Villanueva vs.

COMELEC, 140 SCRA 352

FACTS:
Narciso Mendoza, Jr. filed his certificate of candidacy last January 4, 1980 (last day of
filing) for the January 30, 1980 local elections. He was running independently for the
office of vice mayor of the Municipality of Dolores, Quezon. But on that same day, he
withdrew his certificate of candidacy and filed an unsworn statement stating that he is
withdrawing for some personal reasons. Upon learning Mendoza’s withdrawal, the
petitioner, Crisologo Villanueva, filed his sworn “Certificate of Candidacy in substitution”
of Mendoza’s for the same office.
The results showed that Villanueva won the elections (with 3,112 votes as against his
opponent Vivencio G. Lirio’s 2,660 votes). However, the Municipal Board of Canvassers
disregarded the votes casted upon Villanueva on the ground that those were stray
votes. The Provincial Election Officer said that the petitioner’s name did not appear in
the certified list of candidates for that municipality, so he presumed that the COMELEC
did not approve his candidacy.
The 1978 Election Code provides:
SEC. 27. ... No certificate of candidacy duly filed shall be considered withdraw ... unless
the candidate files with the office which received the certificate ... or with the
Commission a sworn statement of withdrawal ...
SEC. 28. ... If, after last day for filing certificates of candidacy, a candidate with a
certificate of candidacy duly filed should ... withdraw ... any voter qualified for the office
may file his certificate of candidacy for the office for which ... the candidate who has
withdrawn ... was a candidate on or before midday of election ...
Clearly, Petitioner Villanueva could not have substituted for Candidate Mendoza on the
strength of Section 27 of the 1978 Election Code which he invokes. For one thing,
Mendoza's withdrawal of his certificate is not under oath, as required under Section 27
of the Code; hence it produces no legal effect. For another, said withdrawal was made
not after the last day (January 4, 1980) for filing certificates of candidacy, as
contemplated under Sec. 28 of the Code, but on that very same day.
ISSUE(S):
Whether or not Mendoza's withdrawal is valid considering the provision of Sec. 27 of the
Election Code.
Whether or not the substitution of Villanueva for Mendoza is valid considering the
provision of Sec. 29 of the Election Code.
HELD:
The Court finds merit in the reconsideration prayed for, which would respect the will of
the electorate instead of defeating the same through the invocation of formal or
technical defects.
The Court holds that the Comelec's first ground for denying due course to petitioner's
substitute certificate of candidacy, i.e. that Mendoza's withdrawal of his certificate of
candidacy was not "under oath," should be rejected. It is not seriously contended by
respondent nor by the Comelec that Mendoza's withdrawal was not an actual fact and a
reality, so much so that no votes were cast for him at all, In fact, Mendoza's name, even
though his candidacy was filed on the last day within the deadline, was not in the
Comelec's certified list of candidates. His unsworn withdrawal filed later on the same
day had been accepted by the election registrar without protest nor objection, On the
other hand, since there was no time to include petitioner's name in the Comelec list of
registered candidates, because the election was only four days away, petitioner as
substitute candidate circularized formal notices of his candidacy to all chairmen and
members of the citizens election committees in compliance with the suggestion of the
Comelec Law Manager, Atty. Zoilo Gomez.
this Court held that "(T)he will of the people cannot be frustrated by a technicality that
the certificate of candidacy had not been properly sworn to, This legal provision is
mandatory and non-compliance therewith before the election would be fatal to the
status of the candidate before the electorate, but after the people have expressed their
will, the result of the election cannot be defeated by the fact that the candidate has not
sworn to his certificate or candidacy."
The Comelec's post-election act of denying petitioner's substitute candidacy certainly
does not seem to be in consonance with the substance and spirit of the law.
Declared the petitioner as the duly elected vice mayor of Dolores, Quezon.
The Comelec's post-election act of denying petitioner's substitute candidacy certainly
does not seem to be in consonance with the substance and spirit of the law.
Rulloda v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 154198, January 20, 2003
FACTS:
In the barangay elections of July 15, 2002, Romeo N. Rulloda and Remegio L. Placido
were the contending candidates for Barangay Chairman of Sto. Tomas, San Jacinto,
Pangasinan. On June 22, 2002, Romeo suffered a heart attack and passed away. His
widow, petitioner Petronila "Betty" wrote a letter to the Commission on Elections
seeking permission to run as candidate for Barangay Chairman.
Petitioner’s request was supported by the AppealPetition containing several signatures
of people purporting to be members of the electorate of Barangay Sto Tomas.

On July 14, 2002, Election Officer Ludivico L. Asuncion issued a directive to the
Chairman and Members of the Barangay Board of Canvassers which states: Just in
case the names BETTY or PETRONILA or the surname RULLODA is written on the
ballot, read the same as it is written but add the words NOT COUNTED like BETTY
NOT COUNTED or RULLODA NOT COUNTED.
Petitioner garnered 516 votes while respondent Remegio Placido received 290 votes.
Despite this, the Board of Canvassers proclaimed Placido as the BarangayChairman.
Petitioner learned that the Commission issued Resolution No. 4801. Section 9 of the
same states- “There shall be no substitution of candidates for barangay and
sangguniang kabataan officials”.

Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari, seeking to

annul Section 9 of Resolution No. 4801 and Resolution No. 5217.

ISSUE:
WON substitution is allowed in barangay and SK elections.

RULING:
YES, substitution is allowed in barangay and SK elections thus the instant petition is
GRANTED. The assailed Resolution No. 5217 of the Commission on
Elections, insofar as it denied due course to petitioners certificate of candidacy, is declar
ed NULL and VOID. The proclamation of respondent Remegio L. Placido as Barangay
Chairman is SET ASIDE, and the Board of Canvassers is ORDERED to proclaim
petitioner as the duly elected Barangay Chairman.

Election means the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote;
embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the people.
Respondents base their argument on the provision of Section 77 of the Omnibus
Elections Code on Candidates: In case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of
another. If after the last day of the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official
candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified
for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by the same political party may
file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was
disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned may
file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the preceding
sections not later than mid-day of the election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification
should occur between the day before the election and mid-day of election day, said
certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision
where he is a candidate or, in the case of candidates to be voted by the entire
electorate of the country, with the Commission.

Private respondent argues that in as much as the barangay election is non-partisan,

there can be no substitution because there is no political party from which to designate
the substitute. However, it is well-settled that in case of doubt, political laws must be so
construed as to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the
ballot. Contrary to respondents claim, the absence of a specific provision governing
substitution of candidates in barangay elections
cannot be inferred as a prohibition against said substitution.
Manahan vs. ECC, 104 SCRA 198

FACTS
The petitioner filed a claim with GSIS for the death benefit of her deceased husband
under P.D. 626. However, GSIS denied the claim on a finding that the ailment of the
deceased, enteric fever, is not an occupational disease. The petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration on the ground that the deceased was in perfect health when admitted to
the service and that the ailment of said deceased was attributable to his employment.
GSIS affirmed the denial of the claim on the ground that enteric fever or paratyphoid is
similar in effect to typhoid fever, in the sense that both are produced by Salmonella
organisms. Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) also affirmed the decision of
GSIS that the ailment of the deceased was not induced by or aggravated by the nature
of the duties of the deceased as a teacher. Petitioner cites the epidemiology and
pathology of enteric fever to support the claim that the ailment of the deceased resulted
from his employment as classroom teacher.
ISSUE
Whether the presumption of compensability subsists in favor of the claimant.
RULING
In case of doubt, the same should be resolved in favor of the worker, and that social
legislations – like the Workmen's Compensation Act and the Labor Code - should be
liberally construed to attain their laudable objective, i.e., to give relief to the workman
and/or his dependents in the event that the former should die or sustain an injury.
Villavert vs. ECC, 110 SCRA 223

Petitioner, Domna Villaver, the mother of Marcelino VIllavert who died of acute
hemorrhagic pancreatitis. Marcelino was employees as a Code verifier of the Philippine
Constabulary. Pursuant to PD 626, the petitioner filed a claim with the GSIS but was
denied since the cause of death was not an occupational disease; and failure to show
causal connection between the fatal ailment and the nature of his employment.

To support the claim, a certification from Lt. Col. Pancheco was submitted and
corroborated by an affidavit by the chief Clerk, Mr. Valenzuela.

Facts showed that:

(a) he also performed duties as a computer operator, there being exposed to heat
(b) handles administrative functions
(c) he was given excessive responsibilities due to lack of qualified civilian personnel
(d) the nature of his work caused his irregular meals
(e) he performs rotation duties
(f) never drinks alcoholic liquor, neither smokes nor engages on immoral habits

That day, Marcelino complained of chest pain and headache. But despite that, he was
still required to render OT until late in the evening that day, typing voluminous
communications, computing allowances and preparing checks for the salary of the PC
and Integrated National Police nationwide. Upon arriving home, he went straight to
sleep without eating meals. Shortly thereafter, Marcelino was seen by mother gasping
of breath and perspiring. He was rushed to the hospital but died.

The Medico Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation stated that the exact
cause of acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis is still unknown despite extensive researches
in this field, although most research data are agreed that physical and mental stresses
are strong causal factors in the development of the disease.

Issue: WON the petitioner should receive compensation on the grounds of occupational
disease.

Held: YES. From the foregoing facts of record, it is clear that Marcelino N. Villavert died
of acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis which was directly caused or at least aggravated by
the duties he performed as coder verifier, computer operator and clerk typist of the
Philippine Constabulary. There is no evidence at all that Marcelino N. Villavert had a
"bout of alcoholic intoxication" shortly before he died. Neither is there a showing that he
used drugs.

It should be noted that Article 4 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended,
provides that "All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of this Code,
including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of
labor."
Del Rosario and Sons vs. NLRC, 135 SCRA 669
FACTS:
- On 1 February 1978 Del Rosario & Sons Logging Enterprises, Inc. (Petitioner)
entered into a Contract of Services with Calinar Security Agency for the supply of
security guards at a rate of P300.00 per month for each guard.

- Paulino Mabuti, Napoleo Borata and Silvino Tudio, three of the guards deployed
by the Security Agency with the Petitioner, filed a Complaint against the Security
Agency and the Petitioner for underpayment of salary and the non-payment of
living allowance and 13th month pay.

- Thereafter, five other guards filed their complaint for the same causes of action.

- Petitioner contended that complainants have no cause of action against it due to

absence of employer-employee relationship between them. They also denied
liability alleging that due to the inadequacy of the amounts paid to it under the
Contract of Services, it could not possibly comply with the payments required by
labor laws.

- The Security Agency denied liability alleging that it cannot comply with the
payments required by law to the Security Guards because of the inadequate
contract price paid by the Petitioner.

- The Labor Arbiter dismissed the Complaint against the Petitioner because
of the non-existence of an employer-employee relationship but ordered the
Security Agency to pay the Security Guards the total amount that they
sought – which was P2,923.17.

- Upon appeal by the Security Agency, the NLRC decided to hold both the Security
Agency and the Petitioner jointly and severally liable to pay the Security Guards
because the Petitioner is considered an indirect employer of the Security Guards
pursuant to Articles 106 and 107 of the Labor Code, as amended.

- The Security Agency, in its appeal to the NLRC above, failed to file it under oath
and did not pay the required appeal fee on time – thus the petition having
dismissed.
ISSUE/Held:
- WoN the NLRC erred in dismissing the appeal of the Security Agency
despite their failure to file the appeal under oath and pay the appeal fee on
time?

a.) YES. The SC rules that the NLRC has the right to accept the appeal despite
the lack of verification and the delay in the payment of the appeal fee. Article
221 of the Labor Code provides that, unlike in the Courts of law where the
rules of evidence are controlling, the primordial interest of the Labor Code
and the NLRC is to speedily and objectively ascertain the facts of the case
without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of
due process. Anyway, the deficiency in the verification in this case can be
cured in the actual oath-taking.
b.) The formal defects in the appeal of the Security Agency were not fatal
defects. The lack of verification could have been easily corrected by
requiring an oath. The appeal fee had been paid although it was delayed.
Failure to pay the docketing fees does not automatically result in the
dismissal of the appeal. Dismissal is discretionary with the Appellate Court and
discretion must be exercised wisely and prudently, never capriciously, with a
view to substantial justice. Failure to pay the appeal docketing fee confers a
directory and not a mandatory power to dismiss an appeal and such power must
be exercised with sound discretion and with a great deal of circumspection,
considering all attendant circumstances

- WoN the NLRC erred in deciding that the Petitioner and the Security
Agency are jointly and severally liable to pay the Security Guards.

a.) NO. The SC affirms the decision of the NLRC holding the Petitioner and the
Security Agency jointly and severally liable for the underpayment of the salary
and the non-payment of the living allowance and 13th month pay to the Security
Guards. Under Article 106 of the Labor Code, the Principal (in this case, the
Petitioner) should be held jointly and severally liable with the Contractor (in this
case, the Security Agency), in case the latter fails to pay the wages of its
employees. This is more so the case with Petitioner considered as an indirect
employer under the definition stated in Article 107 of the same Labor Code.
Articles 106 of the Labor Code provides that “in the event that the
contractor or subcontractor fails to pay the wages of his employees in
accordance with this Code, the employer shall be jointly and severally
liable with his contractor or subcontractor to such employees to the extent
of the work performed under the contract, in the same manner and extent
that he is liable to employees directly employed by him,”
 Article 107 of the Labor Code provides that “the provisions of the
immediately preceding Article shall likewise apply to any person,
partnership, association or corporation which, not being an employer,
contracts with an independent contractor for the performance of any work,
task, job or project.”

b.) The joint and several liability imposed by the Court is however without
prejudice to the Petitioner’s right to reimburse from the Security Agency the
amount it paid the Security Guards.
In the case at bar, petitioner became an indirect employer of respondents-
complainants when petitioner entered into a Contract of Services with the
Security Agency and the latter hired the complainants to work as guards for
the former. However, the petitioner’s liability should be without prejudice to
a claim for reimbursement against the Security Agency for such amounts
as petitioner may have to pay to complainants.

c.) The SC further ruled that the inadequate contract price received by the
Security Agency from the Petitioner is irrelevant because the Security Agency is
expected to have known the labor laws and the correct compensation it should
have demanded for its services.
The Security Agency may not seek exculpation by claiming that petitioner’s
payments to it were inadequate. As an employer, it is charged with
knowledge of labor laws and the adequacy of the compensation that it
demands for contractual services is its principal concern and not any
other’s.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment under review, without prejudice
to petitioner’s right to seek reimbursement from Calmar Security Agency for
such amounts as petitioner may have to pay to complainants. Costs
against the private respondent.
Pp. vs. Manantan, 5 SCRA 684

Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code.

Manantan plead not guilty and moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as
"justice of the peace", he is not one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code. At first the lower court denied the motion to dismiss holding that
a "justice of the peace" is within the purview Section 54.

Section 54 of the said Code reads:

No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or

employee of the Army, no member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or
rural police force and no classified civil service officer or employee shall aid any
candidate, or exert any influence in any manner in a election or take part therein,
except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace
officer.

But on the second motion filed by defense counsel, who cited in support thereof the
decision of the Court of Appeals in People vs. Macaraeg where it was held that a justice
of the peace is excluded from the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code, the lower court dismissed the information.

Defendant-appellee argues that a justice of the peace is not comprehended among the
officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. He submits the
aforecited section was taken from Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code,
which provided the following:

SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. — No judge of the First
Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and
no officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary, or any Bureau or
employee of the classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or exert influence
in any manner in any election or take part therein otherwise than exercising the
right to vote.

When, therefore, section 54 of the Revised Election Code omitted the words "justice of
the peace," the omission revealed the intention of the Legislature to exclude justices of
the peace from its operation.

ISSUE:

A question of law: Is a "justice the peace" included in the prohibition of Section 54 of

the Revised Election Code?
HELD:

Court held that, yes, it is included in Section 54.

Justices of the peace were expressly included in Section 449 of the Revised
Administrative Code because the kinds of judges therein were specified, i.e., judge of
the First Instance and justice of the peace. In Section 54, however, there was no
necessity therefore to include justices of the peace in the enumeration because the
legislature had availed itself of the more generic and broader term, "judge.", which
includes all kinds of judges.

A "justice of the peace" is a judge. A "judge" is a public officer, who, by

virtue of his office, is clothed with judicial authority. This term includes all officers
appointed to to decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity, including justices
of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts.

From the history of Section 54 of REC, the first omission of the word "justice of
the peace" was effected in Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 357 and not in the
present code as averred by defendant-appellee. Whenever the word "judge" was
qualified by the phrase "of the First Instance', the words "justice of the peace" were
omitted. It follows that when the legislature omitted the words "justice of the peace" in
RA 180, it did not intend to exempt the said officer from its operation. Rather, it had
considered the said officer as already comprehended in the broader term "judge".

The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by the
defendant-appellee. Under the said rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an
enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. However, it is applicable
only if the omission has been clearly established.

In the case at bar, the legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace
from the enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in partisan political activities.
In Section 54, justices of the peace were just called "judges". Also, the application of
this rule does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather
from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted
from a legislative enumeration. In the case at bar, there is no omission but only
substitution of terms.

The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only
factor controlling the interpretation of such laws; instead, the rule merely serves as an
additional, single factor to be considered as an aid in determining the meaning of penal
laws.
Also, the purpose of the statutes to enlarge the officers within its purview. Justices of
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and various judges, such as the judges of the
Court of Industrial Relations, judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations, etc., who were
not included in the prohibition under the old statute, are now within its encompass.
The rule "expressio unius est exclusion alterius" has been erroneously applied by CA
and lower courts because they were not able to give reasons for the exclusion of the
legislature for the term "justices of peace".
Centeno vs. Villalon-Pornillos, 236 SCRA 197
Facts:

This petition is an appeal on the decision of the Trial Court convicting Centeno and Yco
for violating P.D. 1564 known as the Solicitation Permit Law when they both solicited
money for the renovation of their chapel without a permit from the DSWD.
In 1985, the petitioners, officers of Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay, launched
a fund drive for the renovation of their chapel in Bulacan.
The petitioners approached and solicited from Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident
of Tikay, a contribution of P1,500.00. The solicitation was made without a permit from
the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). Hon. Angeles filed a
complaint against the petitioners for violation of P.D. 1564 known as the Soliciation
Permit Law.
P.D. 1564 provides as follows:
Sec. 2. Any person, corporation, organization, or association desiring to solicit or
receive contributions for charitable or public welfare purposes shall first secure a permit
from the Regional Offices of the Department of Social Services and Development as
provided in the Integrated Reorganization Plan.
In 1992, the trial court found the petitioners guilty of violating the Solicitation Permit
Law.
In this instant case, the petitioners assert among others that the term “religious purpose”
is not expressly included in the provisions of the statute, hence what the law does not
include, it excludes.

Issue(s):
I. Whether or not the phrase “charitable purposes” should be construed in the
broadest sense so as to include a religious purpose.
II. Whether or not penal laws are to be construed strictly against the State and
liberally in favor of the accused.
Held/Ratio:

I. The 1987 Constitution and other statutes treat the words “charitable” and
“religious” separately and independently of each other.
 In P.D. 1564, it merely stated “charitable or public welfare purposes” which
means that it was not the intention of the framers of the law to include
solicitations for religious purposes. The world “religious purpose” is not
interchangeable with the expression “charitable purpose”.

The acts of the petitioners cannot be punished under the said law because
the law does not contemplate solicitation for religious purposes.
The solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by
the State in the exercise of police power. However, in the case at bar,
considering that solicitations intended for a religious purpose are not within
the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564, as earlier demonstrated,
petitioner cannot be held criminally liable therefor.

The decision appealed from is reversed and set aside, and petitioner Martin
Centeno is acquitted of the offense charged.

II. To subsume the "religious" purpose of the solicitation within the concept of
"charitable" purpose which under Presidential Decree

No. 1564 requires a prior permit from the Department of Social Services and
Development, under paid of penal liability in the absence thereof, would be
prejudicial to petitioner. Accordingly, the term "charitable" should be strictly
construed so as to exclude solicitations for "religious" purposes. Thereby, we
adhere to the fundamental doctrine underlying virtually all penal legislations
that such interpretation should be adopted as would favor the accused.

For, it is a well-entrenched rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly

against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. They are not to be
extended or enlarged by implications, intendments, analogies or equitable
considerations. They are not to be strained by construction to spell out a new
offense, enlarge the field of crime or multiply felonies. Hence, in the
interpretation of a penal statute, the tendency is to subject it to careful
scrutiny and to construe it with such strictness as to safeguard the rights of
the accused. If the statute is ambiguous and admits of two reasonable but
contradictory constructions, that which operates in favor of a party accused
under its provisions is to be preferred. The principle is that acts in and of
themselves innocent and lawful cannot be held to be criminal unless there is
a clear and unequivocal expression of the legislative intent to make them
such. Whatever is not plainly within the provisions of a penal statute should
be regarded as without its intendment. 13

The purpose of strict construction is not to enable a guilty person to escape

punishment through a technicality but to provide a precise definition of
forbidden acts. 14 The word "charitable" is a matter of description rather than
of precise definition, and each case involving a determination of that which is
charitable must be decided on its own particular facts and circumstances. 15
The law does not operate in vacuo nor should its applicability be determined
by circumstances in the abstract.
Tinio vs. Francis, 98 Phil. 32 (1955)

FACTS:
This action was brought by the heirs of the deceased Sergio Nicolas to annul the sale of
a homestead which had been inherited by them from said decedent. Sergio Nicolas filed
the corresponding final proof papers in relation to the homestead and on June 15, 1943
the said final proof was approved by the Director of Lands, who thereupon ordered the
issuance of a patent in his favor. At the time of the issuance of the above order, Sergio
Nicolas had already died, so the order directs the issuance of the patent to his heirs,
represented by his widow.

In or about the year 1947 the heirs transferred their rights of the homestead to the
defendants. The transfers were approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce on March 9, 1948 and thereafter the defendants secured the issuance of a
homestead patent in their favor.

The present action was commenced to annul the conveyances executed by plaintiffs to
defendants and to recover the land, together with the fruits of the land received by the
defendants, as damages. The defendants alleged the execution of the sales in their
favor. The trial court held that the conveyance was valid. It ruled that both Section 20
and Section 118 of the Public Land Act being apparently conflicting, they should be
reconciled such that the prohibition contained in section 118 should be made to apply
only if the patent had already been issued, otherwise section 20 would be absolutely
useless. Thus, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not said conveyances satisfy the requirements of Sec. 20 of the Public Land
Act.

Ruling:
The conveyances made by the heirs of the homesteader to the defendants herein in the
year 1947 do not comply with the first requirements of section 20 of the Public Land Act
that the Director of Lands is satisfied from proofs submitted by the homesteader that he
(homesteader) could not continue with his homestead through no fault of his own, and
with the second that a conveyance must be made with the prior or previous approval of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce; that from the date of an order for the
issuance of a patent for a homestead the homesteader to all intents and purposes is
considered as having the patent actually issued to himself, in so far as the prohibition
contained in section 118 of the Public Land Act, otherwise the intent and policy of the
law may be avoided by the homesteader by postponing the getting of his patent.

The legislative policy or intent is to conserve the land which a homesteader has
acquired under the Public Land Law, as above stated, for him and his heirs. The
legislative policy is so strong and consistent that the original period of five years from
the issuance of the patent, within which period conveyance or sale thereof by the
homesteader or his heirs was prohibited (section 116 of Act No. 2874) is now extended
to 25 years if no approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce is secured. A
construction which would carry into effect the evident policy of the law should be
adopted in favor of that interpretation which would defeat it.

In accordance herewith, the conveyances executed by the plaintiffs to the defendants

are hereby declared null and void, the transfer certificate of title issued in the name of
the defendants ordered cancelled, and the possession of the land returned to the
plaintiffs upon return to the defendants of the amounts received as price for the sale. No
damages or costs. So, ordered.
Cajiuat vs. Mathay, 124 SCRA 710 (1983)

F: Petitioners were, prior to their retirement, permanent officials and employees of the
then Rice and Corn Administration abolished under Presidential Decree No. 4. They
being retirable, they exercised the option to do so under the Optional Retirement Law.
They had, therefore, received the gratuity under such law. With the issuance of the
aforesaid Presidential Decree, however, they were led to hope that a claim for
separation gratuity would likewise be justified.
The Solicitor General rejected such an argument. Thus: "It is respectfully submitted that
since the petitioners herein have already retired and were paid the gratuity under
Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended by Republic Act No. 1616, they are no longer
entitled to the gratuity provided under paragraph 3, Section 26 of Presidential Decree
No. 4."
Par. 3, Section 26 of Presidential Decree No. 4. It reads as follows: "Permanent officials
and employees of the Rice and Corn Administration . . . who prefer to retire, if qualified
for retirement, shall be given gratuity equivalent to one month salary for every year of
service but in no case more than twenty-four months salary, in addition to all other
benefits to which they are entitled under existing laws and regulations."
I: WON PD 4 exempts petitioners to receive double pension
R: No, this is so because to assume otherwise would not only be an act of "over-
liberality" on the part of the State but likewise inconsistent with its policy against double
pension or gratuity for the same service." It is similarly obvious that the retirement
benefits he was found to be entitled to receive were in consideration of the same
services to the government. The rule in construing or applying pension and gratuity laws
is that, in the absence of express provisions to the contrary, they will be so interpreted
as to prevent any person from receiving double compensation."
"other benefits"= refer to "those receivable by a retiree under the general retirement
laws, like the refund of contributions to the retirement fund and the money value of the
accumulated vacation and sick leaves of said official employee.
“in addition to all other benefits to which they are entitled under existing laws and
regulations”= was inserted to insure the payment to the retiree of the refund of the
contributions to the retirement fund and the money value of the accumulated vacation
and sick leaves of said official or employee.
WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari is denied for lack of merit and the decision of
respondent, the then Auditor General, denying due course to the claim of petitioner for
double gratuity affirmed. No costs.
NHA vs. Reyes, 123 SCRA 245 (1983)  SUPERSEDED by EPZA v. Dulay, G.R. No.
L-59603, April 29, 1987
Facts:
The undisputed fact that in this certiorari proceeding against respondent Judge for
failure to comply with the provision of the Presidential Decrees as to the amount to be
paid by petitioner to entitle it to a writ of possession in an expropriation proceeding, no
question was raised as to their validity, calls for the grant of the remedy sought.

The controversy started with the filing of a complaint with the then Court of Agrarian
Relations, Seventh Regional District, Branch II, Cavite City, against private
respondents, for the expropriation, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 757, of a parcel
of land, with an area of 25,000 square meters, owned and registered in the name of
respondent Quirino Austria, and needed for the expansion of the Dasmariñas
Resettlement Project.
Then came from petitioner about a year later, a motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession. Petitioner was able to secure an order placing it in possession. Thereafter,
private respondent Quirino Austria filed a Motion to Withdraw Deposit in the amount of
P6,600.00, a sum which was equivalent to the value of the property assessed for
taxation purposes and which was deposited by petitioner pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 42 .
There was an Opposition to the Motion to Withdraw Deposit by petitioner, citing Section
92 of Presidential Decree No. 464. Petitioner's submission is that the owner's
declaration at P1,400.00 which is lower than the assessor's assessment, is the just
compensation for the respondents' property, respondents thus being precluded from
withdrawing any amount more than P1,400.00. Respondent Judge, however, issued an
order dated July 13, 1978 which, according to petitioner, is clearly contrary to the letter
and spirit of the aforecited laws.
There was a Motion for Reconsideration dated July 21, 1978. Its basis is the provision
in Presidential Decree No. 1224: "In the determination of just compensation for such
private lands and improvement to be expropriated, the government shall choose
between the value of the real property and improvements thereon as declared by the
owner or administrator thereof or the market value determined by the City or provincial
assessor, whichever is lower, at the time of the filing of the expropriation complaint." It
was then submitted that under the aforequoted statutory provision, the owner's declared
market value at P1,400.00 which is lower than that fixed by the assessor is the just
compensation of respondent Quirino Austria's property sought to be expropriated. The
motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
Issue: Whether or not there was just compensation.

Ruling:
The issue in this petition for certiorari and mandamus involves the application of a rule
introduced by P.D. No. 76 and reiterated in subsequent decrees that not only promotes
social justice but also ends the one-sided practice supported by the conniving consent
of government officials and employees, of under declaring properties for the purpose of
taxation but ballooning the price thereof when the same properties are to be acquired by
the government for public purposes. Put to test is the power of the government to
introduce rationality in the laws and to discourage a deceitful practice that is not only
damaging to the government officers but also undermines its effort at awakening a
democratic responsiveness of the citizenry toward good government and its economic
and social programs. The courts should recognize that the rule introduced by P.D. 76
and reiterated in subsequent decrees does not upset the established concepts of justice
or the constitutional provision on just compensation for, precisely, the owner is allowed
to make his own valuation of his property. The writ of certiorari is granted and the order
of respondent judge of July 13, 1978 is hereby nullified and set aside.
NHA vs Reyes was superseded by EPZA vs. DULAY

Fact:
On January 15, 1979, the President of the Philippines, issued Proclamation No. 1811,
reserving a certain parcel of land of the public domain situated in the City of Lapu-Lapu,
Island of Mactan, Cebu and covering a total area of 1,193,669 square meters, more or
less, for the establishment of an export processing zone by petitioner Export Processing
Zone Authority (EPZA). Not all the reserved area, however, was public land which
includes, four (4) parcels of land with an aggregate area of 22,328 square meters
owned by the private respondent.
The petitioner, therefore, offered to purchase the parcels of land from the respondent in
acccordance with the valuation set forth in Section 92, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
464, as amended. The parties failed to reach an agreement regarding the sale of the
property. The petitioner filed with the then CFI of Cebu for expropriation with a prayer
for the issuance of a writ of possession against the private respondent for the purpose
of establishing the Mactan Export Processing Zone. The respondent judge issued a writ
of possession, order of condemnation and order to appointing certain persons as
commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the
properties sought to be expropriated. The petitioner Objection to Commissioner’s
Report on the grounds that P.D. No. 1533 has superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of
the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of just compensation through commissioners;
and that the compensation must not exceed the maximum amount set by P.D. No.
1533.

Issue:
Whether the exclusive and mandatory mode of determining just compensation in P.D.
No. 1533 which states “Section 1. In determining just compensation for private property
acquired through eminent domain proceedings, the compensation to be paid shall not
exceed the value declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest
in the property or determined by the assessor, pursuant to the Real Property Tax Code,
whichever value is lower, prior to the recommendation or decision of the appropriate
Government office to acquire the property.” valid and constitutional?

Held:
No, the method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees
constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render the
Court inutile in a matter which under the Constitution is reserved to it for final
determination. Although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would still
have the power to determine the just compensation for the property, following the
applicable decrees, its task would be relegated to simply stating the lower value of the
property as declared either by the owner or the assessor. As a necessary consequence,
it would be useless for the court to appoint commissioners under the Rules of Court.
The determination of “just compensation” in eminent domain cases is a judicial function.
The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but
when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property
may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or
executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court’s
findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the “just-ness” of the
decreed compensation.

