Evidence

Cases on Anti Wire Tapping Law

1. Gaanan v IAC
Facts:
 In the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the living room
of complainant’s residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed with
the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico
 After they had decided on the proposed conditions, complainant made a telephone call to Laconico
 That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer to come to his office and advise him on the settlement
of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip
 According to the request, appellant went to the office of Laconico where he was briefed about the problem
 When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a
telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement
 Appellant heard complainant enumerate the following conditions for withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault:
1. The P5,000.00 was no longer acceptable, and that the figure had been increased to P8,000.00. A breakdown of the
P8,000.00 had been made together with other demands, to wit: (a) P5,000.00 no longer for the teacher Manuel
Montebon, but for Atty. Pintor himself in persuading his client to withdraw the case for Direct Assault against Atty.
Laconico before the Cebu City Fiscal’s Office
2. Public apology to be made by Atty. Laconico before the students of Don Bosco Technical High School
3. P1,000.00 to be given to the Don Bosco Faculty club
4. Transfer of son of Atty. Laconico to another school or another section of Don Bosco Technical High School
5. Affidavit of desistance by Atty. Laconico on the Maltreatment case earlier filed against Manuel Montebon at the
Cebu City Fiscal’s Office, whereas Montebon’s affidavit of desistance on the Direct Assault Case against Atty.
Laconico to be filed later
6. Allow Manuel Montebon to continue teaching at the Don Bosco Technical School
7. Not to divulge the truth about the settlement of the Direct Assault Case to the mass media
8. P2,000.00 attorney’s fees for Atty. Pintor
 Twenty minutes later, complainant called up again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions.
 Laconico answered `Yes’
 Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions on where to deliver the money
 Complainant called again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the office of the then Department of Public
Highways
 Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary,
insisted that complainant himself should receive the money
 When he received the money at the Igloo Restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary
 Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal
of the case for direct assault
 Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant
 Since appellant listened to the telephone conversation without complainant’s consent, complainant charged appellant and
Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act
 The lower court found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200, which prompted
petitioner to appeal
 The IAC affirmed with modification hence the present petition for certiorari.
Issue: WON an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to overhear a private
conversation would constitute unlawful interception of communications between the two parties using a telephone line

Ruling:
 NO
 Because of technical problems caused by the sensitive nature of electronic equipment and the extra heavy loads which
telephone cables are made to carry in certain areas, telephone users often encounter what are called "crossed lines." An
unwary citizen who happens to pick up his telephone and who overhears the details of a crime might hesitate to inform police
authorities if he knows that he could be accused under Rep. Act 4200 of using his own telephone to secretly overhear the
private communications of the would be criminals. Surely the law was never intended for such mischievous results

 The main issue in the resolution of this petition, however, revolves around the meaning of the phrase "any other device or
arrangement." Is an extension of a telephone unit such a device or arrangement as would subject the user to imprisonment
ranging from six months to six years with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification for a public officer or
 deportation for an alien? Private secretaries with extension lines to their bosses’ telephones are sometimes asked to use
answering or recording devices to record business conversations between a boss and another businessman. Would
transcribing a recorded message for the use of the boss be a proscribed offense? Or for that matter, would a "party line" be
a device or arrangement under the law?

 The petitioner contends that telephones or extension telephones are not included in the enumeration of "commonly known"
listening or recording devices, nor do they belong to the same class of enumerated electronic devices contemplated by law.
He maintains that in 1964, when Senate Bill No. 9 (later Rep. Act No. 4200) was being considered in the Senate, telephones
and extension telephones were already widely used instruments, probably the most popularly known communication device.

 Whether or not listening over a telephone party line would be punishable was discussed on the floor of the Senate. Yet, when
the bill was finalized into a statute, no mention was made of telephones in the enumeration of devices "commonly known as
a dictaphone or dictagraph, detectaphone or walkie talkie or tape recorder or however otherwise described." The omission
was not a mere oversight. Telephone party lines were intentionally deleted from the provisions of the Act.

 The respondent People argue that an extension telephone is embraced and covered by the term "device" within the context
of the aforementioned law because it is not a part or portion of a complete set of a telephone apparatus. It is a separate
device and distinct set of a movable apparatus consisting of a wire and a set of telephone receiver not forming part of a main
telephone set which can be detached or removed and can be transferred away from one place to another and to be plugged
or attached to a main telephone line to get the desired communication coming from the other party or end.

 The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the purpose of secretly overhearing,
intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the
deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.

Application:
 An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated
in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. The
telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is
a rule in statutory construction that in order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases
of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. (see Commissioner of Customs v. Esso Estandard Eastern, Inc., 66 SCRA
113, 120).

 In the case of Empire Insurance Company v. Rufino (90 SCRA 437, 443-444), we ruled:

o "Likewise, Article 1372 of the Civil Code stipulates that `however general the terms of a contract may be, they shall
not be understood to comprehend things that are distinct and cases that are different from those upon which the
parties intended to agree.’ Similarly, Article 1374 of the same Code provides that ‘the various stipulations of a
contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of them
taken jointly.’

x x x

o "Consequently, the phrase `all liabilities or obligations of the decedent’ used in paragraph 5(c) and 7(d) should be
then restricted only to those listed in the Inventory and should not be construed as to comprehend all other
obligations of the decedent. The rule that `particularization followed by a general expression will ordinarily be
restricted to the former’ is based on the fact in human experience that usually the minds of parties are addressed
specially to the particularization, and that the generalities, though broad enough to comprehend other fields if they
stood alone, are used in contemplation of that upon which the minds of the parties are centered. (Hoffman v. Eastern
Wisconsin R., etc., Co., 134 Wis. 603, 607; 115 NW 383, cited in Francisco, Revised Rules of Court (Evidence), 1973
ed., pp. 180-181."cralaw virtua1aw library

 Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not exclusive to that enumerated therein,
should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which would
be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be
presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their
purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone conversation.
  An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when the extended unit does not have to be
connected by wire to the main telephone but can be moved from place to place within a radius of a kilometer or more. A
person should safely presume that the party he is calling at the other end of the line probably has an extension telephone
and he runs the risk of a third party listening as in the case of a party line or a telephone unit which shares its line with
another. As was held in the case of Rathbun v. United States (355, U.S. 107, 2 L Ed 2d 137-138):

o "Common experience tells us that a call to a particular telephone number may cause the bell to ring in more than
one ordinarily used instrument. Each party to a telephone conversation takes the risk that the other party may have
an extension telephone and may allow another to overhear the conversation. When such takes place there has been
no violation of any privacy of which the parties may complain. Consequently, one element of 605, interception, has
not occurred."

 In the same case, the Court further ruled that the conduct of the party would differ in no way if instead of repeating the
message he held out his hand-set so that another could hear out of it and that there is no distinction between that sort of
action and permitting an outsider to use an extension telephone for the same purpose.

 Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. Thus, in case of doubt
as in the case at bar, on whether or not an extension telephone is included in the phrase "device or arrangement", the penal
statute must be construed as not including an extension telephone. In the case of People v. Purisima, 86 SCRA 542, 562, we
explained the rationale behind the rule:

o "American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to be `the tenderness of the law of the rights of
individuals; the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion
of the court limited. (United States v. Harris, 177 US 305, 44 L Ed 780, 20 S Ct 609; Braffith v. Virgin Islands (CA3) 26
F2d 646; Caudill v. State, 224 Ind 531, 69 NE2d 549; Jennings v. Commonwealth, 109 VA 821, 63 SE 1080, all cited in
73 Am Jur 2d 452.) The purpose is not to enable a guilty person to escape punishment through a technicality but to
provide a precise definition of forbidden acts." (State v. Zazzaro, 20 A 2d 737, quoted in Martin’s Handbook on
Statutory Construction, Rev. Ed. pp. 183-184)."cralaw virtua1aw library

 In the same case of Purisima, we also ruled that in the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure, the primary
rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records will show
that not only did our lawmakers not contemplate the inclusion of an extension telephone as a prohibited "device or
arrangement" but of greater importance, they were more concerned with penalizing the act of recording than the act of
merely listening to a telephone conversation.

 It can be readily seen that our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment, persons such as government
authorities or representatives of organized groups from installing devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or to
intimidate, blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over the telephone users. Consequently, the mere act of listening,
in order to be punishable must strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA No. 4200 or others of similar nature.
We are of the view that an extension telephone is not among such devices or arrangements.

2. Ramirez v. CA

Facts:
 A civil case for damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the
private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter’s office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a
“hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and personality, “contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy.”
 In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event
 The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.
 As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal,
private respondent filed a criminal case before the RTC for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to prohibit and
penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes.”
 RTC decision:
o Granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that:
1. The facts charged do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and
 2. The violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to the taping of a communication by person other than a
participant to the communication
 CA decision:
o Rules that the allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 of R.A. 4200
 Petitioner Ramirez’ arguments:
o Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation.
o She contends that the provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private conversation by a party other
than those involved in the communication.
o That the substance or content of the conversation must be alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts charged
would not constitute a violation of R.A. 4200.
o That R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a “private communication,” not a “private conversation” and that
consequently, her act of secretly taping her conversation with private respondent was not illegal under the said act

MAIN Issue:
Does RA 4200 apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation?

Ruling:
 YES
 First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute.
 Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and
interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead
to an injustice
 Section 1 of R.A. 4200 provides:
o It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken
word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or
record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a Dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described
 The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any
private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder.
 The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or
different from those involved in the private communication.
 The statute’s intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier
“any.”
 Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, “even a (person) privy to a communication who records
his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator” under this provision of
R.A. 4200
 A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court’s conclusion that in enacting R.A.
4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or
communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third persons

Sub-Issue
WON the substance of the conversation should be alleged in the information

Ruling:
 NO
 What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications by means
of the devices enumerated therein.
 The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private recorder would suffice to constitute an offense
under Section 1 of R.A. 4200.
 As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court:
o Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation,
as well as its communication to a third person should be professed.

Sub-Issue no. 2:
WON “private communication” in RA 4200 include “private conversation”

Ruling:
 OBVIOSOULY YES
  The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning “to share or to impart.”
 In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the
“process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as language
signs or gestures)”
 These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of “meanings or
thoughts” which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and
private respondent, in the privacy of the latter’s office.
 Any doubts about the legislative body’s meaning of the phrase “private communication” are, furthermore, put to rest by the
fact that the terms conversation and communication were interchangeably used by Senator Tanada in his Explanatory Note
to the bill

3. NAVARRO vs CA, August 26, 1999

Facts:

 At around 8:40 in the evening of February 4, 1990, Stanley Jalbuena and Enrique "Ike" Lingan, who were reporters of the
radio station DWTI in Lucena, together with one Mario Ilagan, went to the Entertainment City following reports that it was
showing the nude dancers.
o After the three had seated themselves at a table and ordered beer, a scantily clad dancer appeared on stage and
began to perform a strip act. As she removed her brassieres, Jalbuena brought out his camera and took a picture.
 At that point, the floor manager, Dante Liquin, with a security guard, Alex Sioco, approached Jalbuena and demanded to
know why he took a picture. Jalbuena replied: "Wala kang pakialam, because this is my job."
o When Jalbuena saw that Sioco was about to pull out his gun, he ran out of the joint followed by his companions.
 Jalbuena and his companions went to the police station to report the matter.
o Three of the policeman on duty, including petitioner Navarro, were having drinks in front of the police station, and
they asked Jalbuena and his companions to join them.
o Jalbuena declined and went to the desk officer, Sgt. Añonuevo, to report the incident. In a while, Liquin and Sioco
arrived on a motorcycle.
 Sioco and Liquin were met by petitioner Navarro who talked with them in a corner for around fifteen minutes.
o Afterwards, petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena and, pushing him to the wall, said to him: "Putang ina, kinakalaban
mo si Kabo Liquin, anak yan ni Kabo Liquin, hindi mo ba kilala?"
o Petitioner Navarro then pulled out his firearm and cocked it, and, pressing it on the face of Jalbuena, said "Ano,
uutasin na kita?"
o At this point, Lingan intervened and said to petitioner Navarro: "Huwag namang ganyan pumarito kami para magpa-
blotter, I am here to mediate."
 Petitoner Navarro replied: "Walang press, press, mag-sampu pa kayo." He then turned to Sgt. Añonuevo and told him to make
of record the behavior of Jalbuena and Lingan.
o This angered Lingan, who said: "O, di ilagay mo diyan"
o Petitioner Navarro retorted: "Talagang ilalagay ko." The two then had a heated exchange. Finally, Lingan said:
"Masyado kang abusado, alisin mo yang baril mo at magsuntukan na lang tayo."
 As Lingan was about turn away, petitioner Navarro hit him with the handle of the pistol above the left eyebrow. Lingan
fell on the floor, blood flowing down his face. He tried to get up, but petitioner Navarro gave him a fist blow on the forehead
which floored him.
o Petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena and said: "Kita mo yan ha, buhay kang testigo, si Ike Lingan and naghamon."
o He said to Sgt. Añonuevo: "Ilagay mo diyan sa blotter sa harap ni Alex Sioco at Dante Liquin, na si Ike Lingan ang
naghamon."
o He then poked his gun at the right temple of Jalbuena and made him sign his name on the blotter. Jalbuena could
not affix his signature. His right hand was trembling and he simply wrote his name in print.
 Lingan had been taken to the hospital. But Lingan died from his injuries.
 Unknown to petitioner Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record on tape the exchange between petitioner and the deceased.
 Petitioner Navarro claims that it was the deceased who tried to hit him twice, but he (petitioner) was able to duck both times,
and that Lingan was so drunk he fell on the floor twice, each time hitting his head on the concrete.

