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Organizational Behavior
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JOURNAL OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR, VOL. 13, 325-334 (1992)
BLAIR H. SHEPPARD
Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, U.S.A.
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to provide one synthesis of the collection of papers in this issue.
The task of conducting such a review is a daunting one. The authors in this issue are the
field of organizational conflict research (with a few exclusions). Moreover, they appear not
to believe that a synthesis of their different approaches exists. The image of the field of organiza-
tional conflict evoked by a complete read of these papers is that of a schizophrenic with a
very poor prognosis. Brown draws this conclusion most directly:
'I hope that events like this symposium and the formation of the Interest Group on Conflict
Management within the Academy of Management will encourage more interaction between
parochial subcommunities because I believe that improvements in the management of
our academic and intellectual conflicts will be very stimulating and productive in the creation
of new conflict management theory and technology. But I remain skeptical, for I am conti-
nually impressed with the power of parochialism to undercut good intentions' (p. 307).
Others in this issue suggest the same diagnosis by the stridency of their conclusions in favor
of one view over another. Take Pondy as an example. In his paper (p. 257), he argues against
the interpretation of organizational conflict he espoused in 1967. 'Let me suggest that an organi-
zation is precisely the opposite of the cooperative system' (emphasis his).
While as Brown suggests, some of this schizophrenia does derive from parochial association
with different disciplinary constituent groups (e.g. organizational behavior, industrial relation
organizational development, economics, social psychology, anthropology or sociology), I argue
that most of it comes from differences in focus, perspective or frame adopted by the various
strains of research that make up the complex tapestry of organizational conflict research. In
this paper, I will describe two major ways that these differences in focus are manifested, and
then propose a possible cure to the schizophrenia that results from these differences.
A diagnosis
0894-3796/92/030325-10$05.00
? 1992 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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326 B. H. SHEPPARD
fields of study and individual research efforts have tended to be trapped within a single level.
Rare is a study or theory entailing more than one level of analysis.
Research at the institutional level addresses the types of structures, rules, organizational
interdependencies and norms that exist in and between social systems that evoke conflict, and
provide a backdrop against which it is resolved or otherwise managed. Institutional economics
(e.g. Dunlop, 1958; Commons, 1957 and more recently Kochan, Katz and McKersie, 1986),
some organizational theory (e.g. Cyert and March, 1963; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Lawrence
and Lorsch, 1967) and much of the sociological research on conflict (e.g. Marx and Engels,
1948; Strauss, 1978) is written at this level of analysis. At the institutional level, research questions
include: whose interests will be recognized as deserving consideration, or as legitimate? What
conflicts exist between these interests? How should institutions be configured to deal with these
conflicts? As Kochan (p. 289) argues, most of the early history of industrial relations took
an institutional perspective on organizational conflict. The institutional perspective on industrial
relations focused on issues of union representation and recognition, the nature of issues permitted
for discussion in management-labor conflict, and appropriate mechanisms for dealing with
differences on these issues.
Clearly, institutional research has strong policy implications. In addition, institution-
oriented theory contained a store of rich, anecdotal information based on practice. Kochan
also argues that Walton and McKersie's A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations served
as a turning point in the field, away from institutional questions to more dispute-specific research.
As with big egos in small towns, it was as if only one level of analysis could dominate a
field at a time Industrial Relations was too small for two perspectives to coexist. Dispute-
focused, empirical research the type described by Pruitt and Kolb in this issue (p. 297 and
p. 311) - was to dominate the institutional view of Dunlop and Commons and Kerr for the
next few decades.
Thus, the study of labor relations and negotiations shifted from the first, most macroscopic,
to the second, most microscopic level of analysis: the dispute. The study of disputes involves
analysis of the resolution or management of a single conflict that arises in the context of a
relationship, existing in a social system (see Kolb, this issue, p. 311). Thus, the dispute problem
is defined by an episode or event of disagreement. Issues dealt with at the dispute level include
the study of the nature of disagreements in organizations (Robbins, 1974), tactics of conflict
(e.g. Pruitt, 1981), identification of dispute solutions (Nash, 1953; Raiffa, 1982), dispute decision
behavior (Bazerman and Neale, 1983), the conflict process (Putnam and Poole, 1987), the hidden
side of disputes (Kolb and Bartunek, 1992) and conflict management techniques (Thomas, 1976,
1992; Sheppard, 1984). Of course, disputes are highly affected by the nature of the institutions
and the relations in which they are embedded. Thus, an unfriendly acquisition of a company
in the United States is likely to be quite different than an acquisition of a very different company
in Japan. Also, it is clear that a dispute episode can affect a relationship and sometimes an
institution (e.g. the 1980 air traffic controllers' strike changed the face of air traffic control
systems and public sector labor relations). The study of dispute episodes is the sine qua non
of conflict research in the 1980s and early 1990s. In fact, the Lewicki, Weiss and Lewin review
in this issue (p. 209) is almost entirely dedicated to models of the dispute episode.