One of the basic postulates in constitutional law is the presumption of

validity of legislative or executive acts. In Angara v. Electoral Commission 12
the leading case on the subject until now, Justice Laurel, in speaking of
judicial review, made clear that it is not for the judiciary to "pass upon
questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation."13 His landmark
opinion continues: "More than that, courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature
is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in
the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the
wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
government. "14 As pointed out in Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operators
Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila:15 "Primarily what calls for a
reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to offset the
presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance.
As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all
in favor of validity ..."16 As of this stage in this particular case, there is a
failure to challenge the validity of such legislation. Both public and private
respondents in their comments considered as answers raised no such
constitutional question. Even for it, therefore, as of this stage of litigation,
and under the conceded facts, there should be a recognition that the law as
it stands must be applied. The Decree having spoken so clearly and
unequivocally calls for obedience. It is repeating a common place to state
that on a matter where the applicable law speaks in no uncertain language,
the Court has no choice except to yield to its command.
Tano vs. Socrates, 278 SCRA 154 (1997)

Facts:

On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an

ordinance banning the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City
from January 1, 1993 to January 1, 1998. Subsequently the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
Provincial Government of Palawan enacted a resolution prohibiting the catching ,
gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of a several species of live marine
coral dwelling aquatic organisms for 5 years, in and coming from Palawan waters.

Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying that the court
declare the said ordinances and resolutions as unconstitutional on the ground that the
said ordinances deprived them of the due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly
restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and
Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the challenged ordinances unconstitutional.

Ruling:

No. The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless and held that the
challenged ordinances did not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and
applicable laws. There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a
subsistence or marginal fisherman. Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to
bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the State to
protect the nation’s marine wealth. The so-called “preferential right” of subsistence or
marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all absolute.

In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the state and
pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their
“exploration, development and utilization...shall be under the full control and supervision
of the State.

It is clear to the Court that both Ordinances have two principal objectives or purposes:
(1) to establish a closed season for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered
therein for a period of five years, and (2) to protect the corals of the marine waters of the
City of Puerto Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further destruction due to
illegal fishing activities.
The accomplishment of the first objective is well within the devolved power to enforce
fishery laws in municipal waters, such as P.D. No. 1015, which allows the establishment
of closed seasons. The devolution of such power has been expressly confirmed in the
Memorandum of Agreement of 5 April 1994 between the Department of Agriculture and
the Department of Interior and Local Government.
The realization of the second objective falls within both the general welfare clause of the
LGC and the express mandate thereunder to cities and provinces to protect the
environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the
environment.[33]
Finally, the centerpiece of LGC is the system of decentralization[26] as expressly
mandated by the Constitution.[27] Indispensable thereto is devolution and the LGC
expressly provides that [a]ny provision on a power of a local government unit shall be
liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be
resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower local government unit. Any fair
and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of
the local government unit concerned,[28] Devolution refers to the act by which the
National Government confers power and authority upon the various local government
units to perform specific functions and responsibilities.[29]
One of the devolved powers enumerated in the section of the LGC on devolution is
the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of
mangroves.[30] This necessarily includes enactment of ordinances to effectively carry
out such fishery laws within the municipal waters.
CIR vs. S.C. Johnson and Sons, Inc., 309 SCRA 87 (1999)
Facts:
• S. C. Johnson and Son, Inc. entered into a license agreement with SC Johnson
and Son, United States of America (USA)

• For the use of the trademark or technology, S. C. Johnson and Son, Inc. was
obliged to pay SC Johnson and Son, USA royalties based on a percentage of net
sales and subjected the same to 25% withholding tax on royalty payments.

• S. C. Johnson and Son, Inc. filed with the International Tax Affairs Division
(ITAD) of the BIR a claim for refund of overpaid withholding tax on royalties
arguing that the preferential tax rate of 10% should apply to them since the
licensing agreement was approved by the Technology Transfer Board

Issue
WON respondent is entitled to the "most favored nation" tax rate of 10% on royalties as
provided in the RP-US Tax Treaty in relation to the RP-West Germany Tax Treaty.
Held
NO. Under Article 13 of the RP-US Tax Treaty, the Philippines may impose one of three
rates:
1. 25 percent of the gross amount of the royalties

2. 15 percent when the royalties are paid by a corporation registered with the
Philippine Board of Investments and engaged in preferred areas of activities

3. The lowest rate of Philippine tax that may be imposed on royalties of the same
kind paid under similar circumstances to a resident of a third state.

The RP-US and the RP-West Germany Tax Treaties do not contain similar
provisions on tax crediting. Since the RP-US Tax Treaty does not give a matching tax
credit of 20 percent for the taxes paid to the Philippines on royalties as allowed under
the RP-West Germany Tax Treaty, private respondent cannot be deemed entitled to the
10percent rate granted under the latter treaty . There is no payment of taxes on
royalties under similar circumstances.
The purpose of these international agreements is to reconcile the national fiscal
legislations of the contracting parties in order to help the taxpayer avoid simultaneous
taxation in two different jurisdictions.
More precisely, the tax conventions are drafted with a view towards the
elimination of international juridical double taxation, which is defined as the imposition of
comparable taxes in two or more states on the same taxpayer with respect of the same
subject matter and for identical periods.
The intention behind the adoption of the provision on “relief from double taxation” in the
two tax treaties in question should be considered in light of the purpose behind the most
favored nation clause.
The purpose of a most favored nation clause is to grant to the contracting party
treatment not less favorable than that which has been or may be granted to the “most
favored” among other countries. The most favored nation clause is intended to establish
the principle of equality of international treatment by providing that the citizens or
subjects of the contracting nations may enjoy the privileges accorded by either party to
those of the most favored nation. The essence of the principle is to allow the taxpayer in
one state to avail of more liberal provisions granted in another tax treaty to which the
country of residence of such taxpayer is also a party provided that the subject matter of
taxation, in this case royalty income, is the same as that in the tax treaty under which
the taxpayer is liable. Both Article 13 of the RP-US Tax Treaty and Article 12 (2) (b) of
the RP-West Germany Tax Treaty, above-quoted, speaks of tax on royalties for the use
of trademark, patent, and technology. The entitlement of the 10% rate by U.S. firms
despite the absence of a matching credit (20% for royalties) would derogate from the
design behind the most favored nation clause to grant equality of international treatment
since the tax burden laid upon the income of the investor is not the same in the two
countries. The similarity in the circumstances of payment of taxes is a condition for the
enjoyment of most favored nation treatment precisely to underscore the need for
equality of treatment.
The decisions of CTA and CA are set aside.
Saysip Sesbreno vs. CBAA, 270 SCRA 360 (1997)

On April 3, 1980, Mr. Sesbreo purchased from Estrella Benedicto Tan two (2)
parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-55917 issued by the
Register of Deeds of Cebu City. The conveyance included "a residential house of strong
materials constructed on the lots above-mentioned"[5] located in Cebu City.
Thereafter, petitioner declared the real property constructed on the said lots for
purposes of tax assessment as a residential house of strong materials with a floor area
of sixty (60) square meters. Effective in the year 1980, the declared property was
assessed by Respondent City Assessor of Cebu City under Tax Declaration No. 02-
20454 at a market value of P60,000.00 and an assessed value of P36,900.00
During a tax-mapping operation conducted in February 1989, the field inspectors of
the Cebu City Assessor discovered that the real property declared and assessed under
Tax Declaration No. 02-20454 was actually a residential building consisting of four (4)
storeys with a fifth storey used as a roof deck. The building had a total floor area of
500.20 square meters. The area for each floor was 100.04 square meters. The building
was found to have been made of Type II-A materials. On October 17, 1990, these
findings were confirmed by the Board of Commissioners in an ocular inspection
conducted on the subject property.
Based on the findings of the field inspectors, Respondent City Assessor of Cebu
City issued Tax Declaration No. GR-06-045-00162 effective in the year 1989, canceling
Tax Declaration No. 02-20454 and assessing the building therein at a net market value
of P499,860.00 and an assessed value of P374,900.00. The 1981-1984 Schedule of
Market Value was applied in the assessment.
Petitioner protested the new assessment for being "excessive and unconscionable."
He questioned the new assessment before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals of
Cebu City, which however dismissed petitioner's appeal on January 11, 1990.Hence,
petitioner elevated his case to Respondent Central Board of Assessment Appeals.
Respondent Central Board of Assessment Appeals.
On September 23, 1991, Respondent CBAA rendered a decision, [11] the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Resolution is hereby modified, viz.:

For the purpose of determining the back taxes due on the excess area of subject
building for the years 1981 to June 30, 1987, Respondent-Appellee (Respondent City
Assessor of Cebu) is hereby directed to issue a new tax declaration effective 1981.
For the purpose of determining the back taxes due on the excess area of subject
building for the years July 1, 1987 to 1989, Respondent-Appellee is hereby ordered to
issue another tax declaration effective July 1, 1987, to supersede the tax declaration
(effective 1981).
Not satisfied, petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration. During the hearing
on said motion, the parties submitted a joint manifestation.

ISSUES:

"B-1. Whether or not Respondent Central Board of Assessment Appeals erred in

resolving the issue of back taxes from 1981 to 1988 despite the fact that
such issue was not raised in the appeal, under its pretext that it is applying
Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 464

B-2. Whether or not Respondent Central Board of Assessment Appeals erred in not
strictly applying par. n, Section 3, Presidential Decree No. 464 defining
'market value' as basis for computing the 'assessed value';

B-3. Whether or not Respondent Central Board of Assessment Appeals erred in not
strictly applying or refusing to apply Section 23 of Presidential Decree No.
464.

Corollary Issues:

a. Whether or not respondent CBAA's assessment is discriminatory, unjust,

confiscatory and unconstitutional.

b. Whether or not P.D. No. 20, as invoked in the doctrinal jurisprudence of

Reyes vs. Almanzor, 196 SCRA 328, may be applied to the case at bar in
relation with par. n, Sec. 3, P.D. 464 defining 'market value' which was
cited in the Reyes vs. Almanzor case (x x x)."

HELD:
The petition is DISMISSED and the assailed Resolution of CBAA is AFFIRMED.

RATIO:

Preliminary Matters

At the outset, it should be emphasized that "appeal by certiorari" or a petition for

review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is not the correct remedy in questioning the
decisions and resolutions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals. Rather, a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the ground of grave abuse
of discretion should be filed.[19]
Moreover, the CBAA decision dated September 30, 1991 and the as sailed
Resolution dated July 28, 1992 show that petitioner failed to pay under protest the tax
assessed against his property. This is a violation of Section 64 of Presidential Decree
No. 464[20] which requires that, before a court may entertain any suit assailing the
validity of a tax assessment, the taxpayer must first pay under protest the tax assessed
against him. The said section provides:

"SEC. 64. Restriction upon power of court to impeach tax. No court shall entertain any
suit assailing the validity of tax assessed under this Code until the taxpayer shall have
paid, under protest, the tax assessed against him nor shall any court declare any tax
invalid by reason of irregularities or informalities in the proceedings of the officers
charged with the assessment or collection of taxes, or of failure to perform their duties
within this time herein specified for their performance unless such irregularities,
informalities or failure shall have impaired the substantial rights of the taxpayer; nor
shall any court declare any portion of the tax assessed under the provisions of Code
invalid except upon condition that the taxpayer shall pay the just amount of the tax, as
determined by the court in the pending proceeding." (Underscoring supplied)

For the foregoing lapses, if for no other, this case ought to be dismissed. However,
there are other cogent reasons showing that the petition has no merit. These will be
shown as we tackle the various issues raised by petitioner in his memorandum.

Petitioner's First Issue: Propriety of Raising the Issue of Back Taxes

As a rule, no issue may be raised on appeal unless it has been brought before the
lower tribunal for its consideration.[21] The Court has held in several cases, however,
that an appellate court has an inherent authority to review unassigned errors (1) which
are closely related to an error properly raised, or (2) upon which the determination of the
error properly assigned is dependent, or (3) where the Court finds that consideration of
them is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case. Thus:

"x x x. In line with the modern trends of procedure, we are told that, 'while an
assignment of error which is required by law or rule of court has been held essential to
appellate review, and only those assigned will be considered, there are a number of
cases which appear to accord to the appellate court a broad discretionary power to
waive the lack of proper assignment of errors and consider errors not assigned. And an
unassigned error closely related to the error properly assigned, or upon which the
determination of the question raised by the error properly assigned is dependent, will be
considered by the appellate court notwithstanding the failure to assign it as error.' (4
C.J.S., 1734; 3 C.J., 1341, footnote 77)."[22]

"At any rate, the Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even if they are
not assigned as errors in their appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary in
arriving at a just decision of the case x x x[23]

Second Issue: Applicability of Section 24, PD 464

Arguing that he should not be liable for back taxes, petitioner states that
Respondent CBAA should have applied Section 24, instead of Section 25, of PD 464.
These statutory provisions read:

"Section 24. Date of effectivity of Assessment or Reassessment. All assessments or

reassessments made after the first day of January of any year shall take effect on the
first day of January of the succeeding year: Provided, however, That the reassessment
of real property due to its (1) partial or total destruction, or to (2) a major change in its
actual use, or to any (3) great and sudden inflation or deflation of real property values,
(4) or to the gross illegality of the assessment when made or to any other abnormal
cause, shall be made within ninety days from the date any such cause or causes
occurred, the same to take effect at the beginning of the quarter next following the
reassessment.

Section 25. Assessment of Property Subject to Back Taxes. Real property declared for
the first time shall have back taxes assessed against it for the period during which it
would have been liable if assessed from the first in proper course but in no case for
more than ten years prior to the year of initial assessment; Provided, however, that the
back taxes shall be computed on the basis of the applicable schedule of values in force
during the corresponding period.

If said taxes are paid before the expiration of the tax collection period next ensuing, no
penalty for delinquency shall be imposed, otherwise the taxes shall be subject to all the
penalties to which they would have been liable had they originally become delinquent
after assessment of the property in the usual course."

The Court held that the area in excess of that declared by the taxpayer was deemed
declared for the first time upon its discovery. It ratiocinated thus: "x x x it is neither just
that another landowner should be permitted by an involuntary mistake or through other
causes, not to say bad faith, to state an area far less than that actually contained in his
land and pay to the State a tax far below that which he should really pay. This was one
of the objects of the Legislature in ordering the revision, so that all real estate should
pay the taxes that legally must accrue to the State. Wherefore, even taking the
Spanish text of the phrase in (S)ection 12 of Act No. 2238 that real property declared for
the first time shall have taxes assessed against it, etc.,' it should not be understood to
apply only to real estate that have (sic) never been declared; as within the meaning of
such phrase, the excess areas resulting from the revision must be understood as never
having been declared before; because only that area must be deemed as declared
which is stated in the declaration sheet, and the area over and above that cannot be
considered as ever having been declared." (Underscoring supplied)

Also section 24 merely lays down the general rule that assessments under PD
464 are to be given prospective application. It cannot be construed in such a manner as
to eliminate the imposition of back taxes

Third Issue: Applicability of Par. N, Section 3, PD 464

Petitioner insists that Respondent CBAA should have computed the assessed value
of the property based on its market value as defined in paragraph n, Section 3 of PD
464, to wit:

n) Market Value is defined as "the highest price estimated in terms of money which the
property will buy if exposed for sale in the open market allowing a reasonable time to
find a purchaser who buys with knowledge of all uses to which it is adapted and for
which it is capable of being used." It is also referred to as "the price at which a willing
seller would sell and a willing buyer would buy, neither being under abnormal pressure."

We cannot sustain petitioner's contention. The cited provision merely defines

"market value." It does not in any way direct that the market value as defined therein
should be used as basis in determining the value of a property for purposes of real
property taxation. On the other hand, Section 5 of PD 464 provides unequivocally that
"(a)ll real property, whether taxable or exempt, shall be appraised at the current and fair
market value prevailing in the locality where the property is situated." [31]
Contrary to petitioner's contention, acquisition cost cannot be and is not the sole
basis of the current and fair market value of a property. The current value of like
properties and their actual or potential uses, among others, are also considered.

Sub-Issue: Is CBAA's Assessment Unconstitutional?

 Equally unmeritorious is petitioner's contention that the imposition of back taxes on
his property is unconstitutional for being violative of Section 22, [37] Article III of the 1987
Constitution.
When both Public Respondents CBAA and City Assessor imposed back taxes on
petitioner's property, they did not violate the rule that laws shall have only prospective
applicability. Respondents were only applying PD 464 which had been in effect since
1974. Besides, Section 25 of PD 464 is not penal in character; hence, it may not be
considered as an ex post facto law.[38]

Sub Issue: Application of Reyes vs. Almanzor

Petitioner also claims that the assessed building is covered by PD 20; [39] thus the
assessor should have used the "income approach," as enunciated in Reyes vs.
Almanzor,[40] in fixing the valuation of the property, instead of the "comparable sales
approach." To prove that his property was covered by PD 20, petitioner submitted as
annexes to his instant petition several documents consisting of official receipts of lease
rentals.[41]
The submission of these documents before us cannot establish that his property is
covered by PD No. 20. The documents were never presented as documentary exhibits
before the City Assessor of Cebu City, Local Board of Assessment Appeal or CBAA.
This Court, not being a trier of facts, cannot consider these alleged evidence submitted
for the first time in this special civil action.
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 269 SCRA 317 (1997)

Two sets of board and officers of Eastern Telecommunications, Philippines,

Inc. (ETPI) were elected, one by the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) and the other by the registered ETPI stockholders

Victor Africa, a stockholder of ETPI filed a petition for Certiorari before the
Sandiganbayan alleging that the PCGG had been “illegally exercising the rights of
stockholders of ETPI,” in the election of the members of the board of directors. The
Sandiganbayan ruled that only the registered owners, their duly authorized
representatives or their proxies may vote their corresponding shares.

The PCGG filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition before the
Court which was granted. The Court referred the PCGG’s petition to hold the special
stockholders’ meeting to the Sandiganbayan for reception of evidence and resolution.
The Sandiganbayan granted the PCGG “authority to cause the holding of a special
stockholders’ meeting of ETPI and held that there was an urgent necessity to increase
ETPI’s authorized capital stock; there existed a prima facie factual foundation for the
issuance of the writ of sequestration covering the Class “A” shares of stock; and the
PCGG was entitled to vote the sequestered shares of stock.

The PCGG-controlled ETPI board of directors held a meeting and the increase in
ETPI’s authorized capital stock from P250 Million to P2.6 Billion was “unanimously
approved”. Africa filed a motion to nullify the stockholders meeting, contending that only
the Court, and not the Sandiganbayan, has the power to authorize the PCGG to call a
stockholders meeting and vote the sequestered shares.

The Sandiganbayan denied the motions for reconsideration of prompting Africa

to file before the Court a second petition, challenging the Sandiganbayan Resolutions
authorizing the holding of a stockholders meeting and the one denying the motion for
reconsideration.

ISSUES:

1. WoN the Sandiganbayan gravely abusedits discretion in ordering the holding of a

stockholders meeting to elect the ETPI board of directors without first setting in place,
through the amendment of the articles of incorporation and the by-laws of ETPI?

2. WoN the PCGG can vote the sequestered ETPI Class “A” shares in the stockholders
meeting for the election of the board of directors?

HELD:

First Issue :
On the PCGG’s imputation of grave abuse of discretion upon the Sandiganbayan for
ordering the holding of a stockholders meeting to elect the ETPI board of
directors without first setting in place, through the amendment of the articles of
incorporation and the by-laws of ETPI, the safeguards prescribed in Cojuangco, Jr. v.
Roxas. The Court laid down those safeguards because of the obvious need to reconcile
the rights of the stockholder whose shares have been sequestered and the duty of the
conservator to preserve what could be ill-gotten wealth. There is nothing in the
Cojuangco case that would suggest that the above measures should be incorporated in
the articles and by-laws before a stockholders meeting for the election of the board of
directors is held. The PCGG nonetheless insists that those measures should be written
in the articles and by-laws before such meeting, “otherwise, the {Marcos] cronies will
elect themselves or their representatives, control the corporation, and for an appreciable
period of time, have every opportunity to disburse funds, destroy or alter corporate
records, and dissipate assets.” That could be a possibility, but the peculiar
circumstances of the case require that the election of the board of directors first be held
before the articles of incorporation are amended. Section 16 of the Corporation Code
requires the majority vote of the board of directors to amend the articles of
incorporation. At the time Africa filed his motion for the holding of the annual
stockholders meeting, there were two sets of ETPI directors, one controlled by the
PCGG and the other by the registered stockholders. Which of them is the
legitimate board of directors? Which of them may rightfully vote to amend the articles of
incorporation and integrate the safeguards laid down in Cojuangco? It is essential,
therefore, to cure the aberration of two boards of directors sitting in a single corporation
before the articles of incorporation are amended to set in place the Cojuangco
safeguards. The danger of the so-called Marcos cronies taking control of the
corporation and dissipating its assets is, of course, a legitimate concern of the PCGG,
charged as it is with the duties of a conservator. Nevertheless, such danger may be
averted by the “substantially contemporaneous” amendment of the articles after the
election of the board.

Second Issue :

The principle laid down in Baseco vs. PCGG was further enhanced in the subsequent
cases of Cojuangco v. Calpo and Presidential Commission on Good Government v.
Cojuangco, Jr., where the Court developed a “two-tiered” test in determining whether
the PCGG may vote sequestered shares. The issue of whether PCGG may vote the
sequestered shares in SMC necessitates a determination of at least two factual matters:
a.) whether there is prima facie evidence showing that the said shares are ill-gotten and
thus belong to the state; and b.) whether there is an immediate danger of dissipation
thus necessitating their continued sequestration and voting by the PCGG while the main
issue pends with the Sandiganbayan. The two-tiered test, however, does not apply
in cases involving funds of “public character.” In such cases, the government is granted
the authority to vote said shares, namely: (1) Where government shares are taken over
by private persons or entities who/which registered them in their own names, and (2)
Where the capitalization or shares that were acquired with public funds somehow
landed in private hands. In short, when sequestered shares registered in the names of
private individuals or entities are alleged to have been acquired with ill-gotten wealth,
then the two-tiered test is applied. However, when the sequestered shares in the name
of private individuals or entities are shown, prima facie, to have been (1) originally
government shares, or (2) purchased with public funds or those affected with public
interest, then the two-tiered test does not apply. The rule in the jurisdiction is, therefore,
clear. The PCGG cannot perform acts of strict ownership of sequestered property. It is a
mere conservator. It may not vote the shares in a corporation and elect members of
the board of directors. The only conceivable exception is in a case of a takeover of a
business belonging to the government or whose capitalization comes from public funds,
but which landed in private hands as in BASECO. In short, the Sandiganbayan held that
the public character exception does not apply, in which case it should have proceeded
to apply the two-tiered test. This it failed to do. The questions thus remain if there is
prima facie evidence showing that the subject shares are ill- gotten and if there is
imminent danger of dissipation. The Court is not, however, a trier of facts, hence, it is
not in a position to rule on the correctness of the PCGG’s contention. Consequently, the
issue must be remanded to the Sandiganbayan for resolution.
Grego vs. COMELEC, 274 SCRA 481 (1997)
FACTS:
On October 31, 1981, before the effectivity of the Local Government Code of 1991,
private respondent Humberto Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff
by no less than the Supreme Court upon a finding of serious misconduct in an
administrative complaint.

Subsequently, Basco ran as a candidate for councilor in the Second District of the City
of Manila in the January 18, 1988 local elections. He won and assumed office. He was
successfully re-elected in 1992 and 1995.

It was his latest re-election which is the subject of the present petition on the ground
that he is disqualified under Section 40(b) of the LGC of 1991. Under said section, those
removed from office as a result of an administrative case are disqualified to run for any
elective local position.

Issue/Held
- WoN Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991 apply
retroactively to those removed from office before it took effect on January
1, 1992?

a.) NO. The Supreme Court held that its refusal to give retroactive application to
the provision of Section 40(b) is already a settled issue and there exist no
compelling reason for the Court to depart therefrom. That the provision of the
Code in question does not qualify the date of a candidate’s removal from office
and that it is couched in the past tense should not deter the Court from applying
the law prospectively. A statute, despite the generality in its language, must not
be so construed as to overreach acts, events or matters which transpired before
its passage.
Section 40 (b) of the Local Government Code under which petitioner
anchors Basco's alleged disqualification to run as City Councilor states:
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. — The following persons are
disqualified from running for any elective local position:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative
case;
xxx xxx xxx
b.) In this regard, petitioner submits that although the Code took effect only on
January 1, 1992, Section 40 (b) must nonetheless be given retroactive effect and
applied to Basco's dismissal from office which took place in 1981. It is stressed
that the provision of the law as worded does not mention or even qualify the date
of removal from office of the candidate in order for disqualification thereunder to
attach. Hence, petitioner impresses upon the Court that as long as a candidate
was once removed from office due to an administrative case, regardless of
whether it took place during or prior to the effectivity of the Code, the
disqualification applies. 9 To him, this interpretation is made more evident by the
manner in which the provisions of Section 40 are couched. Since the past tense
is used in enumerating the grounds for disqualification, petitioner strongly
contends that the provision must have also referred to removal from office
occurring prior to the effectivity of the Code.10
Republic Act 7160 took effect only on January 1, 1992.
The rule is:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Well-settled is the principle that while the Legislature has the
power to pass retroactive laws which do not impair the obligation of
contracts, or affect injuriously vested rights, it is equally true that
statutes are not to be construed as intended to have a retroactive
effect so as to affect pending proceedings, unless such intent is
expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the
language of the enactment. . . . (Jones v. Summers, 105 Cal. App.
51, 286 Pac. 1093; U.S. v. Whyel 28 (2d) 30; Espiritu v. Cipriano, 55
SCRA 533 [1974], cited in Nilo v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 519
[1974]. See also Puzon v. Abellera, 169 SCRA 789 [1989]; Al-
Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines v. Civil Service
Commission, et al., G.R. No. 100599, April 8, 1992).
There is no provision in the statute which would clearly
indicate that the same operates retroactively.
It, therefore, follows that [Section] 40 (b) of the Local
Government Code is not applicable to the present case.
(Emphasis supplied).
Salvacion vs. Central Bank, 278 SCRA 27 (1997)
FACTS: Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested for committing four counts of
rape and serious illegal detention against Karen Salvacion. Police recovered from him
several dollar checks and a dollar account in the China Banking Corp. He was,
however, able to escape from prison. In a civil case filed against him, the trial court
awarded Salvacion moral, exemplary and attorney’s fees amounting to almost
P1,000,000.00.
Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar deposit of Bartelli with the China
Banking Corp. but the latter refused arguing that Section 11 of Central Bank Circular
No. 960 exempts foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment, or any other
order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever. Salvacion therefore filed this action for declaratory
relief in the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of Republic
Act No. 6426, as amended by PD 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency
Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign transient?
HELD: NO.
The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246,
insofar as it amends Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, are hereby held to be
INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are
hereby required to comply with the writ of execution issued in the civil case and to
release to petitioners the dollar deposit of Bartelli in such amount as would satisfy the
judgment.

Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law makes futile the favorable judgment and
award of damages that Salvacion and her parents fully deserve. It then proceeded to
show that the economic basis for the enactment of RA No. 6426 is not anymore
present; and even if it still exists, the questioned law still denies those entitled to due
process of law for being unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the law may be
good when enacted. The law failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright
injustice and inequality such as the case before us.

The SC adopted the comment of the Solicitor General who argued that the Offshore
Banking System and the Foreign Currency Deposit System were designed to draw
deposits from foreign lenders and investors and, subsequently, to give the latter
protection. However, the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not
the kind of deposit encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives and
protection by said laws because such depositor stays only for a few days in the country
and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank only for a short time. Considering
that Bartelli is just a tourist or a transient, he is not entitled to the protection of Section
113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against attachment,
garnishment or other court processes.
Further, the SC said: “In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its
justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular
No. 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of
any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever,
is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen
aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of
the New Civil Code which provides that “in case of doubt in the interpretation or
application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to
prevail.”
Oliveros vs. Villaluz, 57 SCRA 163 (1974)

Facts:
The suspension order of September 25, 1971 suspending petitioner mayor from office
covered only his then current term of office (January 1, 1968 to December 31, 1971)
and no other term. Petitioner's reelection to the same office of mayor of Antipolo for a
new term (January 1, 1972 to December 31, 1975) despite his pending anti-graft
criminal case (by virtue whereof the suspension order was issued against him) was
concededly an eventuality and an uncertain and unknown future event not contemplated
or covered by the suspension order. Hence, he should not be held guilty of having
"willfully and deliberately disobeyed the suspension order" when his act of assumption
of office as mayor for a new term after his reelection by the electorate of Antipolo was
not prohibited nor even contemplated in the said suspension order.
On September 25, 1971 after due notice and hearing as ordered by this Court in an
earlier case,1 respondent court issued its order upholding the validity of the information
for violation of section 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act 3019 filed on March 31, 1971 against
petitioner as accused2 and directing that "the accused Mayor Jose Rentoria Oliveros of
Antipolo, Rizal, is hereby ordered SUSPENDED pursuant to section 13, of Republic Act
No. 3019, from office within twenty-four hours from receipt of this Order." Petitioner duly
complied with the suspension order and ceased to hold office thereafter.
In the general elections of November 8, 1971, however, petitioner ran for re-election
and despite the pending criminal anti-graft charge against him and his suspension from
office won re-election and was duly proclaimed mayor-elect of Antipolo, Rizal for a new
term beginning January 1, 1972 and ending December 31, 1975. Pursuant to the
mandate of the Election Code of 1971 (Republic Act 6388)3 petitioner took his oath of
office and entered upon the performance of his duties as re-elected mayor of Antipolo
on January 1, 1972.
On January 17, 1972, respondent People through the state prosecutor filed a contempt
petition against petitioner, asserting that petitioner's act of "taking over once again the
functions of the office of mayor in the face of a suspension order [of September 25,
1971] constitutes grave disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order" and that his
assumption of office was "illegal and improper ... deliberately with grave abuse of
authority and in open defiance of the order of this Honorable Court."4
Respondent court after hearing rejected Petitioner's answer and pleas that he acted
only in obedience to the mandate of the people of Antipolo who re-elected him to a new
term of mayor altogether different and distinct from his previous expired term during
which he was ordered suspended and issued its challenged order of January 26, 1972
declaring that "the order of suspension dated September 25, 1971 is still subsisting and
that accused is still under suspension" and finding petitioner guilty of contempt of court.
Reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari
and prohibition. The Court thereupon issued its order of February 4, 1972 restraining
enforcement and implementation of the challenged order of January 26, 1972 until
further orders.
Sec 13 of the Anti-Graft Law – suspension unless acquitted, reinstated!

Issue: whether or not the suspension order against an elective official following an
information for violation of the Anti- Graft law filed against him, applies not only to the
current term of office but also to another term if the accused run for reelection and won

Ruling:

only refers to the current term of the suspended officer (and not to a future unknown
and uncertain new term unless supplemented by a new suspension order in the event of
reelection) for if his term shall have expired at the time of acquittal, he would obviously
be no longer entitled to reinstatement; otherwise it will lead to absurdities .

