Natural Resources Cases:

G.R. No. L-39492 March 23, 1990

ANTIPAZ L. PINEDA, CARLOS P. PINPIN, AMADEO J. HILARIO and SALVADOR D.
SANTOS, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, FELISA ESGUERRA, BENJAMIN ESGUERRA, DAVID
ESGUERRA, LOLITA ESGUERRA, SOLEDAD ESGUERRA, ARTURO ESGUERRA, ROMULO
ESGUERRA, EDUARDO ESGUERRA, ANGEL DOMINGO, LEONARDO REYES, respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.:
This petition to annul and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals which upheld the right
of possession and ownership of Benjamin, David, Lolita, Soledad, Arturo, Romulo, Eduardo
(all surnamed Esguerra), Angel Domingo and Leonardo Reyes (hereafter Private
Respondents).
On October 4, 1960, private respondents filed an action for recovery of ownership and
possession of a parcel of land in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and docketed as Civil Case
No. 6327. The property involved contiguous parcels of "montañosa" land with an area of
177,499 square meters, located in Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. In their complaint, private
respondents asserted ownership based on open, continuous, exclusive, peaceful, adverse and
notorious possession; that sometime in April, 1957, Antipaz L. Pineda, Carlos P. Pinpin, Amadeo
J. Hilario and Salvador P. Santos (hereafter, petitioners) entered the land clandestinely and
squatted thereon by force and intimidation and against their will; that on April 4, 1957
petitioners filed with the Bureau of Lands applications for free patent in which they made
deceptive and fraudulent misrepresentations, viz. (1) that the land in dispute was neither
claimed nor occupied by any person; (2) that they started to cultivate the land and made
improvements thereon since January 16, 1938, in the case of Antipaz L. Pineda and Amadeo J.
Hilario, and on January 16, 1945, in the case of the other petitioners, and (3) that the
controversial land has not been declared for taxation purposes until 1958 when petitioners
declared the same for said purpose; that on the basis of the aforestated misrepresentations,
the Director of Lands approved their applications and hence the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources entered the corresponding free patents; that the free patents of Pineda,
Pinpin, and Hilario were forwarded to the Register of Deeds of Rizal who thereafter issued the
corresponding original certificates of title; that no notices concerning the survey of the land,
the applications for free patent and the investigation on the applications were properly made;
that the free patents and certificates of title are null and void because they cover private
land, so that the Bureau of Lands has no jurisdiction and authority to issue the patents
therefor; and that by reason of defendants' illegal entry in the premises and unlawful squatting
thereon, plaintiffs (herein private respondents) were deprived of the beneficial enjoyment of
their property (pp. 55-56, Rollo).
Petitioners on the other hand, state that they obtained the titles only after complying with the
requirements of the law and the rules and regulations of the Bureau of Lands concerning the
grant of public lands and issuance of titles; that the Torrens title issued to them have become
incontestable, more than one year having elapsed from the issuance of the patents; that
private respondents did not file any criminal action for trespass to private property against the
petitioners in any court of justice, to support their claim that petitioners entered the above-
mentioned parcel of land clandestinely and without the knowledge of plaintiffs and squatted
thereon by force and intimidation and against the will of plaintiffs; that in seeking to annul the
acts of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, private
respondents failed to include either officers as parties and had not exhausted available
administrative remedies.
On April 3,1967, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of private respondents, as follows:
WHEREFORE, above premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered against the defendants
Antipaz L. Pineda, Carlos P. Pinpin, Amadeo J. Hilario and Salvador D. Santos, declaring the
plaintiffs FELISA, BENJAMIN, DAVID, LOLITA, SOLEDAD, ARTURO, ROMULO and EDUARDO, all
surnamed ESGUERRA, owners and legal possesors of the parcels of land subject to this
complaint and now designated as Lots Nos. 5,6,7,8 and 9 of plan Gss-354-D, Sheet 2 (Exibit 5 or
Annex 2 of defendants' answer ); ordering said defendants to vacate the said parcels of land
and surrender the same to the plaintiffs; declaring null and void Original Certificates of Title
Nos. 270,292,294, and 369 in the names of the defendants insofar as the foregoing lots are
concerned (Exibit 6-b,7-b,8-b and 9-b respectively); directing the Registar of Deeds of Rizal to
cancel said original certificates of title accordingly; and sentencing defendants to pay the costs
of this suit. [Rec. on App., pp. 47-48]. (p.16, Rollo)
Petitioners appealed, assigning the following errors:
1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING NULL AND VOID ORIGINAL CERTIFICATES OF TITLE
NOS. 270, 292, 294 AND 369 IN THE NAMES OF DEFENDANTS AND IN DIRECTING THE REGISTER
OF DEEDS OF RIZAL TO CANCEL SAID ORIGINAL CERTIFICATES OF TITLE.
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING PLAINTIFFS AS OWNERS AND LEGAL POSSESSORS
OF THE LAND IN QUESTION AND IN ORDERING DEFENDANTS TO VACATE SAID PROPERTY.
3. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS COMPLAINT AFTER DEFENDANTS'
ORIGINAL CERTIFICATES OF TITLE HAD BECOME INCONTROVERTIBLE. (P.17, Rollo)
On August 10, 1973, the Court of Appeals issued a decision 1 affirming the CFI judgment, thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against
appellants. (p. 17, Rollo)
On May 27, 1974, upon petitioners' motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals voted to
reverse 2 the foregoing decision of August 10, 1973, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of this Court dated August 10, 1973 is hereby reconsidered and set
aside. The decision appealed from is hereby reversed and plaintiffs-appellees' complaint is
dismiss without special pronouncement as to costs. (p. 18, Rollo)
On August 15, 1974, upon private respondents' motion for reconsideration, the Court of
Appeals acted in the following manner:
1. Two justices, namely, Hon. Andres Reyes and Hon. Magno S. Gatmaitan voted to set aside the
Resolution promulgated on May 27, 1974, and to reinstate the decision promulgated on August
10, 1973, with the modification, however that Lot No. 5 shall be excluded from the effects of
the judgment.
2. Acting Presiding Justice Antonio G. Lucero voted to affirm in toto the decision of the lower
court.
3. Justices Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr. and Mariano Serrano upheld the May 27, 1974 Resolution and
voted to deny private respondents' motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit on October 15, 1974.
Petitioners have come to US on the following grounds:
1. There is no Court of Appeals judgment "which would overturn its Resolution dated May 27,
1974, which, in turn, reversed its original decision of August 10, 1973 and which resolution
dismissed private respondents' complaint.
2. Assuming that the Resolutions of August 15, 1974 and October 3, 1974 may be considered as
judgment, the Resolution dated May 27, 1974 should nevertheless stand because:
a. The non-inclusion of the Director of Lands or any other representative of the Republic is fatal
to private respondents' case.
b. The Court of Appeals erred when it upheld private respondents' continuous possession of the
