his death.
The accused was charged with homicide.
ISSUE: WON the accused should be held liable for the death of
the victim.
HELD: YES.
As to the criminal responsibility of the accused for the death
thus occasioned the likewise can be no doubt; for it is obvious that
the deceased, in throwing himself in the river, acted solely in
obedience to the instinct of self-preservation and was in no sense
legally responsible for his own death. As to him it was but the
exercise of a choice between two evils, and any reasonable
person under the same circumstances might have done the same.
As was once said by a British court, "If a man creates in another
man's mind an immediate sense of dander which causes
such person to try to escape, and in so doing he injuries
himself, the person who creates such a state of mind is
responsible for the injuries which result."
The accused did not cause any injury.
Q: What rule do we learn here?
Remember, in Iligan and Mananquil, it is easy to apply proximate
cause because they caused injury; they were committing an
intentional felony.
Q: Was the accused in this case committing an intentional
felony?
A: The accused was brandishing a knife against the victim.
Q: Is there a crime already committed? Is the act of
brandishing a bolo and going after a person considered a
crime?
A: None.
Q: So, is the first element of Art. 4, i.e., that an intentional
felony has been committed), is this satisfied?
A: You have quite a difficulty, right? Because in the earlier cases
we discussed, they already inflicted an injury. In Iligan, if we
stopped there, that is attempted homicide already. But here,
probably grave threats if he shouted against the victim. So, we
have a problem. But the SC said that he is still liable.
Q: Why?
A: The accused instilled fear upon the mind of the victim, on the
basis of which the latter tried to save himself by leaping into the
water, but in so doing, he injured or killed himself. The person who
instilled the fear will be criminally liable. That is the ruling in U.S.
vs. Valdez. This the same ruling in People vs. Page.
In People vs. Page, the victim jumped out of a vehicle for fear of
being held-up.
52 Parricide, murder, homicide, infanticide, abortion, duel, physical
injuries, rape
 Imagine, they just declared a hold-up. The accused did
not point a gun or brandish a knife against the victim. The
victim just jumped out of the vehicle.
 As we always say, the person should always be the
proximate cause. How can he be the proximate cause
when he has not done anything yet? But he instilled fear
upon the mind of another person, prompting the latter to
do something to save himself, and in doing so, if that led
to his injury, then that person who instilled the fear will be
criminally liable.
Q: In People vs. Page, are not the accused already
committing an intentional felony by virtue of robbery?
A (Sir): Remember, there were two of them, one was beside the
passenger who jumped out of the vehicle, while the other was
beside the driver. Supposedly, both of them are liable for robbery.
But, they are held liable for robbery with homicide because this
passenger jumped out. That is why we are discussing if this
person beside the driver should also be held liable for homicide.
His liability would only be limited to robbery. But, considering that
they created that fear, and they were in conspiracy, they were both
held liable for robbery with homicide.
b. Impossible crimes
i. Arts. 4(2), 59
Q: What is an impossible crime?
A: It is an act which would be an offense against persons or
property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate
to ineffectual means.
 By its definition, it is just an act. it does not say that it is
a crime.
One common question in the bar: In impossible crime, is a crime
committed?
A: A crime is an act or omission under the RPC. Since an
impossible crime is penalized under Art. 59 of the RPC, an
impossible crime is therefore, a crime. Objectively, there is no
crime, but subjectively, there is an intention to commit a crime.
The person who committee it is a criminal. That act is punishable
under Art. 59 of the RPC, so the person incurs criminal liability.
If we define a crime as an act or omission punished by law, then
this act is punished under Art. 59.
So, you should remember that it is just an act, but it would be an
offense against persons or property. So, you should know what
the crimes against persons52 or property53 are. In one exam, it
involved kidnapping.
Q: Is there an impossible crime involved in kidnapping?
A: No, because it is not a crime against person or property, it is a
crime against liberty.
Q: So, there can be an impossible crime of rape?
A: Yes, when the victim is already dead.
Q: What do we call that kind of impossibility?
53 Robbery, brigandage, theft, usurpation, culpable insolvency, swindling
and other deceits, removal, sale or pledge of mortgaged property,
destructive arson, malicious mischief,
A: Legal impossibility.
Q: Why?
A: Because the intended acts, even if completed, would not
amount to a crime.
 The acts were all completed to commit rape, but despite
the performance of all acts of execution, the crime cannot
still be committed the person is already dead. You cannot
rape a dead person.
 Just like getting from a pocket of another person. You
actually took a watch, but then you realized it was your
watch. So, there was a consummation of theft, but since
it was your watch, the elements of theft cannot be
completed, because one element is that it should be a
personal property of another person. How can you steal
your own property?
 That is what we call legal impossibility.
Q: What is factual impossibility?
A: Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances
unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the
consummation of the intended crime.
 In Intod vs. CA, that is a factual impossibility.
 Another factual impossibility is reaching in the pocket
when there is no money there.
So, the first kind impossible crime is that which is inherently
impossible of accomplishment. The second is, use of inadequate
or ineffectual means.
 Ineffectual, we are quite sure about that. Instead of using
poison, salt or another condiment is used, which will not
lead to the death of the intended victim. That would be
an ineffectual means.
 Q: What would be an inadequate means?
 A: So, actual poison was used. But instead of the
required gram, so little was used.
 Q: But is that not already an attempt?
 A: In attempted crime, the means used will eventually
lead to the crime when all of the elements of the crime
had been completed. But in impossible crime, the means
used are inadequate, meaning, even though you
complete all the acts, it will not lead to the commission of
the crime.
In People v. Balmores, the accused actually falsified the PCSO
ticket. So, it is not inherently impossible.
Q: Was the means used inadequate? Because he actually
falsified the ticket, but the person who examined it was just
diligent and he discovered the falsification. Does that mean
that the means used was inadequate? Not ineffectual, right?
Not inherently impossible, but possibly inadequate. Was he
convicted for an impossible crime?
A: No, he was convicted for attempted estafa.
 That is why, I am bringing this to your attention: that if the
means used is inadequate, it may also be an attempted
stage already of a felony.
 Because when one uses a poison but for an inadequate
amount, does that injure the person?
In Jacinto v. People, there are only three elements of impossible
crime. The accused stole the check which bounced when
deposited. This is an impossible crime, it is an act which would
have been an offense against persons or property (theft), but it is
inherently impossible (factual) because there is no deposit.
 Thus, the requisites of an impossible crime are:
(1) that the act performed would be an offense
against persons or property;
(2) that the act was done with evil intent; and
(3) that its accomplishment was inherently
impossible, or the means employed was either
inadequate or ineffectual.
 So, in this case, there are only three elements. But in
some annotations, there is a fourth element – that the act
is not penalized under the RPC.
Q: In Intod v. CA, what did they do again, if we consider this
fourth element (it is not punished by any other provision in
the RPC)?
A: The accused shot at the house but the intended victim was not
there. The court ruled that it was an impossible crime.
Q: But by shooting at the house, did the accused not also
commit malicious mischief or damage to property?
A: Yes.
 So, the fourth element, that it does not constitute any
other offense or crime under the RPC, would be missing,
because we can consider that as damage to property.
 Does that mean that the SC erred in ruling Intod v.
CA?
 In the book of Reyes, there is that fourth element.
Q: If a poison was used, but little amount of which was used,
instead of killing, it led to the vomiting of the intended victim,
causing physical injuries, will there still be an impossible
crime?
A: If we consider the fourth element, we will not consider that as
an impossible crime anymore, but for the resulting injury of
physical injuries.
In Jacinto v. People, this is another case where the elements of
impossible crime are enumerated. This is the closest we have – it
did not include the fourth element that the act should not be
punished by any provision under the RPC. But our scholars
included this fourth element. Apparently, in many annotations,
they follow this fourth element.
So, in answering, you state Jacinto v. People. Then, you also cite
that in many annotations, there is a fourth element.
 2. Stages of Commission Two degrees
51 Attempted
a. Definitions lower58
i. Arts. 6 and 7 One degree
52 Consummated
lower59
Q: Why are we determining stages of commission of One degree
54 Accomplice Frustrated
felonies? What will be its effect on the criminal liability of a lower60
person? Two degrees
A: To determine the corresponding penalty to be imposed against 56 Attempted
lower61
a person. Two degrees
53 Consummated
lower62
For this part, refer to Arts. 46 to 57. Two degrees
55 Accessories Frustrated
lower63
Q: What does Art. 4654 state? Two degrees
A: That the penalty prescribed by law for the commission of a 57 Attempted
lower64
felony shall be imposed upon the principals in the commission of
such felony and that if the law prescribes a penalty for a felony in Q: What is Art. 58?
general terms, it is understood to be applicable to the A: Article 58. Additional penalty to be imposed upon certain
consummated felony. accessories. - Those accessories falling within the terms of
paragraphs 3 of Article 19 of this Code who should act with abuse
Q: What, again, is the penalty for consummated homicide? of their public functions, shall suffer the additional penalty of
A: Reclusion temporal. absolute perpetual disqualification if the principal offender shall be
guilty of a grave felony, and that of absolute temporary
Q: To whom and at what stage shall this penalty be applied? disqualification if he shall be guilty of a less grave felony.
A: Against the principal at the consummated stage.
 So, all the penalties stated in the RPC will be imposed Q: What is Art. 59?
upon a principal in a consummated felony. A: Article 59. Penalty to be imposed in case of failure to commit
the crime because the means employed or the aims sought are
 So, you remember Art. 46 because that will be your impossible. - When the person intending to commit an offense has
anchor for graduation of penalties, because it states that already performed the acts for the execution of the same but
if there is a penalty under the RPC, it should be imposed nevertheless the crime was not produced by reason of the fact
that the act intended was by its nature one of impossible
on the principal in a consummated felony.
accomplishment or because the means employed by such person
are essentially inadequate to produce the result desired by him,
the court, having in mind the social danger and the degree of
Q: What if it is a frustrated felony? criminality shown by the offender, shall impose upon him the
A: Then the penalty next lower in degree shall be imposed. See penalty of arresto mayor or a fine from 200 to 500 pesos.
Art. 50.55
Earlier, we discussed Arts. 48, 49, and 59. So we already have an
Q: Principal also? idea of Arts. 46 to 59.
A: Yes, principal in a frustrated felony.
Q: What is Art. 60?
Q: In attempted felony? A: Article 60. Exception to the rules established in Articles 50 to
A: Two degrees lower than that prescribed by law for the 57. - The provisions contained in Articles 50 to 57, inclusive, of
consummated felony. See Art. 51.56 this Code shall not be applicable to cases in which the law
expressly prescribes the penalty provided for a frustrated or
Persons attempted felony, or to be imposed upon accomplices or
Stage of
Article criminally Penalty accessories.
Commission
liable  The law itself provides for the penalty, so we will not
Prescribed by
46 Consummated apply the rules under Arts. 46 to 57.
the RPC
Principal
One degree
50 Frustrated
lower57

54 Article 46. Penalty to be imposed upon principals in general. - The 58 Reckoned from Art. 46.
penalty prescribed by law for the commission of a felony shall be imposed
upon the principals in the commission of such felony. 59 Reckoned from Art. 46.

Whenever the law prescribes a penalty for a felony is general terms, it 60 Reckoned from Art. 50.
shall be understood as applicable to the consummated felony.
55 Article 50. Penalty to be imposed upon principals of a frustrated
crime. - The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for 61 Reckoned from Art. 51.
the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principal in a
frustrated felony. 62 Reckoned from Art. 46.
56 Article 51. Penalty to be imposed upon principals of attempted
crimes. - A penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for 63 Reckoned from Art. 50.
the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principals in an
attempt to commit a felony. 64 Reckoned from Art. 51.
57 Reckoned from Art. 46.
  Because, if it is frustrated or attempted, there is a
corresponding penalty already provided in the law.
Q: Going back to stages, what are these attempted,
frustrated, and consummated stages?
A:
Article 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. -
Consummated felonies as well as those which are frustrated and
attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its
execution and accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated
when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would
produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do
not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the
commission of a felony directly or over acts, and does not perform
all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by
reason of some cause or accident other than this own
spontaneous desistance.
There are two ways of determining the stage of commission.
The first one is based on Art. 6.
 In attempted, not all acts of execution are performed. The
offender commences the commission of the crime
directly by overt acts.
 In frustrated, he already performs all acts of execution
which would produce the felony. This is important,
“produce the felony” as a consequence.
 In consummated, offender performs all acts of execution
and the crime is produced.
[To Agapito]
Q: In People v. Borinaga, the accused hit the back of the
chair. Then the victim fell down, but the victim was not hit.
What was the ruling of the SC?
A: Frustrated murder.
Q: Do you agree?
A: No.
Q: Why not?
A: It is only an attempted murder because the accused has not
performed all of the acts which would produce the crime as a
consequence. At the time that the accused stabbed the chair, he
saw that the victim was not injured, so he knew that he was not
able to kill the victim. Therefore, it is only attempted.
 It is, therefore, important for us to determine whether the
acts performed would produce the felony, whether or not
all acts of execution have been performed.
 Stabbing the back of the chair will not lead to the death
of the victim. So, it cannot be frustrated. Of course, it
cannot be consummated.
Q: Are frustrated and consummated the same?
A: No, in frustrated felony, the crime is not produced, whereas in
a consummated felony, it is produced.
In your definition in Art. 6, all the elements for its execution are
present. In consummated, the offender performs all acts of
execution, and the felony is produced, whereas, in frustrated, the
offender performs all acts of execution but the felony is not
produced.
Q: For what reason?
A: For causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
So, it is easy to distinguish between consummated or frustrated.
So, the debate really lies upon whether an act is attempted or
frustrated. But it is also very easy because the offender
commences the commission of the felony but does not perform all
acts of execution. This is the distinction between attempted and
frustrated.
 In frustrated, the offender performs all acts of execution,
but in attempted, he does not.
 Q: For what reason?
 A: For some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance.
 The problem lies on what are acts of execution. That is
why there is difficulty in determining whether it is
attempted or frustrated.
Q: Is “causes independent of the will of the perpetrator” the
same as “some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance”?
A: Yes. Accident is not within the will of the perpetrator. Causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator is likewise not within his
will. Apparently, they are similar.
 The only distinction is that in attempted, the offender
does not perform all acts of execution. The reason for
him not performing is some cause or accident other than
his own spontaneous desistance.
 In frustrated, he performs all acts of execution, but then
the felony is not produced by reason of causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator.
Objective and subjective phase
U.S. vs. EDUAVE
G.R. No. L-12155, February 2, 1917
FACTS:
The accused stabbed a girl, who charged him with rape,
using a bolo from the rear giving her a terrible blow in the
back and side. He threw the body into the bushes. When he
gave himself up, he declared that he had killed the victim. He
was charged with frustrated homicide. He contended that he
should be liable only for attempted homicide.
ISSUE: WON the accused is liable for frustrated homicide.
HELD: Yes.
The crime CANNOT be attempted murder. This is clear
from the fact that the defendant performed all of the acts
which should have resulted in the consummated crime
and voluntarily desisted from further acts. A crime cannot be
held to be attempted unless the offender, after beginning the
commission of the crime by overt acts, is prevented, against
his will, by some outside cause from performing all of the acts
which should produce the crime. In other words, to be an
attempted crime the purpose of the offender must be
 thwarted by a foreign force or agency which intervenes and
compels him to stop prior to the moment when he has
performed all of the acts which should produce the crime as
a consequence, which acts it is his intention to perform. If he
has performed ALL of the acts which should result in the
consummation of the crime and voluntarily desists from
proceeding further, it cannot be an attempt.
The essential element which distinguishes attempted
from frustrated felony is that:
 FRUSTRATED: There is NO intervention of a foreign or
extraneous cause or agency between the beginning of
the commission of the crime and the moment when all of
the acts have been performed which should result in the
consummated crime;
 ATTEMPTED: There is such intervention and the
offender does not arrive at the point of performing all of
the acts which should produce the crime. He is stopped
short of that point by some cause apart from his
voluntary desistance.
To put it in another way, in case of an attempt the
offender never passes the subjective phase of the offense.
He is interrupted and compelled to desist by the intervention
of outside causes before the subjective phase is passed.
On the other hand, in case of frustrated crimes the
subjective phase is completely passed. Subjectively the
crime is complete. Nothing interrupted the offender while he
was passing through the subjective phase. The crime,
however, is not consummated by reason of the intervention
of causes independent of the will of the offender. He did all
that was necessary to commit the crime. If the crime did not
result as a consequence it was due to something beyond his
control.
SUBJECTIVE PHASE:
The subjective phase is that portion of the acts
constituting the crime included between the act
which begins the commission of the crime and the last act
performed by the offender which, with the prior acts, should
result in the consummated crime. From that time forward the
phase is objective.
It may also be said to be that period occupied by the acts
of the offender over which he has control — that period
between the point where he begins and the points where
he voluntarily desists. If between these two points the
offender is stopped by reason of any cause outside of his own
voluntary desistance, the subjective phase has not been
passed and it is an attempt. If he is not so stopped but
continues until he performs the last act, it is frustrated.
That the case before us is frustrated is clear.
CONCLUSION: FRUSTRATED MURDER.
Q: If we just go by this definition (as already discussed), we
can already eliminate consummated. It can only be attempted
or frustrated. So, how do we determined whether it is
attempted or frustrated? Why? Was there any indication in
the case as to the nature of the wound caused to the woman?
In the Iligan case, if we stop at the hacking, you have an idea
as to what kind of wound. What kind?
A: Superficial wound.
Q: Was that attempted?
A: Attempted.
Q: Why?
A: Because it was not fatal, it will not cause the death of the victim.
It will not produce the felony as a consequence.
But in this case (referring to U.S. v. Eduave), we have no idea as
to the kind of wound inflicted.
Q: In homicide or murder, when can we say that all acts of
execution have been performed?
A: When the wound inflicted upon the victim is fatal.
Q: In theft, when do we say that all acts of execution have
been performed?
A: If the offender was able to take away the personal property of
the victim.
Q: In rape?
A: If there is entry, regardless of full or slight penetration. That is
the final act when we can say that all acts of execution have been
performed.
In U.S. v. Eduave, we are not given any information as to whether
the wound inflicted is fatal or not. So, we cannot, based on our
definition on the board (referring to what has been discussed so
far), we cannot say whether it is attempted or frustrated.
 The accused believed that he inflicted a terrible blow it
may not have been a fatal wound.
 But then, if the wound is fatal, then frustrated.
 So, the SC discussed another basis for determining
whether the crime is frustrated or attempted. There is
another criterion or standard.
Q: What is that standard?
A: The objective and the subjective phase.
Q: What is a subjective phase?
A: The subjective phase is that portion of the acts constituting the
crime included between the act which begins the commission of
the crime and the last act performed by the offender which, with
the prior acts, should result in the consummated crime. From that
time forward the phase is objective.
If he did not pass through this stage, it is only attempted.
But it would prove helpful in the case of Eduave because we don’t
have any idea whether all acts of execution have been performed.
Q: But, in the mind of the perpetrator, what was in his mind?
A: That he had already performed all acts of execution.
 While that may not be objectively true (that he has
performed all acts of execution), but in his mind, thought
that he had already performed all acts of execution. In
that case, he has already passed the subjective phase,
because he already threw the victim in the bushes. So,
he thought that he had performed all acts of execution.
In People v. Listerio, the accused, who were carrying steel pipes
and bladed weapons, mauled the victims. One of the victims was
given a blow to such extent that he lost consciousness. Since he
lost consciousness, the accused thought that they had already
killed him or that they had performed all acts of execution. So,
again, they passed through the subjective phase. But, the
definition is the crime included between the act which begins the
commission of the crime and the last act performed by the
offender. Almost the same. That is in the mind of the perpetrator.
He started and he supposedly performed the last act in his mind.
In Eduvae and Listerio, they passed through the subjective
phase. But, we don’t have an idea on what kind of wound was
caused.
Q: What was the wound inflicted in People v. Listerio?
A: Non-fatal.
Q: So, if non-fatal, then, based on our definition, what stage
would that be?
A: Attempted only.
Q: But in that case, what was the ruling?
A: Frustrated, meaning, they have performed all acts of execution.
But in reality, based on your statement earlier that a fatal wound
should be caused, it will only be attempted.
Q: So, if we base it on our definition, what will be our
conclusion in People v. Listerio?
A: Attempted only.
 But the SC considered the other standard in determining
whether the perpetrator has passed through the
subjective phase or not.
Q: Regardless of the stage based on our definition, did the
accused pass through the subjective phase?
A: Yes. Frustrated. In both cases of Eduave and Listerio.
In People v. Trinidad, the accused fired two shots, hitting the
victim on his thighs. The SC ruled that it was only attempted
murder because the accused has not performed all acts of
execution that would have brought his death. In here, the court
laid down a doctrinal rule that if the wound is not fatal, then it is
only attempted.
 RULE: If the wound is superficial, not fatal, it is only
attempted. But if the wound is fatal, all acts of execution
have been performed, then it would be a frustrated felony
if the felony is not produced.
If we follow the rule in Trinidad and we determine in Listerio that
the wound was not fatal, so if we follow Trinidad, our ruling will just
be attempted murder. But pursuant to Eduave and Listerio, there
is another criteria for determining whether it is attempted or
frustrated. BUT, we use this criteria only when we do not have an
idea on whether or not the wound is fatal. In Listerio, the victim
lost consciousness, and they thought they already killed the
victim. Otherwise, the general rule will be applied. If no fatal
wound, attempted.
 If there is a fatal wound, frustrated. But then, if there is
no clarity as to the wound inflicted, but then the
perpetrator already believed that he has performed all
acts of execution, then frustrated.
But in People v. Sy, the accused shot the victim, but the latter ran
away. The perpetrator did not chase him. But in his mind, he
believed he has not yet inflicted a fatal wound. Attempted only.
So, we use the objective and subjective phase as an exception.
We still use the definition based on Art. 6.
 In objective phase, the person has no control anymore
over the result of his crime.
[To Agapito]
Q: Suppose he has inflicted a fatal wound, he had a change
of heart, brought the victim to the hospital, the victim
survives. Will he be criminally liable?
A: Physical injuries.
Q: Not for frustrated homicide?
A: No.
Q: He performed already all acts of execution and inflicted a
mortal or fatal wound. He had a change of heart. He brought
the victim to the hospital. The victim died. Will he be liable for
consummated felony?
A: Yes.
Q: Does his change of heart have an effect upon his liability?
A: No answer given.
[To Pangilinan]
Q: If the victim survives, what is his liability?
A: Attempted felony, because independent of the will of the
perpetrator.
[To Mesina]
Q: The felony is not produced because of his will, what is his
liability?
A: Frustrated felony.
Q: If the perpetrator commences, he does not perform all acts
of execution, he desists spontaneously, will he be liable?
A: No. [Agapito and Mesina]
[To Agapito]
Q: He had a knife. He stabbed the victim. He did not hit. He
hit superficial wound only. But then later, his wife called him,
“Pedro let’s eat already,” and stopped. Is he criminally liable?
He was not able to inflict a mortal wound.
A: Only for physical injuries, because there was spontaneous
desistance.
[To Mesina]
Q: Why would he be liable?
A:
His intended crime is to kill. So homicide. If he commenced directly
by overt acts but he spontaneously desisted, but caused
superficial wound only, he would not be liable for attempted
homicide, but only for physical injuries. Because his intent to kill
was diminished. So, he is liable not anymore for attempted
homicide. His acts constitute another felony punishable under the
RPC. That would be physical injuries. That is for attempted.
But for frustrated, he already performed all acts of execution. Then
he did not desist because he has already performed all acts of
execution but he had a change of heart, so he brought the victim
to the hospital. The victim survived. So, what he prevented was
the production of the felony, not the performance of all the acts of
execution.
[To Mesina]
Q: Is he liable?
A:
Agapito: Physical injuries
Mesina: Frustrated homicide
Pangilinan: Frustrated homicide
NOTE: Sir did not say the correct answer.
***
Felony is an act or omission.
We know what an act is punishable by the RPC.
Q: What is an overt act?
A: An overt act is any physical activity or deed that indicates the
intention to commit a crime, which is more than a mere planning,
without being frustrated or attempted, which if allowed to
continue to its complete termination will naturally and logically
ripen into a crime.
In contrast to an act in the definition of a felony, an act here is a
neutral act. it does not indicate yet the intention to commit a crime.
It is just some physical activity or deed, tending to produce an
effect in the external world. But this overt act, it is a physical
activity or deed which indicates the intention to commit a crime
already. That is why it is called an overt act. It is different from the
act in defining a felony. So, by these overt acts, you know already
that he is trying to commit a felony.
In the case of People v. Lamahang, the accused was trying to
get the wooden blocks in the store. He was charged with robbery.
 Our thinking is that if a person is trying to gain entry into
a house, his purpose is to rob.
 But the SC gave us an idea in this case that his overt act
(that which indicates already a mentality to commit a
particular crime).
Q: So, the act of breaking open a wooden block, does this
indicate the intention to commit a crime already?
A: Yes.
Q: For what crime?
A: Not clear – not correct to say robbery. The act of entering may
result in different felonies. So, the crime is still indeterminate. The
purpose could have been to rob, to kill, or kidnap. But the overt
act of destroying the wooden blocks already indicates a particular
crime and that would be trespass to dwelling. From that particular
act, only one crime is possible. It is trespass to dwelling. You
cannot jump into conclusions that he is robbing or raping the
Chinaman.
Overt act will indicate an intention to commit a particular crime,
different from the act in defining a felony which is some physical
activity or deed.
In stages of commission, it is important for us to know the manner
of commission of the crime.
Q: You know what slander by deed is? Example of slander by
deed?
A: Slapping.
Q: Is there an attempted slander?
A: None. It is always consummated because of the manner of
commission of the crime. It is always consummated.
In an attempt to flee to a hostile country, the mere attempt is
already consummated. There is no need for that person to arrive
at another country. So you should take a look at the manner of
commission.
But we have what we call material crimes.
For corruption also, it is consummated by the mere offer of the
person corrupting the public officer.
In some instances, it needs the agreement of both parties.
But in usual crimes we know (material crimes), it is always
attempted, frustrated and consummated, these three stages. But
there are felonies that on the basis of their elements and manner
of commission, there can be no three stages – only consummated.
We discussed earlier that for homicide or murder, it is attempted
if there is no mortal wound, but if there is fatal wound, it will be
frustrated if the victim has not died.
b. Specific felonies
i. Rape
Q: How about in rape?
A: There is no frustrated stage (People vs. Orita).
In People v. Erinia, the SC ruled that it was frustrated rape.
Q: Why did the SC rule frustrated rape in Erinia?
A: There was no conclusive evidence of penetration.
But in People vs. Orita, the SC ruled that Erinia is a stray
decision. Based on the elements and the manner of commission,
there should be no frustrated rape. It is either attempted or
consummated – it is either in or out.
In People v. Hernandez, it does not matter whether there is full
penetration or not. Any penetration, no matter how slight, already
consummates the offense.
 Previously, the rupture was required to consummate
rape. If you want to be literary, you read People v.
Campuhan – stripping the “citadels of passion.”
ii. Theft
Q: How about in theft? What happened in Adiao, Dino and,
Valenzuela?
A:
U.S. V. ADIAO
G.R. No. L-13785, October 8, 1918
FACTS:
Defendant, Tomas Adiao, a customs inspector, abstracted a
leather belt valued at P0.80, from the baggage of a Japanese
named T. Murakami, and secreted the belt in his desk in the
Custom House, where it was found by other customs employees.
The defendant was charged with theft. He was found guilty of
the lesser crime of frustrated theft. He appealed to the CFI and
was found guilty, again, of frustrated theft.
ISSUE: WON the conviction for frustrated theft is proper.
HELD: No, he should be convicted for consummated theft.
Based on these facts, the Court is of the opinion that the crime
cannot properly be classified as frustrated, as this word is defined
in Article 3 of the Penal Code, but that since the offender
performed ALL of the acts of execution necessary for the
accomplishment crime of theft.
 The fact that the defendant was under observation during the
entire transaction and that he was unable to get the merchandise
out of the Custom House, is not decisive; all the elements of the
completed crime of theft are present.
Adiao was convicted of consummated theft because there was
already taking, although he was not able to get it out of his office.
That is not essential in committing the offense.
In People v. Dino, the accused took rifles from a military base.
The articles were loaded in a truck. When they reached the
checkpoint, the security guard apprehended them before they
could get out of the military base. The SC ruled that it was only
frustrated theft because they were not able to take the articles out
of the checkpoint and that in order to be a consummated theft, it
should have passed the checkpoint.
Q: What additional element of the crime was stated by the CA
here?
A: Full control and enjoyment of the thing stolen.
Q: But then, in Valenzuela v. People, what did the SC rule?
A: There was consummated theft because the detergents were
already taken out of the grocery premises. The court declared
further that there is no frustrated theft.
Q: What is the final act in theft?
A: The unlawful taking of the property.
Q: What do we call this?
A: Asportation.
iii. Robbery
The gravamen of the offense of theft is unlawful taking of personal
property of another – asportation. This is also true in robbery.
In Lamahang, there is no unlawful taking yet. They were trying to
enter the store of the Chinaman. But in Salvilla, there was taking
already; they demanded money and watch, placed in a paper bag.
There was unlawful taking already.
So, there are no frustrated rape and theft.
Q: How about in arson? Is there a frustrated stage?
A: No answer given. Look at decided cases of the SC.
iv. Murder
We discussed murder already. Although the SC said in Borinaga
it is frustrated murder, but he just hit the back of the chair so how
can that be frustrated?
There is a dissent. What was prevented was not the killing of the
person, but the fact that the knife hit the back of the chair instead.
The SC has not come up a decision overturning Borinaga.
But in People v. Sy, artificial wound. The victim was able to
escape. The perpetrator did not chase him. He knew subjectively
and objectively that it was only in the attempted stage.
In People v. Trinidad, the SC clarified a doctrinal rule that if the
wound is not fatal, it is only in attempted stage; but if fatal, then
frustrated already.
c. Penalties to be imposed in relation to stages
of commission
Articles 6,7, 46, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56,
57, and 60, 61, and 71
We discussed already letter (c) on penalties.
d. Republic Act No. 9165
You remember People v. Enriquez, the buy-bust case. Enriquez
was carrying the marijuana. They were in the waiting shed and it
was at that time that the police declared that he was a police
officer. The accused said that he should be charged and convicted
only of attempted delivery, because it is quite problematic for
crimes under special penal laws. The act prohibited should be
consummated always. There is no frustrated or attempted in
special penal laws.
The SC said in this case that there was delivery already. Although
the SC said that frustrated and attempted stages do not apply in
crimes punished under special penal laws.
Q: Then, we have this R.A. 9165, sec. 26. What does it punish?
A: They are penalized as if they have been consummated already.
 So, there is a problem created by People v. Enriquez,
because in R.A. 9165, it only mentions that even an
attempt is punished as if it has been consummated
already.
 Take note that it punishes conspiracy already in any of
these crimes.
Section 26. Attempt or Conspiracy. – Any attempt or
conspiracy to commit the following unlawful acts shall be
penalized by the same penalty prescribed for the commission
of the same as provided under this Act:
(a) Importation of any dangerous drug and/or controlled
precursor and essential chemical;
(b) Sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery,
distribution and transportation of any dangerous
drug and/or controlled precursor and essential
chemical;
(c) Maintenance of a den, dive or resort where any
dangerous drug is used in any form;
(d) Manufacture of any dangerous drug and/or
controlled precursor and essential chemical; and
(e) Cultivation or culture of plants which are sources of
dangerous drugs.
February 17, 2018
3. Conspiracy and proposal to commit a felony
a. Arts. 8, 115, 136, 141, 186, 306
Q: What is conspiracy?
A: A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. See Art. 8.65
Q: If they executed the crime, will they be punished for
conspiracy?
A: No, they are not liable for conspiracy if the crime is committed
because then conspiracy will only be a mode of incurring criminal
liability.
Q: So, for one to be liable for conspiracy, the crime should
not have been committed?
A: Yes. Otherwise, they will be held liable for the crime committed,
and conspiracy will only be used as a mode for incurring criminal
liability.
Conspiracy is a separate offense in itself. But the conspirators will
be liable only if the conspiracy is not executed. If it is executed,
they will not be liable anymore for conspiracy, but for the crime
committed. But then, conspiracy will still be relevant.
Q: What is the relevance of conspiracy when the conspirators
performed the crime?
A:
Q: In People v. Peralta, conspiracy is understood in two
senses. What are these? Remember culpa, there are two
perspectives: as a mode of incurring criminal liability and as
a quasi-offense. Similarly, conspiracy is understood in two
senses. What are these?
A:
1) As a mode of incurring criminal liability
2) As a crime in itself
Q: What do you mean by, “as a mode of incurring criminal
liability”?
A:
Q: Do the conspirators perform the same acts?
A: Not necessarily.
Q: So, even though their participations are different from
each other, what would be the criminal liability?
A: As principal (Mesina)
Q: Not for their specific acts?
A:
PEOPLE v. PERALTA
G.R. No. L-19069, October 29, 1968
FACTS:
In the municipality of Muntinglupa, province of Rizal, two
known warring gangs inside the New Bilibid Prison as “Sigue-
Sigue” and “OXO” were preparing to attend a mass at 7 a.m.
However, a fight between the two rival gangs caused a big
commotion in the plaza where the prisoners were currently
assembled. The fight was quelled and those involved where led
away to the investigation while the rest of the prisoners were
ordered to return to their respective quarters.
65 Article 8. Conspiracy and proposal to commit felony. - Conspiracy
and proposal to commit felony are punishable only in the cases in which
the law specially provides a penalty therefor.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.
In the investigation, it was found out that the accused, “OXO”
members, Amadeo Peralta, Andres Factora, Leonardo Dosal,
Angel Paramog, Gervasio Larita and Florencio Luna (six among
the twenty-two defendants charged therein with multiple murder),
are also convicts confined in the said prisons by virtue of final
judgments.
They conspired, confederated and mutually helped and aided
each other, with evident premeditation and treachery, all armed
with deadly weapons, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously killed “Sigue-Sigue” sympathizers Jose Carriego,
Eugenio Barbosa and Santos Cruz, also convicts confined in the
same institution, by hitting, stabbing, and striking them with ice
picks, clubs and other improvised weapons, pointed and/or
sharpened, thereby inflicting upon the victims multiple serious
injuries which directly caused their deaths. They were charged
with three counts of murder.
ISSUE: WON conspiracy attended the commission of the multiple
murder?
HELD: Yes.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime unless when the
law specifically provides a penalty thereof as in treason, rebellion
and sedition. However, when in resolute execution of a common
scheme, a felony is committed by two or more malefactors, the
existence of a conspiracy assumes a pivotal importance in the
determination of the liability of the perpetrators. Once an express
or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable
as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their
respective active participation in the commission of the crime/s
perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy because in
contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all.
The collective criminal liability emanates from the ensnaring
nature of conspiracy. The concerted action of the conspirators in
consummating their common purpose is a patent display of their
evil partnership, and for the consequences of such criminal
enterprise they must be held solidarity liable. However, in order to
hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, it
must be established that he performed an overt act in furtherance
of the conspiracy, either by actively participating in the actual
commission of the crime, or by lending moral assistance to his co-
conspirators by being present at the scene of the crime, or by
exerting moral ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators as to
move them to executing the conspiracy.
Conspiracy alone, without execution of its purpose, is not a
crime punishable by law, except in special instances (Article 8,
Revised Penal Code) which, do not include robbery.
Reverting now to the case at bar, the trial court correctly ruled
that conspiracy attended the commission of the murders. To wit,
although there is no direct evidence of conspiracy, the court can
safely say that there are several circumstances to show that the
crime committed by the accused was planned. First, all the
deceased were Tagalogs and members of sympathizers of
There is proposal when the person who has decided to commit a felony
proposes its execution to some other person or persons.
“Sigue-Sigue” gang (OXO members were from either Visayas or
Mindanao), singled out and killed thereby, showing that their killing
has been planned. Second, the accused were all armed with
improvised weapons showing that they really prepared for the
occasion. Third, the accused accomplished the killing with team
work precision going from one brigade to another and attacking
the same men whom they have previously marked for liquidation
and lastly, almost the same people took part in the killing of the
Carriego, Barbosa and Cruz.
So, first rule: Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come
to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it.
Q: “Felony.” Does this mean that conspiracy does not exist
in crimes punished under special penal laws?
Second rule, generally, conspiracy is not punishable, except when
there is a law specifically providing for a penalty therefor.
Two views on conspiracy:
1) As a separate indictable offense; and
2) As a rule for collectivizing criminal liability
Q: What does “collectivizing criminal liability” mean?
A: That all of the conspirators who acted in the furtherance of one
criminal design will be collectively, criminally liable. That is the
relevance.
If the conspiracy or planned crime is executed, the conspirators
will not be liable anymore for conspiracy but for the crime
committed.
Based on our discussion of persons criminally liable in criminal
law 1, a person may only be criminally liable for his own acts. He
cannot be liable for acts of another person.
Q: In evidence, can the acts of a third person prejudice us?
A: No, res inter alios acta.
In conspiracy, since it is a rule for collectivizing criminal liability,
even if a third person commits the act, the co-conspirators will be
liable. So, it is a rule for collectivizing criminal liability.
Conspiracy as a separate, indictable offense:
Generally, conspiracy is not punishable, unless there is a law
punishing it.
Q: Why is it not punishable, generally?
A:
Q: In last meeting, we discussed stages of commission.
Which stages are punishable?
A: Attempted, frustrated, and consummated. See Art. 6 and 7.66
Light felonies are punishable only when they have been
consummated. Not all attempted and frustrated light felonies are
66 Article 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. -
Consummated felonies as well as those which are frustrated and
attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its
execution and accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the
offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony
as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of
causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a
felony directly or over acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution
punishable, only those pertaining to crimes against persons and
property.
Q: What stage is conspiracy in?
A: It does not fall in any of the stages. It is a mere preparatory act.
Q: How is overt act defined, again?
A: An overt act is any physical activity or deed that indicates the
intention to commit a crime, which is more than a mere planning,
without being frustrated or attempted, which if allowed to continue
to its complete termination will naturally and logically ripen into a
crime.
If, according to Art. 6, only attempted, frustrated, and
consummated felonies are punishable, then preparation and
planning are not punishable, with more reason is there for
conspiracy not to be punished, because it is before planning and
preparation. But, our law, in some cases, punishes conspiracy.
Q: What are these particular cases?
A:
1) Conspiracy to commit treason (Art. 115);
2) Conspiracy to commit sedition (Art. 141);
3) Conspiracy to commit rebellion (Art. 136);
4) Conspiracy in monopolies and combinations in restraint
of trade (Art. 186); and
5) Conspiracy to commit insurrection (Art. 136)
This is a very special case. Conspiracy, according to Art. 6, should
not be punished. Only attempted, frustrated, and consummated.
But the law provides for certain conspiracies which are
punishable.
Q: What is the common thread on these conspiracies?
A: Treason is a threat against external security of the state,
rebellion against internal security, same with coup d’etat and
monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade. So, it tackles
the security and safety of the state.
That is why, by the mere conspiracy, they are punished already.
They are threat to our existence as a state.
Q: Are there any other conspiracies punished, aside from
those punished in the RPC?
A: Yes, under special laws.
1) Selected acts committed under the Dangerous Drugs
Act;
2) Espionage
3) Illegal Association;
4) Highway Robbery;
5) Arson; and
which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident
other than this own spontaneous desistance.
Article 7. When light felonies are punishable. - Light felonies are
punishable only when they have been consummated, with the exception
of those committed against person or property.
 6) Terrorism under the Human Security Act. Q: So, even if he is just a cook, but part of the conspiracy,
what is his liability?
All of these conspiracies pertain to the security and existence of A: Co-principal.
our government or state so very grievous offenses. The rule is
that, there should be a law. Q: Driver of a getaway vehicle or lookout?
A:
Q: If you are asked, is there a conspiracy to commit homicide If he is part of a conspiracy, he is always a co-principal. That is
or murder? the rule of collectivizing criminal liability, regardless of the extent
A: None. of their participation.