Petitioner concedes that "the power and authority of respondent judge to continue trying
the criminal case against petitioner may not in any way be affected by the fact of
petitioner's re-election," but contends that "said respondent's power to preventively
suspend petitioner under section 13 of Republic Act 3019 became inefficacious upon
petitioner's re-election"5 arguing that the power of the courts cannot be placed over that
of sovereign and supreme people who ordained his return to office.
Petitioner's reliance on the loose language used in Pascual vs. Provincial Board of
Nueva Ecija6 that "each term is separate from other terms and that the re-election to
office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of
cutting off the right to remove him therefor" is misplaced.
The Court has in subsequent cases made it clear that the Pascual ruling (which dealt
with administrative liability) applies exclusively to administrative and not to criminal
liability and sanctions. Thus, in Ingco vs. Sanchez7 the Court ruled that the re-election of
a public officer for a new term does not in any manner wipe out the criminal liability
incurred by him in a previous term.
In Luciano vs. Provincial Governor8 the Court stressed that the cases of Pascual and
Lizares are authority for the precept that "a re-elected public officer is no longer
amenable to administrative sanctions for acts committed during his former tenure" but
that as to criminal prosecutions, particularly, for violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, as in the case at bar, the same are not barred by re-election of the public
officer, since, inter alia, one of the penalties attached to the offense is perpetual
disqualification from public office and it "is patently offensive to the objectives and the
letter of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act ... that an official may amass wealth thru
graft and corrupt practices and thereafter use the same to purchase re-election and
thion 13 which reads as follows: . — have been filed against him.

Construction to avoid absurdity

4. Reason: it is always presumed that the legislature intended 
 exceptions to its

 language which would avoid consequences 
 of this character 


5. Thus, statutes may be extended to cover cases not within the 
 literal meaning of the
terms if their exact and literal import 
 would lead to absurd or mischievous
results 


6. Interpretation talis in ambiguis simper fienda est ut evitetur 
 inconveniens et

absurdum – where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid
inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted 


7. Courts test the law by its results – if law appears to be arbitrary, courts are not bound
to apply it in slavish disobedience to its language 


8. Courts should construe a statute to effectuate, and not to defeat, its provisions; nor
render compliance with its provisions impossible to perform 

Amatan vs. Aujero, 248 SCRA 511 (1995)

A.M. No. RTJ-93-956 September 27, 1995

PANFILO S. AMATAN, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE VICENTE AUJERIO, respondent.

RESOLUTION

KAPUNAN, J.:

Facts:
- Rodrigo Umpad was charged with homicide. Upon arraignment, he and his counsel, the offended party and the public
prosecutor entered into a plea bargaining whereby, with the approval of the judge, the information was amended to
attempted homicide and the accused pleaded guilty thereto.

- The plea bargaining agreement was entered into and approved by Judge Aujero pursuant to Section 2, Rule 116 of the
1985 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure - which allows an accused with the consent of the offended party, to plead
guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not such offense is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is
cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction.

- Amatan filed an administrate suit against Judge Aujero for gross ignorance of the law for approving the plea bargaining
agreement and sentencing the accused for the crime of attempted homicide, the Judge explained that what he did was in
accordance with Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Issue/Held:

- WoN Judge Aujero is administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law.

a.) Yes, Judge Aujero is guilty of gross ignorance of the law.

Section 2, Rule, 116 of the 1985 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, allows the accused in
criminal case to plead guilty "to lesser offense regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the
crime charged."

The fact of death of the victim for which the accused Rodrigo Umpad was criminally liable,
cannot by simple logic and plain common sense be reconciled with the plea of guilty to the
lower offense of attempted homicide.

The crime of homicide as defined in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code necessarily
produces death; attempted homicide does not.

b.) Concededly, hiatus in the law exists in the case before us, which could either lead to a misapprehension of Section 2
of Rule 116 or to outright confusion. Such a result was itself recognized by the Deputy Court Administrator when he
recommended an amendment to the provision in his Memorandum.

However, the law is not entirely bereft of solutions in such cases. In instances where a literal application of a
provision of law would lead to injustice or to a result so directly in opposition with the dictates of logic and
everyday common sense as to be unconscionable, the Civil Code 5 admonishes judges to take principles of
right and justice at heart.

In case of doubt the intent is to promote right and justice. Fiat justice ruat coelum. Stated
differently, when a provision of law is silent or ambiguous, judges ought to invoke a solution
responsive to the vehement urge of conscience.
These are fundamental tenets of law. In the case at bench, the fact of the victim's death, a
clear negation of frustrated or attempted homicide, ought to have alerted the judge not only
to a possibly inconsistent result but to an injustice. The failure to recognize such principles
so cardinal to our body of laws amounts to ignorance of the law and reflects respondent
judge's lack of prudence, if not competence, in the performance of his duties.
Ursua vs. CA, 256 SCRA 147 (1996)

FACTS:
In 1989, Cesario Ursua (a Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer
assigned in Kidapawan, Cotabato) was charged with bribery and dishonesty. His lawyer
then asked him to get a copy of the complaint against him from the Office of the
Ombudsman. His lawyer asked him to get for the copy of the complaint because the law
firm’s messenger, a certain Oscar Perez, was unable to go to the office of the
Ombudsman since it is attending other matters.
Before going to the Ombudsman, Ursua talked to Perez. He revealed to him that he
feels uncomfortable asking for a copy of the complaint because he is the respondent in
the said case. Perez then told him than he can go there as “Oscar Perez” so that he
does not have to reveal his true identity.
At the Office of the Ombudsman, Ursua signed the logbook there as “Oscar Perez”.
When he was handed a copy of the complaint, he signed the receipt as “Oscar Perez”.
However, a staff of the Ombudsman was able to learn that he was in fact Cesario
Ursua. The staff then recommended that a criminal case be filed against Ursua.
Eventually, Ursua was sentenced to three years in prison for violating C.A. No. 142, as
amended, otherwise known as “An Act To Regulate The Use Of Aliases”.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Cesario Ursua’s conviction is proper.

HELD:
No. Ursua should be acquitted. The Supreme Court ruled that a strict application of C.A.
No. 142, as amended, in this case only leads to absurdity – something which could not
have been intended by the lawmakers.
Under C.A. No. 142, as amended, save for some instances, a person is not allowed to
use a name or an alias other than his registered name or that which he was baptized.
Under the law, what makes the use of alias illegal is the fact that it is being used
habitually and publicly in business transactions without prior authorization by competent
authority. In this case, Ursua merely used the name “Oscar Perez” once, it was not
used in a business transaction, the use of the name was with the consent of Oscar
Perez himself, and even if he used a different name, in this instance, he was not even
required to disclose his identity at the Office of the Ombudsman. When he was
requesting a copy of the complaint, he need not disclose his identity because the
complaint is a public record open to the public.
In short, the evils sought to be avoided by the C.A. No. 142 was not brought about when
Ursua used a name other than his name. A strict application of the law is not warranted.
When Ursua used the name of Oscar Perez, no fraud was committed; there was no
crime committed punishable under C.A. No. 142. The purpose of the law is to punish
evils defined therein so when no such evil was produced by Ursua’s act, said law need
not be applied.
Time and again, it has been decreed that statutes are to be construed in the light
of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. Thus in construing
a statute, the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be
construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. The court may consider
the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity,
contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers.
Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against
the State and in favor of the accused. The reason for this principle is the tenderness of
the law for the rights of individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by
conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court
limited. Indeed, our mind cannot rest easy on the proposition that petitioner should be
convicted on a law that does not clearly penalize the act done by him.
NPC vs. Province of Lanao del Sur, 264 SCRA 271 (1996)

Petitioner own certain real properties situated in Saguiaran, Lanao del Sur. Said
properties comprise petitioner's Agus II Hydroelectric Power Plant Complex. Petitioner
was assessed real estate taxes on said properties in the approximate amount of one
hundred fifty five million covering the period from June 14, 1984 to December 31,
1989,1 allegedly because petitioner's exemption from realty taxes had been withdrawn.
After two demand letters was sent by provincial treasurer to the petitioner for the
payment of real property taxes due, a Notice of Auction (Sale) covering the subject
properties was served on petitioner. The auction sale was held even though the Court
issued a TRO enjoining respondents from proceeding with and conducting the auction
sale of the subject properties with the Province of Lanao del Sur as the sole bidder. A
certificate of sale was immediately issued and registered with the Register of Deeds of
the province. The following are the relevant laws and resolutions for the tax exempt
status of petitioner for the period up to December 31, 1989: Section 13
Commonwealth Act No. 120 - exempted NPC from the payment of all forms of taxes,
duties, fees, imposts as well as costs and service fees including filing fees, appeal
bonds, supersede as bonds, in any court or administrative proceedings "to enable the
Corporation to pay its indebtedness and obligations." • Section 2 of Republic Act No.
358 - exempted NPC from all taxes, duties, fees, imposts, charges and restrictions of
the Republic of the Philippines, its provinces, cities and municipalities in order to
facilitate payment of its indebtedness. • • Republic Act No. 6395 - revised the charter
of the petitioner. Presidential Decree No. 380 amended Section 13, paragraphs (a)
and (d), of RA 6395 by specifying, among others, the exemption of petitioner from
taxes, duties, fees, imposts and other charges imposed, "directly or indirectly", on all
petroleum products used by petitioner in its operations. • Section 40(a) Presidential
Decree No. 464, also known as the Real Property Tax Code - Real property owned
by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions and any
government-owned corporation so exempt by its charter • Presidential Decree No. 776
- created the Fiscal Incentives Review Board (FIRB) for the purpose of determining
what subsidies and tax exemptions should be modified, withdrawn, revoked or
suspended • Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 938 - amended the provisions
of Section 13 of RA 6395 by integrating the various tax exemptions into a general
exemption from "all forms of taxes, duties," etc. • Section 2 Presidential Decree No.
1931 - withdrew all tax exemption privileges granted to government-owned or controlled
corporations. However, the President of the Philippines and/or the Minister of
Finance, upon the recommendation of the Fiscal Incentives Review Board (FIRB)
is Section 2 Presidential Decree No. 1931 - withdrew all tax exemption privileges
granted to government-owned or controlled corporations. However, the President of the
Philippines and/or the Minister of Finance, upon the recommendation of the Fiscal
Incentives Review Board (FIRB) is empowered to restore, partially or totally, the
exemptions withdrawn. • FIRB Resolution No. 10-85 - restored petitioner's tax and duty
exemption privileges enjoyed by it under CA 120 as amended, effective from June 11,
1984 up to June 30, 1985 • FIRB Resolution No. 1-86 10 - extended the tax and duty
exemption privileges of petitioner from July 1, 1985 onwards indefinitely • Executive
Order No. 93 - withdrawing all tax and duty incentives of government and private
entities. But Section 2 gave FIRB the authority to restore tax and/or duty exemptions
withdrawn. • FIRB Resolution No. 17-87 11- restored petitioner's tax and duty
exemption privileges, effective on the same effectivity date of E.O. 93. •

ISSUE Whether petitioner has ceased to enjoy its tax and duty exemption privileges,
including its exemption from payment of real property taxes.

RULING Although Section 1 of PD 1931 withdrew all tax exemptions including those of
petitioner, Section 2 thereof authorized and empowered the President and/or the
Minister of Finance to restore the same to deserving entities. FIRB Resolution No. 10-
85 reinstated the petitioner's tax exemptions that was made effective June 11, 1984, the
promulgation date of PD 1931, until June 30, 1985. By virtue of FIRB Resolution No. 1-
86, tax exemption was restored as of July 1, 1985, to continue for an indefinite period.
Petitioner's tax exemptions withdrawn by PD 1931 were validly restored by FIRB
Resolutions Nos. 10-85 and 1-86. Again withdrawn by EO 93, they were once more
restored by FIRB Resolution No. 17-87, effective as of March 10, 1987. Moreover, in the
same case of Maceda vs. Macaraig, Jr., the Court reaffirmed that EO 93 along with PDs
776 and were 1931 were all valid, and that FIRB Resolution No. 17-87 and the tax
exemptions restored thereunder were "valid and effective." The conclusion is that the
tax exemption privileges of petitioner had been validly restored and preserved by said
FIRB resolutions. From the foregoing chronological presentation that Section 10 of PD
938 amended Section 13 of RA 6395, the petitioner's charter, by converting the various
tax exemptions therein into a general exemption from all forms of taxes, direct and
indirect. This state of exemption from taxes subsisted even with the enactment of PD
1931 in 1984. It cannot then be successfully argued that petitioner's taxexempt status
was revoked in 1977 by PD 1177. The Court has consistently held that repeals by
implication are not favored, and will not be decreed, unless it is manifest that the
legislature so intended. As laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and with
full knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it is but reasonable to conclude that in
passing a statute it was not intended to interfere with or abrogate any former law
relating to same matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is not only
irreconcilable, but also clear and convincing, and flowing necessarily from the language
used, unless the later act fully embraces the subject matter of the earlier, or unless the
reason for the earlier act is beyond peradventure removed. Hence, every effort must be
used to make all acts stand and if, by any reasonable construction, they can be
reconciled, the later act will not operate as a repeal of the earlier.
Velunta vs. Chief, Philippine Constabulary, 157 SCRA 147 (1988)

Facts: The petitioner is a regular member of the Integrated National Police of Tacloban,
rank patrolman. One evening, while directing a traffic, a motorized tricycle was
apprehended and an altercation resulted to shooting and death of Romeo Lozano.

The wife of Lozano, filed an administrative case against petitioner with NAPOLCOM for
grave misconduct. Velunta was found guilty of grave misconduct and meted the penalty
of dismissal from service. On motion for reconsideration, the Adjudication board decided
on less grave misconduct with a penalty of 6-month suspension.

During the pendency of the administrative case, Mrs. Lozano file a homicide case. On
May 14, 1982, the fiscal found prima facie evidence and recommended the case be
referred to the Tanod-bayan for having been committed during the performance of
official duties.

The tanod-bayan approved and endorsed the filing of information against the petitioner
to the military authorities, pursuant to PD 1850 which authorizes the Chief of the
Philippine Constabulary to convene court martials to try, hear, and decide cases for
criminal acts committed by members of the Integrated National Police.

The petitioner challenges the assumption of jurisdiction by the General Court Martial
over the criminal case for homicide against him on the following basis:

(a) EO 1040, effective July 10, 1985, provides that supervision and control over all
units and members of the Integrated National Police have been transferred to
NAPOLCOM and placed directly under the Office of the President, thereby
removing police officers from the supervision and control of the Chief of the PC
under the DND.

(b) PD 1850 was expressly repealed by Section 3 of EO No. 1040.

Issue: WON the General Court martial has jurisdiction over a criminal case for
homicide.
Held: YES. Jurisdiction is vested only if expressly conferred by the constitution and
statutes and those of necessary implication to make the express powers effective. Thus,
in resolving the issue, the court looked into expressed provision of law to determine
jurisdiction.

PD 1850 SECTION 1. Court Martial Jurisdiction over Integrated National Police

and Members of the AFP. — Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding
— (a) uniformed members of the Integrated National Police who commit any
crime or offense cognizable by the civil courts shall henceforth be exclusively
tried by courts-martial

EO 1012 provides, the provision of special or general laws to the contrary

notwithstanding, the operational supervision and direction exercised by the PC
over all units of the INP force stationed or assigned in the different cities and
municipalities all over the country, is hereby transferred to the city or municipal
government concerned until further orders from the President of the Philippines

EO 1040 provides, the NPC shall henceforth be under the Office of the President
as may be directed by and under the control of the president, it shall exercise
administrative control and supervision over all units of the INP force throughout
the country

The aforecited provision does not repeal in express terms, P.D. No. 1850. Implied
repeals are not favored and will not be declared unless the intent of the legislators is
manifest. Neither is there any inconsistency between P.D. No. 1850 and EO 1012.

EO No. 1012 states that it is only the "operational supervision and direction" over all
units of the Integrated National Police force stationed or assigned in the different cities
and municipalities that was transferred from the Philippine Constabulary to the city or
municipal government concerned.

Likewise, under Executive Order No. 1040 it is the exercise of "administrative control
and supervision" over all units of the Integrated National Police forces throughout the
country that was transferred to the President of the Philippines.
City of Baguio vs. Marcos, 27 SCRA 342 (1969)  [Compare with Director of Lands
vs. Abaja, infra]

Facts:
In April 12, 1912, the director of lands in the CFI of Baguio INSTITUTED the reopening
of cadastral proceedings. In November 13, 1922, a decision was RENDERED. The land
involved was the Baguio Townsite which was declared public land. In July 25, 1961,
Belong Lutes petitioned to reopen the civil case on the following grounds: 1) he and his
predecessors have been in continuous possession and cultivation of the land since
Spanish times; 2) his predecessors were illiterate Igorots, thus, were not able to file their
claim. On the contrary, F. Joaquin Sr., F. Joaquin Jr., and Teresita Buchholz opposed
Lutes’ reopening on the following grounds: 1) the reopening was filed outside the 40-
year period provided in RA 931; 2) the petition to reopen the case was not published;
and 3) as lessees of the land, they have standing on the issue.

Issue:
Whether or not the reopening of the peririon was filed outside the 40-year period
provided in RA 931, which was ENACTED on June 20, 1953

Held:
The Supreme Court grabted the reopening of cadastral proceedings

Ratio:
The title of RA 931 was “An Act to Authorize the Filing in Proper Court under Certain
Conditions, of Certain Claims of Title to Parcels of Land that have been Declared Public
Land, by Virtue of Judicial Decisions RENDERED within the 40 Years Next Preceding
the Approval of this Act.” Section 1 of the Act reads as “..in case such parcels of land,
on account of their failure to file such claims, have been, or about to be declared land of
the public domain by virtue of judicial proceedings INSTITUTED within the 40 years
next preceding the approval of this act.” If the title is to be followed, November 13, 1922
is the date which should be followed, hence, would allow the reopening of the case. If
Section 1 is to be followed, the date of the institution of reopening of the case which was
April 12, 1912, the petition would be invalid.

StatCon maxim:
The title is an indispensable part of a statute, and what may inadequately be omitted in
the text may be supplied or remedied by its title
Ebarle vs. Sucaldito, 156 SCRA 803 (1987)

Facts:

• Petitioner Bienvenido Ebarle was then provincial Governor of Zamboanga and a

candidate for re-election in the 1971 local elections.
• Anti-Graft League of the Phils. filed different complaints with the City Fiscal against the
petitioner for violations of provisions of the Anti-Graft Law (RA 3019) as well as
Arts.171, 182, 183, 213 & 318 of the Revised Penal Code.
o On the bidding for the supply of gravel and sand for the province of Zamboanga
del Sur in favor of Tabiliran Trucking Company
o On the collection of advances under the trucking contract of Tabiliran Trucking
Company, making it appear that it was collected by Teoson Trucking Company,
who held the subsisting contract
o on the bidding for the construction of the right wing portion of the Capitol Building
of the Province of Zamboanga del Sur, in favor of supposed winning bidder who
is the brother-in-law of Ebarle
o on petitioner’s testifying falsely under oath that he acquired a certain lot by
purchase but the lot was in fact owned by the provincial government
of Zamboanga del Sur (where the provincial jail is located)
o on the simulated bidding in favor of Tabiliran Trucking Company
o on appointments of people related to Ebarle to different positions in the
government
• petitioner filed for prohibition and certiorari in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga
del Sur but the case was dismissed
 in the petition filed before the SC, petitioner claims that the respondents City Fiscal
and the Anti-Graft League failed to comply with the provisions of EO 264 preliminary
to their criminal recourses.

TITLE: "OUTLINING THE PROCEDURE BY WHICH COMPLAINANTS CHARGING

THE GOV’T OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES WITH THE COMMISSION OF
IRREGULARITIES SHOULD BEGUIDED" (see below for full text of EO 264)

Issues:
• Whether or not respondents had to comply with the provisions of EO264.

Held:

No, the petitioner’s reliance upon the provisions of EO 264 has no merit.
o it is plain from the very wording of the Order that it has exclusive application to
administrative, and NOT criminal complaints

see title: “Commission of Irregularities”

o no mention, not even by implication, of criminal “offenses”, or crimes
 o while “crimes” amount to “irregularities”, the EO could have very well referred to
the more specific term had it intended to make itself applicable thereto
o “procedure provided by law and regulations” pertains to existing procedural rules
with respect to the presentation of administrative charges against erring
government officials
see also the paragraphs of EO264:
o the following are but restatements of existing rules:
Paragraph 3 = Sec. 33 of RA 2260, Civil Service Act of 1959
Paragraph 4 = Decentralization Act of 1967
Paragraph 5 = Police Act of 1966
o specific reference to “erring officials or employees…removed or otherwise
vindicated”
o if it were to apply to criminal prosecutions, it would have employed such technical
terms as “accused,” “convicted,” or “acquitted”

--------------------------------------------^_^------------------------------------------------
FULL TEXT OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 264
MALACAÑANG
RESIDENCE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
MANILA BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 264

OUTLINING THE PROCEDURE BY WHICH COMPLAINANTS CHARGING

GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES WITH COMMISSION OF
IRREGULARITIES SHOULD BE GUIDED.

WHEREAS, it is necessary that the general public be duly informed or reminded of the
procedure provided by law and regulations by which complaints against public officials
and employees should be presented and prosecuted;

WHEREAS, actions on complaints are at times delayed because of the failure to

observe the formal requisites therefor, to indicate with sufficient clearness and
particularity the charges or offenses being aired or denounced, and to file the complaint
with the proper office or authority;

WHEREAS, without in any way curtailing the constitutional guarantee of freedom of

expression, the Administration believes that many complaints or grievances could be
resolved at the lower levels of government if only the provisions of law and regulations
on the matter are duly observed by the parties concerned; and

WHEREAS, while all sorts of officials misconduct should be eliminated and punished, it
is equally compelling that public officials and employees be given opportunity afforded
them by the constitution and law to defend themselves in accordance with the
procedure prescribed by law and regulations;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines. by

virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby order:

1. Complaints against public officials and employees shall be in writing, subscribed and
sworn to by the complainants, describing in sufficient detail and particularity the acts or
conduct complained of, instead of generalizations.

2. Complaints against presidential appointees shall be filed with the Office of the
President or the Department Head having direct supervision or control over the official
involved.

3. Those against subordinate officials and employees shall be lodged with the proper
department or agency head.

4. Those against elective local officials shall be filed with the Office of the President in
case of provincial and city officials, with the provincial governor or board secretary in
case of municipal officials, and with the municipal or city mayor or secretary in case of
barrio officials.

5. Those against members of police forces shall be filed with the corresponding local
board of investigators headed by the city or municipal treasurer, except in the case of
those appointed by the President which should be filed with the Office of the President.

6. Complaints against public officials and employees shall be promptly acted upon and
disposed of by the officials or authorities concerned in accordance with pertinent laws
and regulations so that the erring officials or employees can be soonest removed or
otherwise disciplined and the innocent, exonerated or indicated in like manner, and to
the end also that other remedies, including court action, may be pursued forthwith by
the interested parties after administrative remedies shall have been exhausted.

Done in the City of Manila, this 6th day of October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and seventy.
Pp. vs. Purisima, 86 SCRA 542 (1978)
Facts:These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines
represented, respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one Decision as
they involve one basic question of law.

The respondent-courts are: CFI of Manila Branches VII and XVIII and CFI of Samar

Several informations were filed before the abovementioned courts charging the accused of
Illegal Possession of Deadly Weapon in violation of Presidential Decree #9. The counsel of the
defense filed motions to quash the said informations after which the respondent-courts passed
their own orders quashing the said informations on common ground that the informations did not
allege facts constituting ang offense penalized until PD#9 for failure to state an essential
element of the crime, which is, that the carrying outside of the accused’s residence of a bladed,
pointed, or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with, or related to to
subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder.

The respondent courts stand that PD#9 should be read in the context of Proc.1081 which seeks
to maintain law and order in the country as well as the prevention and suppression of all forms
of lawless violence. The non-inclusion of the aforementioned element may not be distinguished
from other legislation related to the illegal possession of deadly weapons. Judge Purisima, in
particular, reasoned that the information must allege that the purpose of possession of the
weapon was intended for the purposes of abetting the conditions of criminality, organized
lawlessness, public disorder. The petitioners said that the purpose of subversion is not
necessary in this regard because the prohibited act is basically a malum prohibitum or is an
action or conduct that is prohibited by virtue of a statute. The City Fiscal also added in cases of
statutory offenses, the intent is immaterial and that the commission of the act is voluntary is
enough.

Issue: Are the informations filed by the people sufficient in form and substance to constitute the
offense of “Illegal possession of deadly weapon” penalized under Presidential Decree No. 9?

Held:

1. It is the constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal prosecution to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

2. Under Sec. 5 Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, for a complaint or information to be sufficient, it
must state the designation of the offense by the statute and the acts or omissions complained of
as constituting the offense. This is essential to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him
the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly.

3. The supreme court says that the preamble of PD#9 states that the intention of such decree is
to penalize the acts which are related to Proc.1081 which aim to suppress lawlessness,
rebellion, subversive acts, and the like. While the preamble is not a part of the statute, it implies
the intent and spirit of the decree. The preamble and whereas clauses also enumerate the facts
or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions provided.

The petition is DISMISSED.

Pp. vs. Echavez, 95 SCRA 663 (1980)
FACTS:
Fiscal Abundio R. Ello filed with the lower court separate information against sixteen
persons charging them with squatting as penalized by Presidential Decree No. 772. The
information provides that the accused Mario Aparici, with stealth and strategy, enter
into, occupy and cultivate a portion of a grazing land physically occupied, possessed
and claimed by Atty. de la Serna, Jr., accused's entrance into the area has been and is
still against the win of the offended party.

BJudge Echaves dismissed the information on the grounds (1) that it was alleged that
the accused entered the land through "stealth and strategy", whereas under the decree
the entry should be effected "with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking
advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner", and (2) that under the rule of
ejusdem generis the decree does not apply to the cultivation of a grazing land.

Because of that order, the fiscal amended the information by using in lieu of "stealth and
strategy" the expression "with threat and taking advantage of the absence of the ranch
owner and/or tolerance of the said ranch owner". The fiscal asked that the dismissal
order be reconsidered and that the amended information be admitted.

The lower court denied the motion. It insisted that the phrase "and for other purposes" in
the decree does not include agricultural purposes because its preamble does not
mention the Secretary of Agriculture and makes reference to the affluent class.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PD No. 772, which penalized squatting and similar acts, applies to
agricultural lands.

RULING:
No. We hold that the lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to
pasture lands because its preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in
urban communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made
by well-to-do individuals. The squatting complained of involves pasture lands in rural
areas.

A preamble may restrict what otherwise appears to be a broad scope of a law.

The preamble of the decree is quoted below:

WHEREAS, it came to my knowledge that despite the issuance of Letter of
Instruction No. 19 dated October 2, 1972, directing the Secretaries of National
Defense, Public Work. and communications, Social Welfare and the Director of
Public Works, the PHHC General Manager, the Presidential Assistant on Housing
 and Rehabilitation Agency, Governors, City and Municipal Mayors, and City and
District Engineers, "to remove an illegal constructions including buildings on
and along esteros and river banks, those along railroad tracks and those
built without permits on public and private property." squatting is still a major
problem in urban communities all over the country;
WHEREAS, many persons or entities found to have been unlawfully occupying
public and private lands belong to the affluent class;
WHEREAS, there is a need to further intensify the government's drive against this
illegal and nefarious practice.

The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) invoked by the trial court
does not apply to this case. Here, the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is intended
to apply only to urban communities, particularly to illegal constructions. The rule of
ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory construction which is resorted to when the
legislative intent is uncertain. Thus, trial court's order of dismissal is affirmed.

SEC 1 – PD No. 772. Any person who, with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or
taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner, succeeds in
occupying or possessing the property of the latter against his will for residential,
commercial or any other purposes, shall be punished by an imprisonment ranging
from six months to one year or a fine of not less than one thousand nor more than
five thousand pesos at the discretion of the court, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency. (2nd paragraph is omitted.)
On the other hand, it should be noted that squatting on public agricultural lands,
like the grazing lands involved in this case, is punished by Republic Act No. 947:
SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person corporation or association to enter or
occupy, through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, any public agriculture
land including such public lands as are granted to private individuals under the
provision of the Public Land Act or any other laws providing for the of public
agriculture lands in the Philippines and are duly covered by the corresponding
applications for the notwithstanding standing the fact that title thereto still remains in
the Government or for any person, natural or judicial to investigate induce or force
another to commit such acts.
CIR vs. TMX Sales, Inc., 205 SCRA 184 (1992)
FACTS: TMX Sales Inc. filed its quarterly income tax for the 1st quarter of 1981. It
declared P571,174.31 and paying an income tax of P247,019 on May 13, 1981.
However, during the subsequent quarters, TMX suffered losses. On April 15, 1982,
when TMX filed its Annual Income Tax Return for the year ended in December 31,
1981, it declared a net loss of P6,156,525. On July 9, 1982, TMX filed with the Appellate
Division of BIR for refund in the amount of P247,010 representing overpaid income tax.
His claim was not acted upon by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. On May 14,
1984, TMX Sales filed a petition for review before the Court of Tax Appeals against CIR,
praying that the CIR be ordered to refund to TMX the amount of P247,010. The CIR
averred that TMX is already barred for claiming the refund since more than 2 years has
elapsed between the payment (May 15, 1981) and the filing of the claim in court (March
14, 1984). The Court of Tax Appeals rendered a decision granting the petition of TMX
Sales and ordered CIR to refund the amount mentioned. Hence, this appeal of CIR.

ISSUE: Whether or not TMX Sales Inc. is entitled to a refund considering that two years
gas already elapsed since the payment of the tax

RULING: Yes. Petition of CIR is denied. Sec. 292, par. 2 of the National Internal
Revenue Code stated that “in any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be begun after
the expiration of two years from the date of the payment of the tax or penalty regardless
of any supervening cause that may arise after payment.” Thus, in resolving the instant
case, it is necessary that we consider not only Section 292 (now Section 230) of the
National Internal Revenue Code but also the other provisions of the Tax Code.
A literal application of Section 292 (now Section 230) would thus pose no problem as
the two-year prescriptive period reckoned from the time the quarterly income tax was
paid can be easily determined. However, if the quarter in which the overpayment is
made, cannot be ascertained, then a literal application of Section 292 (Section 230)
would lead to absurdity and inconvenience.
The most reasonable and logical application of the law would be to compute the 2-year
prescriptive period at the time of the filing of the Final Adjustment Return or the Annual
Income Tax Return, where it can finally be ascertained if the tax payer has still to pay
additional income tax or if he is entitled to a refund of overpaid income tax. Since TMX
filed the suit on March 14, 1984, it is within the 2-year prescriptive period starting from
April 15, 1982 when they filed their Annual Income Tax Return.
Agcaoili vs. Sunguitan, 48 Phil 678 (1926)

Facts:
Julio Agcaoili was appointed as justice of the peace of the municipality of Laoag, Ilocos
Norte by Francis Harrison on March 25, 1916, with authority to have and hold the said
office with all the powers, privileges, and emoluments thereinto of right appertaining into
him, subject to the conditions prescribed by law. Agcaoili received a letter from Luis
Torres, Undersecretary of Justice, saying that he should cease to be a justice because
he is now over 65 years old. Justice Agcaoili filled a protest through a letter addressed
to the undersecretary to which he asserted that he will not cease from the office
because he was appointed as justice of peace before the enactment of Act 3107, and
he has the right to hold office during good behaviour. Agcaoili filed protest at Provincial
Fiscal of Ilocos Norte. He waited for a reply but nothing came. So, he filed for a petition
for writ of quo warranto in the CFI of the Province of Ilocos Norte.

