Book Good Governance and Youtha

Good Governance and Youth

Editor
Professor Dr Melanie Sully
Director, Institute for Go-Governance, Vienna
www.go-governance.com
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CONTENTS
Preface
Oskar Wawra,
Director, International Relations Department, City of Vienna 5
Good Governance in the Black Sea Region:

Expectations and Reality. A Personal View
Jakub Forst-Battaglia
Former Director of the Austrian Cultural Forum, Kiev; Diplomat in the
Austrian Federal Ministry for Europe and Integration 7
Children and Young People in the Austrian Parliament:

The Democracy Workshop 15
The Involvement of Young People in Democratic Life at Regional

Level
Assembly of European Regions (AER) 25
Youth Participation in the EU: Empowering Youth through

Volunteering
Simona Pronckuté
Brussels-based Analyst from Lithuania 35
Viennese District Elections 2015: Urban District Campaign

Alexandra Dancasiu
Policy Analyst, Institute for Go-Governance, Vienna 45
Protests and Plenums: Bosnia’s Civic Awakening and Youth

Participation
Stefan Ralchev
Programme Director and Policy Analyst, Institute for Regional and
International Studies (IRIS), Sofia, Bulgaria 53
“Independent” Ukrainian Generation between “Old”

and “Young” Elites:
Challenges for Youth Participation in Ukraine’s Political System
Sergii Glebov
Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, Dean School
of International Relations, Institute of Social Sciences, Odesa Mechnikov
National University Ukraine 67
#Electric Yerevan: Energising Democracy

or Instrumentalising Youth?
Gevorg Melikyan
Independent Political Analyst, Yerevan, Armenia 83
State Youth Policy and Youth Participation Through

the Youth Council Adjunct to the Mayor of Yerevan
Samvel Mertarjian 3
Vice President of the Youth Council Adjunct to the Mayor of Yerevan
The Impact and Sustainability of Youth Exchanges
in the South Caucasus and Good Governance
Gevorg Melikyan
Independent Political Analyst, Yerevan, Armenia
State Youth Policy and Youth Participation Through
the Youth Council Adjunct to the Mayor of Yerevan
Samvel Mertarjian
Vice President of the Youth Council Adjunct to the Mayor of Yerevan 95
The Impact and Sustainability of Youth Exchanges

in the South Caucasus and Good Governance
Hovhannes Stepanyan
Expert from Armenia, Educated at Cardiff University UK 99
Paternalism Discovers Youth: Giving Rights

or Making Conclusions
Assoc Prof Dr Hikmet Kirik
Department of Political Science and Public Administration,
Political Science Faculty, Istanbul University, Turkey 111
Nature of Youth Activism in Georgia:

Trends Motives, Ideology
Levan Kakhishvili and Iveta Gogava
Experts based in Georgia 129
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Preface
Oskar WAWRA
Director, International Relations Department, City of Vienna
This collection of essays forms part of a series looking at themes in democratic

governance on a comparative basis. Good governance covers contemporary
issues such as rule of law, anti-corruption measures, transparency,
accountability, political participation and inclusiveness to enhance democracy.
Over the last years the City of Vienna together with the Austrian Federal
Ministry for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs has cooperated with the
Vienna based Institute for Go-Governance in organising conferences, Summer
Schools, seminars, and publications dedicated to exploring in depth these themes
and bringing international scholars, NGOs and civil society together for
extensive debates. This book series forms part of the sustainability of the entire
project. Geographically the work has to date focussed on the Black Sea Region,
the West Balkans but has also interconnected with the experience and best
practices of European Union countries.
In 2015 an international conference was held in Yerevan, Republic of Armenia

supported additionally by the City of Yerevan but also Kapsch of Austria. The
topic under discussion was governance and participation and received
widespread media attention. Later in the year a workshop was held on the topic
of youth participation in political life, in Podgorica the capital of Montenegro.
This time too we could count on the support of the local City Hall.
This book extends the topic with written contributions from youth and experts
from a wide range of countries, including not only Austria but Turkey, Armenia,
Georgia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Belgium. Organisations such as the Assembly
of European Regions based in Brussels/Strasbourg and the Democracy
Workshop based in the Austrian Parliament have also contributed.
These projects have come about due to the hard work and initiatives of many
people including Thomas Resch of the City of Vienna and Melanie Sully editor
of this series and head of the Institute for Go-Governance. We are grateful to the
valuable input by many, many more across Europe. Enjoy reading about this
vital topic for the future.
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GOOD GOVERNANCE IN THE BLACK SEA REGION:
EXPECTATIONS AND REALITY. A PERSONAL VIEW
Jakub FORST-BATTAGLIA
former Director of the Austrian Cultural Forum, Kiev; Diplomat in the Austrian
Federal Ministry for Europe and Integration
Looking back over several years of efforts in promoting the idea of Good
Governance throughout the large and heterogeneous Black Sea Basin I
remember our first little brain-storm- like meeting at the Austrian Foreign
Ministry in December 2009. In this context I have to thank above all Professor
Melanie Sully for her excellent initiative in putting this important region on the
mental map of Austria, and to thank the City of Vienna in particular, our
Ministry for European and International Affairs and all the scientists, scholars
and politicians from Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan,
Russia, Ukraine and Moldova, who contributed to our efforts thus enhancing a
common consciousness and creating a multiplier effect, also partly involving
observers from European institutions as well as from Britain and France.
That goes in step with an EU Strategy for the South Caucasus elaborated in 2009
and 2010 after the short Russian-Georgian war of 2008 aiming at strengthening
democratization, political pluralism, the rule of law, human rights and
fundamental freedoms. Good governance as an overall concept encompasses a
responsible administration, accountable to reliable democratic institutions,
transparent, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive. The goal is a
sustainable development ensuring better living conditions in a well-functioning
economy for a majority of the population. An active civil society, a consensus
oriented public life believing in peaceful conflict management is needed to
ensure the success of these principles.
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These aims are closely linked to the guiding principles of the Eastern
Partnership of the EU established at the European Council’s Prague Summit in
2009, in order to bring Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and
Belarus closer to the EU thus covering the Eastern dimension of the European
Neighborhood Policy (ENP) itself established back in 2004 after major EU
enlargement. The Eastern Partnership was founded at the request of Poland and
Sweden as a policy initiative intended to forge closer ties with six countries in
Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus seeking to promote regional stability
through trade agreements and the strengthening of democratic institutions. An
Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum (CSF) was created subsequently as a
platform for civil society organizations to monitor and discuss the developments
regarding democracy building and human rights development.
In connection with this, important programmes were launched such as Black Sea
Synergy cooperation developed by the European Commission after Bulgaria and
Romania had joined the EU in January 2007, being adopted in Kiev in 2008
.Another programme, initiated specifically by Austria and Romania in 2010,
focussed on the Danube Region Strategy, oriented towards a better
infrastructure, also related to socio-economic and cultural integration, welfare
and security as well as proper governance.
Behind all these efforts lies the basic philosophy of the European Union namely
that functioning democracies are not only stable economically, socially and
politically, but basically peaceful, non-aggressive and moderate in their
behaviour, considering peaceful settlement of conflicts or of competing interests
as the only acceptable way of resolving conflicts. The EU has already created a
broad zone of peace, stability, rule of law and democracy and tries to be
surrounded by outer countries not presenting a threat to this pattern.
Coming back to our initiative, namely a series of yearly conferences called

Good Governance in the Black Sea Region, starting from Odessa in 2011,
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followed by Tbilisi 2012, Istanbul 2013 und Chisinau 2014, now Yerevan 2015,
we see that, compared with the greater goals of EU cooperation policy, we are
helping to implement those policies by rightly observing as academicians and
diplomats what is going on in the countries concerned, creating a basis for
discussion, a food for thought and a larger audience raising awareness and
encouraging the exchange of best practices.
“Anchors of Democracy: the Black Sea”, “The Culture of Governance”,

“Governance and Dialogue: the Black Sea” or “Governance and Participation:
the Black Sea” that is how the main topics of our subsequent deliberations were
called, reflecting opinions and analysis describing current developments or
historical examples showing how similar multi-ethnic or international problems
used to be approached or settled in the past between challenge and response.
Civil society is therefore encouraged by our conference series to deepen critical

self-reflection on best practices in particular among younger and well-educated
broader elites of the population.
It is not just important to remember the role of different so-called “coloured

revolutions” like the Rose Revolution of 2003 in Georgia bringing Mikheil
Saakashvili to power or the Orange Revolution in Ukraine of 2004/5,
spontaneous mass-movements with a certain success on the spot in obliging
unpopular State leaders to resign but too weak to carry out a long-lasting,
comprehensive reform changing the ruling structures from the roots. That is why
in Ukraine, despite some progress under President Yushchenko, his old
adversary Yanukovych came to power in 2010 because people felt disappointed
by domestic rivalries and bad governance. His performance being just
authoritarian, serving mainly limited personal and particular interests of pressure
groups and oligarchs from Eastern Ukraine but much worse altogether than the
periods before led to his removal for gross abuse of office in early 2014.
Different NGO’s had helped to maintain a certain public vigilance but finally it
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was a grass-roots movement that swept away the regime, the point of no-return
being the sudden refusal of the President to sign the Association Agreement with
the EU, an agreement that, in the eyes of the majority, would have opened the
path towards a paradigmatic change in society including European values in
governance and economy, without corruption and arbitrary rule, leaving behind
old Post-Soviet habits. As Sergiy Gerasymchuk astutely writes, “The revolution
in Ukraine was a spontaneous demonstration of the determination of citizens not
to be manipulated and misguided…The autonomous public had its basis in a
civils society equally distant from state and market. Its structure was composed
of a network of voluntarily associations”. (Participatory Democracy/Ukraine,
Moldova, Romania, in: Governance and Participation: the Black Sea, pp. 56/57
editor Melanie Sully)
In this way, we might be satisfied from an European point of view with the fact
that further steps have been made in the meantime not only by Ukraine under its
new democratic leader President Poroshenko, but also by Georgia and Moldova
to meet European standards at first by signing Association Agreements with the
EU. Much still needs to be done and there is a long way to go. Every country
has to deal with its own particular problems. There are different levels of
participation, power-sharing, good or bad governance, between societies more
prosperous or poor, more authoritarian or more pluralistic. Some have national
minority questions to settle or unresolved frozen conflicts.
If we try to view briefly the situation in the countries concerned, referring to the
2014 conference papers presented by their respective nationals, we see the
following picture: Gevorg Melikyan for Armenia (Why Participation Matters:
Armenia, in: Governance and Participation, : the Black Sea, pp. 121-130) and
Levan Kakhishivlii for Georgia (Patterns of Participation in Georgia, in :
Governance and Participation: the Black Sea, pp. 101-112) deplore the lack of
trust in institutions and political parties.
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We hear from Kamal Makili-Aliyev how e-government is becoming successful
in Azerbaijan (Development of E-Government in Azerbaijan, in: Government
and Participation: the Black Sea, pp. 113-120), an interesting experience I could
witness in Estonia a decade ago when I served there as Austrian Ambassador,
another Post-Soviet republic, very successful in terms of economy and reliable
democratic institutions. As far as Azerbaijan is concerned, we learn from
different independent human rights observers that civil society activists and
media still face problems with repression and interference by state authorities
despite quite prosperous economic developments, probably the best in the whole
Caucasus region. We therefore hope for visible improvements also in the good
governance sphere.
Talking of “The 2012-14 protest movements in Bulgaria” (in: Government and

Participation: the Black Sea, pp. 147-160) our colleague Stefan Ralchev points
out they had an “effect on decision-making, producing real changes in
appointments, legislation and policies” having “facilitated a new spirit of
transparency and accountability in public life which, if it becomes the norm, will
inevitably be conducive to better governance”. We know that also in Romania,
still serious improvements are needed, particularly in combatting endemic
corruption.
As for Turkey’s challenges, Hikmet Kirik (Turkey’s Challenges, in: Governance

and Participation: the Black Sea, pp. 121-130) writes that this large country “is
still in the process of transition from a traditional concept to one of governance”
pointing out that “the government has achieved a remarkable level of economic
and political stability especially in a highly problematic region…a new capital
and middle class emerged “. This in fact seems to be a key to success and is still
lacking in many Post-Soviet societies only about to recreate painfully a new
prosperous middle class badly needed to ensure sustainable good governance in
the long run.
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In general, civil society is becoming stronger and more active everywhere. The
conference contributions from year to year clearly show how vibrant and
impatient people are becoming, more ready to struggle for a better life as free
citizens overcoming the classical passivity in the Post-Soviet sphere.
Expectations for quick change alternate with frustration and the feeling of
impoverishment in view of the current deep economic crisis.
Ukraine is a good example. Society had to mature very quickly in view of the
Euromaidan, called the Revolution of Dignity. Events created a strong
consciousness of national solidarity. Ukraine has to carry a heavy burden due to
the war in the East with several thousands of victims and far more than one
million refugees, a tragedy provoked by local separatists who from the
beginning were armed and supported by the Big Eastern Neighbour unwilling to
accept a free and independent Ukraine choosing its own direction.
“There is no way back” as a fearless young female student activist told me once
during the most critical days of Maidan. That is why our efforts in enhancing
good governance in a pluralistic civil society in the academic and semi-public
sphere have met expectations here despite of heavy problems and setbacks.
Without pretending to make a direct impact one might say we are symbolically
“on the right side of History”.
The major challenge we have to face now is a broader and international one.
Most of the countries we are talking about, except for Turkey, a big and proud
country with old power traditions from five hundred years of Ottoman times on
the Southern coast of the Black Sea, have been part of the Soviet and formerly
Czarist-Russian sphere of influence or directly part of the USSR or Russia.
Romania and Bulgaria, nowadays EU and NATO members, used to be ruled by
the Communist Party and were members of the Warsaw Pact at least as separate
states.
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Russia strongly rejects what her leaders consider as being an incursion of
Western attempts in order to weaken and reduce the Russian sphere of influence.
The natural and democratic development of free societies seems to be alien to
this way of thinking deeply rooted in old-fashioned imperial great power
schemes making a true and constructive dialogue strongly advocated by the
European Union extremely difficult. The EU sees a mere expansion of values
corresponding to those widely recognized by the United Nations, the Council of
Europe or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as
binding without looking for some Western imperial ambitions in the spirit of the
19th century. For the EU fair competition linked with repeated offers of good
and peaceful partnership is not aggression against anyone.
Nonetheless no one may contest from the outset the right of every country to
decide its own fate and foreign policy orientation within the norms laid down
and admitted by international law.
Speaking of expectations and reality of Good Governance, let us refer to “A