RTC:
  After a thorough and in-depth evaluation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and the defense, this court finds that
the evidence for the prosecution is the more credible, concrete and sufficient to create that moral certainty in the mind of
the court that accused herein is criminally responsible.
 This court finds that the prosecution witnesses, more particularly Stanley Jalbuena, lacked any motive to make false
accusation, distort the truth, testify falsehood or cause accusation of one who had neither brought him harm or injury.
 The postmortem report issued by Dra. Eva Yamamoto confirms the detailed account given by Stanley Jalbuena on how Lingan
sustained head injuries.

Court of Appeals:

 Affirmed the RTC ruling.

 Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: whether or not the tape is admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200.

RULING: YES

 First. Petitioner Navarro questions the credibility of the testimony of Jalbuena on the ground that he was a biased witness,
having a grudge against him. The testimony of a witness who has an interest in the conviction of the accused is not, for this
reason alone, unreliable.
 Trial courts, which have the opportunity observe the facial expressions, gestures, and tones of voice of a witness while
testifying, are competent to determine whether his or her testimony should be given credence.
 In the instant case, petitioner Navarro has not shown that the trial court erred in according weight to the testimony of
Jalbuena.
 Indeed, Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by the voice recording had made.
 It may be asked whether the tape is admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200, which prohibits wire tapping. The answer is in the
affirmative.
 The law provides:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken
word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as dictaphone or dictagraph of dectectaphone or walkie-
talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described:

It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceding sentence,
to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any
communication or spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this
law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in
writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, That the use of such
record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3
hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same
or any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding
sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or
investigation.

 Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications.
 Since the exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was NOT private, its tape recording is not prohibited.

ISSUE: WON the recording was duly authenticated?

RULING: YES
  Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated.
 A voice recording is authenticated by the testimony of a witness
o (1) that he personally recorded the conversations;
o (2) that the tape played in the court was the one he recorded; and
o (3) that the voices on the tape are those of the persons such are claimed to belong.

 In the instant case, Jalbuena testified that he personally made the voice recording; that the tape played in the court was the
one he recorded; and that the speakers on the tape were petitioner Navarro and Lingan.
 A sufficient foundation was thus laid for the authentication of the tape presented by the prosecution.
 Second. The voice recording made by Jalbuena established: (1) that there was a heated exchange between petitioner Navarro
and Lingan on the placing in the police blotter of an entry against him and Jalbuena; and (2) that some form of violence
occurred involving petitioner Navarro and Lingan, with the latter getting the worst of it.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the modification that petitioner Felipe Navarro is hereby
SENTENCED to suffer a prison terms of 18 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. SO ORDERED.

NOTES:

 The following is an excerpt from the tape recording:

Lingan: Pare, you are abusing yourself.

Navarro: Who is that abusing?

Lingan: I'm here to mediate. Do not include me in the problem. I'm out of the problem.

xxx xxx xxx

Navarro: Wala sa akin yan. Ang kaso lang . . .

Lingan: Kalaban mo ang media, pare, Ako at si Stanley, dalawa kami. Okay. Do not fight with me. I just came here to ayusin
things. Do not say bad things against me. I'm the number one loko sa media. I'm the best media man. . . .

Navarro: Huwag tayong mag-lokohan sa ganyan! Huwag na tayong mag-takotan! Huwag mong sabihing loko ka!

Lingan: I'm brave also.

Navarro: Ay lalo na ako. Tahimik lang naman ako. Wala ka namang masasabi sa akin dahil nag-tatrabaho lang ako ng ayon sa
serbisyo ko.

Lingan: You are challenging me and him. . . .

Navarro: Ay walastik ka naman Ike! Pag may problema ka dito sinasabihan kita na may balita tayong maganda. Pambihira ka
Ike. Huwag mong sabihin na . . . Parang minomonopoly mo eh.

Lingan: Pati ako kalaban ninyo.

Navarro: Talagang kalaban namin ang press. Lahat, hindi lang ikaw!

Lingan: You are wrong. Bakit kalaban nyo ang press?

Navarro: Pulis ito! Aba!

Lingan: Alisin mo ang baril mo! Alisin mo ang baril mo! Suntukan tayo, sige.
 Navarro: Mayabang ka ah!

(Sounds of a scuffle)

Navarro: Hinamon ako nyan! Pare hinamon ako nyan! Pare hinamon ako nyan, testigo kayo. Alisin ko daw ang baril ko.
Hinamon ako nyan. Pare, ilagay mo diyan, hinamon ako sa harap ni Stanley. Testigo kayo, hinamon ako. Pulis tayo eh. Puta,
buti nga, suntok lang ang inabot nyan. Sa harap ni Alex, ni Joe, ni Stanley, hinamon ako. Pare, hinamon ako, kinig nyo ha.
Hinamon ako nyan. Sige, dalhin nyo sa hospital yan.

RE: Post Mortem Findings:

CAUSE OF DEATH:

= CEREBRAL CONCUSSION & SHOCK

= BLOW ON THE HEAD

Dr. Yamamato testified:

Q Give your opinion as to what was the possible cause of this findings number one, which is oozing of blood from the forehead?

A It may be due to a blow on the forehead or it bumped to a hard object, sir.

Q Could a metal like a butt of a gun have caused this wound No. 1.?

A It is possible, sir.

Q And in the alternative, could have it been caused by bumping on a concrete floor?

A Possible, sir.

FISCAL:

What could have been the cause of the contusion and swelling under your findings No. 2 doctor?

WITNESS:

It may be caused by bumping to a hard object, sir.

Q Could a butt of a gun have caused it doctor?

A The swelling is big so it could have not been caused by a butt of a gun because the butt of a gun is small, sir.

Q How about this findings No. 4?

A By a bump or contact of the body to a hard object, sir.

Q And findings No. 5 what could have caused it?

A Same cause, sir.

Q This findings No. 6 what could have caused this wound?

A Same thing sir.

FISCAL:

In this same post mortem report and under the heading cause of death it states: Cause of Death: Cerebral concussion and Shock, will
you explain it?

A Cerebral concussion means in Tagalog "naalog ang utak" or jarring of the brain, sir.

Q What could have been the cause of jarring of the brain?

A It could have been caused by a blow of a hard object, sir.

Q What about the shock, what could have caused it?

A It was due to peripheral circulatory failure, sir.

FISCAL:

Which of these two more likely, to cause death?

WITNESS:

Shock, sir.

Q Please explain further the meaning of the medical term shock?

A It is caused by peripheral circulatory failure as I have said earlier sir.

xxx xxx xxx

FISCAL:

Could a bumping or pushing of one's head against a concrete floor have caused shock?

WITNESS:

Possible, sir.

How about striking with a butt of a gun, could it cause shock?

A Possible, sir.

 The above testimony clearly supports the claim of Jalbuena that petitioner Navarro hit Lingan with the handle of his pistol
above the left eyebrow and struck him on the forehead with his fist.

RE: mitigating circumstance

 Third. It is argued that the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party
immediately preceding the act should have been appreciated in favor of petitioner Navarro.
 Provocation is defined to be any unjust or improper conduct or act of the offended party, capable of exciting, inciting or
irritating anyone. The provocation must be sufficient and should immediately precede the act. To be sufficient, it must be
adequate to excite a person to commit the wrong, which must accordingly be proportionate in gravity. And it must
immediately precede the act so much so that there is no interval between the provocation by the offended party and the
commission of the crime by the accused.
 In the present case, the remarks of Lingan, which immediately preceded the act of petitioner, constituted sufficient
provocation.
  In People v. Macaso, we appreciated this mitigating circumstance in favor of the accused, a policeman, who shot a motorist
after the latter had repeatedly taunted him with defiant words.
 Hence, this mitigating circumstance should be considered in favor of petitioner Navarro.
 Furthermore, the mitigating circumstance that the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed
should also be appreciated in favor of petitioner.
 The frantic exclamations of petitioner Navarro after the scuffle that it was Lingan who provoked him shows that he had no
intent to kill the latter.
 Thus, this mitigating circumstance should be taken into account in determining the penalty that should be imposed on
petitioner Navarro.

RE: aggravating circumstance

 However, the aggravating circumstance of commission of a crime in a place where the public authorities are engaged in the
discharge of their duties should be appreciated against petitioner Navarro.
 The offense in this case was committed right in the police station where policemen were discharging their public functions.
 The crime committed as found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals was homicide, for which the penalty under Art. 249
of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal.
 As there were two mitigating circumstances and one aggravating circumstances, the penalty should be fixed in its minimum
period.
 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner Navarro should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the
minimum of which is within the range of the penalty next lower degree, i.e., prision mayor, and the maximum of which
is reclusion temporal in its minimum period.

4. Chavez vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008 [‘Hello Garci’ Tapes issue]

Ponente: Puno, C.J.

Nature of the case: This case is a special civil action of Certiorari and Prohibition in SC.

Petitioner: Francisco Chavez (Chavez)

Respondents: Raul M. Gonzales (Gonzales), in his capacity as Secretary of DOJ; and National Telecommunications Commission (NTC)

FACTS:
 The case originates from events that occurred a year after the 2004 national and local elections
 On June 5, 2005, Press Secretary Bunye told reporters that the opposition was planning to destabilize the administration by
releasing an audiotape of a mobile phone conversation allegedly between the President of the Philippines, Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo (GMA), and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
 The conversation was audiotaped allegedly through wire-tapping

 Later, in a Malacañang press briefing, Secretary Bunye produced two versions of the tape:
o One supposedly the complete version, and
o The other, a spliced, “doctored” or altered version, which would suggest that the President had instructed the
COMELEC official to manipulate the election results in the President’s favor
o It seems that Secretary Bunye admitted that the voice was that of President Arroyo, but subsequently made a
retraction
 On June 7, 2005, former counsel of deposed President Joseph Estrada, Atty. Alan Paguia (Paguia), subsequently released an
alleged authentic tape recording of the wiretap
o Included in the tapes were purported conversations of the President, the First Gentleman Jose Miguel Arroyo,
COMELEC Commissioner Garcillano, and the late Senator Barbers

 On June 8, 2005, respondent DOJ Secretary Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the compact disc (CD)
and those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act
o These persons included Secretary Bunye and Atty. Paguia
o He also stated that persons possessing or airing said tapes were committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest
by anybody who had personal knowledge if the crime was committed or was being committed in their presence
  On June 9, 2005, in another press briefing, Secretary Gonzales ordered the NBI to go after media organizations “found to
have caused the spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of a tape” of an alleged wiretapped conversation
involving the President about fixing votes in the 2004 national elections
o Gonzales said that he was going to start with Inq7.net, a joint venture between the Philippine Daily Inquirer and
GMA7 television network, because by the very nature of the Internet medium, it was able to disseminate the
contents of the tape more widely
o He then expressed his intention of inviting the editors and managers of Inq7.net and GMA7 to a probe, and
supposedly declared, “I have asked the NBI to conduct a tactical interrogation of all concerned”

NTC
 On June 11, 2005, the NTC issued this press release: NTC gives fair warning to radio and television owners/operators to
observe Anti-Wiretapping Law and pertinent circulars on program standards xxx
o Taking into consideration the country’s unusual situation, and in order not to unnecessarily aggravate the same, the
NTC warns all radio stations and television network owners/operators that the conditions of the authorization and
permits issued to them by Government like the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority explicitly
provides that said companies shall not use their stations for the broadcasting or telecasting of false information or
willful misrepresentation
o Relative thereto, it has come to the attention of the [NTC] that certain personalities are in possession of alleged
taped conversations which they claim involve the President of the Philippines and a Commissioner of the COMELEC
regarding supposed violation of election laws.
 These personalities have admitted that the taped conversations are products of illegal wiretapping operations

