10

HUMAN ERRORS AND

STRUCTURAL RELIABILITY

R. E. MELCHERS

1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter is concerned with human error as it affects the products of the structural engineering
profession and the construction industry. Yet is must be said at the outset that the structural engineering
industry has an excellent record in achieving structural safety and structural serviceability. The risk of
death as a result of structural failure while a structure is in use is very low, as indicated in Table W-
I. The statistics for structural failure therein refer to buildings, bridges, etc., but even extending the
definition to the structural components of aircraft, trains, aerospace vehicles, and motor cars will not
change the conclusions significantly. It is clear that only very occasionally do significant structural
failures occur. Why, then, should we be concerned about structural reliability and in particular the
influence of human error on structural reliability?
The reasons are twofold. One is concern with the safety of new, perhaps inherently risky ventures
and the safety of personnel using them and the other is concern with the general safety of members of
society. New forms of bridge construction and extension of techniques beyond previous applications
are well known to have been the apparent cause of failure in the past. Similarly, development of ever
more complex systems, both structural and non structural, has been accompanied by occasional, some-
times spectacular, failures. Examples include the Tay bridge, the Tacoma Narrows bridge, and the West
Gate bridge and nonstructural systems such as the Flixborough and Bhopal chemical plants and the
Chernobyl nuclear plant. The implication is that whenever new or particularly hazardous systems are
being designed, constructed, and used, there should be particular interest in their safety and this applies
to structural engineering as much as to complex systems more generally.
Society is interested in structural reliability only in the sense that a structural failure with significant
consequences shatters confidence in the stability and continuity of one's surroundings. Buildings,
bridges, and other such structures are seen as "rock solid," "strong," and very much part of our
permanent environment. History shows that buildings and bridges usually last a long time: perhaps on
the order of hundreds of years. Society does not expect structures to fail. However, it is much less
surprised at deaths due to motor car accidents and accepts aircraft crashes somewhat less easily. Clearly,
there is a difference in expectations: the risk levels for buildings and bridges are usually associated with

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C. Sundararajan (ed.), Probabilistic Structural Mechanics Handbook
© Chapman & Hall 1995
212 Human Errors and Structural Reliability

involuntary risk (i.e., the background risk associated with day-to-day living) and are much lower than
the risk associated with voluntary activities, such as travel, mountain climbing, deep sea fishing, or
those associated with an occupation.
As most structural engineers know, structural failure is actually quite common. Detailed investigation
of any structure will reveal some observable defects, perhaps even almost immediately on construction.
Usually, however, there are no immediate or significant short-term consequences, although there may
be long-term problems such as those due to corrosion and fatigue. It seems that structural failures are
really only of interest to society when the overt consequences of failures are sufficiently serious. Thus,
even if an almost insignificant error leads to a serious consequence, the importance attached to it will
be very large indeed. Conversely, major errors in structural engineering may occur without anyone ever
becoming aware of them unless there is a structural failure or serious defect. It should be evident,
therefore, that it is not the nature of the error that is committed, but rather the consequences, that govern
not only society's perception of the safety of structures but also what is recorded in history. It is clear,
also, that figures such as those in Table 10-1 reflect consequences, given that failure has occurred. These
two aspects, the failure event and its consequences, cannot be separated. The seriousness of conse-
quences will color any statistics on the reasons for structural failure, a matter perhaps not as widely
recognized as it should be.
Our interest herein is with situations in which human error may not be discounted in assessing the
reliability of a system. For structural engineers this might become necessary when dealing with a novel
structural design or with a novel construction technique (e.g., a new type of offshore structure, or a
new form of bridge). For others it might be necessary when developing proposals for particularly
hazardous facilities, such as nuclear power facilities, chemical plants, or liquefied petroleum gas depots.
One of the difficult aspects of structural reliability theory is the possibility of relating observed rates
of failure of structures to the numbers calculated by reliability theory. The discrepancy has been noted
many times (Brown, 1979; Ellingwood, 1987). Typically, annual rates calculated using high-quality
descriptions of loading, material strength, etc. are one to two orders of magnitude lower than those

Table 10-1. Selected Risks in Society

Approximate Estimated
death rate typical Typical risk of
(X 10- 9 deathslhr exposure death
Activity exposure) (hr/year) (X 1O- 6/year)"

Alpine climbing 30,000-40,000 50 1,500-2,000

Boating 1,500 80 120
Swimming 3,500 50 170
Cigarette smoking 2,500 400 1,000
Air travel 1,200 20 24
Car travel 700 300 200
Train travel 80 200 15
Coal mining (UK) 210 1,500 300
Construction work 70-200 2,200 150-440
Manufacturing 20 2,000 40
Building fires 1-3 8,000 8-24
Structural failures 0.02 6,000 0.1

·Values rounded.
Source: Melchers, R. E. (1987b). Structural Reliability Analysis and Prediction. Chichester, England: Ellis Horwood/John Wiley
& Sons. Reprinted with permission.