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12.1 Introduction
The cable entry, whether conduit or cable gland, is required to preserve the integrity of the enclosure which
it enters. The requirements for hazardous area glanding are in addition to any other gland requirements for
cable support, weatherproofing, electrical continuity, securing of cable armour or braid, etc..
For flameproof enclosures the prevention of flame transmission must extend to the conduit or cable
glanding. This may be achieved in some cases by the provision of appropriate flame path lengths and
controlled flame gaps and in others by providing total sealing e.g. pressure tight stopper boxes, MICC
glands, or pressure tight barrier glands. In effect, this means:
potting compound
swage ring
These are very similar to uncertified glands, but are identified by the coding, which is almost invariably
‘EEx d IIC’. Usually, such glands are dual certified EEx d IIC/EEx e II.
solid filler
extruded air-gaps
bedding
The following information is required to properly specify flameproof glands for use in hazardous areas:
The gas group (though almost all glands are 'IIC')
If the cable is filled to prevent flame propagation
The type of cable construction
Whether serving is polymeric or metallic
Type and thickness of armour
Cable dimensions; diameter overall, diameter under armour & tolerances
Cable voltage grade
Special environmental requirements
Enclosure screw thread
If the cable core is 'filled', as in cable manufactured to BS5467, BS6346 or BS6116, then it is assumed to
be substantially resistant to the transmission of exploding gas. In this case, a compression gland may
normally be used. However, see section 12.6
Chapter 12, HAZARDOUS AREA ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT
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©Sira April 2001
Many other cables in general use, however, have 'non-filled' cores which allow gas to pass readily down the
centre of the cable. To prevent this, cables need to be provided with a means of sealing between cores,
bedding and inner sheath, such as a certified flameproof barrier gland.
Any entry into flameproof equipment must maintain the flameproof properties. This requires that the entry
be sealed against any exploding gas being expelled into the surrounding atmosphere or to cool any which
escapes through allowable paths so that it cannot ignite the surroundings.
In a flameproof compression gland, the flameproof properties of the enclosure are achieved by the use of an
elastomeric seal pressing onto the inner bedding of the cable to prevent flame transmission along the cable,
and by the use of carefully machined threads forming a flamepath with the enclosure.
The cables used for some wiring systems are not designed to be pressure-proof and hence may be damaged
by exploding gas passing down their centre. To prevent this a barrier gland is needed which provides a
solid seal around the cable cores. Various designs exist, some using brass thimble inserts and other using
direct application of epoxy putty to the gland. An alternative to using a barrier gland would be to use a
component approved stopper box in conjunction with an ordinary gland.
Internal
Yes source of No
ignition?
Yes Volume No
>2 litres?
1 Firstly, if the cable used is MICC (mineral insulated), then use a certified flameproof "pyro" gland.
If not MICC, it is necessary to know if the cable is filled or unfilled.
2 If the flameproof apparatus has its own certified cable entry device (such as an in-line plug), then a
filled cable can enter straight into this device.
For cable entry using a standard gland, the diagram above should be followed.
There are two situations in which a barrier gland is required, despite the fact that a filled cable is used: if
the enclosure contains components which spark (Ex d switches, contactors, etc.) and:
either the hazard is a IIC gas
or the enclosure is in a Zone 1 and is more than 2 litres in volume.
Conduit must be
seam-welded or
solid-drawn
Conduit seals (‘stopper boxes’) are essential
at or within 450 mm of Ex d enclosure wall
when conduit passes from hazardous area to non-hazardous area
Direct or indirect entry is allowed into the flameproof enclosure. Any size of conduit is allowed, but there
must be a compound-filled stopper box within 450 mm, according to EN 60079-14. (A stopper box is,
incidentally, also required when conduit passes from a hazardous to a non-hazardous area.) The conduit
may be seam-welded or solid drawn.
With only two exceptions, glands used with enclosures which are not flameproof need not be certified, but
the integrity of the enclosure must not be impaired. However, note that some company codes of practice
exceed the minimum requirements of BS5345 and EN 60079-14 and these codes should be followed when
on such plants. (One example would be the widespread specification of a flameproof compression gland on
all non-flameproof ‘Ex’ equipment). For most non-flameproof methods of protection, ingress protection to
at least IP54 must be achieved - this is an absolute requirement for Ex e.