Q: Kidnapping? Q: And their liability, if there are several offenses committed,

A:
Q: But they will be punished?
A: Yes.
Q: What is the evidence required to prove conspiracy?
A: Conspiracy may be proved either by direct evidence or
circumstantial evidence.
 Of course, there will be difficulty in coming up with direct
proof. These are discussed in secrecy.
Q: This rule for collectivizing criminal liability applies when?
A: When the planned crime is committed, all the co-conspirators
will be liable as co-principals, regardless of the extent of their
participation.
 He was just a cook in the house, he was just a driver of
the get-away vehicle, in which case he is an accomplice
if there is no conspiracy.
 So, principals are three: direct participation, inducement,
indispensable cooperation.
Q: If he is a principal by indispensable cooperation, when
does he participate?
A: During the act.
Q: How about an accomplice?
A: Before or simultaneous to the act
as in the case of Peralta where there are three murders, their
liability is considered as? In civil law.
A: Solidary and multiple.
Q: Suppose there are three rapes, he carnal knowledge only
in the first rape. But then for the next two, he was cheering
on the others. How many liabilities for that person? Only one
for the rape he committed or three?
A: Three [Agapito]
Q: In the Peralta case, did all of them participate in the actual
killings?
A: Not in all the three.
Q: But were they held liable for all three?
A: Yes, because their liability is solidary and multiple.
It is possible to prove conspiracy by circumstantial evidence. It is
not always written, or you cannot hear them planning conspiracy.
Q: So, what should we take a look at?
A: Whether or not the conspirators have a common design.
Q: It is possible that there is no conspiracy, but then they
committed the crime and acted in conspiracy. Is that
possible?
A: Yes.
Q: Can you give an example?
A: A and B are both angry at C. It happened that they were all
eating in one area. Without previous agreement, A attacked C. B,
seeing A, also attacked C. So, through their actions, they already
agreed to inflict physical injuries against C.
[To Munoz]
Q: If C was already down, but A continued hitting C. B
stopped already. Death of C ensued. Will B be also
responsible for C’s death?
A:

Q: Accessory? In our definition, they come to an agreement. Note the thinking

A: After.
Q: Can a crime be committed even without a lookout or a
getaway car?
A: Yes.
You should always think of the crime. Are there robbers who
commit the crime even without a getaway vehicle? Yes. That
is your query. If there is, then the participation is
indispensable. So, he is just an accomplice. The co-
conspirators, who are principals, shall be liable regardless of
the extent of their participation.
that conspiracy happens when they acted together in killing C.
Their actions show common design. So, in circumstantial
evidence, we take a look at whether they have a common design
and was “concert in action.” They have unity in action. Common
design, which is the plan or agreement and by their action, they
really intended to commit it.
We cannot look at their minds. We can only look at their actions.
So, they physically injured, used a knife in hitting C. They had unity
in hitting C. That is the common design. That is the way to prove
conspiracy.
ESTRADA v. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 148965. February 26, 2002

[To Mesina] FACTS:

 As an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then President of the Republic of the
Philippines, five criminal complaints against the former President
and members of his family, his associates, friends and
conspirators were filed with the respondent Office of the
Ombudsman.
The respondent Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution
finding probable cause warranting the filing with the
Sandiganbayan of several criminal Informations against the
former President and the other respondents therein. One of the
Informations was for the crime of plunder under Republic Act No.
7080 and among the respondents was herein petitioner Jose
Jinggoy Estrada, then mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila.
HELD:
Pertinent to the case at bar is the predicate act alleged in sub-
paragraph (a) of the Amended Information which is of receiving or
collecting, directly or indirectly, on several instances, money in the
aggregate amount of P545,000,000.00 for illegal gambling in the
form of gift, share, percentage, kickback or any form of pecuniary
benefit x x x. In this sub-paragraph (a), petitioner, in conspiracy
with former President Estrada, is charged with the act of receiving
or collecting money from illegal gambling amounting to P545
million. Contrary to petitioners posture, the allegation is that he
received or collected money from illegal gambling on several
instances. The phrase on several instances means the
petitioner committed the predicate act in series. To insist that
the Amended Information charged the petitioner with the
commission of only one act or offense despite the phrase several
instances is to indulge in a twisted, nay, pretzel interpretation.
***
etitioner also faults the respondent Sandiganbayan for
sustaining the charge against petitioner for alleged offenses and
with alleged conspirators, with which and with whom he is not
even remotely connected contrary to the dictum that criminal
liability is personal, not vicarious results in the denial of
substantive due process.[18]
The Solicitor General argues, on the other hand, that
petitioner is charged not only with the predicate act in sub-
paragraph (a) but also with the other predicate acts in sub-
paragraphs (b), (c) & (d) because he is indicted as a principal and
as co-conspirator of the former President. This is purportedly clear
from the first and second paragraphs of the Amended
Information.[19]
For better focus, there is a need to examine again the
allegations of the Amended Information vis--vis the provisions of
R.A. No. 7080.
The Amended Information, in its first two paragraphs, charges
petitioner and his other co-accused with the crime of plunder. The
first paragraph names all the accused, while the second
paragraph describes in general how plunder was committed and
lays down most of the elements of the crime itself. Sub-
paragraphs (a) to (d) describe in detail the predicate acts that
constitute the crime and name in particular the co-
conspirators of former President Estrada in each predicate
act. The predicate acts alleged in the said four sub-
paragraphs correspond to the items enumerated in Section 1
(d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (a) alleged the predicate act
of receiving, on several instances, money from illegal gambling, in
consideration of toleration or protection of illegal gambling, and
expressly names petitioner as one of those who conspired with
former President Estrada in committing the offense. This
predicate act corresponds with the offense described in item [2] of
the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph
(b) alleged the predicate act of diverting, receiving or
misappropriating a portion of the tobacco excise tax share
allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur, which act is the offense
described in item [1] in the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of the
law. This sub-paragraph does not mention petitioner but instead
names other conspirators of the former President. Sub-paragraph
(c) alleged two predicate acts - that of ordering the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) and the Social Security System
(SSS) to purchase shares of stock of Belle Corporation, and
collecting or receiving commissions from such purchase from the
Belle Corporation which became part of the deposit in the Jose
Velarde account at the Equitable-PCI Bank. These two predicate
acts fall under items [2] and [3] in the enumeration of R.A. No.
7080, and was allegedly committed by the former President in
connivance with John Does and Jane Does. Finally, sub-
paragraph (d) alleged the predicate act that the former President
unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts, kickbacks, in
connivance with John Does and Jane Does, and deposited the
same under his account name Jose Velarde at the Equitable-PCI
Bank. This act corresponds to the offense under item [6] in the
enumeration of Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080.
From the foregoing allegations of the Amended Information,
it is clear that all the accused named in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d),
thru their individual acts, conspired with former President
Estrada to enable the latter to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-
gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17. As
the Amended Information is worded, however, it is not certain
whether the accused in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) conspired with
each other to enable the former President to amass the subject
ill-gotten wealth. In light of this lack of clarity, petitioner cannot be
penalized for the conspiracy entered into by the other accused
with the former President as related in the second paragraph of
the Amended Information in relation to its sub-paragraphs (b) to
(d). We hold that petitioner can be held accountable only for the
predicate acts he allegedly committed as related in sub-paragraph
(a) of the Amended Information which were allegedly done in
conspiracy with the former President whose design was to amass
ill-gotten wealth amounting to more than P4 billion.
We hasten to add, however, that the respondent
Ombudsman cannot be faulted for including the predicate
acts alleged in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) of the Amended
Information in one, and not in four, separate Informations. A
study of the history of R.A. No. 7080 will show that the law was
crafted to avoid the mischief and folly of filing multiple
informations. The Anti-Plunder Law was enacted in the aftermath
of the Marcos regime where charges of ill-gotten wealth were
filed against former President Marcos and his alleged
cronies. Government prosecutors found no appropriate law to
deal with the multitude and magnitude of the acts allegedly
committed by the former President to acquire illegal
wealth.[20] They also found that under the then existing laws such
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Revised Penal
Code and other special laws, the acts involved different
transactions, different time and different personalities. Every
transaction constituted a separate crime and required a
separate case and the over-all conspiracy had to be broken
down into several criminal and graft charges. The preparation
of multiple Informations was a legal nightmare but eventually,
thirty-nine (39) separate and independent cases were filed
against practically the same accused before the
Sandiganbayan.[21] R.A. No. 7080 or the Anti-Plunder Law[22] was
enacted precisely to address this procedural problem. This is
pellucid in the Explanatory Note to Senate Bill No. 733, viz:
Plunder, a term chosen from other equally apt terminologies
like kleptocracy and economic treason, punishes the use of high
office for personal enrichment, committed thru a series of acts
done not in the public eye but in stealth and secrecy over a period
of time, that may involve so many persons, here and abroad, and
which touch so many states and territorial units. The acts and/or
omissions sought to be penalized do not involve simple
cases of malversation of public funds, bribery, extortion,
theft and graft but constitute plunder of an entire nation
resulting in material damage to the national economy. The
above-described crime does not yet exist in Philippine statute
books. Thus, the need to come up with a legislation as a
safeguard against the possible recurrence of the depravities of the
previous regime and as a deterrent to those with similar inclination
to succumb to the corrupting influence of power.
There is no denying the fact that the plunder of an entire
nation resulting in material damage to the national economy is
made up of a complex and manifold network of crimes. In the
crime of plunder, therefore, different parties may be united by
a common purpose. In the case at bar, the different accused and
their different criminal acts have a commonalityto help the former
President amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. Sub-
paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended Information alleged the
different participation of each accused in the
conspiracy. The gravamen of the conspiracy charge, therefore,
is not that each accused agreed to receive protection money from
illegal gambling, that each misappropriated a portion of the
tobacco excise tax, that each accused ordered the GSIS and SSS
to purchase shares of Belle Corporation and receive commissions
from such sale, nor that each unjustly enriched himself from
commissions, gifts and kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them,
by their individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or
indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of
ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former President Estrada.
In the American jurisdiction, the presence of several
accused in multiple conspiracies commonly involves two
structures: (1) the so-called wheel or circle conspiracy, in which
there is a single person or group (the hub) dealing individually with
two or more other persons or groups (the spokes); and (2) the
chain conspiracy, usually involving the distribution of narcotics or
other contraband, in which there is successive communication
and cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate
business operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then
wholesaler and retailer, and then retailer and consumer.[23]
From a reading of the Amended Information, the case at bar
appears similar to a wheel conspiracy. The hub is former
President Estrada while the spokes are all the accused, and the
rim that encloses the spokes is the common goal in the overall
conspiracy, i.e., the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-
gotten wealth.
Some of our distinguished colleagues would dismiss the
charge against the petitioner on the ground that the allegation of
conspiracy in the Amended Information is too general. The fear is
even expressed that it could serve as a net to ensnare the
innocent. Their dissents appear to be inspired by American law
and jurisprudence.
We should not confuse our law on conspiracy with
conspiracy in American criminal law and in common
law. Under Philippine law, conspiracy should be understood
on two levels. As a general rule, conspiracy is not a crime in
our jurisdiction. It is punished as a crime only when the law
fixes a penalty for its commission such as in conspiracy to
commit treason, rebellion and sedition. In contrast, under
American criminal law, the agreement or conspiracy itself is
the gravamen of the offense.[24] The essence of conspiracy is
the combination of two or more persons, by concerted action, to
accomplish a criminal or unlawful purpose, or some purpose not
in itself criminal or unlawful, by criminal or unlawful means. [25] Its
elements are: agreement to accomplish an illegal objective,
coupled with one or more overt acts in furtherance of the illegal
purpose; and requisite intent necessary to commit the underlying
substantive offense.[26]
A study of the United States Code ought to be
instructive. It principally punishes two (2) crimes of
conspiracy[27] conspiracy to commit any offense or to defraud
the United States, and conspiracy to impede or injure
officer. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United
States is penalized under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 371,[28] as follows:
Sec. 371. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud
the United States. If two or more persons conspire either to
commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the
United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any
purpose, and one or more of such persons to any act to effect the
object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object
of the conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such
conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided
for such misdemeanor.
Conspiracy to impede or injure officer is penalized under 18
U.S.C. Sec. 372, viz:
Sec. 372. Conspiracy to impede or injure officer. If two or
more persons in any State, Territory, Possession, or District
conspire to prevent, by force, intimidation, or threat, any person
from accepting or holding any office, trust or place of confidence
under the United States, or from discharging any duties thereof,
or to induce by like means any officer of the United States to leave
the place, where his duties as an officer are required to be
performed, or to injure him in his person or property on account of
his lawful discharge of the duties of his office, or while engaged in
the lawful discharge thereof, or to injure his property so as to
molest, interrupt, hinder, or impede him in the discharge of his
official duties, each of such persons shall be fined not more than
$5,000 or imprisoned not more than six years, or both.
Section 371 of 18 U.S.C. punishes two acts: (1) conspiracy
to commit any offense against the United States; and (2)
conspiracy to defraud the United States or any agency
thereof. The conspiracy to commit any offense against the United
States refers to an act made a crime by federal laws. [29] It refers
to an act punished by statute.[30]Undoubtedly, Section 371 runs
the whole gamut of U.S. Federal laws, whether criminal or
regulatory.[31] These laws cover criminal offenses such as
perjury, white slave traffic, racketeering, gambling, arson, murder,
theft, bank robbery, etc. and also include customs violations,
counterfeiting of currency, copyright violations, mail fraud,
lotteries, violations of antitrust laws and laws governing interstate
commerce and other areas of federal regulation. [32] Section 371
penalizes the conspiracy to commit any of these substantive
offenses. The offense of conspiracy is generally separate and
distinct from the substantive offense,[33] hence, the court
rulings that acquittal on the substantive count does not foreclose
prosecution and conviction for related conspiracy. [34]
The conspiracy to defraud the government refers primarily to
cheating the United States out of property or money. It also covers
interference with or obstruction of its lawful governmental
functions by deceit, craft or trickery, or at least by means that are
dishonest. It comprehends defrauding the United States in any
manner whatever, whether the fraud be declared criminal or not.
The basic difference in the concept of
conspiracy notwithstanding, a study of the American case law
on how conspiracy should be alleged will reveal that it is not
necessary for the indictment to include particularities of time,
place, circumstances or causes, in stating the manner and
means of effecting the object of the conspiracy. Such
specificity of detail falls within the scope of a bill of particulars. An
indictment for conspiracy is sufficient where it alleges: (1) the
agreement; (2) the offense-object toward which the agreement
was directed; and (3) the overt acts performed in furtherance of
the agreement. To allege that the defendants conspired is, at
least, to state that they agreed to do the matters which are set
forth as the substance of their conspiracy. To allege a conspiracy
is to allege an agreement. The gist of the crime of conspiracy
is unlawful agreement, and where conspiracy is charged, it is
not necessary to set out the criminal object with as great a
certainty as is required in cases where such object is charged
as a substantive offense.
In sum, therefore, there is hardly a substantial difference
on how Philippine courts and American courts deal with
cases challenging Informations alleging conspiracy on the
ground that they lack particularities of time, place,
circumstances or causes. In our jurisdiction, as aforestated,
conspiracy can be alleged in the Information as a mode of
committing a crime or it may be alleged as constitutive of the
crime itself. When conspiracy is alleged as a crime in itself,
the sufficiency of the allegations in the Information charging
the offense is governed by Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. It requires that the information for
this crime must contain the following averments:
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information.- A complaint
or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused, the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the
name of the offended party; the approximate date of the
commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.
To reiterate, when conspiracy is charged as a crime, the
act of conspiring and all the elements of said crime must be
set forth in the complaint or information. For example, the
crime of conspiracy to commit treason is committed when, in time
of war, two or more persons come to an agreement to levy war
against the Government or to adhere to the enemies and to give
them aid or comfort, and decide to commit it. [48] The elements of
this crime are: (1) that the offender owes allegiance to the
Government of the Philippines; (2) that there is a war in which the
Philippines is involved; (3) that the offender and other person or
persons come to an agreement to: (a) levy war against the
government, or (b) adhere to the enemies, to give them aid and
comfort; and (4) that the offender and other person or persons
decide to carry out the agreement. These elements must be
alleged in the information.
The requirements on sufficiency of allegations are
different when conspiracy is not charged as a crime in itself
but only as the mode of committing the crime as in the case
at bar. There is less necessity of reciting its particularities in the
Information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the
offense charged.The conspiracy is significant only because it
changes the criminal liability of all the accused in the conspiracy
and makes them answerable as co-principals regardless of the
degree of their participation in the crime. The liability of the
conspirators is collective and each participant will be equally
responsible for the acts of others, for the act of one is the act of
all.
There was a series of predicate acts that was stated in the
Information but the SC held that Jinggoy Estrada can only be tried
in the illegal gambling case.
The first argument he said, there was no combingation or series
as against him. It was cited only in one of the predicate crimes –
in illegal jueteng. So, he said, there is no combination or series as
against him.
Q: What did the SC say to that?
A: In the Information, it was alleged that they committed it in
several instances. According to the SC, several instances must be
understood as series of predicate acts.
So, not combination or series.
The information did not state the actual word, “combination or
series.” What was used was “several instances.”
Another issue is that the act of conspiracy was not specifically
alleged in the Information. The SC looked into two kinds of
conspiracy: first, conspiracy as a crime in itself; and second,
conspiracy as a rule for collectivizing criminal liability.
 In the FIRST, in alleging conspiracy as a crime in itself,
the SC held that conspiracy must be specifically alleged,
as well as the acts in furtherance of the crime and all the
elements of the crime.
 For example, conspiracy to commit treason. There are
elements to commit treason. Then two or more persons
come to an agreement in the commission of treason,
then they decide to commit it. Those are the elements,
so those are the elements in the information. If it is
conspiracy to commit treason. That is the crime itself
alleged in the Information.
 In the SECOND, as a rule for collectivizing criminal
liability, the court held that it would not be necessary to
describe the particularities for a conspiracy. There are
two modes on how to allege conspiracy as a rule for
collectivizing criminal liability:
1) First, it would be sufficient to allege conspiracy
by using synonyms or derivates of the word
“conspiracy,” such as to connive, to collude, or
to confederate.
2) Second, by alleging the basic facts constituting
the conspiracy in order that a person of
common knowledge would understand what it
is being intended with precision, in order for the
accused to plead properly the crime
 In this case, the Information is worded as, “President
Estrada, in connivance with Jinggoy Estrada, for
receiving and collecting 545 million through illegal
gambling as a share of profit, etc.” According to the court,
such is sufficient. The word, “in connivance” is
synonymous to the word conspiracy although it is coined
in general terms, that would be sufficient to allege
conspiracy.
The SC also discussed wheel conspiracy and chain conspiracy,
because Jinggoy was saying, it was alleged only in one crime, the
predicate crime, so he should be liable only for that particular
predicate crime – illegal gambling. So, he cannot be in conspiracy
with the other persons indicated in the other predicate crimes.
Q: What did the SC say regarding that? He’s saying that he
cannot be in conspiracy with President Estrada and the
others, because he is cited only in one of the predicate crimes
– illegal gambling.
Q: There are four, right? In the three, was he mentioned?
A: No.
Q: So, how can he be in conspiracy with all of these
personalities when he was mentioned only in one?
A: The SC said that Jinggoy can only be held liable for the
predicate act where his name was alleged as a co-conspirator of
President Estrada. Therefore, he cannot be tried and convicted
with the other three predicate acts.
Q: Can he be convicted of plunder?
A:
Q: We can settle this by discussing wheel and chain
conspiracies. What are these?
A: In the American jurisdiction, the presence of several accused
in multiple conspiracies commonly involves two structures:
1) the so-called wheel or circle conspiracy, in which there
is a single person or group (the hub) dealing individually
with two or more other persons or groups (the spokes);
 there is a person at the middle – President
Estrada – and he conspires with several
individuals (spokes). It is a wheel because it
forms a wheel. This not the usual conspiracy
that we have. The conspiracy that we have is
the godfather conspiracy – chain conspiracy.
2) the chain conspiracy, usually involving the distribution
of narcotics or other contraband, in which there is
successive communication and cooperation in much the
same way as with legitimate business operations
between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler
and retailer, and then retailer and consumer.
 The example given in the case is difficult to
understand.
 This is a chain. You think of God father. There
is the godfather at the top. He talks to third
persons but in terms of committing a crime, he
talks only to one person (consigliere). If
godfather orders the killing of another, only one
person knows of such order. The consigliere
now tells the assassin (A), down the line. So, it
is consequential. Mr. A has no personal
knowledge of the order of the godfather. So, if
anything happens, Mr. A cannot tell the police
that it was the godfather who ordered the killing,
because they do it consequentially. It is down
the line.
 In the case, the example given is a
manufacturer, wholesaler/distributor, retailer,
then to the sari-sari store. It is consequential.
This is the chain conspiracy.
Q: In this case, what is the conspiracy used?
A: From a reading of the Amended Information, the case at bar
appears similar to a wheel conspiracy. The hub is former
President Estrada while the spokes are all the accused, and the
rim that encloses the spokes is the common goal in the overall
conspiracy, i.e., the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-
gotten wealth.
 Jinggoy is deemed part of this conspiracy, but he is just
one of the spokes. So, he cannot argue that he is not part
of the conspiracy. There are two kinds of conspiracies. If
he is talking about the chain, it is not existing in this case.
What was used by the former President is the wheel
conspiracy, with regard to the GSIS, SSS, he talked to
some different persons. But they still belong to one grave
conspiracy – to amass, accumulate ill-gotten wealth. And
Jinggoy is part of that, so he cannot argue that he is not
part of the conspiracy, even though he figured only in one
predicate crime.
 That is why, the SC discussed these two conspiracies.
 This was already asked in the Bar exams.
Just remember the definition of conspiracy under Art. 8 – two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it. Not to execute it, because if
they execute it, they will not be liable anymore for conspiracy.
The conspirators must perform an overt act in order to become a
part of the conspiracy. You may wonder why the mastermind does
not perform an overt act. To perform an overt act, he may actually
participate in the commission of the crime, but he need not be the
person performing the act. Whatever the extent of the
participation, he can also render moral assistance. He need not
be in the crime scene, or even if he is in the crime scene, he
provides moral assistance, he forms a cheering squad.
Q: How about the mastermind?
A: The mastermind has moral ascendancy over the persons who
perform the act. So, he is just in the safe corners of his residence.
He does not do anything, but he has moral ascendancy over the
other participants in the conspiracy, so he still provides some sort
of participation, being part of the conspiracy.
 If he provides money or reward, he will be the principal
by direct inducement. He need not perform a specific
overt act.
4. Multiple/Repeat offenders
a. Recidivism
Art. 14(9)
b. Habituality (Reiteracion)
Art. 14(10)
c. Quasi-recidivism
Art. 160
d. Habitual Delinquency
Art. 62(5)
In multiple offenders, we are talking of persons:
1) Recidivist
2) Reiteracion
3) Quasi-recidivist
4) Habitual delinquent
Q: Who is a recidivist?
A: A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime,
shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another
crime embraced in the same title of this Code. See Art. 14(9)67
 The only thing that you remember in recidivism is, “Are
the two crimes embraced in the same title?”
 If you are faced with a question about multiple offenders,
take a look at whether the crime is embraced in the same
title. If they are, then probably, he will be a recidivist.
 But for recidivism to exist, he should have been
previously convicted.
 It is not required that he has served already. If he is
convicted, he serves it, then, reiteracion will come into
play. He has served it already.
 Suppose he is previously convicted 20 years ago, time
does not matter for recidivism. He may have been
convicted 30 years ago, 100 years ago. This is not time-
bound. The only requirement is that he is convicted for
the second time for an offense embraced in the same title
as the first offense. Necessarily, the first and the second
are both felonies, because they cannot be in a special
penal law. If it is a special penal law, then they are not
embraced anymore in the same title.
 Our concern here is that there is a statement here “at the
time of his trial.” Otherwise, our only concern is that he is
convicted twice, two offenses embraced in the same title.
PEOPLE v. LAGARTO
G.R. No. 65833, May 6, 1991
FACTS:
Lagarto fatally stabbed the deceased in the market. The
accused was charged with murder under Art. 248 against him,
with treachery and evident premeditation. The information alleged
that he was a recidivist, having been previously convicted of the
crime of homicide and was rendered September 15, 1983 and the
decision for which became final on October 11, 1983.
The date of the commission of the offense for which the
accused is being charged is October 26, 1983, which was
subsequent to the date of his conviction for homicide.
ISSUE: WON the court correctly appreciated the existence of
recidivism.
HELD: Yes.
We find, as the trial court found, that the accused is a
recidivist. A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one
crime, shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of
another crime embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal
Code. Herein accused had been convicted of the crime of
homicide in Criminal Case No. 1473 before the trial of the present
67Article 14. Aggravating circumstances. - The following are
aggravating circumstances:
xxx
9. That the accused is a recidivist.
Criminal Case No. 1566. The former counsel de oficio of herein
accused alleged that the judgment in Criminal Case No. 1473 was
rendered on September 15, 1983, hence when the accused was
arraigned on October 11, 1983 for Criminal Case No. 1566 he was
not a recidivist.
The former counsel de oficio is of the opinion that "the time of
trial" is to be reckoned with the date of the arraignment. The
phrase "at the time of his trial" should not be restrictively construed
as to mean the date of arraignment.
We declared in People vs. Enriquez, 90 Phil. 428, that the
phrase "at the time of his trial for an offense" is employed in its
general sense, including the rendering of the judgment. In US vs.
Karelsen, 3 Phil. 23, We held that the phrase "at the trial" is meant
to include everything that is done in the course of the trial, from
arraignment until after sentence is announced by the judge in
open court. In the case at bar, the accused was convicted of
homicide in Criminal Case No. 1473 on September 15, 1983.
There being no appeal, the judgment therein became final on
October 11, 1983. The second conviction was rendered on
October 26, 1983 for Murder. Hence, it is crystal clear that the
accused is a recidivist: the accused had been convicted by final
judgment at the time of the rendition of the judgment for the
second offense.
Q: In this case, what was the stage of the second offense?
A: Arraignment.
Q: In the rules of remedial law, is arraignment part of the trial?
A: When we talk of trial, strictly, it is the presentation of evidence
or the reception of evidence for both the prosecution and the
defense. So, arraignment is not yet part of the trial.
Q: Reiteracion is provided in what article?
A: Art. 14(10). Both recidivism and reiteracion are aggravating
circumstances (AC).
Q: Recidivism is an aggravating circumstance. What kind?
A: Generic aggravating circumstance.
Q: As a generic aggravating circumstance, what is its effect
on the criminal liability of the person?
A:
Q: If there are three aggravating circumstances, no
mitigating, can it be increased by one degree?
A:
Q: 10 aggravating circumstances, no mitigating, can the
penalty be increased to one degree or two degrees higher? Is
there such an instance?
A:
Q: At no time can the penalty be increased to degree higher,
even if there are 100 aggravating circumstances?
A:
Q: But for mitigating, 100 mitigating circumstances, no
aggravating, is it possible to reduce by one degree lower?
A:
Q: What is the worst kind of multiple offender?
A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have
been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced
in the same title of this Code.
A: Habitual delinquent.
Q: Who is a habitual delinquent?
A: For the purpose of this article, a person shall be deemed to be
habitual delinquent, is within a period of ten years from the date of
his release or last conviction of the crimes of serious or less
serious physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or falsification, he is
found guilty of any of said crimes a third time or oftener.
Q: What is the effect of a generic aggravating circumstance?
A: It increases the penalty by one period.
Q: Is it necessarily the maximum period?
A: No.
Q: Why not?
A:
Q: Suppose minimum period, with one generic aggravating
circumstance, what is the imposable penalty, no mitigating?
A: Medium.
Q: Prision correcional minium, one AC, no MC, what will you
impose?
A:
23:51.
Q: What is the penalty for Art. 48?
A: The maximum period for the graver penalty, regardless of
whether or not there are aggravating or mitigating circumstance.
Q: Who is a quasi-recidivist?
A: He is a person who has been convicted by final judgement, and
who commits a felony before beginning to serve such sentence,
or while serving the same.
Q: Is quasi-recidivism an AC or a separate crime?
A:
It is provided in Art. 160, under crimes against public order.
Q: Is it a separate crime?
A: NO, it is a special aggravating circumstance.
Q: It is not a generic AC similar to recidivism and reiteracion?
A: No, it is special.
Q: What makes it special?
A: This person is serving his sentence then he commits a crime
again, or before he starts serving sentence. He is incorrigible,
right? While being inside the prison, he commits another crime, so
he is a special person.
 The offender is punished by the maximum period of the
penalty prescribed by law for the new felony.
Q: How about a recidivist? Can he commit the crime
immediately?
A: Yes.
68 Article 160. Commission of another crime during service of penalty
imposed for another offense; Penalty. - Besides the provisions of Rule 5
of Article 62, any person who shall commit a felony after having been
convicted by final judgment, before beginning to serve such sentence, or
while serving the same, shall be punished by the maximum period of the
penalty prescribed by law for the new felony.
Q: Suppose he has been convicted today, he commits
another crime tomorrow. Is he a recidivist?
A: Yes.
Q: Even if he has not yet served sentence?
A: Yes.
Q: As long as the new crime is embraced in the same title?
A: Yes.
Q: But he must be convicted of the second offense?
A: Yes. That is the fourth element of recidivism. He must be
convicted of the second offense. This is where we apply the
aggravating circumstance.
Q: What will be the effect on his penalty?
A: The offender shall be punished by the maximum period of the
penalty prescribed by law for the new felony. See Art. 160.68
Q: In Art. 14(90, does it state that it should be applied in its
maximum period?
A: No, same as with reiteracion.
Q: What will be the effect of a generic aggravating
circumstance?
A: To be imposed in its maximum period, that is assuming the
penalty is to be imposed in its full degree.
[To Fogata]
Q: What if it is prision mayor in its minimum period, there is
a generic aggravating circumstance, what will be applied?
What is the maximum sentence?
A: Maximum of the minimum.
Q: Let us just say the penalty is prision mayor. No mitigating,
one aggravating?
A: Maximum period.
Q: If there is no mitigating or aggravating? What will you
apply?
A: Medium.
 That is considering there is no prescribed penalty, which
divides already into several periods. But, that is not
always the case. In theft, for instance, it says, prision
mayor in its minimum.
Q: Prision mayor in its minimum, no mitigating or
aggravating, what will you apply?
A:
NOTE: The answer that when there is a generic aggravating
circumstance, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum is not
necessarily always correct because it presupposes that the
penalty imposed is in the full degree, for which reason you apply
Art. 64. But that is not always the case in RPC, for instance, the
penalty imposed for theft is prision mayor in minimum. That also
happens in many other crimes.
Any convict of the class referred to in this article, who is not a habitual
criminal, shall be pardoned at the age of seventy years if he shall have
already served out his original sentence, or when he shall complete it
after reaching the said age, unless by reason of his conduct or other
circumstances he shall not be worthy of such clemency.

Q: What happens if the prescribed penalty is already in the
minimum, medium or maximum, and there is one generic
aggravating circumstance?
A: The variance would be into the number of years, containing the
minimum period of prision mayor [Fogata]
Q: If there is a generic AC, definitely, the penalty will be
increased. There is no question there. But the problem is,
how many degrees higher or periods higher?
A:
Q: If there are 10 AC, no MC, can you increase by one degree?
A:
Q: If there is 1 generic AC and the prescribed penalty is
prision mayor minimum, what penalty will you impose?
A:
In quasi-recidivism, we are quite sure that we shall apply the
maximum period. In Art. 48, the penalty for the most serious crime
will be applied in its maximum period.
Q: Does it say for generic AC, you should impose the penalty
in its maximum period?
A: No, it just increases.
 But we have a problem on how many periods (or
degrees) to increase.
 So far, what has been settled is that a generic AC will
increase the penalty.
***
The first lesson in People v. Lagarto, the time of trial is interpreted
in broader sense; it does not mean only during the time of
presentation of evidence, in this case from arraignment up to
judgment. The court said that he is already a recidivist, for having
committed murder after having been previously convicted of
homicide.
Q: What is reiteracion?
A: That the offender has been previously punished by an offense
to which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty or for two or
more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty. See Art. 14(10).
 He should also be convicted for his second offense.
 Not necessarily a second crime because if the previous
convictions were for light, punished by light penalties,
there should be at least two. So, this may be his third
offense already. It may be the second or his third offense
and he is convicted of a new crime.
This is not a perfect definition because it states, “to which the law
attaches an equal or greater penalty” in relation to the latest crime.
69 5. Habitual delinquency shall have the following effects:
(a) Upon a third conviction the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty
provided by law for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the
additional penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods;
(b) Upon a fourth conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty
provided for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to the
It is also considered a generic aggravating circumstance; the
effect of the penalty is to increase it.
Q: Who is a habitual delinquent?
A: A habitual delinquent is a person who, within a period of 10
years from the date of his release or last conviction of the crimes
of serious or less serious physical injuries, robbery, theft, estafa,
or falsification, is found guilty of any of the said crimes a third time
or oftener.
Q: What is the effect on the penalty?
A: Additional penalty. See Art. 62(5).69
Q: Is this special also?
A: No, extraordinary.
Q: What is the effect on the criminal liability?
A: An additional penalty is imposed, depending on whether it is
the third, fourth, or fifth conviction.
 He will be punished for the last offense, plus another
penalty.
 There is no effect anymore for the penalty for the last
crime. There is no increase.
 Because in quasi-recidivism, it should be imposed in the
maximum period. In generic AC, the penalty will be
increased for the last crime. in here, an additional penalty
is imposed, no effect on the penalty imposed for the
second offense.
 It is extraordinary because an additional penalty is
imposed. In all three others, there are bonuses also, but
always in the higher period only, that is if there are no
MC.
Q: If there is a mitigating circumstance, what will happen?
A: It will offset the generic AC.
Q: How about for the special AC?
A: It depends upon the kind of mitigating circumstance:
1) Ordinary
2) Privileged
Special AC cannot be mitigated by an ordinary MC. A privileged
MC can be applied, can be lowered by a degree or two.
Q: How about habitual delinquency?
A:
 Without any MC, it will increase the penalty.
additional penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods;
and
(c) Upon a fifth or additional conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to
the penalty provided for the last crime of which he be found guilty and to
the additional penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion
temporal in its minimum period.
  But with MC, then it will be offset. It does not necessarily
lead to an increase in the penalty.
 Here, if there is an ordinary MC, it cannot affect, it will not
lower the penalty. Still applied in its maximum period. But
if it is a privileged MC, it may affect the criminal liability
by penalties by lowering the degree or two.
Q: Will habitual delinquency be affected by ordinary MC?
A: For the additional penalty, we do not appreciate any MC or AC.
But for the penalty for the last offense, the MC or AC will be
applied.
PEOPLE v. TOLENTINO
G.R. No. L-48740, August 5, 1942
FACTS:
In the municipal court of Manila, where this action was
commenced, as well as in the Court of First Instance, to which it
was appealed, both of the above-named defendants pleaded
guilty to the charge of theft of seven shirts valued at P14 belonging
to one Cosme Famorca. Both being, recidivists, were sentenced
in the Court of First Instance to suffer two months and one day
of arresto mayor and to pay the corresponding civil indemnity to
the offended party.
Faustino Tolentino y de Dios was further sentenced to suffer
an additional penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor for
habitual delinquency. He alone appealed to this Court.
The trial court sentenced the appellant under paragraph 5 (b)
of article 62 of the Revised Penal Code, as if this were only his
fourth and not his fifth conviction. The Solicitor General
recommends the affirmance of that sentence, on the theory that
appellant's fourth previous conviction alleged in the information
should bee disregarded because the date of his release in
connection therewith was not shown. On the other hand counsel
for the appellant, on the basis of the trial court's implied finding
that this is appellant's fourth conviction, contends that appellant
should be sentenced under paragraph 5 (a) of article 62, as if the
present were only his third conviction, on the ground that the first
conviction should be taken circumstance and should be
disregarded as an element of habitual, delinquency.
HELD:
We cannot uphold appellant's contention. Under his theory an
accused cannot be sentenced for habitual delinquency unless he
has had at least three previous convictions, because the first
conviction has to be taken only as an aggravating circumstance
and has to be disregarded for the purpose of determining habitual
delinquency. That, we think, would be unwarranted interpretation
of the Habitual Delinquency Law.
All of these are crimes against property. The first issue is WON
recidivism is an element of habitual delinquency, so that is only
his fourth conviction, because we will count the first as an element
of the habitual delinquency. The second issue is WON a habitual
delinquent is necessarily a recidivist.
FIRST ISSUE: Recidivism should be disregarded in the imposition
of additional penalty, it should not be considered as a separate
offense
 In the imposition of additional penalty in habitual
delinquency, we do not consider any aggravating or
mitigating circumstance. There is a penalty already
imposed under Art. 62(5). If it is your third conviction, you
will be imposed an additional penalty of prision
correccional in medium and maximum periods.
 Just like here in special AC, we consider already the MC
or AC, unless it is a privileged MC, because the law
already provides for the penalty, just like in habitual
delinquency. What we should take a look at in the
additional penalty, is it the third conviction, the fourth
conviction, the fifth conviction? Because the law already,
under Art. 62(5), provides for the penalty. So, it is not
relevant to consider recidivism as an AC for the
imposition of the additional penalty. What is important is
whether it is the third, fourth, or fifth conviction.
SECOND ISSUE: WON a habitual delinquent is necessarily a
recidivist
 We go back to the definition of a habitual delinquent.
There are five crimes that a habitual delinquent can
commit. Apparently, the SC may have been correct, but
not exactly:
1) serious and less serious physical injuries
(crimes against persons);
2) robbery (crimes against property);
3) theft (crimes against property);
4) estafa (crimes against property); ands
5) falsification (crimes against public interest)
 So there are three possible titles.
Q: If we examine the statement of the SC that a habitual
delinquent is necessarily a recidivist, what is your
answer?
A: Not necessarily, because it is possible that he may be
convicted for an offense that is not embraced in the same title.
Q: Suppose the first three crimes are convictions for
crimes against persons, property, and public interest.
Third conviction. Three separate titles of the RPC. For the
fourth conviction?
 A: He will necessarily be a recidivist, because then it will be
any one of the three titles.
But recidivism will only be important in the imposition of the
penalty for the last offense. So, it can be appreciated along with
habitual delinquency. Meaning to say, the two can go together.
They can be BFFs.
Q: How about recidivism and quasi-recidivism, can they be
BFFs also? Can they appreciated at the same time?
A:
Q: Suppose a quasi-recidivist is convicted of murder, then he
killed again while serving sentence. Murder again. Embraced
in the same title. He is a recidivist?
A: Yes.
Q: Is he also a quasi-recidivist?
A: Yes.
Q: So, two aggravating circumstances?
A: Only one [Fogata and Caligagan]
Q: Can reiteracion can exist together with habitual
delinquency?
 In the case of Tolentinto, it was appreciated, right?
Recidivism and habitual delinquency.
 Recidivism, it cannot be appreciated considering the
penalty for habitual delinquency. But for the last offense,
recidivism can be appreciated. That was the ruling in
People v. Bernal. It affects the penalty for the main
action, the recidivism. But it will not anymore be
considered in the imposition of the additional penalty,
because in the additional penalty, we just consider
whether it is a third, fourth or fifth conviction, because the
law itself already provides for the penalty.
 In Bernal, there was a conviction for four thefts.
A: No, recidivism is already inherent in habitual delinquency
[Caligagan]
 In People v. Real, ill-treatment was considered as
crime against person (although this crime no longer
exists in the RPC). The second offense, grave
threats, is a crime against national security and
liberty. So different titles. But the last offense,
murder, is a crime against persons.
PEOPLE v. REAL
G.R. No. 93436, March 24, 1995
HELD:
In recidivism or reincidencia, the offender shall have
been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime
embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal Code (Revised
Penal Code, Art. 14[g]). In reiteracion, the offender shall have
been punished previously for an offense to which the law attaches
an equal or greater penalty or for two or more crimes to which it
attaches a lighter penalty (Revised Penal Code, Art. 14[10]).
Unlike in reincidencia, the offender in reiteracion commits a crime
different in kind from that for which he was previously tried and
convicted (Guevarra, Penal Sciences and Philippine Criminal Law
129 [1974]).
Appellant was previously convicted of ill-treatment by deed
(Revised Penal Code, Art. 266, Title Eight) and grave threats
(Revised Penal Code, Art. 282, Title Nine). He was convicted of
homicide in the instant criminal case (Revised Penal Code, Art.
249, Title Eight). Inasmuch as homicide and ill-treatment by deed
fall under Title Eight, the aggravating circumstance to be
appreciated against him is recidivism under Article 14[g] rather
than reiteracion under Article 14(10) of the Revised Penal Code.
There is no reiteracion because that circumstance requires
that the previous offenses should not be embraced in the same
title of the Code. While grave threats fall in title (Title Nine)
different from homicide (Title Eight), still reiteracion cannot be
appreciated because such aggravating circumstance requires that
if there is only one prior offense, that offense must be punishable
by an equal or greater penalty than the one for which the accused
has been convicted. Likewise, the prosecution has to prove that
the offender has been punished for the previous offense. There is
no evidence presented by the prosecution to that effect.
Appellant is convicted of homicide, appreciating in his favor
the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, which is
offset by the aggravating circumstance of recidivism.
There are two kinds of reiteracion, the second one, the penalty is
greater than or equal to. The second crime is, there were two
previous convictions, light penalties, but the third is a graver
penalty. So, two previous convictions – lighter penalties and
murder.
 Here, he was previously convicted and punished. And
that is provided for under Art. 14(10). There is no
evidence here that he has served already.
 But the third crime is the same as ill-treatment.
Q: What if there is evidence?
A: It is possible [Enriquez]
Q: The first two were in two separate titles. The third one is
the same as ill-treatment (recidivism, embraced in the same
title). But then, the two previous convictions (light penalties),
these were served already. And then, there is a third crime,
reiteracion also? So, there are two aggravating
circumstances?
A: Only one [Dayrit and Garcia]
We clarified already it is not necessarily correct for the SC to say
that a habitual delinquent is necessarily a recidivist. That is not
always correct.
In Real, the SC ruled recidivism because there is no evidence of
previous service of the sentences.
Q: What if there is evidence of previous service of the
sentences? Does that make reiteracion present?
A:
Q: Should we apply them simultaneously or should it be only one?
A: Apply both [Dayrit]
Q: So we have two ACs?
A:
 But we don’t have any case. As long as there are two
different ACs, paragraphs 9 and 10 [Dayrit]
Do we appreciate both ACs at the same time or should we
appreciate only one? Because we have settled that for habitual
delinquent and recidivism, yes. But recidivism applies only to the
penalty for the last offense. Reiteracion and HD, should we apply
also reiteraction? Almost the same principle as recidivism
because it will affect only the penalty for the last offense, not for
the additional penalty.
Q: Quasi-recidivism and HD, will they co-exist?
There is a possibility that the two may co-exist.
Q: For example, homicide, first offense. Homicide, second.
Convicted 10 years ago. Fully served already. He is convicted
again for homicide. He is a recidivist. He is also reiteracion
(equal penalty). Should we appreciate both?
A: No, only recidivism [Enriquez]
 This contemplates different titles. Only if they are
convicted and served for crimes embraced in different
titles.
A: For the additional penalty.
Q: There is an issue as to when the fourth and third crime
were committed. Why?
A: The offense was committed before the third conviction, so it
should be that the last crime that was committed should have been
committed after the last conviction. Here, the crime was
committed before the third conviction so it was not considered.
So, for recidivism there is no issue with regard to time, we just
contend with, there is a qualifier that at the time of the trial, the
person has been convicted.
We also have no issue with reiteracion as regards time. Even if
committed 10, 5, or 20 years ago. But he should have served it
already.
Quasi-recidivism, while serving or before serving but after he has
just been convicted. Meaning to say, he has been brought to the
penal institution and he commits a crime. so, this is special
because he is really a bad person.