The third level of analysis the intermediate level, focusing on relationships is the most
difficult to clearly define. At the relationship level, the focus is on how one or more particular
parties (persons, groups, divisions, organizations, or governments) learn to manage their interde-
pendencies over time. Thus, the relational problem is defined by a set of actors while the institutio-
nal problem is defined by a set of rules, or processes or understandings over many actors. The
relational problem is defined by the evolution of many disputes over time, while the dispute
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CONFLICT RESEARCH AS SCHIZOPHRENIA 327
problem concerns the management of one dispute episode. Research problems at the relationship
level include the evolution of principles or practices for allocating work, rewards, or resources
between entities; the evolution of expectations and patterns of interaction; and problems of
coordination and control. Katz and Kahn's (1966) concepts of role conflict and ambiguity,
Thomas' (1976) 'structural model', and Walton's (1969) process models of conflict resolution
exemplify research at this level of analysis.
Clearly, relational dispute issues will be affected by the institution(s) in which a given relation-
ship is embedded. For example, the relationship between a company and a union is very different
in Sweden than in the United States, Japan or the United Kingdom. Similarly, marital conflicts
in the United States were probably very different when divorces were difficult to get, compared
to now when they are relatively frequent and easy to get. Unfortunately, research on the evolution
of relational conflict in different contexts is rare, although stellar examples do exist (e.g. Brown,
1982). In recent years, theorists in the fields of anthropology and organizational development
have been almost the sole purveyors of this level of analysis.
Taken together, these three levels of analysis - individual, relational and institutional
represent a nearly complete picture of organizational conflict. As demonstrated by research
to date, it is possible to investigate issues within any one problem domain without consideration
of the others. However, I think that continuing this artificial separation is done at the great
risk of missing the important issues that lie at the interface of these levels, and at the great
risk of overgeneralizing findings at any one level to the other two levels. Take a non-organizatio-
nal example. It would be possible to investigate how marital laws and norms develop (an institu-
tional question), patterns of interactions in typical marriages (a relational question) and the
mode of parental intervention into sibling conflicts (a dispute issue). However, there are complex
interactions among the levels: institutional context affects marital relationships and marital
disputes, marital relations affect marital institutions and marital disputes, and marital disputes
influence marital relations and the institutional context of marriage. As a simple example, modes
of divorce and divorce rate are highly affected by the ease with which one can get a divorce,
which, in turn clearly affects how marriages evolve. Institution affects disputes, which affects
relationships. In the work context, similar issues abound. The dynamic interplay between institu-
tion, work relations and disputes that occurs as an organization evolves from an organizational
model of a Weberian bureaucracy to a project team-based organization is quite dramatic. Each
level is affecting the others in very interesting but complex ways.
Unfortunately, the perfect study of cross-level influences is very difficult, as it requires access
to more than one institution, each one having many relationships within it, and studied over
a long enough period of time to discover a broad sample of disputes. Moreover, the nature
of analyses which adequately assess cross-level effects is quite difficult, as the mode of effect
of each level on the other levels varies across levels. Institutions tend to have their dominant
effect by being omnipresent, having a minor influences on any single event, but over time
they dramatically reshape disputes and relationships. Once a pattern has been established that
is consistent with the institutional context, that context then serves as a conservative force
to stop adaptation (Tolbert and Arthur, 1989). On the other hand, disputes often appear to
change relationships and institutions selectively but acutely; they have very little effect until
a certain very important dispute occurs which dramatically redefines the institution or relation-
ship. One good example are 'precedent setting' cases in the law. For example, when Hattie
May Phillips sat in the front of the bus in Birmingham, Alabama in the 1950s, the nature
of American race relations was changed forever. Finally, multi-level research is inherently
interdisciplinary, since the study of each aspect of conflict has been the domain of different
disciplines. Institutional problems are addressed by sociologists, political scientists and macro-
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328 B. H. SHEPPARD
economists. Relational problems have been the domain of anthropologists and certain clinically-
oriented social psychologists. The dispute problem has been the domain of psychologists, game
theorists and communications researchers. As a result of the difficulties inherent in multiple
level analyses -problems of research methods and the way the levels affect each other
one would expect very little research incorporating all three levels of analysis.