1 when using an MICC (pyro) cable - the seal must be EEx e certified
2 when using a plastic gland which is not otherwise certified with the equipment
Otherwise, glands which can meet the IP54 requirements are acceptable. EN 60079-14 has no such
requirements, but certification in the two instances listed above is probably the easiest way of proving
compliance.
Ex N/EEx n enclosures: similar entry requirements to Ex e are required, maintaining IP54. Additional
sealing is required on 'restricted breathing' apparatus - no specific gland exists, but a flameproof barrier
gland in conjunction with thread sealant and a suitable IP washer can make an almost gas-tight seal.
Intrinsic safety does not have any specific glanding requirements. Indeed, the enclosure is only required by
the standard to be IP20 ('fingerproof'). However, for operational reasons, weatherproofing will almost
certainly be desirable with the appropriate selection of a gland.
Pressurised apparatus needs to be as leak-free as possible for practical reasons. Most glands can be made
fairly air-tight, the flameproof barrier gland being, perhaps, the best in this respect.
Depending upon the application, the gland may have to serve different functions. Some of the differing
requirements are outlined in the following table:
Gland type
Feature Ex d Ex e Industrial
Adequate mechanical strength
Mechanically exposionproof
Good electrical contact between gland & enclosure for proper earthing
Good electrical contact between gland &armour for proper earthing
Protected against dust ingress possibly possibly
Protected against water ingress possibly possibly
Cores must be sealed against explosion possibly
Certified
The first 9 clauses contain general requirements applicable to all equipment, as follows:
The following 14 sections of this chapter (numbered 13.1 - 13.14) will deal with each of these clauses in
turn.
The standard covers the “design, selection and erection of electrical installations in explosive gas
atmospheres”, whether the equipment is permanent, temporary, portable, transportable or hand-held. All
voltages are covered. The requirements are in addition to those in non-hazardous areas, so, for example in
the UK, the Wiring Regulations apply.
Exclusions: mines where firedamp (methane) is present, flammable dusts, explosives and medical facilities.
Other codes apply to all these locations.
This section is a list of all other relevant IEC standards. Most of them are in the 79-series, dealing with the
construction of equipment and area classification, but also referenced are standards for ingress protection,
testing, protection against electric shock, conduits, transformers and RCDs.
This clause contains 24 definitions. Some of the more useful are as follows:
3.8-3.20: these define the standardised abbreviations of input and output parameters to be used for
intrinsically safe equipment. They are the same as those in the intrinsic safety construction standard.
However, older equipment will use different abbreviations and chapter 7 of this manual should be consulted.
3.21 - simple apparatus: “Electrical component or combination of components of simple construction with
well-defined construction with well-defined electrical parameters which is compatible with the intrinsic
safety of the circuit in which it is used. The following apparatus is considered to be simple apparatus:
a) passive components, for example switches, junction boxes, resistors and simple semiconductor devices;
b) sources of stored energy with well-defined parameters, for example capacitors or inductors, whose values
are considered when determining the overall safety of the system;
c) sources of generated energy, for example thermocouples and photocells, which do not generate more than
1.5 V, 100 mA and 25 mW. Any inductance or capacitance present in these sources of energy are
considered as in b).”
This is not to say that such installations are ideal: the person who signs off the installation is taking full
responsibility for the compliance of the items with the code of practice. However, as the risk in a zone 2 is
low, such a course of action may be justified. There is no such option for zones 1 or 0.
Clauses 5.3 and 5.4: Selection according to the ignition temperature and apparatus group of the gas
These clauses are covered in Chapter 3 of this manual.
For portable apparatus not exceeding 250 V/6A and not exposed to heavy mechanical stresses (e.g. not
hand-lamps, foot-switches, barrel pumps), rather less robust cables may be used:
ordinary chloropropene or equivalent synthetic elastomeric-sheathed cables
ordinary tough rubber-sheathed cables
other equally robust cables
13.10 Clause 10: Additional requirements for type of protection “d” – Flameproof enclosures
Figure 1 in IEC 60079-14 (section 12.6 in the preceding chapter) gives the selection procedure when the
cable entry is not included or specified as part of the equipment.
[Note that BS 5345 did not permit flexible conduit in zone 1, nor did it permit conduit seals to be up to
450 mm from the enclosure; they had to be screwed into the enclosure.]
“As a consequence of this principle, the aim of the installation rules for intrinsically safe circuits is to
maintain separation from other circuits.”