 Considering that these taped conversations have not been duly authenticated nor could it be said at this time that the tapes
contain an accurate or truthful representation of what was recorded therein, it is the position of the NTC that the continuous
airing or broadcast of the said taped conversations by radio and television stations is a continuing violation of the Anti-
Wiretapping Law and the conditions of the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority issued to these radio and
television stations
 It has been subsequently established that the said tapes are false and/or fraudulent after a prosecution or appropriate
investigation, the concerned radio and television companies are hereby warned that their broadcast/airing of such false
information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be just cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the
licenses or authorizations issued to the said companies
 It reiterates the pertinent NTC circulars on program standards to be observed by radio and television stations (See Notes
below for NTC circulars)
 NTC will not hesitate, after observing the requirements of due process, to apply with full force the provisions of said Circulars
and their accompanying sanctions on erring radio and television stations and their owners/operators

 On June 14, 2005, NTC held a dialogue with the Board of Directors of the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP)
o NTC allegedly assured the KBP that the press release did not violate the constitutional freedom of speech, of
expression, and of the press, and the right to information
o Accordingly, NTC and KBP issued a Joint Press Statement (See Notes below)

 Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 of ROC against respondents Secretary Gonzales and the NTC, “praying for
the issuance of the writs of certiorari and prohibition, as extraordinary legal remedies, to annul void proceedings, and to
prevent the unlawful, unconstitutional and oppressive exercise of authority by the respondents”

Petitioner’s Allegations:
 That the acts of respondents are violations of the freedom on expression and of the press, and the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern
 Specifically asked this Court:
o For the nullification of acts, issuances, and orders of respondents committed or made since June 6, 2005 until the
present that curtail the public’s rights to freedom of expression and of the press, and to information on matters of
public concern specifically in relation to information regarding the controversial taped conversion of President
Arroyo and for prohibition of the further commission of such acts, and making of such issuances, and orders by
respondents

Respondents’ Response/Arguments:
 Denied that the acts transgress the Constitution
 Questioned petitioner’s legal standing to file the petition
  As to the validity of the “fair warning” issued by respondent NTC:
o That broadcast media enjoy lesser constitutional guarantees compared to print media, and the warning was issued
pursuant to the NTC’s mandate to regulate the telecommunications industry
 It was also stressed that “most of the television and radio stations continue, even to this date, to air the tapes, but of late
within the parameters agreed upon between the NTC and KBP”

ISSUE 1: Whether the acts of respondents infringed free speech and freedom of the press.

RULING 1:
 Yes.
 A governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny, with
the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule.
 This rule applies equally to all kinds of media, including broadcast media.
 This outlines the procedural map to follow in cases like the one at bar as it spells out the following:
(a) The test;
(b) The presumption
(c) The burden of proof
(d) The party to discharge the burden, and
(e) The quantum of evidence necessary

Application
 On the basis of the records of the case at bar, respondents who have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge
freedom of speech and of the press failed to hurdle the clear and present danger test
 It appears that the great evil which government wants to prevent is the airing of a tape recording in alleged violation of the
anti-wiretapping law.
 However, the records of the case at bar are confused and confusing, and respondents’ evidence falls short of satisfying the
clear and present danger test.

 Firstly, the various statements of the Press Secretary obfuscate the identity of the voices in the tape recording.
 Secondly, the integrity of the taped conversation is also suspect.
o The Press Secretary showed to the public two versions, one supposed to be a “complete” version and the other, an
“altered” version
 Thirdly, the evidence of the respondents on the who’s and the how’s of the wiretapping act is ambivalent, especially
considering the tape’s different versions
o The identity of the wire-tappers, the manner of its commission and other related and relevant proofs are some of
the invisibles of this case.
 Fourthly, given all these unsettled facets of the tape, it is even arguable whether its airing would violate the anti-wiretapping
law.

 We rule that not every violation of a law will justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press.
 Our laws are of different kinds and doubtless, some of them provide norms of conduct which even if violated have only an
adverse effect on a person’s private comfort but does not endanger national security.
 There are laws of great significance but their violation, by itself and without more, cannot support suppression of free speech
and free press.
 In fine, violation of law is just a factor, a vital one to be sure, which should be weighed in adjudging whether to restrain
freedom of speech and of the press.
 The totality of the injurious effects of the violation to private and public interest must be calibrated in light of the preferred
status accorded by the Constitution and by related international covenants protecting freedom of speech and of the press.
 In calling for a careful and calibrated measurement of the circumference of all these factors to determine compliance with
the clear and present danger test, the Court should not be misinterpreted as devaluing violations of law.
 By all means, violations of law should be vigorously prosecuted by the State for they breed their own evil consequence.
 But to repeat, the need to prevent their violation cannot per se trump the exercise of free speech and free press, a preferred
right whose breach can lead to greater evils.
 For this failure of the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court has no option
but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free press.
  There is no showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the national security of the
State.

ISSUE 2: Whether the mere press statements of the Secretary of Justice and of the NTC in question constitute a form of content-
based prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution.

RULING 2:
 Yes.
 In resolving this issue, we hold that it is not decisive that the press statements made by respondents were not reduced in
or followed up with formal orders or circulars
 It is sufficient that the press statements were made by respondents while in the exercise of their official functions
 Undoubtedly, respondent Gonzales made his statements as Secretary of Justice, while the NTC issued its statement as the
regulatory body of media
 Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of the government in an official capacity is covered by the rule
on prior restraint
 The concept of an “act” does not limit itself to acts already converted to a formal order or official circular.
 Otherwise, the non-formalization of an act into an official order or circular will result in the easy circumvention of the
prohibition on prior restraint.

Application
 The press statements at bar are acts that should be struck down as they constitute impermissible forms of prior restraints on
the right to free speech and press.
 There is enough evidence of chilling effect of the complained acts on record.
 The warnings given to media came from no less the NTC, a regulatory agency that can cancel the Certificate of Authority of
the radio and broadcast media.
 They also came from the Secretary of Justice, the alter ego of the Executive, who wields the awesome power to prosecute
those perceived to be violating the laws of the land.
 After the warnings, the KBP inexplicably joined the NTC in issuing an ambivalent Joint Press Statement
 After the warnings, petitioner Chavez was left alone to fight this battle for freedom of speech and of the press.
o This silence on the sidelines on the part of some media practitioners is too deafening to be the subject of
misinterpretation.

 The constitutional imperative for us to strike down unconstitutional acts should always be exercised with care and in light of
the distinct facts of each case.
 For there are no hard and fast rules when it comes to slippery constitutional questions, and the limits and construct of relative
freedoms are never set in stone. Issues revolving on their construct must be decided on a case to case basis, always based on
the peculiar shapes and shadows of each case
 But in cases where the challenged acts are patent invasions of a constitutionally protected right, we should be swift in striking
them down as nullities per se.
 A blow too soon struck for freedom is preferred than a blow too late.

Re: Anatomy of Restrictions: Prior Restraint, Content-Neutral and Content-Based Regulations

Sub-Issue: Whether the challenged acts need to be subjected to the clear and present danger rule.
Ruling:
 Yes. The challenged acts in the case at bar need to be subjected to the clear and present danger rule, as they are content-
based restrictions.

 Philippine jurisprudence, even as early as the period under the 1935 Constitution, has recognized four aspects of freedom of
the press
 These are:
(1) Freedom from prior restraint
(2) Freedom from punishment subsequent to publication
(3) Freedom of access to information, and
(4) Freedom of circulation
 Considering that petitioner has argued that respondents’ press statement constitutes a form of impermissible prior restraint,
a closer scrutiny of this principle is in order, as well as its sub-specie of content-based (as distinguished from content-neutral)
regulations
 At this point, it should be noted that respondents in this case deny that their acts constitute prior restraints

 This presents a unique tinge to the present challenge, considering that the cases in our jurisdiction involving prior restrictions
on speech never had any issue of whether the governmental act or issuance actually constituted prior restraint
 Rather, the determinations were always about whether the restraint was justified by the Constitution
 Be that as it may, the determination in every case of whether there is an impermissible restraint on the freedom of speech
has always been based on the circumstances of each case, including the nature of the restraint.
 And in its application in our jurisdiction, the parameters of this principle have been etched on a case-to-case basis, always
tested by scrutinizing the governmental issuance or act against the circumstances in which they operate, and then
determining the appropriate test with which to evaluate.

 Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual
publication or dissemination
o Freedom from prior restraint is largely freedom from government censorship of publications, whatever the form of
censorship, and regardless of whether it is wielded by the executive, legislative or judicial branch of the government.
o Thus, it precludes governmental acts that required approval of a proposal to publish; licensing or permits as
prerequisites to publication including the payment of license taxes for the privilege to publish; and even injunctions
against publication.
o Even the closure of the business and printing offices of certain newspapers, resulting in the discontinuation of their
printing and publication, are deemed as previous restraint or censorship.
o Any law or official that requires some form of permission to be had before publication can be made, commits an
infringement of the constitutional right, and remedy can be had at the courts

 Given that deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is the hostility against all prior restraints on speech, and any act that
restrains speech is presumed invalid, and “any act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should
be greeted with furrowed brows,” it is important to stress not all prior restraints on speech are invalid.
 Certain previous restraints may be permitted by the Constitution, but determined only upon a careful evaluation of the
challenged act as against the appropriate test by which it should be measured against.

 Hence, it is not enough to determine whether the challenged act constitutes some form of restraint on freedom of speech.
 A distinction has to be made whether the restraint is:
(1) A content-neutral regulation, i.e., merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls
the time, place or manner, and under well defined standards; or
(2) A content-based restraint or censorship, i.e., the restriction is based on the subject matter of the utterance or
speech.
 The cast of the restriction determines the test by which the challenged act is assayed with.

 When the speech restraints take the form of a content-neutral regulation, only a substantial governmental interest is
required for its validity
o Because regulations of this type are not designed to suppress any particular message, they are not subject to the
strictest form of judicial scrutiny but an intermediate approach—somewhere between the mere rationality that is
required of any other law and the compelling interest standard applied to content-based restrictions
 The test is called intermediate because the Court will not merely rubberstamp the validity of a law but also require that the
restrictions be narrowly-tailored to promote an important or significant governmental interest that is unrelated to the
suppression of expression.
 The intermediate approach has been formulated in this manner:
o A governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government, if it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and if the incident restriction on alleged freedom of speech & expression is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.

 On the other hand, a governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given the
strictest scrutiny in light of its inherent and invasive impact.
o Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster,
with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality
  Unless the government can overthrow this presumption, the content-based restraint will be struck down
 With respect to content-based restrictions, the government must also show the type of harm the speech sought to be
restrained would bring about—especially the gravity and the imminence of the threatened harm—otherwise the prior
restraint will be invalid
 Prior restraint on speech based on its content cannot be justified by hypothetical fears, “but only by showing a substantive
and imminent evil that has taken the life of a reality already on ground”

 As formulated, “the question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature
as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.
It is a question of proximity and degree.”

 The regulation which restricts the speech content must also serve an important or substantial government interest, which is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression
 Also, the incidental restriction on speech must be no greater than what is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
 A restriction that is so broad that it encompasses more than what is required to satisfy the governmental interest will be
invalidated
 Therefore, the regulation must be reasonable and narrowly drawn to fit the regulatory purpose, with the least restrictive
means undertaken

 Thus, when the prior restraint partakes of a content-neutral regulation, it is subjected to an intermediate review.
 However, a content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity and is measured against the clear and present
danger rule.
 The latter will pass constitutional muster only if justified by a compelling reason, and the restrictions imposed are neither
overbroad nor vague.

Application
 Applying the foregoing, it is clear that the challenged acts in the case at bar need to be subjected to the clear and present
danger rule, as they are content-based restrictions.
 The acts of respondents focused solely on but one object—a specific content—fixed as these were on the alleged taped
conversations between the President and a COMELEC official
 Undoubtedly these did not merely provide regulations as to the time, place or manner of the dissemination of speech or
expression.

OTHER DISCUSSIONS

Re: Procedural Threshold: Legal Standing

 The petitioner, who is not a member of the broadcast media, prays that we strike down the acts and statements made by
respondents as violations of the right to free speech, free expression and a free press
o For another, the recipients of the press statements have not come forward—neither intervening nor joining
petitioner in this action
o Indeed, as a group, they issued a joint statement with respondent NTC that does not complain about restraints on
freedom of the press

 It would seem, then, that petitioner has not met the requisite legal standing, having failed to allege “such a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the Court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions”
 But as early as half a century ago, we have already held that where serious constitutional questions are involved, “the
transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing
aside if we must, technicalities of procedure”
 Subsequently, this Court has repeatedly and consistently refused to wield procedural barriers as impediments to its
addressing and resolving serious legal questions that greatly impact on public interest, in keeping with the Court’s duty under
the 1987 Constitution to determine whether or not other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of
the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them

 Thus, in line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi when a case involves an issue of overarching significance to
our society, we therefore brush aside technicalities of procedure and take cognizance of this petition, seeing as it involves a
challenge to the most exalted of all the civil rights, the freedom of expression
  The petition raises other issues like the extent of the right to information of the public.
o However, it is fundamental that we need not address all issues but only the most decisive one which in the case at
bar is whether the acts of the respondents abridge freedom of speech and of the press.