property since 1878 under a claim of title entitling them to a right of ownership.
c. Petitioners' Torrens Titles have become indefeasible. (pp. 20-21, Rollo)
As to the first assigned error, the Resolution of the Court of Appeals has sufficiently disclaimed
this and We quote:
Appellants allege that there is no judgment rendered in the Resolution of August 15,1974
because there no unanimous vote of any three Justices. This is devoid of merit. Associate
Justices Magno Gatmaitan and Andres Reyes, and Acting Presiding Justice Antonio Lucero voted
for the setting aside of this Court's Resolution of May 27,1974 and for the reinstatement of the
original decision penned by Justice Barcelona, dated August 10 1973. On the other hand,
Associate Justices Ramon G. Gaviola and Mariano Serrano voted to deny the motion for
reconsideration of plaintiffs-appelles, which in effect maintained this Court's Resolution of May
27, 1974. The majority prevails. As to Lot 5, four (4) Justices, namely: Honorable Gatmaitan,
Reyes, Gaviola and Serrano voted for the exclusion of said parcel of land from the effects of the
judgment that has been reinstated. Hon. Presiding Justice Lucero dissented and voted for the
inclusion of said Lot 5 in the judgment. Again, the majority prevails. (pp. 111-112, Rollo)
The second assigned error raises the primary issue of which of the parties have the better rights
over the property in litigation.
Under present jurisprudence, alienable public land held by a possessor personally, or through
his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed
period 3 is converted to private property by mere lapse or completion of said period ipso jure.
(Director of Lands v. IAC, G.R. No. 73002, December 29,1986,146 SCRA 509; Susi v. Reyes, 48
Phil. 424).
Private respondent's possession and claim of ownership is unrebutted. As observed by the trial
court:
... it appears that the possession and claim of ownership over the land in question by plaintiffs
and their predecessors- in-interest prior to, and during the Second World War was
unrebutted. Defendants did not even deny this and in fact their evidence is anchored from the
year 1945 onward. The evidence of the plaintiffs on this point appears to be coherent, reliable
and contained nothing which would cast doubt thereon. As regards the evidence concerning
facts occurring in and after 1945, the testimony of Benjamin Esguerra is corroborated in some
aspects by his other witnesses and is consistent with the entire mass of evidence; while that of
defendant Antipaz Pineda is not supported by any other evidence and is unconfirmed by any
witness except as to events taking place from 1957 onward. His testimony is unreliable and
repletes (sic) with impeaching facts and circumstances. He testified that they purchased the
rights and interests of the spouses John Keys and Consuelo Pallingayon sometime in 1945 over
the land in question. According to the investigation reports of Domingo Madrinan, however,
the defendants acquired their supposed rights and interest by occupation and not by purchase
(Exhibits 6, 7, 8 and 9). According to the free patent applications of the defendants, their
supposed acquisition by occupation was not 1945 but in 1938 with respect to Pineda and
Hilario, and in 1945 with respect to the other two defendants. In fact, Domingo Madrinan
testified that during his investigation he was informed by defendants that they occupied the
property in 1938. Pineda declared that the sale in their favor from the spouses John Keys and
Consuelo Pallingayon was in writing and filed with the Bureau of Lands with their free patent
applications. He further added that tax receipts evidencing payments of taxes in the name of
Consuelo Pallingayon were also filed with the Bureau of Lands. The record of the said office,
however, yield no such writing and tax receipts. ... (Emphasis supplied)
... Except for the testimony of Pineda which this Court cannot, for reasons heretofore
mentioned, believe, no reliable and competent evidence was adduced showing that defendants
have been occupying and cultivating the property before 1957. The evidence for the plaintiffs
on the other hand disclosed that even before 1920's their predecessor in interest, Macario
Borja, was already in the exclusive, public and peaceful possession of the land, cultivating the
same and continued to do so until about 1937 or 1938 when he conveyed the same to the
spouses Agustin Esguerra and Luisa Bunyi. The latter took over the possession and enjoyment
of this land until their respective death in 1940 and 1946. Their children, plaintiffs-herein,
succeeded them and held possession and enjoyment until 1957 when the defendants intruded
on the property and started exercising possessory acts. (Decision, Record on Appeal, pp. 33-34;
p. 43.) (pp. 62-64, Rollo; emphasis ours)
It is a well-settled rule that findings of trial courts are accorded great respect in the absence of
any showing that they ignored, overlooked or failed to properly appreciate matters of
substance which would affect the results (Centino v. C.A., G.R.No. 77298, January 13, 1989;
Natividad del Rosario Vda. de Alberto v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-29759, May 18,1989).
Following the Susi doctrine, (supra) therefore, private respondents are deemed to have
acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to grant, but also a grant of the Government
over the controversial land. By such grant, the property in litigation is segregated from the
public domain; and becomes private property, over which necessarily, the Director of Lands
no longer has jurisdiction:
... Lands held in freehold or fee title, or of private ownership, constitute no part of the public
domain and cannot possibly come within the purview of said Act No. 2874, inasmuch as the
'subject' of such freehold or private land is not embraced in any manner in the title of the Act
and the same are excluded from the provisions or text thereof. (Marcelino C. Agne, et al. v. The
Director of Lands, et al., G.R. No. L-40399, February 6,1990; Marcelino C. Agne, et al. v. Hon.
IAC, et al., G.R. No. 72255, February 6,1990)
Absent such jurisdiction and being thus private property, it is clear that the certificates of title
issued in favor of petitioners are null and void, and the issue on indefeasibility of title
becomes irrelevant.
Private ownership of land (as when there is a prima facie proof of ownership like a duly
registered possessory information) is not affected by the issuance of a free patent over the
same land, because the Public Land Law applies only to lands of the public domain. The
Director of Lands has no authority to grant to another a free patent for and that has ceased to
be a public land and has passed to private ownership (Garcia vs. Director of Lands, 80 Phil.
424). Consequently, a certificate of title issued pursuant to a homestead patent partakes of
the nature of a certificate issued in a judicial proceeding only if the land covered by it is really
a part of the disposable land of the public domain. (Pedro De la Concha, et al. v. Irineo
Magtira, G.R. No. L-19122, October 19,1966; 18 SCRA 398)
Similarly, the foregoing considered the issues on non-inclusion of the Director of Lands in the
petition, or the failure to exhaust administrative remedies are irrelevant.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 10, 1973, penned by Justice
Barcelona, as reinstated per its resolution dated August 15, 1974, is AFFIRMED, with the
modification that Lot No. 5 shall be excluded from the effects of the judgment that has been
reinstated. The petition is DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED
Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz, Gancayco and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.