The others are considered generic because it is not habitual on

Q: Homicide, falsification. Just like in this case, physical
their part. This is the worst person.
injuries and grave threats. No applicable AC there?
A: NO.
The period is essential. What is the period? Before or while
serving sentence.
Q: Third, he commits homicide. He is not quasi-recidivist, not
a habitual delinquent. Is he a reiteracion?
In HD, as long as the next conviction is within 10 years. If after
A: Yes, but he is also a recidivist. Our problem now is should we
conviction for the second offense, he is released again, then we
apply both?
need 10 years. So the period may be within a period of 30 years.
But the convictions may happen within a span of 30 years. So the
[Supposed to be discussed – whether or not they should be
term within a period of 10 years is not quite accurate. But reckoned
appreciated separately or only one]
from the last conviction or last release. This may span 30 years.
- CASA
PEOPLE v. LAYSON
G.R. No. L-25177, October 31, 1969 March 03, 2018 - CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

FACTS: CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH AFFECT CRIMINAL LIABILITY

The accused were serving sentences when they killed the
victim because the latter urinated at the accused’s coffee. The
1. Justifying Circumstances
RTC convicted them of murder and appreciated quasi-recidivism.
2. Exempting Circumstances and other absolutory causes
ISSUE: WON the RTC correctly appreciated quasi-recidivism.
3. Mitigating Circumstances
HELD: YES.
The special aggravating circumstance of quasi- 4. Aggravating Circumstances
recidivism (art. 160, Rev. Penal Code) was correctly considered
against all the accused, who, at the time of the commission of the 5. Alternative Circumstances
offense, were undoubtedly serving their respective sentences for
previous convictions. Quasi-recidivism has for its effect the Q. Why are they called circumstances which affect criminal
punishment of the accused with the maximum period of the liability?
penalty prescribed by law for the new felony, and cannot be offset
by an ordinary mitigating circumstance.6 A. It will affect one’s criminal liability. It may justified the act, thus,
When they pleaded guilty to the charge of murder, all the accused incur no criminal liability. Or it may exempt, mitigate or aggravate
admitted all the material facts and circumstances alleged in the one’s criminal liability.
information. The crime of murder is punished with reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death. Because of the
attendance of the special aggravating circumstance of quasi-
recidivism, this Court is left with no alternative to affirming the In justifying circumstances, there is NO CRIME, the act being
death penalty imposed by the court a quo. justified. The persons mentioned therein do not incur criminal
liability.
In Bernal, four convictions for theft. The issue here is whether or
not to consider recidivism and habitual delinquency. The SC held
that recidivism is not an integral part of HD. It will not be taken into
consideration in determining the imposable penalty. Q. How about civil liability?
Q: Recidivism for the last offense or for the additional
penalty?
A. There is no civil liability, except in par. 470 of Art. 11 where
the civil liability is borne by the persons benefited by the act.
Q. Why is it “borne by the persons benefited by the act”?
A.Basis is Article 10171
Article 101 is also your legal basis for determining WON there is
criminal liability or civil liability in Art 11 and 12.
Q. What is the other term for par. 4 of Art. 11 “Avoidance of
greater evil or injury”?
A. Doctrine of State of Necessity
Q. Why is it called Doctrine of State of Necessity?
(No one got it correct)
70Art.11 (4) Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury,
does an act which causes damage to another, provided that the
ffg requisites are present:
1. The evil sought to be avoided actually exists;
2. That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it
3. That there be no other practical and less harmful means of
preventing it.
71Art. 101 Rules regarding civil liability in certain
cases - The exemption from criminal liability
established in subdivisions 1,2,3,5 and 6 of Art. 12
and in subdivision 4 of Article 11 of this Code does
not include exemption from civil liability, which shall
be enforced subject to the ffg rules:
First: In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of Art. 12,
the civil liability for acts committed by an imbecile or
insane person, and by persons under 9 years or age
or over 9 but under 15 years of age, who acted
without discernment, shall devolve upon those
having such a person under their legal authority or
control, unless it appears that there was no fault or
negligence on their part.
Should there be no person having such insane,
imbecile or minor under his authority, legal
guardianship or control, or is such person be
Atty Dan: “When an injury is imminent to happen to one’s self
(there is no 3rd person because that would be defense of
stranger or relative), and that injury is greater than the person
caused. Here, the person is required, by virtue of the
circumstances,to undertake a particular action, and that action
causes injury but the injury he caused is less than the injury that
is supposed to happen that may occur against him”
Q. Why is self-defense considered a justifying circumstance?
A.
1. When a man is exposed to peril against his life or limb, it is
natural thing to protect himself
It is a basic human instinct to protect ourselves when we are
being attack.
2. The impossibility on the part of the State to avoid a present
unjust aggression and protect a person unlawfully attacked, and
insolvent, said insane, imbecile or minor shall
respond with their own property, excepting property
exempt from execution, in accordance with civil law.
Second: In cases falling within the subdivision 4 of
Art. 11, the persons whose benefit the harm has
been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to
the benefit that may received.
The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion,
the proportionate amount for which one shall be
liable.
When the respective shares cannot be equitably
determined, even approximately or when the liability
also attaches to the Government, or to the majority of
the inhabitants of the town, and in all events,
whenever the damage has been caused with the
consent of the authorities or their agents,
indemnification shall be made in the manner
prescribed by special laws or regulations.
Third: In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of
Art 12, the persons using violence or causing the
fear shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or if
there be no such persons, those doing the act shall
be liable, saving always to the latter that part of their
property exempt from execution.
therefore it is inconceivable for the State to require that the 1. Imbecility/Insanity, unless acted during a lucid interval
innocent succumb to an unlawful aggression without resistance
2. 15 y/o or under

3. Above 15 but below 18 years of age unless acted with

Atty Dan: “Although we have social contract with the government discernment
and that it is the government that should act on our behalf, that is 4. Accident
why we have police officers, they’re the ones who supposed to
arrest the criminal but what if the police officers are not present, 5. Irresistible force
while we are being attacked, should we just call police officers
6. Uncontrollable fear
then wait for the criminal to kill us? That cannot be so.”
7. Insuperable Cause

(Atty Dan: ”If you understand the reason behind the rule, then
that’s the best kind of knowledge, right?”) In exempting circumstances, there is a crime committed but no
criminal liability arises.

**same justification for the other two justifying circumstances -

defense of relatives and strangers There is civil liability, except in par. 4 and 7. (Basis: Art.101)

(4) Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due
care, causes an injury by mere ACCIDENT without fault or
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES: intention of causing it.

1. Self-Defense Q. Why is there no civil liability?

2. Defense of Relatives A. The performance of lawful act

3. Defense of Strangers

4. Avoidance of greater evil or injury

5. Fulfillment of Duty or Lawful exercise of a Right or Office
Q. Are they the same?
A. No
In fulfillment of duty, it pertains to the public officers
fulfilling their duty (not husband and wife duties)
In lawful exercise of a right or office, it need not be
public officers, but also private individuals (ex. Doctrine
of Self-Help72)
6. Obedience to Lawful Order of a Superior
(7) Any person who fails to perform an act required by law,
when prevented by some lawful or INSUPERABLE
CAUSE.
Q. Why is there no civil liability?
A. There is a failure to perform a positive duty
because of some lawful or insuperable cause
Q. What is insuperable cause?
A. Beyond one’s control
In Civil Code, it is Fortuitous event or force majure

*It pertains also to public officers. What about private

individuals? No case yet US vs VICENTILLO
The municipal president detained the offended party for three
**take note of “lawful” order days because to take him to the nearest justice of the peace
required a journey for three days as there was no other means
7. Battered Women Syndrome (RA 9262) of transportation.
Q. Insuperable cause?
A. YES (As if force majure, it was beyond the control of the
municipal president)
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES:

72Art. 249 of the Civil Code: the owner of lawful reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual
possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any or threatened unlawful physical invasion or
person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For usurpation of his property
this purpose, he may use such force as may be
 The distance which required a journey for 3 days was
considered an insuperable cause. Hence, it was held that the
accused was exempt from criminal liability.
PEOPLE vs BANDIAN(the pregnant woman)
A mother who at the time of childbirth was overcome by severe
dizziness and extreme debility and left the child in a thicket
where said child died, is not liable for infanticide73, because it
was physically impossible for her to take home the child.
The severe dizziness and extreme debility of the woman
constitute an insuperable cause. (It was beyond her control)
The act performed by the appellant in the morning by going
into the thicket, according to her, to respond to call of nature,
notwithstanding the fact that she had fever for a long time, was
perfectly lawful.
Q. Why infanticide? Or is it parricide74?
A. Infanticide, the child is less than 3 days of age
Take note: In infanticide, it can be any child (less than 3 days
of age) of any person, while in parricide, it is necessary that
the killer is the father or mother of the child.
***Back to SELF-DEFENSE
Elements of Self-Defense:
1. Unlawful aggression;
2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it;
General rule is that there should be an actual attack on the
person for him to invoke self-defense
*prevent - the unlawful aggression is “not yet happening
but about to be committed” (imminent danger)
*repel - the unlawful aggression is already on-going (actual
attack)
3. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.
Q. What can be subject of self-defense?
A. The life of the person, the right to property and honor
73 Art 155. Infanticide. The penalty provided for parricide
in Art. 246 and for murder in Art. 248 shall be imposed
upon any person who shall kill any child less than three
days of age (xxx)
Q. What is the rule when it comes to defense involving right to
property?
A.Defense of property can be invoked as a justifying
circumstance only when it is coupled with an attack on the
person of one entrusted with said property.
Atty. Dan: “This is a useless self-defense”
RE: DEFENSE OF PROPERTY
PEOPLE vs APOLINAR
Facts: The accused, armed with a shotgun, was looking over
his land. He noticed a ma carrying a bundle on his shoulder.
Believing that the man had stolen his palay, the accused
shouted for him to stop, and as he did not, the accused fired in
the air and then at him, causing his death.
Held: Defense of property is not of such importance as right to
life, and defense of property can be invoked as a justifying
circumstance only when it is coupled with an attack on the
person of one entrusted with said property.
Missing element: Unlawful aggression
**same ruling for other case - US vs Bumanglag
*take note: rape is now crime against person.
RE: DEFENSE OF HONOR
PEOPLE vs JAURIGUE
Facts: The deceased was courting the accused in vain. One
day, the deceased approached her, spoke to her of his love
which she flatly refused, and he thereupon suddenly embraced
and kissed her on account of which the accused gave him fist
blows and kicked him. Thereafter, she armed herself with a fan
knife, whenever she went out. One week after the incident, the
deceased entered a chapel , when to sit by the side of the
accused and placed his hand on the upper part of her right
thigh. Accused pulled out her fan knife and with it stabbed the
deceased at the base of the left side of the neck, inflicting a
mortal wound.
Held: NOT JUSTIFIED.
Missing element: reasonable means employed
74 Art. 246. Parricide. Any person who shall kill his father,
mother or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any
of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse, shall be
guilty of parricide and shall be punished by penalty of
reclusion perpetua
 The means employed by the accused was evidently excessive.
The chapel was lighted with electric lights, and there were
several people, including her father and the barrio lieutenant,
inside the chapel. Under the circumstances, there was and
there could be no possibility of her being raped.
because then he was the aggressor and the 3rd element for
self-defense is limited only to the person defending himself.
Q. So in self-defense, unlawful aggression is an indispensable
requirement?

PEOPLE vs BOHOLST-CABALLERO (1974) A. Yes

Facts: The husband and the wife in this case were living
separately. One evening, when the wife went out carolling with
a friend, she met her husband who upon seeing her, held her
by the collar of her dress and asked her: "Where have you There could be no valid self-defense if there was no unlawful
been prostituting? The husband then held her by the hair, aggression. We are talking here of “unlawful”.
slapped her face until her nose bled, and pushed her towards
the ground. While the husband was kneeling over her as she
lay her back on the ground and his hand choking her neck, she
pulled out the knife inserted at the left side of her husband’s
belt and plunged it at his body hitting the left back portion just AGGRESSION MUST BE UNLAWFUL
below the waist.
Q. Are all elements present? Q. So when a police officer is arresting a person, is that unlawful
A. YES aggression?

1. there was unlawful aggression A. No, the police officer is fulfilling his duty. In fact, its a justifying
circumstance. .
2. Reasonable necessity of the use of the knife

3. She did not provoke the husband

Q. What will constitute provocation?
A. Provocation is sufficient when it is proportionate to the
aggression, that is, adequate enough to impel one to attack the
person claiming self-defense.
Note that in incomplete self-defense, defense of relatives and
defense of stranger, UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION must be
present, it being an indispensable requisite.What is absent is
either one or both of the last two requisites.

**If the person defending gives provocation, then he cannot be

justified for his acts. It is privileged mitigating circumstance if majority of the requisites
are present.

Q. What if the husband saw the wife kissing other man? Will he
be justified in boxing the wife?
Favorite in the bar exam - people vs alconga.
(justified? Mitigating? Art. 247?)

A: Mitigating - Immediate vindication of a grave offense because

an offense was committed against him by the wife, but not
justifying
PEOPLE vs ALCONGA (eto ung breakfast)
Facts: The deceased was the banker in a game of black jack.
The accused posted himself behind the deceased acting as a
spotter and communicating by signs to his partner. Upon
discovering the trick, the accused and the deceased almost
came to blows. Eventually, fight ensued between them. In the
first stage of the fight, the deceased was the unlawful
aggressor;
The OSANG CASE
Case: There was this wife, Osang, she was sleeping. Then
someone got inside the room, then had sex with her. She
thought it was her husband. After the sexual intercourse, the
person stood up, dressed up, and then told Osang (di ko nagets,
nagtawanan na lahat). Upon hearing the voice, she realized it
was not her husband. She got up and killed the person. Was she
justified in killing the person?
A: NO, there was no more unlawful aggression

Held: not justified.

Re: unlawful aggression Q. Is it similar with the case of Alconga?
When unlawful aggression which has begun no longer exists,
because the aggressor runs away, the one making a defense A. Of course the facts are different, but the SC also held that the
has no more right to kill or even wound the former aggressor. unlawful aggression had already ceased. When Osang attacked
or killed the person, there is no more unlawful aggression. It
Re: lack of sufficient provocation
already ceased. The aggression was already completed. Hence,
The attack made by the deceased when Alconga was the one
the defense of Osang is not valid.
defending himself during the first stage of the fight, was not
considered provocation to Alconga in the 2 nd stage of the fight,
 US vs MACK (1907)
Facts: There was a negro soldier (accused) sitting on a bench
when a policeman arrived. He ordered for him to go to their
quarter which the former refused to obey.
The deceased (standing 10-12 ft away from accused) cursing
and abusing him for his failure to obey the order, wrought
himself into a passion dragged himself free from his
companion, who was endeavoring to restrain him and take him
away, and started toward the accused, at the same time
drawing his bolo and brandishing it in a threatening manner.
Thereupon the accused got up, drew his revolver wherein he
fired the deceased three shots.
Held: The use of a revolver against an aggressor armed with a
bolo was held reasonable, it appearing that the deceased was
advancing upon the accused and within a few feet of striking
distance when the latter shot him.
Atty Dan: In this case, there was no actual attack yet. The
policeman was just approaching the black soldier, from 12 ft away
to 3-6 ft away when the soldier shot him.Valid self-defense?
UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION
Q. Was there unlawful aggression?
A. YES, the soldier was in imminent danger. (IMMINENT
ATTACK)
When we talk of unlawful aggression - (1) actual attack; (2)
imminent attack (not threat)
Q. Was there other options for the black soldier?
A: yes, he could have run away, or he could have shot the feet of
the policeman to prevent him for further advancing
REASONABLE NECESSITY OF THE MEANS EMPLOYED
There are two things that you should take a look--
1. Necessity of the course of action taken by the person making
a defense
2. Necessity of the means used.
COURSE OF ACTION. So the soldier could have just run away.
That is one option of the black soldier. The SC said it was just right
him to stood his ground. In Boholst-Caballero, the wife was
75 Art 11 (4) Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or
injury, does an act which causes damage to another,
provided that the following requisites are present:
already on the ground, she has no other course of action. In
Alconga, when he is being attacked, he has no course of action
but to defend himself. But in this case, he has the option to run
away. So, the first thing that you have to take a look at is if there
is another option on the part of the person defending, can he do
that option? If not, then he will be justified.
MEANS The accused used his gun, he was much bigger, could
he have just used his bare hands against the police officer? But
the SC said, it could not have expected that he would just use his
bare hands as against the bolo. The use of the gun was justified.
Although the gun is superior than the bolo, but that is considered
a reasonable means under the circumstances. Was he
reasonable in shooting the policeman? The accused is not a
sharpshooter, and cannot shot the police officer with accuracy. So
it was not reasonable to expect him to shot at him at a particular
part of the body.
PROVOCATION
Provocation may have been given by the person defending but it
is not sufficient
Lack of Sufficient provocation.
So there are three instances here:
1. If the person defending gave no provocation at all
2. If the person defending gave provocation but is not sufficient
3. He gave provocation but on a previous date, not immediately
preceding the aggression.
PEOPLE vs SUMICAD
The aggressor was a bully, a man larger and stronger, of
known violent character, with previous criminal records for
assault. He attacked with fist blows a smaller man who was
then armed with a bolo. In spite of having received, as a
warning, a cut with a bolo on the left shoulder, the aggressor
continued to attempt to possess himself of the bolo. Killing him
with a bolo was justified in this case.
----------- B R E A K -------------------------
Atty Dan: For defense of relative, just remember who are the
persons and that the third requisite is different in self-defense. Just
remember the first 2 in self-defense. The third one, even if there
was a provocation given on the party defending (inaudible) did not
participate (inaudible).
In the third, there is also a change in the requisite in defense of a
stranger, not compelled by any given motive or defense.
Of course, “stranger” pertains to any person. So, he can defend
himself, he can defend a relative, or a stranger.
The fourth justifying circumstance is avoidance of greater injury.75
The requisites are also provided in the RPC.
1. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;
2. That the injury feared be greater than that done to
avoid it.
The first requisite: “must actually exist”- It’s not something which
is a product of the imagination. Must actually be proven to be
existing.
The second requisite: In cause of uncontrollable fear, it is upon
equal or greater injury. But for avoidance of greater injury in
justifying circumstance, it should be greater. Take note of par 6 of
your Art 12.76
Third requisite: That’s why it’s a state of necessity. Because he
has no other option That is his first and only option. There is no
other practicable and less harmful means.
UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR VS AVOIDANCE OF GREATER
INJURY
In the example of Reyes, a person has to choices. To bump or to
Exempting Justifying
Absence of freedom There is freedom
(choice) (choice)
There is intelligence,
go to a “bangin”. no intent
Q: How about an insane person? Does he have intelligence?
Intent? None.
Q: How about an imbecile? Intelligence, none.
Q: In an Accident: What is missing? Negligence and intent.
Q: In irresistble force: What is missing? Freedom. Intent? He is
being forced to do something against his will. Can he have criminal
intent? He has intelligence but no intent.
In avoidance of greater evil, he has freedom, he has intelligence,
but no intent.
In uncontrollable fear, Freedom? None. He acts with no choice.
Unlike in avoidance of greater injury, he has a choice, he has
freedom. He has intelligence but he has no intent.
In the impulse of uncontrollable fear, and proportion of
uncontrollable force, there is no freedom.
They are almost similar.
Elements of Uncontrollable fear
1. The existence of an uncontrollable fear
2. That the fear must be real and imminent
3. That there be no other practical and less harmful
means of preventing it.
3. The fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal to that
committed.
TY VS PEOPLE
The mother of the accused incurred a hospital bill amounting to
more than 1M. She issued several checks which bounced.
Defense: The issuance of those checks were to avoid greater
injury and that she acted out of uncontrollable fear. Otherwise
her mother would be maltreated in the hospital.
SC: The evil sought to be avoided did not exist. On
uncontrollable fear, the requisites are not present.
PEOPLE VS HERNANDEZ
Runaway bride. She was charged with slander. Defense:
Avoidance of greater injury. The injury is that she’ll be in a
“loveless marriage”.
Evil actually exist: loveless marriage.
Loveless marriage vs the embarrassment to the male. Which is
greater? Loveless marriage.
Third, there was no other means. Either you marry or not.
All the requisites are present.
March 10, 2018 - Criminal Law Review
Battered Women Syndrome (RA 9262)
Q. What is BWS?
A. It refers to a scientifically defined pattern of psychological
and behavioral symptoms found in women living in battering
relationships as a result of cumulative abuse. [Sec. 3(c)]
“scientifically defined pattern” - it means the opinion of expert
witness is material; THERE MUST BE EXPERT WITNESSES
testifying that the woman is living in battering relationships
There are three stages in BWS:
1. The tension-building phase
- minor battering occurs; could be verbal or slight physical abuse
76 Art 12 (6) Any person who acts under the impulse of
an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury.
or another form of hostile behavior
2. The acute battering incident
-characterized by brutality, destructiveness and sometimes,
death; the battered woman has no control
3. The tranquil, loving phase
-the couple experience profound relief. The batterer may show a
tender and nurturing behavior towards his partner, and the
battered woman also tries to convince herself that the battery will
never happen again
Q. In order to constitute BWS, how many cycle there should be?
A. At least two
Q. Is this syndrome apply only to married persons?
A. No. Applies also to those who “dating or intimate
relationship”
Q. What about puppy love? Highschool sweethearts?
Atty. Dan: better invoke minority
Q. How about man-to-man or woman-to-woman relationship?
A. Not covered, should be between a man and a woman
BWS - constitute a justifying circumstance.
The battered woman is not liable, criminal and civil.
Sec. 26 of RA 9262
“Victim-survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering
from battered women syndrome do not incur criminal and civil
liability, notwithstanding the absence of any elements for
justifying circumstances of self-defense under the RPC.”
PEOPLE vs GENOSA (2004)
In this case, the wife who killed her husband invoked BWS to
exempt from liability.
Q. Were there expert witnesses?
A. There were experts witness establishing that the wife is
suffering from symptoms of a battered woman.
RULING: Genosa is not entitled to BWS as justifying
circumstance.
-no unlawful aggression, the wife killed the husband while
sleeping
-no two cycles proved in this case, only one incident of acute
battering was established
-it was appreciated only as a mitigating circumstance
Note: this case was decided on Jan 2004 before the
enactment of RA 9262 on March 2004
The rule now is that even without unlawful aggression, the
battered woman can still invoked RA 9262 as a justifying
circumstance --> Section 26 of RA9262 “notwithstanding the
absence of any elements for justifying circumstances of
self-defense under the RPC”
RA 9262 supersedes Ppl vs Genosa
There are now 7 justifying circumstances, including BWS.
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
1. Imbecility or Insanity (not in lucid interval)
2. Minority -15 y/o and below
3. Minority - above 15 y/o but below 18 y/o, unless acted with
discernment
4. Causing an injury by mere accident while performing a lawful
act with due care
5. Under the compulsion of an Irresistible force
6. Under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or
greater injury
7. Failure to perform an act required by law, when prevented by
some lawful or insuperable cause
I. Imbecility or Insanity
PEOPLE v. NUNEZ (1997)
-the accused was charged with kidnapping with murder
-he, with the other accused, persuaded two kids to come with
them
-one of the kids was immediately killed because he was poor
(his father was a jeepney driver) while the other was a son of a
businessman, and their purpose of kidnapping the two is to
extort money/ransom
-one of the accused invoked imbecility, he was cutting the
grass instead of guarding their kidnapped victim (thus the latter
was able to escape)
-the defense was found to be untenable; said incident was
more of a negligence on his part or feeble mindedness which
cannot be equated to imbecility
-to be an imbecile, he must not be able to distinguish right from
wrong
Imbecile - one who, while advanced in age, has a mental -he was sent to the psychopatic hospital on the same day of
development comparable to that of children between two and crime and arrest, indicating the police’s doubt of his mental
seven years of age normalcy

-An irresistible homicidal impulse was considered embraced in

**compare it to minority defense (15 and below) - it is an
exempting circumstance because there is lack of discernment
(lack of intelligence)
take note of the requisites for a culpable and intentional
felonies:
Culpable: freedom, intelligence,
imprudence/negligence/lack of foresight/lack of skill
Intentional: freedom, intelligence, malicious intent
If minority 15 and below is an exempting circumstance, how
much more for an imbecile whose mental development is liken to
that of a 2 to 7 y/o
the term “insanity”
Q. When should insanity exist for it to be exempting?
A. At the time of the commission of the offense (so you must
determine whether or not he is insane during the commission of
the crime
Can you also examine before the commission of the crime?
Medical history was considered in this case.
-in order to ascertain a person’s mental condition at the time of
the act, it is PERMISSIBLE to receive evidence of the
condition of the mind during a reasonable period of both
before and after that time. See Ppl vs Robios
3 different theories in insanity:

Who is an insane person? 1. Insanity as a defense in a confession and avoidance must be

A person who is deprived of his consciousness of his acts due to
his mental illness (Fogata)
To constitute insanity, there must be complete deprivation of
intelligence or that there be a total deprivation of the freedom of
the will. (Reyes)
proved beyond reasonable doubt when the commission of the
crime is established
2. An affirmative verdict of insanity is to be governed by
preponderance of evidence
3. Prosecution must prove sanity beyond reasonable doubt
The theory that is followed in the PH is the first one.

What about a joker? He is NOT. There is no complete Atty Dan: it is the burden of the defense to prove insanity; that is
deprivation of reason and intelligence why insanity as a defense is some sort of by way of confession
and avoidance;

PEOPLE v. BONOAN (1937)

What is the presumption in the PH? Every person is presumed
Dementia praecox is covered by the term insanity. Thus,
when a person is suffering from a form of psychosis, a type of SANE.
dementia praecox, homicidal attack is common, because of
delusions that he is being interfered with sexually, or that his
property is being taken. During the period of excitement, such
person has no control whatever of his acts. The accused admits that he committed the crime (confession)
but avoids criminal liability by invoking exempting or justifying
Facts: circumstance, that he is insane but in the Philippines, he is
-The accused was charged with murder for stabbing a person presumed to be sane. So it is his burden to prove insanity.
-At the time of killing, there was an exchange of dialogue, the
accused threaten to kill the victim. On the other hand, the
victim said, “babayaran kita”. It appears that the victim is
indebted to the accused
Who is an insane person?
-the court finds the accused demented at the time he
PEOPLE vs AMBAL(1980)
perpetrated the crime. ACQUITTED
- the accused killed her wife for failure of the latter to buy him
There is evidence that:
medicine.
-he was confined (twice) in the insane dept. of a hospital
-he voluntarily surrendered to the police
and diagnosed with dementia praecox long before he
-as a defense, he invoked insanity
committed the crime; recurrence of ailments were not
RULING:
entirely lacking of scientific foundation
-guilty of parricide with only one mitigating - voluntary
-he had an insomnia attack, a symptom leading to dementia
surrender
praecox, four days prior to the act
 That he immediately surrendered to the authorities is
proof that the he knew that what he had done was wrong
and that he was going to be punished for it
-defense of insanity UNTENABLE
-the alleged insanity was not substantiated by any sufficient
evidence
- to constitute insanity, there must be a complete
deprivation of intelligence in the commission of the act of
that the accused acted without the least discernment
. period prior to or at the precise moment when the criminal act
TEST OF INSANITY
1. Right or Wrong Test - capacity/ability of the accused to
distinguish between right and wrong at the time and with respect
to the act which is the subject of the inquiry
2. Irresistible Impulse Test - the accused knew what he was
doing was wrong provided that as a result of mental disease he
lacked the power to resist the impulse to commit the act
Q. Kleptomania. Is he insane?
A. (the question has not been brought before the court for its
determination)
Determine whether the impulse to steal is irresistible or not
(by competent alienist or psychiatrist)
-Use the irresistible impulse test
-EXEMPTING - it is covered in the term “insanity” if the unlawful
act of the accused is due to his mental disease or defect
producing an irresistible impulse as when the accused has been
deprived or has lost the power of his will which would enable him
to prevent himself from doing the act
-MITIGATING - if the mental disease/defect of the accused only
diminishes the exercise of his will-power and did not deprive him
of the consciousness of his acts
Q. What test do we follow in the Philippines?
A. Both
PEOPLE v. ROBIOS (2002)
-the accused was charged with complex crime of parricide with
unintentional abortion
-he did not present any evidence to contravene the allegation
that he killed his wife but interposed insanity as a defense
RULING: the defense failed to meet the quantum of proof
required to overthrow the presumption of sanity
- the court held that the claim of insanity was unsubstantiated
and wanting in material proof
- evidence points to his allegedly unsound mental
condition after the commission of the crime
- examination on the mental condition of the accused was
made 7 months after the commission of the crime
 insanity must have existed at the time of the
commission of the offense, or the accused must have
been deranged even prior thereto. Otherwise he would still
be criminally responsible
- Verily, his alleged insanity should have pertained to the
was committed, not at anytime thereafter
 when insanity is alleged as a ground for exemption from
criminal responsibility, the evidence must refer to the
time preceding the act under prosecution or to the
very moment of its execution. If the evidence points to
insanity subsequent to the commission of the crime, the
accused cannot be acquitted.
**Get a doctor to determine whether or not a person is insane
PEOPLE v. BELONIO (2004)
-the accused (a recidivist) was charged with murder
-defense: INSANITY (schizophrenia)
He avers that no normal person would ever bump another
person, give the latter a hard look and eventually stab him
to death. He adds that he and the victim did not know each
other at that time
 The moral and legal presumption is that one acts with free
will and intelligence, and that a felonious or criminal act
has been done with deliberate intent, that is, with freedom
and intelligence. Whoever, therefore, invokes insanity as a
defense has the burden of proving its existence.
 Insanity is a defense in the nature of confession and
avoidance, and as such must be adequately proved. The
law presumes that all persons are of sound mind, and that
acts are done consciously
- the defense utterly failed to discharge its burden of proving
that appellant was insane. The testimony or proof of appellants
insanity must relate to the time preceding or the very moment
of the commission of the offense charged
-The main circumstances presented by the defense that
remotely evinces that appellant was insane at that time was
his act of bumping the victim, without any apparent reason,
giving him a long hard look, and then eventually stabbing
him. However, this sequence of events cannot overcome the
legal presumption of sanity, let alone prove appellants insanity.
SOMNABULISM (sleepwalking) - where the acts of the person
afflicted are automatic, is embraced in the plea of insanity and
must be clearly proven
- considered an EXEMPTING circumstance
PEOPLE vs TANEO (1933)
 -the accused who, while sleeping, suddenly got up, got a bolo
and upon meeting his wife who tried to stop him, wounded her
and also attacked other persons, is NOT criminally liable
-it appearing that the act was committed while in a dream and
his acts were not voluntary in the sense of entailing criminal
liability.
-The expert doctor stated that considering the
circumstances of the case, the defendant acted while in a
dream, under the influence of an hallucination and not in
his right mind.
-the act was done without criminal intent, taking into
consideration the apparent lack of motive
Sleepwalking is an exempting circumstance, covered in the term
insanity. However, unlike in mitigating circumstances in Art 13,
there is no provision of “similar and analogous circumstances” in
exempting circumstances.
So the enumeration in Art 12 (Exempting circumstances)
exclusive?
In aggravating circumstances (Art. 14), there are 21 in the
list and quasi-recidivism is not included but is considered
special aggravating. Apparently, it is exclusive list but you
can still find provisions in the RPC that indicates
aggravating circumstances
In mitigating circumstances (Art. 13), obviously not
exclusive list because of the “similar and analogous
circumstances” in the list
In alternative circumstances, there are only three -
relationship, degree of instruction and intoxication. It can be
considered an exclusive list.
In justifying circumstances (Art. 11), there were only 6 and
can be considered an exclusive list before RA9262
(battered woman). but now, there is RA 9262. Apparently, it
is not an exclusive enumeration.
In exempting circumstances, apparently the enumeration is
exclusive but you can still find other circumstances just like
sleepwalking. Sleepwalking is not one of the circumstances but
in the case of Ppl. v Taneo, he was exempted, similar to insanity.
What did the court do after ruling that he was acquitted?
He was ordered to be confined in the government insane
asylum.
II. MINORITY
1. 15 y/o and below (absolutely exempt)
2. above 15 y/o but below 18 y/o, without discernment
Periods of criminal responsibility:
1. Absolute Irresponsibility - 15 years and below
2. Conditional Irresponsibility - 15 years and 1 day to 18 years
3. Full Responsibility - 18 years or over to 70 years old
4. Mitigated Responsibility - over 70 years of age.
Q. If a minor celebrates his 15th birthday today, March 10, and
then he commits a crime at 1pm. Is he exempt from criminal
liability? So when you say 15 years old, should it be only on his
actual 15th birthday? What is the presumption for under and over
15 years old? Does he act with discernment or not?
A. He is exempt
PEOPLE vs DOQUENA (1939)
-accused was prosecuted for homicide
-on the date of the crime, he was exactly 13yrs, 9mo and 5
days old.
-the lower court ruled that he acted with discernment
He was one of the brightest pupil in the school and he
was captain of cadet corps thereof; He obtained excellent
marks; how he testify in court
-SC affirmed the ruling of the lower court
It is error to determine discernment by the means resorted to
by the attorney for the defense, as discussed by him in his
brief. He claims that to determine whether or not a minor acted
with discernment, we must take into consideration not only the
facts and circumstances which gave rise to the act committed
by the minor, but also his state of mind at the time the crime
was committed, the time he might have had at his disposal for
the purpose of meditating on the consequences of his act, and
the degree of reasoning he could have had at that moment. It
is clear that the attorney for the defense mistakes the
discernment referred to in article 12, subsection 3, of the
Revised Penal Code, for premeditation, or at least for lack of
intention which, as a mitigating circumstance, is included
among other mitigating circumstances in article 13 of said
Code. The discernment that constitutes an exception to
the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under
fifteen years of age but over nine (now 15 years of age and
below), who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental
capacity to understand the difference between right and
wrong, and such capacity may be known and should be
determined by taking into consideration all the facts and
circumstances afforded by the records in each case, the
very appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment
and behaviour of said minor, not only before and during
the commission of the act, but also after and even during
the trial

In exam, do not answer only “MINORITY”. Be precise.
PEOPLE v. NAVARRO
-Luisa Navarro, 13 years old who was approached by agents
of the Price Enforcement Division of PRISCO asking from her
price of one tin of Hershey’s Cocoa.
-She was arrested after allegedly selling cocoa 11 cents more
that ceiling price.Found guilty of violating E.O. 447 in
connection with Sec 12ofRA5096 Anti6 Profiteering law and
was sent to the custody of Phil.Training School for Girls
Issue: WON Article12 par3 can be applied despite being
charged with violation of a special law
Held: Yes.Nothing in the law says that RPC is not suppletory
to their provisions(Art10) While intent is immaterial in crimes
mala prohibita, the circumstances, which exempt from criminal
liability,are based on lack of intelligence,intent and
spontaneity. In the language of art.12(3), state has the burden
of proving that the minor acted with discernment. Discernment
being more than mere understanding is the mental capacity to
understand the difference between right and wrong.
In the instant case, accused did not fully grasp the
importance of the question and there was no record that she
was a merchant. Such minor, over 9 but less than 15 (old law)
is not criminally responsible
-The prosecution failed to prove that the petitioner acted with
discernment; It did not endeavor to establish Renes mental
capacity to fully appreciate the consequences of his
unlawful act. Accordingly, even if he was, indeed, a co-
conspirator, he would still be exempt from criminal liability as
the prosecution failed to rebut the presumption of non-
discernment on his part by virtue of his age.
The person above 15 years old but below 18 years old is exempt
from criminal liability, unless he acted with discernment. So there
is a presumption that he acted without discernment. Hence, it is
the burden of the prosecution to prove that the minor acted with
discernment.
What questions would you ask the minor to overcome the
presumption? Use the test. If he can determine right from wrong,
and the consequences of his action.
-BREAK-
R.A. 9344 Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006
Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility

TWO TEST OF DISCERNMENT: Section 6. A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of
the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal
1. Right or Wrong Test - capacity to understand between right
liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention
and wrong (Ppl vs Doquena)
program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.
2. If fully understand the consequences of his/her actions (Ppl vs
Navarro)
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of
age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be
subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted
JOSE v PEOPLE (2005)
-police officers planned a buy bust operation in which they with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to
arrested Zarraga and Jose (13y/o) the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.
-Jose was in a car with his cousin, Zarraga, when the
latter inquired from the poseur-buyer, SPO1 Guevarra, if
he could afford to buy shabu. SPO1 Guevarra replied in
the affirmative, after which the accused Zarraga called The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not
JOSE to bring out and hand over the shabu wrapped in include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in
plastic and white soft paper. JOSE handed over the accordance with existing laws.
plastic containing the shabu to accused Zarraga, who
handed the same to the poseur-buyer
-Aside from bringing out and handing over the plastic bag
to accused Zarraga, JOSE merely sat inside the car and
had no other participation whatsoever in the transaction INTERVENTION PROGRAM under Section 20
between the accused Zarraga and the poseur-buyer.
There is no evidence that JOSE knew what was inside  The authority which will have an initial contact with the child
the plastic and soft white paper before and at the time he has the duty to immediately release the child to the
handed over the same to his cousin custody of his/her parents/guardian, or in the absence
- The claim of the OSG that the prosecution was able to prove thereof, the child’s nearest relative
that the petitioner conspired with his co-accused to
sell shabu to the poseur-buyer, and thereby proved the  If the parents, guardians or nearest relatives cannot
capacity of the petitioner to discern right from wrong, is
be located, or if they refuse to take custody, the child
untenable. Conspiracy is defined as an agreement between
two or more persons to commit a crime and decide to commit may be released to any of the following:
it. Conspiracy presupposes capacity of the parties to such
conspiracy to discern what is right from what is wrong.  A duly registered nongovernmental or
religious organization;
  A barangay official or a member of the
Barangay Council for the Protection of
Children (BCPC);
 A local social welfare and development
officer;
 The DSWD, when and where appropriate
Q. How about a minor over 15 but below 18 years old?
A. Same procedure above, if said minor acted without
discernment.
Q. Who determines whether the child acted with or without
discernment?

 Said authority shall also give notice to the local social A. Local social welfare and development officer who will make an
welfare and development officer who will determine the initial assessment (not case study because it will take long
appropriate programs in consultation with the child and to period of time)
the person having custody over the child

 If the child has been found to be abandoned, Q. Where should the child be confined?
neglected or abused by his parents, or in the event
that the parents will not comply with the prevention A. Bahay Pag-asa, if ever he will be confined.
program, the proper petition for involuntary
commitment shall be filed by the DSWD or the Local
Social Welfare and Development Office pursuant to
Bahay Pag-asa – refers to a 24-hour child-caring institution
the Child and Youth Welfare Code established, funded and managed by local government units
(LGUs) and licensed and/or accredited nongovernment
organizations (NGOs) providing short-term residential care for
children in conflict with the law who are above fifteen (15) but
15 and below Over 15 but Over 15 but below eighteen (18) years of age who are awaiting court
below 18 (without below 18 (WITH disposition of their cases or transfer to other agencies or
discernment) discernment) jurisdiction.
Released to Released to Penaty is not more
parents parents than 6 yrs
/guardians /guardians imprisonment:
----> intervention ---> intervention diversion Procedure: for child over 15 but below 18 y/o
program (Sec. 20) program (Sec. 20) programs
(alternative child 1. The police officer has the custody of the child (Initial Contact
appropriate with the Child)
proceedings)
Penalty exceeds 6 2. He will turn over the custody of the child to the local social
yrs imprisonment: welfare and development who will make an initial assessment
Court proceedings whether or not said child acted with discernment
--> TRIAL -->
automatic a) If the assessment is that there is NO discernment,
suspension of then the child should be immediately released to the
sentence parents/ guardian/ nearest relatives;

b) If the assessment provides that the child acted with

 So in RA9344, it provides that a child 15 and under is discernment, then determine the penalty imposed on
absolutely exempt. the offense committed by the child:

i. If penalty is not more than 6 years imprisonment

Q. What does the arresting police officer do when he arrest a
person who is a 15 y/o or under?
A. He shall immediately release the child to his parents/ guardian
(or nearest relative, then DSWD). He shall not be put into prison;
but shall be subjected to (community-based) intervention
program under Section 20
**The local social welfare and development officer shall
determine the appropriate programs in consultation with the
child and to the person having custody over the child
Community-based intervention program - the purpose is to
rehabilitate the child (e.g. training, seminar etc.)
- DIVERSION PROGRAMS
ii. If penalty is more than 6 years imprisonment -
COURT PROCEEDINGS
Diversion Programs - refers to the program that the child in
conflict with the law is required to undergo after he/she is found
responsible for an offense without resorting to formal court
proceedings
"Diversion" refers to an alternative, child-appropriate
process of determining the responsibility and treatment of
a child in conflict with the law on the basis of his/her social,
cultural, economic, psychological or educational background
without resorting to formal court proceedings
-there will be compromise agreement, mediation, alternative
dispute resolution, as long as they bring the child outside the
formal court proceedings. But it is limited only to crimes where the
penalty is not more than 6 years imprisonment
Q. But if the child is brought to the court, is the court precluded
from undergoing diversion proceedings?
A. No, diversion proceedings may still be resorted to even if the
crime is punishable by more than 6 yrs imprisonment, but it
should be within the court sanction of proceedings. Only the
court then may conduct such diversion proceedings
SEC. 37. Diversion Measures. - Where the maximum
penalty imposed by law for the offense with which the child
in conflict with the law is charged is imprisonment of not
more than twelve (12) years, regardless of the fine or fine
alone regardless of the amount, and before arraignment of
the child in conflict with the law, the court shall determine
whether or not diversion is appropriate.
Q. So if the diversion proceeding is successful, what happens?
No more criminal liability?
A. The child shall be released. No criminal liability, but will not
preclude civil liability
Court Proceedings - child over 15 but below 18 with
discernment
Q. What happens after trial?
A. Automatic suspension of sentence, if found guilty
Section 38. Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years
of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found
guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and
ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the
offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the
judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in
conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without
need of application: Provided, however, That suspension
of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is
already eighteen years (18) of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the
various circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the
appropriate disposition measures as provided in the
Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
So when it is time to come up with a decision, the court
automatically suspend the sentence.
See Article 80 of RPC - Suspension of sentence of minor
delinquents, it is amended by the Child and Youth Welfare
Code (PD 603); but the most recent law is R.A. 9344
Before then, there is question on whether the sentence should
automatically suspend or whether the child should still applied for
it. But in RA 9344, the suspension is now automatic whether the
child requested for it or not.
Q. What happens after the sentence has been suspended?
A.
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to
Court. - If the court finds that the objective of the
disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict
with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict
with the law has willfully failed to comply with the conditions
of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in
conflict with the law shall be brought before the court
for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen
(18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the
court shall determine whether to discharge the child in
accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence,
or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain
specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age
of twenty-one (21) years.
Q. So if the child was 16y/o at the time of the crime, when trial
was completed and the court is about to render judgment, he is
19 years old already. Would there still be an automatic
suspension of sentence?
A: Yes, even if he is over 18 already, as long as during the
commission of the offense, he is below 18 years old.
3 scenarios when the child in conflict with the law has
reached 18 years old: (Section 40)
1. The court shall determine whether the child should be
discharged
2. The court shall promulgate the judgement
3. The court shall determine whether to extend the suspended
sentence until the child reached 21 years old
If the child is convicted, the court may order the execution of the
sentence.