This is exactly what we find. Some fields, in fact, have vigorously adopted different levels
of analysis at different times, but rarely have the multiple levels of analysis co-existed. Industrial
relations provides the best example. As Kochan (this issue, p. 289) claims about A Behavioral
Theory of Labor Negotiations:
'It moved industrial relations and collective bargaining from its institutional-historical
school and opened up the field to the work of social science' (italic section can be read
to mean the study of disputes with strong empirical methods).
Kochan further states directly his belief about the incompatibility of institutional and 'dispute'
(my word) research in decrying the loss of Walton and McKersie to the study and influence
of the institutional perspective:
'Neither Walton nor McKersie could fully escape their institutional upbringing. Neither
was content to remain aloof as theorists far removed from practice. As we all know, Walton
went on to become one of the foremost practitioners of organizational development and
change and a leader in introducing employee participation and related workplace inno-
vations. McKersie went on to become a distinguished labor-management relations third
party and dispute resolver, policy advisor, and academic administrator ...
The benefits from these efforts speak for themselves. But I believe they [the movement
into the world of policy and practice] have also produced a considerable cost. While they
have been very supportive mentors and colleagues and promoters who attempt to do so,
their follow-on works have been better known for their applied contributions than for
their new theoretical insights. I say this not as criticism but as a commentary on the inherent
tradeoffs built into our field'.
There are two implications of Kochan's position. First, that institutional thinking would greatly
benefit from more time spent in practice. Second, that such thinking -and the related required
practice - is incompatible with the nature of 'good' social science.
Such views about the incompatibility of different levels of analysis is pervasive in much
present day organizational conflict research. These views arise from several sources. First, a
separationist perspective could be right. Institutionalists, relationalists and disputists should
stay apart, each tending to their own level of analysis. Second, our field may have done a
poor job of developing well-rounded academics, capable of thinking and working at more
than one level of analysis. Third, it is the explicit task of theorists at each level to undermine
the assumptions of research at the other levels. Micro-level researchers challenge the broad
and sweeping assumptions of the macro level, while macro level theorists challenge the excessive
attention to detail at the micro level. Finally, there has been an historical tendency for researchers
emphasizing different levels of analysis to have different research and personal goals. Brown
claims this last point quite clearly:
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CONFLICT RESEARCH AS SCHIZOPHRENIA 329
chairs and prestige among fellow researchers. Organization development emphasizes under-
standing and promoting constructive change in organizations and focuses on relationships.
Excellence is most often recognized in high demand for consulting services from organizatio-
nal clients. Industrial relations values both research and practice at the institutional level
of analysis. Excellence may lead to appointments to high political positions as well as
research professorships'.
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330 B. H. SHEPPARD
zation can get back to the business of serving its one single interest well. From this perspective,
the task for research is to develop the 'right' conflict resolution processes, structures and methods
so that the optimal solution can be found efficiently. In sum, the one-interest view sees conflict
as a form of organizational pathology, requiring an efficient and effective problem-solving
approach so that the organization can get 'back to business'. Words such as 'diagnosis', 'defini-
tion', 'problem-solving' 'restructuring' and 'resolution' are commonly used from this perspective.
This perspective is primarily (but often unconsciously) assumed by researchers in micro-organiza-
tional behavior (see Pondy's comments) and organizational development.
The second model the 'few-interest model' views conflict as several parties in the organiza-
tion coexisting and interacting in various forms of dynamic tension. Conflict is inevitable, since
by nature the interests of the parties are in disagreement. From this perspective, the management
(and research) task is to develop a set of processes, structures and methods so that the parties
can work out their differences in as effective and fair a manner as possible. Conflict is a natural
phenomenon that needs to be managed so as to meet the interests of the parties at any given
point in time, and yet with as little destruction to the overall institution as possible (although
note that a typical Marxist doctrine would not be concerned about the destructive aspects
of this conflict). Words such as 'negotiation', 'arbitration', 'conciliation' and 'war' come to
mind as representative of this perspective. Clearly, the field of industrial relations is built on
this dual-interest model.