2. REPUBLIC V. IAC

G.R. No. 73085 June 4, 1990

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, PABLO, JUAN, JR., JULIAN, RUFINA, LEONOR, GLORIA
TERESITA, ANTONIO, DOLORES, BERNARDO, JR., and MARIA VIOLETA, all surnamed
MERCHAN, respondents.
Alfredo L. Raya for respondents.

PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate
Court*, dated December 2, 1985, in AC-G.R. CV No. 67964 affirming the appealed decision of
the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Quezon, Branch II, Lucena City.
The antecedent facts of this case are as follows:
Claiming that they acquired the property by virtue of a document which they alleged to be a
Spanish title originally issued in the name of Bernardo Merchan, the private respondents filed
a complaint dated August 7, 1974 against petitioner Republic of the Philippines for quieting of
title over said property located in Sitio de Malapianbato alias Arras, Bo. de Ayuti, Lucban,
Quezon, containing an area of one million six hundred and sixty thousand (1,660,000) square
meters, more or less, or 166 hectares. The petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case because the
land is part of a forest reserve established by Proclamation No. 42 dated October 14,1921, and
by Proclamation No. 716 dated May 26,1941 which declared the area as part of the "Mts.
Banahaw-San Cristobal National Park."
The motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court.
The private respondents filed a motion to declare the petitioner in default for failure to file its
answer within the reglementary period and for the appointment of a Commissioner to receive
their evidence, which was granted.
The petitioner filed a motion to lift the order of default which was denied by the trial court. The
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid denial.
Meanwhile, Judge Manolo L. Maddela rendered a decision on December 18, 1975, declaring the
private respondents as owners of the land subject of the litigation.
On April 21, 1976, the trial court, presided over by Judge Delia P. Medina, issued an order
declaring as moot and academic petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the order denying
the motion to lift the order of default in view of this Court's resolution declaring null and void
all judicial acts, decisions, orders and resolutions performed, promulgated and issued after
January 2, 1976, by then Judge Manolo L. Maddela. In the same order, Judge Medina required
the petitioner to file a reply to the private respondents' opposition to its motion to set aside the
decision of December 18, 1975. The petitioner filed its reply on May 10, 1976.
Petitioner's motion to set aside the decision dated December 18, 1975 of the trial court which
rendered judgment in private respondents' favor was granted by the court on July 23, 1976,
thereby vacating and setting aside the questioned decision and the order of default. In the
same order, the petitioner was required to file its answer to the complaint which it did.
The private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the order granting the motion to
set aside the decision dated December 18, 1975, which was denied.
On September 16, 1976, the private respondents filed a manifestation assailing the jurisdiction
of the court to hear the case contending that it properly belonged to another branch of the
court but this was denied.
On September 27, 1976, the private respondents filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction against Judge Medina. The appellate court
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent judge from further proceeding with
Civil Case No. 7840. The appellate court further required the petitioner to file its answer, which
was duly submitted.
Meanwhile, on December 29, 1976, the private respondents, six months after the effectivity of
P.D. No. 892, filed an application for the registration of the parcel of land involved in Civil Case
No. 7840. This was docketed as Land Registration Case No. N-1055.
On November 29, 1977, the appellate court denied the aforesaid petition for certiorari and
lifted the restraining order.
The trial court, this time presided by Judge Benigno M. Puno, issued an order setting the case
for pre-trial. For failure of petitioner's counsel to attend the scheduled hearing, the trial court
issued an order declaring the said failure as a waiver to present evidence and to cross-examine
the private respondents' witnesses and declared the case submitted for decision.
On March 3, 1980, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of the private respondents, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant:
(1) Declaring the plaintiff the rightful co-owners and possessors of the land in question as well
as the improvements thereon since time immemorial by themselves and/or their predecessors-
in-interests;
(2) Ordering the defendant Bureau of Forestry, as represented by the Director of Forestry, to
desist from disturbing the peaceful possession and ownership of the plaintiffs over the land in
question;
(3) Ordering the defendant to recognize the right of possession and ownership of the plaintiffs
over the land described in paragraph 7 of the complaint which is particularly known as Cad. Lot
No. 4292 (portion) of Cadastral Survey No. 340-D, Case No. 4, situated at the barrio Ayuti,
Municipality of Lucena, Province of Quezon, Island of Luzon;
(4) Ordering the defendant to agree in, and cause the segregation of the land in question within
the perimeter of the Mt. Banahaw San Cristobal National Park, it being private property of the
plaintiffs; and
(5) The applicants in Land Registration Case No. 1055 are hereby directed to take immediate
measures for the early and prompt hearing and/or disposition of said case, otherwise, the Court
will be constrained to dismiss the same for lack of interest. (Rollo, pp. 113-114).
The petitioner appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the judgment
of the trial court.
Hence, this petition.
On August 10, 1987, the Court gave due course to the petition and granted the parties a period
of thirty (30) days from notice within which to file memoranda (Rollo, p. 112). The petitioner
filed its memorandum on September 18, 1987 (Rollo, p. 113), while the private respondents
submitted for consideration their comment to the petition dated August 25, 1986, and their
rejoinder to the reply of the petitioner dated June 29, 1987 (Rollo, p. 135).
The main issue in this case is whether or not the subject parcel of land which was declared a
part of the forest reserve in 1921 and later a national park in 1941 may be subject of private
appropriation and registration.
The petitioner contends that being part of a forest reserve, and later as a national park, the
subject parcel of land cannot be the subject of appropriation as private property. As reservation
for a national park, the land cannot be registered because public reservations are outside the
commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or registered as private property.
The petitioner further argues that the document itself dated July 29, 1870 which private
respondents allege to be a Spanish title negates their claim. The supposed Spanish title plainly
reveals that it is a mere instrument executed by Bernardo Merchan, private respondents'
predecessor-in-interest, claiming possession over the land described therein which he sought to
be recognized by the government during the Spanish regime. The document does not say it is a
title, nor does it state that Bernardo Merchan has acquired ownership over the land. The
document does not contain the specific area of the land which is claimed to be owned by
private respondents.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The land in question was proclaimed part of a forest reserve by virtue of Proclamation No. 42
dated October 14, 1921. This proclamation was superseded by Proclamation No. 716 dated
May 26, 1941 establishing the Mts. Banahaw-San Cristobal National Park.