Issue:
Whether or not Sec. 216 of Act 190 is applicable to the petitioner with regard to his
petition for quo warranto

Held:
No.
Ratio: Article 190 provides remedies for the usurpation of office and franchise. Section
216 provides “Nothing herein contained shall authorize an action against a corporation
for forfeiture of charter, unless the same be commenced within five years after the act
complained of was done or committed; nor shall an action be brought against an officer
to be ousted from his office unless within one year after the cause of such ouster, or the
right to hold the office, arose.” The Supreme Court held that this provision is applicable
only to private officials. Hence, it has no applicability to the petitioner, who is a justice of
the peace. The second point the court made is with regard to the rules of Statutory
Construction, given that the said provision is applicable to public officials, the sentence
after the word “committed;” should not be treated as a separate thought from the
preceding phrase. In the end, the court ruled that the petitioner remain in office.

StatCon maxim: A semicolon is a mark of grammatical punctuation, in the English

language, to indicate a separation in the relation of the thought, a degree greater than
that expressed by a comma, and what follows that semicolon must have relation to the
same matter which precedes it. A semicolon is not used for the purpose of introducing a
new idea. A semicolon is used for the purpose of continuing the expression of a
thought, a degree greater than that expressed by a mere comma. It is never used for
the purpose of introducing a new idea. The comma and semicolon are both used for the
same purpose, namely, to divide sentences and parts of the sentences, the only
difference being that the semicolon makes the division a little more pronounced than the
comma.
Pp. vs. Subido, 66 SCRA 545 (1975)

Facts:

The CFI found Subido guilty of libel. Therefore, he was sentenced of 3 months of
arresto mayor with the accessory penalties of the law, pay the fine of P500.00,
indemnify the offended party, Mayor Arsenio Lacson, of P10,000.00, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. However, the Court of Appeals
modified the judgment by removing the penalty of arresto mayor, reducing the indemnity
amount from P10,000 to P5,000 and mentioned nothing of the subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency. As a result, Subido filed with the trial court to recognize the
decision of the Court of Appeals and to cancel his appeal bond.

Issue:

Whether or not, the accused-appellant can be required to serve the fine and indemnity
prescribed in the judgment of the Court of Appeals in form of subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.

Ruling:

Under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code "a libel committed by means of writing,
printing, litography, engraving, radio, phonograph, paintings, theatrical exhibition,
cinematographic exhibition or any similar means, shall be punished by prision
correccional in its minimum and medium period or a fine ranging from 200 to 6000
pesos or both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended
party". It is evident from the foregoing provision that the court is given the discretion to
impose the penalty of imprisonment or fine or both for the crime of libel. It will be noted
that the lower court chose to impose upon the accused: three months of arresto mayor;
a fine of P500.00; indemnification of the offended party in the sum of P10,000.00;
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and the payment of the costs. On the
other hand, the Court of Appeals in the exercise of its discretion decided to eliminate the
penalty of three (3) months arresto mayor and to reduce the indemnity of P10,000.00 to
P5,000.00.

As thus worded and punctuated there would be no doubt that the lower court would
want to make accused-appellant serve the subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-
payment of the indemnity only.
Besides, We see no plausible reason why the lower court would want accused-
appellant to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency to pay the indemnity
only and not to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment of the fine.
Accordingly if according to the lower court's decision, the accused-appellant should
suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency to pay the fine and the indemnity
and the only modifications made by the Court of Appeals are to eliminate the three (3)
months of arresto mayor and to reduce the indemnity to the offended party, Mayor
Arsenio Lacson, from P10,000.00 to P5,000.00, then by force of logic and reason, the
fine of P5000.00, the reduced indemnity of P5,000.00 and the subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency should stand.
Fortunately, however, accused-appellant is favored by the retroactive force of Article 39
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 5465 which exempts an
accused person from subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency to pay his civil
liability.
Pp. vs. Yabut, 58 Phil. 499 (1933)

Facts:

 appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila, convicting the
appellant of the crime of murder and assessing the death penalty
 on or about the 1st day of August, 1932, in the City of Manila, the accused
Antonio Yabut, then a prisoner serving sentence in the Bilibid Prison, with intent
to kill, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and treacherously, assault, beat and use
personal violence upon one Sabas Aseo, another prisoner also serving sentence
in Bilibid, inflicting upon him various other physical injuries on different parts of
the body which caused the death of the latter about twenty-four (24) hours
thereafter
 Antonio Yabut was a recidivist, he having previously been convicted twice of the
crime of homicide and once of serious physical injuries, by virtue of final
sentences rendered by competent tribunals
 Upon arraignment, the accused plead not guilty.

 Issue: WON Yabut was a recidivist

Held:

 The appellant places much stress upon the word "another" appearing in the
English translation of the headnote of article 160 and would have us accept his
deduction from the headnote that article 160 is applicable only when the new
crime which is committed by a person already serving sentence is different from
the crime for which he is serving sentence
 It is clear that no such deduction could be drawn from the caption.
 There is no warrant whatever for such a deduction from the text itself of article
160. The language is plain and unambiguous
 There is not the slightest intimation in the text of article 160 that said article
applies only in cases where the new offense is different in character from the
former offense for which the defendant is serving the penalty.
 It is familiar law that when the text itself of a statute or a treaty is clear and
unambiguous, there is neither necessity nor propriety in resorting to the
preamble or headings or epigraphs of a section of interpretation of the text,
especially where such epigraphs or headings of sections are mere
catchwords or reference aids indicating the general nature of the text that
follows.
 Titles were not intended by the Legislature to be used as anything more than
catchwords conveniently suggesting in a general way the subject matter of each
article.
 Titles are a convenient index to the contents of the articles of the Code and
cannot, in any event have the effect of modifying or limiting the unambiguous
words of the text.
 defendant guilty of homicide and, applying article 249 of the Revised Penal Code
in connection with article 160 of the same, we sentence the defendant- appellant
to the maximum degree of reclusion temporal, that is to say, to twenty years of
confinement and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Sabas Aseo
(alias Sabas Asayo), in the sum of P1,000. Costs de oficio.
 Secondary aids may be consulted to remove, not to create doubt.
Camacho vs. CIR, 80 Phil 848 (1948)
FACTS:
 Petitioners in this case are the tenants.
 One of the respondents is the landowner.
 They have a landowner-tenant relationship.
 R.A. 34 have amended specific provisions under Act. No. 4054 or known as the
"The Philippine Rice Share Tenancy Act" which included the share basis
provision.
 Petitioners claimed that they are entitled to what has been provided under R.A.
34.
 CIR granted the petitioner's claim. 70%-30% in favor of the petitioners.
 Landowner insisted that what governed their landowner-tenant relationship at
that time was the Act. No. 4054.

ISSUE:

Is the landowner correct in assailing the applicability of the amendment of Act. 4054?

HELD:

No, the landowner is incorrect.

 Proclamation No. 14 issued by the President of the Philippines dated November

30, 1946, which declares the provisions of Act. No. 4054, as amended, to be in
full force and effect throughout the Philippines, was obviously intended for
territories in the Philippines in which said Act had not yet been declared in force
by proclamation prior to said date
 an amendment of a law being a part of the original which is already in force
and effect in a certain territory, must necessarily become effective therein as a
part of the amended law at the time the amendment takes effect
 that it is a well settled rule that the history of a legislation is also important in
interpreting the intention of the legislative body, and therefore courts may refer
to messages of the executive (The President) to the legislature

Since the tenants owns the work animals and the necessary implements, that he
defrayed the cost of plowing and cultivation, and that the costs of harvest and threshing
were deducted from the gross produce, they are really entitled to 70% share in the
harvested crops.

HISTORY OF LEGISLATION:

 Act No. 4054 had already been put in force since January 30, l937 in
Pangasinan
  It is therefore clear that Act No. 34, the amendatory act of Act No. 4054, became
effective ipso facto in Pangasinan since the date of its passage, September 30,
1946
 that the President in his message to Congress of the Philippines on August 8,
1946, the President said that "In view of the fact that planting season of rice is
under way and that the harvest will take place before the next session of the
Congress, I earnestly request that this matter receives your early attention and
that the proposed amendments be enacted at an early date"
 Act No. 34 was passed by Congress and approved by the President on
September 30, 1946 to take effect immediately
 it is to be inferred that it was the intention of the Congress to make it applicable
to the harvest of rice during the agricultural year 1946-1947.

Republic Act No. 34 (September 30, 1946)

AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF ACT NUMBERED FOUR THOUSAND

FIFTY-FOUR, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS "THE PHILIPPINE RICE
SHARE TENANCY ACT"

Section 3. Sections eight, nine and twenty-two of the same Act are amended to read as
follows:

"Sec. 8. Share basis. - In the absence of any written agreement to the contrary
and when the tenant furnishes the necessary implements and the work animals
and defrays all the expenses for planting and cultivation of the land, the crop
shall be divided as follows: the tenant shall receive seventy per cent of the
net produce of the land and the landlord thirty per cent, for first-class land,
the normal production of which, based on the average yield for the three
preceding years, is more than forty cavans of palay per one cavan of
seeds; seventy-five per cent for the tenant and twenty-five per cent for the
landlord, in case of land the average normal production of which is not more than
forty cavans of palay per one cavan of seeds. In case the landlord furnishes the
necessary work animals and farm implements and, likewise, bears all the
expenses of planting and cultivation, the landlord shall receive seventy per cent
and the tenant thirty per cent of the crop; but if the landlord furnishes the
necessary work animals and farm implements and bears equally with the tenant
the expenses of planting and cultivation, the crop shall be divided equally
between the parties.

"Expenses for harvesting and threshing shall be deducted from the gross
produce. Expenses for the maintenance of irrigation systems within the
respective areas shall be for the account of the tenant, but amortizations for the
cost of construction of the system itself shall be for the account of the landlord.
The expenses for construction and maintenance of privately owned irrigation
 systems shall be agreed upon between the landlord and tenant, but in case of
disagreement, all expenses for the construction of the system shall be for the
account of the landlord, provided that the costs of constructing the distribution
canals shall be for the account of the tenant.

"The division shall be made in the same place where the crop has been threshed
and each party shall transport his share to his warehouse, unless the contrary is
stipulated by the parties.

ACT NO. 4054

AN ACT TO PROMOTE THE WELL-BEING OF TENANTS (APARCEROS) IN

AGRICULTURAL LANDS DEVOTED TO THE PRODUCTION OF RICE AND TO
REGULATE THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THEM AND THE LANDLORDS OF SAID
LANDS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

"The Philippine Rice Share Tenancy Act."

Sec. 8. Share basis. – In the absence of any written agreement to the contrary and
when the necessary implements and the work animals are furnished by the
tenant; and the expenses for planting, harvesting, threshing, irrigation and
fertilizer, if any, as well as other expenses incident to the proper cultivation of the
land, are born equally by both the landlord and tenant, the crop shall be divided
equally. The division shall be made in the same place where the crop has been
threshed and each party shall transport his share to his warehouse, unless the contrary
is stipulated by the parties: Provided, however, That when the landlord furnishes the
work animal gratuitously it shall be deemed as a special consideration, and the tenant
shall be obliged to transport the share of the landlord to his warehouse if it is within the
municipality where the land cultivated is situated.
Nepomuceno vs. Ocampo, 95 Phil 292 (1954)
Facts:
On January 15, 1949, Municipal Council of Taytay Palawan, Antonio Gonzales, passed
Ordinance No. 1 Series of 1949, entitled “An ordinance governing the grant of exclusive
privilege of fishery over the Malampaya Sound, Taytay, Palawan.” In pursuant to Resolution No.
28, a notice to the effect that "the exclusive privilege of erecting fish corrals within the Malapaya
Sound ... will be sold at public auction on December 12, 1949. Bids, complying with the
minimum requirements of said ordinance, were:
Bartolome E. San Diego P95,000.00
Rosalia Abueg- P90,000.00 (sister-in-law of Bartolome)
Batas Riego de Dios- P87,000.00 (brother-in-law)
Jose Soyangco- P80,002.00 (Relative)
The highest bidder was awarded to Bartolome Sandiego, a part of the contract reads as, “That
the party of the first part, by virtue of Resolutions Nos. 28 and 29, in connection with Ordinance
No. 1, all series of 1949, and in pursuance with the provisions of Act No. 4003, as amended,
hereby lets, and the Party of the Second Part leases, the exclusive privilege of erecting fish
corrals in Malampaya Sound (or bay), Taytay, Palawan”
Herein petitioner, Lubin Nepomuceno and Isabel Nepomuceno, instituted this present action
against respondent, Judge Ocampo and Bartolme San Diego, to annul the writ of preliminary
injunction against them and other private defendants of Civil Case No. 11035 and 14013, from
prohibiting and limiting the former, to operate fishing within 200 meters from nearest fish corral
licensed by the Municipality, and the latter from total prohibition from operating. In support of
this pretense the Nepomucenos allege that the contract of lease between San Diego and the
municipality of Taytay is void, said contract having been authorized by Ordinance No. 1, series
of 1949, which had never been approved and, hence, never became effective, apart from being
inconsistent with the Fisheries Act.
Respondent Bartolome maintains that the public auction was valid and it was entered in
pursuant to Act No. 4003 and not Ordinance No. 1 of 1949, and it has never been disapproved
by Sec ANR and became effective upon the approval of RA No. 659, amending sec 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 471.

Issue:
WON the contract of lease signed by Sandiego is valid.

Ruling:
No, it is not valid.
Article 15 of Ordinance No. 1, series of 1949, from which San Diego's contract derives its
authority, provides that said ordinance "shall take effect upon its approval by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources pursuant to paragraph 1, section 4, of Act 4003, as
amended." It is not denied that said approval had never been given by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. In fact, the latter did not receive copy of said ordinance until
December 31, 1949, or 19 days after the execution of the lease contract in favor of San Diego. It
is thus obvious that the contract was void when it was made.
We do not believe, however, that Republic Act No. 659 affects ordinance No. 1, series of 1949,
for the same was submitted to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on December
31, 1949, or long before the approval of said statute, on June 16, 1951, and legislative acts
operate prospectively unless the intention to the contrary appears clearly. To our mind, such
intent has not been established satisfactorily. What is more, the explanatory note to Senate Bill
153, which, upon approval became Republic Act No. 659, says:
The purpose of this amendment to the Fisheries Act is simply to secure prompt action by the
Department Chief concerned over local fishing ordinances, rules, and regulations. Nothing is
changed in the existing law, the only addition being the requirement that the department
disapproval of such ordinances must be communicated to the board of council concerned within
thirty days after submission of the ordinance; otherwise the latter goes into full force and effect.
If, as stated in the aforementioned explanatory note, by the approval of Senate Bill 153 or
Republic Act No. 659, "nothing is changed in the existing law," it follows that said act did not
affect the legislation in force, or the ordinances submitted to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, before its enactment.
Rule of Statutory Construction, where there is ambiguity in a statute or where a statute is
susceptible of more than one interpretation, courts may resort to the explanatory note to clarify
the ambiguity and ascertain the purpose or intent of the statute.
At any rate, even if pursuant to Republic Act No. 659, Ordinance No. 1, series of 1949, were to
be considered approved by said officer, such approval would have taken place, at best on June
16, 1951, when said legislation became effective. In other words, the contract of lease made, in
favor of San Diego, on December 12, 1949, would still be null and void, for, at that time, the
ordinance authorizing its execution was not effective as yet.
Palanca vs. City of Manila, 41 Phil. 125 (1920)

FACTS:
This is an appeal from an amended decision of the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila, the Honorable Simplicio del Rosario presiding, requiring the defendant City to
pay to the plaintiff the sum of P2,400 with legal interest thereon from the respective
dates on which the several payments composing the amount were made, without costs.
Stipulations are as follows:
 from july 1, 1914 - june 30, 1916 plaintiff held a distiller's license and paid the
proper taxes to conduct his business of distilling liquor.
 place of business indicated in license was 1925 calle analoague, manila
 plaintiff had a store at nos. 538-540 calle pinpin, manila that was not adjacent to
the distillery but is entirely separate therefrom
 stores at calle pinpin sold liquor distilled from calle analogue however, no sales
were made at the distillery in calle analoague.
 the city assessor and collector demanded the plaintiff to get a wholesale dealers
license and pay taxes of php 1200 per year to continue operation
 plaintiff paid to said city assessor php 300 quarterly from the 3rd qtr of 1914 -
2nd. OF 1916 while protesting in writing. However, said protests were overruled and
denied with no part of the money being refunded
 manila liquor license act no. 59 ammended by act no. 95
 sec. 16 states that licenses, known as distiller's license, for periods of one year
may be given upon payment in advance of the sum of 600 php to conduct business
as a distiller of alcohol and to sell, give away or dispose by gallon.
 sec. 17 provides the issuance of "First class wholesale liquor license" upon
payment in advance of 1200 php which may be made in 4 quarterly installments.
However, nothing in this section may be construed to prohibit any person holding
either of the licenses from disposing of the products of such brewery or distillery

ISSUE/HELD:
- WoN the Plaintiff, after taking out and paying for his license as a distiller, was
entitled to sell the products of his distillery in a separate and distinct store without
the necessity of acquiring or paying for an additional license as a wholesale
liquor dealer?

a.) YES. Legislative intent is reinforced by sec.17 of the aforementioned law. No

provision of the act limits the sale or disposition of the products of the license
distiller to the distillery proper.
Administrative Code of 1916 Sec. 2502 and 2503 and Administrative
Code of 1917 Sec. 2530 and 2531 continue the language of Manila
Liquor License Act No. 59 and respective amendments by Act no. 95
Sec. 16 and 17 thereof, the latter as superseded by Act No. 95,
provides license to be granted to distillers not only authorizes the
licensee “to conduct the business of a distiller of alcoholic liquors”
but also “to sell, give away or otherwise dispose of the products of
such distillery, in quantities of one gallon or more.” No provision of
the act limits the place of sale or disposition of the products of the
licensed distillers to the distillery proper.
1916 Administrative Code would provide that the plaintiff must
obtain a wholesale liquor dealer's license. To that effect, statute was
modified to reenact it as part of the aforementioned code with the
insertion of the words "at the place of production". By express
repeal, the legislative body shows that prior to that word the statute
had a different meaning, permitting the distiller to sell the products
at places other than "the place of production.”
Manila Liquor License Act was adopted from Ohio, and carried with it
the construction given to it. The courts could avail of actual proceedings of
the legislative to assist in determining the construction of a statute of
doubtful import, as in this case.
In Senior v. Ratterman (1887) wholesale dealers and not manufacturers
are liable to the tax imposed by the terms of the act of the general
assembly on May 14, 1886
Under the law in force during period to which this litigation relates
the plaintiff with respect to his license cannot be required to avail of
an additional license as wholesale liquor dealer.
STATUTES WHICH ARE PLAIN AND SPECIFIC SHOULD BE APPLIED
WITHOUT ATTEMPTED CONSTRUCTION OR INTERPRETATION.
Phil. Assn. of Gov’t Retirees, Inc. vs. GSIS, 121 Phil 1402 (1965)

FACTS:

On August 29, 1958, the Supreme Court rendered its decision in the case of Flaviano Bautista
vs. Auditor General and General Manager, GSIS (G.R. No. L-10859), holding that Bautista, who
was compulsorily retired at the age of 65 years under Commonwealth Act No. 186, as
amended, is entitled to the refund of the 5% discount made by the GSIS from his five-year lump
sum annuity under Section 11(a)-3 of Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended.

Shortly after, many government retirees filed claims with the GSIS for the refund of the 5%
discount made from their five-year lump sum annuities. On October 29, 1948, a group of
government retirees called on the General Manager of the GSIS to explore the possibility of an
amicable settlement of their claims. While the General Manager was desirous to seek a re-
examination of the ruling in the Bautista case, he was amenable to find a solution thereto,
provided that the retirement insurance fund of the GSIS would not be impaired thereby
prejudicing the rights of more than 270,000 government employees still in the active service.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a government employee compulsorily retired at the age of 65 years under the
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended, is entitled to the refund of the 5%
discount made by the GSIS from his five-year lump sum annuity under Section 11 (a)-3 of said
Act, as amended.

RULING:
The decision of the Auditor General under review, sustaining that of the General Manager of the
Government Service Insurance System, is reversed, and the latter ordered to pay to the
petitioner the sum of P2,060.75, without pronouncement as to costs.
The main reason adduced by appellants in urging a reconsideration and reversal of the view
taken by this Court in the Bautista case is that, subsequently ' the rendition of our decision
therein, appellants herein found some facts allegedly unknown to them before, which facts, they
believe, indicate that the intent of Congress in enacting the legal provision under consideration
is other than that set forth in said decision. These new facts are said to consist of some views
expressed on the floor of the House of Representatives, during the consideration of the bill,
which, upon subsequent approval by the two (2) Houses of Congress, became Republic Act No.
660, regarding the purpose and effect thereof. This Court has already held, however, that such
views do not necessarily reflect the feeling of the House of Representatives, much less that of the
Senate, and that, accordingly, they are not controlling in the interpretation of the law in
question (Casco Phil. Chemical Co., Inc.. vs. Gimenez, L-17931, February 28, 1963; Manila
Jockey Club, Inc. vs.Games & Amusement Board, 107 Phil., 151. Inasmuch, moreover, as the
other arguments of appellants herein are a substantial reiteration of those invoked before this
Court and considered by the same in the Bautista case, we find no reason to modify or disturb
the doctrine therein laid down.
Wherefore, the decisions appealed from must be, as they are hereby affirmed, with costs against
respondents-appellants in G. R. No. L-20503 and defendants-appellants in G. R. No. L-20632.
It is so ordered.
Disini v, Secretary, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014 (re provision on cybersex)

FACTS:
Petitioners Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr., Rowena S. Disini, Lianne Ivy P. Medina,
Janette Toral and Ernesto Sonido, Jr., as taxpayers, file a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the petitioners seek to
1) nullify Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of RA 10175, otherwise known as the
“Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012” for violating the fundamental rights protected
under the Constitution; and 2) prohibit the Respondents, singly and collectively, from
enforcing the afore-mentioned provisions of the Cybercrime Act.
Named as Respondents are the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of the Interior
and Local Government, the Executive Director of the Information Communications
Technology Office, the Chief of the Philippine National Police, and the Director of the
National Bureau of Investigation.

ISSUES/GROUNDS:
1. Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of The Cybercrime Act violate the petitioners’
constitutionally protected rights to freedom of expression, due process, equal
protection, privacy of communications, as well as the Constitutional sanctions
against double jeopardy, undue delegation of legislative authority and the right
against unreasonable searches and seizure;
o • Sections 6 and 7 of the Cybercrime Act more than doubles the liability
for imprisonment for any violation of existing penal laws are in violation of
the petitioners’ right against Double Jeopardy;
o • Section 12 of the Cybercrime Act, which permits the NBI and the PNP
“with due cause” to engage in real time collection of traffic data without the
benefit of the intervention of a judge, violates the Petitioners’
Constitutionally-protected right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizure as well as the right to the privacy of communications;
o • Section 19 of the Cybercrime Act, which authorizes the Respondent
Secretary of DOJ to block or restrict access to any content upon a prima
facie finding that the same violates the law, contains an undue delegation
of legislative authority, infringes upon the judicial power of the judiciary,
and violates the Petitioners’ Constitutionally-protected right to due
process and freedom of expression; and
o • Section 4(c)(4) defines libel as a cybercrime and in relation to Section 6
of the law increased the penalty from 6 months to 4 years and 2 months
to the greater period of 6 years to 10 years, infringes upon the right to
freedom of expression and also restricts the freedom of the press. Under
Section 12, a prima facie finding by the Secretary of DOJ can trigger an
order directed at service providers to block access to the said material
without the benefit of a trial or a conviction. Thus, RA 10175 infringes
 upon the right to freedom of expression and also restricts the freedom of
the press. The increased penalties, plus the ease by which allegedly
libelous materials can be removed from access, work together as a
“chilling effect” upon protected speech.
2. No other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the court of law, and that this
Petition is therefore cognizable by the SC’s judicial power under Article VIII,
Section 1 par. 2 of the Constitution and pursuant to Rule 65, Sec. 1 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.

ARGUMENTS/DISCUSSIONS:
1. The Cybercrime Act Violates Free Speech:
o • imposes heavier penalties for online libel than paper-based
libel; single act of online libel will result in two convictions penalized
separately under the RP and the Cybercrime Act;
o online libel under the Cybercrime Act will ensure the imprisonment of the
accused and for a much longer period. Such changes will result in a
chilling effect upon the freedom of speech;
o • with the passage of the Cybercrime Act, Senator Vicente Sotto III’s
earlier threat to criminally prosecute all bloggers and internet users who
were critical of his alleged plagiarism of online materials for use in his
speech against the Reproductive Health Bill became real; threat of
criminal prosecution under RA 10175 will work to preclude people such as
Petitioners from posting social commentaries online, thus creating a
“chilling effect” upon the freedom of expression;
o • gives the DOJ Secretary blanket authority to restrain and block access to
content whether authored by private citizens or the organized press sans
any hearing of any kind but merely upon a mere prima facie showing that
a particular Internet article constitutes online libel;
o • respondents must demonstrate how the Cybercrime Act will fare under
strict scrutiny
2. Sections 6 and 7 of the Cybercrime Act violate the Double Jeopardy and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Constitution:
o • Persons who commit crimes using information and communication
technologies (ICTs) face the possibility of being imprisoned more than
double the imprisonment laid down in the RPC or special law, simply by
the passage of the Cybercrime Act;
o • the cybercrimes defined and punished under Section 6 of the Act are
absolutely identical to the crimes defined in the RPC and special laws
which raises the possibility that an accused will be punished twice for the
same offense in violation of the Constitution;
 o • Congress created a class of offenders who commit crimes “by, through
or with the use” of ICTs in violation of the equal protection clause
3. The Real Time Collection of Traffic Date Violate the Right to Privacy and the
Right Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizure:
o • No compelling state interest that justifies real time collection of data; the
authority vested on the Philippine National Police and the National Bureau
of Investigation to collect data is not bounded by any reasonable standard
except “due cause” which presumably, the PNP and NBI will determine for
itself;
o • While the privacy of suspected terrorists, through the Human Security
Act, are protected by the intervention of the Court of Appeals
before surveillance operations are conducted, the privacy of all citizens
may be infringed without judicial participation in the Cybercrime Act;
o • Neither the PNP nor the NBI is required to justify the incursion into the
right to privacy;
o No limits imposed upon the PNP or the NBI since they can lawfully collect
traffic data at all times without interruption;
o • No stated justification for this warrant-free unlimited incursion into the
privacy of citizens
4. The Respondent DOJ Secretary’s Take Down Authority under Section 19 of the
Cybercrime Act violates Due Process and is an Undue Delegation of Legislative
Authority
o • The DOJ Secretary’s overwhelming powers to order the restriction or
blocking of access to certain content upon a mere prima facie finding
without any need for a judicial determination is in clear violation of
petitioners’ Constitutionally protected right to due process;
o • The Cybercrime Act contemplates that the respondent DOJ Secretary
will be “judge, jury and executioner” of all cybercrime-related complaints;
o To consider that all penal provisions in all specials laws are cybercrimes
under Section 6, it • follows that:
1. Complaints filed by intellectual property rights owners may be acted
upon the Respondent DOJ Secretary to block access to websites
and content upon a mere prima facie showing of an infringement;
2. Foreign sites (e.g. Amazon.com) offering goods on retail to
Philippine citizens may be blocked for violating the Retail Trade
Law;
3. Foreign service providers such as Skype may be blocked from
offering voice services without securing a license from the National
Telecommunications Communication;
 4. YouTube video may be blocked for presumably violating the IP
Code.
o • The Cybercrime Act fails the two tests laid down by the Court in Abakada
Guro Party List v. Purisima (GR No. 166715) to determine the validity of
delegation of legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the
sufficient standard test
1. Nowhere in the Cybercrime Act’s declaration of policy does it lay
down the legislative policy with respect to the blocking of content.
No limits upon the takedown power of the respondent DOJ
Secretary;
2. Prima facie standard is not enough to prevent the DOJ Secretary
from exercising infinite discretion and becoming the supreme
authority in the Philippine Internet landscape.
PRAYER:
1. Declare null and void, for being unconstitutional, Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19
of RA 10175;
2. Prohibit all Respondents from implementing Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of
RA 10175;
3. Issue a TRO enjoining the Respondents from implementing Sections 4(c)(4), 6,
7, 12 and 19 of RA 10175; and
4. Issue other reliefs, just and equitable in the premises.
5. The Supreme Court on Tuesday, February 18, upheld as constitutional most
provisions of Republic Act 10175 or the Cybercrime Law, including online libel –
subject to one condition.
6. The High Court also struck down a provision of the law that gives the state the
power to take down online content without a court warrant.
7. Seeking to strike a balance between fundamental freedoms and government
control, the High Court decided on the constitutionality of Republic Act 10175 a
little over a year afteroral arguments were heard on Jan 15, 2013.
8. Among the hotly-debated issues during the oral arguments was the law's
provision on online libel. (READ: 'Libel gone is best-case scenario for SC
cybercime ruling')
9. The Supreme Court decision, penned by Justice Roberto Abad, ruled online libel
to be constitutional but with an exception – that is, in cases where it covers
persons other than the original author. Recipients of, and netizens who react to a
potentially defamatory post, will not be covered by online libel.

Unconstitutional provisions
Three provisions were voted down as categorically unconstitutional:
 Section 4 (c)(3) which pertains to unsolicited commercial communications
 Section 12 which pertains to real-time collection of traffic data
  Section 19 which pertains to restricting or blocking access to computer data
The SC decided that Section 19 – granting power to the Department of Justice
(DOJ) to restrict computer data on the basis of prima facie or initially observed evidence
– was not in keeping with the Constitution. The said automatic take-down clause is
found in Section 19 of the cybercrime law.
Even the SOLICITOR General, in his defense of RA 10175, admitted before the SC
that Section 19 is "constitutionally impermissible, because it permits a form of final
restraint on speech without prior judicial determination."
Section 12 would have allowed law enforcement authorities with due cause to collect or
record by technical or electronic means "traffic data" in real time.
Section 4 (c)(3) of the law says that "the transmission of commercial electronic
communication with the use of computer system which seek to advertise, sell, or offer
for sale products and services are prohibited" unless certain conditions – such as prior
affirmative consent from the recipient – are met. This was ruled unconstitutional.
A separability clause contained in Section 29, Chapter VIII of the law allows the rest of
the law to "remain in full force and effect" even if certain provisions are held invalid.