Small components are permitted to exceed the limit of 135 oC for a T4 temperature class, as tests have
shown that ignition does not occur until much higher temps are reached when the hot body is small. Table 4
in IEC 60079-14 is the same as that in the IS construction standard.
13.13 Clause 13: Additional requirements for type of protection “p” – Pressurised apparatus
Chapter 13, pHAZARDOUS AREA ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT
age 10 of 12
©Sira April 2001
Clause 13.1: Ducting
Entire installation should be assessed for compliance (unless certified as a whole)
Ducts tested to 1.5 times the overpressure (200 Pa minimum) – achieve this by closing the outlets
Ducting materials should not be degraded by the protective or flammable gases
Protective gas to be from the non-hazardous area (unless supplied by cylinder)
Locate compressor, ducting and exhaust in non-hazardous area where possible; ducting ideally
should be at an overpressure throughout its length
Spark and particle barriers required if exhaust is in hazardous area as follows:
Table 5
Zone of exhaust duct outlet Apparatus
A B
Zone 2 Required Not required
Zone 1 Required * Required *
A = apparatus which may produce ignition-capable sparks or particles in normal operation
B = apparatus which does not produce ignition-capable sparks or particles in normal operation
* If the temperature of the enclosed apparatus constitutes a hazard upon failure of pressurisation, a suitable
device shall be fitted to prevent the rapid entry of the surrounding atmosphere into the pressurised
enclosure.
Apparatus with an internal source of release must have an alarm for failure of the protective gas.
Clause 13.3: Multiple pressurised enclosures with a common safety device – refer to IEC 79-2 (the
construction standard)
With the exception of lightning protection and possibly prevention of static electricity, earthing is intended
to provide an acceptable environment for both electrical equipment and personnel. The requirements are
threefold, firstly to provide for electrical circuit protection for the electrical equipment, secondly to provide
for protection against electric shock for the personnel and thirdly to provide for the correct function of the
apparatus. The first of these is achieved by providing fault current return paths and the second by
connecting all exposed metalwork together so that personnel are unable to touch parts at dangerously
different potentials. We can conveniently give the first two provisions names:
The third objective usually includes the provision of a suitable level of electromagnetic compatibility.
The purpose of this paper is to consider the basic objectives in relation to hazardous areas in general and to
consider some specific problems associated with shunt diode barrier devices.
The terms EPC and PPC have the advantage of not referring to 'earthing', 'bonding' or 'conductors' thus
avoiding preconceptions about the objectives and their implementation. A generalised distribution and
utilisation system is presented in Figure 1 and shows these sets of connections. There is inevitably some
overlap between the two functions.
Electrical protection connections (EPC): These connections are required to carry sufficient fault current
back to the source of supply so that the protective equipment can operate. It is tempting to think that a
connection to earth provides a home for all wayward currents, but this is incorrect. The only place a
current can go is back to the source of supply. This means that the electrical protection connections have to
provide a return path back to the source. Whether this is done via the structure or via conductors does not
change the intent, the choice is influenced by economics (the cost of providing dedicated conductors) and
the level of reliability desired (via structure or copper conductors). Various national and industry codes of
practice have specific guidance in these areas.
Personnel protection connections (PPC): These connections are required to provide equipotential bonding
so that personnel cannot touch parts at dangerously different voltages and thus receive electric shocks.
These differences in voltage may arise from fault currents, which will flow via any available path, or from
static charges. In hazardous areas differences in voltage from both sources have to be limited to very small
values, typically a few volts, so that ignition-capable sparks do not arise. It should be remembered that
sparks of 40J are sufficient to ignite hydrogen/air mixtures. Again it does not really matter whether
mechanical connections to structure are relied upon or whether bonding conductors are used instead. There
are, however, reasons why one implementation will be preferred to another; for example, concrete structures
present a problem in this respect. There is no prima facie reason for including the ground in this potential
equalisation apart from lightning protection, protection of overhead line distribution systems and the
problem of stepping between the structure and the ground.