It is already a settled rule that forest lands or forest reserves are not capable of private
appropriation, and possession thereof, however long, cannot convert them into private
property (Vano v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 41 Phil. 161 [1920]; Adorable v.
Director of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401 [1960]; Director of Forestry v. Munoz, 132 Phil. 637 [1968];
Republic v. De la Cruz, 67 SCRA 221 [1975]; Director of Lands v. Reyes and Alinsunurin v.
Director of Lands, 68 SCRA 177 [1975]; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648 [1979];
Republic v. Animas, 56 SCRA 499 [1974]; Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701
[1984]; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 156 [1985]; Director of Lands v. Rivas, 141 SCRA
329 [1986]) unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable by the
Director of Forestry (Republic v. Court of Appeals, 154 SCRA 476 [1987]).

In this case, there is no proof of reclassification by the Director of Forestry that the land in
question is disposable or alienable.

Furthermore, with the passage of Presidential Decree No. 892, effective February 16, 1976,
Spanish Titles can no longer be used as evidence of land ownership. Under the same decree,
lands not under the Torrens System shall be considered as unregistered.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the appellate court is hereby REVERSED, and Civil Case
No. 7840 and Registration Case No. N-1055 are hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

3. Director of Forestry v. Villareal

G.R. No. L-32266 February 27, 1989

THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, petitioner
vs.
RUPERTO A. VILLAREAL, respondent.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Valmonte, Pena & Marcos for respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
The basic question before the Court is the legal classification of mangrove swamps,
or manglares, as they are commonly known. If they are part of our public forest lands, they
are not alienable under the Constitution. If they are considered public agricultural lands, they
may be acquired under private ownership. The private respondent's claim to the land in
question must be judged by these criteria.
The said land consists of 178,113 square meters of mangrove swamps located in the
municipality of Sapian, Capiz. Ruperto Villareal applied for its registration on January 25, 1949,
alleging that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for more
than forty years. He was opposed by several persons, including the petitioner on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines. After trial, the application was approved by the Court of First
Instance. of Capiz. 1 The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 2 The Director of
Forestry then came to this Court in a petition for review on certiorari claiming that the land in
dispute was forestal in nature and not subject to private appropriation. He asks that the
registration be reversed.
It should be stressed at the outset that both the petitioner and the private respondent agree
that the land is mangrove land. There is no dispute as to this. The bone of contention between
the parties is the legal nature of mangrove swamps or manglares. The petitioner claims, it is
forestal and therefore not disposable and the private respondent insists it is alienable as
agricultural land. The issue before us is legal, not factual.
For a proper background of this case, we have to go back to the Philippine Bill of 1902, one of
the earlier American organic acts in the country. By this law, lands of the public domain in the
Philippine Islands were classified into three grand divisions, to wit, agricultural, mineral and
timber or forest lands. This classification was maintained in the Constitution of the
Commonwealth, promulgated in 1935, until it was superseded by the Constitution of 1973. That
new charter expanded the classification of public lands to include industrial or commercial,
residential, resettlement, and grazing lands and even permitted the legislature to provide for
other categories. 3 This provision has been reproduced, but with substantial modifications, in
the present Constitution. 4
Under the Commonwealth Constitution, which was the charter in force when this case arose,
only agricultural lands were allowed to be alienated. 5 Their disposition was provided for
under C.A. No. 141. Mineral and timber or forest lands were not subject to private ownership
unless they were first reclassified as agricultural lands and so released for alienation.
In the leading case of Montano v. Insular Government, 6 promulgated in 1909, mangrove
swamps or manglares were defined by the Court as:
... mud flats, alternately washed and exposed by the tide, in which grows various kindred plants
which will not live except when watered by the sea, extending their roots deep into the mud
and casting their seeds, which also germinate there. These constitute the mangrove flats of the
tropics, which exist naturally, but which are also, to some extent cultivated by man for the sake
of the combustible wood of the mangrove and like trees as well as for the useful nipa palm
propagated thereon. Although these flats are literally tidal lands, yet we are of the opinion that
they cannot be so regarded in the sense in which that term is used in the cases cited or in
general American jurisprudence. The waters flowing over them are not available for purpose of
navigation, and they may be disposed of without impairment of the public interest in what
remains.
xxx
Under this uncertain and somewhat unsatisfactory condition of the law, the custom had grown
of converting manglares and nipa lands into fisheries which became a common feature of
settlement along the coast and at the same time of the change of sovereignty constituted one
of the most productive industries of the Islands, the abrogation of which would destroy vested
interests and prove a public disaster.
Mangrove swamps were thus considered agricultural lands and so susceptible of private
ownership.
Subsequently, the Philippine Legislature categorically declared, despite the above-cited case,
that mangrove swamps form part of the public forests of this country. This it did in the
Administrative Code of 1917, which became effective on October 1 of that year, thus:
Section 1820. Words and phrase defined. - For the purpose of this chapter 'public forest'
includes, except as otherwise specially indicated, all unreserved public land, including nipa
and mangrove swamps, and all forest reserves of whatever character.
It is noteworthy, though, that notwithstanding this definition, the Court maintained the
doctrine in the Montano case when two years later it held in the case of Jocson v. Director of
Forestry: 7
...the words timber land are always translated in the Spanish translation of that Act (Act of
Congress) as terrenos forestales. We think there is an error in this translation and that a better
translation would be 'terrenos madereros.' Lumber land in English means land with trees
growing on it. The mangler plant would never be called a tree in English but a bush, and land
which has only bushes, shrubs or aquatic plants growing on it cannot be called 'timber land.
xxx xxx xxx
The fact that there are a few trees growing in a manglare or nipa swamps does not change the
general character of the land from manglare to timber land.
More to the point, addressing itself directly to above-quoted Section 1820, the Court declared:
'In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil. Rep., 175), this Court said that the phrase