2020 Vison for the Black Sea region”, a report by the Commission on the Black
Sea, an independent international body emanating from various civil society
initiatives from Germany, Turkey, Greece and Romania, namely the
Bertelsmann Stiftung, the Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation, the
Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey and the International Centre
for Black Sea Studies. According to this Commission “the region’s future lies in
further democratization and economic integration with the wider world, it also
needs an enhanced sense of security, strengthened political stability, sustained
efforts to solve its protracted conflicts and the renunciation of the use of force
for their settlement “.
Summing up, we know how delicate and risky the situation is. The political
transition processes towards a functioning democracy are still challenged by
domestic and external actors. Frozen conflicts might switch into hot ones,
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religious fundamentalism or ethnic fanaticism bear the risk of increased
terrorism, economic crisis might provoke political clashes, more divisions
between EU and non-EU members could deepen, and tensions between Russia
and the West intensify. The EU and NATO do not intend to enlarge as quickly
as some hope and cannot be expected to resolve structural problems of others.
Thus much homework still needs to be done because there is no alternative to
good governance if a country wants to succeed.
Placing above all the eternal value of human life let us seek an increased sense
of responsibility in avoiding conflicts spinning out of control. We must find
ways for a future of common respect, mutual understanding and fruitful
cooperation in a spirit of constructive dialogue geared towards the future. Here
lies the true meaning of good governance if expectations are to turn into reality.
Young people, less burdened by terrible nightmares from the past, can really
make the difference rejecting hatred and revenge. They should take this
opportunity.
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CHILDREN AND YOUNG PEOPLE IN THE AUSTRIAN
PARLIAMENT:
THE DEMOCRACY WORKSHOP
The Democracy Workshop offered by the Austrian Parliament is intended to

promote an understanding of democracy and an interest in politics. Founded in
2007, the program is designed as an interactive workshop and experimental
ground offering different approaches to political topics. It is presented as part of
a range of programs on political education offered to children, young people and
young adults alike.
The Democracy Package, as a consequence of which the voting age was lowered
from 18 to 16 years, brought into force in 2007 as well as the publication of
studies that showed an increase in political apathy among young people were
some of the reasons behind the founding of the Democracy Workshop. In
addition, there was a growing consensus that alongside its traditional functions
of legislation and control, parliament should also play a leading role in
providing transparency regarding political processes and decisions: to inform the
public about current, everyday political processes in parliament is a cornerstone
of a representative democracy. Practical knowledge of basic rules involved in a
parliamentary democracy are essential requirements for understanding and
judging these everyday political processes and discourses. All of these were
driving forces behind the development of the concept of the Viennese
Democracy Workshop. The access to information and education provided by the
Austrian Parliament creates a foundation on how to form an opinion, make a
decision (when voting) and participate in political processes.1
1
Nationalrat Bilanz 2008–2013, p.40
15
In 2007, taking these facts into account the Democracy Workshop and
Parliament's online platform for children the Democracy Webshop
(www.demokratiewebstatt.at) were established for 8 to 15 year olds, along with
the biannual youth parliaments (for students of the 9th grade) and guided tours
for children and young people (aged 6 to 18). The parliament building as the
place of legislation as well as the involvement of Members of Parliament in the
workshops and the youth parliament are of great significance for the program.
The program has provided a coherent and at the same time multi-faceted offer
for the respective age groups. The employment of specific measures enables
children and young people from other federal states outside the capital city of
Vienna to attend the workshops. In 2015, the program was extended by an offer
specifically created for apprentices including workshops, guided tours and its
own youth parliament for apprentices.
The goals of these new installations are to strengthen democratic awareness

through the imparting of basic democratic values as well as to further the
willingness to participate in democratic decision-making processes and to
sensitize youth to processes that question or even threaten a democracy. This
allows the reduction of barriers and inhibition about participating in the political
process, the support of articulation of opinions and needs as well as a positive
experience of democracy.2
Youth Parliaments for Students of the 9th Grade

With their inception in 2008, youth parliaments now take place twice a year,
giving students the opportunity to find out for themselves for an entire day what
it is like to be a Member of Parliament. Based upon a fictitious bill, the
participants hold discussions in committee and plenary sessions and experience
first-hand the difficult yet necessary and rewarding task of achieving a
2
Die politische Partizipation Jugendlicher und die Demokratiewerkstatt des Parlaments (Wien, 2007)
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compromise. At the end of the day they can voice their opinion on the topic
from the rostrum of the plenary hall of the National Council Chamber before
they subsequently vote on the fictitious bill. To be a protagonist of these
processes reveals to the participants their own, new approach to parliamentary
processes and fosters their understanding for real political processes as well as
their interest.
Workshops of the Democracy Workshop for Students ages 8 to 14

Imparting knowledge of political and parliamentary structures and processes as
well as fostering articulation and media competence3 are the three core goals of
the Democracy Workshop and have been realised in a first phase in four
different workshops. In terms of content, the focus of these first workshops is on
the federal legislation, the function and task of Members of Parliament, the basis
of democratic participation, media and the handling of information.4 Already by
the end of 2008, the program had been extended to include a workshop on the
history of the Austrian Republic as well as in 2009 a workshop on the European
Union.
The daily workshops can be attended by school classes from the 3rd grade
onwards. Per year between 450 to 470 workshops take place with almost 10,000
children and young people attending. In January 2016, the total number of
participants of the democracy workshops reaches 80,000.
Approximately half of the visiting groups come from schools located outside of
Vienna. Regarding the type of school it can be pointed out that roughly half of
the classes come from general/new secondary schools (Hauptschule/Neue
Mittelschule), a quarter each from primary schools (Volksschulen) and
academic secondary schools (Allgemeinbildende Höhere Schulen).
3
cf. Wolfgang Sander, Politik entdecken – Freiheit leben, Didaktische Grundlagen politischer Bildung
(Schwalbach 2008), chapters II.3 and IV.1.
4
Jahresbericht 2008 Nationalrat, p.45
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The workshops in detail:
Workshop with Members of Parliament (Topic: "Are laws there for everyone?")
Enjoying rights! Who are laws made for? Can laws be changed? What role does
parliament play? Children and young people actively learn about the basics of
the Austrian legal system. They receive support from Members of the National
and Federal Council as well as experts in parliamentary administration who
offer a tangible insight into the legislative process and the day-to-day activities
of Members of Parliament.
Political Workshop (Topic: "Following the tracks of a law") Where do laws

originate and who are the people that make them? What does it take to make a
law? – The Political Workshop addresses this extensive process in a way
suitable for children and takes them on an interactive expedition through the
various rooms in the parliament building. Grouped in different expeditionary
teams, the participants will encounter a number of challenges which the children
have to solve for themselves. Their solutions will guide them on the way to
forming an understanding of basic concepts and relationships between
legislation and parliamentary work.
Participation Workshop (Topic: "My opinion counts")

The formation of opinion – how does it work? How does one arrive at a joint
decision and where can you speak your mind? – Active participation in the
decision-making and opinion-forming process is the focus of this workshop. The
participants are confronted with a variety of opinion-forming processes in the
course of a participation game and develop their own ideas on where and how to
express their own views in everyday situations. They learn how to position
themselves as team players in a system and to actively participate in shaping it.
The highlight is the joint voting on a topic at the end of the game.
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Media Workshop (Topic: "Manipulation through Information")
The rapidly growing flow of information in our society requires a critical
approach to the media. This is precisely the subject of the Media Workshop: The
children and young people are introduced in a playful way to the function and
significance of the media in a democracy, as well as the subsequent formation of
opinion and information processing. In small groups, they are introduced to the
different work steps and tasks which lead to a media report: beginning with the
research through to editing and the technical realisation of the report. The
participants actively and independently process relevant information for writing
their own media reports and personally adapt information in different ways. The
goal is to sensitise the children and young people, allowing for a reflected
consumption of media and an enhancement of their media competences.
Workshop "A Journey through Time" (Topic: Discover the history of the
Republic as reflected in Parliament)
How was the Republic of Austria founded? What is a Constitution and how does
the separation of powers work? What does the government do and how can the
population participate? What was the Cold War and how did it affect Austria? –
These and further relevant topics which have shaped the development of the
Republic of Austria since 1918 are addressed in small groups. In the course of
this workshop, a large timeline of important events is created and visualised in
an overall picture. Finally, putting personal family data into a historical context
lets the past become even more alive.
Workshop "European Union" (Topic: "Getting to know the European Union")

How was the EU formed and why is there a European Union at all? Where and
in what ways does Austria have a say in the EU? How do EU decisions affect
our own lives? Which countries belong to the European Union and why is the
cooperation of members so important? – As well as valuable information about
the European Parliament, the EU Commission and central aspects of the general
19
functioning of the EU, topics such as the role of the Euro and travelling within
the EU are presented. This workshop is to be regarded as a contribution to the
communication of the significance and importance of this confederation of
states to the young EU citizens and as an effort to make them aware of unity as a
concept.
Educational approach:
The didactic work in the workshops is oriented towards the constructive learning
theory and enables the participants to work in small groups on problems from
their own perspective in an environment conducive to learning.5 Adequate
phrasing as well as the selection of topics from the participants' own living
environment are considered in the imparting of the topic.
The learning process is facilitated by the production of a media product
(newspaper, radio broadcast or a short movie) in which the outcomes of the
workshop are presented. These tangible results help to strengthen and review the
newly acquired knowledge, as well as support the participants' comprehension
of how media reports are composed and how easy it is to manipulate with them.
After attending a democracy workshop, the participants are sensitised and not
only consume information about politics and parliament more easily, but
furthermore are able to better combine the newly acquired information with
already existent knowledge from their school education, which leads to an
integral political understanding. This understanding becomes visible in an
increase of interest in politics and in media reports on current affairs.
At the end of each workshop, the media product is presented in front of the
entire group. It is subsequently made available on the Parliament's website for
children www.demokratiewerkstatt.at. By watching and showing the products
5
cf. Wolfgang Sander, Jahresbericht 2009 Nationalrat, p.55f.
20
multiple times (to friends and family, presentations in school) the information is
repeated and thus the learning effect can be increased. At the same time, the
children and young people act as multipliers in their own living environment.
A monthly issue ("Demokratiewerkstatt aktuell") composed of a selection of
articles written by the participants in the individual workshops is also distributed
amongst Members of Parliament of both chambers as well as parliamentary
employees.
Members of Parliament and the original location of the federal legislation

The inclusion of Members of Parliament as well as the original location of
legislation are important elements and unique factors in the program of the
Democracy Workshop by the Austrian Parliament. Members of Parliament of
both chambers participate as guests in the workshops (Workshops with
Members of Parliament) and support the children and young people by helping
them envisage the parliamentary processes as well as the tasks of Members of
Parliament by talking about their daily working tasks. In return, the politicians
acquire a unique insight into the views and standpoints of the children and
young people.
Equally as important is the role of the parliament building itself. In the course of
the Political Workshop, which guides the participants through the parliament
building, the children's perception regarding democracy and participation can be
expanded, as previously abstract terms become concrete in the surroundings of
the original location. Unlike ordinary guided tours, the workshop enables the
participants to view all the rooms in which the respective committees take place
and which are mentioned by the media in the sphere of political journalism.
Learning in the original location creates an immediate, realistic experience for
the participants and thus a more intense learning experience.
The workshops were designed to include a number of anchor points which place
an emphasis on current topics such as questions on politics of education or
historic anniversaries.
Prominent guests of state including the21Speaker of the Indian Parliament Meira
Kumar or the Speaker of the House of Commons John Bercow used their
official state visit to the Austrian Parliament to visit the Democracy Workshop
historic anniversaries.
Prominent guests of state including the Speaker of the Indian Parliament Meira
Kumar or the Speaker of the House of Commons John Bercow used their
official state visit to the Austrian Parliament to visit the Democracy Workshop
to answer the children’s questions. Added to the prominent guests who have
visited the workshops is also the well-known singer-songwriter Wolf Biermann,
who authentically related to the participants what it is like to live in a non-
democratic system.
In 2011/2012, the workshops focused on the relations between legislative and
executive authority and were highlighted by the visit of a number of members of
government, state secretaries, and members of the Ombudsman Board. On the
occasion of the 75th anniversary of the annexation6 in 2013, the first workshops
with contemporary witnesses were held. This shows that the Democracy
Workshop of Parliament also provides a platform enabling exchange between
parliament and the general public.
School and Democracy Workshops