The third perspective the multi-interest model views conflict in an institution as the
dynamic interplay of interests across a diversity of parties. Conflict is inevitable, but the particular
actors involved vary widely across situations. The research task is to develop processes, structures
and methods so that a majority of interests certainly, the most critical interests for a given
issue will be served well without harming those interests which are excluded. The nature
of conflict will vary as a function of the specific problem being addressed and the interests
affected by a given problem. Words such as 'politics', 'coalitions', 'general welfare' 'voting
rules' and 'representation' are the common terminology from this perspective. Some of the
earliest work in organizational theory was based on such a set of assumptions (e.g. March
and Simon, 1958), yet that work has been largely forgotten. Instead, the field of political sciences
has tended to employ this perspective. In addition, constituency management in the contempor-
ary public and private organizations as employee groups, shareholders, environmental acti-
vists, government agencies, and customers or suppliers attempt to influence the organization's
goals, policies and procedures - is one representation of the multi-interest form.
By asking the question of the papers in this issue, 'how many interests exist?', a few observations
can be made. First, it appears that in the past, a great deal of effort has been dedicated to
legitimating one view over another. To quote Pondy again,
'My 1976 conflict model was right for its time. It presented conflict as an aberration,
as a breakdown in standard processes, as a temporary outbreak or outcropping in the
otherwise smooth flow of a stable and cooperative set of relationships that made up an
organization ... Within the model, the on-going relationship itself, and the assumptions
undergirding it, were not subject to question or attack or redefinition. The use of raw
power or of violence for redressing grievances or for altering the fundamental nature of
the relationship played little or no role in the model. Power, violence, dissolution or revolu-
tion might occur between nations, or gangs, or social classes, or within troubled families,
but not within those islands of sanity and purposiveness called formal organizations. And
even the extreme forms of conflict that might occur within other types of social systems
were seen as those systems gone ... The central flaw in the 1967 model is, I believe, the
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CONFLICT RESEARCH AS SCHIZOPHRENIA 331
assumption that organizations are cooperative, purposive systems which occasionally exper-
ience conflicts or breakdowns in cooperation ... Let me suggest that an organization is
precisely the opposite of the cooperative system'.
It also appears that as we concluded about differing levels of analysis, different fields can
also be depicted as shifting quite dramatically from one focus to another over time. In a paper
presented at the 1986 Symposium, Kolb observed:
Indeed, one might argue that what marks theory and research since the 1960s is a shift
in theory away from consensual and rational models of organizational form and process,
exemplified by structural-functional theory, toward those that depict organizations as more
political in character ... These theories depict organizations as arenas of conflict in which
shifting coalitions with different interests and resources vie for influence and control. Con-
flict is not an abnormal or aberrant phenomena in this view, nor can it be easily managed
or contained, for it becomes the very essence of what an organization is' (Kolb, 1986).
As with levels of analysis, differing views on the number of interests operating within a firm
also appear to be unable to coexist in a field at one time. To quote an old grade-B Western
movie, 'This town is too small for the three of us'. I think this perspective is very troublesome
for the future of the field. Clearly, all three views about the number of interests are valid.
Within the same organization it is possible and desirable to see instances of the single interest
perspective (as when the existence of the firm is jeopardized, or when all affected parties have
had reasonable input and it is time to execute the negotiated plan), the few, competing interests
perspective (as in collective bargaining, the creation of business units, or some aspects of the
budgeting process) and the multi-interest perspective (as in the consideration of organizational
responses to public policy). In fact, historically, much thought was dedicated to developing
institutions that could permit each model to apply in the appropriate situation. For example,
as a cornerstone document in the creation of the United States government, the authors of
The Federalist Papers debated at length how to simultaneously manage the legislative (multi-
interest), administrative (single interest) and judicial (few interest) functions of government.
One solution was the allocation of these problems to separate, yet balanced functions (as in
the United States' Constitution). However, other solutions exist in other forms of government
(e.g. parliamentary systems) and in many organizations, as mechanisms are created to hear
input from a number of constituencies, negotiate with the most important interests, and still
formulate an organizational mission and strategy that is in the best interest of the shareholders.
In the history of research on organizational conflict very little effort has been directed at
acknowledging that organizations, polities and economies simultaneously consist of joint, few
and multiple interests, or ways to study these entities. Without such consideration, our views
of conflict will be incomplete and will demand that single-perspective, incomplete orientations
clash for ownership of truth about conflict within and between organizations. Such a clash
will not only have unfortunate consequences for academic models of conflict, but also for
actual interests within organizations. As Kochan et al. (1986) imply, industrial relations will
be worse off if we cannot discover a means of acknowledging that management and labor
have both shared and conflicting interests, and develop institutions predicated upon this under-
standing. Similarly, organizations in general will be worse off if we cannot develop means
for considering how common, distinct and multiple interests can be considered within the same
organization. As Pondy suggests, the longest-lived organizations in the Western World (four
parliaments and 62 universities) have developed just such means. Unlike most organizations,
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332 B. H. SHEPPARD
it is willingly acknowledged that competing views and interests exist within universities, even
though common interests also exist and are recognized.