The above combination of electrical and personnel protection connections has minimal effect on non-
intrinsically safe installations. However intrinsic safety has its own rules regarding 'earthing' which have to
be fitted into the above philosophy. Intrinsic safety depends on limiting voltage and current within the
system to low levels so that any sparking which may occur is not ignition capable. It also permits live
working which means that sparking to the surroundings is an acceptable situation and must also be non-
ignition capable. This presupposes that the intrinsically safe system is not only at the same potential (give
or take the system voltage) as its surroundings but also the current limitation in the circuit is not by-passed
by a fortuitous connection to earth. It also pre-supposes that the voltage accessible to personnel is safe
from a physiological standpoint. An acceptable voltage can be assessed from existing limits for safe
systems, e.g. SELV or FELV as defined in BS7671, or by considering the physiology of electric shock from
first principles. In either case most intrinsically-safe installations, which usually do not exceed 30Vdc, are
acceptable.
These ideas become particularly important when shunt diode safety barriers are used as these require a
connection to 'earth' to achieve intrinsic safety. Figure 2 illustrates that the components within the barrier
will limit the voltage and current within the system without connection to 'earth'.
IO ?
UM UO
Thus the implementation shown Figure 3 achieves the objectives of intrinsic safety, electrical protection and
personnel protection, without prejudicing any of them, in the most general manner.
[There is no Figure 4]
Likewise Figure 5 shows the installation which results from following the German national code of practice.
It can be seen that each is a particular implementation of the general objectives illustrated in Figure 3. The
differences between the two arise from the need to fit barriers and their earthing into pre-existing
installation practices which are themselves different.
Off-shore installations appear somewhere between the two because the greater formality of the bonding of
the structure approximates to a potential equalisation conductor.
Performance under fault conditions: The obvious fault condition is the one which applies excessive
voltage to the barrier and causes the barrier fuse to blow. In this case sufficient current is required to flow
in the barrier 'earth' to blow a fuse which is unlikely to have much more than a 250mA rating. The
minimum current required to do this is about 425mA which the barrier 'earth', even at its maximum
permitted resistance of 1ohm, will carry without difficulty. The maximum current which could flow is that
obtained from the maximum of the mains voltage limited by the cold resistance of the fuse. This will be in
the region of 30A to 70A. Again, even at the maximum permitted resistance of 1ohm for the barrier 'earth',
no significant problems arise.
Until the publication of EN 60079-17:1997, BS 5345 was the code of practice used in the UK. The two
codes are very similar in philosophy but have some differences in detail.
Inspection is required to maintain the safety of the equipment, as well as to ensure that it is in working
order. These two requirements are not the same:
operability safety
BS 5345 EN 60079-17:1997
Covers selection, installation, inspection and Covers inspection and maintenance only
maintenance [installation covered by EN 60079-14:1997]
Levels of inspection left to operator Defines visual, close & detailed levels of inspection
and gives guidance on applicability
Maximum 2 years between inspections Maximum 3 years
Part 3 clause 19.2 requires gaps in Ex d equipment Clause 5.1.1 allows a visual inspection only
to be measured periodically
The maximum period between inspections may be interpreted somewhat more loosely than every three years
if equipment is assessed on a rolling sample basis. The size and composition of the sample is at the
discretion of the operator, justified by past records.
Unlike BS 5345, EN 60079-17 defines three levels of inspection. Both codes also define initial, periodic
and sample inspections.
B INSTALLATION
1 Type of cable is appropriate * * *
2 There is no obvious damage to cables * * * * * * * * *
3 Sealing of trucking ducts, pipes and/or conduits is satisfactory * * * * * * * * *
4 Stopper boxes and cable boxes are correctly filled *
5 Integrity of conduit system and interface with mixed system is maintained * * *
6 Earthing connections, including any supplementary earthing bonding
connections are satisfactory (e.g. connections are tight and conductors are
of sufficient cross section)
- physical check * * *
- visual check * * * * * *
7 Fault loop impedance (TN systems) or earthing resistance (IT systems) is
satisfactory * * *
8 Insulation resistance is satisfactory * * *
9 Automatic electrical protective devices operate within permitted limits * * *
10 Automatic electrical protective devices are set correctly (auto-reset not
possible in zone 1) * * *
11 Special conditions of use (if applicable) are complied with * * *
12 Cables not in use are correctly terminated * * *
13 Obstructions adjacent to flameproof flanged joints are in accordance with * * *
IEC 79-14
C ENVIRONMENT
1 Apparatus is adequately protected against corrosion, weather, vibration
and other adverse factors * * * * * * * * *
2 No undue accumulation of dust and dirt * * * * * * * * *
3 Electrical insulation is clean and dry * *
NOTES
- General: the checks used for apparatus using both types of protection “e” and “d” will be a combination of both columns.