The workshops are designed to supplement the education of participants.
Preparation in terms of content before attending the workshops is not necessary.
While it is possible to utilise the workshops as part of a school project to deepen
the understanding of a topic, the workshops are often used as an initial
introduction to a topic.
Once participants have attended at least four different workshops, they are
honoured by the president of the National Council in a ceremony conducted in
the plenary hall of the National Council Chamber and appointed so called
Democracy Workshop Professionals. Since the beginnings of the Democracy
Workshops in 2007, 190 school classes have received this honour representing
approximately 4.270 students.
6
Annexation of Austria in 1938 by Germany (Ed).
22
On request, the Parliamentary Administration offers presentations to university
students on the range of offers concerning political education on democracy
provided by Parliament. These presentations are offered as a supplementary part
of the university students’ education to become teachers of political education.
The national and international interest in the relatively young program has
already produced a number of "spin-offs": Since 2011, once per year and for the
duration of one week the Diet of Tirol organises a number of workshops in
Innsbruck based on the Viennese Democracy Workshop and since 2014 the Diet
of Upper Austria also offers a similar format. In January 2013, a democracy
workshop following the example set by the Viennese Democracy Workshop was
opened in Montenegro.
Apprentice Forum of the Democracy Workshop for 15 to 24 year olds

Studies on the behaviour of first-time voters cannot stand as a testament to the
clear success of the reduction of the voting age to 16: the turnout of first-time
voters is notably lower than that of other persons entitled to vote. Furthermore,
great differences concerning knowledge, interest and participation in politics can
be observed between students and apprentices. For this reason in 2015 the offer
of political education programs provided by Parliament has been extended to
include specific workshops, guided tours and youth parliaments for apprentices.
The three different workshops for apprentices of the Democracy Workshop have
been developed in cooperation with youth representatives to ensure the
workshops' contents relate to the real-life context of the participants. The goal of
these workshops is to impart competence in judgement, political decision-
making and responsibility as well as to highlight possibilities of participation of
individuals and society and to foster self-confidence regarding the active
participation in society.
The significance of politics in the life of each individual is at the centre of the
three workshops and is intended to 23encourage the formation of one's own
opinion and participation. Apprentices are given the chance to develop a
positive approach towards politics and to establish themselves as citizens.
participation in society.
The significance of politics in the life of each individual is at the centre of the
three workshops and is intended to encourage the formation of one's own
opinion and participation. Apprentices are given the chance to develop a
positive approach towards politics and to establish themselves as citizens.
Apprentice forum of the Democracy Workshops – Parliament

The goal of this workshop is to illustrate how federal legislation functions by
showing the participants how their own environment is being affected by
parliamentary processes. A simulation of a committee meeting in the parliament
building offers the apprentices an insight into the parliamentary tasks.
Apprentice forum of the Democracy Workshops – Democracy

This workshop is intended to facilitate a basic understanding that participation
(through voting and personal commitment, whether it be in the working
environment, political parties, or interest groups) is essential for the functioning
of a democracy.
Apprentice forum of the Democracy Workshops – Politicians

Through engaging with members of parliament in face-to-face discussions,
awareness of the tasks of politicians is heightened. Furthermore, this workshop
aims at creating knowledge and understanding of the importance of political
parties, familiarising the participants with the composition of the political
constellation of Austria as well as explaining the importance of pluralism in a
democratic system.
24
THE INVOLVEMENT OF YOUNG PEOPLE IN DEMOCRATIC
LIFE AT REGIONAL LEVEL
Assembly of European Regions (AER)
Over the last years, decreasing youth participation has been noted in Europe.
This lack of interest in public policies goes hand in hand with the current economic
situation. These young people mostly belong to a generation that the European
Commission tends to call «NEET». They are Not in Education, Not in Employment,
and Not in Training. As a consequence, these citizens feel excluded from democratic
life, on top of feeling excluded from the labour market.
Yet, on regional, national and European levels, governments are
implementing measures to make the voices of youth heard. For instance, the Alsace
Region has put in place its Youth Parliament in 2011, giving it full decision
making powers in certain regional policies concerning youth. With its policy,
Alsace aims at considering young people as equal as senior citizens, because they
represent added value to European democratic systems. In order to keep the region
attractive for those who will shape its economic development in the next years,
regional authorities can involve youth in public life and allow territorial
anchorage. The region is investing in its own future, as it educates its young
people to become responsible citizens.
In addition, low participation represents a threat for democracy, as well as
for European integration. Therefore, the integration of young people in political
decisions must become a priority. The youth of today constitutes tomorrow’s
leadership: investing in its education means stabilizing democratic institutions.
Youngsters do not feel listened to by decision-makers, and as a consequence do
not believe in democratic elections. Therefore, they must be at the heart of political
debates across Europe. Many of AER member regions have empowered young
activists through the creation of Youth Assemblies, Councils or Parliaments in
their administrative institutions.
Though young people do not feel included, they have a lot of innovative ideas
that they are keen to share in their own way. Politics should take into account their
25
opinion, especially concerning topics that affect them directly. A closer structured
dialogue between youngsters and decision-makers might be a solution to falling
youth participation. In fact, it has been noticed that youngsters are interested in
politics, but they express themselves in new ways, using online media, volunteering
or taking to the streets. That is why, it is our responsibility to encourage dialogue
between youth structures and decision-makers, and traditional institutions have to
connect with them to adapt politics to the digital era.
Despite these changes in democratic practices, we need to improve youth
interest in traditional representative democracy institutions, and give them
information on their rights as full citizens. Indeed, it is the only way to make
their voice be effectively heard. Youth participation is not only about voting. It is
also fundamental to teach the citizens democratic practices. They should grow up
into their citizen’s responsibilities, and learn to debate and exchange ideas. That
is why, education must not be forgotten when it comes to the question of youth
participation.
Young people are not systematically involved and encouraged to participate
in decision making processes. Regional authorities should accept them as full
partners, and specific structures should be created to support this purpose.
So, the role of youth structures - such as youth councils – is crucial in order
to enable young people to have a say in the implementation of what should have
a youth dimension. Young people must be full actors in the policies that affect
them, assume direct responsibility for projects, and play an active part in related
policies.
According to Dolnoslaskie’s practice, setting up youth councils is the best
way to fix a current problem: young people are not always listened to, nor perceived
as serious partners by politicians. Thus, the aim of these platforms is to ensure a
better participation of youth in public life, as well as to create a real and useful
dialogue between them and the regional authorities. Some structures already exist
in Europe, as proved by the good practices of AER’s members towards youth par-
ticipation in their regions, and the way they may be developed according to them.
Each Region is free to choose the type of body it wants to create in order to
develop youth participation. There is no one option better than the other, what is
26
important is for regional authorities to help and support youth structures, so they
can be active and considered as serious elements in regional politics.
Thus, youth structures can be embodied in youth councils, but not only.
According to the Alsatian Youth Parliament various types of collective engagement
should be developed. It is actually up to each region’s tradition.
Different levels of youth involvement in regional politics exist: consultation,
committee, co-management, cooperation, common projects and initiatives, etc.
Such structures allow for young people to participate in several ways: attend
plenary sessions of the Regional Council, make proposals regarding various
policies, make proposals regarding youth policies only or independently develop
and monitor youth projects at regional level, etc.
In Donetsk, for example, the student Parliament is a collegiate advisory-
deliberative body at Donetsk Regional Council. Its members can attend sessions
of the Council, and meetings of the standing commissions, express their recom-
mendations and proposals. One of the good practices of youth involvement in the
process of decision- making in Donetsk is the project “Future Begins Today”:
members of Students Parliament had a two-weeks internship at city councils of
the region, with the opportunity to study the structure of such councils, examine
deputies at work and their youth policy programs, and make recommendations for
their implementation.
In Västernorrland, the Regional Youth Committee’s role is to spread
awareness and create a public opinion.
In the Alsace region, the Alsatian Youth Parliament (AYP) is consulted by the
Regional Council, since 2011, concerning regional projects, and actions in favour
of youth. Divided into three thematic committees, the Alsatian Youth Parliament
deals with major regional youth projects, and sets up propositions for concrete
actions. It designs concrete action proposals, and, thus, plays a contributing role in
regional politics. The AYP is the 3rd regional council of its kind.
In St Gallen, the Youth Parliament is organized as an association. Every
citizen between 14 and 26 can become a member, and when the Youth Session
take place it is open for all young citizens from the region. The Youth Parliament
of St. Gallen has its own budget, and is free to organize its own events (Youth
27
Session, concerts, Public debates, etc.). Several types of selection for members do
exist: elections, appointment / nominations, on a voluntary basis, etc. St Gallen
recommends the members of youth councils to be elected by the young people
they represent.
In Alsace, the members of the Youth Parliament are appointed by a jury, so
as to ensure a fair and balanced representation of the Alsatian Youth. For example,
objective criteria such as geographic origins, age, gender, and status (student,
employee, job seekers, etc.) are taken into account.
Taking into account all these examples, we can point out the necessity for
authorities to settle down youth structures, and to let them participate in the
decision making process. There is also an important need to provide resources, both
financial and material (meeting rooms, offices, computers, etc.), to support them.
Lastly, to ensure the diversity of the population that is represented, young
people with any minority background, and those with disabilities should be
represented in youth councils. Politics are often perceived to be a world out of reach
for young people. Thus, politicians must find a way to improve youth interest in
politics by developing modern forms of communication, so that more people can
be “politically aware”, awakened and a true part of it.
Young people have not lost interest in politics, they are engaging differently:
they are participating in school councils, youth organisations, youth work, and via
social media. The essential element for today’s younger population is to make their
voices heard.
Västernorrland grabs attention from the fact that people are today mobile,
and looking for quick solutions and results. They are more interested in daily
life issues, and they use different communication tools compared to adults. For
example, they prefer communicating through networks and social media.
Also, it is mainly a problem of communication which causes a gap between
the politicians and young people. They are usually not interested in political issues
because the political world is often a strange concept that they do not understand,
with subjects that cannot manage to attract their attention and interest.
Thus, one of the main things to work on is to improve youth citizenship with
better methods of information. Indeed, this should allow an improvement of youth
28
interest in politics. It is only if young people are “politically awakened” that
communication between politics and young people will be developed through mo-
dern forms of youth participation.
For Nordland, an important action is that of raising youth interest in politics,
to include young people with the right experience according to the theme in
question. For example, pupils should be consulted about schools or victims should
be consulted about post traumatic stress care. Furthermore, several commissions
dealing with several youth topics must be created in youth councils, so that young
people can attend to the one they are interested and / or qualified in.
In Alsace, three committees were set up: two deal with orientation, training,
and professional integration on one side, and citizenship, mobility, access to
culture, and living conditions on the other. The 3rd committee is in charge of
overlooking projects submitted by youth, in response to calls for projects from the
region.
In Västernorrland, the committee may also establish working groups on
specific issues.
The young parliamentarians from Dolnoslaskie will, very soon, have the
ability to present documents to the Regional Parliament of Lower Silesia in
places where they live in, for instance at schools, at youth councils, etc. Young
parliamentarians will collect ideas for initiatives in their hometowns, and bring
them to the meetings of the Youth Regional Parliament where they will be discussed
and voted. It is a very good way to collect youth ideas and participation from all
across the region’s territory.
The Regional Youth Committee of Västernorrland was created with and for
young people. It originality stems from the way it has settled down: to establish the
youth committee, the county council invited youth organisations, youth parties,
schools, etc. to discuss on all the important questions regarding the creation of the
Regional Youth Committee. Also, its members took initiatives and built up a work-
team during the preparatory process. They decided to work on an information
campaign plan for each municipality in order to raise interest, and to start up a
democratic nominating process.
29
In Voivodina, the Provincial Secretariat for Sports and Youth works to
motivate young people to activism and social inclusion, and to promote
volunteerism.
Following its practical experience, Donetsk recommends, in order to erase
the communication problem, the organization of recurrent meetings between
young people and local authority representatives to make the dialogue between
them more effective.
Västernorrland suggests that politicians revise their methods for
communication with youth and discuss directly with them on how to build the
structures for youth participation and involvement.
Sharing power and responsibility are key factors to increase youth
participation. Politicians should increase political communication towards the
younger population, especially through the use of internet as a free and easy way
to inform them.
Another very important thing to work on is the “physical / geographical”
access of young people to political information and participation. It is really
important to help young people in rural cities to have access to political information,
and to be able to frequently come to youth structures. For instance, regional
transport should be developed by regional authorities for that purpose, and
regional authorities may financially help members of youth councils to join their
structures.
Education has an important role to play for motivating young people.
According to the Alsatian Youth Parliament, there is a big lack of political
information towards young people, and when there is, information often appears
too abstract for them, and far from their life and reality. Young people are not aware
enough of the importance that political decisions can make, and education has a
major role to play there.
As Alba County said, “School is the first institution we came in contact with,
our first contact with the institutionalized society”, that is why school must offer
a civic education. But not only schools. Education is a subject for family, public
administration, non-governmental organizations and local environment, especially
to reach young people who dropped out.
30
Young people need youth structures to address their needs and aspirations
today while they are young, not tomorrow.
An interest in politics, policy-making and participation can be awakened in
children by setting up school councils and other representative bodies in schools,
and providing education for democratic citizenship.
However, young people also learn about citizenship through non-formal
education they receive elsewhere, such as in youth clubs and local civic
organisations.
In Voivodina, civic education was introduced in the first grade (7 years old)
in regular classes throughout schools and high schools. Young people learn their
rights, how civil society works, and state institutions. Furthermore, all secondary
schools in Voivodina have been established as student parliaments, as schools are
the best place to begin with, because everybody starts there, it is a way to reach
every young person.
According to St Gallen, political or civic education needs to begin much
earlier in school, like it is the case in Voivodina. It would also be relevant to look at
the role of NGOs, to invite them to schools, so that they can present their activities,
because non-formal education is also important.
Voivodina also recommends the support of small youth organizations in rural
areas, which must not be left apart. It is important to reach out to young people
who live in rural cities.
Participation increases the feeling of being a part of a whole - in this case the
local society. That is why the Alsatian Youth Parliament insists on the importance
of reaching out to those who dropped out of school, by sensitizing all types of
structures that are still in contact with them - such as NGO’s, job agencies, etc. –
to inform them. In order to have representative youth councils, students who have
dropped out of school should also be part of them.
The Alsatian Youth Parliament also recommends schools to teach students
how to give their opinion and on how to listen to the others, so they can start
thinking and discussing about youth issues. This exercise will be very useful
to raise their “political awareness” and self confidence, in order to make them
participate in regional youth issues.
31
Schools do not allow a lot of free time out of classes, and usually members
of youth councils do it in their own free time. Thus, it can be hard for students
to combine both school and youth councils, so some suggestion could be, for
instance, giving a minimum number of hours to the members of youth structures
during school time or considering that being a member of a youth council is a part
of their formation, and for example giving them ECTS credits at university
level, etc.
Following the above mentioned acknowledgements, the Regions should keep
in mind that it is important to give youth some power in their decision making
process, as today’s youngsters represent the leaders of tomorrow. Empowering
youth and providing youngsters with education and training will lead to the stabi-
lization of our democracies. Thus, regional authorities should enable youngsters
to participate to make their voices heard by implementing youth structures in their
administrations, the relevant point being to give youth the means to get involved.
Besides this structural dimension, a dialogue between youngsters and
politicians should be established. The younger generation is still interested in
politics, but that it is using modern ways of communication. In this perspective,
decision makers should connect with young people, using similar channels.
Politicians and young people should “meet” to set an effective dialogue, and avoid
standoffs. By consulting youth more on this matter, politicians can learn about
possible forms of communication.
Another lesson to be learned is not to neglect the importance of civic
education in a democracy. One is not born as a responsible and aware citizen,
one becomes that. Political responsibility includes trusting our young citizens and
enabling them to gain experiences in political decision-making, through adapted,
formal or non-formal structures. For this reason, it should be a priority to educate
young people, and provide them with political information. This could be achieved
by developing civic education classes in schools, where pupils would learn how
to use tools of democracy, such as debating. Non formal education should not
be forgotten either. Governments could rely on cooperation with NGOs, youth
organisations, etc.
32
Bringing young citizens closer to decision-makers is a chance for regional
authorities to be more attractive in the eyes of youngsters, who are the first
resources to territorial development. Integrating young people in democratic life,
and taking their needs into account will guarantee a prosperous life for regions, on
a human, economic and political level. Indeed, in order to tackle future challenges,
decisions-makers must work closely today with tomorrow’s political actors.
Moreover, empowering young people’s voice in democratic life could lead to
a stabilization of our institutions and democracies.
The intrinsic problem of democracy must never be forgotten: democracy
can destroy itself. To tackle this threat, decision makers must promote youth
participation and civic education. Considering the increasing far-right parties
and radical Eurosceptic views, time has come for European politicians, whether
they are elected on local, regional or national levels, to take up the challenge and
give young people the chance to build up a stronger Europe, based on people’s
sovereignty.
Thus, integrating young people in democratic life, at regional level, means
strengthening European democratic models by empowering tomorrow’s citizens.
33
34
YOUTH PARTICIPATION IN THE EU: EMPOWERING YOUTH
THROUGH VOLUNTEERING
Simona PRONCKUTÉ
This paper is of particular interest for youth empowerment through participation