Q. Will he be put in prison if convicted?
A. He will be serving his sentence in an agricultural camp or
other training facilities, not in penal institutions. (Section 51)
SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in
Agricultural Camps and other Training Facilities. - A child
in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of
the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of
confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural
camp and other training facilities that may be established,
maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in
coordination with the DSWD.
Q. If the child reaches 21 years old, so there is only two option -
discharge or promulgation of judgement?
A. Yes, it can no longer be extended since the extension is only
up to 21 years old.
Q. In the promulgation of judgment, the minor is entitled to
mitigating circumstance?
A. Yes, he is entitled to privileged mitigating circumstances of
minority, one degree lower
Q. Can it be possible for two degree lower than penalty to be
imposed?
A. Art. 68 of the RPC
Article 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under
eighteen years of age. - When the offender is a minor under
eighteen years and his case is one coming under the provisions
of the paragraphs next to the last of Article 80 of this Code, the
following rules shall be observed:
1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who
is not exempted from liability by reason of the court having
declared that he acted with discernment, a discretionary
penalty shall be imposed, but always lower by two degrees at
least than that prescribed by law for the crime which he
committed. --> good as dead; 15y/o and below are now
absolutely exempt
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age
the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be
imposed, but always in the proper period. √
PEOPLE v. JACINTO (2011)
-accused was found guilty for the rape of then 5 y/o victim
-the crime was committed when he was only 17 y/o
-evidence pointed that he acted with discernment
-judgement was rendered when he was already 25 years old
 The suspension of sentence lasts only until the child in
conflict with the law reaches the maximum age of twenty-
one (21) years. Section 40 of the law and Section 48 of the
Rule are clear on the matter. Unfortunately, appellant is
now twenty-five (25) years old.
 Be that as it may, to give meaning to the legislative intent
of the Act, the promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict
with the law should extend even to one who has
exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so
long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was
still a child.
 The offender shall be entitled to the right to restoration,
rehabilitation and reintegration in accordance with the Act
in order that he/she is given the chance to live a normal life
and become a productive member of the community.
 The age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of
the promulgation of the judgment of conviction is not
material. What matters is that the offender committed the
offense when he/she was still of tender age.
 Thus, appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp
or any other training facility in accordance with Sec. 51
of Republic Act No. 9344.
PEOPLE v. ARPON (2011)
-accused was charged with statutory rape and 7 counts of
rape. He was uncle of the victim
- the testimony of the victim was only able to establish three
instances when the accused-appellant had carnal knowledge
of her
- the accused was 13 y/o at the time of the first incident of rape
*although this happened before RA 9344, the latter is still
applicable under its Sec 68
- for the 2nd and 3rd rape, he was 17 y/o (in this instances, the
court ruled that he acted with discernment - he knew the
consequences of his action by threatening the victim)
RULING:
-for the 1st count of rape, he is EXEMPTED.
-for the 2nd and 3rd count or rape, he is GUILTY of QUALIFIED
RAPE.
For purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority (Art. 68), the
penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned with. Thus,
for the second and third counts of rape, the proper penalty
imposable upon the accused-appellant is reclusion
perpetua for each count.
Had the trial court correctly appreciated in favor of the
accused-appellant the circumstance of his minority, the latter
would have been entitled to a suspension of sentence for the
second and third counts of rape under Section 38 of Republic
Act No. 9344
Be that as it may, the suspension of sentence may no longer
be applied in the instant case given that the accused-appellant
is now about 29 years of age and Section 40 of Republic Act
No. 9344 puts a limit to the application of a suspended
sentence, namely, when the child reaches a maximum age of
21
Nonetheless, the disposition set forth under Section 51 of
Republic Act No. 9344 is warranted in the instant case -
 confinement to agricultural camp and other training facilities.
(remanded to the trial court)
Additionally, the civil liability of the accused-appellant for the
second and third incidents of rape shall not be affected by the
above disposition and the same shall be enforced in
accordance with law and the pronouncements in the prevailing
jurisprudence.
Q. How to determine the age of the minor?
SEC. 7. Determination of Age. - The child in conflict with the
law shall enjoy the presumption of minority. He/She shall
enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the law until he/she
is proven to be eighteen (18) years old or older.
The age of a child may be determined from the child's birth
certificate, baptismal certificate or any other pertinent
documents. In the absence of these documents, age may be
based on information from the child himself/herself,
testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of
the child and other relevant evidence. In case of doubt as to
the age of the child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor.
Any person contesting the age of the child in conflict with
the law prior to the filing of the information in any appropriate
court may file a case in a summary proceeding for the
determination of age before the Family Court which shall
decide the case within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of
the appropriate pleadings of all interested parties.
If a case has been filed against the child in conflict with the law
and is pending in the appropriate court, the person shall file a
motion to determine the age of the child in the same court
where the case is pending. Pending hearing on the said motion,
proceedings on the main case shall be suspended.
In all proceedings, law enforcement officers, prosecutors,
judges and other government officials concerned shall exert all
efforts at determining the age of the child in conflict with the
law.
Republic Act 10630
-amends R.A. 9344
Q. What is relevant here in RA 10630?
(since children are being used by syndicates)
SEC. 20-A. Serious Crimes Committed by Children Who Are
Exempt From Criminal Responsibility. –
A child who is above twelve (12) years of age up to fifteen (15)
years of age and who commits parricide, murder, infanticide,
kidnapping and serious illegal detention where the victim is
killed or raped, robbery, with homicide or rape, destructive
arson, rape, or carnapping where the driver or occupant is
killed or raped or offenses under Republic Act No. 9165
(Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) punishable by
more than twelve (12) years of imprisonment, shall be
deemed a NEGLECTED CHILD under Presidential Decree No.
603, as amended, and shall be MANDATORILY placed in a
special facility within the youth care faculty or ‘Bahay Pag-
asa’ called the Intensive Juvenile Intervention and Support
Center (IJISC).
"In accordance with existing laws, rules, procedures and
guidelines, the proper petition for involuntary commitment
and placement under the IJISC shall be filed by the local social
welfare and development officer of the LGU where the offense
was committed, or by the DSWD social worker in the local social
welfare and development officer’s absence, within twenty-four
(24) hours from the time of the receipt of a report on the alleged
commission of said child. The court, where the petition for
involuntary commitment has been filed shall decide on the petition
within seventy-two (72) hours from the time the said petition has
been filed by the DSWD/LSWDO. The court will determine the
initial period of placement of the child within the IJISC which
shall not be less than one (1) year.
The multi-disciplinary team of the IJISC will submit to the court a
case study and progress report, to include a psychiatric
evaluation report and recommend the reintegration of the child to
his/her family or the extension of the placement under the IJISC.
The multi-disciplinary team will also submit a report to the court
on the services extended to the parents and family of the child
and the compliance of the parents in the intervention program.
The court will decide whether the child has successfully
completed the center-based intervention program and is already
prepared to be reintegrated with his/her family or if there is a
need for the continuation of the center-based rehabilitation of the
child. The court will determine the next period of assessment or
hearing on the commitment of the child."
SEC. 20-B. Repetition of Offenses. –
A child who is above twelve (12) years of age up to fifteen (15)
years of age and who commits an offense for the second time
or oftener: Provided, That the child was previously subjected to
a community-based intervention program, shall be deemed a
NEGLECTED CHILD under Presidential Decree No. 603, as
amended, and shall undergo an intensive intervention program
supervised by the local social welfare and development
officer: Provided, further, That, if the best interest of the child
requires that he/she be placed in a youth care facility or ‘Bahay
Pag-asa’, the child’s parents or guardians shall execute a
written authorization for the voluntary commitment of the
child: Provided, finally, That if the child has no parents or
guardians or if they refuse or fail to execute the written
authorization for voluntary commitment, the proper petition for
involuntary commitment shall be immediately filed by the
DSWD or the LSWDO pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 603,
as amended."
SEC. 20-C. Exploitation of Children for Commission of
Crimes. – (syndicates)
Any person who, in the commission of a crime, makes use,
takes advantage of, or profits from the use of children,
including any person who abuses his/her authority over the child
or who, with abuse of confidence, takes advantage of the
vulnerabilities of the child and shall induce, threaten or instigate
the commission of the crime, shall be imposed the penalty
prescribed by law for the crime committed in its maximum
period."
SEC. 20-D. Joint Parental Responsibility. – Based on the
recommendation of the multi-disciplinary team of the IJISC, the
LSWDO or the DSWD, the court may require the parents of a
child in conflict with the law to undergo counseling or any other
intervention that, in the opinion of the court, would advance the
welfare and best interest of the child
(don’t make a mistake of citing Art.80 of the RPC, since it
superseded by RA 9344)
III. ACCIDENT
Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care,
causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of
causing it.
PEOPLE v. BINDOY (1931) (the chismoso case)
- accused was charged with homicide
- a disturbance arose in a tuba wineshop. Bindoy offered some
tuba to Faustino Paca's wife Tibay. She refused because she
already have one, but Bindoy threatened to injure her if she did
not accept. Pacas stepped in to defend his wife, attempting to
take away from Bindoy the bolo he carried. Emigdio
Omamdam who came to the wine shop to see what;s
happening, instead got stabbed in the chest by Bindoy. This
happened when Bindoy succeeded in disengaging himself
from Pacas, wrenching the bolo from the latter's hand towards
the left behind the accused and with such violence that the
point of the bolo reached Omamdam's chest who was then
behind Bindoy.
RULING: the Court acquitted Bindoy
Pacas and Bindoy were actually for the possession of the bolo.
When Pacas let go of the bolo, Bindoy had pulled so violently
that it flew towards his left side, at the very moment when
Emigdio Omamdam came up and who was therefore hit in the
chest without Bindoy seeing him. Bindoy alleges that it was
caused accidentally and without malicious intent because
he was only defending his possession of the bolo which
Pacas was trying to wrench away from him and his conduct
was perfectly lawful.
What are the elements of accident?
1. a person is performing a lawful act
2. With due care
3. He causes an injury to another by mere accident
4. Without fault or intention of causing it
US v. TANEDO (1910)
-the accused, while hunting, saw wild chickens and fired a
shot. The slug, after hitting a wild chicken, recoiled ad struck
the tenant who was a relative of the accused. The man who
was injured died
Held: If life is taken by misfortune or accident while the actor is
in the performance of a lawful act executed with due care and
without intention of doing harm, there is no criminal liability
POMOY v. PEOPLE (2004)
-accused (police) and victim (detainee) are grappling for the
possession of a gun
-two gunshots were heard resulting to the death of the victim
RULING: the death of the victim was the result of an
accidental firing of the service gun of the accused
-presence of all the elements of “accident”
Lawful Act. He was in the lawful performance of his duty
as a law enforcer that petitioner tried to defend his
possession of the weapon when the victim suddenly tried
to remove it from his holster
No negligence. He exercised all the necessary
precautions to prevent his service weapon from causing
accidental harm to others.
No criminal intent. At no instance during his testimony
did the accused admit to any intent to cause injury to the
deceased, much less kill him
-Petitioner advanced self-defense as an alternative.
Self-defense is inconsistent with the exempting
circumstance of accident, in which there is no intent to
kill. On the other hand, self-defense necessarily
contemplates a premeditated intent to kill in order to
defend oneself from imminent danger. Apparently, the
fatal shots in the instant case did not occur out of any
conscious or premeditated effort to overpower, maim or
kill the victim for the purpose of self-defense against any
aggression; rather, they appeared to be the spontaneous
 and accidental result of both parties’ attempts to possess A. Exempt due to irresistible force
the firearm.

B. UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR
If he is negligent, he cannot avail “accident”, and will be liable for
reckless imprudence. In accident, there is no civil liability.

Any person who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear

of an equal or greater injury
IV. IRRESISTIBLE FORCE

Elements:
Any person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible
force 1. the threat which causes fear is of an evil greater than or at
least equal to that which he is required to commit;

2. It promises an evil of such gravity and imminence that the

Elements:
ordinary man would have succumbed to it.
1. the compulsion is by means of physical force

2. That the physical force must be irresistible

Distinguish between irresistible force from uncontrollable
fear
3. That the physical force must come from a third person.

IRRESISTIBLE FORCE UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR

U.S. v. CABALLEROS (1905)
The offender uses violence The offender employs
-Baculi, one of the accused, who was not a member of the
or physical force to compel intimidation or threat in
band which murdered some American school-teachers, was in
another person to commit a compelling another to commit
a plantation gathering bananas. Upon hearing the shooting, he crime a crime
ran. However, he was seen by the leaders of the band who (similar to blackmaill)
called him and striking him with the butts of their guns, they
compelled him to bury the bodies.
Held: Baculi was not criminally liable as accessory for
concealing the body of the crime of murder committed by the
band, because he acted under the compulsion of an irresistible U.S. vs EXALTACION (1904)
force. -Exaltacion and Tanchinco were compelled under fear of death
to swear allegiance to the Katipunan whose purpose was to
overthrow the government by force of arms
Q. Is the person using irresistible force criminally liable? -The accused cannot be held criminally liable for rebellion,
because they joined the rebels under the impulse of an
A. Yes, as a principal by inducement uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury

Illustration:
Preliminaries
A points a gun at B and ordered him to kill C. B killed C. B is not
liable because he was compelled by A using irresistible force. On
the other hand, A is criminally liable as a principal by
inducement.

Who is a principal by inducement?

Those who force or induce another to commit the crime

Q. What about the person who committed the crime? Is he

guilty? The one was induced by force.
 Article 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases.77
Justifying Exempting Absolutory
Circumstances Circumstances Causes (No
Note: Art: 11-15 talks of circumstances which affect criminal
(Art. 11) (Art. 12) specific
concept/term of liability
Absolutory
causes in the
367 articles of
RPC)- no exact
provision
pertaining to
absolutory
causes, but this
is a recognized
rule.-akin to
exempting
circumstances
-No Crime at all. -There is a - There is a
The act is crime crime
justified

-No Criminal -But no criminal -But no criminal

liability liability liability by
reason of public
policy and
sentiments
-No Civil liability -Generally,
XPN: Art. 11(4) there is civil
Avoidance of liability
Greater evil78 XPN: Art. 12(4)
Accident and
(7) Lawful

77 Article 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain
cases -The exemption from criminal liability established in
subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Article 12 and in
subdivision 4 of Article 11 of this Code does not include
exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced
subject to the following rules:
First. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of Article 12, the
civil liability for acts committed by an imbecile or insane
person, and by a person under nine years of age, or by
one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has
acted without discernment, shall devolve upon those
having such person under their legal authority or control,
unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on
their part.
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of Article 11,
the persons for whose benefit the harm has been
prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the
benefit which they may have received.
The courts shall determine, in sound discretion, the
proportionate amount for which each one shall be liable.
When the respective shares cannot be equitably
determined, even approximately, or when the liability
also attaches to the Government, or to the majority of
the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events, whenever
the damages have been caused with the consent of the
authorities or their agents, indemnification shall be made
in the manner prescribed by special laws or regulations.

Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile
or minor under his authority, legal guardianship or
control, or if such person be insolvent, said insane,
imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property,
excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance
with the civil law.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of
Article 12, the persons using violence or causing the fears
shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no
such persons, those doing the act shall be liable, saving
always to the latter that part of their property exempt
from execution

78 Art 101- The exemption from criminal liability

established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Article 12

insuperable
cause.79
EXTRA: In answering a question, do not start with the statement
that there is no penalty. State first that there is no criminal liability,
hence there is also no penalty. There is no imposable penalty
simply because there is no criminal liability. Penalty is just a
consequence of a person being held criminally liable. So don’t start
with penalty. It follows that there is no penalty when there is no
criminal liability. So you even need not state that there is no
penalty, it is understood already.
Hence, in one case, where a judge imposed the penalty of censure
(or reprimanded) even if he acquitted the accused, it was held
that the judgment was improper since the person did not commit
a crime, and consequently, did not incur any criminal liability.
EXTRA: The Absolutory cause is the brother of exempting
circumstances, and not of justifying circumstances
ABSOLUTORY CAUSES
and in subdivision 4 of Article 11 of this Code does not
include exemption from civil liability.
79 Id.
80 Article 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted
felonies. - Consummated felonies as well as those which
are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
1) Art. 6- Spontaneous Desistance during the Attempted
Stage only80-Note: There is no spontaneous desistance
during the frustrated stage.
Q: In Art. 6, are all stages of execution punished?
A: YES, “Consummated felonies as well as those which
are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.”
NOTE: There is an absolutory cause if during the attempted
stage, a person spontaneously desisted.
RATIONALE: “He is already on the brink of committing a
crime, he steps back and then changes his course; he went
back to the good side of things; he refrained from going all
the way to the dark side, that is the public policy; that is why
we should reward these individuals who saw the light and did
not proceed with the execution of the crime; that is in Art. 6.”
2) Article 7- Light felonies which have not been
consummated with the exception of those committed
against person or property.
In other words, light felonies which are in the attempted or
frustrated stage.
NOTE: In Art. 6 provides that all stages are punishable. But Art. 7
provides that light felonies are punishable generally only when
consummated.
Q: What is the penalty for light felonies?
A: Light felonies are those infractions of law for
the commission of which a penalty of arrest
menor (1 day to 30 days) or a fine not
exceeding 40000 (as amended) pesos or both;
is provided.
NOTE: The penalty provided herein
are those for consummated felonies.
Q: How many degrees lower is the penalty for
a frustrated felony than that for a consummated
felony.
A: one degree lower.
Q: How about attempted felony?
xxxxx
There is an attempt when the offender commences the
commission of a felony directly or over acts, and does not
perform all the acts of execution which should produce
the felony by reason of some cause or accident other
than this own spontaneous desistance.
 A: two degrees lower.
Q: What is one degree lower than arresto
menor?
A: Public censure81
Q: What is two degrees lower than arresto
menor?
A: Fine
RATIONALE: Frustrated and Light Felonies are generally
negligible offenses.
XPN: If light felonies are committed against person or property.
-do not lower the society’s expectation with respect to light
felonies when it comes to crimes against persons or property.
a) spouses,
Q: Who are the accessories?
A: Article 19. Accessories. - Accessories are those who,
having knowledge of the commission of the crime, and
without having participated therein, either as principals
or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission
in any of the following manners:
1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to
profit by the effects of the crime.
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or
the effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its
discovery.
3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of
the principals of the crime, provided the accessory acts
with abuse of his public functions or whenever the author
of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an
attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is
known to be habitually guilty of some other crime.
NOTE: Not all accessories are exempt from criminal
liability, only those who are specifically provided in Art.
20 of RPC. In general, those who are related to the
principal. Namely,:

TIP: If you know the reason for the rule, you are very much ready b) ascendants,
for the Bar exam.
c) descendants,
3) Article 20. Accessories who are exempt from
criminal liability. - The penalties prescribed for d) legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers and sisters,
accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are
Q: Who are those natural brothers and sisters?
such with respect to their: five relationships
A: At present, there are only two children in the
a) spouses,
family code, namely, legitimate and illegitimate
b) ascendants, children. The Natural child is a concept in the
old civil code but not in the family code.
c) descendants, Unfortunately for us, this concept has not been
amended.
d) legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers and
sisters, Q: An adopted child, is he legitimate or
illegitimate?
e) or relatives by affinity within the same degrees,
A: Legitimate.
With the single exception of accessories falling within the
provisions of paragraph 1 of the next preceding article. Q: How about a natural child?

81 Art. 71. SCALE NO. 1 6. Arresto mayor,

1. Death, 7. Destierro,

2. Reclusion perpetua, 8. Arresto menor,

3. Reclusion temporal, 9. Public censure,

4. Prision mayor, 10. Fine.

5. Prision correccional,
 A: Illegitimate whose parents do not suffer from
any legal impediment from marrying.82
NOTE: A natural child is legitimated
after the marriage of his/her parents.
Q: Who are the other illegitimate children?
A: Those who are born from parents who are
not married but there is a legal impediment,
namely, the acknowledged child.
NOTE: The RPC refers always to the
“legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers and
sisters”.
e) or relatives by affinity within the same degrees,
Q: Who are these persons?
A: i) Ascendants-in-law e.g. grand father in
law; ii) Descendants-in-law; iii) legitimate,
natural, and adopted brothers-in-law and
sisters-in-law.
NOTE: Only these accessories are exempt from criminal liability.
RATIONALE: The public policy or sentiment behind the
absolutory cause is that, since the principal is their close relatives,
the law recognizes that it may be natural for the accessories to
protect their close relatives. Blood relation and to preserve honor
of the family.
XPN; WHEN NOT EXEMPT: Those who, although related,
profited themselves or assisted the offender to profit by the
effects of the crime.
RATIONALE: In this case, the accessory is not impelled
to protect the principal but to profit or for their own financial gain.
4) Art. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under
exceptional circumstances. - Any legally married person
who having surprised his spouse in the act of committing
sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them
or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall
inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the
penalty of destierro.
If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he
shall be exempt from punishment.
These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to
parents with respect to their daughters under eighteen years of
82 Article 269. Only natural children can be legitimated.
Children born outside wedlock of parents who, at the
time of the conception of the former, were not
age, and their seducer, while the daughters are living with their
parents.
Any person who shall promote or facilitate the prostitution of his
wife or daughter, or shall otherwise have consented to the
infidelity of the other spouse shall not be entitled to the benefits
of this article.
Q: If the injury caused is Less Serious or Slight Physical injuries,
is there a penalty?
A: There is no penalty, hence an absolutory cause.
Q: What if the person kills or inflicts physical injuries, is
there a penalty?
A: Yes. He shall suffer the penalty of destierro.
Q: Is this circumstance an absolutory cause
even if the law imposes destierro, which is a penalty?
NOTE: when you say it is an absolutory cause,
there should be no criminal liability, hence, no penalty.
But in Art. 247, you would wonder that there is no
penalty only when the injury caused is less serious or
slight physical injuries. But if the innocent spouse kills or
inflicts serious physical injuries, he will suffer the penalty
of destierro. In art. 25, destierro is one of the penalties.
Accordingly, he is not totally absolved from criminal
liability. Nonetheless, the annotations always say that
Art. 247 is an absolutory cause.
Q: If you will be asked in the bar if Art. 247 is an
absolutory cause, what would be your answer?
A: You distinguish. There are 2 scenarios in art. 247,
namely, first, if the resulting injury is merely slight or less
serious physical injuries, then it is an absolutory cause
since the person does not incur criminal liability. On the
other hand, if we strictly interpret art. 247 with regard to
that circumstance resulting to death or serious physical
injuries, it cannot be considered as an absolutory cause
because the penalty of destierro is imposed; however for
some
Commentators, they believe this provision still
constitutes as an absolutory cause because despite the
gravity of the crime committed, only
the very slight penalty of destierro is imposed and such
penalty is imposed more for the benefit of the accused;
and in that sense it may be considered as an absolutory
cause.
TIP: If you understand the rule, then you can know how
to explain and provide an answer. You actually don’t
have the option to choose which the correct
disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are
natural.
 interpretation is. You just place your initial position, and
then explain that you know that there is another
interpretation and place it in your answer. The examiner
will know that you know the rule and the reasons behind
the rule, but you made a judgement that since destierro
is a penalty, it is not totally an absolutory cause, but if
you give the additional reasoning that it is more for the
benefit of the accused, then it might be beneficial to the
accused
REQUISITES: As to husband with respect to his
spouse
1) Any legally married person
2) having surprised his spouse in the act of committing
sexual intercourse with another person,
3) kills or injures any of them or both of them in the
act or immediately thereafter,
ART. 247 DOES NOT APPLY TO A COMMON LAW
RELATIONSHIP- HENCE “LEGALLY MARRIED PERSONS”
Q: What if the husband went home and saw his wife
having intimate relations with the yaya who is also a
woman, and killed them both; can he invoke Article 247?
A: No. He will be liable for Parricide with a mitigating
circumstance of EITHER Passion or Obfuscation OR
Immediate Vindication of a Grave Offense. (Only one of
the two, not both) “Sexual intercourse is defined as
between a man and a woman. So even though article
247 talks of any person or another person, the act of
sexual intercourse cannot be done between persons of
the same sex; thus he cannot invoke article 247.
NOTE: The general view now is that Art. 247 is an
absolutory cause. Nonetheless, it must be noted that
destierro is a penalty. Accordingly, it is not totally an
absolutory cause if you consider destierro as a penalty,
but if you consider destierro to be disproportionate to the
83 Article 280. Qualified trespass to dwelling. - Any
private person who shall enter the dwelling of another
against the latter's will shall be punished by arresto
mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos.
If the offense be committed by means of violence or
intimidation, the penalty shall be prision correccional in
its medium and maximum periods and a fine not
exceeding 1,000 pesos.
crime committed and it is for the benefit of the accused,
then you can mention that it is also an absolutory cause?
NOTE: ART. 247 Applies not only to married spouses but also to
parents with respect to their daughters under eighteen years
of age, and their seducer, while the daughters are living with
their parents.
-Art. 247 can also be invoked by the parents with
regard to their daughter, but not with regard to
their son.
i) person who can be invoked are the parents;
ii) with regard to their daughter under 18 years of age,
and her seducer,
iii) and the daughter should be living with her parents;
iv) surprise the daughter and seducer while having
sexual intercourse;
v) kills or injures any of them or both of them in the act
or immediately thereafter.
MEANING OF “immediately thereafter.”
Q: What does immediately thereafter means? Up to how
many hours?, e.g. the next day?
Illustrative case:
People vs Avarca.
The husband could not find a gun, so he looked
first for a gun; but then the sexual act was
completed already and the man was already
playing mahjong. So when he got the gun, he
went to the mahjong area and shot the victim but several hours
have already elapsed. But it is stillconsidered as “immediately
thereafter.”
A: But the next day is not anymore. Since it is necessary
that the person is acting under the impulse of catching them in
the act. But the law allows immediately thereafter.
5) ART. 28083-Persons who shall enter another's
dwelling against the latter's will for the purpose of
preventing some serious harm to himself, the
occupants of the dwelling or a third person; person
The provisions of this article shall not be applicable to any
person who shall enter another's dwelling for the
purpose of preventing some serious harm to himself, the
occupants of the dwelling or a third person, nor shall it be
applicable to any person who shall enter a dwelling for
the purpose of rendering some service to humanity or
justice, nor to anyone who shall enter cafes, taverns, inn
and other public houses, while the same are open.
 who shall enter a dwelling for the purpose of
rendering some service to humanity or justice;
anyone who shall enter cafes, taverns, inn and other
public houses, while the same are open.
THREE SETS of persons who shall enter another's dwelling
1. For the purpose of preventing some serious harm:
i. To himself
ii. The occupants of the dwelling
iii. Third person
2. For the purpose of rendering some service to
humanity or justice:
e.g. Good Samaritan rule: to assist a woman who is about to
give birth.
3. Enter cafes, taverns, inn and other public houses,
while the same are open.
6) Article 332.84 Persons exempt from criminal liability
in the crimes of theft, swindling or malicious mischief
As to what are the Crimes involved: (only 3 crimes)
1. Theft85- generally those who, with intent to gain but
without violence against or intimidation of
persons nor force upon things, shall take personal
property of another without the latter's consent
e.g. if you steal the car of your brother or sister. But only if you
are living together (so you stick with your brother or sister
who is rich :D)
2. Swindling86- generally any person who shall defraud
another.
84 Article 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability. -
No criminal, but only civil liability, shall result from the
commission of the crime of theft, swindling or malicious
mischief committed or caused mutually by the following
persons:
1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by
affinity in the same line.
2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property
which belonged to the deceased spouse before the same
shall have passed into the possession of another; and
3. Malicious mischief87- Any person who shall
deliberately cause the property of another any damage
not falling within the terms of arson
As to whom said provision apply: (only 3 sets of
persons
1. i) Spouses; ii) ascendants; iii) descendants, iv)
relatives by affinity in the same line.
NOTE: no need that they are living together
2. Widowed spouse- with respect to property which
belonged to the deceased spouse
Condition: before the same shall have passed into
the possession of another
-either widow or widower
3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and
sisters-in-law,
Condition: if living together (NOTE)
CAVEAT-Provision, not applicable to strangers: The
exemption established by this article shall not be applicable to
strangers participating in the commission of the crime.
Illustration
Problem: For example there is a conspiracy, 4 persons who
commit the crimes of theft, swindling or malicious mischief against
the brother or sister, or against any of those persons identified,
but only one is among those relatives identified, the 3 others are
not related to the victim. What are their criminal liabilities?
3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-
law, if living together.
The exemption established by this article shall not be
applicable to strangers participating in the commission of
the crime.
85 Article 308. Who are liable for theft. -
86 Article 315. Swindling (estafa).
87 Article 327. Who are liable for malicious mischief
A: “As regards to the other 3 who are strangers, they are 2. Abduction
criminally liable for theft, swindling or malicious mischief but the
other one who falls within the 3 enumerations is exempted from 3. Acts of lasciviousness
criminal liability.” (Bantay)

CAVEAT: RAPE is no longer included, already classified as a

FINAL POINT: Person, not absolved from CIVIL liability, crime against persons. No longer a private crime. Exclude
only from criminal liability: “He is exempt only from criminal rape. The basis for rape now is art. 266
liability. If you steal the luxury car of your brother or sister, you
COMPARISON:
will still be held civilly liable. It exempts only from criminal liability,
but not from civil liability. (Atty. Calica)
Art 332- Persons Art. 344- In cases of
exempt from criminal seduction, abduction,
liability in the crimes of and acts of
theft, swindling or lasciviousness.
TIP: Art. 332 is a favourite topic in the bar malicious mischief
The exemption The provisions of this
established by this paragraph shall also
article shall not be be applicable to the
7) Art. 344-PRIVATE CRIMES88:- can be prosecuted applicable to co-principals,
only be the victim himself or herself. strangers accomplices and
participating in the accessories after the
-In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and commission of the fact of the above-
rape, the marriage of the offender with the offended party crime mentioned crimes.
shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty
already imposed upon him. The provisions of this paragraph
Scenario in 344: the victim marries the offender. Will it the
shall also be applicable to the co-principals, accomplices and
marriage also benefit the co-principals, accomplices, and
accessories after the fact of the above-mentioned crimes.
accessories?

A: Yes. They will also be exempt from criminal liability. That’s the
As to what are the Crimes involved: (only 3 crimes) effect of marriage, just like pardon.

1. Seduction NOTE: RAPE has been classified as crime against person.

Is the provision still applicable in case of rape? Rape has
been transferred from Art. 344 to Art. 266(A)-(D)89. there is no

88 Article 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery,
concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness. - The crimes of adultery and concubinage
shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by
the offended spouse.
The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution
without including both the guilty parties, if they are both
alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or
pardoned the offenders.
offender has been expressly pardoned by the above
named persons, as the case may be.
In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness
and rape, the marriage of the offender with the offended
party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the
penalty already imposed upon him. The provisions of this
paragraph shall also be applicable to the co-principals,
accomplices and accessories after the fact of the above-
mentioned crimes.

89 "Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon. - The subsequent valid

The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of
lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a
complaint filed by the offended party or her parents,
grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the
marriage between the offended party shall extinguish the
criminal action or the penalty imposed.
"In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the
subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the offended party
shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty:
Provided, That the crime shall not be extinguished or the
similar provision in art. 226. Accordingly, there is now a debate
whether said provision applies to rape. It undoubtedly applies to HELD: Entrapment, hence Lua Chu was held liable for the acts.
seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness. No similar Even though Juan Samson smoothed and facilitated the
provision in the anti-rape law. Art. 266(c) does not mention co- introduction of the prohibited drugs, the accused have already
principals, accomplice, and accessories. planned and actually ordered the opium without the
Q: what if there are 4 rapists who acted in conspiracy. The one consent or participation of Juan Samson. When Lua Chu
rapist married the offended party. It will surely benefit the married approached Samson, he already stated that he would be bringing
offender, but how about the three others? in opium from abroad. Samson did not suggest the importation to
-Meaning of “shall extinguish the criminal action”- means that the Lua Chu. He only set up a trap to catch a criminal. Mere deception
action arising from the act of rape can no longer be prosecuted. of the detective will not shield defendant if the offense was
So if cannot be prosecuted anymore, all persons subject to the committed by him free from the influence or the instigation of the
criminal action will be benefited. The provision talks of the criminal detective.
action, and not only of a particular participant, the criminal action
itself is extinguish.
A: TIP: State first that art. 266(c) did not copy the provisions of U.S. vs Phelps (Objective Test)
art. 344. So It is not yeat clear whether marriage will benefit the
Facts: Phelps was instigated by Smith, an employee of the BIR,
co-principals, accomplices, and accessories. But it must be noted
into procuring opium and providing for a venue in which to smoke
that art. 266 provides for the extinguishment of the criminal
opium. He was the first to introduce the idea of smoking
action, if that is so, then it benefits everyone, that is if there is
opium by directly asking it from Phelps. Smith asked
only one action and the principal is the one who marries. However,
phelps whether the latter smokes opium. He asked phelps
if there is a conspiracy, then there will be four counts, four
to look for an opium joint Immediately upon Phelps’
Information(s). In the Information of the accused who marries
commission of the crime under Smith’s inducement, Smith
(where he is the principal) the victim, the provision will apply the
reported Phelps and had him arrested. Phelps had himself
criminal action is extinguished. But in all the other Information(s),
examined immediately and it was found that he himself did not
where the person who marries is merely a co-principal, the 2nd
smoke.
rapist is the principal, the provision will not apply. In the 2nd case,
the co-principal, and not the principal, is the one who marries.

8) INSTIGATION by Public officers (not entrapment) ISSUE: WON instigation.

- Instigation is an absolutory cause. Entrapment

however is not an absolutory cause, it is a legitimate
police operation. Instigation is not a legitimate
police operation.
Illustrative cases
People vs Lua Chu (Subjective Test)
Facts: Uy Se Tieng was the consignee of the Shipments of Opium
coming from Hongkong, who represented agents of the real
owners of shipments of opium containing 3,252 tins. He
collaborated with Samson and Natividad officers of the Customs.
When the opium arrived in Cebu, Samson informed the
constabulary represented by Captain Buencosejo and the
Provincial Fiscal, and requested a stenographer named Jumapao
hid themselves behind the curtains in the house of Samson to
witness the conversation. The following morning Uy Se Tieng and
companion, Uy Ay presented papers to Samson. Captain
Buencosejo showed up and caught them in the act and arrested
the two Chinese.
ISSUE: Wether instigation or entrapment
HELD: YES. Phelps acquitted because he was instigated by a
public officer. There is instigation in this case. Phelps was induced
by Smith into making arrangements for the two of them to smoke
opium. Smith not only suggested the commission of the crime but
also expressed his desire to commit the offense in paying the
amount required for arrangements. Such acts done by employees
of the government in encouraging or inducing persons to commit
a crime in order to prosecute them should not be encouraged by
the courts. Phelps cannot be held guilty of the crime.
NOTE: Instigation is the same as inducement. The person who
induces is a principal by inducement. In cases of instigation, is the
public officer who instigated criminally liable?
NOTE: IT IS MATERIAL WHO INDUCES THE PERSON: If
the one who made the instigation is a private individual,
not performing public function, both he and the one
induced are criminally liable for the crime committed: the

penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is void ab

initio.
former, as principal by induction; and the latter, as principal by
direct participation.
On the other, if the person who induced is a public officer or
employee, then the instigation would be an absolutory
cause.
TWO TESTS in determining the existence of instigation:-
what must be proved.
SUBJECTIVE TEST
(ORIGIN OF INTENT
TEST) - Origin of
intent; from where the
intent to commit the
crime originated.
Focused on the
accused’s propensity to
commit the crime in his
mind.
TEST: If it originated
from the accused
himself, then he is liable.
But if it originated from
the public officer, then
he is absolved, since the
act would constitute and
instigation
Q: In the Philippines, what
A: We use either tests, but primarily the subjective tests.
OBJECTIVE TEST
Focused on the public
officer’s nature or conduct of
the police operation, not
anymore of who induced
whom. (before, during, and
after).
TEST: The public officers
must prove that: (a) there
was a sale transaction that
took place; that the marked
money was exchanged for
the item (ex. dangerous
drugs and money)-that the
sale was actually
consummated; (b) prove in
court the item itself and the
marked money and that a
sale actually occured; (c)
take a look at the police
officers who preserved the
items and the physical
inventory and ensure that
the chain of custody was
established.90
test is used?
*People vs Doria (Objective & Subjective)
Facts: In 1995, members of the PNP Narcotics Command
(Narcom), received information from 2 civilian informants (CI)
that Doria was engaged in illegal drug activities in Mandaluyong
City. The Narcom agents decided to entrap and arrest Doria in a
buy-bust operation. The Narcom agents formed Team Alpha and
designated PO3 Manlangit as the poseur-buyer. At 7:20 a.m.,
Doria appeared. PO3 Manlangit handed Doria the marked bills
worth P1,600.00.The exchange of money for marijuana was
completed. Doria asked PO3 to wait for an hour while he will get
the marijuana from his associate. After a while, when Doria was
about to give the marijuana, PO3 Manlangit forthwith arrested
him. They frisked Doria but did not find the marked bills on him.
Upon inquiry, Doria left the money to his associate Gaddao. The
team went to the house and they noticed a box under the dining
table. Suspicion aroused, PO3 Manlangit entered Gaddao’s house
and took hold of the box and found that it contained 10 bricks of
dried marijuana leaves. Simultaneous with the box’s discovery,
SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from Gaddao. They
arrested Gaddao and Doria.
Held: The test used in courts is a combination of objective
(focused on acts of law enforcer) and subjective (focused on
predisposition of accused to commit the offense).
W/N the warrantless arrest of Doria was lawful? YES
Appellant was caught in the act of committing an offense. When
an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a
buy-bust operation, the police are not only authorized but duty-
bound to arrest him even without a warrant.
W/N warrantless arrest and search of her (Gaddao) person and
residence was lawful? NO
Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation
to give ground for her arrest. She was not committing any crime.
Since the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao was
illegal, it follows that the search of her person and home and the
subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be
deemed legal as an incident to her arrest. Ruling: Doria sentenced
to reclusion perpetua; Gaddao is acquitted.