- Items B7 and B8: account should be taken of the possibility of an explosive atmosphere in the vicinity of the apparatus when using
electrical test equipment.
B INSTALLATION
C ENVIRONMENT
A APPARATUS
B INSTALLATION
C ENVIRONMENT
EN 60079-17 provides a flow chart to assist in determining inspection type and frequency:
Existing
plant Type: Periodic
Grade: Close
Type: Sample
Grade: Detailed Can an increase in the NO
periodic inspection interval
be justified?
Type: Sample
Grade: Visual Is the periodic
NO interval already
three years?
Type: Periodic
* IC - ignition capable
Grade: Close (IC)*
in normal operation, YES
Visual (Not IC)*
ie where the internal
components of the
Type: Sample
apparatus produce, in
Grade: Detailed
normal operation, arcs,
sparks or surface
temperatures capable
of causing ignition.
Can an increase in NO
the periodic inspection
Carry out safety audit to interval be justified?
recommend new YES
periodic interval
When a large number of similar items are present (e.g. junction boxes), a sample inspection may be carried
out. The results of this can be used to decide sample frequency and size for future inspections. The
maximum recommended interval of 3 years can thus be extended by reference to data accumulated over a
number of years if this data shows that serious faults are very rare. The zone designation is also a factor in
making the decision.
Equally, equipment installed in particularly arduous environments might require frequent inspections on
100% of the items.
There are no formal guidelines for the recording of data, but it should:
be concise - a “one-sheet-per-item” method of recording may be more efficiently replaced by a
check-list containing many similar items in the same location
be easily referenced to the equipment – equipment must have a tag before the inspection starts and
inspection is best done by location
highlight required actions – aspects where the equipment does not comply should be clearly
marked in a way that makes it easy to identify among the mass of data; required action should be
prioritised (see below)
be easily retrieved at a future date – until the time where inspectors can enter the data directly into
their (intrinsically safe) palmtop computers for later downloading, the summarised information
should be transferred from clipboard to computer to facilitate future retrieval
Prioritising actions: it is helpful to have a scale (say, 1 to 4) to indicate the urgency of the action required.
Thus, for example, action code 1 (e.g. a thermocouple in a zone 0 that is not fed via a barrier or isolator)
requires immediate attention whereas action code 4 (e.g. an uncertified junction box in a zone 2) requires
consideration at the next convenient opportunity but its continued presence may be justified and
documented. Additionally, potential faults (e.g. where the documentation to prove compliance is not
available) should be separately designated (say, P1 to P4).
Inspection without maintenance is ineffective so some means of linking the two is required. There are many
ways of achieving this and one is shown below.
Checklists Copies of
(no faults) Copies of repair Completed
checklists orders repairs
Checklists
When a flammable atmosphere might be present, only certified meters should be used. Of the two types
available, the low voltage type makes a negligible difference to the total voltage, current, power and stored
energy in an intrinsically safe circuit if it is within the limits imposed for simple apparatus.
When a flammable atmosphere might be present, only certified meters should be used. The two types
available are:
1 Intrinsically safe low voltage/ current multimeter - BS5345 Part 4, clause 21.1.2 allows the use of
such meters on live I.S. circuits (and, by implication and where safe, live non-I.S. circuits)
“regardless of the possible presence of flammable atmospheres”. [There is no mention of this in
EN 60079-17, which does not cover testing.]
2 Intrinsically safe high voltage insulation tester (e.g. a ‘Megger’). This is not usually to be used on
I.S. circuits and should only be used on other circuits with care as capacitance, notably cable
capacitance, can enhance any spark produced due to insulation breakdown and make it non-
intrinsically safe.
The potential problem with using an I.S. insulation tester in a hazardous area means that its use should be
carefully controlled and operators need to be aware of the possible risks. Care should be taken in using an
insulation tester on long cable runs, particularly where the cable runs through a hazardous area
containing IIC gases like hydrogen. Hydrogen needs less than one eighth the amount of spark energy
compared to a IIA gas.
Where practical, use of an insulation tester should be limited to shutdown situations. Where this is not
possible, it is as well to prove that points where sparking is most likely are free of flammable gas (e.g. at a
junction box). It is not practical to issue a gas-free certificate for an entire cable run where this may be
hundreds of metres. The balance is between the risk of insulation failure leading to an unsafe situation
versus the small but definite risk posed by the instrument itself.