within the youth programmes in the European Union, as the “article 165 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides for European Union
action to be aimed at encouraging the participation of young people in
democratic life in Europe1”.
Webster defines “empower” as
1. give official authority or legal power to,
2. enable,
3. promote the self-actualization or influence.2
In the article the definition of youth empowerment refers mainly to "promoting
the self actualization or influence.3 According to Cargo and Jennings, “youth
empowerment involves a collective, democratic, and pro-social process of
engagement.”4 There is a clear correlation between the youth participation and
EU decision-making process as young people get actively involved in issues that
directly affect them. Young Europeans can make an invaluable contribution to
local communities and be empowered, when they participate in international
youth exchanges or volunteering activities. Essentially, youth participation is
related to active citizenship, empowerment and active involvement in society at
1
Resolution of the Council and of the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States,
meeting within the Council, on encouraging new and effective forms of participation of all young
people in democratic life in Europe 2011/C 169/01,
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:42011Y0609(01)
2
Examining "Empowerment": A How-To Guide for the Youth Development Professional,
http://www.joe.org/joe/1998december/a1.php
3
Examining "Empowerment": A How-To Guide for the Youth Development Professional,
http://www.joe.org/joe/1998december/a1.php
4
Matthew Morton and Paul Montgomery, Protocol for a systematic review: Youth empowerment
programs for improving self-efficacy and self-esteem of adolescents, 2010, p.3.
35
local, regional, national or European levels. Moreover, empowerment,
engagement and inclusiveness have been defined as the key principles
supporting youth participation. Empowerment allows the youth personal
development and new skills, while active engagement would help young people
to address their concerns in order to make a change in a society or local
community. Implementing a principle of inclusiveness would ensure an ability
of participation of all young people.5
The examples in the article focus on the youth in the EU, it is important to note
that the empowerment process is useful for children, teachers, organisations and
society as well. This article is aimed at those people and organisations who work
with young people.
Recognition of Volunteering Activities in the EU

Within the adoption of the White Paper on Youth (2001), the EU Member States
recognized volunteering as a key element of the EU youth policy in 2002.6 The
European Commission White Paper (2001) was a basis to develop an Open
Method Coordination (OMC) focusing on active citizenship of young people.
The OMC defined four key priorities: promoting youth participation,
information, voluntary activities and better knowledge and understanding of
youth.7 In line with the White Paper, the EU proposed more mobility for young
people in Europe with new forms of voluntary activities and opportunities under
5
Youth participation and engagement explained, http://yerp.yacvic.org.au/get-started/involve-young-
people/youth-participation-and-engagement-explained
6
The Power of Volunteering, Coyote magazine, no.17, Council of Europe and the EU, July 2011,
p.13, http://pjp-eu.coe.int/documents/1017981/1667873/coyote_17_web.pdf/b68bd393-a013-49fe-
a72d-90adcc57eb12
7
Commission Staff Working Paper - Impact Assessment on Youth Actions - accompanying the
document: Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a
single Education, Training, Youth and Sport Programme for the period 2014 - 2020, SEC(2011) 1402
final, vol.3, Brussels, 23/11/2011, p.9,
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&t=PDF&f=ST+17188+2011+ADD+3
36
the European Voluntary Service (EVS).8 In September 2007, the
Communication from the Commission entitled "Promoting young people's full
participation in education, employment and society" highlighted the need to
recognize the active involvement of young people in society, including
voluntary activities such as the European Voluntary Service.9
Furthermore, the Resolution of the European Parliament (A6-0070/2008) on the

role of volunteering in contributing to economic and social cohesion
“encourages the EU Member States and regional and local authorities to
recognise the value of volunteering in promoting social and economic
cohesion.”10
The European Youth Pact and the White Paper on Youth - “A New Impetus for
European Youth” (2001) highlight that volunteering has been recognized as a
tool for the youth empowerment and especially of those that have disadvantaged
background.11
Finally, the European Year of Volunteering 2011 was a great occasion to raise
awareness of volunteering and contribution to the society by the millions of
volunteers in the EU:
8
Communication from the Commission to the Council on European policies concerning youth -
Addressing the concerns of young people in Europe - implementing the European Youth Pact and
promoting active citizenship - Communication from Mr. Figel’ in association with Mr. pidla {SEC
(2005) 693}/* COM/2005/0206 final */
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52005DC0206
9
European Commission, Promoting young people's full participation in education, employment and
society, 05/09/2007, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV:c11103
10
European Parliament resolution of 22 April 2008 on the role of volunteering in contributing to
economic and social cohesion (2007/2149(INI))
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P6-TA-2008-
0131&language=EN
11
The Power of Volunteering, Coyote magazine, no.17, Council of Europe and the EU, July 2011,
p.15, http://pjp-eu.coe.int/documents/1017981/1667873/coyote_17_web.pdf/b68bd393-a013-49fe-
a72d-90adcc57eb12
37
“Volunteering is a core expression of civic participation and democracy, putting
European values such as solidarity and non discrimination into action and
contributing to the harmonious development of our societies.”12
Today, according to Eurobarometer recent data, one fourth of the young

Europeans take part in voluntary activities. 27% of youth involved in
volunteering has received formal recognition for this activity.13 Regarding
participation of young people in organisations, it has decreased in 2014 - only
49% of respondents have participated over the last 12 months in at least one
organisation.
Impact of the EU Youth Programmes on Young People
Volunteering activities through the EU youth programmes has a particular

impact on young people. As a result, many of former participants of EU youth
programmes were encouraged to get more active to carry out their own
initiatives and new activities at local or regional levels. Furthermore, having
been involved in youth activities help to foster youth's creativity and upgrade
their skills. It goes without saying that most of innovative ideas and new projects
come from the active and empowered youth.
According to the statistics, the Youth in Action (2007-2013) successfully