90 EXTRA: Test buy - used in trademark infringement
cases. After the test buy then you can apply for a search
warrant and then conduct the raid.
Buy-bust - before the buy-bust, they arrange the marked
money, if it is a sales transaction, they must prove that
there was an exchange of item and the money. Take a
look at the conduct, and not anymore who induced
whom. Was the sale transaction actually consummated?
Did they get the merchandise? Did they pay for it? Then if
it is so, then they should prove in court that the item
itself, the dangerous drug, and they should also prove in
court the marked money, and prove that a contract of
sale actually occurred. Take a look at the police officers
who served the items, and physical inventory, and ensure
that the chain of custody was established. (Atty. Calica)
 INSTIGATION
The instigator practically
induces the would-be
accused into the
commission of the offense
and himself becomes a
co-principal.
The law enforcer
conceives the commission
of the crime and suggests
to the accused who
adopts the idea and
carries it into execution.
A public officer or a
private detective induces
an innocent person to
commit a crime and would
arrest him upon or after
the commission of the
crime by the latter.
Must be made by public
officers or private
detectives.91
The accused must be
acquitted.
It is an absolutory cause.
ENTRAPMENT (1) Any of the essential elements of the crime charged is not
Ways and means are proved by the prosecution and the elements proved do not
resorted to for the constitute any crime.
purpose of trapping and (2) The act of the accused falls under any of the justifying
capturing the lawbreaker circumstances. (Art. 11)
in the execution of his
(3) The case of the accused falls under any of the exempting
criminal plan.
circumstances. (Art. 12)
(4) The case is covered by any of the absolutory causes:
(a) Spontaneous desistance during attempted stage
(Art. 6), and no crime under another provision of the RPC or
The means originates other penal law is committed.
from the mind of the (b) Light felony is only attempted or frustrated,
criminal. The idea and the and is not against persons or property. (Art. 7)
resolve to commit the (c) The accessory is a relative of the principal.
crime come from him. (Art. 20)
(d) Legal grounds for arbitrary detention.
(Art. 124)
(e) Legal grounds for trespass. (Art. 280)
(f) The crime of theft, swindling or malicious mischief is
committed against a relative. (Art. 332)
The practice of
entrapping persons into (g) When only slight or less serious physical injuries
crime for the purpose of are inflicted by the person who surprised his spouse or
instituting criminal daughter in the act of sexual intercourse with another
prosecutions. It is a person. (Art. 247)
scheme or technique (h) Marriage of the offender with the offended
ensuring the party when the crime committed is rape, abduction,
apprehension of the
seduction, or acts of lasciviousness. (Art. 344)
criminals by being in the
actual crime scene. (i) Instigation.
(5) Guilt of the accused not established beyond reasonable doubt.
(6) Prescription of crimes. (Art. 89)
(7) Pardon by the offended party before the institution of criminal
action in crime against chastity. (Art. 344)
I. PRELIMINARIES: RULES IN APPRECIATING
Is not a bar to the
MITIGATING AND AGGRAVATING
prosecution and
conviction of the CIRCUMSTANCES:
lawbreaker.
It is not an absolutory 1. Determine first the imposable penalties for the crime
cause. to determine whether to apply either Art. 63 or Art. 64

A. Art. 6392;
Complete defenses in criminal cases: (Reyes)

91 Note: If the one who made the instigation is a private
individual, not performing public function, both he and the
one induced are criminally liable for the crime committed:
the former, as principal by induction; and the latter, as
principal by direct participation.
92
Article 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. -
In all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible
penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have
attended the commission of the deed.
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of
two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed
in the application thereof:
1. When in the commission of the deed there is present only
one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be
applied.
2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
3. When the commission of the act is attended by some
mitigating circumstances and there is no aggravating
circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances
attended the commission of the act, the court shall reasonably
allow them to offset one another in consideration of their
 1) when the law prescribes a single indivisible
penalty;
- it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may
have attended the commission of the deed.
-presence of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances is immaterial.
2) when it prescribes two indivisible penalties.
- This can happen only once, when the penalty
imposed is reclusion perpetua to death.
a. When there are some mitigating circumstances,
and no aggravating circumstance
-the lesser penalty shall be applied (reclusion
perpetua)
b. When there is one aggravating and no
mitigating
-the higher penalty shall be applied (death)
c. No mitigating, no aggravating
-lesser penalty(reclusion perpetua)
d. Some mitigating, some aggravating.
-offset, then apply preceding rules.
COMMENT: The provision favors the accused, since
there is only one instance when the higher indivisible
penalty (death) is applied, that is, when there is one
aggravating and no mitigating. In the two other
instances, the lesser penalty is to be applied.
NOTE: There are only 4 indivisible penalties, namely:
i. Death
ii. Reclusion Perpetua
iii. Perpetual Absolute or Special Disqualification
iv. Public Censure
B. Art. 6493
1)
number and importance, for the purpose of applying the
penalty in accordance with the preceding rules, according to
the result of such compensation.
93
Article 64. Rules for the application of penalties which
contain three periods. - In cases in which the penalties
prescribed by law contain three periods, whether it be a single
divisible penalty or composed of three different penalties, each
one of which forms a period in accordance with the provisions
of Articles 76 and 77, the court shall observe for the application
of the penalty the following rules, according to whether there
are or are not mitigating or aggravating circumstances:
1. When there are neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances, they shall impose the penalty prescribed by law
in its medium period.
2. When only a mitigating circumstances is present in the
commission of the act, they shall impose the penalty in its
minimum period.
3. When an aggravating circumstance is present in the
commission of the act, they shall impose the penalty in its
maximum period.
NOTE; Qualifying aggravating: Art. 62(1) provides that
aggravating circumstances which:
i. In themselves constitute a crime specially
punishable by law.
- If it is a crime by itself. e.g. arson (use of
fire).
a. When in the commission of the crime,
advantage was taken by the offender of
his public position, the penalty to be
imposed shall be in its maximum
regardless of mitigating circumstances.
The maximum penalty shall be imposed if the
offense was committed by any group who
belongs to an organized/syndicated crime
group.
An organized/syndicated crime group means a
group of two or more persons collaborating,
confederating or mutually helping one another
for purposes of gain in the commission of any
crime. (Art. 62(1)(a) as amended by RA 7659)
ii. Are included by the law in defining a crime and
prescribing the penalty therefor.
- If it is an element of the crime.
- e.g. murder (use of fire or poision in killing the
person)
- falsification by public officer (That advantage be
taken by the offender of his public position)94
shall not be taken into account for the purpose of increasing the
penalty.
NOTE: The classification of the circumstances is important in
determining which circumstance offsets which.
4. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances are
present, the court shall reasonably offset those of one class
against the other according to their relative weight.
5. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and
no aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall
impose the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the
period that it may deem applicable, according to the number
and nature of such circumstances.
6. Whatever may be the number and nature of the aggravating
circumstances, the courts shall not impose a greater penalty
than that prescribed by law, in its maximum period.
7. Within the limits of each period, the court shall determine
the extent of the penalty according to the number and nature
of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the
greater and lesser extent of the evil produced by the crime.
94
Article 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary
or ecclesiastic minister. – xxx any public officer, employee, or
notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall
falsify a document
 since even if
Mitigating circumstances the penalty is
Ordinary Privileged lowered by
one or two
-one which lowers the -one which lowers the
degrees, the
penalty only by a period penalty by one or two
privileged
degrees
mitigating
-can be offset by generic Cannot be offset
does not
aggravating
qualify or
circumstance
affect the
nature of the
Aggravating circumstances crime.
Generic Specific Qualifying Inherent
NOTE: Only ordinary mitigating and generic aggravating can be
-those -those when it is an -those
offset by each other.
which are which are element of the that it
applicable applicable crime. (Art. must of
to all only to 62(1)) necessity II. MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
crimes particular accompa NOTE: Art. 13 is not an exclusive list
crimes ny the
commissi EFFECTS IN GENERAL: Lessens or diminishes penalty either by
on period or degree.
thereof.
(Art.
62(2)) TWO KINDS; Ordinary, and Privileged
A. Ordinary Mitigating Circumstances95
-if the -can be offset by generic aggravating circumstance.
circumst -there are ten ordinary mitigating circumstances as
ance is enumerated by art. 13
either -but, not only ten since the list is not exclusive since par
the crime
10. provides for “similar or analogous circumstances”
itself Art.
62(1)
1. Incomplete Justifying and Exempting Circumstances
-one which -increases -not -not (ordinary mitigating) when not the majority of such
increases the penalty appreciated appreciat conditions be present;
the penalty by a period separately ed - If majority of the conditions provided for a justifying or
by a period separatel exempting circumstance are present, the same would be
y
considered as a privileged mitigating circumstance as
-can be -can be -cannot be -cannot
offset by offset offset be offset provided for in Art. 69.
ordinary NOTE: it
mitigating cannot be 2. Under 18 (privileged) or over 70 (ordinary);
circumstan offset even by - Since the circumstance of “over 15 but under 18 who
ce a privileged acted with discretion” is a privileged mitigating
mitigating circumstance as it lowers the penalty by a degree, not all

95
Article 13. Mitigating circumstances. - The following are
mitigating circumstances;
1. Those mentioned in the preceding chapter, when all the
requisites necessary to justify or to exempt from criminal
liability in the respective cases are not attendant.
2. That the offender is under eighteen year of age or over
seventy years. In the case of the minor, he shall be proceeded
against in accordance with the provisions of Art. 80.
3. That the offender had no intention to commit so grave a
wrong as that committed.
4. That sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the
offended party immediately preceded the act.
5. That the act was committed in the immediate vindication of
a grave offense to the one committing the felony (delito), his
spouse, ascendants, or relatives by affinity within the same
degrees.
6. That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as
naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation.
7. That the offender had voluntarily surrendered himself to a
person in authority or his agents, or that he had voluntarily
confessed his guilt before the court prior to the presentation of
the evidence for the prosecution;
8. That the offender is deaf and dumb, blind or otherwise
suffering some physical defect which thus restricts his means of
action, defense, or communications with his fellow beings.
9. Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of
the will-power of the offender without however depriving him
of the consciousness of his acts.
10. And, finally, any other circumstances of a similar nature and
analogous to those above mentioned.
 circumstances enumerated under art. 13 are ordinary
mitigating.
- The said circumstance is always a privileged mitigating
as provided by art. 68.96
NOTE: Art. 68(1) is not a good law anymore, because a
person who is under is already absolutely exempt from
criminal liability as provided by RA 9344.
RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630
1) For serious crimes committed by above 12 up to 15
years of age: A child who is above twelve (12) years
of age up to fifteen (15) years of age and who
commits:
i. parricide,
ii. murder,
iii. infanticide,
iv. kidnapping and serious illegal detention where
the victim is killed or raped,
v. robbery, with homicide or rape,
vi. destructive arson,
vii. rape, or
viii. carnapping where the driver or occupant is
killed or raped, or
ix. offenses under Republic Act No. 9165
(Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002) punishable by more than twelve (12)
years of imprisonment,
shall be deemed a neglected child, and shall be
mandatorily placed in ‘Bahay Pag-asa’ called the
96
Article 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under
eighteen years of age. - When the offender is a minor under
eighteen years and his case is one coming under the provisions
of the paragraphs next to the last of Article 80 of this Code, the
following rules shall be observed:
1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who
is not exempted from liability by reason of the court having
declared that he acted with discernment, a discretionary
penalty shall be imposed, but always lower by two degrees at
least than that prescribed by law for the crime which he
committed.
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age
the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be
imposed, but always in the proper period.
97
SEC. 20-A
98
"SEC. 20-B. Repetition of Offenses. – A child who is above
twelve (12) years of age up to fifteen (15) years of age and who
commits an offense for the second time or oftener: Provided,
That the child was previously subjected to a community-based
intervention program, shall be deemed a neglected child under
Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, and shall undergo an
intensive intervention program supervised by the local social
welfare and development officer: Provided, further, That, if the
best interest of the child requires that he/she be placed in a
youth care facility or ‘Bahay Pag-asa’, the child’s parents or
guardians shall execute a written authorization for the
Intensive Juvenile Intervention and Support Center
(IJISC).97
2) For repeat offenders committed by above 12 up to 15
years of age: A child who is above twelve (12) years of
age up to fifteen (15) years of age and who commits
an offense for the second time or oftener: Provided,
That the child was previously subjected to a community-
based intervention program, shall be deemed a
neglected child.98
3. Did not intend to commit so grave a wrong (praetor
intentionem);
Requisites
i. There must be a notable and evident
disproportion between the means employed to
execute the criminal act and its
consequences.(Reyes citing US v. Reyes, 36 Phil
904)
Illustrative case
People v. Ural, 56 SCRA 138 (1974)
FACTS: Policeman Ural maltreated Napola and set him
on fire inside the detention cell. When Ural started to
notice the serious consequence of his act, he tried to
remove Napola’s burning shirt and put the fire out.
Napola sustained second-degree burns. Despite of the
medical attention given, Napola died almost a month
after the incident. CFI convicted Ural of murder
(qualified by use of fire)99.
ISSUE: WON the conviction is proper
HELD: Yes.
voluntary commitment of the child: Provided, finally, That if the
child has no parents or guardians or if they refuse or fail to
execute the written authorization for voluntary commitment,
the proper petition for involuntary commitment shall be
immediately filed by the DSWD or the LSWDO pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended."
99
Article 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the
provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of
murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death, if
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with
the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the
defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck,
stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a street car or
locomotive, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or
with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the
preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a
volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the
suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or
corpse.
 DISCUSSION: The circumstances present in this case
are:
i. That the crime be committed by means of
fire.100
NOTE: this aggravating circumstance cannot
be appreciated separately since it qualifies the
killing to murder; hence, a qualifying
aggravating circumstance.101
ii. That advantage be taken by the offender of his
public position.102
- Since the accused in this case is a police
officer, and the crime was committed while
the victim was inside the detention cell.
- The accused would not have been able to
commit the crime were it not for his public
position.
- Appreciated separately against the accused
in this case.
iii. Praeter intentionem.103
- The accused merely intended to maltreat
the victim and not to kill him
- “He tried to remove Napola’s burning shirt
and put the fire out.”
Hence, in this case there were one generic aggravating,
and one ordinary mitigating circumstance. Thus, the two
circumstances offset each other.
Since murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death,104 based on Art. 63(4) in connection with Art.
63(2), the lesser penalty between the indivisible
penalties shall be applied. Thus, penalty of reclusion
perpetua was imposed.
4. Sufficient provocation on the part of the offended
party immediately preceded the act;
- This circumstance presupposes that the crime
should have been committed as soon as possible
after the provocation was given
- Time element is material, not mere proximate
cause.
- On the part of the offended party
- The accused invokes sufficient provocation on the
part of the offended party.
Requisites
i. The provocation must be sufficient;
ii. It must originate from the offended party;
and
iii. The provocation must be immediate to the act
RELATE TO: Self-defense has three requisites: 1.
Unlawful aggression; 2. Reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it; 3. Lack of
100
Art. 14(12)
101
Art. 62(1)
102
Art. 14(1)
sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.
-the accused invokes the lack of sufficient provocation
on his part
Illustrative case
People v. Leonor
FACTS: The victim (dentist) in this case initially agreed
to give accused leonor a discount but later changed her
mind. When the accused refused to avail the service, the
victim cursed the accused and pushed him. As a
consequence of which, Leonor stabbed the victim. An
information for robbery with homicide was filed against
Leonor.
ISSUE: WON there is sufficient provocation
HELD: No, the cursing and pushing were not
commensurate to the stabbing.
What ifs:
Q: What if the dentist, while already performing the
service, used her tools to threaten Leonor. Would that
constitute unlawful aggression?
A: Yes, since the unlawful aggression contemplated by
law includes immediate and imminent threats.
NOTE: It is important to determine whether the act of
the offended constitutes unlawful aggression or
sufficient provocation, because if it is the former, the
accused may already invoke self-defense
Q: What would constitute sufficient provocation which
do not constitute unlawful aggression
A: If the dentist threaten the accused that she would
slash him by pointing the tool from afar. In this case,
such act would still not constitute unlawful aggression.
5. Immediate vindication of a grave offense;
Requisites
i. That there be a grave offense done to the:
a. One committing the felony
b. His spouse
c. Ascendants
d. Descendants
e. Legitimate, natural, or adopted brothers or sisters
f. Or relatives by affinity within the same degrees
ii. The felony is commited in vindication of such grave
offense.
- As opposed to sufficient provocation, the circumstance
of immediate vindication admits of an interval of time
- But there must be no sufficient time to enable the
accused to recover his serenity.
103
Art. 13(3)
104
Art. 248
- It is different from sufficient provocation. In this case,
there might be an interval of time.
- What is essential is that the proximate cause of the
attack is the grave offense earlier committed
- The grave offense must be against
Illustrative case
US v. Ampar, 37 Phil 201 (1917)
FACTS: There was a fiesta, the roast pig was being served.
The accused, who was 70 years old, asked from the victim
some roast pig, to which the victim replied “come here and
I’ll make roast pig out of you”. As a consequence, a little
later while the said Modesto Patobo was squatting down, the
accused came up behind him and struck him on the head with
an ax, causing death the following day. The defendant was
charged with murder.
ISSUE: WON the immediate vindication of a grave offense
may be appreciated
HELD: Yes. The court noted that the defendant, being a very
old man, the reply of the victim to him, while may be
considered as a joke for an ordinary man, to an old man, such
statement may be considered so insulting and offending.
Hence it was considered as a grave offense. Instead of being
respected, he was made as a butt of a joke.
NOTE: The grave offense in this case need not constitute a
crime, it does not contemplate a crime.
People v. Pajares, 210 SCRA 237 (1992)
FACTS: Earlier that day (about 10 hrs ago), one of the
defendants found out that there was an altercation between
his brother and the victim. As a consequence, the defendants
mauled and stabbed the victims to retaliate in favour of his
brother.
ISSUE: WON vindication of a grave offense is attendant.
HELD: No.it must be emphasized that there is a lapse of
about ten (10) hours between said incident and the killing
of Diosdado Viojan. Such interval of time was more than
sufficient to enable appellant to recover his serenity.
Hence, the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication
of a grave offense cannot be appreciated in his favor.
NOTE: A grave offense may either be a verbal act or a
physical act. In Q: What if the proximate cause of the killing
was the grave offense earlier committed, would that
necessarily constitute the vindication of a grave offense?
A: NO, although the mitigating circumstance admits an
interval of time, the vindication must also be done
immediately, that is, there must be no sufficient time to
enable the accused to recover his serenity.
People v. Rebucan, infra.
RULING: As regards the mitigating circumstance of
immediate vindication of a grave offense, the same cannot
likewise be appreciated in the instant case. Article 13,
paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code requires that the act
be "committed in the immediate vindication of a grave
offense to the one committing the felony (delito), his spouse,
ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted
brothers or sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same
degrees." The established rule is that there can be no
immediate vindication of a grave offense when the
accused had sufficient time to recover his equanimity.
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant points to the alleged
attempt of Felipe and Timboy Lagera on the virtue of his wife
as the grave offense for which he sought immediate
vindication. To our mind, a period of four days was
sufficient enough a time within which the accused-
appellant could have regained his composure and
self-control. Thus, the said mitigating circumstance cannot
be credited in favor of the accused-appellant.
6. Passion or obfuscation;
Requisites
i. The accused acted upon an impulse
ii. The impulse must be so powerful that it naturally
produced passion or obfuscation in him
iii. The passion must arise from legitimate sentiments
-not due to unworthy reasons.
COMMENT: if you are the one on the wrong, you
cannot invoke this circumstance.
Illustrative case
U.S. v. Hicks, 14 Phil 217 (1909)
FACTS: For about five years, Augustus Hicks and Agustina
Sola illicitly lived together. Subsequently, due to a trouble
arising between them, Agustina quitted Hick's house,
separated from him, and went to live with her
brother-in-law. A few days later she contracted new
relations with another negro named Wallace Current who
then went to live in the said house. Ultimately, the accused
went to the house and shot Agustina Sola. As a consequence,
she died. Augustus Hicks was charged with murder.
ISSUE: whether or not the mitigating circumstance of
passion and obfuscation should be appreciated
HELD: NO.
US v. De la Cruz, 22 Phil 426
FACTS: The evidence clearly discloses that the accused, in
the heat of passion, killed the deceased, who had theretofore
been his querida (concubine or lover) upon discovering her in
flagrante in carnal communication with a mutual
acquaintance.
ISSUE: whether or not the mitigating circumstance of
passion and obfuscation should be appreciated
HELD: YES
NOTE: If the accused and the deceased where legally
married, and the accused killed the spouse upon surprising
her in flagrante in carnal communication with another person,
such would fall under art. 247, namely, Death or physical
injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances, an
absolutory cause. The accused shall suffer the penalty of
destierro
 COMPARISON: The difference between the two cases is the
presence of a lawful sentiment in the latter case. In the Hicks,
the accused and the woman were already separated. In De
la Cruz, the accused and the deceased were still in a
relationship. Hence, in hicks, the accused was moved not
because of passion, but because of jealousy, an unlawful
sentiment. In De la Cruz, the caused was the betrayal by the
woman with whom he was in a relationship.
Furthermore, in De la Cruz, the accused caught her in
flagrante, such would certainly produce passion and
obfuscation.
NOTE: Even if Hicks caught the woman and the other person
in flagrante having sexual intercourse, passion would still be
unavailing since Hicks and the woman were already
separated. Hence, there would be no basis for passion and
obfuscation.
7. Voluntary surrender & voluntary plea of guilt;
-Two circumstances are provided for in this paragraph,
namely, voluntary surrender, and voluntary plea of guilt
in an open court.
1) Voluntary surrender
Requisites
i. The accused was not yet lawfully arrested
CAVEAT: the law does not require that the surrender be prior to
the order of arrest; it only requires that the accused was not yet
lawfully arrested
ii. The accused surrendered to a person in
authority or his agent
Who are person in authority: Art. 152. Any person directly
vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member
of some court or government corporation, board, commission,
shall be deemed a person in authority. A barrio captain and a
barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in authority.
Who are agents of persons in authority: A person who by
direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by
competent authority, is charged with the maintenance of public
order and the protection and security of life and property, such as
a barrio captain, barrio councilman, barrio policeman and
barangay leader and any person who comes to the aid of persons
in authority, shall be deemed an agent of person in authority
NOTE: In applying the provisions of articles 148105 and 151106
of this code, teachers, professors, and persons charged with the
supervision of public or duly recognized private schools, colleges
and universities, shall be deemed persons in authority. (As
amended by PD 299 and BP 873)
iii. The surrender must be voluntary and
spontaneous
105
Direct Assaults
- there must be an intent to submit oneself
unconditionally to the authorities, showing an intention
to save the authorities the trouble and expense that his
search and capture would require (Canta v. People).
Q: What if there is already a police warrant?
A: This would not necessarily preclude the application of
this circumstance since the non-issuance of an arrest
warrant is not an element.
Q: What if the arrest warrant was issued, after which the
police officers held a press conference precisely to inform
the public that the police officers will arrest the accused.
Thereafter, the accused surrendered to the nbi. can he
avail of this circumstance?
A: Yes, all of the requisites are present. The law does not
require that the surrender be prior to the order of arrest
Neither the absence of a press conference is an element.
In this case the accused wilfully surrendered to the nbi.
The surrender is voluntary when there is an intent to
submit oneself unconditionally to the authorities,
showing an intention to save the authorities the
trouble and expense that his search and capture
would require. In this case, the search has not yet
started.
2) Plea of guilt in an open court
Requisite:
i. That the offender spontaneously confessed
his guilt
ii. That the confession of guilt was made in open
court, that, before the competent court that
is to try the case.
iii. The plea must be done prior the
presentation of the evidence for the
prosecution.
Q: What if the accused plead guilty after the
presentation of evidence by prosecution but
before the completion, would this circumstance
be appreciated?
A: NO, since the prosecution has already
started the presentation of evidence.
NOTE: Even if only one witness was presented,
this case will no longer be available. It must be
done during arraignment or at least prior the
presentation of evidence by the prosecution.
NOTE: In this paragraph, two separate mitigating
circumstances are provided. Both may be appreciated
separately.
RATIONALE: By voluntary surrendering, 1) they are submitting
themselves to the court process, and 2) they prevent the
unnecessary wastage of resources, not only financial, but also
man-power wise in seeking and arresting the accused.
Illustrative case
106
‘Resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the
agents of such person
 People v. Leonor defense will not merely be illness, but an exempting circumstance
-voluntary surrender was not appreciated in this case of insanity or imbecility.
since the accused tried to evade the police officers after
the report by mixing himself with the crowd. NOTE: Insomnia is also not considered as an illness. Lack of sleep
is not equivalent to illness
8. Physical defect (restricts his means of action,
10. Similar or analogous circumstances.
communication and defense);
- All of the above circumstances are ordinary mitigating
- This circumstance connotes not merely physical
except under 18 years of age.
defect person. The defect must restrict action,
-Hence, art. 13 is not an exclusive list.
communication and defense.
- Not all kinds of physical defect.
Illustrative case
Illustrative case:
Canta v. People, 353 SCRA 250 (2001)
People v. Albuquergue, 59 Phil. 150 (1933)
FACTS: Narciso Gabriel acquired from his half-sister a cow.
FACTS: The accused in this case was suffering from
Subsequently, Narciso gave the custody of the animal, to
partial paralysis. He merely intended to injure the
Agapay, when it was lost. He was told that petitioner
victim, however, he unfortunately stabbed the
Exuperancio Canta had taken the animal. Thereafter, they
victim in his neck.
found the cow in the possession of Canta’s father. Ultimately,
COMMENT: The mitigating appreciated in this case
Narciso Gabriel reported the matter to the police. As a result,
was praeter intentionem. However, if the paralysis
Narciso and petitioner Exuperancio were called to an
restricted the action communication and defense,
investigation. Petitioner admitted taking the cow but claimed
then it may also be separately appreciated.
that it was his, since the cow suck the breast of the mother’s
9. Illness (diminishes his exercise of willpower);
cow, and that it was lost. As Narciso did not come the
Requisites:
following day, although Maria did, Florentino said he told his
i. That the illness must diminish the exercise of his
son to take the cow to the Municipal Hall of Padre Burgos.
will-power
Petitioner did as he was told. Petitioner Exuperancio Canta
ii. The illness should not deprive the offender of
was charged of violation of P.D. No. 533, otherwise known as
consciousness of his acts.
the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974.
-if he lost his consciousness, he cannot invoke this.
ISSUE: WON the mitigating of analogous circumstance is
present
Illustrative case
HELD: YES. The circumstance of voluntary surrender has the
People v. Javier, 311 SCRA 576 (1999)
following elements: (1) the offender has not actually been
FACTS: Accused-appellant Eduardo Javier admitted
arrested; (2) the offender surrenders to a person in authority
killing his wife in their bedroom with the use of a sharp
or to the latters agent; and (3) the surrender is voluntary. In
bolo. He identified the bolo as the same one presented
the present case, petitioner had not actually been arrested.
by the prosecution and which he used in wounding
In fact, no complaint had yet been filed against him when he
himself. Accused-appellant told the court that he killed
surrendered the cow to the authorities. It has been
his wife because he could not sleep for almost a month.
repeatedly held that for surrender to be voluntary, there must
He claimed that when the killing took place, his mind
be an intent to submit oneself unconditionally to the
went totally blank and he did not know what he was
authorities, showing an intention to save the authorities the
doing.
trouble and expense that his search and capture would
ISSUE: WON illness should be appreciated as a
require.
mitigating circumstance.
In petitioner’s case, he voluntarily took the cow to the
HELD: No. The mitigating circumstance of illness cannot
municipal hall of Padre Burgos to place it unconditionally in
be appreciated. Since he remembered the vital
the custody of the authorities and thus saved them the
circumstances107 surrounding the ghastly incident, from
trouble of having to recover the cow from him. This
the time of the killing up to the time he was brought to
circumstance can be considered analogous to voluntary
the hospital, it shows that he was in full control of his
surrender and should be considered in favor of petitioner.
mental faculties. This negates his claim that he was
suffering from an illness that diminished the exercise of
B. Privileged
his will-power.
-cannot be offset by generic aggravating circumstance
NOTE: If the accused was suffering from insanity or imbecility, -There are five privileged mitigating:
he would no longer have the consciousness of his acts. Hence, the

107
“On the other hand, it is clear that accused-appellant was
aware of the acts he committed. First, he remembered killing
his wife in their bedroom with the use of a bolo, where he
mangled her neck twice; he remembered trying to commit
suicide, by wounding himself with the same bolo he used in
killing his wife; and he remembered being brought to the
hospital”
1. Over 15, under 18-with discretion108
- one degree;
2. Incomplete justifying or exempting circumstances109- when
majority of such conditions be present.
- one or two degrees based on the discretion of the judge;
Illustration
In case of self-defense, the requisites are:
1) unlawful aggression;
2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; and
3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.
If 1 and 2, or 1 and 3 are present, then it is considered as a
privileged mitigating circumstance. But if only unlawful
aggression is present, then it is merely an ordinary mitigating
circumstance which is art. 13(1). (NOTE: Unlawful
aggression is always essential in self-defense cases)
NOTE: In the justifying circumstance of performance of a
duty, there are only two requisites, namely:
1) That the accused acted in the performance of a duty
or lawful exercise of a right or office; and
2) That the injury caused or offense committed by the
necessary consequence of the due performance of such
duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.
In Pp v. Oanis, where only one of the requisites was present,
art. 69 was applied. In the said case, what was present was
that the accused acted in the performance their duty. 2nd
requisite is wantingfor the crime commited by them is not the
necessary consequence of a due performance of their
duty.(they have exceeded their duty by killing a person
108 Article 68(2). Penalty to be imposed upon a person under
eighteen years of age. Upon a person over fifteen and under
eighteen years of age the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper
period. (first par. no longer applicable)
109 Article 69. Penalty to be imposed when the crime committed
is not wholly excusable. - A penalty lower by one or two
degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed if the
deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of
the conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from
criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in Article 11
and 12, provided that the majority of such conditions be
present.
110 Art. 64(5). When there are two or more mitigating
circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are present,
the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem applicable,
according to the number and nature of such circumstances.
111 Article 67. Penalty to be imposed when not all the requisites
of exemption of the fourth circumstance of Article 12 are
present. - When all the conditions required in circumstances
Number 4 of Article 12 of this Code to exempt from criminal
liability are not present, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period
without any resistance from him and without ascertaining his
identity. Also note the JS Prom case.
3. two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstances110
- one degree lower.
NOTE: At all times, there should be no aggravating
circumstances. Even if there are 5 mitigating, and only 1
aggravating, such would not constitute privileged
circumstance. The law requires total absence of
aggravating circumstances
4. Art. 67111; when all the requisites of the exempting
circumstance of accident are not present.
- two degrees lower from the lowest afflictive penalty.
- Under Art. 9(1), Grave felonies are those to which the
law attaches the capital punishment or penalties which
in any of their periods are afflictive, in accordance with
Art. 25112 of this Code.
- Hence, the minimum penalty imposable in grave felonies
is generally prision mayor, in this case, the minimum
penalty imposable is arresto mayor in its maximum.
5. Art. 47; death penalty reduced to reclusion perpetua for
under 18 or over 70.
- under 18 (privileged); over 70 (ordinary)
- but also talks of privileged mitigating since instead of
imposing death penalty, reclusion perpetua is the
imposable penalty. But note, death penalty has been
suspended
III. AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES113
shall be imposed upon the culprit if he shall have been guilty of
a grave felony, and arresto mayor in its minimum and medium
periods, if of a less grave felony.
112
Afflictive penalties:
Reclusion perpetua,
Reclusion temporal,
Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification,
Perpetual or temporary special disqualification,
Prision mayor.
113
Article 14. Aggravating circumstances. - The following are
aggravating circumstances:
1. That advantage be taken by the offender of his public
position.
2. That the crime be committed in contempt or with insult to
the public authorities.
3. That the act be committed with insult or in disregard of the
respect due the offended party on account of his rank, age, or
sex, or that is be committed in the dwelling of the offended
party, if the latter has not given provocation.
4. That the act be committed with abuse of confidence or
obvious ungratefulness.
5. That the crime be committed in the palace of the Chief
Executive or in his presence, or where public authorities are
 2.Cruelty-
FOUR KINDS; Generic, Specific, Inherent, Qualifying applicable on to
crimes against
persons
Generi Specific Qualifyin Inherent
3. Ignominy-
c g
crimes against
-applies -available only to -Those that --those that it
chastity
to all particular crimes change the must of necessity
4. Disregard of
crimes (art 14 nature of accompany the
the respect due
(3;15;16;17;21) the crime commission
the offended
) thereof.
party on account
(Art. 62(2))
of his rank age
e.g.
or sex(not
i. fire-arson114;
dwelling)- only
ii. Unlawful entry-
to crimes against
Trespass to
persons or honor
dwelling115
iii. derailment of
a locomotive-
damage and NOTE: Special Aggravating Circumstance is different from
obstruction to Extraordinary Aggravating Circumstance
means of
communication Special Aggravating Extraordinary
116
Aggravating
Immediately imposes the Imposes an additional
-Those that must maximum of the penalty penalty
of necessity e.g. Quasi-recividism- Habitual Delinquency-
accompany the Where the person Where a person within a
commission of commits a felony before period of ten years from
the crime (Art. beginning to serve or the date of his release or
62(2)) while serving a sentence last conviction of the
e.g. crimes of less or serious
1.Treachery- physical injuries, estafa,
applicable only falsification or theft, is
to crime against found guilty is found
persons