agricultural lands as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spain which
are not timber or mineral lands.
Whatever may have been the meaning of the term 'forestry' under the Spanish law, the Act of
Congress of July 1st 1902, classifies the public lands in the Philippine Islands as timber, mineral
or agricultural lands, and all public lands that are not timber or mineral lands are necessarily
agricultural public lands, whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries or
ordinary farm lands.
The definition of forestry as including manglares found in the Administrative Code of 1917
cannot affect rights which vested prior to its enactment.
These lands being neither timber nor mineral lands, the trial court should have considered
them agricultural lands. If they are agricultural lands, then the rights of appellants are fully
established by Act No. 926.
The doctrine was reiterated still later in Garchitorena Vda. de Centenera v.
Obias, 8 promulgated on March 4, 1933, more than fifteen years after the effectivity of the
Administrative Code of 1917. Justice Ostrand declared for a unanimous Court:
The opposition rests mainly upon the proposition that the land covered by the application there
are mangrove lands as shown in his opponent's Exh. 1, but we think this opposition of the
Director of Forestry is untenable, inasmuch as it has been definitely decided that mangrove
lands are not forest lands in the sense in which this phrase is used in the Act of Congress.
No elaboration was made on this conclusion which was merely based on the cases of Montano
and Jocson. And in 1977, the above ruling was reaffirmed in Tongson v. Director of
Forestry, 9 with Justice Fernando declaring that the mangrove lands in litis were agricultural in
nature. The decision even quoted with approval the statement of the trial court that:
... Mangrove swamps where only trees of mangrove species grow, where the trees are small
and sparse, fit only for firewood purposes and the trees growing are not of commercial value as
lumber do not convert the land into public land. Such lands are not forest in character. They do
not form part of the public domain.
Only last year, in Republic v. De Porkan, 10 the Court, citing Krivenko v. Register of
Deeds, 11 reiterated the ruling in the Mapa case that "all public lands that are not timber or
mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands, whether they are used as nipa
swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm lands.
But the problem is not all that simple. As it happens, there is also a line of decisions holding the
contrary view.
In Yngson v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 12 promulgated in 1983, the Court
ruled "that the Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to dispose of swamp lands or mangrove
lands forming part of the public domain while such lands are still classified as forest lands.
Four months later, in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry, 13 the Court was more
positive when it held, again through Justice Gutierrez:
The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified as forest land
because it is not thickly forested but is a 'mangrove swamps.' Although conceding that
'mangrove swamp' is included in the classification of forest land in accordance with Section
1820 of the Revised Administrative Code, the petitioners argue that no big trees classified in
Section 1821 of the said Code as first, second and third groups are found on the land in
question. Furthermore, they contend that Lot 885, even if it is a mangrove swamp, is still
subject to land registration proceedings because the property had been in actual possession of
private persons for many years, and therefore, said land was already 'private land' better
adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by the
public interests to be kept under forest classification.
The petition is without merit.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification
simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land
classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin
cultivators or other farmers. 'Forested lands' do not have to be on mountains or in out-of-the-
way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in
brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of
its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks
like. Unless and until the land classsified as 'forest' is released in an official proclamation to
that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain,
the rules on confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply.'
The view was maintained in Vallarta v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 14 where this Court agreed
with the Solicitor General's submission that the land in dispute, which he described as "swamp
mangrove or forestal land," were not private properties and so not registerable. This case was
decided only twelve days after the De Porkan case.
Faced with these apparent contradictions, the Court feels there is a need for a categorical
pronouncement that should resolve once and for all the question of whether mangrove
swamps are agricultural lands or forest lands.
The determination of this question is a function initially belonging to the legislature, which has
the authority to implement the constitutional provision classifying the lands of the public
domain (and is now even permitted to provide for more categories of public lands). The
legislature having made such implementation, the executive officials may then, in the discharge
of their own role, administer our public lands pursuant to their constitutional duty " to ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed' and in accordance with the policy prescribed. For their
part, the courts will step into the picture if the rules laid down by the legislature are challenged
or, assuming they are valid, it is claimed that they are not being correctly observed by the
executive. Thus do the three departments, coordinating with each other, pursue and achieve
the objectives of the Constitution in the conservation and utilization of our natural resources.
In C.A. No. 141, the National Assembly delegated to the President of the Philippines the
function of making periodic classifications of public lands, thus:
Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into:
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Lumber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the
purposes of their administration and disposition.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or disposable lands,
the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
shall from time to time declare what lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act.
With particular regard to alienable public lands, Section 9 of the same law provides:
For the purpose of their administration and disposition, the lands of the public domain
alienable or open to disposition shall be classified, according to the use or purposes to which
such lands are destined, as follows:
(a) Agricultural;
(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes;
(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; and
(d) Reservations for townsites and for public and quasi-public uses.
The President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
shall from time to time make the classifications provided for in this section, and may, at any
time and in a similar manner, transfer lands from one class to another.
As for timber or forest lands, the Revised Administrative Code states as follows:
Sec. 1826. Regulation setting apart forest reserves- Revocation of same. - Upon there
commendation of the Director of Forestry, with the approval of the Department Head, the
President of the Philippines may set apart forest reserves from the public lands and he shall by
proclamation declare the establishment of such reserves and the boundaries thereof, and
thereafter such forest reserves shall not be entered, sold, or otherwise disposed of, but shall
remain as such for forest uses, and shall be administered in the same manner as public forest.
The President of the Philippines may in like manner by proclamation alter or modify the
boundaries of any forest reserve from time to time, or revoke any such proclamation, and upon
such revocation such forest reserve shall be and become part of the public lands as though such
proclamation had never been made.
Sec. 1827. Assignment of forest land for agricultural purposes. - Lands in public forest, not
including forest reserves, upon the certification of the Director of Forestry that said lands are
better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by
the public interests to be kept under forest, shall be declared by the Department Head to be
agricultural lands.
With these principles in mind, we reach the following conclusion:
Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as comprised within the public forests
of the Philippines as defined in the aforecited Section 1820 of the Administrative Code of
1917. The legislature having so determined, we have no authority to ignore or modify its
decision, and in effect veto it, in the exercise of our own discretion. The statutory definition
remains unchanged to date and, no less noteworthy, is accepted and invoked by the
executive department. More importantly, the said provision has not been challenged as
arbitrary or unrealistic or unconstitutional assuming the requisite conditions, to justify our
judicial intervention and scrutiny. The law is thus presumed valid and so must be respected.
We repeat our statement in the Amunategui case that the classification of mangrove swamps
as forest lands is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive
of what the land actually looks like. That determination having been made and no cogent
argument having been raised to annul it, we have no duty as judges but to apply it. And so we
shall.
Our previous description of the term in question as pertaining to our agricultural lands should
be understood as covering only those lands over which ownership had already vested before
the Administrative Code of 1917 became effective. Such lands could not be retroactively
legislated as forest lands because this would be violative of a duly acquired property right
protected by the due process clause. So we ruled again only two months ago in Republic of the
Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 15 where the possession of the land in dispute commenced as
early as 1909, before it was much later classified as timberland.
It follows from all this that the land under contention being admittedly a part of the mangrove
swamps of Sapian, and for which a minor forest license had in fact been issued by the Bureau of
Forestry from 1920 to 1950, it must be considered forest land. It could therefore not be the
subject of the adverse possession and consequent ownership claimed by the private
respondent in support of his application for registration. To be so, it had first to be released as
forest land and reclassified as agricultural land pursuant to the certification the Director of
Forestry may issue under Section 1827 of the Revised Administrative Code.
The private respondent invokes the survey plan of the mangrove swamps approved by the
Director of Lands, 16 to prove that the land is registerable. It should be plain, however, that the
mere existence of such a plan would not have the effect of converting the mangrove swamps,
as forest land, into agricultural land. Such approval is ineffectual because it is clearly in
officious. The Director of Lands was not authorized to act in the premises. Under the aforecited
law, it is the Director of Forestry who has the authority to determine whether forest land is
more valuable for agricultural rather than forestry uses, as a basis for its declaration as
agricultural land and release for private ownership.
Thus we held in the Yngson case:
It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public domain that until
timber or forest lands are released as disposable and alienable neither the Bureau of Lands nor
the Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, sell or otherwise dispose of these lands for
homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing or other purposes, fishpond leases and other
modes of utilization.
The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and dispose of swamp lands or
mangrove lands forming part of the public domain while such lands are still classified as
forest land or timber land and not released for fishery or other purposes.
The same rule was echoed in the Vallarta case, thus:
It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by
private persons. It is not registerable. The adverse possession which can be the basis of a grant
of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases cannot commence until after the forest land has
been declared alienable and disposable. Possession of forest land, no matter how long cannot
convert it into private property.'
We find in fact that even if the land in dispute were agricultural in nature, the proof the private
respondent offers of prescriptive possession thereof is remarkably meager and of dubious
persuasiveness. The record contains no convincing evidence of the existence of
the informacion posesoria allegedly obtained by the original transferor of the property, let
alone the fact that the conditions for acquiring title thereunder have been satisfied. Nowhere
has it been shown that the informacion posesoria has been inscribed or registered in the
registry of property and that the land has been under the actual and adverse possession of the
private respondent for twenty years as required by the Spanish Mortgage Law. 17 These matters
are not presumed but must be established with definite proof, which is lacking in this case.
Significantly, the tax declarations made by the private respondent were practically the only
basis used by the appellate court in sustaining his claim of possession over the land in question.
Tax declarations are, of course, not sufficient to prove possession and much less vest
ownership in favor of the declarant, as we have held in countless cases. 18
We hold, in sum, that the private respondent has not established his right to the registration of
the subject land in his name. Accordingly, the petition must be granted.
It is reiterated for emphasis that, conformably to the legislative definition embodied in Section
1820 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, which remains unamended up to now,
mangrove swamps or manglares form part of the public forests of the Philippines. As such,
they are not alienable under the Constitution and may not be the subject of private
ownership until and unless they are first released as forest land and classified as alienable
agricultural land.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the application for
registration of title of private respondent is DISMISSED, with cost against him. This decision is
immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento,
Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