empowered more than 130 000 young people and youth workers every year to
benefit from non-formal learning activities and foster their participation in
society across and beyond the EU.14 Over the four years 2007-2010 of the
Programme, more than 527 000 persons (390 000 young people and 137 000
12
Proposal for a Council Decision on the European Year of Volunteering (2011), COM(2009) 254
final, p.2, 03/06/2009, Brussels, http://ec.europa.eu/citizenship/pdf/doc828_en.pdf
13
New Eurobarometer Survey on young people reveals decreasing involvement in out-of-school
activities
http://ec.europa.eu/youth/news/2015/0422-eurobarometer_en.htm
14
The Impact of the European Voluntary Service, p.1,
http://ec.europa.eu/youth/tools/documents/evs-impact_en.pdf
38
youth workers) took part in the international and local projects within the Youth
in Action.15 Moreover, the Youth in Action involved around 20 000 different
youth relevant promoters such as youth organisations, informal groups of young
people, public bodies every year.16 Overall, since 1989, the EU youth
programmes offered the opportunities for over 1.9 million young people and
youth workers.17
Studies on the impact of youth programmes on youth prove that the participation
in the EU youth programmes help to gain news skills and develop new attitudes.
In addition, the participation helps young people to foster a self-development,
and become more self-confident and independent. Regarding the further issues,
volunteering and participation in youth related projects and activities allow
young people to become more tolerant and open for new cultures. Organising
international projects might be regarded as a unique opportunity for the youth to
experience different European cultures, understand cultural differences and
overcome prejudices related to any social groups, minorities, immigrants, and
people with disadvantaged background.18
The good practices and the positive impact of the EU youth programmes are
also illustrated by the high numbers of participants’ positive feedback. Almost
95% of former participants of the Youth in Action programme agreed that their
interpersonal and social competences were upgraded. Near 80% of them
15
16
17
Commission Staff Working Paper - Impact Assessment on Youth Actions - accompanying the
document: Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a
single Education, Training, Youth and Sport Programme for the period 2014 - 2020, SEC(2011) 1402
final, vol.3, Brussels, 23/11/2011, p.9,
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&t=PDF&f=ST+17188+2011+ADD+3
18
Quality Impact of the Youth in Action Programme Report of the 2010 Survey,
http://ec.europa.eu/youth/tools/documents/2010-youth-impact-survey_en.pdf
39
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more
young
young people across and beyond Europe.
young people
people across
across and
and beyond
beyond Europe.
Europe.
Furthermore,
Furthermore, the new Erasmus+ programme also has a great potential to
Furthermore, the the new
new Erasmus+
Erasmus+ programme
programme also also has
has aa great
great potential
potential toto
contribute
contribute for youth empowerment through the mobility, as well as through joint
contribute for
for youth
youth empowerment
empowerment through
through the
the mobility,
mobility, asas well
well asas through
through
20
joint
joint
projects
projects on
on citizenship
citizenship education,
education, volunteering
volunteering andandyouth
youth exchanges.
exchanges. The
20
20 The
projects on citizenship education, volunteering and youth exchanges. The
Erasmus+ programme supports innovative youth projects and activities that
Erasmus+ programme
Erasmus+ programme supports
supports innovative
innovative youth
youth projects
projects and
and activities
activities that
that
promote both formal and non-learning and education at all levels and for all age
promote both
promote both formal
formal and
and non-learning
non-learning and
and education
education at at all
all levels
levels andand for
for all
all age
age
groups.21
21
groups.21
groups.
Finally, the EU Youth Strategy (2010-2018) highlights the importance to
Finally,
Finally, the
the EUEU Youth
Youth Strategy
Strategy (2010-2018)
(2010-2018) highlights
highlights the the importance
importance to to
promote young people’s participation in civil society and representative
promote young people’s participation in civil society and
promote young people’s participation in civil society and representative representative
19
Quality Impact of the Youth in Action Programme Report of the 2010 Survey, p.9,
19
Quality
Quality Impact
Impact of
of the
the Youth
Youth in
in Action
Action Programme
Programme Report
Report of
of the
the 2010
2010 Survey,
19
Survey, p.9,
p.9,
20
Education Ministers adopt a declaration to tackle intolerance, discrimination and radicalisation, 17
March
20
2015,
20 Education Ministers adopt a declaration to tackle intolerance, discrimination and radicalisation, 17
Education Ministers adopt a declaration to tackle intolerance, discrimination and radicalisation, 17
https://eu2015.lv/news/media-releases/964-education-ministers-release-declaration-to-tackle-
March
March 2015,
2015,
intolerance-discrimination-and-radicalisation
21
European Commission, Strategic framework – Education & Training 2020,
http://ec.europa.eu/education/policy/strategic-framework/index_en.htm
21
21 European Commission, Strategic framework – Education & Training 2020,
European Commission, Strategic framework – Education & Training 2020,
40
democracy.22 The EU Youth Strategy defines initiatives in the areas of voluntary
activities and participation.23 It also includes an engagement in dialogue with
young people, support youth organisations, promotion of participation by under-
represented groups of young people, youth organisations, and other civil society
organisations and new ways of “learning to participate”.24
European Voluntary Service - a Tool to Empower Young Europeans
One of the most well-known EU youth programmes under the Erasmus+ is the
European Voluntary Service (EVS). The pilot EVS was launched in 1996 with a
goal to enhance active citizenship, solidarity and mutual understanding among
young people through unpaid voluntary work.25 A European Voluntary Service
programme was built on the successful pilot action and established in July 1998.
Since 1996 and until the end of the Youth in Action programme close to 90 000
young people went abroad as EVS volunteers. In 2014, the first year of the
Erasmus+ programme, there were an additional 10 000. It is estimated that at the
end of 2015, it can be expected that more than 100 000 young people will have
been given the opportunity to volunteer abroad through EVS. 26
The programme is known for its effectiveness to facilitate young people’s social
integration and empower volunteers to contribute actively in civil society. For
many volunteers the participation in a European Voluntary Service project gave
an invaluable opportunity to gain professional experience and increase their
further opportunities in education and employability. All project participants
who took part in the study on EVS, come up with the same conclusion that
22
European Commisison, European Youth: Participation in Democratic Life, Flash Eurobarometer
375, Report, May 2013, http://ec.europa.eu/youth/library/reports/flash375_en.pdf
23
EU Youth Strategy,
http://ec.europa.eu/youth/policy/youth_strategy/index_en.htm
24
European Commission, Participation in Civil Society,
http://ec.europa.eu/youth/policy/youth_strategy/civil_society_en.htm
25
European Voluntary Service – fact sheet, P.1,
http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/youth/library/documents/evs/Facts_on_EVS.pdf
26
Data from the consultation with an EU official from the DG EAC, 29/11/2015, Brussels
41
“voluntary work is a chance for intellectual development, gaining experience,
learning foreign languages and cultures.”27 The assessment of the first
programme’s years was quite successful and proved the need of this type of
international projects in Europe. Former EVS volunteers sum their experiences
up as “you get to a higher intellectual level”, “I moved from [European studies]
theory to practice” or “the main reasons why many volunteers choose to
participate in EVS projects is to get to know other countries.” 28 The impact
study on EVS reflects that the EU youth projects are a right instrument to
empower the youth and involve them in active participation.29 As a result, over
the years, the EU increased its budget for the EU youth programmes, including
the EVS.
The non-formal education within volunteering activities is seen as an important

means for empowering young people in order to upgrade their personal, social
and professional skills. The EVS programme partner organisations offer a broad
range of non-profit activities mainly in the social, cultural or environmental
fields. Therefore, there has been a big potential to develop existing projects or
even to create new ones. As a result, the European Voluntary Service might be
seen as a complement to formal education that gives an invaluable opportunity
to young people to take a more active role in society at local, regional, national
or European levels.
27
Dominik Mytkowski, Impact study on Action 2 (European Voluntary Service) of the YOUTH
Programme in Poland, p.4,
http://pjp-eu.coe.int/documents/1017981/1668255/Mytkowski.pdf/be61c751-1890-4dac-b75c-
520b20328f00
28
520b20328f00
29
520b20328f00
42
Local EVS projects are very unique in terms of providing the best opportunities
for EVS volunteers’ integration into the local community. The EVS provides a
great potential for local communities to benefit from new initiatives and
innovative ideas from EVS volunteers. The EVS projects can be very beneficial
for different actors in local communities. “A successful voluntary service project
should empower a young person to broaden his/her horizons as a European
citizen serving a local community.”30
Like the other EU youth programmes, the EVS equally presented a very positive
impact on young people. Almost 80% of young volunteers appreciated their
increased competence in communicating in foreign languages. More than 40%
of them took into consideration social and civic competences.31 Regarding the
impact on future educational and professional perspectives, 90% of respondents
were planning to engage in further education opportunities (formal, non-formal,
vocational). 32
To sum up, the European Voluntary Service is highly successful and promotes
young people’s active citizenship and participation through intercultural non-
formal learning activities in which empowered young volunteers are the key
actors.33 EVS is one of the important achievements of the EU that fosters a self-
actualization and empowers young people.
30
Volunteers' perception of the Impact of the European Voluntary Service in their lives. A study
developed by the Structure of Operational Support for the European Voluntary Service, Brussels,
September 1999, p.9,
https://www.salto-youth.net/downloads/toolbox_tool_download-file-
91/Study%20on%20the%20impact%20of%20EVS.pdf
31
32
33
43
The European Voluntary Service will be celebrating its 20th anniversary in
2016.
Conclusion
The EU successfully set up a legal framework of the EU youth policies to
implement youth programmes. Over the years, the importance and recognition
of the EU youth policies have been increased as one of the key priorities. Today
the EU acknowledges the importance of youth empowerment through youth
programmes.
The further development of the EU youth programmes such as Youth in Action,

EVS or Erasmus allow a better implementation of the Programmes in order to
cover a higher number of young people. Many youth projects and initiatives are
organised by volunteers who have a great capacity to enable other peer
participants through informal education:
“The positive correlation between participation in youth work and non-formal

learning and achievement in formal education, one of the key results highlighted
in the recent study on Youth Work in the EU.”34
Investing in young people means investing in the EU’s future. Only active,
empowered and skilled young Europeans can bring innovative ideas and positive
changes in our society. Volunteering is the most powerful tool to release each
young person’s potential.
https://www.salto-youth.net/downloads/toolbox_tool_download-file-
91/Study%20on%20the%20impact%20of%20EVS.pdf
34
European Commission, European Education, Training and Youth Forum 2014, Report, Future
priorities of the ET 2020 Strategic Framework for European Cooperation in Education and Training
and Synergies with Youth Policy, December 2014, p.6,
http://ec.europa.eu/education/events/2014/doc/etyf-report_en.pdf
44
VIENNESE DISTRICT ELECTIONS 2015:
URBAN DISTRICT CAMPAIGN
Alexandra DANCASIU
Policy Analyst, Institute for Go-Governance, Vienna

“The surest way to corrupt a youth is to instruct him to hold in higher esteem
those who think alike than those who think differently.”
Friedrich Nietzsche
Countries in Europe are caught in a maelstrom of different types of crisis and
challenges i.e. financial, demographic, climate, social, you name it. Austria is a
parliamentary representative democracy and one of the richest countries in the
world with a high standard of living, a relatively low unemployment rate and a
well-developed market economy. The country’s economy thrives from the large
service sector, extensive vocational training programs, a stable industrial sector
producing construction, machinery etc., and a small but well developed
agricultural sector. Compared to other countries, Austria had relatively good
structures to survive the financial crisis in response with austerity packages.
Nevertheless, the country had to dig deep into its pockets to pay up after the
Hypo Alpe Adria bank collapse, just on top of the not yet stabilized public
finances after the financial crisis.1 Austria, Germany and Sweden enjoy a good
reputation of high living standards, which made these country popular
destinations in the current refugee crisis. Taking into account the challenges of
being a small but strongly frequented transit country and to others even a
destination, which consequently faced over 90,000 asylum seekers in 2015,2 the
current political challenges in times of economic difficulties require answers.
Which way to go? How to respond to the questions, that today’s problems make
us ask? Economists help us understand the dimension of the different options we
have, but choosing the so-called right path, is a political decision to the core.
1
See "Austria". The World Factbook. Central Intelligence Agency. Accessed 3.1.2016.
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/au.html
2
See APA, Österreich: 90.000 Asylanträge im Jahr 2015 (German), 12.1.2016. Accessed 14.1.2016.
http://derstandard.at/2000028877483/90-000-Asylantraege-im-Jahr-2015
45
Hence, I will talk about one concrete example, which should illustrate the
process of choosing a political solution to current challenges by a fundamental
citizen right, and some would say obligation, provided by a democracy, namely
voting.
About running, voting and the background of this paper
By voting we tell politicians, which way to go. This political instrument is