Simultaneous consideration of multiple institutional models will not be easy. Such thinking
will require that researchers with multi-disciplinary perspectives consider conflict together, that
meta-perspectives be developed, and that large studies be conducted over extended periods
of time. Simple, efficient research is generally predicated upon restricted institutional assump-
tions. However, some promise already exists. Perhaps most interesting is the interpretative
approach taken in the community conflict arena (e.g. Merry and Silbey, 1984). In this research,
the frame adopted for considering conflict is the expressed subject of interest. Also, evolving
research on multi-party negotiations and dilemmas (Kramer, 1991) is grappling with the dilemma
of one versus many interests. Finally, administrative and public interest dispute resolution (Gray,
1989) directly confronts the issue of developing agreements from among many diverse interests,
and without losing sight of their differences. However, each of these promising venues is currently
operating at the periphery of organizational conflict research.
A cure
How might the field be different if we were to attempt to undertake the task of holistically
considering the various levels of analysis at which conflict exists, and the various perspectives
on the number of interests inherent in our institutions? It is difficult to answer such a question
without first having engaged in the effort. However, some preliminary speculation is possible.
One way to assess how this field would be different is to consider the sorts of research questions
that are suggested by taking this approach. The most obvious questions concern how various
institutional contexts affect the development of relationships or the evolution of disputes. For
example, are relationships between management and employees really very different in a union
versus non-union setting? Are customer relations affected when consumer arbitration is intro-
duced? In other words, events which happen at one level of analysis become a context for
studying activities at another. It is quite likely that our understanding of either level would
be improved by such an approach. Such research is beginning to be done. Efforts to combine
institutional, relational and dispute models in labor relations is one example (see, for example,
Kochan et al. 1986). I also noted earlier that a natural extension of this approach was being
done by communication researchers, investigating the mutual influence of institutions, relation-
ships and disputes through enactments of the institution in specific disputes contexts.
A second new research tack would focus on determining the appropriate mix of perspectives
within the context of a given organization or economy. In other words, we could begin to
develop a meta-model of conflict management that permits combinations and 'hybrid forms'.
For example, how can the problem of policy formulation, policy administration and judgements
vis-a-vis a stated policy be performed within an organization so that each incorporates the
optimal perspective (and related institutional model), and the efforts complement one another?
Similarly, how can organizations acknowledge multiple interests and still function effectively
and efficiently? Recent perspectives on constituency models are one limited approach to such
a problem (see Freeman, 1984; Mintzberg, 1983).
In further considering efforts at integrating the various views of conflict in organizations,
we might also ask how we would be better off as a result of these kind of efforts. One obvious
benefit would be the development of a formal means of evaluating the generalizability of any
conflict model or study. This evaluation process might include some form of sensitivity analysis,
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CONFLICT RESEARCH AS SCHIZOPHRENIA 333
in which we would compare the results or conclusions of a given piece of research across
different conflict institutions.
A third potential benefit of this integration is that we would, most likely, enhance the relevance
of conflict research to practicing managers and policy-makers. Presently, if they are to apply
our models, these practitioners are forced to choose one perspective from which to act. Such
an approach is bound to have its limitations, forcing managers to develop fictions or myths
with which to justify their singular approach. In other words, attempts to justify a singular
perspective that has already occurred within the academic community, is now transferred to
the world of organizations. That so many myths exist about conflict within organizations (e.g.
the myth that 'we have no conflicts, just rational problems seeking optimal solutions', or the
myth that 'all conflict is no more than a clash of personalities') illustrates that this narrowing
of perspective has already happened. Our field may significantly aid accurate managerial decision-
making by developing models that formally consider multiple frames on conflict and its manage-
ment.
Most importantly, even if efforts to develop an integrated model of organizational conflict
were to fail, we would learn a great deal from trying. We have been too willing to ignore
alternative perspectives. Confronting them directly can have three consequences: an integration
or partial integration can be found, each area can be changed by the attempt, and we can
discover that there exists irreconcilable differences. In any case, we will have learned something
very important.
Conclusion
References
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334 B. H. SHEPPARD
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