4. Manalo v IAC

G.R. No. L-64753 April 26, 1989

PLACIDO MANALO and ARMANDO MANALO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, SPOUSES GEMINIANO DE OCAMPO and AMPARO
DE OCAMPO, and SPOUSES PEDRO SANTOS and CRISANTA SANTOS, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This petition for review by certiorari seeks the reversal of the decision of the respondent
Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) which affirmed the cancellation of the
petitioners' Free Patents and Original Certificates of Titles (OCTs) and upheld the titles of the
private respondents as the true, valid and legal titles to the parcels of land in question.
On October 18, 1973, the private respondents instituted an action for the cancellation of the
petitioners' titles over certain parcels of land. The respondents prayed that their titles over the
said parcels of land be declared as the true and valid ones.
According to the private respondents, they are the co-owners of two parcels of land containing
an area of 33.6344 hectares, more or less, and presently embraced within Transfer Certificate
of titles (TCTs) Nos. T-44205 and T-43298, respectively, both of the Registry of Bataan; that the
TCTs were acquired by the respondents by virtue of Sales Patents Nos. 5339 and 5387 issued on
November 17, 1972 and February 3, 1973, respectively, by the Director of Lands under
Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Law; that the petitioners
Placido Manalo and Armando Manalo with malice and evident bad faith misrepresented that
they have been in possession of the parcels of land in dispute since the year 1944 by
themselves and/or through their predecessors-in-interest; and that in view of the said
misrepresentations, the Director of Lands issued Free Patents Nos. 522897 and 502977 on
October 2, 1971 by virtue of Free Patent Application Nos. (III-4) 508 and (III-4) 519 filed with the
Bureau of Lands under the provisions of Section 44, Chapter VII of the Public Land Law, and by
virtue of which OCTs Nos. 296 and 297 were respectively issued in the names of the petitioners
covering the disputed parcels of land.
In their answer, the petitioners alleged, among others, that they have been in actual, peaceful,
continuous and open possession of the parcels of land in Cabcaben, Mariveles, Bataan since
1944 as evidence by their documents duly filed with the Bureau of Forestry and of Lands,
although the same were still then part of the U.S. Military Reservation; that the lots are already
covered by Torrens Certificates of Titles since 1971 and, therefore, its decree of registration can
no longer be impugned on the ground of fraud, error, or lack of notice, as more than one year
had already elapsed from the issuance and entry of the titles; and that the private respondents
have no legal capacity to institute the action for cancellation, the proper party to question their
titles being the Director of Lands through the office of the Solicitor General.
After hearing, the trial court found for the private respondents and ordered the cancellation of
the petitioners' titles over the lots in dispute. On appeal, the appellate court sustained the trial
court's decision. Hence, petitioners filed this petition raising the following reasons or issues why
the petition should be allowed, to wit:
A
RESPONDENT INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT HAS DECIDED THIS CASE NOT IN ACCORD
WITH LAW AS WELL AS APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT.
B
RESPONDENT COURT HAS GRAVELY ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 274.
C
RESPONDENT COURT HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OF JURISDICTION IN NOT DECLARING THE SALES PATENTS OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AS
NULL AND VOID AB INITIO. (p. 12, Rollo)
In their first ground, the petitioners contend that only the Government, represented by the
Director of Lands, can bring an action to cancel their titles since the disputed parcels of land
were originally part of the public domain. Therefore, the private respondents have no legal
personality to file and prosecute the case below.
This contention is without merit.
When the lots in dispute were certified as disposable on May 19, 1971, and free patents were
issued covering the same in favor of the private respondents, the said lots ceased to be part
of the public domain and, therefore, the Director of Lands lost jurisdiction over them. Since
the lots were no longer part of the public domain, the private respondents, as holders of the
titles based on free patents acquired subsequent to the declaration of alienability and
disposability, have the personality to file the case against persons whom they alleged were in
possession of void titles. As we have held in the case of Heirs of Tanak Pangawaran Patiwayan
v. Martinez (142 SCRA 262, 258-260 [1986]):
The petitioner's main purpose in bringing the action is to recover their rightful share of
inheritance and this fact was even admitted by the trial court when it stated that: "A reading of
the afore-quoted argument of plaintiff Tanak would reveal that the primary objective of the suit
is for plaintiff Tanak to have her rightful share in the property and in the process to have the
certificate of title cancelled." However, said court was of the opinion that "Plaintiff Tanak
cannot get her rightful share in the property unless and until the title issued has been
cancelled." And that "once the title is cancelled then the land automatically reverts to the
public domain."
This is error on the part of the respondent-court because when the patent was issued, the
property in question ceased to become part of the public domain and, therefore, even if
respondent Tagwalan eventually is proven to have procured the patent and the original
certificate of title by means of fraud, the land would not revert back to the state but will be
partitioned among the rightful heirs which also include Tagwalan and his co- respondents.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar, as stated earlier, because of Pangawaran's cultivation of the land throughout
his lifetime, he became entitled to the free patent and such entitlement benefitted his heirs
after he died. Therefore, in the event that the petitioners are able to prove that they are
entitled to a share in the land, there is no need for the land to first revert back to the public
domain before they could acquire their share. By virtue of the free patent issued thereon, the
land ceased to be public. This was our decision in the Sumail case wherein we ruled:
xxx xxx xxx
As already stated, free patent No. V-459 was issued in the name of Gepuliano on September 26,
1949, while Civil Case No. 420 was filed in court only on July 21, 1952, or almost three years
after the issuance of the free patent. It is, therefore, clear that the trial court no longer had
jurisdiction to entertain the complaint in Civil Case No. 420 for the reason already stated, but
not as contended by the Director of Lands that it involved public land, over which he had
exclusive and executive control, because once the patent was granted and the corresponding
certificate of title was issued, the land ceased to be part of the public domain and became
private property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction.