 But aside from the primordial issue of determining whether free speech and freedom of the press have been infringed, the
case at bar also gives this Court the opportunity:
(1) To distill the essence of freedom of speech and of the press now beclouded by the vagaries of motherhood
statements
(2) To clarify the types of speeches and their differing restraints allowed by law
(3) To discuss the core concepts of prior restraint, content-neutral and content-based regulations and their
constitutional standard of review
(4) To examine the historical difference in the treatment of restraints between print and broadcast media and stress
the standard of review governing both; and
(5) To call attention to the ongoing blurring of the lines of distinction between print and broadcast media.

Re: Re-examination of the Law on Freedom of Speech, of Expression and of the Press
 No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.

 Freedom of expression has gained recognition as a fundamental principle of every democratic government, and given a
preferred right that stands on a higher level than substantive economic freedom or other liberties
 The cognate rights codified by Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution, copied almost verbatim from the First Amendment of
the U.S. Bill of Rights, were considered the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the complement of free
speech
 This preferred status of free speech has also been codified at the international level, its recognition now enshrined in
international law as a customary norm that binds all nations

 In the Philippines, the primacy and high esteem accorded freedom of expression is a fundamental postulate of our
constitutional system
o This right was elevated to constitutional status in the 1935, the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions, reflecting our own
lesson of history, both political and legal, that freedom of speech is an indispensable condition for nearly every
other form of freedom
o Moreover, our history shows that the struggle to protect the freedom of speech, expression and the press was, at
bottom, the struggle for the indispensable preconditions for the exercise of other freedoms
 For it is only when the people have unbridled access to information and the press that they will be capable of rendering
enlightened judgments
 In the oft-quoted words of Thomas Jefferson, we cannot both be free and ignorant.

Re: Abstraction of Free Speech

 Surrounding the freedom of speech clause are various concepts that we have adopted as part and parcel of our own Bill of
Rights provision on this basic freedom
 What is embraced under this provision was discussed exhaustively by the Court in Gonzales v. COMELEC, in which it was held:
o …At the very least, free speech and free press may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully
any matter of public interest without censorship and punishment.
o There is to be no previous restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits,
prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt proceedings unless there be a clear and present danger
of substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent.

 Gonzales further explained that the vital need of a constitutional democracy for freedom of expression is undeniable,
whether as a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment; of attaining the truth; of assuring participation by the people in
social, including political, decision-making; and of maintaining the balance between stability and change
 As early as the 1920s, the trend as reflected in Philippine and American decisions was to recognize the broadest scope and
assure the widest latitude for this constitutional guarantee
o The trend represents a profound commitment to the principle that debate on public issue should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open
  Freedom of speech and of the press means something more than the right to approve existing political beliefs or economic
arrangements, to lend support to official measures, and to take refuge in the existing climate of opinion on any matter of
public consequence
 When atrophied, the right becomes meaningless
 The right belongs as well—if not more—to those who question, who do not conform, who differ
 The ideas that may be expressed under this freedom are confined not only to those that are conventional or acceptable to
the majority
 To be truly meaningful, freedom of speech and of the press should allow and even encourage the articulation of the
unorthodox view, though it be hostile to or derided by others; or though such view “induces a condition of unrest, creates
dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger”
 To paraphrase Justice Holmes, it is freedom for the thought that we hate, no less than for the thought that agrees with us.

 The scope of freedom of expression is so broad that it extends protection to nearly all forms of communication.
 It protects speech, print and assembly regarding secular as well as political causes, and is not confined to any particular field
of human interest.
 The protection covers myriad matters of public interest or concern embracing all issues, about which information is needed
or appropriate, so as to enable members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period.
 The constitutional protection assures the broadest possible exercise of free speech and free press for religious, political,
economic, scientific, news, or informational ends, inasmuch as the Constitution’s basic guarantee of freedom to advocate
ideas is not confined to the expression of ideas that are conventional or shared by a majority.
 The constitutional protection is not limited to the exposition of ideas.
 The protection afforded free speech extends to speech or publications that are entertaining as well as instructive or
informative.
 Specifically, in Eastern Broadcasting Corporation (DYRE) v. Dans, this Court stated that all forms of media, whether print or
broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the clause on freedom of speech and of expression.
 While all forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of freedom of expression clause, the freedom of film,
television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspapers and other print
media, as will be subsequently discussed.

Re Differentiation: The Limits & Restraints of Free Speech

 From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the right to free speech and a free press is
not susceptible of any limitation
 But the realities of life in a complex society preclude a literal interpretation of the provision prohibiting the passage of a law
that would abridge such freedom.
 For freedom of expression is not an absolute, nor is it an “unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of
language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom”
 Thus, all speech are not treated the same.
 Some types of speech may be subjected to some regulation by the State under its pervasive police power, in order that it may
not be injurious to the equal right of others or those of the community or society.
 The difference in treatment is expected because the relevant interests of one type of speech, e.g., political speech, may vary
from those of another, e.g., obscene speech
 Distinctions have therefore been made in the treatment, analysis, and evaluation of the permissible scope of restrictions on
various categories of speech

 For example, we have ruled that in our jurisdiction, slander or libel, lewd and obscene speech, as well as “fighting words” are
not entitled to constitutional protection and may be penalized
 Moreover, the techniques of reviewing alleged restrictions on speech (overbreadth, vagueness, and so on) have been applied
differently to each category, either consciously or unconsciously.

 A study of free speech jurisprudence—whether here or abroad—will reveal that courts have developed different tests as to
specific types or categories of speech in concrete situations; i.e., subversive speech; obscene speech; the speech of the
broadcast media and of the traditional print media; libelous speech; speech affecting associational rights; speech before
hostile audiences; symbolic speech; speech that affects the right to a fair trial; and speech associated with rights of
assembly and petition

3 TESTS
 Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either or a combination of three tests, i.e.
 (a) The dangerous tendency doctrine, which permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been
established between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated;
(b) The balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance conflicting social values and
individual interests, and requires a conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a
given situation of type of situation; and
(c) The clear and present danger rule, which rests on the premise that speech may be restrained because there is
substantial danger that the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent
 This rule requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, “extremely
serious and the degree of imminence extremely high”

 As articulated in our jurisprudence, we have applied either the dangerous tendency doctrine or clear and present danger
test to resolve free speech challenges
 More recently, we have concluded that we have generally adhered to the clear and present danger test

Re: Freedom of the Press

 Much has been written on the philosophical basis of press freedom as part of the larger right of free discussion and expression
 Its practical importance, though, is more easily grasped.
 It is the chief source of information on current affairs.
 It is the most pervasive and perhaps most powerful vehicle of opinion on public questions.
 It is the instrument by which citizens keep their government informed of their needs, their aspirations and their grievances.
 It is the sharpest weapon in the fight to keep government responsible and efficient.
 Without a vigilant press, the mistakes of every administration would go uncorrected and its abuses unexposed.
 As Justice Malcolm wrote in United States v. Bustos:
o The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs.
o Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech.
o The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom.
o Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of
clear conscience.

 Its contribution to the public weal makes freedom of the press deserving of extra protection.
 Indeed, the press benefits from certain ancillary rights.
 The productions of writers are classified as intellectual and proprietary.
 Persons who interfere or defeat the freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication are liable for
damages, be they private individuals or public officials.

Re Dichotomy of Free Press: Print v. Broadcast Media

 The regimes presently in place for each type of media differ from one other.
 Contrasted with the regime in respect of books, newspapers, magazines and traditional printed matter, broadcasting, film
and video have been subjected to regulatory schemes

 The dichotomy between print and broadcast media traces its origins in U.S.
 There, broadcast radio and television have been held to have limited First Amendment protection, and U.S. Courts have
excluded broadcast media from the application of the “strict scrutiny” standard that they would otherwise apply to content-
based restrictions
 According to U.S. Courts, the three major reasons why broadcast media stands apart from print media are:
(a) The scarcity of the frequencies by which the medium operates (i.e., airwaves are physically limited while print
medium may be limitless);
(b) Its “pervasiveness” as a medium; and
(c) Its unique accessibility to children

 Because cases involving broadcast media need not follow “precisely the same approach that (U.S. courts) have applied to
other media,” nor go “so far as to demand that such regulations serve ‘compelling’ government interests,” they are decided
on whether the “governmental restriction” is narrowly tailored to further a substantial governmental interest,” or the
intermediate test.

 As pointed out by respondents, Philippine jurisprudence has also echoed a differentiation in treatment between broadcast
and print media.
 Nevertheless, a review of Philippine case law on broadcast media will show that—as we have deviated with the American
conception of the Bill of Rights—we likewise did not adopt en masse the U.S. conception of free speech as it relates to
broadcast media, particularly as to which test would govern content-based prior restraints.

 Our cases show two distinct features of this dichotomy.

o First, the difference in treatment, in the main, is in the regulatory scheme applied to broadcast media that is not
imposed on traditional print media, and narrowly confined to unprotected speech (e.g., obscenity, pornography,
seditious and inciting speech), or is based on a compelling government interest that also has constitutional
protection, such as national security or the electoral process.
o Second, regardless of the regulatory schemes that broadcast media is subjected to, the Court has consistently held
that the clear and present danger test applies to content-based restrictions on media, without making a distinction
as to traditional print or broadcast media

 The distinction between broadcast and traditional print media was first enunciated in Eastern Broadcasting Corporation
(DYRE) v. Dans, wherein it was held that:
o “All forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of speech and
expression clause. The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and present danger
rule…”

 Dans was a case filed to compel the reopening of a radio station, which had been summarily closed on grounds of national
security.
 Although the issue had become moot and academic because the owners were no longer interested to reopen, the Court still
proceeded to do an analysis of the case and made formulations to serve as guidelines for all inferior courts and bodies
exercising quasi-judicial functions.
 Particularly, the Court made a detailed exposition as to what needs be considered in cases involving broadcast media.
 Thus: xxx xxx xxx
o (3) All forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of speech
and expression clause.
o The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and present danger rule, that words
are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right to prevent
o In his Constitution of the Philippines Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando cites at least nine of our decisions which apply
the test. More recently, the clear and present danger test was applied in J.B.L. Reyes in behalf of the Anti-Bases
Coalition v. Bagatsing.
o (4) The clear and present danger test, however, does not lend itself to a simplistic and all embracing interpretation
applicable to all utterances in all forums.

 Broadcasting has to be licensed.

 Airwave frequencies have to be allocated among qualified users.
 A broadcast corporation cannot simply appropriate a certain frequency without regard for government regulation or for the
rights of others.
 All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of expression clause.
 Necessarily, however, the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom
accorded to newspaper and print media.

 The American Court in Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation, confronted with a patently offensive
and indecent regular radio program, explained why radio broadcasting, more than other forms of communications, receives
the most limited protection from the free expression clause.
 First, broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all citizens, material presented over the
airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but in the privacy of his home
 Second, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children.
o Bookstores and motion picture theaters may be prohibited from making certain material available to children, but
the same selectivity cannot be done in radio or television, where the listener or viewer is constantly tuning in and
out.

 Similar considerations apply in the area of national security.

 The broadcast media have also established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Filipinos.
  Newspapers and current books are found only in metropolitan areas and in the poblaciones of municipalities accessible to
fast and regular transportation
 Even here, there are low income masses who find the cost of books, newspapers, and magazines beyond their humble means.
Basic needs like food and shelter perforce enjoy high priorities

 On the other hand, the transistor radio is found everywhere.

 The television set is also becoming universal.
 Their message may be simultaneously received by a national or regional audience of listeners including the indifferent or
unwilling who happen to be within reach of a blaring radio or television set.
 The materials broadcast over the airwaves reach every person of every age, persons of varying susceptibilities to persuasion,
persons of different I.Q.s and mental capabilities, persons whose reactions to inflammatory or offensive speech would be
difficult to monitor or predict.
 The impact of the vibrant speech is forceful and immediate.
 Unlike readers of the printed work, the radio audience has lesser opportunity to cogitate analyze, and reject the utterance.

 Therefore, the clear and present danger test must take the particular circumstances of broadcast media into account.
o The supervision of radio stations-whether by government or through self-regulation by the industry itself calls for
thoughtful, intelligent and sophisticated handling.
 The government has a right to be protected against broadcasts, which incite the listeners to violently overthrow it.
 Radio and television may not be used to organize a rebellion or to signal the start of widespread uprising.
 At the same time, the people have a right to be informed.
 Radio and television would have little reason for existence if broadcasts are limited to bland, obsequious, or pleasantly
entertaining utterances
 Since they are the most convenient and popular means of disseminating varying views on public issues, they also deserve
special protection

Re: Freedom to Comment on Public Affairs

 The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy
 In the 1918 case of U.S. v. Bustos, this Court was already stressing that.
 The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs.
 Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech.
 The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom.
 Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear
conscience.
 A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts.
 Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted.

 Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of expression
clauses of the Constitution

 It is interesting to note that the Court in Dans adopted the arguments found in U.S. jurisprudence to justify differentiation of
treatment (i.e., the scarcity, pervasiveness and accessibility to children), but only after categorically declaring that “the test
for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and present danger rule,” for all forms of media, whether
print or broadcast.

 Indeed, a close reading of the above-quoted provisions would show that the differentiation that the Court in Dans referred
to was narrowly restricted to what is otherwise deemed as “unprotected speech” (e.g., obscenity, national security, seditious
and inciting speech), or to validate a licensing or regulatory scheme necessary to allocate the limited broadcast frequencies,
which is absent in print media
 Thus, when this Court declared in Dans that the freedom given to broadcast media was “somewhat lesser in scope than the
freedom accorded to newspaper and print media,” it was not as to what test should be applied, but the context by which
requirements of licensing, allocation of airwaves, and application of norms to unprotected speech

 In the same year that the Dans case was decided, it was reiterated in Gonzales v. Katigbak, that the test to determine free
expression challenges was the clear and present danger, again without distinguishing the media

 Katigbak, strictly speaking, does not treat of broadcast media but motion pictures
 Although the issue involved obscenity standards as applied to movies, the Court concluded its decision with the following
obiter dictum that a less liberal approach would be used to resolve obscenity issues in television as opposed to motion
pictures:
o All that remains to be said is that the ruling is to be limited to the concept of obscenity applicable to motion pictures.
o It is the consensus of this Court that where television is concerned, a less liberal approach calls for observance.
o This is so because unlike motion pictures where the patrons have to pay their way, television reaches every home
where there is a set.
o Children then will likely be among the avid viewers of the programs therein shown…
o It cannot be denied though that the State as parens patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude of caring for the
welfare of the young

 More recently, in resolving a case involving the conduct of exit polls and dissemination of the results by a broadcast company,
we reiterated that the clear and present danger rule is the test we unquestionably adhere to issues that involve freedoms of
speech and of the press
 This is not to suggest, however, that the clear and present danger rule has been applied to all cases that involve the
broadcast media.
o The rule applies to all media, including broadcast, but only when the challenged act is a content-based regulation
that infringes on free speech, expression and the press

 Indeed, in Osmena v. COMELEC, which also involved broadcast media, the Court refused to apply the clear and present
danger rule to a COMELEC regulation of time and manner of advertising of political advertisements because the challenged
restriction was content-neutral.
 And in a case involving due process and equal protection issues, the Court in Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys
of the Philippines v. COMELEC treated a restriction imposed on a broadcast media as a reasonable condition for the grant of
the media’s franchise, without going into which test would apply.

 That broadcast media is subject to a regulatory regime absent in print media is observed also in other jurisdictions, where
the statutory regimes in place over broadcast media include elements of licensing, regulation by administrative bodies, and
censorship.
 As explained by a British author:
o The reasons behind treating broadcast and films differently from the print media differ in a number of respects, but
have a common historical basis.
o The stricter system of controls seems to have been adopted in answer to the view that owing to their particular
impact on audiences, films, videos and broadcasting require a system of prior restraints, whereas it is now accepted
that books and other printed media do not
o These media are viewed as beneficial to the public in a number of respects, but are also seen as possible sources of
harm

 Parenthetically, these justifications are now the subject of debate.

 Historically, the scarcity of frequencies was thought to provide a rationale.
 However, cable and satellite television have enormously increased the number of actual and potential channels.
 Digital technology will further increase the number of channels available.
 But still, the argument persists that broadcasting is the most influential means of communication, since it comes into the
home, and so much time is spent watching television.
 Since it has a unique impact on people and affects children in a way that the print media normally does not, that regulation
is said to be necessary in order to preserve pluralism. It has been argued further that a significant main threat to free
expression—in terms of diversity—comes not from government, but from private corporate bodies.
 These developments show a need for a reexamination of the traditional notions of the scope and extent of broadcast media
regulation.

 The emergence of digital technology—which has led to the convergence of broadcasting, telecommunications and the
computer industry—has likewise led to the question of whether the regulatory model for broadcasting will continue to be
appropriate in the converged environment.
 Internet, for example, remains largely unregulated, yet the Internet and the broadcast media share similarities, and the
rationales used to support broadcast regulation apply equally to the Internet
 Thus, it has been argued that courts, legislative bodies and the government agencies regulating media must agree to regulate
both, regulate neither or develop a new regulatory framework and rationale to justify the differential treatment.
Disposition: Petition is granted
 The writs of certiorari and prohibition are hereby issued, nullifying the official statements made by respondents on June 8,
and 11, 2005 warning the media on airing the alleged wiretapped conversation between the President and other
personalities, for constituting unconstitutional prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press

Notes:
Re: Freedom of the Press
 In this jurisdiction, it is established that freedom of the press is crucial and so inextricably woven into the right to free speech
and free expression, that any attempt to restrict it must be met with an examination so critical that only a danger that is
clear and present would be allowed to curtail it
 Indeed, we have not wavered in the duty to uphold this cherished freedom
 We have struck down laws and issuances meant to curtail this right, as in Adiong v. COMELEC, Burgos v. Chief of Staff, Social
Weather Stations v. COMELEC, and Bayan v. Executive Secretary Ermita
 When on its face, it is clear that a governmental act is nothing more than a naked means to prevent the free exercise of
speech, it must be nullified

NTC Memorandum Circular 111-12-85 explicitly states, among others, that:

 “All radio broadcasting and television stations shall, during any broadcast or telecast, cut off from the air the speech, play,
act or scene or other matters being broadcast or telecast the tendency thereof is to disseminate false information or such
other willful misrepresentation, or to propose and/or incite treason, rebellion or sedition.”

 The foregoing directive had been reiterated by NTC Memorandum Circular No. 22-89, which, in addition thereto, prohibited
radio, broadcasting and television stations from using their stations to broadcast or telecast any speech, language or scene
disseminating false information or willful misrepresentation, or inciting, encouraging or assisting in subversive or treasonable
acts.

In NTC and KBP’s Joint Press Statement

 NTC respects and will not hinder freedom of the press and the right to information on matters of public concern.
o KBP & its members have always been committed to the exercise of press freedom with high sense of responsibility
and discerning judgment of fairness and honesty.
 NTC did not issue any MC or Order constituting a restraint of press freedom or censorship
o The NTC further denies and does not intend to limit or restrict the interview of members of the opposition or free
expression of views
 What is being asked by NTC is that the exercise of press freedom be done responsibly
 KBP has program standards that KBP members will observe in the treatment of news and public affairs programs.
o These include verification of sources, non-airing of materials that would constitute inciting to sedition and/or
rebellion
 The KBP Codes also require that no false statement or willful misrepresentation is made in the treatment of news or
commentaries
 The supposed wiretapped tapes should be treated with sensitivity and handled responsibly giving due consideration to the
process being undertaken to verify and validate the authenticity and actual content of the same.

5. Capuchino vs. Apolonio, A.M. No. P-04-1771, September 5, 2011

Ponente: Brion, J.

Nature of the case: This is an administrative case that involves 8 personnel of the MTCC in Santiago City, Isabela, Br. 2
 Charged with Grave Misconduct and Violation of the Anti-Wire Tapping Act (RA No. 4200) in two identical complaints filed
by Atty. Capuchino with the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) and this Court
 Ombudsman referred the complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for appropriate action
o Respondents are court personnel under the administrative supervision of OCA
 Dismissed the criminal aspect of the complaint without prejudice to the outcome of the present administrative case against
the respondents

Complainant: Atty. Pacifico Capuchino (Atty. Capuchino)

Respondents:
 Branch Clerk of Court Romeo B. Aspiras (Aspiras)
  Stenographer Maripi A. Apolonio (Apolonio)
 Stenographer Andrealyn M. Andres (Andres)
 Stenographer Ana Gracia E. Santiago (Santiago)
 Legal Researcher Carina C. Bretania (Bretania)
 Interpreter Ma. Anita G. Gatcheco (Gatcheco)
 Clerk IV Fe L. Alvarez (Alvarez)
 Process Server Eugenio P. Taguba (Taguba)

FACTS:
 Complainant Atty. Capuchino was the counsel of the accused in a Criminal Case (People vs. Marirose Valencia) for violation
of BP Blg. 22 filed with the MTCC of Santiago City, Isabela, Br 2
o The accused, Marirose Valencia (Valencia), was convicted of the offense charged and was ordered to pay private
complainant Reynaldo Valmonte (Valmonte) the amount of P120,000, plus interest at the rate of 12% per annum
computed from the time of the filing of the criminal case
 Atty. Capuchino filed MR of Valencia’s conviction
 Pending resolution of the MR, he tried to settle the case amicably with Valmonte

 On May 9, 2001, Atty. Capuchino and Valencia met with Valmonte at the MTCC
o They offered Valmonte the amount of P120,000, asking him to withdraw the criminal case he filed against Valencia
o Valmonte refused and demanded a higher amount
o As they failed to come to a settlement by lunchtime, they agreed to schedule another meeting
 Apprehensive of carrying a big amount, Valencia requested Tessie Duque (who was the only personnel left in the court at
that time) to hold the money for safekeeping until their next meeting with Valmonte
o Initially, Duque refused to receive the money, but relented when Valencia insisted
o She agreed to hold the money temporarily, and issued a provisional receipt for the amount
 Meanwhile, the court denied Atty. Capuchino’s MR and issued a Writ of Execution
o To show her readiness to settle her obligation, Valencia presented the provisional receipt issued by Duque for the
P120,000

 The respondents claimed that Duque was not authorized to receive money from litigants even for safekeeping purposes
o Hence, they brought the matter to the attention of Judge Maxwell Rosete
 Judge Rosete required Duque to comment on the respondents’ report
 Instead of filing the required comment, Duque filed a motion to set the case for hearing
 On September 24, 2002, Atty. Capuchino and Valencia went to the MTCC to attend the hearing on their motion for the
withdrawal of the money deposited with Duque
o The hearing did not materialize because Judge Rosete was absent

 Atty. Capuchino went to see Aspiras to inquire about the next scheduled hearing
 Instead of attending to their request, respondents Aspiras, Apolonio and Taguba casually led them to the court sala and
asked them questions about the money they entrusted to Duque
 Atty. Capuchino later learned that their conversations had been tape recorded by Apolonio with the aid of the other court
personnel
 The tapes were then used by the respondents to report the illegal deposit to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., in a
letter-complaint (dated October 3, 2002)
o They asked for an immediate investigation “before it is blown out of proportion”

Atty. Capuchino’s Claims

 That his and his client’s conversations with Aspiras, Apolonio and Taguba were recorded by Apolonio, with the assistance of
the other court personnel, without his and his client’s knowledge, in violation of the Anti-Wire Tapping Act
 Further claimed that all the respondents conspired with each other to illegally record their conversations

OCA
 Required respondents to comment on the charges against them

Respondents’ Comments
  Respondents Bretania, Gatcheco, Santiago and Andres denied having instigated or influenced Judge Rosete to issue an Order
directing Duque to comment on the allegation that she has no authority to receive money from court litigants, even for
safekeeping purposes
 Denied involvement in the taping incident
 Gatcheco and Andres further claimed that they did not report for work on the date the incident complained of transpired, as
they were on leave
o They submitted photocopies of their Daily Time Record in support of their contentions
 Respondent Alvarez denied involvement in the incident
o Although she intended to keep silent about the incident, she signed the administrative complaint prepared by
Taguba because “she is interested to know the truth, no more, no less”
 Respondent Taguba claimed that he filed a complaint against Duque because he believed that Duque’s act “was improper as
it is unauthorized and unlawful”
o That he was not motivated by malice in filing the complaint
o That Atty. Capuchino has no cause to file the present complaint as the criminal case of his client had already been
terminated
 Respondents Aspiras and Apolonio asserted that “the contention that the alleged tape recording is inadmissible in evidence
by virtue of R. A. No. 4200 cannot hold water because the matters covered are clothed with public interest – the interest of
the Judiciary itself to stand with unblemished integrity”

Atty. Capuchino’s Contentions (in his Reply)

 That violation of a law cannot be condoned, no matter how good and noble the intention of the perpetrators is
 As a lawyer, it is his duty to call attention to violations of the law
 He cannot see any reason why the respondents made a big fuss over the provisional receipt issued by Duque, but he can
discern their sinister motives
 On the respondents’ allegation that he has nothing at stake or interest to file the present case, he counter-argued that the
respondents were the ones who have no stake or interest in the money privately entrusted to Duque and who merely
pretended that they were doing a “messianic act”
 He referred to respondent Taguba as a “false messiah” who has a string of cases for extortion filed with this Court
 That seven of the respondents came to see him at this house several times to apologize, to plead for mercy, and to ask for
the withdrawal of the case against them