Nuances in other provisions

Three other provisions were not struck down and remain in the law, but they will
not apply in certain cases as decided by the SC. Among these provisions is online libel,
which is constitutional as far as the original author is concerned.
Section 5, which pertains to aiding or abetting the commission of a cybercrime
and to the attempt to commit a cybercrime, was declared unconstitutional only in the
following cases: child pornography, unsolicited commercial communications (or spam),
and online libel. Section 5 will apply to all other cybercrimes outlined in the law.
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Cybercrime Division Chief Ronald Aguto
explained to Rappler that it will also be hard for both law enforcement and the
prosecution to prove the "attempt to commit a cybercrime."
Aiding and abetting the commission of a cybercrime, he added, might unduly
cover certain players in the online industry.
Section 7, which pertains to liability of a cyber criminal under other laws, was
declared unconstitutional only in the following cases: online libel and child pornography.
The SC cited the guarantee against double jeopardy or being
punished more than once for the same offense – a guarantee outlined in the
Constitution – in deciding on Section 7.
Libel is punishable by Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, while child
pornography is punishable by RA 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act.
A person convicted of libel or child pornography can only be punished once, under the
coverage of a single law.
CIR vs. CTA, 224 SCRA 665 (1993)
Gloria vs. CA, 306 SCRA 287 (1999)

Facts:
Private respondents are public school teachers. On various dates in September and
October 1990, during the teachers strikes, they did not report for work.
For this reason, they were administratively charged with (1)grave misconduct, (2) gross
neglect of duty, (3) gross violation of Civil Service Law Rules and Regulations and
reasonable office regulations, (4) refusal to perform official duty, (5) gross
insubordination, (6) conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and
(7) absence without leave (AWOL), and placed under preventive suspension. The
investigation was concluded before the lapse of their 90-day suspension and private
respondents were found guilty as charged. Respondent Nicanor Margallo was ordered
dismissed from the service effective October 29, 1990, while respondents Amparo
Abad, Virgilia Bandigas, and Elizabeth Somebang were ordered suspended for six
months effective December 4, 1990.[2]
On appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) affirmed the decision of the MSPB
with respect to Margallo, but found the other three (Abad, Bandigas, and Somebang)
guilty only of violation of reasonable office rules and regulations by failing to file
applications for leave of absence and, therefore, reduced the penalty imposed on them
to reprimand and ordered them reinstated to their former positions and paid their wages
during the period of their appeal/
Private respondents moved for a reconsideration, contending that they should be
exonerated of all charges against them and that they be paid salaries during their
suspension. In its resolution, dated July 15, 1997, the Court of Appeals, while
maintaining its finding that private respondents were guilty of violation of reasonable
office rules and regulations for which they should be reprimanded, ruled that private
respondents were entitled to the payment of salaries during their suspension beyond
ninety (90) days.
Petitioner Ricardo T. Gloria, then Secretary of Education, Culture, and Sports,
moved for a reconsideration insofar as the resolution of the Court of Appeals ordered
the payment of private respondents salaries during the period of their appeal. [7] His
motion was, however, denied by the appellate court in its resolution of October 6,
1997.[8] Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner contends that the administrative investigation of respondents was
concluded within the 90-day period of preventive suspension, implying that the
continued suspension of private respondents is due to their appeal, hence, the
government should not be held answerable for payment of their salaries. Moreover,
petitioner lays so much store by the fact that, under the law, private respondents are
considered under preventive suspension during the period of their appeal and, for this
reason, are not entitled to the payment of their salaries during their suspension.
The present Civil Service Law is found in Book V, Title I, Subtitle A of the
Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. 292). So far as pertinent to the questions in this
case, the law provides:
SEC. 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. -

....

(2) The Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and
municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving
disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. Their
decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than
thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary. In case the decision
rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, the same may be
initially appealed to the department and finally to the Commission and pending appeal,
the same shall be executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case the
same shall be executory only after confirmation by the Secretary concerned.

....

(4) An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory, and in case the penalty
is suspension or removal, the respondent shall be considered as having been under
preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins an
appeal.

SEC. 51. Preventive Suspension. - The proper disciplining authority may preventively
suspend any subordinate officer or employee under his authority pending an
investigation, if the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty,
oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are
reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his
removal from the service.

SEC. 52. Lifting of Preventive Suspension. Pending Administrative Investigation. -

When the administrative case against the officer or employee under preventive
suspension is not finally decided by the disciplining authority within the period of ninety
(90) days after the date of suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential
appointee, the respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the service: Provided,
That when the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or
petition of the respondent, the period of delay shall not be counted in computing the
period of suspension herein provided.

There are thus two kinds of preventive suspension of civil service employees who
are charged with offenses punishable by removal or suspension: (1) preventive
suspension pending investigation (51) and (2)preventive suspension pending appeal if
the penalty imposed by the disciplining authority is suspension or dismissal and, after
review, the respondent is exonerated (47(4)).
Preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty. [10] It is a measure
intended to enable the disciplining authority to investigate charges against respondent
by preventing the latter from intimidating or in any way influencing witnesses against
him. If the investigation is not finished and a decision is not rendered within that period,
the suspension will be lifted and the respondent will automatically be reinstated. If after
investigation respondent is found innocent of the charges and is exonerated, he should
be reinstated.

ISSUE: WON petitioners are entitled to the payment of salaries during the period of
suspension?

RULING: the Court of Appeals ordered the DECS to pay private respondents their
salaries, allowances, and other benefits beyond the ninety (90) day preventive
suspension. In other words, no compensation was due for the period of the preventive
suspension pending investigation but only for the period of preventive
suspension pending appeal in the event the employee is exonerated.
The Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) provided for the payment of such
salaries in case of exoneration. Sec. 35 read:

Sec. 35. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation. - When

the administrative case against the officer or employee under preventive suspension is
not finally decided by the Commissioner of Civil Service within the period of sixty (60)
days after the date of suspension of the respondent, the respondent shall be reinstated
in the service. If the respondent officer or employee is exonerated, he shall be restored
to his position with full pay for the period of suspension.

However, the law was revised in 1975 and the provision on the payment of salaries
during suspension was deleted. Sec. 42 of the Civil Service Decree (P.D. No. 807) read:

Sec. 42. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation. - When

the administrative case against the officer or employee under preventive suspension is
not finally decided by the disciplining authority within the period of ninety (90) days after
the date of suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential appointee, the
respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the service; Provided, That when the
delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the
respondent, the period of delay shall not be counted in computing the period of
suspension herein provided.

This provision was reproduced in 52 of the present Civil Service Law. It is noteworthy
that the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6770) categorically provides that preventive
suspension shall be without pay. Sec. 24 reads:

Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively
suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his
judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or
employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the
respondents continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of
the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay, except when the delay in
the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault,
negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall
not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.

It is clear that the purpose of the amendment is to disallow the payment of salaries
for the period of suspension. This conclusion is in accord with the rule of statutory
construction that -

As a rule, the amendment by deletion of certain words or phrases in a statute indicates

that the legislature intended to change the meaning of the statute, for the presumption is
that the legislature would not have made the deletion had the intention been not in
effect a change in its meaning. The amended statute should accordingly be given a
construction different from that previous to its amendment.

The separate opinion of Justice Panganiban pays no heed to the evident legislative
intent to deny payment of salaries for the preventive suspension pending investigation.
First, it says that to deny compensation for the period of preventive suspension
would be to reverse the course of decisions ordering the payment of salaries for such
period. However, the cases cited are based either on the former rule which expressly
provided that if the respondent officer or employee is exonerated, he shall be restored
to his position with full pay for the period of suspension or that upon subsequent
reinstatement of the suspended person or upon his exoneration, if death should render
reinstatement impossible, any salary so withheld shall be paid, or on cases which do not
really support the proposition advanced.
Second, it is contended that the exoneration of employees who have been
preventively suspended is proof that there was no reason at all to suspend them and
thus makes their preventive suspension a penalty.
The principle governing entitlement to salary during suspension is cogently stated in
Floyd R. Mechems A Treatise on the Law of Public Offices and Officers as follows:

864. Officer not entitled to Salary during Suspension from Office. - An officer who
has been lawfully suspended from his office is not entitled to compensation for the
period during which he was so suspended, even though it be subsequently determined
that the cause for which he was suspended was insufficient. The reason given is that
salary and perquisites are the reward of express or implied services, and therefore
cannot belong to one who could not lawfully perform such services.

Thus, it is not enough that an employee is exonerated of the charges against him. In
addition, his suspension must be unjustified. The case of Bangalisan v. Court of
Appeals itself similarly states that payment of salaries corresponding to the period [1]
when an employee is not allowed to work may be decreed if he is found innocent of the
charges which caused his suspension and [2] when the suspension is unjustified.
 The preventive suspension of civil service employees charged with dishonesty,
oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect of duty is authorized by the Civil Service
Law. It cannot, therefore, be considered unjustified, even if later the charges are
dismissed so as to justify the payment of salaries to the employee concerned. It is one
of those sacrifices which holding a public office requires for the public good. For this
reason, it is limited to ninety (90) days unless the delay in the conclusion of the
investigation is due to the employee concerned. After that period, even if the
investigation is not finished, the law provides that the employee shall be automatically
reinstated.
Director of Lands vs. Abaja, 63 Phil 559 (1936)  [Compare with City of Baguio vs.
Marcos]
Facts:
On July 12, 1919, the Assistant Director of Lands filed in the Court of First Instance of
Occidental Negros a petition praying that the titles with respect to a tract of land
containing about 23,443,355 square meters, divided into lots and situated in the
municipality of Ilog, Occidental Negros, be settled and adjudicated in accordance with
the provisions of Act No. 2259, otherwise known as the Cadastral Act. After due
hearing, the lower court, in a decision dated August 15, 1925, declared lot No. 712,
comprising about 1,322 square meters, public land because no one appeared to claim
it. On January 25, 1934, a motion was filed in the same court by the herein appellants,
Roman de Arruza and Mario Luzuriaga, through their attorney, praying that the
aforesaid decision of the lower court be set aside in so far as lot No. 712 was
concerned, that a new trial be granted and that they be allowed to present their claim
under the provisions of Act No. 4043. On February 2, 1934, the provincial fiscal of
Occidental Negros, on behalf of the government, filed an opposition to the appellants'
motion contending that the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros had no
jurisdiction to reopen the case with respect to lot No. 712 because the motion was not
filed within the time limit prescribed by Act No. 4043.

Issue: Whether or not the ten-year period mentioned in Act No. 4043 should be
counted from the date the decision was rendered or from the date judicial proceedings
were instituted in a cadastral case.

Ruling: Act No. 4043 was not the only Act passed by the Philippine Legislature to
enable persons whose lands had been declared public lands by virtue of the operation
of the cadastral system to recover said lands after complying with certain prescribed
conditions.

In 1923, the Legislature enacted Act No. 3059 (declared in force by Executive
Proclamation No. 57, dated September 25, 1923); in 1930, it approved Act No. 3672
(declared in force by Executive Proclamation No. 299 dated February 28, 1930), and
more recently in 1934, it passed Act No. 4195 (declared in force by Executive
Proclamation No. 767, dated February 7, 1935). A cursory scrutiny of these four Acts
will show that while the titles of Acts Nos. 4043 and 4195 refer to "parcels of land that
have been declared public land, by virtue of judicial decisions rendered etc.", those of
the earlier Acts Nos. 3059 and 3672 fail to make any such allusion. The title of Act No.
3059 is as follows:

An Act to provide that certain claims to parcels of land that have been declared
public land may be filed in the proper court within the period of one year, under
certain conditions. The title of Act No. 3672 is as follows:
 An Act to authorize the filing in the proper court, under certain conditions, of
certain claims of title to parcels of land that have been declared public land,
within the period of one year from the date of the promulgation of this Act. The
title of Act No. 4043 is as follows:

An Act to authorize the filing in the proper court, under certain conditions, of
certain claims of title to parcels of land, that have been declared public land, by
virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the fifteen years next preceding the
approval of this Act. (Emphasis supplied.) And the title of Act No. 4195 reads:

An Act to authorize the filing in the proper court, under certain conditions, of
certain claims of title to parcels of land that have been declared public land, by
virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the fifteen years next preceding the
approval of this Act. (Emphasis supplied.) Upon the other hand, the bodies of all
the four Acts just mentioned speak in clear and unmistakable terms of parcels of
land that "have been, or are about to be, declared land of public domain, by
virtue of judicial proceedings instituted etc."

The discrepancy between the titles and the bodies of Acts Nos. 4043 and 4195 may be
explained. Act No. 4043 was originally House Bill No. 949 (First Session, Ninth
Philippine Legislature). The said bill as presented referred in both its title and body
solely to the retention of judicial decisions. The first paragraph of the explanatory note
prepared by the authors of the bill reads:

The attached bill is practically the same as Act No. 3672 approved by the Eighth
Legislature with the exception that it authorizes the filing of claims to lots that
have been declared public land by virtue of judicial decisions rendered during the
last ten years, whereas by Act 3672 no such claims may be authorized if the
judicial proceedings were instituted more than ten years ago.

It is obvious that the intention of the framers of House Bill No. 949 was to alter the
language and the meaning of the previous Acts of the Legislature on the same subject.
The Legislature, however, thought it proper not to make such alteration and as finally
approved, Act No. 4043 adopts the language used in Acts Nos. 3059 and 3672 and
refers to the institution of judicial proceedings instead of the decision as proposed by
the authors of the bill. In enacting the bill into law, however, the corresponding change
in the title was not made. It is pertinent to observe in this connection that the title of Act
No. 4043, hereinbefore quoted, is a verbatim copy of the title of House Bill No. 949.
When Act No. 4195 was passed, the title of Act No. 4043 was almost literally retained.

The fact that in all the four Acts so far passed by the Philippine Legislature on the
subject there has been a repeated and consistent reference to the institution of judicial
proceedings as the starting point in the computation of the period of ten years (or fifteen
years as regards Act No. 4195) therein laid down is, in our opinion, significant. It shows
beyond question the desire of the Legislature to adhere to the one and only method of
computation consistently followed by it since the beginning.
Salaysay vs. Castro, 98 Phil 364 (1956)

Facts:
Engracio E. Santos is the duly elected Municipal Mayor of San Juan del Monte, Rizal,
and the Petitioner Nicanor G. Salaysay is the duly elected Vice-Mayor. In the month
of
September, 1955 and for some time prior thereto, Santos was under suspension from
his office
due to administrative charges filed against him and so Petitioner Salaysay acted as
Mayor under
section 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code providing that in case of temporary
disability
of the Mayor such as absence, etc., his duties shall be discharged by the Vice-Mayor.
On
September 8, 1955, while acting as Mayor, Salaysay filed his certificate of candidacy for
the
same office of Mayor. In Sept. 8, 1955, while acting as Mayor, Salaysay filed his
certificate of
candidacy for the same office of Mayor. Interpreting said action of Salaysay in running
for the
office of Mayor as an automatic resignation from his office of Vice Mayor, consequently,
forfeiting the office he was holding as acting Mayor. Salaysay refused to turn over the
office of
Mayor and brought this action of prohibition with preliminary injunction against
Executive
Secretary Castro, Governor Pascual and Sto.Domingo to declare invalid.

Issue:
Whether elected municipal official was considered resigned when he filed his certificate
of candidacy for an office other than the one he was elected or actually holding.

Ruling:
No, elected municipal official was considered resigned when he filed his certificate of
candidacy for an office other than the one he was elected or actually holding. It is urged
that the
phrase “actually holding”, in section 27 of Republic Act No 180, was meant to refer only
to
“permanent” incumbents and does not apply to those holding office in a temporary
character.
The law is plain, simple and clear. The resignation therein provided is inapplicable to
any
elective local official who runs for an office he actually holds. It does not qualify the
nature of
said possession, as long as, it is “actual”. It is irrelevant, therefore, whether the office is
held
temporarily or permanently. All this goes to show that we should not and cannot always
be
bound by the phraseology or literal meaning of a law or statute but at times may
interpret, nay,
even disregard loose or inaccurate wording in order to arrive at the real meaning and
spirit of a
statute intended and breathed into it by the law-making body. Falsa demonstratio non
nocet, cum
de corpora constat which means false description does not preclude construction: vitiate
the
meaning of the statute. The intention of the amendment by the President Roxas was to
give and
extend privilege to the appointees and elected official for continuity in their office. This
was not
applicable for the official who assumed the office by succession because of
incapacitated of his
predecessor.
Pp. vs. Pagpaguitan, 315 SCRA 226 (1999)
FACTS:

- On appeal is the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City, Branch I, finding appellants
Domingo Pagpaguitan and Roberto Salazar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and
sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay private complainant Evelyn Nalam,
jointly and severally, the amount of P30,000.00 as moral damages.
- Roberto Salazar is Evelyn's neighbor at barangay Bitan-agan, Butuan City and Domingo Pagpaguitan is his gang
mate. In the evening of January 30, 1992, both of them went to see Evelyn at her employer's house at Montilla
Boulevard, Butuan City, and told her that they met her father who was very angry with her and swore to come
and get her, if not kill her, if she will not go home to Bitan-agan.
- Although Evelyn wondered why her father should feel that way as she asked permission before she left home,
she nevertheless went with the two accused boarding a jeep for San Vicente where the two accused left her
things, then proceeded towards Bitan-agan. The accused told her that they would seek the assistance of
Commander Coz to help pacify her father's anger. But instead of going to the residence of Commander Coz,
the accused brought her to the uninhabited farmhouse of Roberto Salazar's grandfather. With knives it their
hands, they threatened to kill her if she would not go with them up the mountain; they held her by her hands.
- Upon entering the house, Roberto stayed by the door and Domingo started embracing and kissing her several
times; she pleaded with him but he answered that if she could not be taken "harmlessly", then it would have to
be by force; she kicked Domingo and continued to plead with him, but the latter boxed him (sic) on her chest
and thighs many times as she fought back, until she fell to the floor, whereupon Domingo removed his pants
and her panties as she continued pleading and weeping telling Domingo not to do it as she considered him a
brother; Domingo placed himself on top of her, spread her legs and inserted his penis into her vagina and she
felt great pain for this was her first intercourse; he made the motions of pushing and pulling his penis within
her vagina . . . . Her body was in pain and her vagina was bleeding. While Pagpaguitan was doing this to her,
Salazar was watching them.
- The following morning the accused brought her to the house of Domingo in the mountain where his mother
was. As Domingo and Roberto agreed that evening to bring her to Leyte, Domingo's mother left to sell a
carabao to earn money for their fare to Leyte. In the absence of Domingo's mother and in the presence of
Roberto Salazar, Domingo again forced himself upon her.
- During the trial, the judge had ordered complainant to write a letter under his dictation which was subsequently
marked as Exhibit "X" for the court. The judge found this necessary in the interest of justice as the victim had
denied having written either the letter or the dedication at the back of the picture. It is of record that the
handwriting at the back of the picture and in the letter were very different. The trial court made the following
findings after comparing Exhibit "X" with Exhibits "1" and "2", thus:
. . . In a letter by letter comparison, the court found that the alphabets (sic) "g"; "k"; "p" and "y" in
Exhibit 2 and Exhibit X have different writing characteristics which led the court to believe that
Exhibit 2 was not written by the complainant.

ISSUE/HELD:
- WoN THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ARROGATING UNTO ITSELF THE SPECIAL TASK OF
DETERMINING THE GENUINESS OF THE HANDWRITING OF THE COMPLAINANT
WHICH RESULT IT HEAVILY RELIED UPON IN ITS VERDICT AGAINST THE ACCUSED?
a.) NO. The trial court did not err in arrogating unto itself the special task of determining the genuiness of the
handwriting of the complainant which result it heavily relied upon in its verdict against the accused.
- When a writing in issue is claimed on the one hand and denied upon the other to be the
writing of a particular person, any other writing of that person may be admitted in evidence for
the purpose of comparison with the writing in dispute.
- It is also recognized that a comparison of writing is a rational method of investigation;
similarities and dissimilarities thus disclosed have probative value in the search for truth.
b.) Thus, it has been held that, where a comparison is permissible, it may be made by the court, with or
without the aid of expert witnesses.
- The court may, in the exercise of its sound discretion, order a party to write or sign his signature as a
basis for comparison. For, the handwriting of a person is characteristic of the person himself.
- Once admitted, the genuineness of other offered writings alleged to be the work of the same writer
becomes a question for the trier of fact who may, but need not, be assisted in this task by experts.

c.) Our rules on evidence having been drawn mainly from American sources.
- Decisions of American courts have persuasive effect.
- The general rule is local rule is patterned or copied from that of another country, then the
decisions of the courts in such country construing the rule are entitled to great weight in
interpreting the local rule. (University of Illinois v. Spalding, 71 N.H. 163, 51 A. 731.)
“In University of Illinois v. Spalding, it was held that when writing is claimed on the one hand
and denied upon the other to be the writing of a particular person, any other writing of that
person may be admitted in evidence for the purpose of comparison with the writing in dispute.
Our rules on evidence having been drawn mainly from American sources, decisions of
American courts have persuasive effect.
- when comparison is permissible, it may be done by the court, with or without the aid
of an expert witness”
Procter & Gamble vs. Commissioner of Customs, 23 SCRA 691 (1968)
FACTS:
The petitioner appealed the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals affirming the decision
of the respondent denying its claim for refund of P1,434.00, paid as wharfage dues on
three (3) shipments of palm oil and coconut fatty alcohol unloaded at its private wharf in
which are collectible, under sections 2801 and 2802 of Republic Act No. 1937, on goods
unloaded at private wharves.
Procter & Gamble maintains that the interpretation of wharfage dues (in Commissioner
of Customs v. Superior Gas & Equipment Co., supra) should be that wharfage dues
are compensation on rental for the use of a wharf, and no wharfage dues shall be
collected where no Government wharf is used, shall be applied in this case
because Section 2802 of the Tariff and Customs Code, the law applicable herein,
was derived from Section 3 of Republic Act 1371.
It moreover avers that the Tariff and Customs Code, a codification of existing tariff and
customs laws, is presumed to have incorporated pertinent laws without change and any
modification introduced therein was merely to simplify the language of the law but not to
change its meaning. It should be noted that the Tariff and Customs Code levies charges
on the different activities of a vessel engaged in foreign trade.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Procter & Gamble is liable for the payment of wharfage dues imposed in
Section 2802 of the Tariff and Customs Code on the shipments which were not
unloaded on a Government wharf.
HELD:
Yes.
Section 2802 of the Tariff and Customs Code has for its origin Section 14 of the
Philippine Tariff Act of 1909 which we quote hereunder:
SEC. 14. That there shall be levied and collected upon all articles, goods,
wares and merchandise except coal, lumber, creosoted, and other
pressure treated materials as well as other minor forest products, cement,
guano, natural rock asphalt, the minerals and ores of copper, lead, zinc,
iron, and steel metals, refractory gold ores, and sugar molasses, the
products of the Philippines, exported through ports of entry of the
Philippines, or shipped therefrom to the United States or any of its
possessions, a duty of one dollar per gross ton of one thousand
kilos, as a charge for wharfage, irrespective of the port of destination or
nationality of the exporting vessel. In the case of logs, or flitches twelve
inches square or equivalent cross-sectional area, or over, a charge of
thirty cents per cubic meter shall be collected.
Section 14 imposed wharfage dues only on exports and were held to be payable
although the subject merchandise were loaded from a private wharf. In 1909, our
legislators knew that there was no Government wharf existing and it was found safe to
assume that the Government intended to collect wharfage fees, even without the use of
Government owned wharves, in order to raise funds for the acquisition and construction
of wharves throughout the islands. In 1955 Congress enacted Republic Act 1371,
imposing in Section 3 thereof wharfage dues on imports and exports. We quote Section
3 hereunder:
SEC 3. There shall be levied, collected and paid on all articles imported or
brought into the Philippines, and on products of the Philippines, except
coal, lumber, creosoted and other pressure treated materials as well as
other minor forest products, cement, guano, natural rock asphalt, the
minerals and ores of base metals (e.g., copper, lead, zinc, iron, chromite,
manganese, magnesite and steel), and sugar molasses, exported from the
Philippines a charge of two pesos per gross metric ton as a fee for
wharfage: Provided, That in the case of logs, or flitches twelve inches
square or equivalent cross-sectional area, or over, a charge of sixty
centavos per cubic meter shall be collected. Provided, further, That such
wharfage fee shall not be levied on articles imported or brought into
the Philippines which are unloaded on private wharves.
Section 2802 is an almost verbatim copy of Section 3 of Republic Act 1371 minus the
proviso -
”That such wharfage fee shall not be levied on articles imported or brought into the
Philippines which are unloaded on private wharves.”
Since in the present case, the vessels involved called on port to unload, as they in fact,
did, some cargo, said cargo, having been unloaded amidst the safety afforded by the
port, is chargeable with wharfage dues.
Finally, wharfage dues partake of the nature of a tax which is collected by the
Government to support its operation in relation to customs affairs.
Moreover, wharfage dues are charged, not for the use of any wharf.
Like "harbor fees, berthing charges, storage charges and the net income from the share
of arrastre charges," wharfage fees are imposed to form a special fund to be known as
"Port Works Fund," ... for the study, investigation, field surveys, research, planning,
development, construction, improvement, maintenance, and repair of ports, ports
facilities and port areas, warehouses, sheds and offices, buoys, lighthouses and other
aides to navigation including the purchase, maintenance, rental charges and
replacement of necessary equipment....
The decision appealed from is affirmed by the Court.
STATCON TOPIC: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AS EXTRINSIC AIDS (FOCUS:
LIMITATIONS ON THE ORIGIN OF ADOPTED STATUTE)
see AGPALO p. 185 (3.28 Adopted statutes)
"Foreign statutes which are adopted in this country or from which local laws are
patterned form part of the legislative history of the latter."
GENERAL RULE:
"Where the local statutes are patterned after or copied from those of another
country, the decisions of the courts in such country construing those laws are entitled to
great weight in the interpretation of such local statutes and will generally be followed if
found reasonable and in harmony with justice, public policy and other local statutes on
the subject." (in short, copy-paste provided that it is in harmony with justice. tsar)
May be explained this way:
"Where a local rule is patterned or copied from that of another country, then the
decisions of the courts in such country construing the rule are entitled to great weight in
interpreting local rule."
REASON OF THE GENERAL RULE:
"The legislature, in adopting from another country a statute which has previously
received judicial construction in that country, is deemed to have adopted the statute with
such construction and practical application in the country of origin."

see AGPALO p. 186 (3.29 Limitations of rule)

LIMITATIONS:
see AGPALO p. 185 (3.28 Adopted statutes)
A. The presumption that the foreign construction was adopted with the adoptions of the
statute no longer exist when:
 the local law and the foreign statute from which the former was patterned
differ in some material aspects;
 the foreign construction is clearly erroneous or has not become settled;
and
 the adopting state has given the statute its own interpretation.

B. In relation to Procter & Gamble vs. COC: Philippine laws must necessarily be
construed in accordance with the intention of its lawmakers and such intention may be
deduced from the language of each law and the context of other legislation related
thereto
Estrada v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001
Facts:
It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal
gambling, and other forms of corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by the Hor
and, on December 7, impeachment proceedings were begun in the Senate during which
more serious allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada were made and were
only stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the President,
succeeded in suppressing damaging evidence against Estrada. As a result, the
impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked out
and Senate President Pimentel resigned after casting his vote against Estrada.

On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the
crowd at EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be held
concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he
will not run in this election. On January 20, SC declared that the seat of presidency was
vacant, saying that Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. At noon, Arroyo took her
oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and
his family later left Malacañang Palace. Erap, after his fall, filed petition for prohibition
with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from “conducting
any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as president ends.
He also prayed for judgment “confirming Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent
President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties
of his office.

Issue:
Whether or not President Estrada resigned.

Ruling:

It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not resign but only took a temporary leave
dated January 20, 2001 of the petitioner sent to Senate President Pimentel and
Speaker Fuentebella is cited. Again, we refer to the said letter, viz:

"Sir.

By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the Constitution, I am

hereby transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and
duties of my office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice President
shall be the Acting president.

(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada"

To say the least, the above letter is wrapped in mystery. The pleadings filed by the
petitioner in the cases at bar did not discuss, may even intimate, the circumstances that
led to its preparation. Neither did the counsel of the petitioner reveal to the Court these
circumstances during the oral argument. It strikes the Court as strange that the letter,
despite its legal value, was never referred to by the petitioner during the week-long
crisis. To be sure, there was not the slightest hint of its existence when he issued his
final press release. It was all too easy for him to tell the Filipino people in his press
release that he was temporarily unable to govern and that he was leaving the reins of
government to respondent Arroyo for the time bearing. Under any circumstance,
however, the mysterious letter cannot negate the resignation of the petitioner. If it was
prepared before the press release of the petitioner clearly as a later act. If, however, it
was prepared after the press released, still, it commands scant legal significance.
Petitioner's resignation from the presidency cannot be the subject of a changing caprice
nor of a whimsical will especially if the resignation is the result of his reputation by the
people. There is another reason why this Court cannot given any legal significance to
petitioner's letter and this shall be discussed in issue number III of this Decision.

After petitioner contended that as a matter of fact he did not resign, he also argues that
he could not resign as a matter of law. He relies on section 12 of RA No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which allegedly prohibits
his resignation, viz:

"Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an

investigation, criminals or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him,
for any offense under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
on bribery."

A reading of the legislative history of RA No. 3019 will hardly provide any comfort to the
petitioner. RA No. 3019 originated form Senate Bill No. 293. The original draft of the bill,
when it was submitted to the Senate, did not contain a provision similar to section 12 of
the law as it now stands. However, in his sponsorship speech, Senator Arturo Tolentino,
the author of the bill, "reserved to propose during the period of amendments the
inclusion of a provision to the effect that no public official who is under prosecution for
any act of graft or corruption, or is under administrative investigation, shall be allowed to
voluntarily resign or retire."92 During the period of amendments, the following provision
was inserted as section 15:

"Sec. 15. Termination of office – No public official shall be allowed to resign or

retire pending an investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a
prosecution against him, for any offense under the Act or under the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code on bribery.

The separation or cessation of a public official form office shall not be a bar to his
prosecution under this Act for an offense committed during his incumbency." 93
The bill was vetoed by then President Carlos P. Garcia who questioned the legality of
the second paragraph of the provision and insisted that the President's immunity should
extend after his tenure.

Senate Bill No. 571, which was substantially similar Senate Bill No. 293, was thereafter
passed. Section 15 above became section 13 under the new bill, but the deliberations
on this particular provision mainly focused on the immunity of the President, which was
one of the reasons for the veto of the original bill. There was hardly any debate on the
prohibition against the resignation or retirement of a public official with pending criminal
and administrative cases against him. Be that as it may, the intent of the law ought to be
obvious. It is to prevent the act of resignation or retirement from being used by a public
official as a protective shield to stop the investigation of a pending criminal or
administrative case against him and to prevent his prosecution under the Anti-Graft Law
or prosecution for bribery under the Revised Penal Code. To be sure, no person can be
compelled to render service for that would be a violation of his constitutional right.94 A
public official has the right not to serve if he really wants to retire or resign.
Nevertheless, if at the time he resigns or retires, a public official is facing administrative
or criminal investigation or prosecution, such resignation or retirement will not cause the
dismissal of the criminal or administrative proceedings against him. He cannot use his
resignation or retirement to avoid prosecution.

There is another reason why petitioner's contention should be rejected. In the cases at
bar, the records show that when petitioner resigned on January 20, 2001, the cases
filed against him before the Ombudsman were OMB Case Nos. 0-00-1629, 0-00-1755,
0-00-1756, 0-00-1757 and 0-00-1758. While these cases have been filed, the
respondent Ombudsman refrained from conducting the preliminary investigation of the
petitioner for the reason that as the sitting President then, petitioner was immune from
suit. Technically, the said cases cannot be considered as pending for the Ombudsman
lacked jurisdiction to act on them. Section 12 of RA No. 3019 cannot therefore be
invoked by the petitioner for it contemplates of cases whose investigation or prosecution
do not suffer from any insuperable legal obstacle like the immunity from suit of a sitting
President.

Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation

that, under section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from resigning. We hold otherwise. The
exact nature of an impeachment proceeding is debatable. But even
assuming arguendo that it is an administrative proceeding, it can not be considered
pending at the time petitioner resigned because the process already broke down when
a majority of the senator-judges voted against the opening of the second envelope, the
public and private prosecutors walked out, the public prosecutors filed their
Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and the proceedings were postponed
indefinitely. There was, in effect, no impeachment case pending against petitioner when
he resigned.
San Miguel Corp. vs. Inciong, 103 SCRA 139 (1981)

Facts:

On January 3, 1977, Cagayan Coca-Cola Free Workers Union, private respondent

herein, filed a complaint against San Miguel Corporation (Cagayan Coca-Cola Plant),
petitioner herein, alleging failure or refusal of the latter to include in the computation of
13th- month pay such items as sick, vacation or maternity leaves, premium for work
done on rest days and special holidays, including pay for regular holidays and night
differentials.