Prior to commissioning, it may be advantageous to make measurements with both high voltage/current
testers and a low voltage/current tester. All results are recorded but subsequent routine testing in the
possible presence of flammable atmospheres is then only done with the low voltage/current multimeter and
the results compared with the initial readings. (Tests made with a low voltage meter may not necessarily
identify certain bad connections or damaged insulation because of the low test current or voltage.)
‘Meggers’ can produce an incendive spark, even though certified, by
charging up the cable to 500V+
Typical cable is 160pF/m (0.16 nF)
Spark energy to ignite a IIC gas is 40uJ
E = ½CV2
Thus, Ccable = 2E/V2
= 2 x 40/(500 x 500)
= 3.2 x 10-4uF
= 320pF
Cable length = 320/160 = 2 metres!!!!
Above this, the spark is, theoretically, capable of igniting hydrogen!
The potential problem with using an I.S. ‘Megger’ in a hazardous area means that its use should be
carefully controlled and operators need to be aware of the possible risks. Almost invariably, such devices
have an ‘X’ suffix to the certificate number, indicating special conditions for safe use. Care should be taken
in using a ‘Megger’ on long cable runs, particularly where the cable runs through a hazardous area
containing IIC gases like hydrogen. Hydrogen needs less than one eighth the amount of spark energy to
ignite compared to a IIA gas and even a short cable contains enough capacitance when charged to over
500 V to store enough energy to ignite hydrogen if a spark discharge occurs.
Where practical, use of a ‘Megger’ should be limited to shutdown situations. Where this is not possible, it
is as well to prove that points where sparking is most likely are free of flammable gas (e.g. at a junction
box). It is not practical to issue a gas-free certificate for an entire cable run where this may be hundreds of
metres. The balance is between the risk of insulation failure leading to an unsafe situation versus the small
but finite risk posed by the ‘Megger’ itself.
Routine maintenance is required on most equipment in order that it stays working reliably for long periods.
For electrical equipment in hazardous areas this is further complicated by the fact that failure of the
equipment, which may cause an explosion of the flammable materials to which they are exposed, may not
cause an operational problem.
It is useful to distinguish between maintenance and repair. There is clearly overlap, but it is useful to
define maintenance/overhaul as being limited at most to like-for-like replacements whereas repair goes
beyond this and makes good damage which has occurred to a non-replaceable part of the equipment.
Clearly, the certification (and possibly the safety) of the equipment will lapse if it is maintained and repaired
by those who do not understand the safety principles of the equipment. For maintenance, it is sufficient for
those who have been trained in the principles of hazardous area electrical equipment to undertake the job.
Repair is more specialised and many users do not have the facilities on-site to repair equipment. It should
either be returned to the manufacturer or, if not, only entrusted to a repair facility which is approved to do
the work to the current code of practice (see below).
16.2 Maintenance
The European Code of Practice devoted to maintenance is EN 60079-17:1997 which replaces BS 5345
from 1st December 1999. The requirements of the two codes are very similar, but the detailed differences
are compared below:
EN 60079-17 provides much more guidance on the levels of inspection - see Chapter 16.
16.3 Repair
In 1984 the British Electrotechnical and Allied Manufacturers' Association and the Association of Electrical
Machinery Trades published a code of practice for the repair and overhaul of electrical equipment in
potentially explosive atmospheres. It deals mainly with electrical rotating machines, not because they are
the most important items, but because they are often items of expensive equipment which lend themselves to
being repaired. The failure in these machines is often of a mechanical nature anyhow.
This code has now been reproduced as an IEC standard IEC 60079-19:1993.
Where the repair affects the integrity of the explosion protection, repaired apparatus should be marked on
the main part in a visible place. This marking should be legible and durable taking into account possible
chemical corrosion. According to Annex A of both the BEAMA and IEC 60079-19 codes, the marking
should include:
the standard number “IEC 79-19” or the national equivalent ("BEAMA AEMT Code of Practice on
Repairs”)
the name or registered trade mark of the repairer
the repairer's reference number relating to the repair
the date of overhaul/repair
the symbol R or R
Where electrical apparatus is removed for maintenance, any exposed conductors which remain should be
mechanically and electrically secured in an appropriate manner so as to prevent the occurrence of an unsafe
condition.