important for both, the politicians as much as for the constituents. We, the voters,
give voice to our belief, fear, anger and hope, whenever we go voting by the
simple act of voting. You can’t vote without deciding for a political solution for
our current problems. Voting means making a decision. Now, this paper focuses
on the last year’s Viennese state, city council and district elections and with it on
a concrete and very successful campaign of a good friend and young politician,
Josef Mantl3. Rather than applaud the success of his campaign, I will describe
the election results and participation rates and additionally demonstrate the
motivation of the campaign leader. This book is about the Youth and its
importance in the dynamics of Good Governance. The so-called next generation
will bear the consequences of our political decisions today and our votes. Filling
the pages in this chapter with the story of a recent election, a youthful campaign
in a cosmopolitan and at the same time traditional Vienna district and the call
for participation by voting, seemed a good idea.
Youth – Sweet sixteen, time to vote
Austria is the first country in Europe, where the voting age for national elections
has been lowered to sixteen. Youth suffrage is a discussion point in many
European countries. Especially since many democracies are suffering from
political fatigue, reducing the voting age or extending the number of
3
I want to thank Josef Mantl for the insight and opinion on his electoral campaign in 2015, which served as a
basis for the statements in this article referring to him and his campaign.
46
constituents seems a possible cure.4 At the same time, critical voices deny
adolescents the ability to vote because of their lack of interest in politics.
According to this opinion, youth suffrage would even lower the quality of
democracy. A social study has been done by the Department of Methods in the
Social Sciences, University of Vienna, to test exactly this argument by using
survey data from Austria and measurements of “choice quality”. The study
shows, that even though turnout rates might still be low, the lowering of the
voting age combats one of the counter arguments, namely the uninterested and
uniformed young voter. As cited in the paper, “studying electoral participation
for those who do not have the right to vote has a considerable flaw: without the
right to cast a ballot, there is no rational incentive for citizens to increase their
interest and knowledge in politics. Simply having voting rights may encourage
people to gather information and become politically active in other ways.”5 Even
more so, the study based on the data gathered from past Austrian elections
shows that “key criticism of lowering the voting age to 16 does not hold: there is
little evidence that these citizens are less able or less motivated to participate
effectively in politics. This means that critics of lowering the voting age to 16
need to look again at the arguments they use, and that there are important
reasons to consider the potential positive impact of such a reform more
closely.” 6 In that regard, first-time voters clearly should be considered and
addressed by politicians in their campaigns. They do not only represent the
future voting generation but also already show interest – encouraged by their
chance to vote – in current politics and elections. Many first time voters have
been asked about their political opinions in the last elections. The reaction and
atmosphere among the young showed a variety of reactions, starting from
“indifference” to “strongly engaged” and “politically active”. Political education
4
See M. Wagner et al., Voting at 16: Turnout and the quality of vote choice, Electoral Studies 31, 2012, 372–
383. Accessed January 22, 2016. http://homepage.univie.ac.at/markus.wagner/Paper_Votingat16.pdf
5
Id.
6
Id.
47
in schools is important and teachers should aim for more political debates and
critical thinking in their classes. One part of growing up is to learn how to make
decisions. In my opinion, this ideally includes the deliberate, minded and
affirmative capability of a constituent. If the right to vote establishes the
obligation to vote is an important question indeed, which in itself opens room
for a political and philosophical debate. Another question or imperative in the
process of elections is or ought be the transformation of political campaigns to
citizens’ votes. Therefore, what are politicians communicating and what are
citizens reacting to? Who are they casting their votes for? In this regard let’s
have a look at last year’s Viennese elections.
The election and the campaign
The map below, in Table 1, shows a visual distribution of the election results by
parties and districts. Even though the map shines in an all-encompassing red of
the SPÖ, the election and the final political match, was between the SPÖ,
represented by former and current mayor of Vienna Michael Häupl, and the
right-wing populist Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), which was lead and
presented during the elections by Heinz-Christian Strache.
48
Table 1: „ District Council election card Vienna 2015 “ by Furfur7
The final debates predominantly centered around the refugee’s challenges and
the obligations on national and regional levels. Moreover, the discussions were
about the lack of capacities and resources, which consequently were used as
strong emotional arguments by both, the SPÖ and FPÖ, either way.8 Hence,
debates had little to do with Viennese state and district policies in general, but
were turning around a politically instrumentalized topic and headline that were
better suited to the electorate’s emotions than a political agenda for Vienna.
Currently in many countries across Europe more and more nationalist parties
gain power and attract voters, as we could also see in the Viennese election with
the FPÖ. For decades now the Social Democrats have ruled Vienna. Despite the
tight victory of the SPÖ, in the end, both coalition parties, the Social Democrats
as well as the People’s party (ÖVP), have lost ground in the elections. 9
Especially for the centre-right ÖVP the last election in Vienna was a hard blow.
Although on state level the results were disappointing, one district campaign
stood out ie the eighth Viennese City district of Josefstadt and was quite a
success compared to the overall results. Communication entrepreneur and
deputy head of the Go-Governance Institute, esteemed friend, Josef Mantl, used
his professional experience from diverse start-up projects and young campaigns
to run his own campaign together with the sitting district Mayor. Mantl’s
experience in communication strategy, campaigns, events and digital media
resulted in a grassroots campaign that brought him the office of the District Vice
Mayor of Josefstadt.
7
Bezirksvertretungswahlkarte Wien 2015 by Furfur - Gemeindebezirke Wiens.svg
Data Source: Ergebnisse auf Wiener Bezirksebene im Detail: Die vorläufigen Ergebnisse der
Bezirksvertretungswahl, http://derstandard.at/. über Wikimedia Commons (German). Accessed January 22, 2016.
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bezirksvertretungswahlkarte_Wien_2015.svg#/media/File:Bezirksvert
retungswahlkarte_Wien_2015.svg
8
See N.N., Refugee crisis fuels record result for Austrian far-right in Vienna elections, 11.10.2015, The
Guardian. Accessed January 22, 2016. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/11/social-democrats-win-
vienna-election-despite-freedom-party-gains
9
Id.
49
The following charts in Table 2 and 3 show the final results of the Viennese
elections in the 8th district. By comparing the results of the ÖVP in Josefstadt in
both charts, we can see that the ÖVP won in the district elections but overall lost
the city council elections. Consequently the district campaign successfully
resulted in a +3.02 % gain and on the council level the results show a – 9.36%
loss.
Table 2: Vienna District Election 2015 – Results Josefstadt10
Table 3: Vienna City Council Election 2015 – Results Josefstadt 11
10
Vienna District Election results in 2015 - Josefstadt. Accessed January 22, 2016.
https://www.wien.gv.at/english/NET-EN/BV151/BV151-208.htm
50
The participation rate of the district election in 2015 was 67.40 % in comparison
to 2010, where the rate was about 63.39 %12, and 58.50 % in 201013. The slight
but steady increase in participation is a good sign for the democratic
development and political interest in Josefstadt. The general voting age reform
was passed in 2007, but some Austrian states had already reduced the voting age
prior to 2007 for municipal election. Vienna was among these states and in this
regard the increase in participation rate, as stated above, already includes first-
time voters at the age of 16.14 Whether this young voter group was in any way
conditional for the increase, I can’t answer. However, it is important to include
their participation in the voters’ spectrum.
Josefstadt is a young but otherwise traditional district. Even more so, running
for the actually conservative Austrian People's Party with a youthful campaign,
was not only strategically smart, but also in accordance with the spirit of both,
the candidates and the constituents of the district. The latter can also be seen in
the increased votes for both young-oriented and more progressive campaigns in
the district, the ÖVP and the progressive Austrian Green Party (Die Grünen).
Josef Mantl and his colleague, Veronika Mickel, the current District Mayor of
the 8th Viennese City District Josefstadt, campaigned for sustainable
development in their district, more urban and public space projects, free wifi,
start-ups and young entrepreneurial spirit as well as active civil participation
encouragement. Both politicians are members of the traditional conservative
party ÖVP, which won the majority votes in only four of the 23 districts of
Vienna. According to Mantl, their campaign in the 8th district was a success,
because the candidates went out on the streets and talked to the constituents
11
Vienna City Council election results in 2015 - Josefstadt, Accessed January 22, 2016.
https://www.wien.gv.at/english/NET-EN/GR151/GR151-308.htm
12
Id.
13
Vienna district election results in 2010 (German). Accessed January 22, 2016.
https://www.wien.gv.at/wahl/NET/BV101/BV101.htm
14
See V. Oleksyn, Austrians split on voting at age 16 plan, 12.1.2007, The Washingtion Post. Accessed January
22, 2016. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/12/AR2007011202410.html
51
about new, innovative policies and ideas. The focus on young topics and social
media attracted young and young minded constituents alike. Making politics and
the politicians visible by classical local campaigning and constant
communication via social media paid off. The personal dialogue between
candidates and voters is a necessary political process for both sides. At best,
candidates learn from their constituents, what they need, and voters understand
what they vote for. The political dialogue is important to reflect upon the
political possibilities, solutions given by politicians and to inform voters about
their options. In the case of Josefstadt in Vienna, we saw a small but active
grassroots campaign that generated constant political conversation with potential
voters, locally as well as on Facebook, and visibility.
Conclusion
Politics is moving fast and constituents often want to participate and vote, but do
not know, what they are actually voting for. The Viennese elections in 2015
were a good example for growing political interest and participation.
Nevertheless they also illustrated that political debates and campaigns seldom
help to inform the constituents about political choices offered by parties, but
rather play on the voters’ emotions and fears. Sometimes local elections and
smaller campaigns are more encouraging in this sense, because the politicians
need to make themselves personally visible. Local campaigns have less
constituents and less budget, as a result this forces the candidates to go into their
district and speak to the constituents. Expensive billboards and campaigns work
for national elections, but local campaigning can do well without them, as we
could see in the 8th district of Vienna.
52
PROTESTS AND PLENUMS:
BOSNIA’S CIVIC AWAKENING AND YOUTH PARTICIPATION
Stefan RALCHEV
Programme Director and Policy Analyst at the Institute for Regional and
International Studies (IRIS) Sofia, Bulgaria
Over the past several years, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) has witnessed an
unprecedented surge in civic activities. Protests and public gatherings by
citizens were held across the country to criticise the unjust workings of the
postwar economy and the lack of progress and to demand more transparency and
accountability from the governing elites. While popular action and heightened
civic engagement have not been unusual for the entire region of Southeast
Europe (with the examples of Slovenia in 2012-13, Turkey and Bulgaria in 2013
and Macedonia and Montenegro in 2015), civic activity in BiH may be viewed
as special: the country's complicated post-Dayton administrative structure has
favoured a form of ethnocentric consociational 'democracy' which is anything
but friendly to truly civic, cross-nationality popular engagement. Institutions,
political parties and public life in general are practically constructed along three
distinct ethnic lines corresponding to the three main, or 'constitutive', national
groups: Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats. Yet from 2012 onward there has been a
trend of genuinely civic protests and civil action regardless of ethnic background
in which a substantial role was played by the youth. The Banja Luka protests
against construction in a city park in June 2012, the Sarajevo protests against the
failure of the state to provide unique citizens' numbers to babies that led to the
death of a baby girl in June 2013, the rebellion against the failed privatisation
process, economic stagnation and corruption which started in Tuzla in February
2014 and the subsequent unique forums of citizens in major BiH towns called
the plenums are an example of civic action as it would happen in a modern, civic
democracy, which BiH presently regrettably is not. And youths took an active
53
part in the process, organising themselves via social networks and providing
support on the ground.
Background
After the 1992-95 war, the Dayton Peace Accords established BiH as a complex,
multi-level state system basically centred around a balance of power among the
three formerly warring sides: Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), Orthodox Christian
Serbs and Catholic Croats. Probably understandably, Dayton's purpose was
above all to put an end to an ethnic conflict rather than lay the foundations of a
true democratic system based on civic values. Bosnia now consists of two semi-
autonomous parts called 'entities' – the Bosniak-Croat Federation of BiH (FBiH)
and the Serb-dominated Republika Srpska (RS). FBiH is in turn divided into ten
cantons so that in the majority-Croat cantons Croats can have a certain form of
autonomy, given the dominance of Bosniaks as the largest ethnic group. And
there are also municipalities both in the FBiH's cantons and in the RS. Above all
those is the BiH state – a central level of governance overarching the rest and
responsible for foreign policy, defence, state aid, foreign debt and some forms of
taxation. This complex division has created an institutional and administrative
quagmire and BiH now boasts the unbelievable three rotating presidents (from
each constitutive nationality), 14 governments (state level, entities and cantons)
with their respective ministries and hundreds of municipal administrations. The
voting system is such that it guarantees each of the three ethnic groups proper
representation and the veto power to block decisions at state level when they are
deemed detrimental to the 'vital national interest' of any group. This has
produced strong ethnocentric political parties which in times of elections resort
to nationalist rhetoric to garner votes, and important problems in spheres such as
the rule of law, the economy or progress on the European Union membership
path have remained secondary or unnoticed at all.
54
The BiH reality has thus alienated citizens from politics, and they keep
voting for the nationalist parties out of insecurity and lack of viable civic
options, with some rare exceptions. Another source of disillusion has been the
impotence of BiH's main partner, the European Union, in handling the
institutional and economic stagnation of the country through conditionality and
working initiatives for reform and development. Of course, the greater burden of
responsibility lies with entrenched Bosnian politicians who have no incentive in
changing the system and resist EU efforts at reform, while they keep
administering EU and other international aid. But the populace has gradually
started to disbelieve the bloc as a true ideal to be pursued, and the EU itself has
been disconcerted and inattentive to developments in the BiH and Balkans due
to the repeated internal crises it experiences.
A True Civic Action? Overview of popular engagement in BiH in 2012-14