An Order 3 dated February 15, 1977 was issued by Regional Office No. X where the
complaint was filed requiring herein petitioner San Miguel Corporation (Cagayan Coca-
Cola Plant) "to pay the difference of whatever earnings and the amount actually
received as 13th month pay excluding overtime premium and emergency cost of living
allowance. "

Herein petitioner appealed from that Order to the Minister of Labor in whose behalf the
Deputy Minister of Labor Amado G. Inciong issued an Order 4 dated June 7, 1978
affirming the Order of Regional Office No. X and dismissing the appeal for lack of merit.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied, it filed the instant petition.

On February 14, 1979, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order 5 enjoining
respondents from enforcing the Order dated December 19, 1978.

Public respondent's consistent stand on the matter since the effectivity of Presidential
Decree 851 is that "payments for sick leave, vacation leave, and maternity benefits, as
well as salaries paid to employees for work performed on rest days, special and regular
holidays are included in the computation of the 13th-month pay. On its part, private
respondent cited innumerable past rulings, opinions and decisions rendered by then
Acting Labor Secretary Amado G. Inciong to the effect that, "in computing the
mandatory bonus, the basis is the total gross basic salary paid by the employer during
the calendar year. Such gross basic salary includes: (1) regular salary or wage; (2)
payments for sick, vacation and maternity leaves; (3) premium for work performed on
rest days or holidays: (4) holiday pay for worked or unworked regular holiday; and (5)
emergency allowance if given in the form of a wage adjustment."

Petitioner, on the other hand, assails as erroneous the aforesaid order, ruling and
opinions, vigorously contends that Presidential Decree 851 speaks only of basic
salary as basis for the determination of the 13th-month pay; submits that payments for
sick, vacation, or maternity leaves, night differential pay, as well as premium paid for
work performed on rest days, special and regular holidays do not form part of the basic
salary; and concludes that the inclusion of those payments in the computation of the
13th-month pay is clearly not sanctioned by Presidential Decree 851.

The provision in dispute is Section 1 of Presidential Decree 851 and provides:

 All employers are hereby required to pay all their employees receiving a
basic salary of not more than Pl,000 a month, regardless of the nature of
the employment, a 13th-month pay not later than December 24 of every
year.

Section 2 of the Rules and Regulations for the implementation of Presidential Decree
851 provides:

a) Thirteenth-month pay shall mean one twelfth (1/12) of the basic salary
of an employee within a calendar year

b) Basic salary shall include all remunerations on earnings paid by an

employer to an employee for services rendered but may not include cost-
of-living allowances granted pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 525 or
Letter of Instructions No. 174, profit sharing payments and all allowances
and monetary benefits which are not considered or integrated as part of
the regular or basic salary of the employee at the time of the promulgation
of the Decree on December 16, 1975.

Under Presidential Decree 851 and its implementing rules, the basic salary of an
employee is used as the basis in the determination of his 13th-month pay. Any
compensations or remunerations which are deemed not part of the basic pay is
excluded as basis in the computation of the mandatory bonus.

Under the Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree 851, the following
compensations are deemed not part of the basic salary:

a) Cost-of-living allowances granted pursuant to Presidential Decree 525

and Letter of Instructions No. 174;

b) Profit sharing payments;

c) All allowances and monetary benefits which are not considered or

integrated as part of the regular basic salary of tile employee at the time of
the promulgation of the Decree on December 16, 1975.

Under a later set of Supplementary Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential

Decree 851 issued by the then Labor Secretary Blas Ople, overtime pay, earnings and
other remunerations are excluded as part of the basic salary and in the computation of
the 13th-month pay.

The exclusion of cost-of-living allowances under Presidential Decree 525 and Letter of
Instructions No. 174, and profit sharing payments indicate the intention to strip basic
salary of other payments which are properly considered as "fringe" benefits. Likewise,
the catch-all exclusionary phrase "all allowances and monetary benefits which are not
considered or integrated as part of the basic salary" shows also the intention to strip
basic salary of any and all additions which may be in the form of allowances or "fringe"
benefits.

ISSUE: Whether or not in the computation of the 13th-month pay under Presidential
Decree 851, payments for sick, vacation or maternity leaves, premium for work done on
rest days and special holidays, including pay for regular holidays and night differentials
should be considered.

RULING:

NO. The prior Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree 851 which
defines basic salary to include all remunerations or earnings paid by an employer to an
employee, this cloud is dissipated in the later and more controlling Supplementary
Rules and Regulations which categorically, exclude from the definition of basic salary
earnings and other remunerations paid by employer to an employee. A cursory perusal
of the two sets of Rules indicates that what has hitherto been the subject of a broad
inclusion is now a subject of broad exclusion. The Supplementary rules and Regulations
cure the seeming tendency of the former rules to include all remunerations and earnings
within the definition of basic salary.

The all-embracing phrase "earnings and other renumeration" which are deemed not part
of the basic salary includes within its meaning payments for sick, vacation, or maternity
leaves. Maternity premium for works performed on rest days and special holidays pays
for regular holidays and night differentials. As such they are deemed not part of the
basic salary and shall not be considered in the computation of the 13th-month they,
were not so excluded, it is hard to find any "earnings and other remunerations"
expressly excluded in the computation of the 13th-month pay. Then the exclusionary
provision would prove to be Idle and with no purpose.

While doubt may have been created by

This conclusion finds strong support under the Labor Code of the Philippines. To cite a
few provisions:

Art. 87. — overtime work. Work may be performed beyond eight hours a
day provided what the employee is paid for the overtime work, additional
compensation equivalent to his regular wage plus at least twenty-five
(25%) percent thereof.

It is clear that overtime pay is an additional compensation other than and added to the
regular wage or basic salary, for reason of which such is categorically excluded from the
definition of basic salary under the Supplementary Rules and Regulations Implementing
Presidential Decree 851.

In Article 93 of the same Code, paragraph

c) work performed on any special holiday shall be paid an additional

compensation of at least thirty percent (30%) of the regular wage of the
employee.

It is likewise clear that premium for special holiday which is at least 30% of the regular
wage is an additional compensation other than and added to the regular wage or basic
salary. For similar reason it shall not be considered in the computation of the 13th-
month pay.
Maceda vs. Macaraeg, 197 SCRA 771 (1991)

Facts:
The National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) was created by Commonwealth Act No.
120. In 1949, it was given tax exemption by Republic Act No. 358. In 1984, Presidential
Decree No. 1931 was passed removing the tax exemption of NAPOCOR and other
government owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs). There was a reservation,
however, that the president or the Minister of Finance, upon recommendation by the
Fiscal Incentives Review Board (FIRB), may restore or modify the exemption.
In 1985, the tax exemption was revived.
It was again removed in 1987 by virtue of Executive Order 93 which again provided that
upon FIRB recommendation it can again be restored.
In the same year, FIRB resolved to restore the exemption. The same was approved by
President Corazon Aquino through Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr. acting as
her alter ego.
Ernesto Maceda assailed the FIRB resolution averring that the power granted to the
FIRB is an undue delegation of legislative power. Maceda’s claim was strengthened by
Opinion 77 issued by then DOJ Secretary Sedfrey Ordoñez.
Macaraig however did not give credence to the opinion issued by the DOJ secretary.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Secretary can validly ignore the legal opinion of
the Justice Secretary.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court first ruled that there is no undue delegation of
legislative power. First of all, since the NAPOCOR is a GOCC and is non-profit it can be
exempt from taxation. Also, Opinion 77 issued by DOJ Secretary Ordoñez was validly
overruled by Macaraig. This action by Macaraig is valid because the Executive
Secretary, by authority of the President, has the power to modify, alter or reverse the
construction of a statute given by a department secretary – pursuant to the
president’s control power.
Nestle Philippines, Inc. vs. CA, 203 SCRA 504 (1991)

San Miguel Corporation and Nestle S.A. are the two major stockholders of Neslte. Nestle increased its
authorized capital stock and was approved by SEC. Thereafter, some unissued stocks were sold to
San Miguel and Nestle. Nestle filed a complaint with the SEC, seeking to exempt the firm from the
registration requirement of Section4 of the Revised Securities Act and from payment of the fee
referred to in Section 6(c).

The provision states that a corporation may be exempted from the requirement of registr
ation if its issues additional capital stock among its own stock holders exclusively. Nestle argued that
issuance of additional capital stock means issuance of increased authorized capital stock. SEC held
that for purposes of granting a general or particular exemption from the registration requirements, a
request for exemption and a fee equivalent to 0.1% of issued value or securities or stocks are required.

ISSUE: Whether or not Nestle is entitled to exemption.

RULING: Nestle is not exempted from the fee provided for in Section 6 (c) of the Revised Securities
Act. Section 6(a) (4) permits greater opportunity for the SEC to implement the statutory objective of
protecting the investing public by requiring proposed issuers of capital stock to inform such public of
the true financial conditions and prospects of the corporation. When capital stock is issued in the
course of and in compliance with the requirements of increasing its authorized capital stock under
Section 38 of the Corporation Code, the SEC as a matter of course examines the financial condition
of the corporation. Under the ruling issued by the SEC, an issuance of previously authorized but still
unissued capital stock may, in a particular instance, be held to bean exempt transaction by the SEC
under Section 6(b) so long as the SEC finds that the requirements of registration under the Revised
Securities Act are "not necessary in the public interest and for the protection of the investors" by
reason, inter alia,of the small amount of stock that is proposed to be issued or because the potential
buyers are very limited in number and are in a position to protect themselves. The construction of a
statute by the executive officers of the government is entitled to great respect and should be accorded
great weight by the courts.
Phil. Sugar Central vs. Collector of Customs, 51 Phil 143 (1927)
Facts:

I. That the plaintiff at all times and in all transactions herein mentioned have always
acted as representative and attorney-in-fact of the Ma-ao Sugar Central Co.
II. That in May, 1926, the plaintiff herein shipped at Pulupandan, Occidental Negros, on
the steamship Hannover 5,124,416 gross kilos of centrifugal sugar consigned to the
United States.
III. That said sugar was laden through a wharf built, owned and maintained solely by the
Ma-ao Sugar Central Company, a domestic corporation, on a foreshore public land at
Pulupandan, Occidental Negros, leased to it by the Government of Philippine Islands.
IV. That the defendant herein through the collector of customs of the collection district of
Iloilo, assessed and collected wharfage dues on sugar mentioned in paragraph II hereof
at P2 per thousand gross kilos or a total amount of P10,248.84.
V. That the plaintiff paid, under protest, the said amount of P10,248.84 but its protest
was overruled by the defendant.
VI. It is further agreed by the parties herein that Pulupandan through which the sugar in
question was exported, was at the time of the shipment, and is now, a port of entry of
the Philippine Islands, having been declared as such by Act No. 3106.

Issue:
Whether or not the government can legally collect duties as charge for wharfage
required by a statute upon all articles exported through privately-owned wharves.

Ruling:
The weight that may be given to a contemporaneous construction increases as the
period in which it is followed and observed lengthens and its acceptability widens.

It is vigorously contended that by reason of the fact that the sugar in question was
loaded from a private wharf and not from a Government wharf, that the Government has
no legal right to levy and collect the duty "as a charge for wharfage." In construing the
law now in question, we should take into consideration its history, relative situation and
the conditions existing at the time it was enacted.
As stated, the original Customs Tariff of 1901 was enacted by the Philippine
Commission under the authority from the President of the United States. At the time of
its enactment, it is a matter of common knowledge that the Government of the
Philippine Islands did not have, own or operate a pier or wharf anywhere or at any
place, a fact which must have been known to the Commission which enacted the law.
It is stated in the brief for the Attorney-General and not denied in the brief for the
appellee, that the two oldest piers of the Insular Government, Nos. 3 and 5, were first
opened in the year 1910. That prior to that time, and because there was no wharves or
piers, export cargoes by means of lights were brought to the sides of vessels that were
anchored in Manila Bay.
Notwithstanding that the fact the wharfage tax in question has been continuously levied
and collected from 1901 up to the present time. That is to say, in 1901 the Philippine
Commission, which enacted the law, knew or must have known that there was not a
single pier or wharf in the Philippine Islands, and yet without such wharves or piers, the
Government has at all times levied and collected the tax in question, and it if fair to
assume that from and out of the money derived from such sources, it has since erected
and constructed piers and wharves in all of the large cities of its principal ports of entries
at a cost of millions of pesos, and it is a matter of common knowledge that pier 7
recently constructed in the City of Manila cost about P12,979,824.99, and that it is
reputed to b e the most modern, best and fines dock in the Orient.
It further appears from our own records and reports that during all of this time the tax in
question has been paid without any protest or objection, and that the first time that the
law now in question was ever presented to this court was in the case of Compañia
General de Tabacos vs. Collector of Customs (46 Phil., 8), in which an attack was made
on the constitutionality of the law, and its validity was sustained by this court. The
question now presented was not then decided because it did not appear from the
agreed statement of facts that the articles upon which the defendant collected the duty
had or had not passed through a Government wharf. That case was decided on April 7,
1924.
The instant case is the first and only case in which the question now under
consideration was ever presented. Hence, we have a law which since 1901 has been
construed by its officials to mean that the Government of the Philippine Islands is
entitled to levy and collect a duty of $1 per gross ton "as a charge for wharfage" upon all
articles, goods, wares and merchandise exported through the ports of entry of the
Philippine Islands, and that construction has been acquiesced in and accepted, and the
money paid without any protest or objection for twenty-six years, for many years of
which the Government never even owned or operated a wharf.
It also appears that Pulupandan, the place from which the sugar was shipped, was
made a port of entry of the Philippine Islands on March 17, 1923, and that on January
19, 1925, the Legislature appropriated P750,000 for improvements made and to be
made in that port, which were to consist not only of the building of a wharf, but the
construction of breakwaters, sea walls and the dredging of the harbor.
When we consider that the tax in question has at all times for twenty-six years been
levied and collected by the Government both before it owned or operated any wharf,
and that is has spent millions of pesos in the construction of wharves in its principal
ports of entries, and that from the recent port of Pulupandan and for sugar that was
shipped from that port on the steamship Hannover in the year 1926 only the tax in
question amount to P10,284.84, the importance of the instant case and its far reaching
effect upon the finances of the Government of the Philippine Islands stands out in bold
relief and becomes very apparent, and this court is now called upon to overthrow that
long continued constructions, and in legal effect to hold that, because the sugar was
shipped through a private owned wharf, the government is not entitled to collect the
money in question "as a charge for wharfage." The long acquiescence in its construction
and the far reaching effect of such a decision makes it imperative for this court to
sustain the law, if there are any reasonable grounds upon which it can be done.
This rule is well stated in Sutherland on Statutory Construction, volume 2, page 889,
where it is said:
"The practical construction given to a doubtful statute by the department or officers
whose duty it is to carry it into execution is entitled to great weight and will not be
disregarded or overturned except for cogent reasons, and unless it is clear that such
construction is erroneous.

Wharfage is a charge or rent for the temporary use of a wharf.

A "duty on tonnage" is a duty on a vessel for the privilege of entering a port, and does
not prohibit wharfage.
Legaspi vs. Executive Secretary, 68 SCRA 253 (1975)

Facts:

On October 7, 1971, petitioner, an employee of the Department of Agrarian Reforms,

sent a letter to the respondent Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reforms,
Honorable Conrado F. Estrella, expressing his desire to be laid-off under the provisions
of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, on condition that he
would also be paid the gratuity benefits to which he might be entitled under Republic Act
No. 1616.

On March 28, 1972, the respondent Secretary of Agrarian Reforms informed the
petitioner that the Assistant Executive Secretary had denied his request to be laid-off
under the condition set forth in his letter.2

On April 1, 1972, petitioner sent another letter to respondent Secretary of Agrarian

Reforms advising the latter of his decision to be laid-off subject to the following
reservations:

That his application for lay off and all his acts relative thereto shall not be
construed as a waiver of his right (a) to collect all benefits under
Commonwealth Act 186, as amended by Republic Act 660 and Republic
Act 1616, and to receive all payments of said benefits granted therein
should the result of the administrative and legal remedies being sought by
him be favorable to him; and (b) to collect the difference between the
amount of what he shall have collected by virtue of this application and
what he is entitled to under Republic Act 1616, if this is higher, should the
result of the administrative and legal decisions be against him.3

The respondent Secretary of Agrarian Reforms approved petitioner's request, the lay-off
to be effective April 30, 1972.

On May 8, 1972, the General Manager of the Government Service Insurance System
approved petitioner's retirement (Retirement Gratuity No. 27511) under Section 12 (c) of
Commonwealth Act No. 186, as amended by Republic Act No. 1616, effective May 1,
1972. Accordingly, petitioner was paid the amount of P31,845.55 by the Government
Service Insurance System. However, petitioner's claim for gratuity under Section 169 of
Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, was denied.

Petitioner contends that the above-named respondents committed a grave abuse of

discretion and unlawfully neglected to perform an act which the law specifically enjoins
them to do. In support of his claim, he cites precedents wherein a government retiree
was paid his gratuity both under Republic Act 3844, as amended by Republic Act 6389,
and Commonwealth Act 186, as amended by Republic Act 1616. Thus, he points to the
case of Mr. Julian de Vera, a former official of the defunct Land Tenure Administration,
who was allegedly paid his gratuity both under Republic Act 3844, as amended by
Republic Act 6389, and under Commonwealth Act 186, as amended by Republic Act
1616, as ruled upon by the Auditor General in his 7th Indorsement, dated July 19,
1967. Another case is that of Mr. Carmelo del Rosario, a former employee of the
ACCFA which was reorganized and renamed "Agricultural Credit Administration," who
was also paid gratuity under Republic Act 3844, as amended by Republic Act 6389, and
Commonwealth Act 186, as amended by Republic Act 1616, on the basis of the
opinions of the Auditor General the Government Corporate Counsel and that of
Assistant Executive Secretary, Jose J. Leido, Jr., in his 4th Indorsement, dated
November 3, 1967.

Petitioner also makes capital of the opinions expressed by Senator Salvador Laurel,
sponsor in the Senate of Republic Act 6389, and Congressman Emilio Espinosa,
sponsor of the same Act in the House of Representatives, in their letters dated February
22, 1972 and February 4, 1972, respectively, answering the query of Honorable
Secretary Conrado Estrella of the Department of Agrarian Reforms as to the purpose of
Section 36 of Republic Act 6389, amending Section 169 of Republic Act 3844. The two
Members of Congress opined that, in enacting Section 36 of Republic Act 6389,
intended to give gratuity equivalent to one month salary for every year of service but in
no case exceeding twenty-four months salary, in addition to all benefits legally due
under existing laws and regulations, to all employees who may not be absorbed or
prefer to be laid-off from the service.

On the other hand, respondents maintain that the gratuity provided for under Section
169 of Republic Act 3844, is a retirement gratuity intended for those who desire to be
laid-off but would not be eligible to receive retirement benefits under the general laws;
that as can be gleaned from the settled policy in the various retirement statutes, it is not
the intention of the legislature to give double retirement benefits; that the phrase "in
addition to all benefits to which they are entitled under existing laws and regulations"
found in Section 169 of Republic Act 3844 does not refer to the retirement gratuity
receivable under Commonwealth Act 186 but to other benefits, such as refund of
personal contributions to the retirement fund with interest and the money value of
accumulated vacation and sick leaves; and that the provisions of Section 169 of
Republic Act 3844 and Section 36 of Republic Act 6389 do not contain express legal
exception to the general policy that pension and gratuity laws should be construed as to
preclude any person from receiving double pension.

Issue:
WON the law intend to allow an employee who has been laid-off or prefers to be laid-off
under Republic Act 3844, but who is otherwise retireable under existing laws and
regulations, to collect both gratuity under Republic Act 3844 and existing laws.

RULING:
No.
Obviously, the solution to the problem in this present petition lies in the correct
interpretation of the phrase "in addition to all benefits to which they are entitled under
the existing laws and regulations" found in Section 169 of Republic Act 3844. Said
section reads:

SEC. 169. Personnel of Reorganized or Abolished Agencies. —

Permanent officials and employees of all existing government agencies
which are abolished or reorganized under this Code, subject to Civil
Service rules and regulations, shall be absorbed and shall not be divested
of their positions except presidential appointees: Provided, That those
presidential appointees who cannot be absorbed and such officials and
employees who prefer to be laid off shall be given gratuity equivalent to
one month salary for every year of service but in no case more than
twenty-four months salary, in addition to all benefits to which they are
entitled under existing laws and regulations.

As regards the precedents cited by petitioner wherein two employees of the government
were allowed to receive gratuity both under Republic Act 3844 and Commonwealth Act
186, as amended by Republic Act 1616, pursuant to opinions of the Auditor General,
Government Corporate Counsel and Assistant Executive Secretary, suffice it to say that
they are not judicial precedents valid and binding upon this Court. The aforementioned
opinions of the Auditor General, Government Corporate Counsel and Assistant
Executive Secretary have never been passed upon by this Court in a proper case
presented before it. In Chavez vs. Mathay, 15 We ruled:

At any rate, these two cases cited by petitioner are not before this Court.
Not having been elevated to the Court in a proper case, We are not called
upon to rule upon the correctness or error of the Auditor General's ruling
therein. Needless to state, to the extent that said action of the Auditor
General are in conflict with the doctrine against double pension for exactly
the same services in the absence of an express legal exemption,
enunciated in the above-cited cases, they have no valid nor binding effect.
As stated in Taylor (Taylor vs. Gimenez, May 30, 1962), "The error
notwithstanding, the law must be enforced even if it prejudiced the
defendant-appellee under the principle that mistakes of public officials
cannot prejudice the State to the extent of violating an express provision
and policy of the law.
ABS-CBN vs. CTA, 108 SCRA 142 (1981)

FACTS:

The ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation (herein shall be called the “Company”) was
engaged in the business of telecasting local as well as foreign films acquired from
foreign corporations not engaged in trade or business with the Philippines. Under
Section 24 (b) of the National Revenue Code, a withholding tax of 30% (RA 2343). It
was implemented through Circular No. V-334. Pursuant to the foregoing, ABS-CBN
dutifully withheld and turned over to the BIR the amount of 30% of one-half of the film
rentals paid by it to foreign corporations not engaged in trade or business within the
Philippines. The last year that ABS-CBN withheld taxes pursuant to the foregoing
Circular was in 1968.

RA 5431 amended Section 24 (b) of the Tax Code increasing the tax rate from 30 % to
35 % and revising the tax basis from “such amount” referring to rents, etc. to “gross
income.” The following was implemented by Circular No. 4-71.

Petitioner requested for a reconsideration and withdrawal of the assessment.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not respondent can apply General Circular No. 4-71 retroactively and issue
a deficiency assessment against petitioner.

HELD/DECISION:

Any rulings or circulars promulgated by the CIR have no retroactive application when it
would be prejudicial to taxpayers. The retroactive application of Memorandum Circular
No. 4-71 prejudices ABS-CBN since:

1. The assessment and demand on petitioner to pay deficiency withholding income tax
was also made three years after 1968 for a period of time commencing in 1965.

2. ABS-CBN was no longer in a position to withhold taxes due from foreign corporations
because it had already remitted all film rentals and no longer had any control over them
when the new Circular was issued.
Endencia vs. David, 93 Phil 696 (1953)

Facts: Saturnino David, as a Collector of Internal Revenue collected income taxes from Justices
Endencia and Jugo, as Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals and Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court respectively. The lower court held that under the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs.
Meer, 85 Phil., 552, the collection of income taxes from the salaries of Justice Jugo and Justice Endencia
was a diminution of their compensation and therefore was in violation of the Constitution of the
Philippines, and so ordered the refund of said taxes. Respondent, through the Solicitor General
contended that the collection was done pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act 590 which Congress
enacted to authorize and legalize the collection of income tax on the salaries of judicial officers, if not to
counteract the ruling on the Perfecto Case.

Issue: Whether the Legislature may lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the salary of a public
official, specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and
decided otherwise.

Held: The Legislature cannot lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the salary of a public official,
specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided
otherwise. The interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the
exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the
Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not
violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later
interpreting said statute, specially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs
counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land. In the
case at bar, Section 13 of Republic Act 590 interpreted or ascertained the meaning of the phrase “which
shall not be diminished during their continuance in office,” found in section 9, Article VIII of the
Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part
thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of
the Judiciary. The Legislature under our form of government is assigned the task and the power to make
and enact laws, but not to interpret them. This is more true with regard to the interpretation of the basic
law, the Constitution, which is not within the sphere of the Legislative department. Allowing the
legislature to interpret the law would bring confusion and instability in judicial processes and
court decisions.
Pines City Educational Center vs. NLRC, 227 SCRA 655 (1993)
FACTS:
This a petition for certiorari seeking the reversal of the resolution of public respondent
National Labor Relations Commission dated November 29, 1990, in NLRC Case No.
01-04-0056-89, which affirmed in toto the decision of the Labor Arbiter dated February
28,1990.
Private respondents Bentrez et. al., were all employed as teachers on probationary
basis by petitioner Pines City Educational Center. All the private respondents, except
Roland Picart and Lucia Chan, signed contracts of employment with petitioner for a
fixed duration. On March 31, 1989, due to the expiration of private respondents’
contracts and their poor performance as teachers, they were notified of petitioners’
decision not to renew their contracts anymore.
On April 10, 1989, private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal before the
Labor Arbiter, alleging that their dismissals were without cause and in violation of due
process. Except for private respondent Leila Dominguez who worked with petitioners for
one semester, all other private respondents were employed for one to two years. They
were never informed in writing by petitioners regarding the standards or criteria of
evaluation so as to enable them to meet the requirements for appointment as regular
employees.
For their part, petitioners contended that private respondents’ separation from
employment, apart from their poor performance, was due to the expiration of the periods
stipulated in their respective contracts. In the case of private respondent Dangwa
Bentrez, the duration of his employment contract was for one year, or beginning June,
1988 to March 1989 whereas in the case of the other private respondents, the duration
of their employment contracts was for one semester, or beginning November, 1988 to
March 1989.
On February 28, 1990, the Labor Arbiter rendered judgment in favor of private
respondents, ordering their reinstatement and the payment of their full backwages and
other benefits and privileges without qualification and deduction from the time they were
dismissed up to their actual reinstatement. The computation of backwages covered only
the period private respondents were terminated up to January 31, 1990 or 10 months
and does not include backwages from January 31, 1990 up to their actual
reinstatement. In support of this decision, the Labor Arbiter rationalized that the
teacher’s contracts were vague and did not include the specific description of duties and
assignments of private respondents.
NLRC affirmed the decision of Labor Arbiter. Hence, the appeal.
SC held that insofar as the private respondents who knowingly and voluntarily agreed
upon fixed periods of employment are concerned, their services were lawfully
terminated by reason of the expiration of the periods of their respective contracts. With
respect to the remaining private respondents Roland Picart and Lucia Chan, both of
whom did not sign any contract fixing the periods of their employment nor to have
knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon fixed periods of employment, petitioners had the
burden of proving that the termination of their services was legal. As probationary
employees, they are likewise protected by the security of tenure provision of the
Constitution. Consequently, they cannot be removed from their positions unless for
cause.
ISSUE/HELD:
- WoN private respondents Picart and Chan, who were illegally dismissed, were
entitled to payment of backwages.

a.) Yes. Private respondents Picart and Chan were entitled to payment of
backwages. However, in the computation of the backwages, the total
amount derived from employment elsewhere by the employee from the date
of dismissal up to the date of reinstatement, if any, should be deducted
therefrom.
The order for their reinstatement and payment of full backwages and other
benefits and privileges from the time they were dismissed up to their actual
reinstatement was proper, conformably with Article 279 of the Labor
Code, as amended by Section 34 of Republic Act No. 6715, 14 which
took effect on March 21, 1989.
It should be noted that private respondents Roland Picart and Lucia
Chan were dismissed illegally on March 31, 1989, or after the
effectivity of said amendatory law.
However, in ascertaining the total amount of backwages payable to
them, SC went back to the rule prior to the Mercury Drug Rule that the
total amount derived from employment elsewhere by the employee
from the date of dismissal up to the date of reinstatement, if any,
should be deducted therefrom.  Stare Decisis
SC restated the underlying reason that employees should not be permitted
to enrich themselves at the expense of their employer. In addition, the law
abhors double compensation. To this extent, SC’s ruling in Alex Ferrer, et
al., v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 100898, promulgated on July 5, 1993, was
hereby modified.
Pp. vs. Macadaeg, 91 Phil 410 (1952)

Facts: Petition to prevent and restrain Seventh Guerilla Amnesty

Commission from taking jurisdiction and cognizance of a petition foramnesty
filed by respondent Antonio Guillermo a.k.a Silver
•

Seventh Guerilla Amnesty Commission- Hons. Macadaeg, Potenciano

Pecson, Ramon R. San Jose
•

Antonio Guillermo- convicted and sentenced for murder

•

July 15, 1947- case filed in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte—Mar.
29, 1948- judgment.
•

Appeal to the Supreme Court- judgment on May 19, 1950—expressly ruled

in the judgment of conviction that Guillermo is not entitled to the benefits of
amnesty because the murders which he was convicted were committed “not
in furtherance of the resistance movement but in the course of a fratricidal
strife between two rival guerilla units.”
•

Motion for reconsideration- June 5, 1950- denied July 13, 1950

•

June 20, 1950- filed for suspension of the proceedings and reference of the
case to the Seventh Guerilla Amnesty Commission- denied July 13, 1950
•

Petition for amnesty- July 8, 1950B.

Issue Whether the pronouncement of the Court is obiter dictum and if the
Commission has jurisdiction over the petition for amnesty of the convicted.C.

Ruling The petition for prohibition was granted and the preliminary injunction
issued by the Supreme Court on Nov. 24, 1950 made absolute with costs
against Guillermo. He may not raise again the issue in any tribunal, judicial
or administrative and is now estopped from contesting the judgment, of
the jurisdiction of the court that rendered the adverse ruling.D.