16.3.4 Documentation
In addition to the certificate, other documentation, suitable for the repair and/or overhaul, should be
available, e.g. the appropriate drawings, specifications, etc. The data available for the repair and/or
overhaul should generally include, but need not be limited to, details of:
technical specification;
performance and conditions of use;
dismantling and assembly instructions;
certification limitations, where specified;
marking (including certification marking);
recommended methods or repair/overhaul for the apparatus.
Records of any previous repairs, overhauls or modifications should be kept by the user and made available
to the repairer.
The following main reclamation procedures may be performed - check with the code: copy winding, metal
spraying, electro-plating, sleeving, brazing/welding, metal stitching, machining of stator/rotor cores, re-
tapping threaded holes, re-machining surfaces.
‘Small solid particles which settle out under their own weight but may remain suspended for some time’
[BS 6467:Part 2:1988]
The term ‘combustible dust’ describes a particular type of dust (or grit) as follows:-
Many dusts are combustible, ranging from many used in the food industry (flour, cocoa, sugar) to paper fibres,
metal, polymers, coal and others.
Dusts are similar to gases in that they have auto-ignition temperatures in the same range (most are between
150C and 600C for layers and clouds), and can also be ignited by a spark, though the spark ignition energies
are almost invariably much higher than for gases. Therefore, equipment certified for use with flammable gases
can generally be adapted for use with flammable dusts by ensuring that they are dust-tight. This has been the
method used historically (section 17.4) and is still used (section 17.5.1). Equipment protected by its enclosure
only is beginning to come available (section 17.5.2).
Dusts have two ignition temperatures, which differ from each other: cloud ignition and a layer ignition. The
cloud ignition temperature is the higher. The ignition temperatures depend on a number of variables (e.g.
particle size), and cannot be measured accurately, so a large (but different) safety factor is applied to these two
ignition temperatures when assessing the suitability of equipment that may become hot in use.
Dust cloud ignition temperature: a safety factor of 1/3 is used. Thus, when the ignition temperature of a dust
cloud is known (e.g. 380°C for lignite), the maximum surface temperature of the apparatus used must not
exceed two thirds of that figure (253°C). In gas and vapour parlance, this requires T3 apparatus, unless the
equipment has been specifically assessed for dusts, in which case the actual surface temperature should be
written on the equipment.
Other Properties: apart from its ability to form layers, dust has a further potential property which can have a
very real effect on safety and that is its ability to conduct electricity. Clearly, if conducting dusts enter
apparatus they can, by creating faults, cause the very ignition sources we seek to avoid. For this reason the
conductivity of the dust layer is important and such things as metallic and carbon dusts (which have resistivities
below the 105 ohm.metre yardstick used to delineate the conducting dust boundary) require special attention to
be given to equipment enclosures. The required level of ingress protection is given in section 17.4 – IP6X is
always sufficient, but sometimes IP5X may be acceptable.
Historically, the UK has had just two zones, whereas a 3-zone system is now adopted throughout Europe and
by the IEC standards.
Zone Z is one where a dust is, or may be, present in a cloud during normal processing, handling or cleaning
operations in sufficient quantity to be capable of producing an explosive concentration of combustible dust in a
mixture with air. Zone Z is roughly equivalent to zone 21 (see below).
Zone Y is an area where a dust cloud is unlikely and these areas result from malfunction or careless use of
plant equipment, or disturbance of dust layers. Zone Y is roughly equivalent to zone 22 (see below).
PrEN 50281-1-3 is based on IEC 61241, but the zone definitions below are different in that dust layers are
excluded, but are considered separately as sources of release and as a fire risk.
Zone 20: A place in which an explosive atmosphere in the form of a cloud of combustible dust in air is present
continuously, or for long periods or frequently
inside the dust-containment: hoppers, silos, cyclones, filters, etc.
dust transport systems, except some parts of belt and chain conveyors, etc.
blenders, mills, dryers, bagging equipment
Zone 21: A place in which an explosive atmosphere in the form of a cloud of combustible dust in air is likely to
occur in normal operation occasionally
areas outside the dust containment and in the immediate vicinity of access doors subject to frequent
removal or opening for operation purposes when internal explosive dust/air mixtures are present
areas outside the dust containment and in the proximity of filling and emptying points, feed belts,
sampling points, truck dump stations, belt dump over points, etc. where no measures are employed to
prevent the formation of explosive dust/air mixtures
areas outside the dust containment where dust accumulates and where, due to process operations, the
dust layer is likely to be disturbed to form explosive dust/air mixtures
prEN 5028181-3 recommends that it will usually be appropriate to define the zone 21 as an area of width 1 m
around the source of release is sufficient, extending vertically downwards to the ground or a solid floor.