As to the second ground raised in this petition the petitioners contend that Republic Act (RA)
No. 274 is not applicable to the lots in dispute. The title of the said Act states:
An act authorizing the Director of Lands to Subdivide the Lands within the Military Reservations
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines which are no longer needed for military purposes
and to dispose the same by sale subject to certain conditions, and for other purposes.
and Section 1 provides:
Sec. 1. - The Director of Lands shall cause the subdivision of lands within military reservations
owned by the Republic of the Philippines which may be declared by the President of the
Philippines as no longer needed for military purposes. (Phil. Permanent & General Statutes, Vol.
II, p. 698)
According to the petitioners, the above-quoted law only applies to lands within military
reservations belonging to the Republic of the Philippines and not to military reservations
belonging to the United States Government because the parcels of lands belonging to the latter
category upon their release to the Philippine Government never became part of the military
reservations belonging to the Philippines but became part of the public domain. Therefore,
Republic Act No. 274 is not applicable to the disputed lots.
This contention is likewise without merit.
As correctly pointed out by the appellate court in its questioned decision:
Appellants' contention in their fifth assignment of error is likewise not well taken. It is not
correct to say that when the U.S. military Reservation in Bataan, of which the land in question
forms part, was turned over to the Philippine government, the same automatically became a
disposable land of the public domain. The ownership and control over said reservation was
transferred to the Philippine government, but its nature as a military reservation remained
unchanged. Said parcels of land became a disposable land of public domain only on May 19,
1971, per certification of the Bureau of Forestry (Project No. 4-A, C-C. Map No. 26-40). Its
disposition only by sale was duly authorized pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 274.
If the land in question became immediately disposable upon its turn over to the Philippine
government in 1965, then why, it may be asked, was it certified disposable only in 1971. This
Court is of the conclusion that this land above referred to continued to be a military reservation
land while in the custody of the Philippine government until it was certified alienable in 1971.
(p. 37, Rollo)
Thus, in the case of Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, (155 SCRA 412, 418-419 [1987])
we held:
In effect, what the Court a quo has done is to release the subject property from the unclassified
category, which is beyond their competence and jurisdiction. The classification of public lands
is an exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department of the Government and not of the
Courts. In the absence of such classification, the land remains as unclassified land until it is
released therefrom and rendered open to disposition (Sec. 8, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended: Yngson v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 123 SCRA 441 [1983];
Republic v. Court of Appeals, 99 SCRA 742 [1980]. This should be so under time-honored
Constitutional precepts. This is also in consonance with the Regalian doctrine that all lands of
the public domain belong to the State (Secs. 8 & 10, Art. XIV, 1973 Constitution), and that the
State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation
of such patrimony (Republic v. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648 [1979]).
The petitioners' third ground actually raises questions of fact, the petitioners dealing mainly
with the appellate court's appreciation of evidence.
It is not the function of this Court to evaluate each piece of evidence presented before the
lower court. Suffice it to say that we find the conclusions of the lower court and appellate
courts amply supported by evidence and so we apply the time-honored doctrine that absent
the recognized exceptions, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the
parties and the Supreme Court; and that this Court decides appeals which only involve
questions of law. (See Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 159 SCRA 433, 445 [1988]).
We, thus, quote with approval the following findings of the appellate court:
In their fourth assignment of error, appellants would devote much of their discussion to the
proposition that appellees' Sales Patents are null and void ab initio, the land covered therein
having been already previously titled in the name of appellants. This has to be so according to
the appellants, in view of the fundamental principle that once a patent is registered and the
corresponding title is issued,the land ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes
private property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction. A fortiori,
the Director of Lands could not have validly issued Sales Patent Tiles in favor of appellees. We
disagree, Appellants' argumentation would be plausible if we assume that their titles are valid.
Unfortunately, this is not so in the case at bar. Their titles to the land in question are null and
void, it (sic) having been obtained in contravention with the requirements provided by law. On
this score, we have the following learned observation of the court a quo:
"The big tract of land in Mariveles, Bataan to which the parcels of land involved in the case
belong was formerly a portion of the U.S. Military Reservation in Mariveles, Bataan which was
turned over to the Philippine Government only on December 22, 1965 (Republic of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al., No. L-39473, April 30, 1979, 89 SCRA 648). Under such a
situation, the Court seriously doubts whether Placido Manalo and their predecessors-in-interest
could have been in possession of the land since 1944 as they claimed:
Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be
acquired (Republic of the Philippines v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., No. 14912, September 30,
1976, 76 SCRA 146)."
Thus, the Manalos appeared not to have satisfied the requirement of possession since July 4,
1945.
The improvements supposedly constituting a fence, nangka and other fruit-bearing trees and
introduction of cattle in the area involved could have been proven through photographs or the
parties could have sought an ocular inspection by the Court of the site in question. It should be
noted that one of the requisites before a free patent could be issued would be an ocular
inspection and nothing was shown that such had been made.
It should be noted that at the time the Manalos filed their application in April 1967, the lands
were not yet surveyed for the survey plans (Exhibit 4-A and 5-A Manalos) were approved only
on June 17, 1971. These survey plans also have the annotation that the lands became
disposable and alienable only on May 19, 1971. Before these, the Bureau of Lands has no
jurisdiction and could not have accepted the Manalo application in April 1967. (pp. 35-36,
Rollo)
We, therefore, find no reversible error in the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.