Ratio Seventh Guerilla Amnesty Commission can take cognizance only of

cases pending appeal in the Supreme Court on October 2,1946, at that time,
during which date the Guillermo criminal case was still pending in the Court
of First Instance of IlocosNorte. Guillermo’s case was assigned to the
Second GAC. Seventh GAC’s claim of jurisdiction of the application was
merely based on administrative Order no. 217 which expressly states “in view
of the appointments of new Judges of First Instances”and not for the purpose
of setting forth cases cognizable by each of the different commissions. The
courts are not excluded in deciding any claim for amnesty, thus the Court has
jurisdiction over the amnesty petition of Guillermo. It was also found that the
petition was an ill-advised attempt to delay execution of the judgment of
conviction whichno court of justice will countenance. The finding of the
Court that Guillermo is not entitled to the benefits of amnesty is final
and conclusive, not an obiter dictum , under the principle of res judicata.
Delta Motors vs. CA, 276 SCRA 212 (1997)
FACTS
- Private Respondent State Investment House, INc. filed action against DELTA
for a sum of money at the RTC of Manila, Branch VI. DELTA was required to
pay P20M to the private respondent.
- The above decision could not be served by DELTA due to its dissolution. It
had been taken over by Philippine National Bank (PNB) in the meantime.
- Dec. 1986: SIHI moved forservice of the decision by way of publication. It was
published in the Thunderer, a weekly Manila newspaper. Afterwards, SIHI
moved for the execution, which the RTC granted on March 1987. Pursuant to
the writ of execution, properties of DELTA in Iloilo and Bacolod City were
levied upon and sold.
- DELTA commenced a special civil action for certiorari with the CA, alleging
that a) the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over DELTA since there was no
valid/proper service of summons rendering the decision void, and b) the
decision never became final and executory
- The CA ruled that against DELTA on the first ground, but ruled that the
decision never became executory because records show that the assailed
judgment had never been properly served against on PNB (which assumed
DELTA’s operation upon its dissolution). The CA also stated that the
publication was not a cure for such a fatal defect.
- Therefore, the CA decreed that since the decision had not yet attained finality
pending a service of a copy on DELTA, who may appeal within the
reglementory period.
- DELTA filed an MR, insisting there could be no valid service of
summons since the RTC decision was not in accordance with the Rules
and hence void. Dismissed by CA
- DELTA filed a petition with the SC for review on certiorari. Denied.
- DELTA filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC, indicating that it was appealing
from the earlier decision and prayed that records be elevated to the CA
- SIHI filed a motion to dismiss DELTA’s appeal on the grounds that it was filed
out of time (beyond 15 days period after obtaining the copy of the decision).
DELTA’s appeal was dismissed.
- DELTA filed an Omnibus motion with the CA to declare all acts and
proceedings relating to the earlier decision as void. The CA issued a
reolustion on Jan. 5 1995
- SIHI filed a motion for clarification, asking for a deletion of a portion of the
resolutio for it being mere obiter dictum (“While it is true that as a necessary
consequence the decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 22, 1991
ruling that the decision in Civil Case No. 84-23019 "has not attained finality
pending service of a copy thereof on petitioner Delta, which may appeal
therefrom within the reglementary period", all proceedings and/or orders
arising from the trial court's decision in Civil Case No. 84-23019 are null and
void x x x .”) SIHI claimed that the statement was “not necessary for the case
before it” (the denial of the Omnibus motion” and therefore “could not be held
binding for establishing a precedent”).
- CA decreed to amend its resolution and delete the assailed paragraph

ISSUES/HELD
- WON the CA erred in denying the petitioner’s Omnibus motion?
a.) No, the CA was correct is denying the Omnibus motion
Sec. 7 of Rule 51 of the Rules of Court on the Procedure in the CA:
“Questions that may be decided – No error which does not affect the
jursidiction over the subject matter will be considered unless stated in the
asdsignment of errors properly argued in the brief, save as the court, at its
option, may notice plain errors not specified, and also clerical errors.”

b.) The CA could only consider errors raised by the petitioner, which were
only limited to the RTC’s orders and not on the CA’s previous decisions.
Even so, to allow DELTA’s Omnibus motion which it filed more than eight
months after the promulgation of the decision and long after its finality
would result in the abandonment of sound judicial process.

- WON the assailed paragraph in the CA’s resolution was obiter dictum?
a.) Yes, the assailed paragraph is considered obiter dictum.
1.) Obiter dictum – opinion expressed by a court upon some question of
law which is not necessary to the decision of the case before it; “by the
way”. It is not binding as precedent (Cannot be basis for stare decisis)

2.) The phrase was not raised by the petitioner expressly in its petition
assailing the dismisssal of its notice of appeal. Hence, it could not be
considered a prerequisite in disposing of the issues.
Koppel (Phils.), Inc. vs. Yatco, 77 Phil 496 (1946)

Facts:
- Koppel Industrial Car and Equipment company (KICE), a foreign company not doing business in the
Philippines, owned 995 shares out of the 1000 shares that comprise the capital stock of KPI, a domestic
corporation licensed as commercial broker in the Philippines.
- The remaining 5 shares were owned by each of the officers of KPI. KICE is in the business of selling
railwaymaterials, machineries and supplies. Buyers in the Philippines, when interested, asked for price
quotations from KPI, and KPI then cabled for the quotation desired from KICE.
- However, KPI quoted to the purchaser a selling price above the figures quoted by KICE. On the basis of
these quotations, orders were placed by the local buyers.
- Between KICE and KPI, the arrangement nonetheless was that KICE controls how much share of the
profits goes to KPI. For these transactions, the BIR treated KPI as a subsidiary of KICE and collected from
KPI the merchants’ salestax, which was a revenue law in force at the time the sales tookplace.
- KPI paid the taxes under protest, demanded for refund andcontended that KPI could not be liable for
merchants’ sales tax because it was only acting as broker between KICE and the local buyers.
- The lower court dismissed the complaint and ruled infavor of the government.

Issue:
WON KPI is a domestic corporation distinct and separate from, and not a mere branch of KICEC

Ruling:
Koppel (Philippines), Inc. was a mere branch or agency or dummy ("hechura") of Koppel Industrial Car and
Equipment Co. The lower court did not hold that the corporate personality of KPI would also be disregarded
in other cases or for other purposes. It would have had no power to so hold. The courts' action in this regard
must be confined to the transactions involved in the case at bar "for the purpose of adjudging the rights and
liabilities of the parties in the case. They have no jurisdiction to do more."

United States vs. Milwaukee Refrigeration Transit

General Rule: a corporation will be looked upon as a legal entity as a general rule, and until sufficient reason
to the contrary appears;
Exception: the notion of legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or
defend crime, the law will regard the corporation as an association of persons.
(1 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Corporation, Permanent Edition, pp. 139,140)
-disregarded to prevent injustice, or the distortion or hiding of the truth, or to let in a just defense.
-disregarded when the corporation is the mere alter ego, or business conduit of a person,

Manifestly, the principle is the same whether the "person" be natural or artificial. A very numerous and
growing class of cases wherein the corporate entity is disregarded is that where a corporation is so organized
and controlled, and its affairs are so conducted, as to make it merely an instrumentality, agency, conduit or
adjunct of another corporation.

The fact that KPI is a mere branch is conclusively borne out by the fact, among others, that the amount of
the so-called "share in the profits" of KPI was ultimately left to the sole, unbridled control of KICEC. If KPI
was intended to function as a bona fide separate corporation, we cannot conceive how this arrangement
could have been adopted. No group of businessmen could be expected to organize a mercantile corporation
if the amount of that profit were to be subjected to such a unilateral control of another corporation, unless
indeed the former has previously been designed by the incorporators to serve as a mere subsidiary, branch or
agency of the latter. KPI charged the parent corporation no more than actual cost - without profit whatsoever
- for merchandise allegedly of its own to complete deficiencies of shipments made by said parent corporation.
Plaintiff was organized as a Philippine corporation for the purpose of evading the payment by its parent
foreign corporation of merchants' sales tax on the transactions involved in this case and others of similar
nature.

// Upon this appeal, seven errors are assigned to said judgment as follows:.
1. That the court a quo erred in not holding that appellant is a domestic corporation distinct and separate
from, and not a mere branch of Koppel Industrial Car and Equipment Co.;
2. the court a quo erred in ignoring the ruling of the Secretary of Finance, dated January 31, 1931, Exhibit M;

Appellant's second assignment of error can be summarily disposed of. It is clear that the ruling of the
Secretary of Finance, Exhibit M, was not binding upon the trial court, much less upon this tribunal, since the
duty and power of interpreting the laws is primarily a function of the judiciary. (Ortua vs. Singson
Encarnacion, 59 Phil., 440, 444.) Plaintiff cannot be excused from abiding by this legal principle, nor can it
properly be heard to say that it relied on the Secretary's ruling and that, therefore, the courts should not now
apply an interpretation at variance therewith. The rule of stare decisis is undoubtedly entitled to more respect
in the construction of statutes than the interpretations given by officers of the administrative branches of the
government, even those entrusted with the administration of particular laws. But this court, in Philippine
Trust Company and Smith, Bell and Co. vs. Mitchell(59 Phil., 30, 36), said:

The rule of stare decisis is entitled to respect. Stability in the law, particularly in the business field, is desirable.
But idolatrous reverence for precedent, simply as precedent, no longer rules. More important than anything
else is that court should be right//
JM Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413 (1970)

Facts: RA 2616--the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate authorized by Congress (the

first statute to be
specifically tailored to expropriate land), was decided unconstitutional by the lower
court, in favor of the petitioner JMTuason & Co. The Supreme Court then reversed this
decision, reviewing the scope of power given to Congress under the Constitution to
authorize expropriation of lands. They prayed that it be declared unconstitutional
because violative of equal protection clause since statute applies only to Tatalon estate.

Issue: WON RA 2616 (rightfully amended) is unconstitutional because it violates the

petitioner’s rights to due process and equal protection of law?

Ruling: Our Constitution, any constitution, is not to be construed narrowly or

pedantically, for the prescriptions therein contained, to paraphrase Justice Holmes, are
not mathematical formulas having their essence in their form, but are organic living
institutions, the significance of which is vital nor formal. There must be an awareness,
as with Justice Brandeis, not only of what has been, but of what may be. The words
employed by it are not to be construed to yield fixed and rigid answers but as impressed
with the necessary attributes of flexibility and accommodation to enable them to meet
adequately whatever problems the future has in store. It is not, in brief, a printed finality
but a dynamic process.

It thus appears then that it failed to take into account the greater awareness exhibited
by the framers of our Constitution of the social forces at work when they drafted the
fundamental law. To be more specific, they were seriously concerned with the grave
problems of inequality of wealth, with its highly divisive tendency, resulting in the
generous scope accorded the police power and eminent domain prerogatives of the
state, even if the exercise thereof would cover terrain previously thought of as beyond
state control, to promote social justice and the general welfare.

What appears undeniable is that in the light of the broad grant of congressional power
so apparent from the text of the constitutional provision, the historical background as
made clear during the deliberation for the Constitutional Convention, and the cardinal
postulate underlying constitutional construction that its provisions are not to be
interpreted to preclude their being responsive to future needs, the fundamental law
being intended to govern the life of a nation as it unfolds through the ages, the
challenged statute can survive the test of validity. If it were otherwise, then the judiciary
may lend itself susceptible to the charge that in its appraisal of governmental measures
with social and economic implications, its decisions are characterized by the narrow,
unyielding insistence on the primacy of property rights, contrary to what the Constitution
ordains. In no other sphere of judicial activity are judges called upon to transcend
personal predilections and private notions of policy, lest legislation intended to bring to
fruition the hope of a better life for the great masses of our people, as embodied in the
social justice principle of which this constitutional provision under scrutiny is a
manifestation, be unjustifiably stricken down. The appealed decision cannot stand.
Co vs. Electoral Tribunal, 199 SCRA 692 (1991)
Facts:

On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar
was held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the
second legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and
Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed
the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent alleging that Jose
Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines and not a resident of the second
district of Northern Samar.

The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) declared respondent Ong is a

natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting
purposes.

Issue:
1. Whether or not respondent is a natural born Filipino and a resident of Laoang,
Northern Samar.
2. Whether or not the HRET committed grave abuse of authority in the exercise of its
powers.

Ruling:

1. The Court affirmed the decision of HRET that respondent is a natural born Filipino
and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar. The respondent traces his natural born
citizenship through his mother, not through the citizenship of his father. The citizenship
of the father is relevant only to determine whether or not the respondent "chose"
to be a Filipino when he came of age. At that time and up to the present, both mother
and father were Filipinos. Respondent Ong could not have elected any other citizenship
unless he first formally renounced Philippine citizenship in favor of a foreign nationality.
Unlike other persons faced with a problem of election, there was no foreign nationality
of his father which he could possibly have chosen.

2. The Court declared that HRET did not commit any grave abuse of discretion. The
same issue of natural-born citizenship has already been decided by the Constitutional
Convention of 1971 and by the Batasang Pambansa convened by authority of the
Constitution drafted by that Convention. Emil Ong, full blood brother of the respondent,
was declared and accepted as a natural born citizen by both bodies.

The respondent tribunal in resolving the issue of the constitutional provisions'

interpretation, found reason to refer to the interpellations made during the 1986
Constitutional Commission. It said:
 That the benevolent provisions of Sections 2 and 1(3) of Article IV of the 1987
Constitution was (sic) intended by its (sic) framers to be endowed, without
distinction, to all Filipinos by election pursuant to the 1935 Constitution is more
than persuasively established by the extensive interpellations and debate on the
issue as borne by the official records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. 17

Although I find the distinction as to when election of Philippine citizenship was made
irrelevant to the case at bar, since private respondent, contrary to the conclusion of the
respondent tribunal, did not elect Philippine citizenship, as provided by law, I still
consider it necessary to settle the controversy regarding the meaning of the
constitutional provisions in question.

I agree with respondent tribunal that the debates, interpellations petitions and opinions
expressed in the 1986 Constitutional Commission may be resorted to in ascertaining the
meaning of somewhat elusive and even nebulous constitutional provisions. Thus —

The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle
of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and
of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional
construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of
the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be
safely assumed that the people in ratifying the constitution were guided mainly by
the explanation offered by the framers.18

The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission relevant to Section 2, Article

IV in relation to Section 1(3) of the same Article, appear to negate the contention of
petitioners that only those born to Filipino mothers before 17 January 1973 and who
would elect Philippine citizenship after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, are to be
considered natural-born Filipino citizens.
Sarmiento vs. Mison, 156 SCRA 549 (1987)

FACTS:
Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Carague as
the Secretary of the Department of Budget, without the confirmation of the Commission
on Appointments. Sarmiento assailed the appointments as unconstitutional by reason of
its not having been confirmed by CoA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment is valid.

RULING:
Yes. The President acted within her constitutional authority and power in appointing
Salvador Mison, without submitting his nomination to the CoA for confirmation. He is
thus entitled to exercise the full authority and functions of the office and to receive all
the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.

Under Sec 16 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are 4 groups of officers whom the
President shall appoint:
1st, appointment of executive departments and bureaus heads, ambassadors,
other public ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers with the consent and confirmation of
the CoA.
2nd, all other Government officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided by
law;
3rd those whom the President may be authorized by the law to appoint;
4th, low-ranking officers whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the
President alone.

First group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the
nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President appoints.

2nd, 3rd and 4th group of officers are the present bone of contention.

By following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an

express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow
that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the
consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a

bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of appointments where the
consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. The 1987 Constitution
deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments that need
the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
Tano vs. Socrates, 278 SCRA 154 (1997)

Facts:

On Dec 15, 1992, the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Puerto Princesa enacted an

ordinance banning the shipment of all live fish and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City
from January 1, 1993 to January 1, 1998. Subsequently the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
Provincial Government of Palawan enacted a resolution prohibiting the catching ,
gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of a several species of live marine
coral dwelling aquatic organisms for 5 years, in and coming from Palawan waters.

Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, praying that the court
declare the said ordinances and resolutions as unconstitutional on the ground that the
said ordinances deprived them of the due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly
restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and
Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the challenged ordinances unconstitutional.

Ruling:

No. The Supreme Court found the petitioners contentions baseless and held that the
challenged ordinances did not suffer from any infirmity, both under the Constitution and
applicable laws. There is absolutely no showing that any of the petitioners qualifies as a
subsistence or marginal fisherman. Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to
bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the State to
protect the nation’s marine wealth. The so-called “preferential right” of subsistence or
marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all absolute.

In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the state and
pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their
“exploration, development and utilization...shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State.

It is clear to the Court that both Ordinances have two principal objectives or purposes:
(1) to establish a closed season for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered
therein for a period of five years, and (2) to protect the corals of the marine waters of the
City of Puerto Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further destruction due to
illegal fishing activities.
Ordillo vs. COMELEC, 192 SCRA 100 (1992)
Fact:
The people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-
Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite held pursuant to Republic
Act No. 6766 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera
Autonomous Region."
After some deliberations, it was approved by the COMELEC and subsequently set
elections in CAR (Cordillera Autonomous Region) of Ifugao on the first Monday of
March 1991. However, the petitioners filed a petition with COMELEC that there can be
no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one province as the Constitution and
Republic Act No. 6766 require that the said Region be composed of more than one
constituent unit.

ISSUE: Whether or not the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted
favorably for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and
validly constitute such Region.

HELD:
No. The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous
Region.
It is explicit in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution that:
"Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and
in the Cordillera consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical
areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic
and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of
this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines." (Emphasis Supplied)
The keywords — provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote
that "region" is to be made up of more than one constituent unit. The term
"region" used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. This is
supported by the fact that the thirteen (13) regions into which the Philippines is
divided for administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous provinces.
Ifugao is a province by itself. To become part of a region, it must join other provinces,
cities, municipalities, and geographical areas. It joins other units because of their
common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures
and other relevant characteristics.
The Constitutional requirements are not present in this case.
The well-established rule in statutory construction that the language of the
Constitution, as much as possible should be understood in the sense it has in
common use and that the words used in constitutional provisions are to be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, must then, be
applied in this case.
STATCON TOPIC: CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION (VERBA LEGIS; GIVE
ORDINARY MEANING TO THE WORDS)
see AGPALO p. 130 (2.17 Verba Legis or plain meaning rule)
GENERAL RULE:
"Where the statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without interpretation."
see AGPALO p. 585-588 (11.05 How language of constitution construed)
"The words should as much as possible be understood in the sense they have in
common use and given their ordinary meaning, except when technical terms are
employed, in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails."
GENERAL RULE:
The language of the Constitution "should be understood in the sense that it may
have in common."
EXCEPTION:
Only when technical terms are employed.
REASON:
"The fundamental law is not primarily a lawyer's document but essentially that of
the people, in whose consciousness it should ever be present as an important condition
for the rule of law to prevail."
Legaspi vs. Minister of Finance, 115 SCRA 418 (1982)

In 1982, after the lifting of Martial Law, Legaspi, then incumbent member of the interim
Batasang Pambansa, petitioned to declare Presidential Decree 1840 “granting tax
amnesty and filing of statement of assets and liabilities and some other purposes”
unconstitutional. He argued that said decree was promulgated despite the fact that
under the Constitution ‘(T)he Legislative power shall be vested in a Batasang
Pambansa’ (Sec. 1, Article VIII) and the President may grant amnesty only ‘with
concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa. In this case, there was no concurrence given
by the IBP. Legaspi averred that since Martial Law is already lifted, the president can no
longer arbitrarily enact laws. At the same time, Legaspi averred that Amendment No. 6,
which provides legislative powers to Marcos, is invalid because that is no longer allowed
after the lifting of the ML.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marcos can validly grant tax amnesties w/o the concurrence of
the Batasan Pambansa.
HELD: SC ruled PD 1840 to be valid. Legaspi argued that PD 1840 is invalid for it did
not enjoy the concurrence of the Batasan. He relies on Article 7, Sec 11 of the
Constitution which provides that –
‘The President may, except in cases of impeachment, grant reprieves, commutations
and pardons, remit fines and forfeitures and with the concurrence of the Batasang
Pambansa, grant amnesty.’

The SC noted that Article 7, sec. 11, applies only when the President is exercising
his power of executive clemency. In the case at bar, PD 1840 was issued pursuant to
his power to legislate under Amendment No. 6.

It ought to be indubitable that when the President acts as legislator as in the case at
bar, he does not need the concurrence of the Batasan. Rather, he exercises concurrent
authority vested by the Constitution.”
Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991)

FACTS:
The two petitions in this case sought to declare unconstitutional Executive Order No.
284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino. The petitioners alleged that the cited
provision of EO 284 contravenes the provision of Sec. 13, Article VII which declares:
The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any
other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure,
directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be
financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege
granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They
shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

The petitioners maintained that the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution” used in Section 13 of Article VII meant that the exception must be
expressly provided in the Constitution.

Public respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the phrase “unless otherwise
provided in the Constitution” in Section 13, Article VII makes reference to Section 7, par.
(2), Article IXB insofar as the appointive officials mentioned therein are concerned. The
provision relied upon by the respondents provides:
Sec. 7. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position,
no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the government or
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar
as Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad
exceptions made for appointive officials in general under Section 7, par. (2), Article IXB.

RULING:
No. The intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on
the President and his official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in
the government or elsewhere is concerned.

Although Section 7, Article I-XB already contains a blanket prohibition against the
holding of multiple offices or employment in the government subsuming both elective
and appointive public officials, the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to
formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President,
Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any
other office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the
Constitution itself.

Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other
office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law
or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies
and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In
other words, Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to
all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article
VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-
President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.

It is a well-established rule in Constitutional construction that no one provision of the

Constitution is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all
the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so
interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a
particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the
whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat
another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of
a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make
the words idle and nugatory.

In the light of the construction given to Section 13, Article VII in relation to Section 7,
par. (2), Article IXB of the 1987 Constitution, Executive Order No. 284 dated July 23,
1987 is unconstitutional.
Datu Michael Abas Kida vs. Senate of the Phils., G.R. No. 196271, October 18,
2011

F: Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)

were enacted by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that
established the ARMM and scheduled the first regular elections for the ARMM regional
officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and reset the regular elections for
the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001. RA No.
9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset
for the third time the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005 and on
the same date every 3 years thereafter. Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM
regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun
preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the
various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was
enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the
regular national and local elections of the country.

In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners
assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.

I: Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections [including the
ARMM elections]?

R: The Court was unanimous in holding that the Constitution mandates the
synchronization of national and local elections. While the Constitution does not
expressly instruct Congress to synchronize the national and local elections, the intention
can be inferred from the following provisions of the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII)
of the Constitution, which state:

Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under this Constitution shall
be held on the second Monday of May 1987. The first local elections shall be held on a
date to be determined by the President, which may be simultaneous with the election of
the Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all Members of the city or
municipal councils in the Metropolitan Manila area.

Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, and the local
officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
Of the Senators elected in the elections in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the highest
number of votes shall serve for six years and the remaining twelve for three years.

The inclusion of autonomous regions in the enumeration of political subdivisions of the

State under the heading “Local Government” indicates quite clearly the constitutional
intent to consider autonomous regions as one of the forms of local governments.
In this case, the ARMM elections, although called “regional” elections, should be
included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a “local” election based on the
wording and structure of the Constitution.
A thorough reading of RA No. 9054 reveals that it fixes the schedule for only
the first ARMM elections, it does not provide the date for the succeeding regular ARMM
elections. In providing for the date of the regular ARMM elections, RA No. 9333 and RA
No. 10153 clearly do not amend RA No. 9054 since these laws do not change or revise
any provision in RA No. 9054. In fixing the date of the ARMM elections subsequent to
the first election, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 merely filled the gap left in RA No.
9054.

Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs constitutional?

We already identified the three possible solutions open to Congress to address the
problem created by synchronization – (a) allow the incumbent officials to remain
in office after the expiration of their terms in a holdover capacity; (b) call for
special elections to be held, and shorten the terms of those to be elected so the
next ARMM regional elections can be held on May 13, 2013; or (c) recognize that
the President, in the exercise of his appointment powers and in line with his
power of supervision over the ARMM, can appoint interim OICs to hold the
vacated positions in the ARMM regional government upon the expiration of their
terms.

We have already established the unconstitutionality of the first two options,

leaving us to consider the last available option.

In this way, RA No. 10153 is in reality an interim measure, enacted to respond to the
adjustment that synchronization requires. Given the context, we have to judge RA No.
10153 by the standard of reasonableness in responding to the challenges brought about
by synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections.

1st option: We have already established that elective ARMM officials are also local
officials; they are, thus, bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the
Constitution.
2nd option: Calling special elections is unconstitutional since COMELEC, on its own, has
no authority to order special elections. The power to fix the date of elections is
essentially legislative in nature.

RA No. 10153, however, does not in any way amend what the organic law of the
ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of governance. What RA No.
10153 in fact only does is to “appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional
Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly
who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly
elected in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office.”
[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in
fact, provides only for synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that
must in the meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153 should be read – in the
manner it was written and based on its unambiguous facial terms. Aside from its order
for synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim measure responding to the
adjustments that the synchronization requires.
Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408 (1997)

Facts:

The Respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) in pursuant to the

privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50
dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the
issued. In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation,
which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share,
and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator,
which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than
the bid of petitioner.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner

of MHC, petitioner matched the former’s bid price also with Php 44.00 per share
followed by a manager’s check worth Php 33 million as Bid Security, but the GSIS
refused to accept both the bid match and the manager’s check.

The petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution
“Filipino first policy” and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the
Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the
vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. To all intents and purposes, it has
become a part of the national patrimony. Petitioner also argues that since 51% of
the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel
which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled
corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism
industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy.

ISSUE: Whether or not the provisions of Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11
of the 1987 Constitution is self executing or non self executing

If self executing: the sale of Manila Hotel to Renong Berhad is violative of the
Constitutional provision of Filipino First policy (Section 10, second
paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution) and is therefore null and void.
RULING:

As the Filipino first policy was deemed self executing, the court ruled that the
qualified Filipino entity must be given preference by granting it the option to match
the winning bid because the provision. The Supreme Court, therefore, directed the
GSIS and other respondents to cease and desist from selling the 51% shares of the
MHC to the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad, and instead to accept the matching bid
of the petitioner Manila Prince Hotel.

The rule is that (from Agpalo) in the case of doubt, the constitution should be
considered self executing rather than non self executing. Such is the case with
Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution which states that
“in grant of rights and privileges and concessions covering the national economy
and patrimony, the state shall give preference to qualified Filipino”. According to
Justice Bellosillo, ponente of the case at bar, Section 10, second paragraph,
Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory provision, a positive
command which is complete in itself and needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws to enforce it. The Court En Banc emphasized that qualified
Filipinos shall be preferred over foreigners, as mandated by the provision in
question.

Furthermore, (agpalo) in its plain ordinary meaning the term patrimony pertains
to heritage . the constitution speaks of national patrimony , it refers not only to the
natural resources of the Philippines, as the constitution could have very well used
the term natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos and
therefore an example the Manila hotel which has become a landmark a living
testimonial of Philippine heritage

The Court also reiterated how much of national pride will vanish if the nation’s
cultural heritage will fall on the hands of foreigners, and this is not to be taken
lightly as Nationalism is inherent in the concept of the Philippines being a
democratic and republican state. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Puno said that
the provision in question should be interpreted as pro-Filipino and, at the same
time, not anti-alien in itself because it does not prohibit the State from granting
rights, privileges and concessions to foreigners in the absence of qualified Filipinos.
He also argued that the petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid of
Renong Berhad because the former knew the rules of the bidding and that the
foreigners are qualified, too.
Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51 (1983)

Facts:

Petitioner was charged with the crime of rape before the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch XII. Trial was conducted and the same was concluded when the accused rested
his case on August 4, 1975. On the same date, however, the attorneys for both parties
moved for time within which to submit their respective memoranda.

On November 28, 1975, respondent judge filed with the Deputy Clerk of Court his
decision in said case for promulgation. The decision was also dated November 28,
1975.

A certification dated January 26, 1976 was executed by Postmaster Jesse A. Santos of
the Grace Park Post Office 2to the effect that registered letters Nos. 011980 and
011981, addressed to Marietta Ferrer of 9-E Mango Road, Portero, Malabon, Rizal, the
complaining witness, and Atty, Angel P. Purisima of 414 Shurdut Bldg., Intramuros,
Manila, counsel for the accused, respectively, were posted in said office on December
4, 1975. These notices were received by the respective addressees on December 8 and
9, 1975. 3
Similar notices were sent to the Provincial Fiscal of Pasig and to the Provincial Warden
of Pasig, Rizal, who both received them on December 2,1975, 4
On the date set for promulgation of the decision, counsel for accused moved for
postponement, raising for the first time the alleged loss of jurisdiction of the trial court for
failure to decide the case within 90 days from submission thereof for decision. Acceding
to counsel's request that he be given time to consider the proper remedial measure to
take, the respondent judge reset the promulgation of the decision to January 19, 1976
at 8:30 A. M.
On January 19, 1976, counsel for petitioner moved anew for the resetting of the
promulgation of decision. Granting the motion, respondent judge rescheduled the
promulgation to January 26, 1976.
Meanwhile, on January 12, 1976, counsel for the accused filed before us the present
petition. On January 16, 1976, this Court issued an Order temporarily restraining
respondent judge from promulgating the decision in Criminal Case No, C-5910.

Issue: Whether or not the period to decide provided for by the Constitution mandatory.

Ruling:

Section 11 [1], Article X of the New Constitution provides in full, to wit:

SEC. 11 [1]. Upon the effectivity of this Constitution, the maximum period within which a
case or matter shall be decided or resolved from the date of its submission, shall be
eighteen months for the Supreme court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court,
twelve months for all inferior collegiate courts, and three months for all other inferior
courts.

To date, no authoritative interpretation of the above-quoted provision has been rendered

by this Court. Thus, in approaching this novel question, We now tread upon what Mr.
Cooley characterizes as "very dangerous ground when they [referring to the courts]
venture to apply rules which distinguish directory and mandatory statutes to the
provisions of a constitution."
The established rule is that "constitutional provisions are to be construed as mandatory,
unless by express provision or by necessary implication, a different intention is
manifest."The difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often
determined on grounds of expediency, the reason being that less injury results to the
general public by disregarding than by enforcing the letter of the law.

In Trapp v. McCormick, 12 a case calling for the interpretation of a statute containing a

limitation of thirty [30] days within which a decree may be entered without the consent of
counsel, it was held that "the statutory provisions which may be thus departed from with
impunity, without affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are usually those which
relate to the mode or time of doing that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose
of the Legislature or some incident of the essential act. " Thus, in said case, the statute
under examination was construed merely to be directory.
On this view, authorities are one in saying that:
Statutes requiring the rendition of judgment forthwith or immediately after the trial or
verdict have been held by some courts to be merely directory so that non-compliance
with them does not invalidate the judgment, on the theory that if the statute had
intended such result it would clearly have indicated it." [American Tupe Founders Co. v.
Justice's Court, 133 Cal. 819, 65 Pac. 742; Heillen v. Phillips, 88 Cal. 557, 26 Pac. 366;
Drake v. Bagley, 69 Mo. App. 39, State v. Davis, 194 Mo. 585, 5 Ann. Cas. 1000, 4
L.R.A. (N.S.) 1023, 92 S.W. 484; Wissman v. Meagher, 115 Mo. App. 82, 91 S.W. 448;
Pohle v. Dickmann, 67 Mo. App. 381; Herwick v. Koken Barber Supply Co., 61 Mo. App.
454].
Such construction applies equally to the constitutional provision under consideration.
In Mikell v. School Dis. of Philadelphia, 13 it was ruled that "the legal distinction between
directory and mandatory laws is applicable to fundamental as it is to statutory laws."
To Our mind, the phraseology of the provision in question indicates that it falls within the
exception rather than the general rule. By the phrase "unless reduced by the Supreme
Court," it is evident that the period prescribed therein is subject to modification by this
Court in accordance with its prerogative under Section 5[5] of Article X of the New
Constitution to "promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts ... " And there can be no doubt that said provision, having been incorporated for
reasons of expediency, relates merely to matters of procedure. Albermarle Oil & Gas
Co. v. Morris, 14 declares that constitutional provisions are directory, and not
mandatory, where they refer to matters merely procedural.
Peralta vs. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil 285 (1945)

FACTS:
William Peralta was prosecuted for the crime of robbery and was sentenced to life
imprisonment as defined and penalized by Act No. 65 of the National Assembly of the
Republic of the Philippines.
The petition for habeas corpus is based on the contention that the Court of Special and
Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created by Ordinance No. 7 was a political
instrumentality of the military forces of Japan and which is repugnant to the aims of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines for it does not afford fair trial and impairs the
constitutional rights of the accused.