 On the recommendation of the OCA, the Court ordered the redocketing of Atty. Capuchino’s complaint as a regular
administrative matter, and referring the case to the Executive Judge of the MTCC, Santiago City, Isabela, for investigation,
report and recommendation

 Hence, the present administrative case

o Judge Ruben R. Plata, (then the Executive Judge of the MTCC of Santiago City, Isabela) inhibited himself from the
case on the ground that all the respondents have filed an administrative complaint against him and that he filed
against all the respondents a criminal case for perjury and libel with the Office of the Prosecutor of Manila
o The case was instead referred to Judge Fe Albano Madrid, Executive Judge, RTC, Santiago City, Isabela, for
investigation, report and recommendation
 During the scheduled hearings of the case, Atty. Capuchino could not appear as he had suffered a stroke and was under
medication
 All the 8 respondents moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of basis, and for Atty. Capuchino’s failure to appear and to
present evidence against them
o They manifested that they have nothing more to add to their comments filed with the Court

In Judge Madrid’s Undated Report

 Found that the respondents were not guilty of misconduct
 The investigating judge believes that Atty. Capuchino would not care to appear and substantiate his complaint
 He was not a party to the taped conversation
 He was not prejudiced by the letter-complaint of Eugenio Taguba against Tessie Duque nor about the taped conversation
 I suppose that the complaint against the respondents is just a means to get back at them because of the expose they made
regarding the P120,000
 At any rate, the Investigating Judge believes that the outrage of the court employees which prompted them to bring to the
attention of the SC of what they believe was an illegal transaction of another court employee is definitely not a misconduct

OCA’s Report and Recommendation

  OCA disagreed with the findings of Judge Madrid
 It found that the act of respondents Taguba, Aspiras, Apolonio and Santiago of surreptitiously taping their conversations with
Atty. Capuchino and Valencia, without the latter’s knowledge and consent, constitutes misconduct and/or conduct
unbecoming of a court employee
 It confirmed Atty. Capuchino’s allegation that respondent Taguba had been charged with several administrative cases before
this Court
o Taguba, together with respondents Apolonio and Andres, was found guilty of gambling during office hours
Suspended for one (1) month and one (1) day
o Taguba was also found guilty of violation of Republic Act No. 3019 and conduct unbecoming a court employee
 Suspended for six (6) months

The OCA recommended that:

1. The criminal aspect of the case be referred back to the Ombudsman for proper disposition
2. Respondents Taguba, Apolonio and Santiago be suspended for one (1) month for misconduct
3. Respondents Gatcheco and Andres be exonerated as they were absent when the act complained of transpired
4. The issue of Aspiras’ administrative liability be declared moot and academic as he has retired from the service; and
5. The instant case against Bretania be dismissed as her participation in the act complained of could not clearly be established
6. Dismissed the complaint against Alvarez for insufficiency of evidence

 Hence, the present administrative case only relates to respondents Taguba, Apolonio and Santiago

Respondents’ Arguments:
 Taguba denied that he was motivated by malice in bringing Valencia’s deposit of funds to Judge Rosete’s attention and in
filing a complaint against Duque based on the taped conversation
o Believed that the taping was for the good of the service
o All he wanted was to ferret out the truth
o Insisted that Atty. Capuchino has no cause to file the complaint against them because the criminal case of his client
had already been terminated
 Santiago denied any participation in the taping, insisting that she was implicated because she was the owner of the tape
recorder used
o It was borrowed from her by somebody whom she could no longer remember
 On her part, Apolonio, together with Aspiras, maintained that the accusation against them cannot prosper because the
matters covered are matters of public interest – the interest of the Judiciary itself

Note: SC resolved this case based on the question/issue below, and not on the basis of whether respondents Taguba, Apolonio and
Santiago violated the Anti-Wire Tapping Act

ISSUE: Whether the accused employees breached the norms and standards of service in the judiciary.

RULING:
 Yes.
 Their concerted acts – of:
o Leading Atty. Capuchino and Valencia into the court sala
o Engaging them in conversation regarding the money deposited with Duque
o Taping their conversation without Capuchino’s & Valencia’s knowledge, and
o Later, using the taped conversation as basis of the complaint they filed against Duque – constitute misconduct
 Santiago’s claim that she forgot who borrowed her tape recorder and for what purpose it was borrowed is not credible
 The Court observes that there exists animosity among the judges and employees of the court
 When the present case was referred to Judge Plata for investigation, he inhibited himself on the ground that the respondents
had filed a complaint against him and that he had also filed a criminal case against all of them
 The filing of the complaint against Duque was instigated by Taguba
o Initially signed only by Taguba, he prevailed upon the other respondents to co-sign his letter addressed to then Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., which was later docketed as A.M. No. P-05-1958
 He introduced as evidence in this complaint the tape recorded conversation
 Although Duque was penalized for simple misconduct, the Court found that there “was no evidence that she was moved by
evident bad faith, dishonesty or hatred” in receiving Valencia’s money for safekeeping
 We cannot say the same of Taguba’s actions in the animosity-ridden atmosphere apparently obtaining in the MTCC of
Santiago City
  Making false accusations and sowing intrigues are acts unbecoming of a public servant
o They run against the principles of public service envisioned by the 1987 Constitution and by the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials & Employees (RA 6713)
o These acts divert the attention of public employees and the courts from their more important tasks, and result in
undue wastage of government resources
 They cannot be tolerated if we are to demand the highest degree of excellence and professionalism among public employees,
and if we are to preserve the integrity and dignity of our courts

 Misconduct, on the other hand, is a transgression of some definite or established rule of action
o More particularly, it is unlawful behavior by the public officer and refers as well to wrongful or improper behavior
under applicable provisions of the Code of Ethics
o The term “gross” connotes something “out of all measure; beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful such conduct as is
not be excused”
o For administrative liability to attach, it must be established that the respondent was moved by bad faith, dishonesty,
hatred or other similar motives

Application
 Clearly, substantial evidence exists in this case to hold Taguba guilty of gross misconduct punishable by dismissal from the
service even for the first offense
 Not only did he disregard the terms of the Anti-Wiretapping Act within court premises where the public should feel most
secure about their personal liberties
o He undertook the act to secure evidence against a co-employee
o He obtained and used the taped conversation as basis for a complaint against Duque who was penalized for the
deposit she had accepted
 We cannot accept, under these circumstances, any claimed absence of bad faith after considering the devious method Taguba
employed and the purpose that it served, however lofty Taguba thought his purpose had been

 Unfortunately, we can no longer impose the penalty of dismissal on Taguba because he has retired from the service on
disability effective September 1, 2006
o Additionally, we recently found Taguba guilty of gross misconduct in another for soliciting P25,000 from the
defendant in a pending case with the promise that he would work for the defendant’s acquittal
 In lieu of the dismissal that at that point we could no longer impose because of his previous retirement, the Court — “given
the gravity of respondent Taguba’s offense” — ordered the forfeiture of Taguba’s disability retirement benefits
 While we therefore find Taguba administratively liable in the present case, we have run out of administrative penalties to
impose on him
 Nothing, however, can stop us from holding and declaring him liable for the gross misconduct that he stands charged with

 As to Apolonio and Santiago

o The Court finds them guilty of simple misconduct for their participation in the illegal tape recording of the
complainant and his client
o We so rule given the evidence that they merely followed the lead of Taguba
 Under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, simple misconduct is a less grave offense punishable by
suspension for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months for the first offense, and dismissal for the second offense

Disposition:
 Finds respondent Taguba guilty of gross misconduct
 Respondents Apolonio and Santiago – guilty of simple misconduct
 Apolonio – ordered suspended for 1 year effective immediately, with the warning that any similar or graver offense at any
time in the future shall merit the penalty of outright dismissal
 Santiago – ordered suspended for 6 months effective immediately, with the warning that any similar or graver offense at any
time in the future shall merit the penalty of outright dismissal

Atty. Dela Fuente Torres v Atty. Dalangin, Dec. 5, 2017

These are four administrative complaints that were separately filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) by and against substantially the same parties, particularly:

(l) CBD Case No. 11-3215 for gross immorality, malpractice and gross misconduct filed by Atty. Rosita L. Dela Fuente-Torres (Atty.
Torres). et al., against Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin (Atty. Dalangin) and docketed before the Court as A.C. No. 10758:

(2) CBD Case No. 12-3292 for gross misconduct filed by Glenda Alvaro (Alvaro) against Atty. Dalangin and docketed before the Court
as A.C. No. 10759;

(3) CBD Case No. 12-3369 for gross misconduct, violation of the lawyer’s oath and violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR) filed by Atty. Dalangin against Atty. Torres and Atty. Avelino Andres (Atty. Andres), docketed in this Court as A.C.
No. 10760 ; and

(4) CBD Case No. 12-3458 for grave misconduct, dishonesty and violation of Canon 1 of the CPR filed by Atty. Dalangin against Atty.
Torres and docketed in this Court as A.C. No. 10761.

FACTS (relevant to our topic):

A.C. No. 10760

 The two other complaints, CBD Case No. 12-3369 and CBD Case No. 12-3458, were instituted by Atty. Dalangin.
 In CBD Case No. 12-3369, Atty. Dalangin sought the disbarment of Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres for gross misconduct,
violation of the lawyer's oath, and breach of Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1 of the CPR.
 He claimed that both lawyers conspired with their clients in filing CBD Case No. 11-3215, even as they violated Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
 Submitted to support CBD Case No. 11-3215 was Nonilo Alejo’s (Alejo) affidavit, which contained a transcript of a recorded
telephone conversation between Alejo and one Wilma Pineda (Pineda). The recording was without the prior knowledge and
consent of Pineda.
 As a backgrounder, Atty. Dalangin was accused in CBD Case No. 11- 3215 of fabricating testimonies against Noveras, who was
claimed to be a vital witness in a criminal case against Pascual.
o In an affidavit drafted by Atty. Dalangin for Pineda, the latter complained of Noveras and Alejo’s failure to return in
full the cash bond that she posted in a case for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law, even after the case had been
dismissed by the trial court. This allegation was negated in the disputed transcript, as Pineda allegedly confirmed
receiving the full ₱8,000.00, but decided to give half thereof to Alejo for a "blow-out" after her case’s dismissal.
 Both Atty. Andres and Atty. Torres disputed the complaint.
 Atty. Andres asserted that CBD Case No. 12-3369 was filed only to harass and intimidate him, being the counsel of the
complainants in CBD Case No. 11- 3215.
o By way of defense, he adopted a counter-affidavit which he submitted in a separate complaint for violation of R.A.
No. 4200 that was filed by Atty. Dalangin with the City Prosecutor of Pasig City.
o Atty. Andres therein argued that on the basis of Atty. Dalangin’s allegations, the case should have been filed by
Pineda against Alejo, being the purported victim and the one who recorded the conversation, respectively.
 Atty. Torres, on the other hand, pointed out that Atty. Dalangin’s reference to R.A. No. 4200 was tantamount to an admission
that the conversation actually transpired.
 This only confirmed a fault committed by Atty. Dalangin for the fabrications in Pineda's earlier affidavit, which was executed
purposely to destroy the credibility of Noveras. The submission of the transcript was necessary because Atty. Dalangin’s
malpractice was one of the main causes of action in CBD Case No. 11-3215.
 Moreover, the record of the conversation between Alejo and Pineda could not be considered a violation of R.A. No. 4200
because no wire or cable was used to tap their cellular phones. Neither party in the conversation also complained of a
supposed wiretapping.

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner

 The four administrative complaints were eventually consolidated and jointly resolved by the IBP.
 Investigating Commissioner Honesto A. Villamor (Investigating Commissioner) issued a Consolidated Report and
Recommendation which found sufficient bases for Atty. Dalangin’s suspension from the practice of law for three years.
o Atty. Dalangin’s charges against Atty. Dela Torres and Atty. Andres, on the other hand, were recommended for
dismissal.
Recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors

 Adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioner’s Consolidated Report and Recommendation.
 Atty. Dalangin filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the IBP Board of Governors in a Resolution.
 On February 26, 2015, Atty. Dominic C. M. Solis, Director for Bar Discipline, IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, transmitted
the case records to the Court pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
 On even date and before the Court could have rendered its final action on the disbarment complaints against Atty.
Dalangin vis-a-vis the records forwarded by the IBP, Atty. Dalangin forthwith filed with the Court a Petition for Review, which
questioned the IBP resolutions that, first, declared him administratively liable in CBD Case Nos. 11-3215 and 12- 3292,
and second, dismissed his complaints against Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres in CBD Case Nos. 12-3369 and 12-3458.
 In a Resolution, the Court consolidated these cases and, without giving due course to the petition for review, required the
filing of Comments on the petition.
 Accordingly, a Consolidated Comment on the Petition was filed by Andres & Associates Law Office, as counsel for Atty. Torres,
et al., being the complainants in CBD Case Nos. 11-3215 and 12-3292, and respondents in CBD Case Nos. 12-3369 and 12-
3458. Thereafter, Atty. Dalangin filed his Reply to the consolidated comment.