Outdoors, the zone may be smaller due to wind and rain. Consideration should be taken of where dust layers
may form and whether they are likely to be disturbed (zone 21 results) or unlikely to be disturbed (zone 22).
Zone 22: A place in which an explosive atmosphere in the form of a cloud of combustible dust in air is not
likely to occur in normal operation but, if it does occur, will persist for a short time only
outlets from bag filter vents
locations near equipment that is opened at infrequent intervals or equipment that from experience can
easily form leaks where, due to pressure above atmospheric, dust will be blown out: pneumatic
equipment, flexible connections that can become damaged, etc.
storage of bags containing dusty product
areas that are normally classified as zone 21 can fall into zone 22 when measures (e.g. exhaust
ventilation) are employed to prevent the formation of explosive dust/air mixtures
areas where controllable dust layers are formed that are likely to be raised into explosive dust/air
mixtures
around a zone 21 that is not contained by walls, floors or other barriers
Until the introduction of the ATEX Directives (Chapter 4), the selection of electrical equipment for use in
flammable dusts had not been easy since the equipment marking gives little or no information as to its
applicability. In the UK, BS 7535:1992 gives guidance on the selection, installation and maintenance apparatus
in combustible dust zones. It uses the now obsolete two zone (Z/Y) system but also recognises the interior of
the dust containment. Its recommendations can be summarised as follows:
One problem encountered is that equipment frequently does not state its IP rating, so it is not possible to easily
demonstrate compliance with the IP requirement. It may be necessary to make a judgement or contact the
manufacturer. Flameproof (EEx d) equipment is suitable, even if the dust can get inside, since an internal
explosion of a dust cloud is less easily transmitted to the outside than with a gas explosion. For EEx e
equipment, IP5X (dust-protected but not dust-tight) is a minimum requirement, but it may not meet IP6X
(dust-tight), in which case a build-up of dust inside may cause overheating – the severity of the problem can be
gauged by inspection and a judgement made. Encapsulated (EEx m) equipment is gas-tight and restricted
breathing (EEx nR) equipment exceeds IP6X, so both may be used with flammable dusts after considering its
temperature class. Pressurised (EEx p) equipment is also suitable provided dust cannot enter while the
equipment is switched off.
nnnn II 2 G (T3)
II 2 D (T 100oC)
‘nnnn’ is the reference number of the Notified Body accrediting the quality system
‘II’ is the Group (I = mining, II = surface industry)
‘2’ is the ATEX Category:
Category 1: zone 0/1/2 use for gases or 20/21/22 for dusts
Category 2: zone 1/2 or 21/22 use
Category 3: zone 2 or 22 use
‘G (T3)’ refers to the temperature class for Gases
‘D (T 100oC)’ refers to the external surface temperature applicable to Dusts
ATEX-certified equipment continues with the approach used historically but specifically states whether it is
certified for dusts or not. If the equipment is marked for gases only, this may be a lack of forward thinking by
the manufacturer: ask the manufacturer whether certification for dust is possible.
It is important to realise that gases will usually be exposed to a higher temperature than dusts because they are
able to penetrate the enclosure and this is reflected in the temperature class. This means that a lower external
surface temperature can be stated for dusts for EEx i, EEx e, EEx nA and EEx nL equipment.
nnnn II 2 D (T 100oC)
The following European standards are published or are being prepared, based on IEC 61241:1997 (formerly
IEC 1241):
Notes:
1, 2 and 3 deal with zones 20, 21 & 22
the ‘pr’ prefix indicates a provisional standard; this is a final draft which may be used to enable
feedback to be incorporated into the final version
The definitions of the dust zones in prEN 50281-1-3 are different to the IEC definitions in that there is
no mention of dust layers in the EN standard. Layers are dealt with as a source of hazard (when
disturbed) and, separately, as a fire risk (if a dust layer forms on a hot surface)
EN 50281-1-1:1998 gives the requirements for equipment which is not otherwise protected for gases,
i.e. equipment protected by its enclosure; the additional requirements for equipment already certified
for gases are not yet available as European standards. As an interim measure, use BS 7535:1992 in
the UK
The ATEX 94/9/EC Directive and the 1999/92/EC Worker Protection (‘Use’) Directive also use Zones
20, 21 & 22