engaged in the discharge of their duties, or in a place dedicated
to religious worship.
6. That the crime be committed in the night time, or in an
uninhabited place, or by a band, whenever such circumstances
may facilitate the commission of the offense.
Whenever more than three armed malefactors shall have acted
together in the commission of an offense, it shall be deemed to
have been committed by a band.
7. That the crime be committed on the occasion of a
conflagration, shipwreck, earthquake, epidemic or other
calamity or misfortune.
8. That the crime be committed with the aid of armed men or
persons who insure or afford impunity.
9. That the accused is a recidivist.
A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime,
shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of
another crime embraced in the same title of this Code.
10. That the offender has been previously punished by an
offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater penalty
or for two or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty.
11. That the crime be committed in consideration of a price,
reward, or promise.
12. That the crime be committed by means of inundation, fire,
poison, explosion, stranding of a vessel or international damage
thereto, derailment of a locomotive, or by the use of any other
artifice involving great waste and ruin.
13. That the act be committed with evidence premeditation.
14. That the craft, fraud or disguise be employed.
15. That advantage be taken of superior strength, or means be
employed to weaken the defense.
16. That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia).
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially
to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make.
17. That means be employed or circumstances brought about
which add ignominy to the natural effects of the act.
18. That the crime be committed after an unlawful entry.
There is an unlawful entry when an entrance of a crime a wall,
roof, floor, door, or window be broken.
20. That the crime be committed with the aid of persons under
fifteen years of age or by means of motor vehicles, motorized
watercraft, airships, or other similar means. (As amended by RA
5438).
21. That the wrong done in the commission of the crime be
deliberately augmented by causing other wrong not necessary
for its commissions.
114
Art. 320
115
Art. 280
116
Art. 330
 on a previous conviction guilty of the same crimes
or felony.117 for three times or
more.118
NOTE: Delete the impression that once there’s an aggravating
circumstance, the penalty in its maximum period shall be imposed.
This is not entirely correct because the effect of a mitigating is to
diminish the penalty or lower. We don’t know how many periods
or degree. In aggravating, it only increases the penalty by a
period.
NOTE: Although a complex crime under art. 48 imposes the
maximum penalty for the more serious offense, the same cannot
be considered as a special aggravating circumstance because the
provision is ultimately favourable to the accused as opposed to
finding him guilty for two separate offenses.
People v. Orilla- ART. 14, an exclusive list.
FACTS: Fifteen-year old and accused’ sister, Remilyn Orilla was
sound asleep when she was suddenly awakened by a heavy
weight pressing on her body and found accused Joseph Orilla on
top of her. Accused then forced Remilyn Orillas legs apart and
inserted his penis into her vagina. She felt some warm matter
enter her vagina. Appellant remained on top of Remilyn Orilla and,
after a few minutes, she again felt the same substance enter her
vagina. The trial court held accused guilty of qualified rape and
imposed Death. The trial court ruled that since Remilyn was only
15 years old at the time appellant raped her, the death penalty
must be imposed on appellant, the victim’s brother. The Solicitor
General concedes that the trial court erred in imposing the death
penalty based on the twin circumstances of relationship and
minority considering that the Amended Information failed to
allege specifically Remilyns age. What justifies the imposition of
the death penalty, the Solicitor General argues, is the fact that
appellant used a knife in committing the rape and appellant
perpetrated the rape against his own sister. According to the
Solicitor General, Article 335 as amended by RA 7659 provides
that the use of a deadly weapon in the commission of rape results
in the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
117
Art. 160. Commission of another crime during service of
penalty imposed for another offense; Penalty. — Besides the
provisions of Rule 5 of Article 62, any person who shall commit
a felony after having been convicted by final judgment, before
beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving the same,
shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty
prescribed by law for the new felony. chan robles virtual law
library
Any convict of the class referred to in this article, who is not a
habitual criminal, shall be pardoned at the age of seventy years
if he shall have already served out his original sentence, or
when he shall complete it after reaching the said age, unless by
reason of his conduct or other circumstances he shall not be
worthy of such clemency.chanrobles virtual
118
Art 62(5). Habitual delinquency shall have the following
effects:
(a) Upon a third conviction the culprit shall be sentenced to the
penalty provided by law for the last crime of which he be found
Applying Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the presence of an
aggravating circumstance warrants the imposition of the higher
penalty of death. The Solicitor General points out that relationship
in this case is an aggravating circumstance based on Article 15 of
the Revised Penal Code as applied in People v. Baldino.
ISSUE: WON relationship should be appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance for the purpose of imposing the death
penalty
HELD: NO. People v. Baldino, the case invoked by the Solicitor
General, appreciated relationship as an aggravating circumstance
but only for the purpose of assessing exemplary damages against
the accused and not for the purpose of imposing the death
penalty.
Section 11 of Republic Act 7659, imposes the penalty of reclusion
perpetua when the rape was committed with force and
intimidation. But the imposable penalty becomes reclusion
perpetua to death whenever the rape is committed with the use
of a deadly weapon.
On the other hand, the circumstances pertinent to the relationship
(disregard of the filial respect due the victim by reason of her age,
sex and rank) must be alleged in the information and duly proven
in the trial. In the present case, the Amended Information failed
to allege the same and the prosecution did not prove these
circumstances during the trial.
The circumstances pertinent to the relationship
(disregard of the filial respect due the victim by reason of her
age, sex and rank) are aggravating circumstances listed in
paragraph 3 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. Article 14 of
the Revised Penal Code enumerates the aggravating
circumstances. Unlike mitigating circumstances under
Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, Article 14 does not
include circumstances similar in nature or analogous to
guilty and to the additional penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods;
(b) Upon a fourth conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to
the penalty provided for the last crime of which he be found
guilty and to the additional penalty of prision mayor in its
minimum and medium periods; and
(c) Upon a fifth or additional conviction, the culprit shall be
sentenced to the penalty provided for the last crime of which
he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision
mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its
minimum period.
Notwithstanding the provisions of this article, the total of the
two penalties to be imposed upon the offender, in conformity
herewith, shall in no case exceed 30 years.
For the purpose of this article, a person shall be deemed to be
habitual delinquent, is within a period of ten years from the
date of his release or last conviction of the crimes of serious or
less serious physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or falsification,
he is found guilty of any of said crimes a third time or oftener.
those mentioned in paragraphs 1 to 21 of Article 14. The
term aggravating circumstances is strictly construed, not
only because what is involved is a criminal statute, but
also because its application could result in the imposition
of the death penalty. The list of aggravating
circumstances in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is
thus exclusive[51] for the purpose of raising a crime to its
qualified form.
BUT NOTE: ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCES MAY ALSO BE
CONSIDERED AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES or
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
NOTE: Aside from the 21 circumstances listed under art. 14, the
three circumstances (i.e. relationship, intoxication, degree of
instruction or education) may also be considered as aggravating.
CAVEAT: ARTICLE 14 IS AN EXCLUSIVE LIST
Article 14 does not include relationship as an aggravating
circumstance. Relationship is an alternative circumstance under
Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code:
Discussion2: AS TO THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
FACTS: The trial court in this case convicted the accused of
qualifying rape using the second ejaculation as basis for qualifying
ISSUE2: WON the ruling of the trial court is correct.
HELD: No, there is no basis in law. The trial court cannot consider
the second ejaculation by the accused as a qualifying
circumstance to raise the penalty to death it being not the
circumstance provided for in law which would qualify rape.
Q: What are qualifying aggravating circumstances?
A: Those which change the nature of the crime
Q: Can we find them art. 14?
A: No, they are scattered in the provisions of the revised penal
code.
Q: What kind of aggravating circumstances are listed in art. 14?
A: Generic and Specific aggravating circumstances
Q: In discussing qualifying circumstances, would the court make
use of art. 14?
A: No, the Court would not make use of art. 14. E.g. in qualifying
the killing to murder, the court would cite Art. 248. 119 The six
circumstances enumerated in art. 248 are qualifying aggravating
circumstances.
119
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength,
with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the
defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck,
stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a street car or
locomotive, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or
with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the
preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a
volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
NOTE: If the circumstances under art. 14 are used to define a
crime (e.g. Murder), the same would be considered as qualifying
aggravating.
DISCUSSION3: WHETHER THE RAPE QUALIFIED IN THIS
CASE
Q: When is rape qualified?
A: Rape is considered qualified if its commission is attendant by
the circumstances provided for in Art. 266, e.g., that the offended
party is a minor (minority), AND a relative of the accused
(relationship)120.
FACTS: The Amended Informations for Criminal Case Nos. 3219-
A and 3220-A are identical. The allegations read: “That on or
about the dawn of September 12, 1996 at Brgy. Masidem,
municipality of Bani, province of Pangasinan, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-accused,
by means of force or intimidation, armed with a knife, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with REMILYN R. ORILLA, younger sister of accused
against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.”
The trial court convicted appellant of qualified rape in Criminal
Case No. 3219-A because appellant is Remilyns brother and she
was a minor being only 15 years old at the time that appellant
raped her.
ISSUE: WON the trial court is correct in convicting the accused
of qualified rape
HELD: A reading of the Amended Information, however,
does not justify the elevation of the crime of simple rape
to qualified rape. The prosecution went through the trouble of
amending the Information to allege that Remilyn is the younger
sister of appellant to emphasize the qualified nature of the rape.
However, the Amended Information did not allege
Remilyns minor age. The prosecutions failure to allege
specifically Remilyns minor age prevents the
transformation of the crime to its qualified form. The facts
stated in the body of the information determine the crime of which
the accused stands charged and for which he must be tried. The
information must allege every element of the offense to enable
the accused to prepare properly for his defense. The law assumes
that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that
constitute the offense. Since the Amended Information failed to
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the
suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or
corpse.
120
Art 266-B- "The death penalty shall also be imposed if the
crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
"l) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative
by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim;
inform appellant that the prosecution was accusing him of
qualified rape, the court can convict appellant only for simple rape
and the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua and not death.
NOTE: The fact that the offended party is a minor is not an
aggravating circumstance under art. 14. But in rape, the minority
(if concurred by relationship) is considered qualifying
circumstance.
COMMENT BY CALICA: The import of People v. Orilla is that
art. 14 is an exclusive list of aggravating circumstances, but then,
the specific crimes would also state, as in the case of art. 248,
what would be the qualifying circumstances for murder which
applies only to murder. In rape, there are also qualifying
circumstances. The aggravating circumstance in art. 14 are
generic. They would not qualify the crime unless they are
enumerated in the provision defining the crime itself as in the case
of murder in art. 248.
Simbilon v. People, G.R. No. 175528, September 30, 2009
FACTS: The accused is a police officer who, while investigating
the offended party, committed acts of lasciviousness against the
latter. The information provides: That on or about August 14,
1998, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, motivated
by lewd design, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously upon the
person of AAA, by then and there embracing, mashing the breast,
and touching the private part, against her will. CONTRARY TO
LAW.” The RTC rendered a decision finding accused guilty of acts
of lasciviousness with the aggravating circumstance of petitioners
taking advantage of his public position
ISSUE: Won the RTC is correct in appreciating the circumstance
of taking advantage of public position.
HELD: NO. the said circumstance not having been alleged in the
information.
The requirement121 now is that the aggravating as well as the
qualifying circumstances be expressly and specifically alleged in
the complaint or information. Otherwise, they cannot be
considered by the trial court in its judgment, even, if they
are subsequently proved during trial. A reading of the
Information shows that there was no allegation of any aggravating
circumstance.
NOTE: Before, aggravating circumstances not alleged in the
information are appreciated; nonetheless, this rule is no longer
121
Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, provide:
Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. The complaint or
information shall state the designation of the offense given by
the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense,
and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If
there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made
to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusations. The acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying
and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and
valid. The rule now is that all the aggravating and
qualifying circumstances must be alleged in the
information to be appreciated even if proven in the
information. This rule is favorable to the accused and can be
applied retroactively.
People v. Rebucan, G.R. No. 182551, July 27, 2011
RULING AS TO APPRECIATION OF AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCES NOT ALLEGED IN THE INFORAMTION:
Dwelling, minority and intoxication cannot be appreciated as
aggravating circumstances in the instant case considering that the
same were not alleged and/or specified in the information that
was filed on January 23, 2003. Under the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, a generic aggravating circumstance will not
be appreciated by the Court unless alleged in the information. This
requirement is laid down in Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110
TIP: memorize them according from the most easier to remember
or most common.
1. Taking advantage of public position. (i)
TWO TESTS in determining WON the accused has taken
advantage of his public position:
i. When the office is an essential element of the
crime- but in this case, the circumstance is not
appreciated separately as provided for in Art 62(1).
e.g. falsification by public officer (That
advantage be taken by the offender of his
public position)122
ii. Intimate connection or relation test-when the
crime would not have been committed were it not
for his public position. In this case the aggravating
circumstance is appreciated separately
Illustrative case
Pp v. Ural, supra.
The accused is a police officer and has access to the
prison facility that is why he was able to maltreat
the prisoner.
CAVEAT: Amendment provided for in RA 7659- Art. 62
(1(a))- When in the commission of the crime, advantage was
taken by the offender of his public position, the penalty to
concise language and not necessarily in the language used in
the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is being charged
as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for
the court to pronounce judgment.
122
Article 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or
notary or ecclesiastic minister. – xxx any public officer,
employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official
position, shall falsify a document
 be imposed shall be in its maximum regardless of
mitigating circumstances.
2. With contempt/ insult to public authority.
-not agents
Requisites (Reyes)
i. That the public authority is engaged in the exercise
of his functions
ii. The crime should not be committed against the
public authority
iii. The offender knows him to be a public authority
iv. His presence has not prevented the offender from
committing the criminal act
MEANING OF “PUBLIC AUTHORITY”: as distinguished from
1) public officers, 2) persons in authority, 3) agents of persons in
authority.
Illustrative case:
People v. Rodil, G.R. No. L-35156. November 20,
1981
FACTS: The accused stabbed the deceased, PC Lt.
Guillermo Masana, who earlier introduced himself as a PC
officer, while in the presence of PC soldier Virgilio Fidel,
Philippine Coast Guard serviceman Ricardo Ligsa and
Patrolman Felix Mojica of Indang, Cavite. As a matter of fact,
the said chief of police was the one who embraced or
grabbed the accused from behind, wrested the dagger from
him and thereafter brought him to the municipal building of
Indang. While the stabbing incident was taking place, Chief
of Police Primo Panaligan of Indang, Cavite, who happened
to be taking his lunch in the same restaurant, went near the
combatants and embraced and/or grabbed the accused from
behind, and thereafter wrested the dagger from the
accused-appellant. It must be note that appellant knew
Primo Panaligan as the town chief of police.
ISSUE: WON the aggravating circumstance of with
contempt or insult to public authority may be appreciated
HELD; Who are public authorities: Yes “The
aggravating circumstance of contempt of, or insult to public
authority under paragraph 2 of Article 14 of the Revised
Penal Code can likewise be appreciated in the case at bar.
The evidence of the prosecution clearly established that
Chief of Police Primo Panaligan of Indang was present as he
was taking his lunch in the same restaurant when the
incident occurred. As a matter of fact, the said chief of police
was the one who embraced or grabbed the accused from
behind, wrested the dagger from him and thereafter brought
him to the municipal building of Indang. And appellant
admittedly knew him even then as the town chief of police,
although he now claims that he went to the municipal
building to surrender to the chief of police who was not
allegedly in the restaurant during the incident.
While it is true that in the cases of U.S. v. Rodriguez, Et. Al.
(19 Phil. 150,157-158), People v. Siojo (61 Phil. 307, 317),
and People v. Verzo (21 SCRA 1403), this Court ruled that
the term public authority refers to a person in authority and
that a PC lieutenant or town chief of police is not a public
authority but merely an agent of a person in authority; there
is need of re-examining such ruling since it is not justified
by the employment of the term public authority in aforesaid
paragraph 2 of Article 14 instead of the term person in
authority which is specifically used in Articles 148 and 152
of the Revised Penal Code. There is no extended reasoning
of the doctrine enunciated in the aforesaid three (3) cases
why the phrase public authority should comprehend only
persons in authority. The lawmaker could have easily
utilized the term "persons in authority" in the
aforesaid paragraph 2 of Article 14 in much the same
way that it employed the said phrase in Articles 148
and 152. The lawmaker must have intended a
different meaning for the term public authority,
which may however include, but not limited to
persons in authority.
Under the decided cases, a municipal mayor, barrio captain,
barrio lieutenant or barangay captain is a person in authority
or a public authority. Even a public school teacher is now
considered a person in authority under CA 578 amending
Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code (Sarcepudes v. People,
90 Phil. 228). So is the town municipal health officer (People
v. Quebral, Et Al., 73 Phil. 640), as well as a nurse, a
municipal councilor or an agent of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (People v. Yosoya, CA-GR No. 8522-R, May 26,
1955; People v. Reyes, Et Al., O.G.S. 11 p. 24)
The chief of police should therefore be considered a public
authority or a person in authority; for he is vested with
jurisdiction or authority to maintain peace and order and is
specifically duty bound to prosecute and to apprehend
violators of the laws and municipal ordinances, more than
the aforementioned officials who cannot prosecute and who
are not even enjoined to arrest malefactors although
specifically mentioned as persons in authority by the decided
cases and by Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by R.A. 1978 of June 22, 1957. The town chief of
police heads and supervises the entire police force in the
municipality as well as exercises his authority over the entire
territory of the municipality, which is patently greater than
and includes the school premises or the town clinic or barrio,
to which small area the authority or jurisdiction of the
teacher, nurse, or barrio lieutenant, respectively, is limited.”
Who are public officers: Art. 203 For the purpose of applying
the provisions of this and the preceding titles of this book, any
person who, by direct provision of the law, popular election or
appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the
performance of public functions in the Government of the
Philippine Islands, of shall perform in said Government or in any
of its branches public duties as an employee, agent or subordinate
official, of any rank or class, shall be deemed to be a public officer.
Who are person in authority: Art. 152. Any person directly
vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member
 of some court or government corporation, board, commission,
shall be deemed a person in authority. A barrio captain and a
barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in authority.
Who are agents of persons in authority: Art. 152. A person
who by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment
by competent authority, is charged with the maintenance of public
order and the protection and security of life and property, such as
a barrio captain, barrio councilman, barrio policeman and
barangay leader and any person who comes to the aid of persons
in authority, shall be deemed an agent of person in authority
NOTE: In applying the provisions of articles 148123 and 151124
of this code, teachers, professors, and persons charged with the
supervision of public or duly recognized private schools, colleges
and universities, shall be deemed persons in authority. (Art. 152
As amended by PD 299 and BP 873)
NOTE: In voluntary surrender, a person surrenders to a
person in authority, or his agents.
3. Rank, age, or sex/ dwelling if no provocation
NOTE: If all the four circumstances are present, they have weight
of only one aggravating circumstance only.
-Specific aggravating (except dweilling)- applicable only to crimes
against persons or honor. Hence, not applicable in crimes against
property (e.g. robbery)125
Meaning of “with insult or in disregard of person”: It is
necessary to prove the specific fact or circumstance, other
than that the victim is a woman (or an old man, or one of
high rank) showing insult or disregard of sex, age, or rank in order
that it may be considered as aggravating circumstance. There
must be evidence that in the commission of the crime, the accused
deliberately intended to offend or insult the sex or age of
the offended party. (People v. Mangsant 65 Phil. 548)
i. Rank126
-there must be difference in the social condition
of the offender and the offended party.
-this rank is not only limited to a rank of police or
public officer
Illustrative case
People v. Rodil, supra.
123
Direct Assaults
124
‘Resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the
agents of such person
125
The mere fact that the thing belongs to the president does
not make it more valuable than the things belonging to a
private person.
126
Thus, rank aggravated the killing of a staff sergeant by his
corporal (People vs. Mil 92 SCRA 89, 105-106, July 30, 1979),
the killing of the Assistant Chief of Personnel Transaction of the
Civil Service Commission by a clerk therein (People vs. Benito,
62 SCRA 351, 357-358, Feb. 13, 1975), the murder by a pupil of
SEE ABOVE FACTS
ISSUE: WON the aggravating circumstance of disregard of
rank should be appreciated
HELD: Yes. The aggravating circumstance of disregard of
rank should be appreciated because it is obvious that the
victim, PC. Lt. Masana Identified himself as a PC officer to the
accused who is merely a member of the Anti-Smuggling Unit
and therefore inferior both in rank and social status to the
victim.
The term "rank" should be given its plain, ordinary
meaning, and as such, refers to a high social position
or standing as a grade in the armed forces; or to a graded
official standing or social position or station; or to the order
or place in which said officers are placed in the army and navy
in relation to others; or to the designation or title of distinction
conferred upon an officer in order to fix his relative position
in reference to other officers in matters of privileges,
precedence, and sometimes of command or by which to
determine his pay and emoluments as in the case of army
staff officers; or to a grade or official standing, relative
position in civil or social life, or in any scale of
comparison, status, grade, including its grade, status
or scale of comparison within a position (Vol. 36, Words
and Phrases, Permanent Edition, p. 100). As explained by Mr.
Justice Mariano Albert, then of the Court of Appeals, those
"generally considered of high station in life, on account of
their rank (as well as age or sex), deserve to be respected.
Therefore, whenever there is a difference in social condition
between the offender and the offended party, this
aggravating circumstance sometimes is present" (Albert M.A.
— The Revised Penal Code Annotated, 1946 Ed., p. 109).
The difference in official or social status between a P.C.
lieutenant and a mere member of an anti-smuggling unit, is
patent.
NOTE: If the accused herein were charged with the complex
crime of murder with assault against an agent of a person in
authority, and not merely murder, then the aggravating
circumstance of disregard of rank or contempt of or insult to
public authority cannot be appreciated as aggravating
because either circumstance is inherent in the charge of
assault against a person in authority or an agent of a person
in authority. But in the case at bar, the appellant is accused
his teacher (U.S. vs. Cabling, 7 Phil. 469. 474; People vs. Aragon
& Lopez, 107 Phil. 706, 709), the murder of a municipal mayor
(People vs. Lopez de Leon, et al., 69 Phil. 298), the murder -of a
city chief of police by the chief of the secret service division
(People vs. Hollero 88 Phil. 167), assault upon a 66-year old
District Judge of the Court of First Instance by a justice of the
peace (People vs. Torrecarreori CA 52 OG 7644), the killing of a
Spanish consul by his subordinate — a mere chancellor (People
vs. Godinez, 106 Phil. 597, 606607), and the killing of an army
general (People vs. Torres, et al., L-4642, May 29, 1953).
 of murder only. Consequently, either aggravating
circumstance should be considered in the imposition of the
penalty.127
CAVEAT: While the evidence definitely demonstrated that
appellant knew because the victim, who was in civilian
clothing, told him that he was an agent of a person in
authority; he cannot be convicted of the complex crime
of homicide with assault upon an agent of a person in
authority, for the simple reason that the information
does not allege the fact that the accused then knew
that, before or at the time of the assault, the victim
was an agent of a person in authority. The information
simply alleges that appellant did attack and stab PC Lt.
Guillermo Masana while the latter was in the performance of
his official duties, ..." Such an allegation cannot be an
adequate substitute for the essential averment to justify a
conviction of the complex crime, which necessarily requires
the imposition of the maximum period of the penalty
prescribed for the graver offense. Like a qualifying
circumstance, such knowledge must be expressly and
specifically averred in the information; otherwise, in the
absence of such allegation, the required knowledge, like a
qualifying circumstance, although proven, would only be
appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance. Applying
this principle, the attack on the victim, who was known to the
appellant as a peace officer, could be considered only as
aggravating, being "in contempt or with insult to the public
authorities" (Par. 1, Art. XIV of the Revised Penal Code), or
as an "insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended
party on account of his rank, ..." (par. 3, Art. XIV, Revised
Penal Code). CAVEAT2: At present, neither would the
circumstance of rank, if not alleged in the information, be
considered as a generic circumstance.
Q: What if the administrative staff of a school stabbed a professor.
Would that constitute a disregard of rank?
A: Yes, "rank" should be given its plain, ordinary meaning, and as
such, refers to a high social position. It is sufficient that there is
difference in the social condition of the offender and the offended
party.
ii. Age
- Applies in cases where the victim is of tender age
as well as of old age (Reyes)
iii. Sex
127
Thus, in the following cases where the charge was merely
murder or frustrated murder, the aggravating circumstance of
disregard of rank was appreciated:
(1) People vs. Benito, supra — the appellant, a clerk in the
Civil Service Commission, was charged with and convicted of
the murder of the assistant chief of the personnel transaction
of the said Commission;
(2) People vs. Torres, et al., supra — the appellants were
charged with and convicted of murder for the death of Army
- This refers to the female sex, not to the male
sex. (not separately appreciated when the
condition of being a woman is indispensable in the
commission of the crime e.g. in rape, abduction,
seduction- sit being inherent)
iv. Dwelling
- Requisite: The offended party must not give
sufficient and immediate provocation
- Dwelling must be a building or structure
exclusively used for rest and comfort. A
combination house and store (Pp v. Magnaye, 89
Phil 233), or a market stall where the victim slept
is not a dwelling
- Note: Even if the offender did not enter the
dwelling, this circumstance applies. It is enough
that the victim was attacked inside his own house,
although the assailant may have devised means
to perpetrate the assault from without (Pp v.
Ompaid, No. L-23513)
- CAVEAT: Dwelling is not aggravating when both
the offender and offended party are occupants of
the same house. (U.S. v Rodriguez, 9 Phil. 136)
This is true even of offender is a servant in the
house. (Pp v. Caliso, 58 Phil 283)
CAVEAT: Dwelling may mean temporary dwelling. (Pp v. Bandilla,
G.R. 69317) The Code speaks of “dwelling,” not domicile.
(Pp v. Basa, 83 Phil 622)
-hence, even if the house/room is not owned by the victim. So
long as it is a place for exclusively rest and habitation.
-offended must not give provocation
Illustrative case
People v. Daniel, 86 SCRA 511 (1978)
FACTS: This case originated from the Court of First Instance of
Baguio City by virtue of a complaint filed by 13-year old Margarita
Paleng accusing Amado Daniel alias "Amado Ato" of rape alleged
to have been committed against her will, in her own room
situated at No. 25 Interior, Pinsao, Guisad, Baguio City. Accused
raped the victim in the latters boarding house where she is
temporarily staying as she was then a first year high school
student at the Baguio Eastern High School.
ISSUE: WON dwelling should be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance
HELD: YES, Although Margarita was merely renting a bedspace
in a boarding house, her room constituted for all intents and
purposes a "dwelling" as the term is used in Article 14(3),
Col. Valentin Salgado and attempted murder for the injuries
inflicted on Army Gen. Mariano Castaneda;
(3) People vs. Valeriano, et al. — appellants were accused and
convicted of robbery with homicide for the killing of District
Judge Bautista of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga [90
Phil. 15, 34-35]; and
(4) People vs. Hollero supra — where the accused chief of the
Secret Division of the Bacolod City Police Department was
convicted of murder for the killing of the chief of police.
Revised Penal Code. It is not necessary, under the law, that the
victim owns the place where he lives or dwells. Be he a lessee, a
boarder, or a bed-spacer, the place is his home the sanctity of
which the law seeks to protect and uphold.
4. Abuse of confidence or Obvious ungratefulness
- The two aggravating circumstances in this paragraph
(Reyes)
Abuse of Confidence
Requisites
i. That the offended party had trusted the offender
ii. That the offender abused such trust by committing
a crime against the offended party.
iii. That the abuse of confidence facilitated the
commission of the crime
NOTE: Not appreciated in Estafa with abuse of confidence.
In such case, the circumstance is a qualifying circumstance.
Obvious ungratefulness
- Ungratefulness must be obvious, i.e., manifest and clear
5. Malacanang Palace/ Presence of Chief Executive/
Public authorities in performance, or in a place
dedicated to religious worship
Place where public authorities are engaged in the discharge of
their duties (par. 5), distinguished from contempt or insult to
public authorities (par. 2)
Par. 5 Par. 2
Public authorities are in the performance of their
duties
The public authorities The public authorities
must be in their office are performing their
duties outside of their
office
Public authority may be Public authority should
the offended party. not be the offended
party
-NOTE: The place of the commission of the felony, if it is
malacanang palace or a church, is aggravating, regardless of
whether State or official or religious functions are being held.
(Reyes)
- Cemeteries is not a place dedicated to religious worship
- The Chief Executive need not be in Malacanang palace. His
presence alone in any place where the crime is committed is
enough to constitute the aggravating circumstance.
CAVEAT: The offender must have intention to commit a
crime when he entered the place
Illustrative case
People v. Jaurigue, 76 Phil 174
FACTS: At the time of the commission of the crime, both the
deceased and defendant were inside a chapel. The deceased
placed his hand on the right thigh of defendant girl, who
pulled out with her right hand a fan knife and stabbed him.
HELD: The aggravating circumstance that the killing was
done in a place dedicated to religious worship cannot be
legally considered, where there is no evidence to show that
the defendant had murder in her heart when she entered the
chapel on the fatal night.
- NOTE: This ruling seems to be applicable also in case a
crime is committed in Malacanang palace or where public
authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties.
(Reyes)
6. Night time/ uninhabited place/ band
band- more that three armed malefactors
-Nights are from sunset to sunrise. (art. 13, civil code)
-An Uninhabited place is one where there are no houses at all,
a place at a considerable distance from town, or where the houses
are scatter at a great distance from each other.(Reyes) This
should not be considered when the place where the crime was
committed could be seen and the voice of the deceased could be
heard from a nearby house. (Pp v. Laoto, 52 Phil. 401)
- Whenever more than three armed malefactors shall have
acted together in the commission of an offense, it shall be deemed
to have been committed by a band.
- The armed men must act together in the
commission of the crime.
NOTE: “By a band” is inherent in brigandage
-Abuse of superior strength and use of firearms,
absorbed in aggravating circumstance of “by a band.”
When aggravating: Nighttime, uninhabited place, or band
is aggravating –
i. When it facilitated the commission of the crime; or
ii. When especially sought for by the offender to insure
the commission of the crime or for the purpose of
impunity(Pp v. Pardo, 79 Phil 568); or
iii. When the offender took advantage thereof for the
purpose of impunity(US v. Billedo, 32 Phil. 574)
Illustrative case
People v. Bermas, G.R. Nos. 76416 and 94312 July 5, 1999
FACTS: Around 8:30 p.m., at the sea, the offended parties were
on board a fishing boat (basnigan) named "Sagrada Familia". They
intended to catch fish that night and brought with them two (2)
pressure gas lamps, a fishing net, rope and a pole used for the
net. Subsequently, a small paddled boat (sibiran or sibid-sibid)
with two (2) men on board approached the fishing boat. The
sibiran proceeded to the prow of the fishing boat and went around
it four (4) times. Thereupon, one passenger of Sagrada Familia
ordered the offended party to remove the shade of the gas lamp
so that they could recognize accused’ campanion. Those
notwithstanding, appellant's (Bermas) companion could not be
recognized because his face was covered with a mask and only
his eyes could be seen. Appellant's (Bermas) companion was then
wearing a blue long-sleeved jacket and maong pants. Ultimately,
bursts of gunfire from a high-powered automatic rifle shattered
the air killing Catalino Bellen and Teodoro Cas while mortally
wounding Arturo Abion.
ISSUE: WON nighttime should be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance
HELD: NO, it cannot be appreciated. It needs to be stressed
that the mere fact that the mere fact that the offense was
committed at night will not suffice to sustain a finding a
noctrunity. By and of itself, nighttime is not an aggravating
circumstances; it becomes so only when: 1.] it is specially
sought by the offender; 2.] it was taken advantage of by him;
or 3.] it facilitates the commission of the crime by insuring the
offender's immunity from capture. In the case at bench, other
than the time of the occurrence of the felony, nothing else
suggests that it was consciously resorted to by accused-appellants
to facilitate the commission of the crime or that it was availed of
for the purpose of impunity. Indeed, the records show that
the scene of the crime was well illuminated by two (2)
pressure gas lamps which were on board the basnigan
and that Expedito Bonaobra, in fact, even ordered Arturo
Abion to remove the shade (pantalla) of the gas lamp so
that they could recognize accused Bermas' companion.
NOTE: Be that as it may, nocturnity is absorbed in treachery
and cannot be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance.
Likewise abuse of superior strength is absorbed in
treachery, hence, it cannot be appreciated as an independent
aggravating circumstance when treachery is already present.
7. On occasion of calamity
-The offender must take advantage of the calamity or
misfortune
8. Aid of armed men or persons who insure impunity.
Requisites
i. That armed men or persons took part in the
commission of the crime, directly or indirectly.
ii. That the accused availed himself of their aid or relied
upon them when the crime was committed.
NOTE: If there are more than there armed men who shall
have acted together, “aid of armed men” is absorbed by
“employment of a band”
9. Recidivism (v)
-among to two generic aggravating circumstance respecting
multiple offenders
10. Habituality or Reiteracion (vi)
-among to two generic aggravating circumstance respecting
multiple offenders
11. In consideration of promise or reward
-aggravating against both the inducer and the induced.
(U.S. v Parro, 36 Phil 932)
U.S. v. Manalinde, infra.
FACTS: Promise of reward and premeditation are present,
which in the present case are held to be generic, since the
crime has already been qualified as committed with the
treachery, because the accused confessed that he voluntarily
obeyed the order given him by Datto Mupuck to go
juramentado and kill some one in the town of Cotabato, with
the promise that if he escaped punishment he would
be rewarded with a pretty woman.
12. Conflagration, involving great waste
-Derailment of locomotive-constitutes as a crime in itself
in Art. 330.
-Arson- by means of fire, constitutes as a crime in itsely in
Art. 320
13. Evident premeditation (vii)
NOTE: Inherent in the crimes of theft and robbery; cannot be
appreciated separately.
-before a person steals, he already decided and premeditated to
steal and commit a crime.
- Not inherent in murder; can be appreciated.
Requisites
The prosecution must prove-
i. The time when the offender determined to commit
the crime
-the date, and if possible, the time when the
offender determined to commit the crime is
essential, because the lapse of time for the
purpose of the third requisite is computed from
that date and time
ii. An act manifestly indicating that the culprit has
clung to his determination; and
-The premeditation must be based upon external acts
and not presumed from mere lapse of time (U.S. v.
Ricafort, 1 Phil 173)
-The criminal intent evident from outward acts must be
notorious and manifest, and the purpose and
determination must be plain.
iii. A sufficient lapse of time between the determination
and execution, to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act and to allow his
consciousness to overcome the resolution of his will.
(People v. Lagarto, Gr 65883, May 6, 1991)
FACTS: The accused who pleaded guilty confessed tha that his
wife died 100 days before and that Datu Rajamudah Mupuck
actually ordered him to go juramentado in Cotabato in order to
kill somebody because Mupuck had certain grievances to avenge
against a lieutenant and a sergeant. Manalinde’s reward once he
accomplished the task was a pretty woman. In case he gets
caught, Manalinde was ordered by Mupuck to say that he
performed the act in accordance to the orders of Maticayo, Datto
Piang, Tambal and Inug. To carry out his plan, he provided
himself with a kris, which he concealed in banana leaves. He
travelled day and night before arriving at the town and going
juramentado. That upon reaching the town, he attacked from
behind a Spaniard, and immediately after, he attacked a chinaman
who was close by; he further confessed that he had no quarrel
with the assaulted persons.
ISSUE: WON evident premeditation should be appreciated.
HELD: YES. Premeditation was present in the sense that upon
accepting the order and undertaking the journey in order to
comply with the said order, the accused deliberately considered
and carefully and thoughtfully meditated over the nature and
consequences of the acts which he was about to carry out. He
even provided himself with a weapon, to the extent of concealing
the weapon, and travelling for a day and a night for the sole
purpose of taking the life of two unfortunate persons whom he
did not know and with whom he had never any trouble. The crime
was considered to be premeditated since it was evident that there
was a firm and persistent intention of the accused from the
moment when he first received the order until the crime was
committed.
NOTE: No mitigating circumstance can be afforded to the accused
because his act was not a matter of proper obedience. His
allegation that he acted according to the Datu’s order cannot
exculpate him because it is the barbarous and savage custom of
a juramentado to kill anyone without any motive or reason
whatever, and as such, it cannot be accepted or considered under
the laws of civilized nations. Such exhibitions of ferocity and
savagery must be restrained.
14. Craft, Fraud, disguise
i. Craft- involves intellectual trickery and cunning on
the part of the accused
ii. Fraud-direct inducement by insidious words.
How craft distinguish from fraud?
- When there is a direct inducement by insidious words or
machinations, fraud is present; otherwise The act of the
accused done in order not to arouse the suspicion of the
victim constitutes craft.
FRAUD CRAFT
When there is a direct The act of the accused
inducement by insidious done in order not to
words or machinations arouse the suspicion of
the victim constitutes
craft
iii. DISGUISE- There is disguise when some uses
some device to prevent recognition.
Illustrative case
People v. Bermas, supra.
FACTS: Around 8:30 p.m., at the sea, the offended parties
were on board a fishing boat (basnigan) named "Sagrada
Familia". They intended to catch fish that night and brought
with them two (2) pressure gas lamps, a fishing net, rope and
a pole used for the net. Subsequently, a small paddled boat
(sibiran or sibid-sibid) with two (2) men on board approached
the fishing boat. The sibiran proceeded to the prow of the
fishing boat and went around it four (4) times. Thereupon,
one passenger of Sagrada Familia ordered the offended party
to remove the shade of the gas lamp so that they could
recognize accused’ campanion. Those notwithstanding,
appellant's (Bermas) companion could not be recognized
because his face was covered with a mask and only his eyes
could be seen. Appellant's (Bermas) companion was then
wearing a blue long-sleeved jacket and maong pants.
Ultimately, bursts of gunfire from a high-powered automatic
rifle shattered the air killing Catalino Bellen and Teodoro Cas
while mortally wounding Arturo Abion.
ISSUE: WON disguise should be appreciated
HELD: Yes, the generic aggravating circumstance of disguise
(disfraz) must be appreciated in case at bench. There is
disguise when some uses some device to prevent recognition.
Where a malefactor wore a mask to conceal his identity
during the commission of the crime, as is what happened in
this case where accused Arcilla wore a hood at that time he
strafed the victims with his Armalite rifle, disguise is present
and considered a generic aggravating circumstance.
15. Abuse of superior strength
-advantage be taken of superior strength.
16. Treachery (iii)
-There is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against persons employing means, methods or forms in
the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure
its execution without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make.
-a specific aggravating circumstance, applicable only to crimes
against persons
People v. Sangalang, 58 SCRA 737 (1974)
FACTS: deceased Ricardo Cortez left his nipa hut located at
Silang, Cavite to gather tuba from a coconut tree nearby.
Flora Sarno, his wife, was left inside the hut. While he was on
top of the tree gathering tuba, he was struck by a volley of
shots. He fell to the ground at the base of the coconut tree.
A complaint for murder was filed against the five aforenamed
persons including Sangalang
ISSUE: WON there was treachery in the killing of Ricardo
Cortez
HELD: Yes, the victim was shot while he was gathering tuba
on top of a coconut tree. He was unarmed and defenseless.
He was not expecting to be assaulted. He did not give any
immediate provocation. The deliberate, surprise attack shows
that Sangalang and his companions employed a mode of
execution which insured the killing without any risk to them
arising from any defense which the victim could have made.
People v. Rebucan, supra.
RULING AS TO EXISTENCE OF TREACHERY: In the
instant case, the evidence of the prosecution established the
fact that the killings of Felipe and Ranil were attended by
treachery, thus qualifying the same to murder.
TEST: There is treachery when the offender commits
any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make.
Without any provocation, the accused-appellant suddenly
delivered fatal hacking blows to Felipe. The abruptness of
the unexpected assault rendered Felipe defenseless
and deprived him of any opportunity to repel the attack and
retaliate. As Felipe was carrying his grandson Ranil, the
child unfortunately suffered the same fatal end as that of his
grandfather. In the killing of Ranil, the trial court likewise
correctly appreciated the existence of treachery. The said
circumstance may be properly considered, even when
the victim of the attack was not the one whom the
 defendant intended to kill, if it appears from the
evidence that neither of the two persons could in any
manner put up defense against the attack or become
aware of it.
NOTE: Killing of a child, always attendant with treachery:
Furthermore, the killing of a child is characterized by
treachery even if the manner of assault is not shown. For the
weakness of the victim due to his tender years results in the
absence of any danger to the accused.
NOTE: The essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden
attack, offering an unarmed and unsuspecting victim no
chance to resist or to escape. There is treachery even if
the attack is frontal if it is sudden and unexpected,
with the victims having no opportunity to repel it or
defend themselves, for what is decisive in treachery is that
the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victims
to defend themselves or to retaliate
TREACHERY ABSORBS ABUSE OF SUPERIOR
STRENGHT: When the circumstance of abuse of superior
strength concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed in
the latter.
People v. Bermas, supra.
RULING: It need not be overemphasized that the sudden
and unanticipated volley of gunfire from a high-
powered automatic rifle at the unsuspecting and
unarmed victims coupled with other means resorted to
which tended directly and especially to insure the success of
the assault underscores the existence of treachery. To
reiterate, a deliberate, unexpected and sudden attack under
circumstances which render the hapless victim unable and
unprepared to defend himself or to afford him any chance to
escape by reason of the suddenness and severity of the
assault constitutes alevosia
NOTE: Be that as it may, nocturnity is absorbed in
treachery and cannot be appreciated as a generic
aggravating circumstance. Likewise abuse of superior
strength is absorbed in treachery, hence, it cannot be
appreciated as an independent aggravating circumstance
when treachery is already present.
CAVEAT: Although commonly associated with suddenness of
attack, the presence of sudden attack does not necessarily mean
that there is treachery already.
e.g In People v. Rodil, supra. the stabbing was sudden, but
treachery was not appreciated since Lt. Masana and Rodil were
face to face. If they were face to face, treachery would not be
appreciated even if the attack was sudden because there is still
possibility of defense. In fact, in the case of Rodil, Lt. Masa was
able to wrestle with Rodil.
128
Article 15. Their concept. - Alternative circumstances are
those which must be taken into consideration as aggravating or
17. Ignominy (iv)
-a specific aggravating circumstance, applicable only to
crimes against chastity
Illustrative cases
People v. Torrefiel, et al., C.A., 45 O.G. 803
Ruling: When the accused raped a woman after winding
cogon grass around his genital organ, he thereby augmented
the wrong done by increasing its pain and adding ignominy
thereto.
COMMENT: The cogon grass is not necessary for the
commission of rape, but the purpose is to further degrade the
victim.
People v. Alfanta, G.R. No. 125633. December 9, 1999
FACTS: In addition to raping the victim, the man also
inserted his penis into the victim’s anus.
ISSUE: WON there was ignominy
HELD: Yes, The trial court correctly held that there was
ignominy because the appellant used not only the missionary
position, i.e. male superior, female inferior, but also the same
position as dogs do i.e., entry from behind. The appellant
claims there was no ignominy because The studies of many
experts in the matter have shown that this position is not
novel and has repeatedly and often been resorted to by
couples in the act of copulation. This may well be if the sexual
act is performed by consenting partners but not otherwise.
Article 14, paragraph 17, of the Revised Penal Code considers
to be an aggravating circumstance any means employed or
circumstance brought about which add ignominy to the
natural effects of the act.
NOTE: The circumstance, it is said, "pertains to the moral
order and adds disagree and obloquy to the material injury
caused by the crime.
18. Unlawful entry
19. Window be broken
20. Aid of minor, or by means of motorized vehicle
21. Cruelty (ii)
-a specific aggravating circumstance, applicable only to
crimes against persons
Requisites
i. That the injury caused be deliberately increased by
causing other wrong
ii. That the other wrong be unnecessary for the
execution of the purpose of the offender
IV. ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCE128
- May be considered either as mitigating or aggravating.
mitigating according to the nature and effects of the crime and
the other conditions attending its commission. They are the
 - There is no express guideline relationship as well as for (8) Arresto mayor
degree of instruction. But for intoxication, there is (9) Suspension
(10) Destierro
1. Relationship
Mitigating Aggravating Light penalties:
Mitigating in crimes Aggravating in crimes (11) Arrestor menor
against property against persons- if the (12) Public censure
-note in some instances, offended party is older or
absolutory cause. more senior. Penalties common to the three preceding classes:
(13) Fine
-crimes against chastity, (14) Bond to keep the peace
relationship aggravating
ACCESSORY PENALTIES (7)
2. Intoxication
Mitigating Aggravating (1) Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification
when the offender has When the intoxication is (2) Perpetual or temporary special disqualification
committed a felony in a either habitual or (3) Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be
state of intoxication, if the intentional (when he
voted for, the profession or calling
same is not habitual or purposely intoxicated
(4) Civil interdiction
subsequent to the plan himself to increase his
to commit said felony confidence in commiting (5) Indemnification
the crime) (6) Forfeiture or confiscation of instruments and proceeds of
the offense
3. Degree of Instruction or Education (7) Payment of cost
Mitigating Aggravating
To be mitigating, there If the education and high Q: What is the difference between a principal and accessory
must be an absolute lack degree of instruction is penalty?
of education. If with used in the commission of A: The principal penalty is supposed to be included in the
elementary education, the crime. judgment of the trial court. The accessory penalties accompany
this can no longer be the principal penalty and that there is no need for the court to
invoked. Especially for include it in the judgment. Accessory penalties need not be
common crimes like expressly imposed; they are deemed imposed. (Art. 73)
murder, there is no need Outline of accessory penalties inherent in principal penalties:
for education to know
(Art. 40 to 44)
that murder or rape is
(1) Death, when not executed by reason of commutation
evil.
or pardon:
04/07/18 part 1 (a) perpetual absolute disqualification
Article 25. (b) civil interdiction for 30 years, if not expressly
PRINCIPAL PENALTIES (14) remitted in the pardon
(2) Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal:
Capital punishment: (a) civil interdiction for life or during the sentence
(1) Death (b)perpetual absolute disqualification, unless
expressly remitted in the pardon of the principal
Afflictive penalties: penalty
(2) Reclusion perpetua (3) Prision mayor:
(3) Reclusion temporal (a) temporary absolute disqualification
(4) Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification (b) perpetual special disqualification from suffrage,
(5) Perpetual or temporary special disqualification unless expressly remitted in the pardon of the principal
(6) Prision mayor penalty
(4) Prision correccional:
Correctional penalties: (a) suspension from public office, profession or calling
(7) Prision correccional

relationship, intoxication and the degree of instruction and
education of the offender.
The alternative circumstance of relationship shall be taken into
consideration when the offended party in the spouse,
ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural, or adopted brother
or sister, or relative by affinity in the same degrees of the
offender.
The intoxication of the offender shall be taken into
consideration as a mitigating circumstances when the offender
has committed a felony in a state of intoxication, if the same is
not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit said felony
but when the intoxication is habitual or intentional, it shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance.
 (b) perpetual special disqualification from suffrage, if
the duration of imprisonment exceeds 18 months, unless
expressly remitted in the pardon of the principal penalty
Note: There is perpetual special disqualification from suffrage,
only when the duration of the imprisonment exceeds 18 months.
(5) Arresto:
(a) suspension of the right to hold office and
the right of suffrage during
the term of the sentence.
Art. 45. Confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments
of the crime.
(1) Every penalty imposed carries with it the
forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime
and the instruments or tools used in
the commission of the crime.
(2) The proceeds and instruments or tools of
the crime are confiscated and forfeited
in favor of the Government.
(3) Property of a third person not liable for the
offense is not subject to confiscation
and forfeiture.
(4) Property not subject of lawful commerce
(whether it belongs to the accused or
to third person) shall be destroyed.
Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification (Art. 30)
(a) Deprivation of public offices and
employments, even if by election.
(b) Deprivation of right to vote or to be elected.
(c) Disqualification for the offices or public
employments and for the exercise of
any of the rights mentioned.
(d) Loss of right to retirement pay or pension for
any office formerly held.
Note:
Perpetual absolute disqualification is effective during the
lifetime of the convict and even after the service of the sentence.
Temporary absolute disqualification lasts during the term of the
sentence, and is removed after the service of sentence, except:
(1) deprivation of the public office or employment;
(2) loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for
any office formerly held.
Q: Former President Estrada was convicted of plunder (punished
by reclusion perpetua to death), and the Sandiganbayan declared
that he should be imprisoned, reclusion perpetua, the
accessory penalties of which are civil interdiction and
perpetual absolute disqualification, which provides that one
cannot vote or be elected. How come he is now Mayor of Manila?
A: He was pardoned. However, a pardon does not automatically
restore one’s civil and political rights as stated under Art. 36.
Kinds of pardon:
(a) Absolute pardon
(b) Conditional pardon
Effects of pardon by the President:
(1) A pardon shall not restore the right
to hold public office or the
right of suffrage.
Exception: When any or both such rights is or are expressly
restored by the terms of the pardon.
(2) It shall not exempt the culprit from
the payment of the civil
indemnity. The pardon
cannot make an exception to
this rule.
Limitations upon the exercise of the pardoning power:
(1) That the power can be exercised
only after conviction.
(2) That such power does not extend
to cases of impeachment.
(Cristobal v. Labrador, 71
Phil. 34, 38)
When you think of pardon, think of art. 23, 36, 89, 94, and 344.
Art. 23. Effect of pardon by the offended party.
A pardon by the offended party does not extinguish criminal
action except as provided in Article 344 of this Code; but civil
liability with regard to the interest of the injured party is
extinguished by his express waiver.
Art. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage,
seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness. — The
crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted
except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse.
The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution
without including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive,
nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the
offenders.
The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of
lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a
complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents,
or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly
pardoned by the above named persons, as the case may be.
In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape,
the marriage of the offender with the offended party shall
extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed
upon him. The provisions of this paragraph shall also be
applicable to the co-principals, accomplices and accessories after
the fact of the above-mentioned crimes.
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal
liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties and as
to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when
the death of the offender occurs before final judgment.
2. By service of the sentence;
3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all
its effects;
4. By absolute pardon;

5. By prescription of the crime;

6. By prescription of the penalty;

7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in Article

344 of this Code.

Art. 94. Partial Extinction of criminal liability. — Criminal liability

is extinguished partially:

1. By conditional pardon;

2. By commutation of the sentence; and

3. For good conduct allowances which the culprit may earn while
he is serving his sentence.

Perpetual or temporary special disqualification for public

office, profession or calling (Art. 31)
(a) Deprivation of the office, employment,
profession or calling affected.
(b) Disqualification for holding similar offices or
employments perpetually or during the term of
the sentence.
 04/07/18 part 2
Art. 1 the effects of the application of when the RPC takes effect.
Art. 2 territorial application of the criminal law; also tells us when
it may be applied outside of the Philippines: 5 exceptions.
Art. 3 the definition of felonies.
Art. 4 the result is different from that intended which is caused
by three factors:
(1) mistake in the blow, if it is either a complex crime, punished
under Art. 48 or two separate crimes;
(2) mistake in identity or error in personem, is punished under
Art. 49;
(3) praeter intentionem results to criminal liability but mitigated
by lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong under Art. 33.
Which discusses also an impossible crime punished under Art.
59.
Art. 6 talks about the stages of commission of a felony;
attempted, frustrated, and consummated.
All stages are punished except in Art. 7 if the felony involved is
a light felony; only the consummated is punished (sic) EXCEPT
if the felony is crimes against persons or property.
Art. 46 is the anchor, the north star; if the law describes a penalty
it should be imposed on the principal in a consummated felony.
Art. 47 this is not a good law anymore; talks of the execution of
the death penalty but if it is imposed on a minor or a person over
70 years old it will not proceed. 3rd time it will not proceed if there
is a automatic review of the Supreme Court and the required
number of votes is not reached (sic).
Art. 48 complex crimes.
Art. 49 for mistake in identity.
Art. 50 to 56 talks of the graduation of penalties:
Consummate Frustrated Attempted
d (2) The commitment of a minor in any if the institutions
Principal 0 1 2 mentioned in the Art. 80 and for the purposes specified therein.
Accomplice 1 2 3 (3) Suspension from the employment or public office during trial
Accessory 2 3 4 or in order to institute proceedings.
Art. 57 you consider them altogether.
Art. 58 additional penalty to be imposed upon certain
accessories; talks about the accessory who abuses his public
position.
Art. 59 penalty for impossible crimes.
Art. 60 exceptions to the rules established in art. 50 to 57; if the
law already prescribes a penalty for accomplices or accessories
then art. 60 allows it.
Art. 6 and 7 talks of stages of commission.
Art. 8 conspiracy and proposal to commit a felony.
Art. 9 classification of felonies; this has been amended when it
comes to fines, less than 40,000, 40,000 to 1.2 million, then
more than 1.2 million.
Art. 10 and 5, you consider together; art.5 talks of when there is
no law punishing an act but the judge believes it should be
punished so it affirms the principle nullum crimen nulla poena
sige lege; if the penalty is excessive what the courts should do
is it should still apply the penalty but he should report to the Chief
Executive through the Department of Justice; if the court
believes the act should be repressed, it should also render the
proper decision and that is to acquit the accused but then report
to the Chief Executive. Purpose: so that the Chief Executive
would then report to Congress to kindly pass a law penalizing
this act or reducing the penalty.
Art. 10 talks of the relationship between the RPC and the special
penal laws; the soul of this article is in the second sentence and
you delete the first sentence. The default is RPC applies in a
suppletory capacity unless the special penal law defines
otherwise.
Art. 11 to 15 circumstance affecting criminal liability; art. 11
justifying, art. 12 exempting, art. 13 mitigating, art. 14
aggravating, art. 15 alternative, and then absolutory causes
although it has no specific article (art. 247, art. 6, art. 344,
instigation).
Art. 16 to 20 with regards to persons criminally liable.
Art. 21 only penalties prescribed by law will be imposed.
Art. 25 penalties which will be imposed.
Art. 26 how fines are divided into afflictive, coreccional and light
penalty, and has been amended already.
Art. 22 retroactive effect of penal laws.
Art. 23 effect of pardon; pardon by the offended party; affects
only the civil liability but does not extinguish the criminal liability.
What extinguishes the criminal liability is art. 89, absolute
pardon by the President.
Art. 24 are preventive measures which are not considered as
penalties.
Art. 26 fines.
Art. 27 talks of the duration of the penalties.
Art. 28 and 29; art. 29 talks of preventive imprisonment; art. 28
talks of computation of penalties - so you art. 27, 28 and 29 you
consider together; this pertain to duration then the computation
for art. 28.
Preventive Imprisonment has been amended by R.A. 10592.
The following shall not be considered as penalties (Art. 24):
(1) The arrest and temporary detention of accused persons, as
well as their detention by reason of insanity or imbecility, or
illness requiring their confinement in a hospital.
(4) Fines and other corrective measures which, in the exercise
of their administrative or disciplinary powers, superior officials
may impose upon their subordinates.
(5) Deprivation of rights and the reparations which the civil law
may establish in penal form.
Arrest and temporary detention: A was caught inflagrante
delicto, arrested and placed in prison. He is in temporary
detention, and the case will proceed to determine whether he is
guilty or not. If he is not able to pose bail, then he remains inside
the prison facility. This is not considered as a penalty yet.
Because he was just arrested and in custody to answer pending
the resolution of his case.
The minor is in custody of the Bahay Pag-asa -- does not
constitute penalty.
Preventive suspension also is not a penalty.
Administrative fines imposed by the government agencies is a
separate administrative proceeding and that is not imposed by
reason of the criminal action and is not therefore a penalty.
Deprivation of rights: In the Family Code, there are certain rights,
parental authority for example. In civil interdiction, accessory
penalty, that is the effect -- deprivation of parental authority.
They are also in the Family Code, wherein the person is
deprived of his parental authority not by reason of commission
of a crime but for example, he committed a violation of the
conjugal relations, he is deprived of his parental authority. This
does not constitute also a penalty.
But for Art. 29 it talks of the preventive imprisonment.
This is in contrast to Art. 39, which talks of subsidiary penalty or
imprisonment, which a person convicted of a crime and the court
imposes or declares in his judgment if he is not able to pay the
fine he suffers also subsidiary imprisonment.
Art. 29 is a long article, but it just means that if he is imprisoned,
he is not able to pose bail and then his case proceeds, you know
the reality of the justice system in the Philippines, he might be
imprisoned already for 10 years without his case being resolved.
If that is so then if he follows the rules, he will be credited with
the entire time that he was under preventive imprisonment -- the
entire 10 years. However, if he does not follow the rules, he will
be credited only with the 4/5 of the preventive imprisonment.
If due to the crime for which he was charged, he has been
imprisoned, preventive imprisonment, for a period of time, and
then the crime he committed is as if he approximated the
maximum penalty, then he should be immediately released from
prison. What if the penalty imposed is destierro? Then he shall
be released after 30 days of preventive imprisonment and then
the case will still proceed. Why would he still be put in prison
when he has already served out the entire prospective sentence
if he is convicted that is why he is released from prison? Just
take note that in computing the period of time he has spent it is
the actual time plus good conduct allowances. Before the good
conduct allowances is granted only for those convicted already
of final judgment (convicts by final judgment). Now under the
amendment made by R.A. 10592, even if he is under preventive
imprisonment, he is likewise granted with good conduct
allowances.
Art. 27 to 29, duration of penalties.
Art. 30 to 39, the effects of certain penalties.
Art. 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary
absolute disqualification.
(a) Deprivation of public offices and employments, even if by
election.
(b) Deprivation of right to vote or to be elected.
(c) Disqualification for the offices or public employments and for
the exercise of any of the rights mentioned.
Note:
Perpetual absolute disqualification is effective during the
lifetime of the convict and even after the service of the sentence.
Temporary absolute disqualification lasts during the term of
the sentence, and is removed after the service of sentence,
except:
(3) deprivation of the public office or employment;
(4) loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension
for any office formerly held.
Art. 31. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary
special disqualification.
(a) Deprivation of the office, employment, profession or calling
affected.
(b) Disqualification for holding similar offices or employments
perpetually or during the term of the sentence.
Art. 32. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary
special disqualification for the exercise of the right of
suffrage.
(a) Deprivation of the right to vote or to be elected to any public
office.
(b) Cannot hold any public office during the period of
disqualification.
Art. 33. Effects of the penalties of suspension from any public
office, profession, or calling, or the right of suffrage.
(a) Disqualification from holding such office or exercising such
profession or calling or right of suffrage during the term of the
sentence.
(b) If suspended from public office, the offender cannot hold
another office having similar functions during the period of
suspension.
Art. 34. Civil interdiction. Effects:
(a) Deprivation of the rights of parental authority or guardianship
of any ward.
(b) Deprivation of marital authority.
(c) Deprivation of the right to manage his property and of the
right to dispose of such property by any act or any conveyance
inter vivos.
Note: But he can dispose of such property by will or donation
mortis causa.
Art. 35. Effects of bond to keep the peace.
(a) The offender must present two sufficient sureties who shall
undertake that the offender will not commit the offense sought
to be prevented, and that in case such offense be committed
they will pay the amount determined by the court; or
(b) The offender must deposit such amount with the clerk of
court to guarantee said undertaking; or
(c) The offender must be detained, if he cannot give the bond,
for a period not to exceed 6 months if prosecuted for grave or
less grave felony, or for a period not to exceed 30 days, if for a
light felony.
Atty. Calica: Relate to the penalty of bond. Art. 35 talks of the
effects of the bond to keep the peace. Is there any crime wherein
that bond is imposed?
Art. 284. Bond for good behavior. Imposed when you commit the
crime of grave or light threats.
Is this the same as bond to keep the peace?
No. But apparently, there is no other crime in the RPC where the
penalty of bond to keep the peace is imposed. So we are
assuming that this is the bond to keep the peace mentioned in
Art. 25 and 35.
Pardon:
Art. 23: Effect of pardon by private offended parties.
Art. 36: A pardon shall not restore civil and political rights; it
should be expressly granted by the pardoning power.
P.D. 9: Talks of total extinguishment of criminal liability through
absolute pardon.
Art. 94: Talks of conditional pardon.
Art. 37. Costs is part of the pecuniary liabilities. There are 4
pecuniary liabilities (in order of payment): [Art. 38]
(1) Reparation of the damage caused.
(2) Indemnification of the consequential damages.
(3) Fine.
(4) Costs of the proceedings. Defined in Art. 37:
(a) Fees
(b) Indemnities, in the course of judicial
proceedings.
Art. 38: If he does not have sufficient money.
Art. 39: If he does not have money, and he is imposed with the
penalty of fine, the court orders that he shall also suffer
subsidiary penalty. (Art. 39)
Art. 40 to 45: Talks of the accessory penalties.
The death penalty under the 1987 Constitution has not been
abolished according to the case of People vs. Munoz. There was
a debate in the Constitutional Commission whether they should
abolish it or not, but ultimately decided to retain the death
penalty but left it to Congress as to whether or not it should be
imposed (but only for heinous crimes and for compelling
reasons). After the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the
death penalty cannot be imposed anymore.
People vs. Echegaray
Congress enacted a law, R.A. 7659, reimposing the death
penalty in 1993. There is an enumerated list of crimes punished
by the death penalty. For some, punished by reclusion perpetua
to death, depending on the presence of aggravating
circumstances.
Leo Echegaray raped his daughter. He filed an MR. He was
represented by FLAG. First, they argued that death is a cruel,
unusual, and an inhuman punishment. Second, the compelling
reasons, or the requisites under the Constitution were not
present when the Congress approved R.A. 7659.
The SC said the death penalty is not a cruel, unusual, and an
inhuman punishment. What is cruel, unusual, and inhuman is
when there is torture or lingering death. But the mere
extinguishment of life is not. It does not also require that there
should be a death that resulted in the commission of the crime
involved in order for the death penalty to be imposed. The
Constitution merely requires that it be imposed on heinous
crimes, and the Congress properly defined what heinous crimes
are. These are the hateful, grievous, and (incomprehensible)
offenses or crimes, and these were specifically enumerated in
the heinous crimes law, R.A. 7659. As for the compelling
reasons argument, as long as Congress believes there are
heinous crimes that should be addressed, it is already sufficient
to comply with the Constitutional requirements. Leo Echegaray
was executed; but he was the only one executed under R.A.
7659.
In 2006, former President GMA signed into law R.A. 1946, which
prohibited the imposition of the death penalty. In lieu of the death
penalty, it should be reduced to reclusion perpatua.
People vs. Bon
In this case, the SC came out with an extensive discussion
because under art. 71 where the graduated scale of penalties is
enumerated, the death penalty is number one on the scale.
There was an issue in this case, where the accused was
convicted of 6 counts of rape and 2 counts of attempted rape. In
view of R.A. 1946, instead of the death penalty, it was reclusion
perpetua that was imposed on him for the 6 counts of rape. For
the 2 counts of attempted rape, the imposable penalty is the
death penalty, two degrees lower. The issue is where to start,
from death penalty or reclusion perpetua, considering that the
death penalty cannot be imposed. The SC said that we remove
the death penalty from the graduated scale, and start from
reclusion perpetua.
People vs. Sarcia
The SC, without extensive discussion, included the death
penalty in the graduation of penalties. It returned from the old
rule.
People vs. Arpon
Same as People vs. Sarcia.
What is the rule now? You follow the old rule, and start from
the death penalty. Include the death penalty, but be aware of
the discussion in People vs. Bon.
Art. 61 to 65, in relation to mitigating and aggravating
circumstances.
Art. 61 talks of the graduation of penalties. In order to know how
to compute, relate to art. 71. Memorize art. 71.
Art. 62, how to appreciate mitigating and aggravating
circumstances.
When the aggravating circumstance is used to define the crime,
or if it is an element of a crime, or if it is inherent in the crime, it
is not separately appreciated.
Aggravating and mitigating circumstances are appreciated only
if they relate to the moral attributes of the person or if he has a
personal relation to the offended party or for some other
personal cause like rescidivism and reiteracion; and in that
scenario, it will only apply to that person.
If it relates to the material execution of the crime, or the means
or methods used, only the persons who knew of the use of the
means or methods will be affected by the aggravating
circumstance.
Example: Treachery. They planned to kill a person. A killed the
person with treachery. B did not know that A killed the person
with treachery. Therefore, the treachery will affect only the
liability of A, but will not increase the liability of B.
Art. 63 talks of how to appreciate mitigating and aggravating
circumstances with regard to indivisible penalties.
Art. 64, with regards to crimes with 3 periods. Complex Special Continued
Crimes Complex Crimes
Art. 65. Rules in cases in which the penalty is not composed (ordinary) Crimes
of three periods. - In cases in which the penalty prescribed by Governed by Article 48 of the can be found in
law is not composed of three periods, the courts shall apply the Art. 48 RPC does not jurisprudence
rules contained in the foregoing articles, dividing into three equal apply in special
complex crimes.
portions the time included in the penalty prescribed, and forming
Scattered in the
one period of each of the three portions.
revised penal
code. e.g.
Art. 66. Imposition of fines. robbery with
(a) The court can fix any amount of the fine within the limits homicide (Art.
established by law. 294, par. 1),
(b) The court must consider: robbery with
(i) The mitigating and aggravating circumstances; rape (Art. 294,
and par. 2),
(ii) More particularly, the wealth or means of the kidnapping with
culprit. murder or
homicide (Art.
267, last par.),
Art. 67, incomplete accident.
rape with
homicide (Art.
Art. 68, privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. 335)
When a single Also A continued or
Art. 69, incomplete justifying and exempting circumstance act constitutes considered as continuous or
where the majority of the elements are present. two or more a complex continuing is a
grave or less crime but the single crime,
Art. 70. Successive service of sentences. grave felonies, RPC itself consisting of a
or when an provides for its series of acts
Art. 71. Graduated scales. offense is a penalty. but all arising
necessary - This is the from one
means for only criminal
Art. 72. Preference in the payment if the civil liabilities.
committing the difference resolution.
other, the between Only one
Art. 73. Presumption in regard to the imposition of accessory penalty for the complex penalty shall be
penalties. most serious crimes and imposed.
crime shall be special
Art. 74. Penalty higher than reclusion perpetua in certain cases. imposed, the complex A continued
same to be crimes crime is not a
Art. 75. Increasing or reducing the penalty of fine by one or more applied in its - If there is no complex
degrees. maximum single crime.
period. penalty
prescribed
Art. 76. Legal period of duration of divisible penalties.
by the RPC
itself, then it
Art. 77. When the penalty is a complex one composed of three is not
distinct penalties. considered
as a special
Q: Can a corporation be held criminally liable? complex
A: Yes, it can be subject to criminal liability if the penalty is for crime. In
a fine only. such case,
Art. 48 shall
- END - be applies.
A. COMPLEX CRIMES AND SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIMES
NOTE: A complex crime is only one crime.
WHAT IS A COMPLEX CRIME: Article 48. Penalty for complex
crimes. – When a single act constitutes two or more grave or
1. TWO KINDS OF COMPLEX CRIMES UNDER ART. 48
less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime
Compound crime (e.g. Complex crime proper
shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. People v. Guillen)
When a single act When an offense is a
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN COMPLEX CRIMES, SPECIAL constitutes two or more necessary means for
COMPLEX CRIMES, AND CONTINUED CRIMES grave or less grave committing the other
felonies.
 Requisites Requisites capital punishes penalty of
i. That only a single act i. That at least two punishment with arrest menor
is performed by the offenses are or penalties penalties
offender committed which in any which in
ii. That the single act ii. That one or some of of their their
produces: the offenses must be periods are maximum
a) Two or more necessary to commit afflictive period are
grave felonies the other correctional
b) One or more iii. That both or all of the Fine Afflictive Correctional Not
grave and one or offense must be penalty if it penalty if it exceeding
more less grave punished under the exceeds One does not forty
felonies same statute. million two exceed thousand
c) Two or more less hundred One pesos
grave felonies. thousand million (P40,000) or
pesos two both is
(P1,200,000) hundred provided.
a. Compound Crime- When a single act constitutes two or thousand
more grave or less grave felonies. (P1,200,00
Requisites 0) but not
less than
i. That only a single act is performed by the offender
forty
-when we talk of a single act, we only talk of a single thousand
physical act. (P40,000)
Note: a single physical act is different from one
criminal impulse. Art. 25 Penalties which may be imposed.
-In Pp. v. Guillen, infra., the single physical act is the
throwing of the grenade. KIND PENALTY
ii. That the single act produces: Capital punishment 1. Death
a) Two or more grave felonies
b) One or more grave and one or more less grave Afflictive penalties 1. Reclusion Perpetua
felonies 2. Reclusion Temporal
c) Two or more less grave felonies. 3. Perpetual or
Note: There are three possible combinations. temporary absolute
disqualification
-In Pp v. Guillen, the single act produced two grave
4. Perpetual or
felonies, namely, murder and multiple attempted
temporary special
murder. disqualification
Q: How do you determine if a crime is grave, less 5. Prision Mayor
grave, or light felony?
A: Based on the penalties. The classification whether Correctional penalties 1. Prision Correctional
the felony is grave, less grave, or light is based on the 2. Arresto Mayor
penalties imposed under Art. 9129(as amended by RA 3. Suspension
10951). 4. Destierro

Grave Less Light Light penalties 1. Arresto Menor

Grave 2. Public Censure
Penalty Grave felonies Less grave infractions of
other are those to felonies are law for the Article 26. When afflictive, correctional, or light penalty. 130

than fine which the law those which commission of KIND AMOUNT
attaches the the law which a

129
Article 9. Grave felonies, less grave felonies and light
felonies. - Grave felonies are those to which the law attaches
the capital punishment or penalties which in any of their
periods are afflictive, in accordance with Art. 25 of this Code.
Less grave felonies are those which the law punishes with
penalties which in their maximum period are correctional, in
accordance with the above-mentioned Art..
Light felonies are those infractions of law for the commission
of which a penalty of arrest menor or a fine not exceeding
forty thousand pesos (P 40,000) or both; is provided.(as
amended by RA 10951)
130
Article 26. When afflictive, correctional, or light
penalty. - A fine, whether imposed as a single of as an
alternative penalty, shall be considered an afflictive
penalty, if it exceeds One million two hundred thousand
pesos (P 1,200,000); a correctional penalty, if it does not
exceed One million two hundred thousand pesos (P
1,200,000) but is not less than forty thousand pesos (P
40,000); and a light penalty if it be less than forty
thousand pesos (P 40,000). (as amended by RA 10951)
 Afflictive Exceeds One million two
hundred thousands (P
1,200,000)
Correctional Does not exceed One
million two hundred
thousands (P 1,200,000)
but it is not less than
Forty thousand (P 40,000)
Afflictive Less than forty
thousand(P 40,000)
Illustrative case
People v. Guillen, 85 Phil. 307 (1950)
FACTS: Julio Guillen planned to kill the Philippine
President, Manuel Roxas, and threw a grenade during
a rally in Plaza Miranda, Manila, killing one person and
injuring four others. He was charged and convicted by
the trial court of the complex crime of murder and
multiple frustrated murder.
ISSUE: WON the trial court is correct in considering
that the crime in this case is a complex crime
HELD: Yes, the case before us is clearly governed by
the first clause of article 48 because by a single act,
that a throwing highly explosive hand grenade
at President Roxas, the accused committed two
grave felonies, namely: (1) murder, of which Simeon
Varela was the victim; and (2) multiple attempted
murder, of which President Roxas, Alfredo Eva, Jose
Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang were the
injured parties.
b. Complex Crime Proper- when an offense is a necessary
means for committing the other.
131
Article 299. Robbery in an inhabited house or public
building or edifice devoted to worship. - Any armed person
who shall commit robbery in an inhabited house or public
building or edifice devoted to religious worship, shall be
punished by reclusion temporal, if the value of the property
taken shall exceed fifty thousand pesos (P50000), and if:
(a) The malefactors shall enter the house or building in which
the robbery was
committed, by any of the following means:
1. Through a opening not intended for entrance or egress.
2. By breaking any wall, roof, or floor or breaking any door or
window.
3. By using false keys, picklocks or similar tools.
4. By using any fictitious name or pretending the exercise of
public authority.
Or if -
(b) The robbery be committed under any of the following
circumstances:
1. By the breaking of doors, wardrobes, chests, or any other
kind of locked or sealed furniture or receptacle;
2. By taking such furniture or objects to be broken or forced
open outside the place of the robbery.
Requisites
i. That at least two offenses are committed
ii. That one or some of the offenses must be necessary
to commit the other
iii. That both or all of the offense must be punished
under the same statute.
- No complex crime where one of the offens is
penalized by a special law.
Illustrative case
Napolis v. CA, G.R. No. L-28865 February 28, 1972
FACTS: One evening, Mrs. Casimira Lagman Peñaflor , wife
of Ignacio Peñaflor , the owner of a store heard the barkings
of the dog nearby indicating the presence of strangers.
Acting on instinct, she woke up husband Ignacio Peñaflor
who went down the store to take a look. As he approached
the door of the store, it suddenly gave way having been
forcibly pushed and opened by 4 men, one of them holding
and pointing a machinegun. Upon receiving from someone
a stunning blow on the head, Ignacio fell down but he
pretended to be dead. One of the men asked Mrs. Casimira
L. Peñaflor for money saying that they are people from the
mountain. Ultimately, the CFI found the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery in band.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court
convicting Napolis, Malana and Satimbre of the crime of
robbery committed by armed persons, in an inhabited
house, entry therein having been made by breaking a wall,
as provided in Article 299131 (a) of the Revised Penal Code.
In addition, however, to performing said acts, the
malefactors had, also, used violence against Ignacio
Peñaflor , and intimidation against his wife, thereby
infringing Article 294132 of the same Code, under conditions
When the offenders do not carry arms, and the value of the
property taken exceeds 250 pesos, the penalty next lower in
degree shall be imposed.
The same rule shall be applied when the offenders are armed,
but the value of the property taken fifty thousand pesos
(P50000).
When said offenders do not carry arms and the value of the
property taken does not exceed fifty thousand pesos
(P50000), they shall suffer the penalty prescribed in the two
next preceding paragraphs, in its minimum period.
If the robbery be committed in one of the dependencies of an
inhabited house, public building, or building dedicated to
religious worship, the penalties next lower in degree than
those prescribed in this article shall be imposed. (as amended
by ra 10951-before the threshold amount is 250 pesos)
132
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons - Penalties. - Any person guilty of
robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of
any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by
reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide
shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have
been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.
 falling under sub-paragraph (5) of said article, which
prescribes the penalty of prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period,
which is lighter than that prescribed in said Article 299,
although, factually, the crime committed is more serious
than that covered by the latter provision. This Court had
previously ruled that where robbery, though committed in
an inhabited house, is characterized by intimidation, this
factor "supplies the controlling qualification," so that the
law to apply is article 294 and not article 299 of the Revised
Penal Code. This is on the theory that "robbery which is
characterized by violence or intimidation against the person
is evidently graver than ordinary robbery committed by
force upon things, because where violence or intimidation
against the person is present there is greater disturbance
of the order of society and the security of the individual."
And this view is followed even where, as in the present
case, the penalty to be applied under article 294 is lighter
than that which would result from the application of article
299.
ISSUE: WON Art 294(5), which provides for the lighter
penalty than that which would result from the application
of article 299, should be applied due to the presence of
intimidation which "supplies the controlling qualification"
HELD: No, when the elements of both provisions are
present, that the crime is a complex one, calling for
the imposition -- as provided in Art. 48 of said Code -- of
the penalty for the most serious offense, in its maximum
period, which, in the case at bar, is reclusion temporal in its
2. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium
period to reclusion perpetua, when or if by reason or on
occasion of such robbery, any of the physical injuries
penalized in subdivision I of Article 263 shall have been
inflicted.
3. The penalty of reclusion temporal, when by reason
or on occasion of the robbery, any of the physical injuries
penalized in subdivision 2 of the article mentioned in the next
preceding paragraph, shall have been inflicted.
4. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period
to reclusion temporal in its medium period, if the violence or
intimidation employed in the commission of the robbery shall
have been carried to a degree clearly unnecessary for the
commission of the crime, or when in the course of its
execution, the offender shall have inflicted upon any person
not responsible for its commission any of the physical injuries
covered by subdivisions 3 and 4 of said Article 263.
5. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum
period to prision mayor in its medium period in other cases.
133
the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to
reclusion perpetua when the robbery shall have been
accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation, or if by
reason or on occasion of such robbery, any of the physical
injuries penalized in subdivision 1 of Article 263 shall have
been inflicted; Provided, however, that when the robbery
accompanied with rape is committed with a use of a deadly
maximum period. This penalty should, in turn, be imposed
in its maximum period -- from nineteen (19) years, one (1)
month and eleven (11) days to twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal — owing to the presence of the
aggravating circumstances of nighttime.
Discussion: Simply speaking, robbery has two main
divisions, namely: 1) Robbery with violence against or
intimidation of person (art. 294(5)); and 2) Robbery in an
inhabited house or public building edifice devoted to
worship.(art. 299(a)).
In this case, the offenders committed not only a single
physical act but a series of acts constituting both violence
against the person of Ignacio Peñaflor and his wife(294(5)),
and entry of the house or building by breaking the
door.(art. 299(a)). Hence, this is not a compound crime,
but another kind of complex crime, namely, the complex
crime proper.
2. SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME
- Also considered as a complex crime but the RPC itself
provides for its penalty.
- -e.g.
i. robbery with homicide (Art. 294, par. 1),
ii. robbery with rape (Art. 294, par. 2)133,
iii. kidnapping with murder or homicide (Art. 267, last
par.)134,
weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be
reclusion perpetua to death
134
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. -
Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or
in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more
than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public
authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been
inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if
threats to kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor,
except when the accused is any of the parents, female or
a public officer.
The penalty shall be death penalty where the kidnapping
or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting
ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none
of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in
the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the
detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be
imposed. (as amended by RA 7659)
 iv. rape with homicide (Art. 266-B)135
Discussion as to robbery with homicide:
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of
persons; Penalties. - Any person guilty of robbery with the
use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall
suffer:
2. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by
reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of
homicide shall have been committed. Xxxx
- In this case, there are two crimes, robbery and
homicide.
- The homicide may either be a means in the
commission of robbery (i.e. the robber may kill in order
to take the property of the victim-this is the classic
exam of the second type of complex crime, a complex
crime proper under art. 48. Nonetheless, the law
specifically provides a penalty therefor under Art.
294(1)).Hence, in such case, the rule which should be
applied is not art. 48, but art. 294(1). Thus, it is
considered as a special complex crime.
- But the killing may also be committed when the robber,
after the consummation of the offense by a unlawful
taking, is already being chase by the police officers. If
a bystander was killed during the shootout, the killing
of the bystander is not a necessary means, but the law
consider this as a Special complex crime. This
occurs when the killing is not a necessary means for
the commission of the robbery, but the killing occurs
on the occasion of the robbery.
o Other example, if the robber is already escaping
and someone chased him. As a consequence, the
latter was killed by the former. In such case, the
act would not be a complex crime under art. 48
since the killing is not a necessary means for
the commission of murder. Nonetheless, art. 249
(1) provides for a single penalty in such case since
the killing was done on the occasion of the
robbery. This this case, the crime is a special
complex crime of robbery with homicide.
o This also applies to rape. Of course, you cannot
rape a person who is already dead. If the person
killed the person after raping her, the killing is not
a necessary means for the commission of rape,
thus not a complex crime falling under art.
48. Nonetheless, art 266-B provides for a single
135
Article 266-B. Penalty. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the
next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua.
"Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly
weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be
reclusion perpetua to death.
penalty therefor. Hence, what is committed is a
special complex crime of rape with homicide.
- In this case, the robbery and homicide are not
considered two separate crimes, but a special complex
crime of robbery with homicide.
3. CRIMES WHICH CANNOT BE COMPLEXED; Rebellion
cannot be complexed with any other offense committed on
the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its
commission or as an unintended effect of an activity(on the
occasion) that constitutes rebellion. (Enrile v. Salazar,
G.R. No. 92163, June 5, 1990)
Enrile v. Salazar, supra.
FACTS: Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was
arrested by law enforcement officers. He was charged Senator
Enrile with the complex crime of rebellion with murder and
multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the
period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to
December 10, 1990; Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the
petition for habeas corpus herein,alleging that he was deprived
of his constitutional rights as he was, among others, allegedly
denied of his right to bail; He contended that, based on
Hernandez, rebellion should not be complexed with other
common crimes. He was contesting the same since the complex
crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder is
non-bailable as opposed to simple rebellion which is bailable.
The return filed by return by the Solicitor General urged that the
petitioners' case does not fall within the Hernandez ruling
because the information in Hernandez charged murders and
other common crimes committed as a necessary means for the
commission of rebellion, whereas the information against Sen.
Enrile et al. charged murder and frustrated murder committed
on the occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion. Stated
otherwise, the Solicitor General would distinguish between the
complex crime ("delito complejo") arising from an offense being
a necessary means for committing another, which is referred to
in the second clause of Article 48, Revised Penal Code, and is
the subject of the Hernandez ruling, and the compound crime
("delito compuesto") arising from a single act constituting two
or more grave or less grave offenses referred to in the first
clause of the same paragraph, with which Hernandez was not
concerned and to which, therefore, it should not apply.
The parties' oral and written pleas presented the Court with the
following options:
(a) abandon Hernandez and that rebellion cannot absorb
more serious crimes, and that under Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code rebellion may properly be complexed
with common offenses.
"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim
has become insane, the penalty shall become reclusion
perpetua to death.
"When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by
reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be
reclusion perpetua to death.
"When by reason or on the occasion ofthe rape, homicide is
committed, the penalty shall be death. xxxx
 (b) hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed
in furtherance, or as a necessary means for the
commission, of rebellion, but not to acts committed in the
course of a rebellion which also constitute "common" crimes
of grave or less grave character;
- meaning to say, rebellion only absorbs those crimes
committed as necessary means for the commission of
rebellion (e.g. killing of police officers during shoot,
collecting revolutionary taxes), and not those which
occurred during the occasion thereof e.g. killing of a
bystander during shootout.)
(c) maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion
absorb all other offenses committed in its course, whether
or not necessary to its commission or in furtherance
thereof.
- rebellion absorbs whether the other offense is a
necessary means or merely committed on the occasion
thereof.
ISSUE: WON Rebellion can be complexed with the other
offenses committed in its course, whether or not necessary to
its commission or in furtherance thereof.
HELD: NO, rebellion cannot be complexed with any other
offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a
means necessary to its commission or as an unintended
effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion. Hernandez
remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing
of rebellion.(option c)
RATIONALE: There is one other reason-and a fundamental one
at that-why Article 48 of our Penal Code cannot be applied in
the case at bar. If murder were not complexed with rebellion,
and the two crimes were punished separately (assuming that
this could be done), the following penalties would be imposable
upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine
not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the corresponding
period, depending upon the modifying circumstances present,
but never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for the
crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
death (now reclusion perpetua to death), depending upon the
modifying circumstances present. in other words, in the absence
of aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty (death)
could not be imposed upon him. However, under Article 48 said
penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the absence
of a single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if
construed in conformity with the theory of the prosecution,
would be unfavorable to the movant. Upon the other hand, said
Article 48 was enacted for the purpose of favoring the culprit,
not of sentencing him to a penalty more severe than that which
would be proper if the several acts performed by him were
punished separately.
COMMENT: In other words, if art. 48 would be applied in cases
of rebellion, the application of the said provision would not be
favourable to the accused thereby defeating the real intention
of art. 48. In cases of rebellion, the other offenses are absorbed
by rebellion.
NOTE: Murder, arson, and robbery are mere ingredients of the
crime of rebellion, as means “necessary” for the perpetration of
the offense of rebellion. Such common offenses are absorbed or
inherent in the crime of rebellion. (People v. Hernandez, 95
Phil 515).
CAVEAT: But a rebel who, for some independent or
personal motives, commits murder or other common offenses
in addition to rebellion, nay be prosecuted for and convicted of
such common offenses. (People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90)
Not every act of violence is to be deemed absorbed in the crime
of rebellion solely because it happens to be committed
simultaneously with or in the course of the rebellion. If the
killing, robbing, etc. were done for private purposes or profit,
without any political motivation, the crime would be
separately punishable and would not be absorbed by the
rebellion. But ever then, the individual misdeed could not be
taken with the rebellion to constitute a complex crime,
for the constitutive acts and intent would be unrelated
to each other; and the individual crime would not be a means
necessary for committing the rebellion as it would not be done
in preparation or in furtherance of the latter. This appears with
utmost clarity in the case where an individual rebel should
commit rape; the latter felony could not be said to have been
done in furtherance of the rebellion or facilitated its commission
in any way. The ravisher would then be liable for two
separate crimes, rebellion and rape, and the two could not be
merged into a juridical whole. (People v. Geronimo, supra.)
- E.g. If a rebel, after going home, surprise his wife
flirting with another man and killed the other man. In
such case, he will be charged separately for homicide
and rebellion since the motive in the killing is a
personal one and not political.
- In the rebellion, the intent and the motive of the rebel is
important. There are some crimes, where motive is not
essential. But in rebellion, motive is important. In People v.
Geronimo, the accused was convicted of rebellion and a
separate crime of murder.
4. CASES WHERE THE OFFENSES ARE NOT PRODUCED
BY A SINGE PHYSICAL ACT, NEITHER THE OTHER
OFFENSE IS A NECESSARY MEANS.
i. STABBING.
Illustrative case
People v. Toling, G.R. No. L-27097, January 17, 1975
FACTS: Twins Jose and Antonio Toling were charged and
convicted of multiple murder (9 deaths), multiple frustrated
murder (6 victims) and triple homicide (3 victims), when
they ran amuck in a Bicol-bound train, and stabbed
everyone whom they encountered inside the coach. Antonio
Toling told the investigators that while in the train he was
stabbed by a person "from the station" who wanted to get
his money. He retaliated by stabbing his assailant.
He revealed that after stabbing the person who wanted to
rob him, he stabbed other persons because, inasmuch as
he "was already bound to die", he wanted "to kill
everybody.
ISSUE: Whether or not, the stabbings constitute a complex
crime.
 HELD: No, the eight killings and the attempted killing
should be treated as separate crimes of murder and
attempted murder qualified be treachery (alevosia) (Art.
14[16], Revised Penal Code). The unexpected, surprise
assaults perpetrated by the twins upon their co-passengers,
who did not anticipate that the twins would act like
juramentados and who were unable to defend themselves
(even if some of them might have had weapons on their
persons) was a mode of execution that insured the
consummation of the twins' diabolical objective to butcher
their co-passengers. The conduct of the twins evinced
conspiracy and community of design. The eight killings
and the attempted murder were perpetrated by means
of different acts. Hence, they cannot be regarded as
constituting a complex crime under article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code which refers to cases where "a single act
constitutes two or more grave felonies, or when an offense
is a necessary means for committing the other".
COMMENT: neither is the stabbing necessary means for the
commission of the other stabbings.
ii. SHOOTING.
Illustrative cases
People v. Valdez, 304 SCRA 611 (1999)
FACTS: Appellant Rolando Valdez and his companions were
armed with guns, and Without warning, they pointed their
guns and fired at Montanos group. Rolando Valdez was
charged and convicted by the trial court of complex crime
of multiple murder with double frustrated murder and for
separate crime of illegal possession of firearms.
ISSUE: WON the trial court is correct in convicting the
accused of complex crime of multiple murder with double
frustrated murder.
HELD: No, the trial court is incorrect. It was clear from the
evidence that the four crimes of murder resulted not from
a single act but from several individual and distinct acts.
Each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of their
respective firearms, aiming each particular moment
at different persons constitute distinct and
individual acts which cannot give rise to the complex
crime of multiple murder. The Supreme Court ruled that
Valdez was guilty, not of a complex crime of multiple
murder, but of four counts of murder for the death of the
four victims in this case. In the same manner, Valdez was
likewise held guilty for two counts of frustrated murder.
COMMENT: neither is the shooting necessary means for the
commission of the other shootings.
CAVEAT; GUNS WITH SPECIAL MECHANISM: Several
shots from Thompson sub-machine gun causing several deaths,
although caused by a single act of pressing the trigger, are
considered several acts.
Illustrative case
People v. Desierto, C.A., 45 O.G 4542
FACTS: The accused fired his Thomspon sub-machine gun
at several persons. The first burst of shots hit three
persons. The accused let loose a second burst of shots
wounding two others.
ISSUE: WON the shooting constitutes a complex crime
HELD: No. For each death caused or physical injuries
inflicted upon the victims corresponds a distinct and
separate shot fired by the accused, who thus made himself
criminally liable for as many offense as those resulting from
every single act that produces the same
NOTE: Although each burst of shots was caused by one single
act of pressing the trigger of the sub-machine gun, in view of its
special mechanism the person firing it has only to keep
pressing the trigger with his finger and it would fire continually.
Hence, it is not the act of pressing the trigger which should be
considered as producing several felonies, but the number of
bullets which actually produced them. (Reyes)
5. THE SINGLE CRIMINAL IMPULSE RULE.
Illustrative case
People v. Lawas, GR L-7618, June 30, 1955, 97 Phil. 975
FACTS: Lawas ordered the Moros to be tied in order to be
brought to another place. When one of the guards
approached Datu Lomangcolob, the latter refused,
thereupon, Laws fired his revolver at him and ordered the
guards to fire; the guards following the instructions fired at
the Moros including those who tried to escape. After a short
time, Lawas ordered his men to “cease fire” and the firing
stopped.
ISSUE: WON the multiple firing constitutes a complex
crime
HELD: Yes, if the act or the acts complained of resulted
from a single criminal impulse, it constitutes a single
offense. The evidence positively shows that the killing was
the result of a single impulse, which was induced by the
order of the leader to fire, and continued with the intention
to comply therewith, as the firing stopped as soon as the
leader gave the order to that effect. There was no intent to
fire at each and everyone of the victims separately and
distinctly from each other. Furthemore, it may also be
added that there is absolutely no evidence as to the number
of persons killed by each and every one of the appellants,
so even if we were induced to hold each appellant
responsible for each and every death caused by him, it is
impossible to carry that desire into effect as it is impossible
to ascertain the individual deaths caused by each and
everyone. The Court is therefore forced to find the
appellants guilty of only one offense of multiple
homicide for which the penalty to be imposed should be
in the maximum period.
NOTE: Art. 48 does not provide for a single criminal impulse, it
only provides for a single act producing two or more grave or
less grave felonies.
-multiple homicide connotes either separate crimes of
homicide, or a complex crime of multiple homicide.
COMMENT OF ATTY. CALICA: Is this a valid decision?
Ofcourse, it’s a decision of SC. But when do you apply this, when
do you know when there is a single criminal impulse, cannot we
take a look of the mind of the shooters? That is the difficulty in
this ruling. But if you’re taking about a single act, you based it
on Guillen (e.g. a single act of throwing a bomb)