It is in such atmosphere that several civic actions and processes took place in
BiH over the past years that broke the pattern and were hints at a true, cross-
ethnicity civil society in the postwar country. Youth was often the engine of
these actions and the main carrier of their messages. To be fair, the first
expression of such a process was a social initiative which came to existence still
earlier – back in 2005 – the Dosta! (Enough!) non-violent protest movement. It
consisted of youths gathering regularly in front of the BiH Parliamentary
Assembly to “promote accountability and government responsibility to the
people, and to spark civic participation of all Bosnian citizens, no matter what
religious or ethnic group. With several hundred people from 15 cities around the
country involved in nonviolent actions, this grassroots movement... established
itself as a visible actor in Bosnia’s civil society.”1 The movement had a number
of concrete actions, the most popular of which were a protest against high
1 See Darko Brkan, “Dosta! Movement, Bosnia and Herzegovina”, International Centre for
Nonviolent Conflict, available at https://www.nonviolent-conflict.org/index.php/learning-and-
resources/on-the-ground/1139-darko-brkan.
55
electricity prices and a campaign against the FBiH prime minister's shady
purchase of a low-cost flat.2
A notable sign of truly civic attitudes happened in the traditionally more
restrained and nationally homogeneous half of BiH, Republika Srpska. “In June
2012, hundreds of people started gathering in the RS’s administrative centre
Banja Luka to protest the destruction of a city park, Picin Park, because of a
planned construction of a shopping mall there by a developer closely linked with
[the ruling party] SNSD and [its leader Milorad] Dodik; the protests then grew
to condemn the overall situation in RS, ripe with political corruption and lacking
rule of law. That was the first sign of a concerted civil action in RS by people
unburdened by their ethnic background or anxieties, a popular move to stop the
wrongdoing of those at the top of the political hierarchy.”3
However, the true awakening of non-ethnic civil society may be ascribed
to the spontaneous protest against the failure of the BiH state to adopt a law on
unique personal numbers for Bosnian citizens, the so-called JMBG (Jedinstveni
matini broj graana, or Citizens' unitary identification number), in June 2013.
“Because of nationalist squabbles at the central state level, [the] law was not
passed in time, preventing newborns from their civic rights and the freedom to
receive treatment abroad. Thousands gathered on 11 June in front of Parliament
to express their indignation. There [was] one casualty: a baby – Berina
Hamidovi – died on 13 June because... the administrative hurdles in Bosnia
precluded her adequate transfer and treatment in Belgrade.”4 The protesters
blocked the Parliament building and did not allow the MPs inside to leave it,
invoking international news coverage and outcry at the absurdity of the BiH
political system. As I argued back then, June 2013 “corroborated the trend: civic
activity in Bosnia is on the rise, and this activity comes as a direct reaction to the
2 Ibid.
3 Stefan Ralchev, “Will Bosnian Ethnoelites Take Heed, Finally?”, Institute for Regional and
International Studies, 18 June 2013, available at http://www.iris-bg.org/fls/Bosnia-Ethnoelites-
Take-Heed-18.06.2013.pdf.
4 Ibid.
56
careless, irresponsible, self-enriching and harmful ways of the country’s ethnic
elites – Bosniak, Serb and Croat. This was the last straw... The spirit of
Istanbul’s Taksim has moved west to the most unbelievable of settings: a
complicated, ethnically divided Bosnia, ruled by ethnic elites controlling strictly
defined fiefdoms of economic and political might and using the post-war
traumas of their constituencies to lure them to vote along ethnic lines and thus
assure for themselves re-election and continuous plundering of state resources.
Faced with the absurd and totally unacceptable situation to not be able to
register their newborns and provide them with medical treatment for months on
end, the people of Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Mostar and many big and small
Bosnian cities and towns said, 'No more!'” 5
Despite the gradual subsiding of the JMBG movement, its effect was
clear: the authorities were forced to adopt urgently the law on unique personal
numbers and, more importantly, started to take notice of the Bosnian people as a
true, non-ethnically divisible watchdog of their actions, not just a mixture of
national groups readily manipulated in times of elections. The spirit of June
2013 was resurrected in the most massive, and violent, civic protest in the
postwar years of BiH – the so-called riots that started in the northern town of
Tuzla in February 2014. The protests grew from regular workers' gatherings in
front of the Tuzla cantonal government demanding justice and means of
livelihood after a number of failed privatisations in the canton and the resulting
dismissed workers. Tuzla used to be one of the largest industrialised areas in the
former Yugoslavia, and the market liberalisation process after 1991,
characterised by the controversial sale of state assets and layoffs, delivered a
hard blow to its economy and the population. Tuzla has also always had a
tradition in civic organisation and action and unprecedented levels of tolerance
and cooperation among its numerous ethnic groups, even immediately after the
5 Ibid.
57
1990s conflict.6 When youths joined the already protesting workers, the crowds
grew numerous; but they grew really massive when police used force on the
protesters and they started coming in greater and greater numbers in indignation.
The protests then spread to other major Bosnian cities such as Sarajevo, Mostar,
Zenica and even Banja Luka in the RS (with slightly different demands), calling
for a total revamp of the Bosnian system of cronyism, rent, corruption and
ethnocentrism and poor and deprived populace; they were non-ethnic in nature,
with participants from all ethnic groups (even police fighting protesters in Tuzla
were summoned from the nearby RS towns of Doboj and Bijeljina – ethnically
Serb police were called to help their Bosniak counterparts).7
The protests gradually died away, with varying success vis-a-vis the posed
demands, but they left a unique and captivating trace: the self-organisation of
citizens in Tuzla and all major towns in the so-called plenums. These were
gatherings of youth, civil society, academics, other active citizens and even
representatives of political parties in big town halls where urgent problems of
the respective communities raised by the protest action were discussed;
everyone willing had a say; and in the end joint declarations were adopted for
specific actions the municipal and cantonal authorities should undertake. And
many demands were fulfilled. As put by one observer, “plenums highlighted...
that people are able to self-organise and talk about concrete political reforms.
This is a legacy that will remain... [They] demonstrated that it is not ethnic
nationalism that divides Bosnia - social inequality and political dissatisfaction
unite the people of Bosnia... [They] provided networks that continue to organise
and mobilise. These networks played a key role in organising support for those
areas in Bosnia that were hit by the floods in May 2014. This, too, is an
important legacy that has managed to bridge the ethnic divide.”8
6 See Michael Pugh and Margaret Cobble, "Non-Nationalist Voting in Bosnian Municipal Elections:
The Youth Factor
Implications for Democracy and Peacebuilding", Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Jan,
2001), pp.
Youths 27-47, available
constituted at http://www.jstor.org/stable/425781
a substantial driving force and presence in all civic (cross-
7 Ibid.
ethnic) actions described above. Youth organisations and networks in BiH have
58 end of the 1992-95 war, with foci of
traditionally been active ever since the
activities ranging from volunteering in relief action to debating to cultural and
political activism to street campaigning to international cooperation.9 Young
important legacy that has managed to bridge the ethnic divide.”8
The Youth Factor

Youths constituted a substantial driving force and presence in all civic (cross-
ethnic) actions described above. Youth organisations and networks in BiH have
traditionally been active ever since the end of the 1992-95 war, with foci of
activities ranging from volunteering in relief action to debating to cultural and
political activism to street campaigning to international cooperation.9 Young
environmentalists were the initial nucleus of protesters in Banja Luka in June
2012, before the protest grew anti-establishment and was joined by more youths
and citizens of various backgrounds.10 In Sarajevo's JMBG protests, youths
joined at a later stage, after the parents who were directly affected by the JMBG
institutional fiasco initiated the civil action in front of parliament. “The young
people came to be the striking fist of the protest in Sarajevo, joining with their
massive numbers, banners and posters.”11 A Tuzla youth NGO coordinator
accounts for the role of the youth in the February 2014 protests in his home
town:
The workers' protests in Tuzla had already been going on for 3 or 4 years
every Wednesday in front of the cantonal government building. After a lost
friendly football game of local team Sloboda shown live on TV on 4
February, though, disappointed fans who had watched the match in the
nearby cafes joined the rallying workers in front of the government
building. The subsequent police and media attention made Tuzla youths and
citizens of all backgrounds 'notice' the protests, and they joined them the
8 Soeren Keil, “Whatever Happened to the Plenums in Bosnia?”, BalkanInsight, 16 June 2014,
available at http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/whatever-happened-to-the-plenums-in-bosnia.
9 Interview with Miralem Tursinovi, chairman, Omladinski resursni centar – Tuzla [Youth
Resource Centre – Tuzla], an NGO, held in Prishtina, 8 August 2015.
10 “When Fear Disappears: Protests in Banja Luka Entering Third Week”, CNN iReport, 13 June
2012, available at http://ireport.cnn.com/docs/DOC-802568.
11 Interview with Miralem Tursinovi.
59
next day for their own reasons of disillusion: high unemployment, lack of
perspectives, corrupt and unaccountable government. While on the first day
of the protests there were maybe 300 or 400 youths out of 1,000 all in all,
the following days, after the police brutality that occurred and after intense
social networking, the numbers of young people grew three or four times.
Members of youth NGOs started coming from other towns, and on the
fourth day the protesting people were about 15,000. Afterwards this spread
to the entire country.12
Young people were also active participants in the plenums, the direct democracy
expression of civic energy in BiH after February 2014. “The plenums were
conceived in Tuzla and only then spread to Sarajevo and other cities and towns.
They played their most important part during the mandate of the transitional
governments appointed after the resignations of a number of government
officials post-February. How did young people contribute to them? They took
part in the plenums, some of them joined the transitional governments
themselves, and the youngest of them served as carriers of news and announcers
of developments from the plenums via the social networks.”13
Perspectives for Youth Participation in BiH

Youth activism and participation in BiH have been of varying intensity and
effectiveness over the last years. The economic hardships and scarcity of
perspectives for the young in the country as a result of the controversial
transition and postwar stagnation have dealt a major blow, as has the inadequate
engagement of external sources of confidence and trust in the EU: “The
country’s cripplingly high unemployment rate – with youth unemployment over
50% - has compounded the frustration amongst young people that there is no
future in the current political system. Meanwhile, next door to their EU
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
60
counterparts, Bosnians have faced the humiliation of travel restrictions
unimaginable in the Yugoslav era, leaving young people trapped – educated and
un- or under-employed – outside a seemingly increasingly hostile ‘Fortress
Europe’.”14 The Tuzla youth network coordinator shares:
The situation with the young is worse than in 1997-98, when they had just
come up on their feet after the war years. The young cannot wait, they are
impatient [for things to get better]. The capable and educated have left the
country to seek better life abroad, and those who remained are isolated.
They find it hard to form a critical mass for action; they are more passive.
The young are discriminated against as a group. The government is not
doing enough to support them – there is a certain level of dedication by the
local authorities, but it lasts only until local power brokers can benefit from
the young in some way. Yet there is a decent number of youths who can
self-organise under the banner of attaining a change. And it is not just about
organising for a protest – it is about humanitarian, cultural, all sorts of
sustained action. There are some people from our network who have
demonstrated personal ambition and devotion. They come from the NGO
sector and are now in politics, on highly responsible and influential
positions, and they haven't changed a bit – they have remained devoted to
their ideals. That is why I am an optimist.15
To sum up, Bosnia and Herzegovina has recently seen heightened civic activity
in the form of popular protest action and unique plenums of citizens, a form of
direct democracy at the local community and town level. This civic action was
unthinkable until several years ago, given the specific postwar institutional
structure of BiH, the advantages it gives to ethnic politics and the natural hurdles
for true civic, cross-ethnic initiatives. Youth engagement is invariably a part of
14 Heather McRobie, “Listen to Bosnia's Plenums”, Open Democracy, 25 March 2014, available at
https://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/heather-mcrobie/listen-to-bosnias-plenums
15 Interview with Miralem Tursinovi.
61
Bosnian popular democracy of late: young people were the engine or critical
mass presence of the Dosta! movement back in 2005, the Banja Luka Picin Park
protests of June 2012, the JMBG protests in Sarajevo a year after, the Bosnian
riots that started in Tuzla in February 2014 and the consequent citizens'
plenums. One sad conclusion is that the Bosnian authorities and the European
Union are not doing enough to facilitate youths' participation and interaction,
gradually leading to disillusion and departure from the country. Action should
be taken to support the existing number of young people who are devoted to
their ideals and continue to pursue them even when they join the ranks of
decision-makers and opinion-makers at a higher level.
62
J. Forst-Battaglia, M. Sully, S. Glebov
(Go-Governance)
A. Dancasiu, J. Forst-Battaglia, M. Sully, V.Simonyan, J. Mantl

(Go-Governance)
J. Mantl, A. Dancasiu (E. Weingartner)
H. Kirik, S. Ralchev (Go-Governance)

S. Ralchev, O. Kamenchuk
(Go-Governance)
M. Sully, A. Dancasiu
(E. Weingartner)
V. Simonyan, T. Resch (Go-Governance)
Conference Yerevan (Go-Governance)

“INDEPENDENT” UKRAINIAN GENERATION
BETWEEN “OLD” AND “YOUNG” ELITES:
CHALLENGES FOR YOUTH PARTICIPATION
IN UKRAINE’S POLITICAL SYSTEM
Sergii GLEBOV
Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, Dean School of
International Relations, Institute of Social Sciences, Odesa Mechnikov National
University, Ukraine
The key challenge to deal with: general observation

Youth as the most promising social-demographic group always played an
important role in the political life of each country. Youth being “more fluid
category than a fixed age-group”1 as a conglomerate of young people tends to be
associated with the natural verb “motion” which and when artificially flavored
with common interests, ideas, goals, and agenda turns into full-fledged “action”.
Youth acts as a fundamental subject of active participation inside all kinds of
social relations. Youth is an indispensable driving force of civil movement, a
powerful agent of the civil society, and responsible trustee of world view
innovations. Youth is the most open and flexible framework to absorb new
knowledge and one of the most visible carriers of non-standard approaches in
resolving both traditional and brand new problems. Inspiringly, youth is
basically trying to cope with all possible problems not by banal sometimes
ineffective old fashion textbook solutions, but by unblinkered vision of
nontraditional ways. Youth is a “Golden fund”, promising “conservancy area”
for potential future success and not only inside borders of the restricted number
of several “chosen” countries, but worldwide. Such inspiring vision of the
current role and future place of youth in a globalised modern world is also true