ISSUE/HELD:
- WoN the creation of court by Ordinance No. 7 valid?

a.) YES. There is no room for doubt to the validity of Ordinance No. 7 since the
criminal jurisdiction established by the invader is drawn entirely from the law
martial as defined in the usages of nations. It is merely a governmental agency.

- WoN the sentence of life imprisonment valid?

a.) YES. The sentence rendered, likewise, is good and valid since it was within
the power and competence of the belligerent occupant to promulgate Act No. 65.

- WoN the punitive sentence ceased to be valid from the time of the
restoration of Commonwealth, by virtue of the principle of posliminium?

a.) YES. All judgments of political complexion of the courts during Japanese
regime ceased to be valid upon reoccupation of the Islands, as such, the
sentence which convicted the petitioner of a crime of a political complexion must
be considered as having ceased to be valid.

United States Rules of Land Warfare provide that the belligerent occupant may promulgate such
new laws and regulations as military necessity demands, and in this class will be included those
laws which come into being as a result of military rule; that is, those which establish new crimes and
offenses incident to a state of war and are necessary for the control of the country and the protection
of the army, for the principal object of the occupant is to provide for the security of the invading army
and to contribute to its support and efficiency and the success of its operations. (Pub. 1940, pp. 76,
77.)

From the above it appears clear that it was within the power and competence of the belligerent
occupant to promulgate, through the National Assembly of the so-called Republic of the Philippines,
Act No. 65 of the said Assembly, which penalizes the crimes of robbery and other offenses by
imprisonment ranging from the maximum period of the imprisonment prescribed by the laws and
ordinances promulgated by the President of the so-called Republic as minimum, to life imprisonment
or death as maximum. Although these crimes are defined in the Revised Penal Code, they were
altered and penalized by said Act No. 65 with different and heavier penalties, as new crimes and
offenses demanded by military necessity, incident to a state of war, and necessary for the control of
the country by the belligerent occupant, the protection and safety of the army of occupation, its
support and efficiency, and the success of its operations.

They are not the same ordinary offenses penalized by the Revised Penal Code. — The criminal acts
penalized by said Act No. 65 are those committed by persons charged or connected with the
supervision and control of the production, procurement and distribution of foods and other
necessaries; and the penalties imposed upon the violators are different from and much heavier than
those provided by the Revised Penal Code for the same ordinary crimes. The acts penalized by said
Act were taken out of the territorial law or Revised Penal Code, and referred to what is called martial
law by international jurists, defined above by Hyde, in order, not only to prevent food and other
necessaries from reaching the "guerrillas" which were harassing the belligerent occupant from every
nook and corner of the country, but also to preserve the food supply and other necessaries in order
that, in case of necessity, the Imperial Japanese forces could easily requisition them, as they did,
and as they had the right to do in accordance with the law of nations for their maintenance and
subsistence (Art. LII, Sec. III, Hague Conventions of 1907). Especially taking into consideration the
fact, of which this court may take judicial notice, that the Imperial Japanese Army had depended
mostly for their supply upon the produce of this country.

The crimes penalized by Act No. 65 — as well as the crimes against national security and the law of
nations, to wit: treason, espionage, inciting war, violation of neutrality, correspondence with hostile
country, flight to enemy's country, piracy; and the crimes against public order, such as rebellion,
sedition and disloyalty, illegal possession of firearms and other, penalized by Ordinance No. 7 and
placed under jurisdiction of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction — are all of a
political complexion, because the acts constituting those offenses were punished, as are all political
offenses, for public rather than private reasons, and were acts in aid or favor of the enemy and
against the welfare, safety and security of the belligerent occupant. While it is true that these
offenses, when committed against the Commonwealth or United States Government, are defined
and also penalized by the territorial law Revised Penal Code, they became inapplicable as crimes
against the occupier upon the occupation of the Islands by the Japanese forces. And they had to be
taken out of the territorial law and made punishable by said Ordinance No. 7, for they were not
penalized before under the Revised Penal Code when committed against the belligerent occupant or
the government established by him in these Island. They are also considered by some writers as war
crimes in a broad sense. In this connection Wheaton observes the following:

"Of 'war crimes' the number is naturally indefinite, depending as they do on the acts from time to
time ordered to be done or forbidden to be done in the martial law proclamation or regulations of the
invading or occupying commander. Thus, in the Anglo-Boer war, the British military authorities
proclaimed the following to be offenses against their martial law; — Being in possession of arms,
ammunition, etc.; traveling without a permit; sending prohibited goods; holding meetings other than
those allowed; using seditious language; spreading alarmist reports; overcharging for goods;
wearing uniforms without due authority; going out of doors between certain hours; injuring military
animals or stores; being in possession, without a permit, of horses, vehicles, cycles, etc.; hindering
those in execution of military orders; trespassing on defense works. Such offenses, together with
several others, were specified in the Japanese regulations made in the Russo-Japanese war."
(Wheaton's International Law, War, seventh edition, 1944, p. 242.)

It is, therefore, evident that the sentence rendered by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal
Jurisdiction against the petitioner, imposing upon him the penalty of life imprisonment, was good and
valid, since it was within the admitted power or competence of the belligerent occupant to
promulgate the law penalizing the crime of which petitioner was convicted.
Filoteo vs. Sandiganbayan, 263 SCRA 222 (1996)
Facts:
 Petitioner Jose Filoteo Jr., a police investigator of the Western Police District,
was accused of being the mastermind of the armed hijacking of a postal delivery
van.
o 3 May 1982 in Meycauayan, Bulacan, the Postal Delivery Truck of the
Bureau of Postal (driven by Miranda, Bautista and Tagudar) was stopped,
and the suspects (later identified as Frias, Liwanag, Mendoza and
Saguindel) took with them the truck, SSS Medicare checks and vouchers,
SSS Pension checks and vouchers, treasury warrants, and several mail
matters from abroad.
o The van was recovered at La Loma, Quezon City the following day,
although some checks and warrants were missing.
 The Special Operations Group (SOG) of the Philippine Constabulary received a
tip from a civilian that two persons were looking for buyers of stolen checks. The
SOG, led by Capt. Ferrer and Lt. Pagdilao arranged a meeting with the persons
and confronted them regarding the investigation, assuring Frias that his penalty
will be mitigated if he cooperated. He then led Ferrer to Perez and Mendoza, who
also pointed to Liwanag and Mateo. Liwanag, Mateo, Perez and Mendoza all
pointed to the petitioner as mastermind.
 Filoteo admitted involvement in the crime and pointed to three other soldiers as
confederates (Saguindel, Relator and Miravalles). The petitioner executed 2
documents on May 30, 1982, (1) that he was apprised of his constitutional rights
under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, and his waiver of the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code (including his right to
counsel) and (2) that he voluntarily surrendered the checks and vouchers to the
SOG. In a sworn statement in Tagalog (without any counsel), he admitted to full
knowledge and participation in the crime.
 However, in his own defense, he stated that he only knew Mateo (and not the
others) because Mateo was an informer who was paid from time to time by the
police intelligence. He said he was in Lakan Beer House for a friend’s birthday on
May 3, 1982 from 3:30-5 and then 6-8 (the friend and beer house owner also
testified seeing him there). He also said that the SOG refused to give any reason
when they arrested him on May 29, and that nobody apprised him of his
constitutional rights. He claimed that he was repeatedly coaxed to admit his
participation in the hijacking and was made to sign the sworn statement under
duress (he was allegedly electrocuted and “water cured”).
 The Respondent Court found Filoteo guilty for brigandage (PD 532) and
sentenced to twelve years and one day to thirteen years, one month and
eleven days of reclusion temporal. He filed a motion for reconsideration but
was denied. He made an instant alternative petition for certiorari charging the
Sandiganbayan with having abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and with reversible error.

ISSUE/HELD:
- WoN Art III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution can be applied
retroactively?

a.) No. Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution cannot be applied retroactively.

Article 4 of the Civil Code which states that "(l)aws shall have no
retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided," the principle of
prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, shall apply to judicial
decisions, which, although in themselves are not laws, are nevertheless
evidence of what the law means
Article 22 of the RPC provides that "(p)enal laws shall have a retroactive
effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual
criminal,"
b.) What is being construed here is a constitutional provision specifically
contained in the Bill of Rights which is obviously not a penal statute.
A Bill of Rights is a declaration and enumeration of the individual rights
and privileges which the Constitution is designed to protect against
violations by the government, or by individuals or groups of individuals. It is
a charter of liberties for the individual and a limitation upon the power of the
state.
Penal laws, on the other hand, strictly and properly are those imposing
punishment for an offense committed against the state which the executive
of the state has the power to pardon. In other words, a penal law denotes
punishment imposed and enforced by the state for a crime or offense
against its law.
Tolentino vs. Secretary, supra (construction of Sec. 24, Art. VI, Constitution)

Facts:
The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and
properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the
tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the
National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits challenging the
constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.
One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact
the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is
also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required by the
Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution
Ruling:
The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis.
To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution
to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute
and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment
of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the
Senate’s power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose
amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing
revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills
and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the
theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be
expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the
Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its
receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld
pending receipt of the House bill.
The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on
separate days as required by the Constitution because the second and third readings
were done on the same day. But this was because the President had certified S. No.
1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of
printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a
bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and
distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice.
(RULING from Agpalo) Statute: No bill shall be passed by either House shall become a
law unless it has passed 3 readings on separate days, & printed copies thereof in its
final form have been distributed to its Members 3 days before its passage, except when
the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public
calamity or emergency.
It qualifies only its nearest antecedent, which is the distribution of the printed bill in its
final form 3 days from its final passage & not the 3 readings on separate days.
Luz Farms vs. Secretary of DAR, 192 SCRA 51 (1990)

FACTS:
 In 1988, RA 6657 was approved by the President of the Philippines. It includes
the raising of livestock, poultry, and swine in its coverage.
 In 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the IRR of Secs. 11, 13,
and 39 of the said law.
 Luz Farms is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business
allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of some provisions
of CARP.
 Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A. 6657, insofar as they are
made to apply to it:
a) Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)" in the
definition of "Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity.
b) Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as "private agricultural lands
devoted to commercial, livestock, poultry and swine raising . . ."
c) Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing plan.
d) Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the
authority to summarily determine the just compensation to be paid for lands
covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
e) Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan mentioned in Section
13
f) ". . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross sales from the production of
such lands are distributed within sixty (60) days of the end of the fiscal year
as compensation to regular and other farmworkers in such lands over and
above the compensation they currently receive xxx

ISSUE/HELD:
- WON the CARL should include the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in
its coverage?
a.) NO. Sec. 3 (b) and Sec. 11 of RA 6657 are unconstitutional in so far as they
include lands devoted to raising livestock, swine and poultry within its coverage.

The use of land is incidental to but not the principal factor or consideration
of productivity in this industry. It was never the intention of the framers of
the Constitution to include the livestock and poultry industry in the
coverage of the agrarian reform program of the government.

b.) The intention of the Committee was to limit the application of the word
“agriculture”.

Thus, Section II of RA 6657 which includes “private agricultural lands

devoted to commercial livestock, poultry, and swine raising” in the definition
of “commercial farms” is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-
industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program
of the State.
The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on
the meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the
intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry
industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform
program of the Government.
The Committee adopted the definition of "agricultural land" as defined under
Section 166 of R.A. 3844, as laud devoted to any growth, including but not limited
to crop lands, saltbeds, fishponds, idle and abandoned land (Record, CONCOM,
August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p. 11).
The intention of the Committee is to limit the application of the word
"agriculture." Commissioner Jamir proposed to insert the word "ARABLE" to
distinguish this kind of agricultural land from such lands as commercial and
industrial lands and residential properties because all of them fall under the
general classification of the word "agricultural". This proposal, however, was not
considered because the Committee contemplated that agricultural lands are
limited to arable and suitable agricultural lands and therefore, do not include
commercial, industrial and residential lands (Record, CONCOM, August 7, 1986,
Vol. III, p. 30).

- WON the requirement in Sections 13 and 32 of RA 6657 directing

“corporate farms” to execute and implement “production-sharing plans” is
unreasonable for being confiscatory and violative of due process, with
respect to livestock and poultry raisers?
a.) YES. As there is no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the
coverage of agrarian reform, there is no need to call upon them to distribute from
3% of their gross sales and 10% of their net profits to their workers as additional
compensation.

- WON the assailed provisions violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. (Separate Opinion: Sarmiento, J.)
a.) (Separate Opinion) NO. Substantial distinctions exist between land directed
purely to cultivation and harvesting of fruits or crops and land exclusively used for
livestock, poultry and swine raising that make real differences:
a. There are no tenants nor landlords in livestock and poultry businesses;
b. Livestock and poultry do not sprout from land;
c. Land is not a primary resource;
d. Livestock and poultry production are industrial activities;
e. Livestock and poultry farmworkers are covered by minimum wage law
rather than by tenancy law.
Montejo vs. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 415 (1995)

Facts:

Petitioner Cerilo Roy Montejo, representative of the first district of Leyte, pleads for the
annulment of Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736, redistricting certain municipalities in
Leyte, on the ground that it violates the principle of equality of representation.

The province of Leyte with the cities of Tacloban and Ormoc is composed of 5 districts.
The 3rd district is composed of: Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Calubian,
Culaba, Kawayan, Leyte, Maripipi, Naval, San Isidro, Tabango and Villaba.

Biliran, located in the 3rd district of Leyte, was made its subprovince by virtue of
Republic Act No. 2141 Section 1 enacted on 1959. Said section spelled out the
municipalities comprising the subprovince: Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran,
Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi and Naval and all the territories comprised therein.

On 1992, the Local Government Code took effect and the subprovince of Biliran
became a regular province. (The conversion of Biliran into a regular province was
approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite.) As a consequence of the
conversion, eight municipalities of the 3rd district composed the new province of Biliran.
A further consequence was to reduce the 3rd district to five municipalities (underlined
above) with a total population of 146,067 as per the 1990 census.

To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution of inhabitants, voters and

municipalities in the province of Leyte, respondent COMELEC held consultation
meetings with the incumbent representatives of the province and other interested
parties and on December 29, 1994, it promulgated the assailed resolution where,
among others, it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the 2nd district and the
municipality of Palompon of the 4th district to the 3rd district of Leyte.

Issue:

Whether the unprecedented exercise by the COMELEC of the legislative power of

redistricting and reapportionment is valid or not.

Held:

Section 1 of Resolution no. 2736 is annulled and set aside.

The deliberations of the members of the Constitutional Commission shows that

COMELEC was denied the major power of legislative apportionment as it itself
exercised the power. Regarding the first elections after the enactment of the 1987
constitution, it is the Commission who did the reapportionment of the legislative districts
and for the subsequent elections, the power was given to the Congress.
Also, respondent COMELEC relied on the ordinance appended to the 1987 constitution
as the source of its power of redistricting which is traditionally regarded as part of the
power to make laws. Said ordinance states that:

Section 2: The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make minor

adjustments to the reapportionment herein made.”

Section 3 : Any province that may hereafter be created…The number of Members

apportioned to the province out of which such new province was created or where the
city, whose population has so increases, is geographically located shall be
correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such adjustment shall not
be made within one hundred and twenty days before the election.

Minor adjustments does not involve change in the allocations per district. Examples
include error in the correct name of a particular municipality or when a municipality in
between which is still in the territory of one assigned district is forgotten. And consistent
with the limits of its power to make minor adjustments, section 3 of the Ordinance did
not also give the respondent COMELEC any authority to transfer municipalities from
one legislative district to another district. The power granted by section 3 to the
respondent is to adjust the number of members (not municipalities.)

Notes:

Petitioner also prayed for the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa from the 1st district to
the 2nd district. It is likewise denied.
Galman vs. Pamaran, 138 SCRA 294 (1985)

FACTS:
•Former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., an opposition stalwart was gunned down to
death when he returned to the country after a long-sojourn abroad.
•As a result, PD 1886 was promulgated to create an ad hoc Fact Finding Board known
as the ‘Agrava Board.’ The Board conducted public hearings wherein various witnesses
appeared and testified and/or produced documentary and other evidence either in
obedience to a subpoena or in response to an invitation issued by the Board.
•Among the witnesses who appeared, testified, and produced evidence were the private
respondents.
•Two reports were submitted to President Ferdinand E. Marcos, which were turned over
to the Tanodbayan for appropriate action. The Tanodbayan then filed with the
Sandiganbayan two informations for MURDER against the private respondents – one
for the killing of Ninoy Aquino and another for the killing of Rolando Galman, who was
found dead not far from Aquino’s body.
•The Prosecution represented by the Office of the Tanodbayan, marked and offered as
part of its evidence the individual testimonies of private respondents before the Agrava
Board. Private respondents objected to the admission of said exhibits.
•Private respondents filed a formal “Motion to Exclude Testimonies before the Fact
Finding Board as Evidence against (them)” contending that its admission will be in
derogation of their constitutional right against self-incrimination and violative of the
immunity granted by PD 1886.
•When the private respondents were summoned and gave their testimonies before the
Agrava Board, they were denied the right to remain silent. They were compelled to
testify or be witness against themselves. Section 5 of PD 1886 left them with no choice;
they have to take the stand, testify or produce evidence, under pain of contempt if they
failed or refused to do so.
•Both these constitutional rights (to remain silent and not to be compelled to be a
witness against himself) were right away totally foreclosed by P.D. 1886.
ISSUE/HELD:
- WoN the right to remain silent is available only to a person undergoing
custodial interrogation?

a.) NO. Based on jurisprudence, it has been categorically declared that a person
detained for the commission of an offense undergoing investigation has a right
to be informed of his right to remain silent, to counsel, and to an
admonition that any and all statements to be given by him may be used
against him.
However, there has been no pronouncement in any of these cases nor in
any other that a person similarly undergoing investigation for the
commission of an offense, if not detained, is not entitled to the
constitutional admonition mandated by said Section 20, Art. IV of the Bill of
Rights.
b.) The fact that the framers of our Constitution did not choose to use the term
"custodial" by having it inserted between the words "under" and investigation", as
in fact the sentence opens with the phrase "any person " goes to prove that they
did not adopt in toto the entire fabric of the Miranda doctrine.
The privilege against self- incrimination is guaranteed in the Fifth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution. In the Philippines, the same
principle obtains as a direct result of American influence.
1.) At first, the provision in our organic laws were similar to the
Constitution of the United States and was as follows: “That no
person shall be ... compelled in a criminal case to be a witness
against himself.”
2.) As now worded, Section 20 of Article IV (Exclusionary Rule)
reads: “No person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself.”
3.) The deletion of the phrase "in a criminal case" makes the
said provision also applicable to cases other than criminal. The
right "not to be compelled to silence and refuse to take the witness
stand. Their right and privilege (which is not self-executory or
automatic ipso jure) was, while testifying, whether voluntarily or by
subpoena, to invoke the privilege and refuse to answer as and when
a question calling for an incriminating answer is propounded. Failure
to invoke the privilege which is personal does automatically result in
its loss ipso facto.
Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil 567 (1950), dissent of J. Ozaeta

Facts: The 1935 Constitution provides in its Article VIII, Section 9, that the members of
the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts “shall receive such compensation as
may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office”. It
also provides that “until Congress shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court shall receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos, and
each Associate Justice, fifteen thousand pesos”. When Justice Perfecto assumed office,
Congress had not “provided otherwise”, by fixing a different salary for associate justices.
He received salary at the rate provided by the Constitution, i.e., fifteen thousand pesos
a year.

The Collector of Internal Revenue required Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay income tax
upon his salary as member of the judiciary. The latter paid the amount under
protest. He contended that the assessment was illegal, his salary not being taxable for
the reason that imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of the
Constitution.

Issue: Whether the imposition of an income tax upon the salary of a member of the
Judiciary amount to a diminution thereof., and thus violate the Constitution.

Held: The imposition of an income tax upon the salary of a member of the judiciary
amounts to a diminution thereof. If said imposition would not be considered as a
diminution, it would appear that, in the matter of compensation and power and need of
security, the judiciary is on a par with the Executive. Such assumption certainly ignores
the prevailing state of affairs. Further, the Constitution provides that judges shall hold
their offices during good behavior, and shall at stated times receive for their services a
compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. Thus,
next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the
judges than a fixed provision for their support. In the general course of human nature, a
power over a man’s subsistence amounts to a power over his will. The independence of
the judges as of far greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing
their salaries.

Exemption of the judicial salary from reduction by taxation is not really a gratuity or
privilege. It is essentially and primarily compensation based upon valuable
consideration. The covenant on the part of the government is a guaranty whose
fulfillment is as much as part of the consideration agreed as is the money salary. The
undertaking has its own particular value to the citizens in securing the independence of
the judiciary in crises; and in the establishment of the compensation upon a permanent
foundation whereby judicial preferment may be prudently accepted by those who are
qualified by talent, knowledge, integrity and capacity, but are not possessed of such a
private fortune as to make an assured salary an object of personal concern. On the
other hand, the members of the judiciary relinquish their position at the bar, with all its
professional emoluments, sever their connection with their clients, and dedicate
themselves exclusively to the discharge of the onerous duties of their high office. So, it
is irrefutable that the guaranty against a reduction of salary by the imposition of a tax is
not an exemption from taxation in the sense of freedom from a burden or service to
which others are liable. The exemption for a public purpose or a valid consideration is
merely a nominal exemption, since the valid and full consideration or the public purpose
promoted is received in the place of the tax.

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment.

J. Ozaeta Dissent:

ISSUE/HELD:
- WoN the salaries of the judges, the members of the Commission on Elections,
the Auditor General, and the President of the Philippines are immune from
taxation?
a.) NO. It would be a strained and unreasonable construction of the prohibition against
diminution to read into it an exemption from taxation.
There is no justification for the belief or assumption that the framers of the
Constitution intended to exempt the salaries of said officers from taxes. They
knew that it was and is the unavoidable duty of every citizen to bear his aliquot
share of the cost of maintaining the Government; that taxes are the very blood
that sustains the life of the Government.
To make all citizens share the burden of taxation equitably, the Constitution
expressly provides that "the rule of taxation shall be uniform." (Section 22
[1], Article VI.) We think it would be a contravention of this provision to read
into the prohibition against diminution of the salaries of the judges and
other specified officers an exemption from taxes on their salaries. How
could the rule of income taxation be uniform if it should not be applied to a
group of citizens in the same situation as other income earners ?

The first income tax law of the Philippines was Act No. 2833, which was approved
on March 7, 1919, to take effect on January 1, 1920. Section 1 (a) of said Act
provided:
“There shall be levied, assessed, collected, and paid annually upon the
entire net income received in the preceding calendar year from all sources
by every individual, a citizen or resident of the Philippine Islands, a tax of
two per centum upon such income. . . . (Emphasis ours.)”

Section 2 (a) of said Act provided:

 “Subject only to such exemptions and deductions as are hereinafter
allowed, the taxable net income of a person shall include gains, profits, and
income derived from salaries, wages or compensation for personal service
of whatever kind and is whatever form paid, or from professions, vocations,
businesses, trade, commerce, sales, or dealings in property, whether real
or personal, growing out of the ownership or use of or interest in real or
personal property, also from interest, rent, dividends, securities, or the
transaction of any business carried on for gain or profit, or gains, profits,
and income derived from any source whatever.”

That income tax law has been amended several times, specially as to the rates of
the tax, but the above-quoted provisions (except as to the rate) have been
preserved intact in the subsequent Acts.
The present income tax law is Title II of the National Internal Revenue
Code, Commonwealth Act No. 466, sections 21, 28 and 29 of which
incorporate the texts of the above-quoted provisions of the original Act in
exactly the same language. There can be no dispute whatsoever that
judges (who are individuals) and their salaries (which are income) are as
clearly comprehended within the above-quoted provisions of the law as if
they were specifically mentioned therein; and in fact all judges had been
and were paying income tax on their salaries when the Constitution of the
Philippines was discussed and approved by the Constitutional Convention
and when it was submitted to the people for confirmation in the plebiscite of
May 14, 1935.

Now, the (1943) Constitution provides that the members of the Supreme Court
and all judges of inferior courts "shall receive such compensation as may be fixed
by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office." (Section
9, Article VIII, emphasis ours.)
A constitutional provision must be presumed to have been framed
and adopted in the light and understanding of prior and existing laws
and with reference to them.
The salaries provided in the Constitution for the Chief Justice and each
associate Justice, respectively, of the Supreme Court were the same
salaries which they were receiving at the time the 1945 Constitution was
framed and adopted and on which they were paying income tax under the
existing income tax law.
It seems clear to us that for them to receive the same salaries, subject to the
same tax, after the adoption of the 1945 Constitution as before does not
involve any diminution at all.
The fact that the plaintiff was not a member of the Court when the
Constitution took effect, makes no difference. The salaries of justices and
judges were subject to income tax when he was appointed in the early part
of 1945. In fact he must have declared and paid income tax on his salary
for 1945 — he claimed exemption only beginning 1946.

It seems likewise clear that when the framers of the Constitution fixed those
salaries, they must have taken into consideration that the recipients were
paying income tax thereon.
There was no necessity to provide expressly that said salaries shall be
subject to income tax because they knew that already so provided. On the
other hand, if exemption from any tax on said salaries had been intended, it
would have been specifically to so provide, instead of merely saying that
the compensation as fixed "shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office."
De Los Santos vs. Mallare, 87 Phil 289 (1950)

Facts: Eduardo de los Santos, the petitioner, was appointed City Engineer of Baguio on
July 16, 1946, by the President, appointment which was confirmed by the Commission
on Appointments on August 6, and on the 23rd of that month, he qualified for and began
to exercise the duties and functions of the position. On June 1, 1950, Gil R. Mallare was
extended an ad interim-appointment by the President to the same position, after which,
on June 3, the Undersecretary of the Department of Public Works and Communications
directed Santos to report to the Bureau of Public Works for another assignment. Santos
refused to vacate the office, and when the City Mayor and the other officials named as
Mallare's co-defendants ignored him and paid Mallare the salary corresponding to the
position, he commenced these proceedings.

Issue: Whether or not the removal of the petitioner from his present position for
assignment to another position violates Section 4, Article XII of the 1935 Constitution
which provides that "No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause as provided by law."

Ruling: Section 1 of this Article ordains: "A Civil Service embracing all branches and
subdivisions of the Government shall be provided by law. Appointments in the Civil
Service, except as to those which are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly
technical in nature, shall be made only according to merit and fitness, to be determined
as far as practicable by competitive examination." The first clause is a definition of the
scope of Civil Service, the men and women which Section 4 protects. It seems obvious
from that definition that the entire Civil Service is contemplated, except positions "which
are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature." This theory is
confirmed by the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 177 on November 30, 1936, to
implement Article XII of the Constitution. Commonwealth Act No. 177 explains Civil
Service almost in the identical words of that Article of the organic law.

The office of city engineer is neither primarily confidential, policy-determining, nor highly
technical. A confidential position denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the
appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom
of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of
personal trust or confidential matters of state. Nor is the position of city engineer policy-
determining. A city engineer does not formulate a method of action for the government
or any of its subdivisions. His job is to execute policy, not to make it. With specific
reference to the City Engineer of Baguio, his powers and duties are carefully laid down
for him be section 2557 of the Revised Administrative Code and are essentially
ministerial in character. Finally, the position of city engineer is technical but not highly
so. A city engineer is not required nor is he supposed to possess a technical skill or
training in the supreme or superior degree, which is the sense in which "highly
technical" is employed in the Constitution. There are hundreds of technical men in the
classified civil service whose technical competence is not lower than that of a city
engineer. As a matter of fact, the duties of a city engineer are eminently administrative
in character and could very well be discharged by non-technical men possessing
executive ability.

As a contemporaneous construction, this Act affords an index to the meaning of Civil

Service as conceived by the framers of the Constitution. "The principle of
contemporaneous construction may be applied to the construction given by the
legislature to the constitutional provisions dealing with legislative powers and procedure.
Though not conclusive, such interpretation is generally conceded as being entitled to
great weight."

Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution declares that "All laws of the Philippine
Islands shall continue in force until the inauguration of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines; thereafter, such laws shall remain operative, unless
inconsistent with this Constitution
, until amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the Congress of the Philippines, . . . ."
Sec. 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that “He (Governor
-General now President) may remove at pleasure any of the said appointive officers." It
is incompatible with the constitutional inhibition that "No officer or employee in the Civil
Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law." The two
provisions are mutually repugnant and absolutely irreconcilable. One in express terms
permits what the other in similar terms prohibits. The Constitution leaves it to the
Congress to provide for the cause of removal, and it is suggested that the President's
pleasure is itself a cause. The phrase "for cause" in connection with the removals of
public officers has acquired a well-defined concept. "It means for reasons which the law
and sound public policy recognized as sufficient warrant for removal, that is, legal
cause, and not merely causes which the appointing power in the exercise of discretion
may deem sufficient. It is implied that officers may not be removed at the mere will of
those vested with the power of removal, or without any cause. Moreover, the cause
must relate to and affect the administration of the office, and must be restricted to
something of a substantial nature directly affecting the rights and interests of the public."

We therefore hold that the petitioner is entitled to remain in office as City Engineer of
Baguio with all the emoluments, rights and privileges appurtenant thereto, until he
resigns or is removed for cause, and that respondent Mallare's appointment is
ineffective in so far as it may adversely affect those emoluments, rights and privileges
Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil 192 (1946)

FACTS:

- May 25, 1946, a pendum resolution was submitted ordering the following candidates: Jose O. Vera, Ramon
Diokno and Jose E. Romero to their seats as members of chamber. Furthermore, they should not swear into
office for their success on the elections was not proposed to be invalid. The resolution was passed by their
constituents who questioned the validity of the votes they garnered.

- It was reported that during the National Elections, provinces of Nueva Ecija, Pampanga, Tarlac and Bulacan
was under terrorism. Moreover, the election returns of the said provinces were null or void for they believe that
the great majority of voters were coerced or intimidated, suffered from the paralysis of judgement, the people
were deprived of their right to suffrage.

- The ballot boxes from Nueva Ecija were stolen by armed bands in the barrios of municipalities of Bongabon,
Gapan, Sta. Rosa and Guimba.

- Many residents of the four provinces have voluntarily banished themselves from their home towns to avoid
being victimized or losing their lives. Moreover, bodies were found with notes attacked to their necks “Bumoto
kami kay Roxas” after the election.

ISSUE/HELD:

- WoN the SC has the power to intervene with the petition?

a.) NO. The SC refused to intervene with the petition as the Court has no actual jurisdiction over the case.
This had already been established in the case of Alejandrino vs Quezon. It is also alleged that in the
ruling of Angara vs Electoral Commission, this has been modified. This is not true, however, as the Court
specifically cited the Alejandrino Doctrine in Angara to justify their lack of jurisdiction over the said case.

According to the Constitution, there should be separation of powers within the three branches. Each
independent from each other and each has specific roles to perform.

The role of the judiciary is to foresee that the laws are properly delivered to the society and that these
laws are constitutional.

Furthermore, the SC held that the case was not a contest and affirmed the inherent right of the
legislature to determine who shall be admitted to its membership.

- WoN the petitioners Vera, Diokno, and Romero should be deferred to seat as members of the
chamber?

a.) YES. The SC dismissed the case for as mentioned above, the legislative has the power to determine who
shall be admitted to its membership.

No man or group of men is permitted to profit from the results of an election held under coercion, in
violation of law and contrary to the principle of freedom of choice.