6. CONTINUED CRIMES AND CONTINUING CRIME
a. Continued Crimes (Continuous or continuing)
- a single crime, consisting of a series of acts but all
arising from one criminal resolution.
- two or more acts which constitute a single crime as the
acts arose from one criminal resolution
- Only one penalty shall be imposed.
- A continued crime is not a complex crime
Illustrative case
People v. De Leon, G.R.L-25375 and 25376, October
8, 1926
FACTS: Accused Vicente de Leon entered the yard of
Vicente Magat's house, and without violence or
intimidation against persons nor force upon things,
took, with intent to gain, two game roosters which
were in the yard. Ultimately, the trial court found the
accused guilty of one crime of theft, holding that the
theft of the two roosters constituted but one crime
ISSUE: WON the taking of the two roosters
constituted only one crime.
HELD: Yes. The act of taking the two roosters, in
response to the unity of thought in the criminal
purpose on one occasion, is not susceptible of being
modified by the accidental circumstance that the article
unlawfully belonged to two distinct persons. There is
no series of acts here for the accomplishment of
different purposes, but only one of which was
consummated, and which determines the existence of
only one crime. The act of taking the roosters in the
same place and on the same occasion cannot give
rise to two crimes having an independent existence of
their own, because there are not two distinct
appropriations nor two intentions that
characterize two separate crimes.
Q: What are the examples of continuing crime?
A: Rebellion and Subversion are continuing offenses (Umil
v. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311(1990))
Illustrative case
Umil v. Ramos, supra.
FACTS: The Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the
Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) received confidential
information about a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit being
treated for a gunshot wound at a hospital. Upon
verification, it was found that the wounded person who was
listed in the hospital records as Ronnie Javelon is actually
petitioner Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation
squad responsible for the killing of two CAPCOM soldiers
the day before. He was positively identified by eyewitnesses
as the gunman who went on top of the hood of the CAPCOM
mobile patrol car and fired at the two CAPCOM soldiers
seated inside. Thereafter he was arrested even without a
warrant.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s arrest was lawful.
HELD: Yes. Petitioner Dural was arrested for being a
member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), an outlawed
subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing
offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without a
warrant is justified as it can be said that he was
committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of
rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit
such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in
furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute
direct assaults against the State and are in the nature of
continuing crime.
Q: When are two or more acts considered as a single crime?
A: 1) when two or more acts are necessary means for
committing the other offense (complex crime proper);
2) when the law provides for a single penalty therefor
(special complex crime);
3) when it arose from a single criminal resolution (continued
or continuing crime).
4) when the one act is absorbed by the other (e.g rebellion,
treason)
- In treason, giving aid to the enemy, he may perform
multiple acts which may constitute separate crimes but
are absorbed in treason, the same in rebellion.
Sanlakas, et. al. v Angelo Reyes, et. al GR 159085,
Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Separate Opinion
PERTINENT PORTION: Rebellion has been held to be a
continuing crimeand the authorities may resort to
warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as
provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
However, this doctrine should be applied to its
proper context i.e., relating to subversive armed
organizations, such as the New Peoples Army, the
avowed purpose of which is the armed overthrow of
the organized and established government. Only in
such instance should rebellion be considered a
continuing crime. When the soldiers surrendered
peacefully in the evening of July 27, the rebellion or the
coup d etat ended. The President, however, did not lift the
declaration of the state of rebellion until 5 days later, on
August 1, 2003. After the peaceful surrender, no person
suspected of having conspired with the soldiers or
participated in the Oakwood incident could be arrested
without a warrant of arrest.
COMMENT: Rebellion as a continuing offense only
contemplates those which are committed by the rebels in the
mountains.
7. TRANSITORY CRIMES
-When some acts material and essential to the crimes and
requisite to their consummation occur in one
municipality or territory and some in another, in
which event, the court of either has jurisdiction to try the
cases, it being understood that the first court taking
cognizance of the case excludes the other.
1. Kidnapping
HYPOTHETICAL FACTS: A Korean was forcefully taken from
his house in Angeles, brought somewhere in Manila, and then
brought to Camp Crame in Quezon City where he was killed and
cremated. Days after, ransom was demanded by the offenders.
When the offenders asked for ransom, the Korean was already
dead.
Q: What did the offenders commit, kidnapping, or
murder?
Q: When the offenders took him in the subdivision in
Angeles City, did the offenders deprive him of his
liberty?
Q: If yes, was the crime kidnapping, or illegal
detention?
Q: Assuming the detention took three days?
Q: Would it constitute a special complex crime of
kidnapping with murder if he was killed because he
resisted immediately after he was forcefully taken?
A: First you recognize the facts, the facts indicates that
the offenders deprive him of his liberty, so it would
constitute illegal detention. Second, the killed the
victim, so murder or homicide defending whether there
be qualifying circumstances. Now, you determine
whether the intention of the taking was just to kill, then
it would be homicide since the deprivation of liberty is
merely an incident of the killing. On the other hand, if
they really deprived him of his liberty and on the
occasion thereof they killed the victim, then it would be
a special complex crime. We look at their intent by
basing on their actions. (the examiner will not
expressly provide for the intent)
Q: Is there an impossible crime in this case since the
ranson was demanded when the Korean was already
dead?
A: No, it is not an impossible crime. One of the
requisites for an impossible crime136 is that the act
should have been a crime against persons or property.
Kidnapping is a crime against personal liberty and
security.
In kidnapping, there may be several venues where the
information may be filed. It may be filed here in angeles city
because the actual deprivation of liberty took place here. It may
also be filed in Quezon city, and in the place where he was
detained, e.g. in manila. This is what we call a transitory crime,
where the essential elements of the crime occurred in several
venues. If that is so, then the criminal complaint or information
may be filed in any of the places where the essential element of
the crime were committed or occurred.
2. Violation of B.P. 22- AN ACT PENALIZING THE
MAKING OR DRAWING AND ISSUANCE OF A CHECK
WITHOUT SUFFICIENT FUNDS OR CREDIT AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES.
136
Art. 4(2)
Violations of B.P. 22 are categorized as transitory crimes. A suit
on the check can be filed in any of the places where any of the
elements of the offense occurred, that is, where the check is
drawn, issued, delivered or dishonored. (Rigor v. People, G.R.
No. 144887. November 17, 2004)
In Nieva, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,137 the accused delivered to
Ramon Joven a post-dated check drawn against the Commercial
Bank of Manila as payment for Joven's dump truck. Said check
was deposited in the Angeles City Branch of the Bank of
Philippine Islands, joven was advised, however, that the
Commercial Bank of Manila returned the check for the reason
that the account against which the check was drawn is a "closed
account." Consequently, the accused was charged with violation
of BP 22 before the RTC of Pampanga. On the contention of the
accused that said court had no jurisdiction to try the case, the
Court categorically ruled that such contention has no basis. The
evidence discloses that the check was deposited and/or
presented for encashment with the Angeles City Branch of the
Bank of the Philippine Islands. This fact clearly confers
jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga over the
crimes of which petitioner is charged. It must be noted that
violations of B.P. Blg. 22 are categorized as transitory or
continuing crimes and so is the crime of estafa. The rule is that
a person charged with a transitory crime may be validly tried in
any municipality or territory where the offense was in part
committed.
NOTE: A transitory crime is different from and not a continuing
crime.
B. THREE-FOLD RULE
“Article 70. Successive service of sentence. - When
the culprit has to serve two or more penalties, he shall
serve them simultaneously if the nature of the
penalties will so permit otherwise, the following rules
shall be observed:
In the imposition of the penalties, the order of
their respective severity shall be followed so that they
may be executed successively or as nearly as may be
possible, should a pardon have been granted as to the
penalty or penalties first imposed, or should they have
been served out.
For the purpose of applying the provisions of the
next preceding paragraph the respective severity of the
penalties shall be determined in accordance with the
following scale:
1. Death,
2. Reclusion perpetua,
3. Reclusion temporal,
4. Prision mayor,
5. Prision correccional,
6. Arresto mayor,
7. Arresto menor,
8. Destierro,
9. Perpetual absolute disqualification,
10 Temporal absolute disqualification.
137
G.R. Nos. 95796-97. May 2, 1997
 11. Suspension from public office, the right to vote
and be voted for, the right to follow a profession
or calling, and
12. Public censure.
Notwithstanding the provisions of the rule next
preceding, the maximum duration of the convict's
sentence shall not be more than three-fold the length
of time corresponding to the most severe of the
penalties imposed upon him.
No other penalty to which he may be liable shall
be inflicted after the sum total of those imposed equals
the same maximum period.
Such maximum period shall in no case exceed forty
years.
In applying the provisions of this rule the duration
of perpetual penalties (pena perpetua) shall be
computed at thirty years.”
-pertains to a convict who was imposed several sentences
-imprisonment can be served simultaneously with accessory
penalties
-imprisonment cannot be served simultaneously with other
imprisonment, in such case, the same shall be serve
successively base on severity
The three-fold rule; taken into account in the service (or
execution) of the penalty, not in the imposition by the
court.
llustrative case
Mejoranda v. Sandiganbayan,
RULING: Petitioner is mistaken in his application of the
three-fold rule as set forth in Article 70 of the Revised Penal
Code. This article is to be taken into account not in
the imposition of the penalty but in connection with
the service of the sentence imposed (People v.
Escares, 102 Phil. 677 [1957]). Article 70 speaks of
"service" of sentence, "duration" of penalty and penalty "to
be inflicted". Nowhere in the article is anything mentioned
about the "imposition of penalty". It merely provides that
the prisoner cannot be made to serve more than three times
the most severe of these penalties the maximum of which
is forty years.
The Sandiganbayan, therefore, did not commit any error in
imposing eight penalties for the eight informations filed
against the accused-petitioner.
PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE
In the graduation of penalties under Arts 46-60, it would matter
the degree of participation of the offender and stages of
commission. Under Art 46 is the penalty prescribed by law shall
be imposed to a principal in a consummated felony.
 QUESTION FROM THE CLASS: The Three-Fold Rule,
what penalty shall we reckon? Remember there is a
duration prescribed under Art 27. Reclusion Temporal
is 12 yrs and 1 day to 20 years. And there’s also
Reclusion Perpetua. But when the court imposes
penalty, it takes note of the attending circumstances.
First, we have the Prescribed Penalty (what is
written in RPC or special penal law) then we have the
Imposable Penalty (after the court has appreciated
the attending circumstances)
 How do we compute then for Reclusion Perpetua? It’s
perpetual imprisonment, in the first place, there
should be no period for this but then under Art 27 it
says 20 years and 1 day to 40 years. But that’s just
for reference. You know that it is indivisible penalty.
Under Art 70, if it is reclusion perpetua, it would be
counted as thirty years to be multiplied by 3. But the
maximum is 40 years only.
 Q: What is the importance of the duration of
Reclusion Perpetua?
 A: To be eligible for Pardon and For the application of
the three-fold rule ;
In the case of Senator De Lima, she argues that the Corpus
Delicti has not been proved. The charged against Senator De
Lima is that she is allegedly in trading Dangerous Drugs. And
how do you prove that? By the existence of the Corpus Delicti
and the Corpus Delicti is composed of two components: (1)
Commission of the Crime (2) Who Committed the Crime /
Criminal Agencey.
Corpus Delicti – translated as the body of the crime; We are
not referring to the dead body or cadaver in Murder or Homicide.
When we talk about the body of the crime, we are actually
talking about the proof of the commission of the crime. How do
we prove the commission of the crime? If you have been hearing
the case of Barrameda in Malabon, she was killed and her body
was placed in a drum. Her body was cemented and threw her
body in the ocean. That happened against a wife by a Mayor.
She was allegedly killed by the husband and her body was
thrown in the ocean. The body can no longer be found. Does
that mean that just because the body of the crime cannot be
found, we cannot anymore prove the commission of the crime?
It can still be proved.
Three Kinds of Evidence
1) Object Evidence
2) Testimonial Evidence
3) Documentary Evidence
While the body of the cadaver is lost and since it is the object
evidence which is the best evidence or evidence of the highest
order. The commission of the crime may still be proved by other
evidence. By persons who witnessed personally the killing. The
body of the crime can still be proved which consist of 1) the
commission of the crime and the second component of Corpus
Delicti by (2) the one who committed the crime/criminal agency.
How can we prove it? By testimonial evidence. If one saw the
stabbing or shooting of the victim then he can testify to prove
who committed the crime.
So those are the two aspects of Corpus Delicti. These are
important in criminal prosecution. That the corpus delicti must
be proved. By studying the nature of the crime and determine
the evidence which can show that the elements are present.
Q: How about criminal agency?
A: By positive identification of the perpetrators. But then for
person who may be held liable there are three.
Arts 16-20 are the provisions pertaining to persons criminally
liable
Article 16. Who are criminally liable. - The following are
criminally liable for grave and less grave felonies:
1. Principals.
2. Accomplices.
3. Accessories.
The following are criminally liable for light felonies:
1. Principals
2. Accomplices
NOTE: That for light felonies, accessories are not held liable.
Accessories are only held liable for grave and less grave felonies.
WHY? For a light felony, the penalty is arresto menor. An
accomplice is being punished one degree lower 138 from the
Principal. While for accessories, two degrees lower. The penalty
of two degrees lower than arresto menor is Fine. Considering
that the penalty small already., for light felonies, there are no
penalties for Accessory.
PRINCIPALS
Persons considered as principals (Art 17)
(1) Principals by direct participation or those who take a
direct part in the execution of the act
(2) Principals by inducement or those who directly force or
induce others to commit it
(3) Principals by indispensable cooperation or those who
cooperate in the commission of the offense by another
act without which it would not have been accomplished
138
Hence, public censure.
PRINCIPAL BY DIRECT PARTICIPATION
 A person who takes a direct part in the execution of a
felonious act is considered as a principal.
 They take direct part in the execution of a criminal act
who, participating in the criminal design, proceed to
carry out their plan and personally take part in its
execution by acts which directly tend to the same end.
[People v. Ong Chiat Lay, 60 Phil. 788 (1934)]
Q: Who is a Principal by Direct Participation? Is he the
one who is present in the scene of the crime?
A: Yes. If the crime involved, is Murder or Homicide. Then he is
the person who is causing or participating in the killing.
If he serves as a lookout, he also participates but he is not then
a principal by direct participation. If he serves as a driver for a
getaway vehicle, he also participates. If he is only part of the
cheering squad, he is not a principal by direct participation.
In Robbery, he should be the one taking the personal property.
If he’s not the one who is taking the property, he is not a
Principal by Direct Participation.
PRINCIPAL BY DIRECT INDUCEMENT
 A person who directly force or induce others to commit
a felonious act is a principal.
 Those who directly induce others to commit the act are
called “principals by inducement” or “principals by
induction”.
WAYS:
(1) by forcing another – In an exempting circumstance of
Irresistible Force, one who acted in an impulse of
unctrollable fear. There is a third person forcing the
principal by direct participation to commit a crime. That
person forcing is the Principal by Direct Inducement.
Effect if he forces another: The party who commits
the crime is exempt from criminal liability. But the
person forcing the principal by direct participation will
be held criminally liable.
 They force another to commit a crime who
physically, by actual force or grave fear, for
example, with a pistol in hand or by any other
threatening means, oblige another to commit
the crime. The SC had earlier said that he who
suffers violence acts without will and against
his will, and is no more than an instrument,
 and therefore is guilty of no wrong. The real
culprits in such a case, the only guilty
persons, are those who use the violence,
those who force the other to commit the
crime.
(2) By inducing others to commit it – Inducing means that
he did not instill force or use uncontrollable fear.
How does one induce another?139
The first way of inducing another is by command:
 One is induced directly to commit a crime
either by command, or for a consideration, or
by any other similar act which constitutes the
real and moving cause of the crime and which
was done for the purpose of inducing such
criminal act and was sufficient for that
purpose. One who physically commits the
crime may escape criminal responsibility by
showing that he acted with due obedience to
an order and, in such a case, the criminal
responsibility falls entirely upon the one who
orders, that is, upon him who by his
commands has directly induced the other to
commit the act. But in case the obedience of
the inferior is not due to the superior and
therefore not necessary, and does not,
therefore exempt him from criminal
responsibility as the physical author of the
crime, he who thus, by his command, directly
induced him to the criminal act is considered
by law also as a principal in the crime. (US vs
Indanan)
 Accused Indanan is the headman of Parang
who induced his followers to kill a certain
man. The persons who followed his orders are
held Principals by Direct Participation. The
person who induced the command, Indanan,
is held liable as Principal by Inducement
US vs INDANAN (1913)
Panglima Indanan is the headman of Parang. He
ordered the killing of the victim, representing that
he also had orders from the Governor to do so.
The SC convicted him as principal by inducement.
The evidence demonstrates that Indanan was the
recognized headman of Parang and it appears
from the testimony of the witnesses that he had a
very powerful influence over them; hence, his
power over them was such that any order issued
by him had the force and efficacy of physical
coercion. SC was of the opinion that the
139
Joke of Atty Calica: By using his good looks…By the wife who
tells her husband “You know, I want that guy to be killed.”
domination of the accused over the persons who,
at his orders, killed the deceased was such as to
make him responsible for whatever they did in
obedience to such orders.
In this case, the words and acts of the accused
had the effect of a command. And even if they
were not, Indanan falsely represented to the
persons who actually committed the crime that he
had an order from the Governor requiring the
death of the victim and that they were under
obligation to carry out that order. It is clear from
the evidence that their inducement was offered by
the accused directly to the persons interested with
the intention of moving them to do his bidding,
and that such representation was the moving
cause of the fatal act.
In the case of Pp vs Ong Chiat Lay, Ong Chiat Lay was charged
as a co-principal, that he induced with the two other accused
and that he allegedly conspired with them. However, these two
accused were acquiited. SC acquitted Ong Chiat Lay because he
did not induce anyone –since the two accused were not held
liable. If you are a Pirncipal by Inducement, then there should
be persons induced who committed the crime. Persons he
allegedly induced were acquitted, he could not have induced
them. In the same breath, if the two are acquitted, then there
is no conspiracy anymore. This is actually a leap of logic.
 The principal by induction becomes liable only when
the principal by direct participation committed the act
induced. As held in People v. Ong Chiat Lay [60 Phil.
788 (1934)], one cannot be held guilty of having
instigated the commission of a crime without it first
being shown that the crime has been actually
committed by another.
In Pp vs Kichi Omine, the accused is one of the managers in a
plantation. Then there is an employee who fought with the
owner. Accused was present when the crime took place and
shouted “Kill him” but the employee was already fighting with
the owner. His statements were not the moving force for the
employee to strike the owner. Hence, he was not considered as
a principal by inducement. For instance, in a basketball game,
the players were already shooting the ball in the game. So even
if you shout “shoot it, shoot it.” The shouting is not a moving
force for the basketball player to shoot the ball. That’ what
happened in Pp vs Kichi Omine, he shouted “kill him” but it did
not matter. It would matter if that shouting would influence the
Principal by Direct Participation, if for instance the employee was
not fighting with the owner.
PP vs KICHI OMINE
Hilario Pulido and Eduardo Autor were fighting. Pulido’s father
helped. Pulido’s father, Angel, was wounded. During the
confrontation between Angel Pulido and Autor, Omine allegedly
shouted words of inducement to Autor (“pegale y matale”). SC
held that Omine was not guilty as principal by inducement.
According to the witnesses for the prosecution, Hilario Pulido
and Autor had already struck each other in the face with their
fists, and Autor had received a blow in the right eye, and then
struck Hilario with his bolo. Angel Pulido would naturally
intervene in the fight between his son and Autor, and if he did
so, Autor, who had already drawn his bolo, would strike him
without the need of any inducement from Omine.
Furthermore, under the circumstances of this case, even if it
were satisfactorily proved that Omine uttered the words in
question, we are of the opinion that they would not be sufficient
to make him principal by induction, because it does not appear
that the words uttered by Omine caused Autor to strike Angel
Pulido. In the first place, Autor had already other reasons for
striking Angel Pulido when Omine is alleged to have uttered the
words of inducement. In the second place, the words in question
were not, in this particular case, sufficient to cause Autor to
strike the offended party with his bolo. Although Autor was
working under the direction of Omine, he was being paid by
Angel Pulido. It does not appear that Omine had any particular
influence over Autor.
The second way is by consideration or price:
 The contract assassins – there’s price money
involved. The Principal by Inducement says
“You kill Mr. A and I will pay you 5,000 pesos”.
The assassin is liable as Principal by Direct
Participation, aggravated by the circumstance
of consideration of price, reward and money.
The Principal by Inducement is also liable and
his participation will also be aggravated.
Third way is through words or other means:
 This is where the difficulty lies. The important
thing is that the person who induces another
primarily makes a statement to Principal by
Direct Participation that he wants the crime to
be committed. And then the person who
commits the crime is actually moved by the
inducement or the words uttered. For e.g the
example I gave earlier (see footnote number
2), the wife. If the husband is 200% in love
with the wife, whatever tells the husband.
“You know, we will have a lovely night tonight
if by 6pm Mr. A will be out in this world.” And
so the husband killed Mr. A. So both of them
will be held liable.
 In the case of Us vs Indanan, the first
scenario given is that he was the headman
and he made a command. That was the first
mode. It was also considered that he may
have use words –to induce his followers. It
may not be a command but he told them “Kill”
and that was the primordial consideration of
the followers to kill the victim.
Requisites for inducement:
1. The inducement be made directly with the
intention of procuring the commission of the
crime;
 For instance, in the illustration given
earlier – the wife. “I want that guy to be
killed by tonight and we will have a great
night later on.” Of course, for the
husband that is the moving force.
2. Such inducement be the determining cause of the
commission of the crime [United States v.
Indanan, 24 Phil. 203 (1913) and People v. Kiichi
Omine, 61 Phil. 609 (1935)]]
PRINCIPAL BY INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION
The requisites of Article 17(3) are:
(1) participating in the criminal resolution, that is, there is
either anterior conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and
intention immediately before the commission of the crime
charged; and
(2) cooperation in the commission of the offense by
performing another act without which it would not have been
accomplished.
 A person who cooperates in the commission of the
offense by another act without which it would not have
been accomplished is a principal.
 You always think of this person as 1) HE IS ALWAYS
PRESENT AT THE SCENE OF THE CRIME. They are
similar with Principal by Direct Participation in a sense
that they are present at the scene of the crime. 2) BUT
THEY ARE PERFORMING DIFFERENT ACTS.
 The Principal by Direct Participation is consummating
the criminal act, direct performance- killing for
example. How about the Principal by Indispensable
Cooperation? He is not killing the victim but he is
performing a different act which is indispensable to the
killing of the victim. That happened in the case of Pp
vs Montealegre. In this case, the policeman is trying to
arrest two persons. One of them is Capalad. And then
Capalad got hold of his knife and stabbed the police
officer. The police officer upon seeing this tries to get
his gun but Montealegre held his hands so he was not
able to get his gun. Montealegre was not trying to kill
him, it was Capalade. So Capalad was the principal by
Direct participation. As to Montealegre, without his
participation, Capalad might not able to successfully kill
Camantigue (the police officer) because Camantigue
might able to get his gun and kill the perpetrators.
Montealegre is the Principal by Indispensable
Cooperation and Capalad was the Principal by Direct
Participation.
PP vs MONTEALEGRE
Police officer Renato Camantigue was trying to arrest
the accused Napoleon Montealegre and Vicente
Capalad who were smoking marijuana inside a
restaurant. However, Capalad pulled out a knife and
Montealegre held Camantigue’s hand and restrained
him, thus, enabling Capalad to stab Camantigue.
Camantigue died due to the stab wounds inflicted by
Capalad
Montealegre was correctly considered by the trial court
as a co-principal for having collaborated with Capalad
in the killing of the police officer. The two acted in
concert, with Capalad actually stabbing Camantigue
seven times and Montealegre holding on to the victim’s
hand to prevent him from drawing his pistol and
defending himself. While it is true that Montealegre did
not himself commit the act of stabbing, he was
nonetheless equally guilty thereof for having prevented
Camantigue from resisting the attack against him.
Montealegre was a principal by indispensable
cooperation under Article 17, paragraph 3 of the
Revised Penal Code.
The requisites of Article 17(3) are: (1) participating in
the criminal resolution, that is, there is either anterior
conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and intention
immediately before the commission of the crime
charged; and (2) cooperation in the commission of the
offense by performing another act without which it
would not have been accomplished.
In Pp vs Simbra, there were two persons, Berto Simbra
and Tolibas. They successfully had carnal knowledge
with a woman. But before this, the woman was trying
to escape, Simbra got hold of the woman. When the
woman tries to shout, Tolibas covered her mouth. So
she was not able to call the attention of the passersby
and then Simbra raped her. While he was raping the
victim, TOlibas was holding the hand of the woman and
then prevented her from shouting. Thus, his
participation to the rape of Simbra was indispensable.
And then they reversed roles, there was conspiracy and
exchange of participation. In the first instance, Simbra
was the Principal by Direct Participation and Tolibas
was the Principal by Indispensable Cooperation. And
then they reversed. Tolibas now was the Principal by
Direct Particiaption. Simbra was the Principal by
Indispensable Cooperation.
PP vs SIMBRA
While complainant Gresilda Gonzales was fetching
water from the artesian well located in the public
market in the evening, she was grabbed by accused
Berto Simbra. She shouted for help but co-accused
Sergio Tolibas covered her mouth with a handkerchief.
Helping each other, Simbra and Tolibas dragged
Gonzales to a secluded place. Simbra then threw
Gonzales to the ground, while Tolibas held her arms
and covered her mouth. Simbra succeeded in having
carnal knowledge of Gonzales twice. Thereafter,
Tolibas had carnal knowledge of Gonzales thrice, with
Simbra helping him by holding the arms of Gonzales.
While complainant Gresilda Gonzales was fetching
water from the artesian well located in the public
market in the evening, she was grabbed by accused
Berto Simbra. She shouted for help but co-accused
Sergio Tolibas covered her mouth with a handkerchief.
Helping each other, Simbra and Tolibas dragged
Gonzales to a secluded place. Simbra then threw
Gonzales to the ground, while Tolibas held her arms
and covered her mouth. Simbra succeeded in having
carnal knowledge of Gonzales twice. Thereafter,
Tolibas had carnal knowledge of Gonzales thrice, with
Simbra helping him by holding the arms of
Gonzales.Simbra escaped and only Tolibas was
charged and convicted of rape. SC modified the
conviction, by sentencing Tolibas not only to one rape
but to two counts of rape of Gonzales, one for the rape
committed by Simbra and another for the rape
committed by him.
 Considering that Tolibas had sexual intercourse with
Gonzales against her will by employing force and
intimidation, the crime committed is rape through
direct participation. And when Tolibas aided Simbra
and made it possible for the latter to have carnal
knowledge of Gonzales, also against her will, Tolibas
committed another crime of rape through
indispensable cooperation. Thus, Tolibas is guilty of
two crimes of consummated rape.
So the participation of a Principal by Indispensable
Cooperation by its term connotes indispensability. The
crime wouldn’t have been committed were it not for
the indispensable cooperation. That differentiates
Principal by Indispensable Cooperation to an
Accomplice
Principal by Direct Participation vs Accomplice
The Accomplice may or may not be present in the crime
if his participation is through prior act, then he is not
anymore in the scene of the crime. But if his
participation is simultaneous then he is also present in
the crime. So if we have Principal by Direct
Participation and Principal by Indispensable
Cooperation and a third person, the accomplice. Then
we have three persons with different degree of
participation. If it’s rape say for instance, like the case
of Pp vs Simbra. We add third person. Then as to his
participation, he serves as a lookout. If he’s a lookout,
his participation is not indispensable. They can commit
the crime even without the lookout. Robbery can be
committed even without a lookout. Even without the
driver of a getaway car. So the participation of a
lookout and the driver of a getaway car is not
indispensable.
But the problem is, in the case of US vs Diris, the uncle
of one of the perpetrators obtained money, so the
perpetrators went to the house of the uncle and
robbed. The two went upstairs and the other one talk
to the wife. The purpose of the third person is to
distract the wife so that the two can consummate the
robbery. The two who went upstairs are held Principal
by Direct Participation while the one who distracted is
held liable as co-principal. (We discussed a while ago
that a lookout who participated through simultaneous
acts is considered as an Accomplice. What happened
here?)
A: Because a person may become a principal in any of
these three modes but there is also a fourth way of
becoming a Principal. And that is being part of
CONSPIRACY.
Again, three modes of being a principal under Art 17.
And then the fourth mode is Principal by Conspiracy.
We should take a look at this at different perspective.
Because under Art 17, the principals are liable there
ONLY for their personal acts. They cannot be held liable
for the acts of others. But if they are in conspiracy,
they are liable even for the acts of others. So even if
they are just sitting in the sofa and the co-conspirators
are committing a crime, they are liable for the acts of
their co-conspirators who committed the crime even if
they are not in the scene of the crime.
Difference between a principal
under Article 17 of the Revised
Penal Code and a co-conspirator
The difference between an accused who is a principal under
any of the three categories enumerated in Article 17 of the
Revised Penal Code and a co-conspirator who is also a
principal is that while the former’s criminal liability is limited
to his own acts, as a general rule, the latter’s responsibility
includes the acts of his fellow conspirators.
CONSPIRACY
 Under Art 8 of the Revised Penal Code, conspiracy
exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it. Generally, conspiracy is not a
crime except when the law provides a penalty therefore
as in treason, rebellion and sedition.
 Conspiracy is a separate indictable offense when the
law specifically penalize conspiracy. For instance:
Conspiracy to commit treason [Article 115, Revised
Penal Code] coup d’etat, rebellion, and insurrection
[Article 136, Revised Penal Code], sedition [Article 141,
Revised Penal Code], Monopolies and combinations in
restraint of trade [Article 186, and Brigandage [Article
306, Revised Penal Code] are punished under the
Revised Penal Code.
 Conspiracy is also a mode of collectivizing criminal
liability, when the conspiracy is actualized, it cannot be
punished anymore as a separate offense but the
persons who participated in the offense will be
collectively held criminally liable. That’s the time
 conspiracy becomes a mode of collectivizing criminal
liability. (Just remember the Three Musketeers or The
Act of One Is The Act Of All)
 What is the required proof of conspiracy? Conspiracy
must be shown to exist by direct or circumstantial
evidence, as clearly and convincingly as the crime
itself.140Atty. Calica: Usually, 99% it cannot be proven
by direct evidence, because the conspirators do not
usually write down their plan. So we usually used
circumstantial evidence.
 While conspiracy to commit a crime must be
established by positive evidence, direct proof is not
essential to show conspiracy. Since by its nature,
conspiracy is planned in utmost secrecy, it can seldom
be proved by direct evidence. Consequently,
competent and circumstantial evidence will suffice to
establish conspiracy.
 EFFECT OF LIABILITY ONCE CONSPIRACY IS
PROVED: Once conspiracy is proved, all of the co-
conspirators who acted in furtherance of the common
design are liable as co-principals.
 However, in order to hold an accused guilty as a co-
principal, it must be established that he performed
an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, either
by actively participating in the actual commission of the
crime, or by lending moral assistance to his co-
conspirators by being present at the scene of the
crime, or by exerting moral ascendancy over the rest
of the conspirators as to move them to executing the
conspiracy. Atty Calica: Should there be an overt act?
Yes, that is a requirement. For example, one of them
is a driver of the getaway vehicle car, even though his
participation is not indispensable but since he is part of
the conspiracy, he is considered as a principal. It does
not matter anymore the degree of his
participation since he is part of the conspiracy.
Whereas under Art 17, they are liable for their
own acts.
ACCOMPLICES
Accomplices are those persons who, not being included in
Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code (e.g. principals), cooperate
in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous
acts.
In Pp vs Nierra, the wife of the brother was killed. Paciano talked
to Doblen and it was Doblen who introduced the Nierra spouses
to the killer who is Gaspar Misa. So Doblen was the intermediary.
They had an agreement and Doblen got the gun and gave it to
the killer. So the participation of Doble was only to introduced
140
People v. Listerio, 335 SCRA 40 (2000
141
This is an issue posed in Pp vs Nierra. But in PP vs Doble,
SC discussed many cases, the essence of these cases is that if
they were part of conspiracy then they will be considered as
the killer and to provide for the gun. He did not participate in
the killing of the wife. While Rojas on the otherhand, serves as
a lookout while Misa was going to kill the wife. SC held that Sps
Nierra as Principals by Inducement. Misa was the Principal by
Direct Particiaption, he is the one who actually killed. While
Doblen and Rojas, although the SC recognized that they were
part of the conspiracy, but SC appreciated that they only have
lesser degrees of participation so they were only convicted as
Accomplices. For Doblen, he participated through his previous
acts – by introducing the killer to the Spouses. Rojas merely
served as a lookout, by the nature of his participation, he is only
an accomplice.
In Pp vs Doble, the accused here robbed a bank in Navotas. We
are concerned here with the two persons. The perpetrators
needed a banca and it was Doble who was the one who looked
for the said banca. Romaquin was the owner of the banca and
the one who drove it so that the perpetrators can go to Navotas.
They did not actually took part in robbing the bank, Doble
merely looked for the bank while Romaquin is the owner. SC
held them only as accomplices. They were not part of the
conspiracy. Things you should look at:
1. if their participation is only minor, they
will always be accomplices.
2. if they’re part of the conspiracy or not.
If they are part of conspiracy, but their
participation is only minor, they will be held
as principals. But if they are not part of the
conspiracy, only an accomplice.141
Since Doble was not part of the conspiracy and he merely
concurred in the criminal resolution, he was not originally part
of the planning and sicussion where they decided to commit a
crime hence he is not a conspirator.
PP vs DOBLE
Ten men robbed the Prudential Bank in Navotas, Rizal. They
rode banca from Manila to Navotas. Cresencio Doble looked for
the banca to deliver the robbers from Manila to Navotas, Rizal,
while Romaquin was the owner of the banca and was the one
who brought the robbers from Manila to Navotas, Rizal and vice-
versa. However, the SC held that they were not principals in the
crime. At most, their liability would be that of mere accomplices.
They joined the criminal design when Cresencio consented to
look for a banca and Romaquin provided it when asked by the
gang leader, and then brought the malefactors to the scene of
the robbery, despite knowledge of the evil purpose for which
Principals. But if not part of conspiracy and merely concurred
in the criminal resolution, he is considered only as an
Accomplice.
the banca was to be used. It was the banca that brought the
malefactors to the bank to be robbed and carried them away
from the scene after the robbery to prevent their apprehension.
Cresencio and Romaquin thus cooperated, but not in an
indispensable manner. Even without them providing the banca,
the robbery could have been committed, specially with the
boldness and determination shown by the robbers in committing
the crime.
simultaneous acts." The Court has held that an accomplice is
"one who knows the criminal design of the principal and
cooperates knowingly or intentionally therewith by an act which,
even if not rendered, the crime would be committed just the
same."
To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two elements
must be present:

In the case of Pp vs Vera, there was a dissenting opinion by

Justice Vitug and he said that it doesn’t matter when the person
comes into the scene because the idea in the majority of the
case, if he was not part of the original discussion and he just
merely concurred, for instance “Oy papatayin naming si A, okay
sayo?” and then he agreed, he is merely an Accomplice. But if
he participated in the killing “Oh ikaw tiga buhat ng banko”, he
will be considered as a Principal – regardless of his participation.
Justice Vitug said, “No, he cannot be considered merely as an
Accomplice. When he participated in the criminal resolution. He
was already part of the conspiracy. Why did he said that?
Because for example, (In Implied Conspiracy) there is no
conspiracy and there are 5 persons who had no agreement with
each other and the suddenly they met one group and they
fought with each other. By their unity of action and criminal
resolution and they kill one person – there is Implied
Conspiracy. How much more dun sa “Uyy sama ka, patayin
natin si A” But at any rate, Pp vs Vera is still the rule.
(1) the "community of criminal design; that is, knowing the
criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he
concurs with the latter in his purpose;" and
(2) the performance of previous or simultaneous acts that
are not indispensable to the commission of the crime.
The distinction between the two concepts needs to be
underscored, in view of its effect on appellant’s penalty. Once
conspiracy is proven, the liability is collective and not individual.
The act of one of them is deemed the act of all. In the case of
an accomplice, the liability is one degree lower than that of a
principal
 So if the nature of his participation is NOT
INDISPENSABLE , then he is only an Accomplice.

RULE: If you just concur with the criminal resolution, you are
only a mere accomplice (Pp vs Vera)
ACCESSORIES

Conspirator vs Accomplice
Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the
commission of the crime, and without having participated
The Revised Penal Code provides that a conspiracy exists when
therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part
"two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
subsequent to its commission in any of the following manners:
commission of a felony and decide to commit it." To prove
conspiracy, the prosecution must establish the following three
requisites: "(1) that two or more persons came to an agreement,
(2) that the agreement concerned the commission of a crime, 1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to
and (3) that the execution of the felony (was) decided upon." profit by the effects of the crime;
Except in the case of the mastermind of a crime, it must also be
shown that the accused performed an overt act in furtherance
of the conspiracy. The Court has held that in most instances, 2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or
the effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent
direct proof of a previous agreement need not be established,
its discovery; or
for conspiracy may be deduced from the acts of the accused
pointing to a joint purpose, concerted action and community of
interest. 3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of
the principal of the crime, provided the accessory acts
with abuse of his public functions or whenever the
author of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide,
On the other hand, the Revised Penal Code defines accomplices murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief
as "those persons who, not being included in Article 17, Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some
cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or other crime.

 For instance in the movies, the police officers
are depicted as like this, that they arrive after
the crime has been committed and all the
criminals had been killed by the bida. The
police comes and profited from the bida. So
accessories are like this, they come to the
scene of the crime after it had already been
consummated already. So that’s the first thing
you should remember.
 Next, the accessories must also know that the
crime has been committed. They arrived late
but they know that a crime has been
committed and despite that they profit from
the effects of the crime. For e.g a robber and
he said to his BFF, hey we robbed PNB today
and got 1 million. So BFF says, how about
me? Penge balato. Oh sama ka na lang
mamaya maghappy happy tayo.
 They assist by concealing or destroying the
body of the crime. For e.g there is a body in
a pool of blood, then the accessory conceals
the body so as to prevent the discovery of the
body of the crime.
 They harbor, conceal or assist in the escape
of the principal of the crime. Take note that
the accessory here is either (1)Public
Officer – who acts with abuse of his public
function and (2) the author of the crime
is guilty treason, parricide, murder, or an
attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive.
(Only four crimes. So if the principal is guilty
of Kidnapping. Then he cannot be an
Accessory) and is known to be habitually
delinquent.
 There are only limited situations when an
Accessory may be punished that’s why we
have PD 1829 or the Obstruction of Justice
Law.
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
 It covers not only assisting in the escape of the
principal who is guilty for the crimes of treason,
parricide or murder or an attempt to take the life of the
Chief Executive.
 Any crime punishable by RPC, if a person assists in his
escape. Then he can be liable for obstruction of justice.
So if he’s not covered under Art 19 , then he can be
covered under PD 1829.
In Pp vs Talingdan, the husband here was killed by the
paramour of the wife. Apparently the wife had knowledge of
earlier’s plan but she was not part of the conspiracy in the killing
of the husband. But when the paramour together with his
cohorts killed the husband, she was there in the house which
was also witnessed by the daughter. The daughter witnessed
142
Transcriber’s note: not sure with the word used by Atty.
Calica. But in my understanding, what he meant was “the
case may proceed independently”
the killing of the father. The mother told the daughter not to tell
who killed her father. The wife was held to be guilty as an
Accessory. She knew who killed the husband. She is liable for
(b) and (c) of Art 19. She hid the body of the crime and she also
assisted in the escape of the principal.
In Pp vs Vino, (Atty Calica is quite confused daw because the
killing happened when the accused were riding a bicycle) Vino
was caught but Salazar (the gunman) went into hiding. Vino
only participated after the commission of the crime, he only
assisted in the escape of the Principal. He was charged as a
Principal. The first question is if he was charged as a Principal,
can he be convicted as an accessory? Yes. The lesser degree of
participation is included in the higher degree of participation.
The next question is, the case against Salazar, the Principal,
proceeded separately. Can the case of an accessory proceeded
independently form the case of the Principal? Yes. As long as
the commission of the crime has been established. You
differentiate this in the case of Pp vs Ong Chiat Lay. Atty. Calica
does not agree with the decision of Ong Chiat Lay. He was of
the opinion that Pp vs Vino is a better decision. Salazar was
acquitted on the abiss of reasonable doubt. So the enxt query is
Q: Can the accessory be held liable when the principal was
acquitted? A: SC said Yes. There may be various reasons for th
acquittal of the principal. But once it has been established that
a crime has been committed, the degree of participation of the
participants may (traverse142) from each other. The case may
proceed independently from each other. Even though one may
be acquitted, it doesn’t hinder the prosecution of the another.
Good case according to Atty. Calica.
PP vs VINO
Roberto Tejada was shot on the street. His father, Ernesto, went
out of the house, along with another eyewitness, when they
heard the gun shots and subsequently saw Lito Vino and Jessie
Salazar riding a bicycle. Vino was driving it while Salazar was
carrying an armalite. Upon reaching the house of Tejada’s
father, Ernesto, Vino and Salazar stopped to watch Roberto.
Salazar pointed his armalite at Ernesto and his companions. But
then, they just left.
However, Vino’s case proceeded first and separately from that
of Salazar and he was convicted only as an accessory to the
crime of murder. While Vino filed his appeal and such was
pending, Salazar’s case proceeded and was completed, which
resulted in his acquittal because his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt (specifically his identity) was not proved.
The first issue: inasmuch as Vino was charged in the
information as a principal for the crime of murder, can
he thereafter be convicted as an accessory?
The answer is in the affirmative. Vino was charged as a principal
in the commission of the crime of murder. Under Article 16 of
the Revised Penal Code, the two other categories of the persons
responsible for the commission of the same offense are the
accomplice and the accessory. There is no doubt that the crime
of murder had been committed and that the evidence tended to
show that Salazar was the assailant. That Vino was present
during its commission or must have known its commission is the
only logical conclusion considering that immediately thereafter,
he was seen driving a bicycle with Salazar holding an armalite,
and they were together when they left shortly thereafter. It is
thus clear that Vino actively assisted Salazar in his escape and
his liability is that of an accessory. The variance is in the
participation or complicity of Vino. While Vino was being held
responsible as a principal in the information, the evidence
adduced however showed that his participation is merely that of
an accessory. The greater responsibility necessarily
includes the lesser. An accused can be validly convicted
as an accomplice or accessory under an information
charging him as a principal.
Second issue: whether or not the trial of an accessory can
proceed without awaiting the result of the separate
charge against the principal.
The answer is also in the affirmative. The corresponding
responsibilities of the principal, accomplice and accessory are
distinct from each other. As long as the commission of the
offense can be duly established in evidence, the determination
of the liability of the accomplice or accessory can proceed
independently of that of the principal.
Third issue: considering that the alleged principal in this
case was acquitted, can the conviction of Vino as an
accessory be maintained?
Yes. In several cases, SC have ruled that even as principal was
exempted criminally, the accessory may nevertheless be
convicted if the crime was in fact established. In the present
case, the commission of the crime of murder and the
responsibility of Vino as an accessory was established. By the
same token, there is no doubt that the commission of the same
offense had been proven in the separate case against Salazar
who was charged as principal. However, Salazar was acquitted
on the ground of reasonable doubt which held that the identity
of the assailant was not clearly established.
The identity of the assailant, however, is of no material
significance for the purpose of the prosecution of the accessory.
Even if the assailant cannot be identified, the responsibility of
Vino as an accessory is indubitable.
ACCESSORIES EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY
 The basis is an Absolutory Cause.
 If the accessory is related to the Principal, by reason of
that relationship, it is a natural isnticnt to help the
accused who is part of their family so these are:
spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural,
and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by
affinity within the same degrees
 NOTE: that it does not include relatives of
consanguinity within the fourth civil degree.
 And there is exception: with the single exception of
accessories falling within the provisions of paragraph 1
of Article 19 (e.g. those who profit themselves or assist
the offender to profit by the effects of the crime). Just
remember, this accessory is the GAHAMAN. The one
who profited. Of course they are relatives they should
help, but since they benefited, it is set-off from their
motive.
PD 1612 or ANTI FENCING LAW
 Penalizes those who transacts with regard to the stolen
property subject of robbery.
 So if one knows that the subject property is stolen, one
should not transact – meaning of transact, to sell, to
dispose, or buy or use these items.
 That person who engages in that transaction is called
a Fence.
 This fence, if we analyze it by the definition of an
Accessory under Art 19, but since the State recognizes
to stop this proliferation of secondhand items which
were subject of robbery or theft, PD 1612 considers
this as an offense and the fence (although by definition
he is an accessory) will be considered as a
PRINCIPAL.
 There is presumption of fencing by mere possession of
the item subject of robbery or theft. (So what do you
do then if you bought an item? There is a provision
under the law that you should register it with the Police
Commander in your respective area)
PD 1829 or OSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE

Section 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum
period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both,
shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or willfully
obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of
suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases
by committing any of the following acts:
(a) preventing witnesses from testifying in any criminal
proceeding or from reporting the commission of any offense or
the identity of any offender/s by means of bribery,
misrepresentation, deceit, intimidation, force or threats;
(b) altering, destroying, suppressing or concealing any paper,
record, document, or object, with intent to impair its verity,
authenticity, legibility, availability, or admissibility as evidence in
any investigation of or official proceedings in, criminal cases, or
to be used in the investigation of, or official proceedings in,
criminal cases;
(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any
person he knows, or has reasonable ground to believe or
suspect, has committed any offense under existing penal laws
in order to prevent his arrest prosecution and conviction;
(d) publicly using a fictitious name for the purpose of concealing
a crime, evading prosecution or the execution of a judgment, or
concealing his true name and other personal circumstances for
the same purpose or purposes;
(e) delaying the prosecution of criminal cases by obstructing the
service of process or court orders or disturbing proceedings in
the fiscal's offices, in Tanodbayan, or in the courts;
(f) making, presenting or using any record, document, paper or
object with knowledge of its falsity and with intent to affect the
course or outcome of the investigation of, or official proceedings
in, criminal cases;
(g) soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept any benefit in
consideration of abstaining from, discounting, or impeding the
prosecution of a criminal offender;
(h) threatening directly or indirectly another with the infliction
of any wrong upon his person, honor or property or that of any
immediate member or members of his family in order to prevent
such person from appearing in the investigation of, or official
proceedings in, criminal cases, or imposing a condition, whether
lawful or unlawful, in order to prevent a person from appearing
in the investigation of or in official proceedings in, criminal
cases;
(i) giving of false or fabricated information to mislead or prevent
the law enforcement agencies from apprehending the offender
or from protecting the life or property of the victim; or
fabricating information from the data gathered in confidence by
investigating authorities for purposes of background information
and not for publication and publishing or disseminating the same
to mislead the investigator or to the court.
If any of the acts mentioned herein is penalized by any other
law with a higher penalty, the higher penalty shall be imposed.
preventing witnesses from testifying in any criminal proceeding
or from reporting the commission of any offense or the identity
of any offender/s by means of bribery, misrepresentation,
deceit, intimidation, force or threats
 Atty Calica: I don’t know if the Bar Examiner will ask
this, but this has been discussed in the case of Ronnie
Dayan. Allegedly he was induced by Sen De Lima not
to testify in the COngresisonal hearing and the
Congressman were saying that he will be charged
under this law. But take note that under this law, it
involves investigation and prosecution of criminal
cases. In the said congressional hearing, it is not an
investigation of a crime, it is only a congresisional
investigation in aid of legistaltion and not for criminal
offense. There is no obstruction of justice. Probably,
there will be a violation under Crime Against Public
Order – violation to obey a subpoena issued by
Congress. One of the acts penalized there is to disobey
subpoena or if you induced one not to obey a
subpoena.
There are various acts in PD 1829 but also take not par (c)
harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any
person he knows, or has reasonable ground to believe or
suspect, has committed any offense under existing penal laws
in order to prevent his arrest prosecution and conviction
 Remember Art 19 of the RPC, so the Principal there
should be for the crimes of treason, attempt on the life
of the Chief Executive, murder, or parricide. Here, it
refers to any crime punishable under Revised Penal
Code
 More expansive criminal liability here, so if he is not
liable under Art 19, he can be liable under PD 1829
CORPORATION AND OFFICERS
Q: Can the corporation be held liable?
A: Our common notion, at present, they are not liable. But Ching
vs Sec of Justice provides that a corporation can be held liable
so long as a law penalizes the corporation and then the law
provides a procedure. The Corporation may be penalized.
But another problem in the case of West Coast Life Insurance
vs Hurd, which involves a libel case and we know that libel is an
intentional felony which requires malicious intent. Corporation
was charged as liable for Libel. It is not possible for a corporation
to have malicious intent so SC held that it cannot be prosecuted
for libel. But take note that SC also said that it’s possible if so
provided by law. The corporations cannot commit crimes where
malicious intent is required, in that scenario, the officers or
agents of the corporation will be held liable. But the law itself
should state who among the officers shall be held liable. We
have that in Trust Receipts Law, just like what has been
discussed in Ching vs Sec of Justice - board of directors, officers,
or other officials or employees are responsible for the offense.
While in SSS Law, it is the Board of Directors. As the responsible
officers. So the LAW ITSELF SHOULD PROVIDE.
Take note this statement made by the SC in the case of Ching
vs Sec of Justice:
A corporation cannot be arrested and imprisoned; hence,
cannot be penalized for a crime punishable by imprisonment.
However, a corporation may be charged and prosecuted
for a crime if the imposable penalty is fine. Even if the
statute prescribes both fine and imprisonment as penalty, a
corporation may be prosecuted and, if found guilty, may be
fined.
 ATTY. CALICA: if this is asked in the bar exams, and
you are not sure if the bar examiner is knowledgeable
of this, take it easy. The bar examiner may be shocked.
You start your answer that while as a general rule, a
corporation cannot be held criminally liable, because
willful malice is required and a corporation is not
capable of malicious intent. But the case of Ching vs
Sec of Justice provides that a corporation may be held
liable if there’s an imposable penalty of fine. Even if
the statute prescribes both fine and imprisonment as
penalty, a corporation may be prosecuted and, if found
guilty, may be fined.
POINTERS FOR THE MIDTERM EXAMS:
 Read everything in Book I
 Know the Indeterminate Sentence Law and the
Probation Law considering that the Midterm exam
covers everything in Book I
 Extinction of Criminal Liability and Civil Liability
Indeterminate Sentence Law and the Probation Law
 These are imprints of the Positivist Theory. The first
thing you should remember here is this, it requires a
judge to impose a minumun sentence so that an
offender after serving a minium sentence he is eligible
for Parole.
143
If destierro, Atty. Calica said it is excluded in the list.
 Is ISLAW applicable to both RPC and Special Penal
Laws? Yes.
 The next you should know is how will the judge
determines the minimum and maximum sentence.
For RPC:
The maximum sentence, you apply all mitigating and
aggravating and other circumstances which affect the
criminal liability. After completing that, that will be the
maximum sentence.
For the minimum sentence: just look at the prescribed
penalty, then one degree lower. So if it’s reclusion
temporal, one degree lower.
The complication comes when there is Privileged
Mitigating Circumstance, so there is one degree lower.
In the example above of Reclusion Temporal, one
degree lower that will be Prision Mayor but the rule
under ISLAW with respect to the minimum is the
prescribed penalty. So the maximum and minimum
will be the same. So you will drop one degree lower for
the minimum sentence. Otherwise, it’s very simple you
just get the maximum penalty which is the penalty
imposable after considering all the circumstances. The
minimum is one degree lower prescribed. (In the Bar
Exam, the examiner shall always indicate the
Prescribed Penalty)
For Special Penal Laws:
The law in Anti-Graft provides a penalty of
imprisonment not less than one year and not more
than ten years. What is the minimum? Not less than
one year. What is the maximum? Not more than 10
years. So it’s everything in between from one year to
ten years.
 Know the persons disqualified under Indeterminate
Sentence Law:
1. Offenses punishable by death or life
imprisonment143;
 This also includes reclusion perpetua
2. those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal
to commit treason;
3. convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion,
sedition or espionage;
4. convicted of piracy;
5. habitual delinquents; (note that recidivists are
entitled to ISL, PP vs Jaranilla)
6. those who escaped from confinement or those
who evaded sentence;
7. those granted conditional pardon and who violated
its terms;
8. those whose maximum period of imprisonment
does not exceed one year
Note: ISL applies even of the penalty is a result of
plea bargaining

9. those who are already serving final judgment upon

the approval of ISL;