ISSUE: WON Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres violated the Anti-Wire Tapping Act

RULING: NO.

A.C. No. 10760

 The Court affirms the decision of the IBP to dismiss the administrative complaints filed by Atty. Dalangin against Atty. Torres
and Atty. Andres.
 In A.C. No. 10760, Atty. Dalangin sought to support his complaint by referring to the supposed participation of Atty. Torres
and Atty. Andres in a violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
 He asserted that the act also violated the lawyer's oath, and breached Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the CPR which reads:

CANON 1 - A LA WYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND
LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.

 The alleged violation of the statute is a serious charge that the Court cannot take lightly, in view of the breach of the basic
and constitutional right to privacy of communication that inevitably results from the act.
 In brief, the law prohibits any person "to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly
overhear, intercept or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or
dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder x x x." It likewise forbids any person from possessing, replaying
or furnishing transcriptions of communications that are obtained in violation of the law.

APPLICATION:

 In this case, Atty. Dalangin claimed that Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres conspired with Alejo on the wrongful recording of a
private communication with Pineda, along with the use of the transcript thereof to support Alejo’s affidavit in CBD Case No.
11-3215.
 However, Pineda's own denial of the truth of the statements in the transcription lends doubt as to the allegation of a
purported secret recording of an actual conversation.
 While Pineda denied knowledge that her telephone conversation with Alejo was recorded by the latter, she still refused to
acknowledge the veracity of the assertions that she allegedly made as contained in the transcript, which then appears to be
a rejection of the supposed conversation.
 Given the circumstances, the IBP correctly ruled that Atty. Dalangin failed to substantiate the charges in his complaint against
Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres.
OTHER Court Rulings:

Re: Procedure from Resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors

 The Court finds it appropriate to first address the matter of Atty. Dalangin’s immediate recourse to the Court via a petition
for review that questioned the IBP Board of Governors' resolve to affirm the Investigating Commissioner's recommendation
on his administrative liability, notwithstanding the fact that the Court had not yet taken a final action on the complaints.
 When the administrative complaints were resolved by the IBP and the instant petition for review was filed in Court, the
procedure from resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors in administrative cases was as provided in the former Section 12
of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, prior to the amendments introduced by Bar Matter No. 1645 dated October 13, 2015.
The old rule read:

Section 12. Review and decision by the Board of' Governors.

a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record and evidence
transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing and shall
clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is based. It shall be promulgated within a period not exceeding
thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board following the submittal of the Investigator's report.

b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent should be suspended from
the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together
with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.

c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction imposed by it is less than suspension or
disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it shall issue a decision exonerating respondent or imposing such
sanction. The case shall be deemed terminated unless upon petition of the complainant or other interested party filed
with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Board’s resolution, the Supreme Co mi orders otherwise.

d) Notice of the resolution or decision of the Board shall be given to all parties through their counsel. A copy of the same shall
be transmitted to the Supreme Court. (Emphases supplied)

 In B.M. No. 1755 captioned Re: Clarification of Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline, the Court applied this
provision to address the issue therein involved, and explained its proper application in a Resolution dated June 17, 2008. The
Court set the following guidelines:

In case a decision is rendered by the [Board of Governors (BOG)] that exonerates the respondent or imposes a sanction less
than suspension or disbarment, the aggrieved party can file a motion for reconsideration within the 15-day period from
notice. If the motion is denied, said party can file a petition for a review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with this Court
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the resolution resolving the motion. If no motion for reconsideration is filed, the
decision shall become final and executory and a copy of said decision shall be furnished this Court.

If the imposable penalty is suspension from the practice of law or disbarment, the BOG shall issue a resolution setting forth
its findings and recommendations. The aggrieved party can file a motion for reconsideration of said resolution with the
BOG within fifteen (15) days from notice. The BOG shall first resolve the incident and shall thereafter elevate the assailed
resolution with the entire case records to this Court for final action. If the 15-day period lapses without any motion for
reconsideration having been filed, then the BOG shall likewise transmit to this Court the resolution with the entire case
records for appropriate action. (Emphases supplied)

Application:

 Nowhere in his petition did Atty. Dalangin attempt to justify his immediate filing of the petition for review questioning the
IBP resolutions that recommended his suspension.
o It could nonetheless be inferred from the circumstances that Atty. Dalangin's chosen course of action was to
preclude the forfeiture of his right to question the dismissal of the administrative cases where he served as
complainant, given that Section 12(c) provides that where the respondent is exonerated, (t)he case shall be deemed
terminated unless upon a petition of the complainant or other interested party filed with Supreme Court within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the Board's resolution, the Supreme Court orders otherwise.
 o For this reason, the Court refused to make an outright denial of Atty. Dalangin’s petition for review notwithstanding
the fact that it questioned the resolve to suspend him from the practice of law.
o Considering that the petition likewise covered the IBP's dismissal of the disbarment cases against Atty. Torres and
Atty. Andres, the Court, in a Resolution dated June 16, 2015, directed the filing of comments on the petition.
 In any case, it must still be stressed that the filing of the petition for review on the issue of Atty. Dalangin’s suspension from
the practice of law was as yet not among his remedies, considering that the Court still had to release its final action on the
matter.
 It is the Supreme Court, not the IBP, which has the constitutionally mandated duty to discipline lawyers.
 The factual findings of the IBP can only be recommendatory. Its recommended penalties are also, by their nature,
recommendatory.
 In light of these precepts, the Court will then not refuse a review of the IBP's recommendation for Atty. Dalangin’s suspension
notwithstanding the premature filing of the petition.
 In fact, an examination of the IBP resolutions for his suspension is warranted as a matter of course, even in the absence of a
petition, because it is the Court that has the duty to take a final action on any determination of the IBP for a lawyer's
suspension from the practice of law or disbarment.
 Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court had in fact been later amended by B.M. No. 1645 dated October 13, 2015. Section 12 thereof
now reads:

Sec. 12. Review and recommendation by the Board of Governors.

a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record and evidence
transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report.

b) After its review, the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, shall recommend to the Supreme Court the
dismissal of the complaint or the imposition of disciplinary action against the respondent. The Board shall issue a resolution
setting forth its findings and recommendations, clearly and distinctly stating the facts and the reasons on which it is based.
The resolution shall be issued within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board following the
submission of the Investigator's report.

c) The Board’s resolution, together with the entire records and all evidence presented and submitted, shall be transmitted to
the Supreme Court for final action within ten (10) days from issuance of the resolution.

d) Notice of the resolution shall be given to all parties through their counsel, if any.

 In Vasco-Tamaray v. Daquis, the Court emphasized that the amendments reiterated the principle that only the Court has the
power to impose disciplinary action on members of the bar.
 Factual findings and recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline and the Board of Governors of the IBP are
recommendatory, subject to review by the Court.
 As the Court now reviews the IBP’s resolve to dismiss the complaints against Atty. Torres and Atty. Andres, it then also enters
its final action on the IBP Board of Governors’ recommendation to suspend Atty. Dalangin from the practice of law for three
years, as the IBP cited gross misconduct, violations of the CPR and breach of the lawyer's oath as grounds.

Re: A.C. No. 10758

Gross Immorality

 Among several cited grounds, the IBP’s recommendation to suspend Atty. Dalangin from the practice of law for three years
was on the pretext that he publicly and openly maintained a romantic relationship with Pascual even when their marriages
with their respective spouses subsisted.
 Time and again, the Court has indeed regarded extramarital affairs of lawyers to offend the sanctity of marriage, the family,
and the community. Illicit relationships likewise constitute a violation of Article XV, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution which
states that, "[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State." When lawyers are engaged in wrongful relationships that blemish their ethics and morality, the usual recourse is for
the erring attorney's suspension from the practice of law, if not disbarment.
 Upon the Court’s review, however, it finds NO sufficient basis to suspend Atty. Dalangin for a supposed illicit affair with
Pascual. That an amorous relationship actually existed between them was not adequately proved.
 The quantum of proof in administrative cases is substantial evidence.
  The recent ruling on the matter is Cabas v. Sususco, which was promulgated just this June 15, 2016. In the said case, it was
pronounced that:
o In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence, i.e., that
'amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. x x x.
o Accordingly, this more recent pronouncement ought to control and therefore, quell any further confusion on the
proper evidentiary threshold to be applied in administrative cases against lawyers.
 Further, the Court emphasized in Cabas v. Sususco the oft-repeated rule that "mere allegation is not evidence and is not
equivalent to proof. Charges based on mere suspicion and speculation likewise cannot be given credence."
 With careful consideration of the foregoing tenets, the Court's perusal of the records reveals an insufficiency of evidence that
could warrant the recommended suspension from the practice of law.
 To begin with, the two affidavits considered by the IBP as bases for its finding of Atty. Dalangin’s gross immorality harped
only on general statements of a supposed personal and public knowledge on the wrongful relationship between Atty.
Dalangin and Pascual.
 The circumstances that could have led them to their conclusion were scant and unsubstantiated. The most concrete proof
that they could offer was the birth of Julienne, yet even the child's birth certificate, a public document, expressly indicated
the girl’s father to be Pascual's husband, and not Atty. Dalangin. 61 Julienne’s baptismal certificate62 also provided such fact,
along with a confirmation of Atty. Dalangin’s defense on his closeness to Julienne for being her godfather.
 It would be unfair to Atty. Dalangin, more so for the child whose filiation is in a way needlessly dragged into this case, for the
Court to affirm the assertions in the complaint and the IBP's findings and conclusions on the basis of the available evidence.
 The alleged similarities in the physical appearances of Atty. Dalangin and Julienne were but lame and dismal validations of
the complainants’ vehement claim of paternity.
 Even the photographs of Atty. Dalangin, Pascual and Julienne in what appeared to be a trip to Puerto Princesa, Palawan were
insufficient to support a conclusion on the unlawful relations.
o The lone photo where Atty. Dalangin appeared with Pascual and Julienne, who were apparently merely waiting for
boarding in an airport terminal, utterly failed to manifest any romantic or filial bond among them. It was also
explained through an affidavit executed by spouses Dante Capindian and Timotea Jamito that Atty. Dalangin was a
principal sponsor, while Pascual’s family were guests, in their wedding which was held on August 6, 2011 in Puerto
Princesa, Palawan. Apparently, the photos were taken during the said trip. Pascual’s husband, Edgardo, was also
present for the occasion.
 The Court, nonetheless, does not find Atty. Dalangin totally absolved of fault.
o While he vehemently denied any romantic relationship with Pascual, he admitted demonstrating closeness with the
latter's family, including her children.
o It was such display of affection that could have sparked in the minds of observers the idea of a wrongful relationship
and belief that Julienne was a product of the illicit affair.
o Atty. Dalangin should have been more prudent and mindful of his actions and the perception that his acts built upon
the public, particularly because he and Pascual were both married.
o "As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of
good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community."
o As keepers of public faith, lawyers are burdened with a high degree of social responsibility and, hence, must handle
their personal affairs with great caution."
 The fault, nonetheless, does not warrant Atty. Dalangin’s suspension, much less disbarment. An admonition should suffice
under the circumstances. The following pronouncement in Advincula v. Macabata is pertinent:
 While it is discretionary upon the Court to impose a particular sanction that it may deem proper against an erring lawyer, it
should neither be arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, but should ever be controlled by
the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity and independence of the bar and to exact from the lawyer strict
compliance with his duties to the court, to his client, to his brethren in the profession and to the public.
 x x x Only those acts which cause loss of moral character should merit disbarment or suspension, while those acts which
neither affect nor erode the moral character of the lawyer should only justify a lesser sanction unless they are of such nature
and to such extent as to clearly show the lawyer's unfitness to continue in the practice of law. x x x

Gross Misconduct and

Malpractice

 Atty. Dalangin was also charged, and recommended for suspension from the practice of law, for several other acts involving
use of misleading evidence in court and preparation of affidavits with perjured statements to support cases and complaints
for disbarment.
 When he still served as a public attorney, he likewise allegedly demanded acceptance fees from indigent clients, and appeared
in courts beyond his area of jurisdiction.
 Even these charges, however, were not supported by evidence that could warrant Atty. Dalangin’s suspension.
 And while there were several other charges included in the complaint against Atty. Dalangin, the accusations were actually
for actions that should be attributed not to him, but to other individuals like Pascual.
 Specifically on the claim that Atty. Dalangin failed to fully explain to Marzan and Valdez the contents of the affidavit that
supported a disbarment case against Atty. Torres, the Court takes note of the fact that the alleged failure to explain did not
necessarily equate to the falsity of the claims therein made.
 The charge of malpractice for Atty. Dalangin's supposed demand for attorney's fees while he still worked as a PAO lawyer
also remained unsubstantiated by evidence.1âwphi1 Such serious imputation could not have been adequately established by
an affidavit that was executed in 2010 by a lone person, Camacho, from whom the demand for ₱8,000.00 was allegedly made
in 2001.
 Anent the failure of Atty. Dalangin to submit all pages of a certificate of title in Civil Case No. 336-SD(04)AF pending with the
RTC, Branch 88, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija and entitled Tamayo v. Philippine National Bank, it has been explained that the
error had been corrected at once during the pre-trial conference.
 Among the other charges imputed against Atty. Dalangin in A.C. No. 10758, the Court only finds fault for his misquote of
jurisprudence cited in a pleading filed with the RTC, Branch 35, Gapan City for Cad. Case No. 1564-05 entitled Bangko Luzon
v. Diaz.
 It was narrated in the complaint in CBD Case No. 11-3215 that:
 14. x x x [T]he cited jurisprudence is hereto quoted:
 "If a court of competent jurisdiction annulled the foreclosure sale of the property in question, the issuance of a writ of
possession ceases to be ministerial."
 15. In the said case of BPI vs. Tampipi, there is nothing mentioned about the cessation of the ministerial function of the court
but instead what is clearly stated in the decision are the following:
 "Until the foreclosure sale of the property in question is annulled by a court of competent jurisdiction, the issuance of a writ
of possession remains the ministerial duty of the trial court."73
 Atty. Dalangin invoked adherence to the substance and spirit of the cited ruling. As counsel and officer of the court, however,
with the corresponding duty to aid the courts in the task of ascertaining the truth, Atty. Dalangin was remiss in the discharge
of his duties under the CPR. Canon 10, Rule 10.02 thereof provides:
o "[a] lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of paper, the language or the argument of
the opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as a law a provision already rendered
inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved."
 The Court, nonetheless, still does not find suspension to be an appropriate penalty for the act. While the Court detests Atty.
Dalangin’s failure to properly indicate that the statement was not a verbatim reproduction of the cited jurisprudence and,
accordingly, calls his attention on the matter, it finds the admonition to be adequate.
 A suspension for the lone incident would be too harsh a penalty. It appeared that the supposed quotation was Atty. Dalangin’s
own conclusion from the cited jurisprudence. There was no clear indication that the statement was intended to mislead the
court or commit a falsehood; there was no brazen deviation from the principle or doctrine that was embodied in the
jurisprudence's original text.

Re: A.C. No. 10759

 In relation to A.C. No. 10759 on Atty. Dalangin’s altercation on November 14, 2011 with Alvaro as the latter was waiting for
the start of a court hearing in the RTC of Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, the records include affidavits executed by witnesses who
did not appear to have any reason to falsely testify against Atty. Dalangin on the incident.
 Affiant Josephine Rivera, in particular, who claimed to be also then waiting for a scheduled hearing, allegedly saw Atty.
Dalangin shout and point at Alvaro, as he threatened to file a case against the latter.
 Two security guards stationed at the trial court, evidently disinterested persons who would not have wrongly testified against
Atty. Dalangin, likewise confirmed that such heated confrontation actually transpired.
 For the Court, Atty. Dalangin erred in his conduct subject of the complaint, especially since his outburst was carried out within
the court premises and in the presence of several persons who readily witnessed his fit of anger. Part of Atty. Dalangin’s
duties as a lawyer is to maintain the honor that is due the profession. Members of the legal profession should commit to the
mandates of Canon 7, particularly Rule 7 .03 thereof, to wit:
 CANON 7 - A LA WYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD TI-IE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION XX X.
 Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
  Although Atty. Dalangin, at that instant, could have been stirred by his frustration or resentment for the disbarment case
filed against him by Alvaro, such circumstance could not have absolved him from any responsibility for his conduct. At most,
this only serves to mitigate the penalty that the Court deems appropriate to impose, as it likewise considers its finding that
Alvaro’s allegations in CBD Case No. 11-3215 on the supposed extra-marital affair of Atty. Dalangin with Pascual were indeed
not backed by sufficient evidence.
 The Court finds it appropriate to impose upon Atty. Dalangin a fine of ₱5,000.00, with a stem warning that a more severe
sanction will be imposed on him for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the future.
 Although the Court has admonished Atty. Dalangin in A.C. No. 10758, it finds the imposition of this fine still suitable under
the circumstances, given that A.C. No. 10759, although resolved jointly with A.C. No. 10758, is a distinct administrative case
that covers a separate complaint that was instituted solely by Alvaro. The severity of this offense likewise varies from the
other breaches for which the Court has determined the admonition to be appropriate.

Re: 10761

 The commission of perjury was imputed upon Atty. Torres, as the person who prepared the affidavits of Marzan and Valdez.
As witnesses in CBD Case No. 11-3215, Marzan and Valdez claimed that Atty. Dalangin prepared an affidavit for Atty. Torres'
disbarment without fully explaining to them the contents thereof.
 The fact that Atty. Torres induced the affiants to make perjured statements, however, was not established by clear and
convincing proof.
 Even granting that statements of affiants were eventually determined to be inaccurate and untruthful, it would be wrong to
at once ascribe error or fault upon the lawyers who drafted the affidavits, in the absence of clear and sufficient proof that
they actively participated in the intentional commission of a fraud or declaration of fabricated statements.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the Court rules as follows:

(1) In A.C. No. 10758, respondent Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin is ADMONISHED to be more prudent and cautious in handling his personal
affairs and dealings with courts and the public, with a STERN WARNING that any repetition of the same or similar acts in the future
shall be dealt with more severely;

(2) In A.C. No. 10759, Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin is FINED Five Thousand Pesos (₱5,000.00) for his breach of Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, with a STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction will be imposed upon him for any repetition
of the same or similar offense in the future; and

(3) In A.C. No. 10760 and A.C. No. 10761, Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin’s petition for review is DENIED. The Court AFFIRMS the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors' Resolution No. XX-2013-768 dated June 21, 2013 and Resolution dated August 8, 2014,
insofar as the IBP Board of Governors dismissed the following complaints: (1) CBD Case No. 12-3369 against Atty. Rosita L. Dela Fuente-
Torres and Atty. Avelino Andres; and (2) CBD Case No. 12-3458 against Atty. Rosita L. Dela Fuente-Torres.

SO ORDERED.

Notes:

Facts under A.C. No. 10758:

 CBD Case No. 11-3215 is a complaint for gross immorality, malpractice and gross misconduct filed against Atty. Dalangin by
the following complainants: (1) Atty. Torres; (2) Felicidad O. Samatra (Samatra); (3) Alvaro; (4) Mary DF. Noveras (Noveras);
and (5) Generosa S. Camacho (Camacho).
 The complaint imputed upon Atty. Dalangin several breaches of his duties as a lawyer.
 First, it was alleged that Atty. Dalangin filed against employees of the Judiciary and a fellow lawyer groundless suits, which
were merely prompted by his loss in a case and intended to cover up his negligence as counsel.
o By his acts, Atty. Dalangin committed gross misconduct, and breached Rule 18.03, Canon 18, Rules 1.02 and 1.03,
Canon 1, and Canon 11 of the CPR.
o It appeared that prior to the institution of CBD Case No. 11-3215, a complaint for disbarment was filed against Atty.
Torres by Marzan and Valdez, who were clients of Atty. Dalangin and the losing parties in an unlawful detainer case
decided by Presiding Judge Efren B. Mallare (Judge Mallare) of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sto. Domingo,
Nueva Ecija. Marzan and Valdez later disclosed to Atty. Torres that the filing of the disbarment case was orchestrated
 by Atty. Dalangin, who prepared the affidavit and instructed them to sign it even without explaining the contents
and tenor of the document.
 Second, Atty. Dalangin was accused of maintaining an illicit and immoral affair with one Julita Pascual (Pascual), a clerk
at the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) in Talavera, Nueva Ecija, where Atty. Dalangin previously worked as district public
attorney.
o After Atty. Dalangin had left PAO, he retained Pascual as his private secretary, who still remained to be employed
with PAO. Atty. Dalangin and Pascual had a daughter whom they named Julienne, even when each of them had
existing marriages with some other persons.
o The affair between Atty. Dalangin and Pascual, and the paternity of Julienne, were known to the community,
especially the courts.
o Julienne was nonetheless entered in the civil registry as Pascual and her legal husband's own child so as to
conceal the fact that Atty. Dalangin was the real father. The foregoing acts allegedly breached Rule 1.01, Canon
1, and Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the CPR.
 Third, Atty. Dalangin was accused of malpractice for acts that dated back to his prior employment with PAO. He allegedly
collected attorney’s fees from indigent litigants who sought his assistance, like complainant Camacho from whom he
demanded an acceptance fee of ₱8,000.00. When Camacho explained that he could only produce ₱3,000.00, Atty.
Dalangin threw the case records on a table and retorted, "Mabubuhay ba naman ang abogado [ditto]." Without prior
authority from his superiors, Atty. Dalangin also willfully appeared in areas outside his jurisdiction as a district public
attorney.
 Fourth, the complaint included charges that pertained to Atty. Dalangin's handling of his court cases.
o It was claimed that Atty. Dalangin misquoted jurisprudence in a pleading he filed in court, which act constituted
a breach of Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the CPR. In a case for robbery filed by Samatra against Pascual, Atty. Dalangin
also wielded his influence and prepared perjured statements from supposed witnesses, a clear violation of Rule
10.02, Canon 10 of the CPR.
 Finally, Atty. Dalangin violated Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the CPR when he submitted in a civil case fraudulent and
misleading evidence, particularly a certificate of title without the page reflecting the annotations pertinent to the case.

Atty. Dalangin’s Answer:

 Atty. Dalangin filed his Answer and refuted all charges.

 He denied having a hand in the preparation of the disbarment complaint against Atty. Torres, as he argued that neither his
name nor his signature appeared in the records thereof.
 His relationship with Pascual, on the other hand, was only maliciously misinterpreted. He was only a close friend of the
Pascuals, and some of Pascual’s children, including Julienne, were his godchildren.
 Atty. Dalangin likewise denied the claim that he collected attorney's fees while he worked as a PAO lawyer. Although he
admitted appearing as a public attorney in an area that was beyond his jurisdiction, the appearance 1 was with the Regional
Public Attorney's verbal authority, claimed by Atty. Dalangin to be sufficient under office practice.
 Finally, the alleged mistakes that he committed as counsel in specific cases' presentation of evidence had been rectified in
court.

Facts under A.C. No. 10759

 CBD Case No. 12-3292, a complaint for gross misconduct, was filed by Alvaro against Atty. Dalangin for an incident that
happened on the morning of November 14, 2011, while Alvaro was waiting for the start of a hearing at the lobby of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 37, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija.
 Upon seeing Alvaro, Atty. Dalangin allegedly hurled slanderous and defamatory remarks against her, as he spoke at the top
of his voice and referred to her as a "certified swindler." He also confronted and threatened Alvaro for her participation in
the filing of CBD Case No. 11-3215, and then precluded her from visiting the PAO in Talavera, Nueva Ecija.
 Atty. Dalangin’s tirade was heard and witnessed by several persons, and some of them executed their respective affidavits to
narrate the incident.
 The foregoing impelled Alvaro to seek Atty. Dalangin’s disbarment for a violation of Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1, Rule 7.03,
Canon 7, and Rule 8.02, Canon 8 of the CPR.

Dalangin’s Answer:

 While Atty. Dalangin admitted in his Answer the alleged confrontation, he denied shouting invectives at Alvaro.
  When he talked to Alvaro, he merely confronted her for what he claimed were lies declared in her affidavit in CBD Case No.
11-3215. Atty. Dalangin also warned to seek legal remedies should Alvaro fail to substantiate the truth of her testimonies.
 Atty. Dalangin also admitted that he precluded Alvaro from visiting PAO, but explained that this was prompted by his
knowledge that Alvaro was a fixer, who used the name of the office and demanded money from indigent clients.
 For Atty. Dalangin, Alvaro filed this complaint to get back at Atty. Dalangin for banning her at the PAO and depriving her of
earning from her illegal activities.20

Facts under A.C. No. 10761

 The complaint docketed as CBD Case No. 12-3458 was filed solely against Atty. Torres for grave misconduct, dishonesty for
violation of Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code, and breach of Canon 1 of the CPR.
 Atty. Dalangin faulted Atty. Torres for submitting in CBD Case No. 11-3215 Marzan and Valdez’s affidavit, which allegedly
contained untruthful statements. Marzan and Valdez knew from the beginning that they were complainants in a disbarment
case against Atty. Torres. Atty. Torres, however, later made them issue the perjured statements by using as a leverage her
own complaint for perjury against Marzan and Valdez, who were then pressured to sign the affidavits in exchange for the
perjury case’s dismissal.
 In her Answer to the complaint, Atty. Torres insisted on the truth of the statements made by Marzan and Valdez in their
affidavit in CBD Case No. 11-3215.