1
UNESCO official web-page. What do we mean by “youth”?
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/youth/youth-definition/
67
for Ukraine. Ukraine still is a “young” state aged almost 25, but with a long and
deep-rooted “history memory.” Having many centuries of the national history of
own statehood serves as a background and progressive platform to share with
those Ukrainians, who were born after 1991 in the independent Ukrainian state.
Such condition of historical transition well preserves continuity of generations
inside new Ukrainian social landscape.
Before touching upon youth participation in the modern Ukrainian social
landscape, there is a challenge and hidden threat to those, whom we identify as a
“youth.” We are talking about a threat which could cross out effectiveness of its
local and global mission and take away hope for its potential success: let us not
forget that “youth” acts not only as a subject, but also as an object for the state
policy being manipulated by political elites and state ideology. Such a situation
is almost a rule in the totalitarian countries that is why youth was always used as
a tool to achieve goals of a totalitarian regime, rather than of society and
particular individuals. That is why Ukrainian youth and Ukraine itself, as an ex-
part of the totalitarian system, has to take into consideration previous experience
of being under a threat of manipulation and suicidal inertia of social behavior to
fight not for a freedom and civil rights, but for the interests of the political and
state institutions, which were among the very characteristics of the Soviet youth.
Soviet heritage and ideological background: strategy not to repeat

It was usual practice in the USSR, for example, where youth ultimately
had been seen as a combat social class for the global success of communism. Let
us recall “best” practices of the Soviet Pioneer and Komsomol youth
organizations and movements by which Soviet children from the very beginning
of their school life were extremely ideologized and politicized. At first sight, the
structure of the Soviet Pioneer organization, for instance, looked similar to the
structure of the American or British scout organizations, but was fully used and
politically ruled by the only party inside the monopolar party system of the
68
USSR – the Communist party – with clear goals and anticipated outcomes. Not
surprisingly that so-called “patriotic” education of youth in the spirit of
communism became one of the main tasks of the Soviet regime since its
foundation. The key meaning of a long-run strategy of such training of the
Soviet youth could easily be demonstrated just by a very short slogan of the
Soviet pioneers in way of a password and answer: “Be ready to fight for the
deeds of the Communist party! – Always be ready!” At the same time, on the
world arena ideas “to fight for the deeds of the Communist party” and
ideological usage by totalitarian regimes of its “own” “youth” were stretched,
for instance, towards the World Federation of Democratic Youth. This is a left-
wing youth organization with its well-known World Festival of Youth and
Students, which used to be extremely popular during the times of the Cold War
in the Soviet Union and the rest of the socialist camp under the slogan “For
Anti-Imperialist Solidarity, Peace and Friendship”.
The main problem of youth engagement under communist rule, which
faced such efforts to have local “youth” as puppets of totalitarian regimes, was
lack of freedom and democracy inside youngsters and those political systems
around them. Youth participation in social life was restricted and narrowed
under dictatorship of the ruling ideology. Young generations had no possibility
to choose and their involvement into active social life was exclusively seen
through the prism of the future party career which knew neither freedom of
choice, nor real engagement into the policy of the state machine. Youth leaders
out of Soviet Komsomol and Communist party itself were just their small cogs.
Active alternative leadership began to reveal itself only just a couple of years
before break-up of the USSR, when the changing political system with limited
portion of freedom and democracy naturally began to demolish itself.
Having said that, why is there still an element of danger for young
Ukrainians? This is not just a paradoxical question taking into consideration,
that there are almost 25 years of Ukraine during which Ukrainian society has
69
been formally developing outside Soviet realities. That is the whole point that to
some extent even now Ukraine with some evident features of an old-fashioned
bureaucratically corrupted state machine still remains post-Soviet, while youth,
basically the first Ukrainian independent generation of 25, moves forward. This
move is quite solid, despite certain remains of hostile political and social
environment of the past, basically inherited by the older generation of former
and Ukrainian political and business elites. To be objective, yes, traditional
Ukrainian political and social environment especially after the Revolution of
Dignity of 2014 became less “Soviet”, but still remains as an underdeveloped
European democratic platform, which in general is changing in the right
direction, but rather slowly.
First “independent” Ukrainian Generation: a mission to complete vis-a-vis

“old” elites
So, the mission of the first “independent” Ukrainian generation
strategically is to speed up this process of turning Ukraine into a European
democracy and at this tactical stage to assist Ukrainian power with reforms and
implementation in all requirements and possibilities of the Association
agreement with the EU. At the same time, all such ambitious tasks require not
only and just assistance from the youth, but direct involvement into the process.
Success could only be possible with the wide intervention of the best
representatives of the younger generation into various state bodies with the
particular involvement into decision-making mechanism. This is not that easy to
achieve, taking into account, that “old” political elites in Ukraine – which, by
the way, also tame “promising” young people to become part of it – are
encircled into an exclusive club of favorites. They are tied with corporate
economic interests and backstage financial and political agreements on how to
do business and politics in Ukraine in a “shadow” out of the control from the
side of the civil society. Yes, different representatives of different oligarch
70
groups from this caste of VIP business-politicians may compete with each other
and event confront each other, but only inside this closed circle of interests,
established traditions and shared rules which usually have nothing in common
with the official political life and legal system. This is just to demonstrate that
traditional and still corrupted political system in Ukraine poses a huge challenge
to those, who are eager to change it. That means that this is basically young
generation which falls under a threat of direct confrontation between “old”
system and “young” aspirations. In this “battle” there is a chance, that
representatives of the young generation in politics, business, state bodies, law
enforcement agencies, local authorities, and in other fields take a lead in the
process of purification of Ukraine from the remnants of the non-democratic
regime. At the same time, there is also a risk, that formal involvement of youth
into governance in all levels of the state life may give less positive results than
expected due to the fact, that age of the agents of the state system itself is not the
basic feature and key factor of the expected transformation of this particular
system. The critical mass of young politicians will never turn quantity of their
own representation in executive and legislative bodies at all levels into quality
and effectiveness if the positive transformation in the heads of all generations in
a new way of world outlook, including youth itself, does not take place first.
The Philosophy of Participation to Change: from the “proFFessionalism”

and “stability” towards “young” aspirations and action
In this respect, Ukraine in 2014-2016 demonstrates a breakthrough in the
“dialog of responsible generations,” distancing Ukrainian public consciousness
from the Soviet-style tradition, that sphere of governance in the state is a destiny
of mature and experienced professionals. By the way, in Ukraine there is a
popular meme describing such “professionalism” of the former president of
Ukraine Yanukovych’s team, when in his time of presidency his government led
by Prime-minister Azarov was identified as the “government of professionals.”
71
Among people this government was better known as the “government of
proFFesionals” as Yanukovych misspelled his status “professor” in the
application during presidential campaign in 2004. So, to be “proFFesional” in
Ukraine does not mean to be a good manager, but in a corrupted state rather
means to be successful in “know how” to corrupt. This is exactly a strong
demand and task for the whole Ukrainian society to drive away as sooner as
better all representatives of the old-fashion, “proffesionally” corrupted elites
who know how to turn good governance mechanisms oriented to all into
personal benefits for just one or two. Instructively, but until recently the older
generation tended to support those who were more “experienced” in a state or
local management, whom they knew better, for many years, who were from
their region, who was “one of them.” To my mind, that may be explained by the
fact, that such well recognized by electorate managers were associated with
“stability” for many years as far as they were doomed by the corrupted system to
stay in power once they entered this VIP caste of the state clerks. “Yes, the level
is low, but stable” - quite a popular thesis in Ukraine for many people, “just as
good, if not worse.” I myself heard the conversation between two old Odessa
ladies at the end of the 1990s just before the elections of the mayor of the city:
“I will vote for the governor of the Odessa region. I know him for many, many
years. I want him to be the mayor of Odessa. - But how can you vote for him, he
has totally ruined the country side? - So what? But what a great experience he
has!” Hopefully, the last speaker meant just the good experience of being a well-
known manager for many years...
So, what must be the right exit from the situation, when many Ukrainians
had voted for the team of Yanukovych for many years because he was one of
“them” and speculated on “stability”? Except political will to prosecute active
representatives of the Yuanukovych’s team who remained in Ukraine (and not
only from his circle) while Yanukovych and Azarov are hiding in Russia, the
only legitimate way to do it and change the social nature of future elites in
72
Ukraine is to proceed towards the well-known mechanism of the democratic
elections (of course, alongside with the newly established anti-corruption
agencies and transparency process). Before touching upon the issue of youth
participation in the most recent elections in Ukraine and to be objective, the case
of the “team of Yanukovych” was taken into consideration as the most alarming,
but does not limit the problems of active political and economic elites from the
other “teams” or other “teams” of elites as far as they have certain common
characteristics and similarities with the Yanukovych's “Family.”
Youth and Elections in Ukraine: to vote or not to vote?

By the way, there is also a certain difference not only between those who
are taking part in different types of elections as candidates, but also between
those, who elect. It became obvious for Ukraine many years ago, that the older
generation votes differently from the younger generation. There is almost a true
stereotype, that the older generation – so-called generation of the
“grandmothers” - many years after the break-up of the USSR voted basically for
communists who were associated with the “stable” Soviet past and with their
younger, thus “better”, age. Contrarily to them, young people preferred to vote
for those, who were proposing not looking to the past, but to the future, that is
why many young people saw their perspective with those political forces, who
advocate Ukrainian future with Europe. As far as an issue of “stability” was
already mentioned twice – “Soviet-style stability” and “Yanukovych-style
stability” in both Soviet and post-Soviet narratives on “stability”, the key feature
which comes on top is “stagnation”. It turned out, that both “stabilities” turned
into stagnation and soon into regress as history witnessed. Both “stagnation” and
especially “regress” are not in the vocabulary of the active youth as far as it
confronts “action” and “motion” into the different, progressive future. The
future, where stability also finds its place, but on the basis of freedom,
democracy, rule of law, human rights, and constitutional guarantees. It was even
73
a joke some time ago, addressed to the young people – grandsons and
granddaughters – to steal passports of their grandmothers ön the day of the vote
in order not to allow them to vote for the past (in Ukraine it is not possible to
vote without introducing your original passport at the voting booth.
Youth Participation in Ukraine after 2013: best practices
a) Young MPs
So, coming back to the case of Ukraine in 2014-2016 and having said, that
it demonstrates a breakthrough in the “dialog of responsible generations,” I
would like to point out, that there are some promising signals that demonstrate
readiness of the Ukrainian society and electorate to entrust Ukraine’s
parliamentary destiny into the hands of Ukrainian youth. And this is not only
and just the matter of age (during last parliamentary elections in Ukraine in
October 2014 there were about 20 members of parliament between the ages 24
and 30), but the matter of “transformation in the minds.” Thus, among those
who now are known as “young MP” or “young politicians” in the Ukrainian
parliament are representatives of different political parties who entered the
parliament in 2014. Their peculiarity is that they have been identified as
members of the one group which have transformed into interfractional
association under the name “Eurooptimists.”2 Naturally, young Ukrainian
politicians have chosen the only possible strategy of political transformations for
Ukraine and it goes towards Europe. One of their main tasks is to implement
European political values and well-known universal standards of democracy into
parliamentary life of Ukraine. It is also natural, that there are MPs with different
ages and also over 30, with different professional backgrounds, who had no
parliamentary experience before, who came from the civil society being

2
“Eurooptimists.” https://www.facebook.com/EuroOptimists/?sk=timeline&app_data
74
journalists or social activists. At the same time, they are not in a majority in the
parliament (there are 28 at the moment), and not all from those MPs who are
between 24 and 30 joined this group. Yes, they may have different positions as
to the bills to vote in the parliament as far as they are representatives from
different parties, but the main value they represent is that they represent
alternative option to the traditional for Ukraine parliamentary practice. This
alternative option has a modest voice, but this is the voice of those, who are not
“proFFesionals” and are not experienced in “know how.” Many of them proved
themselves as one of the best representatives of the civil society to deal, for
example, with anticorruption campaigns before they entered the parliament. It is
important to realize that the level of trust in many of them is still at a reasonable
level. Will their reputation and now mandate of MP be enough to implement
next steps on the way to democracy in Ukraine? So far it is not that obvious,
even though their parliamentary activity and still active social life may definitely
serve as a signal whether Ukraine is still on the right transition track or not.
Strategically, they are also in the battle between “old” system and “young”
aspiration inside this system, and there still is a question whether they re-
subordinate a system, or whether the system simply re-subordinates them by
crashing their principles with the end of their relatively independent
parliamentary career.
b) First steps in regional politics: the case of my former student

Another instructive example of how a young generation of active young
people may facilitate changes in Ukraine expressed itself during local elections
in October 2015. I have interviewed one of the candidates to local
administration of the Odessa region for my program on one of the Odessa
regional TV channels.3 He was around 30, my former student and graduate. I

Available in Russian language at http://glasweb.com/yuriy-basyuk/
75
was his academic adviser with his diploma thesis and remember his international
activity at the University and academic mobility all over Europe. His University
experience, good command of English, international programs and projects he
was involved in formed a solid ground for his professional career as a journalist
and after as press-secretary of one of the politicians from Odessa. It was
inspiring to know, that after ten years since he left the University classroom, this
young candidate knew best European practices in different segments of life not
to give them up in his new professional stage to implement in Odessa region as a
young politician. His answers were sincere and he sounded convincing when
was talking about European values to be implemented in Ukraine and local
authorities in the Odessa region. It was also natural, that behind this young
candidate was someone from political circles who supported his campaign
(while almost no one in Ukraine can afford to act as totally independent
candidate), but such internal spirit of democratic enthusiasm which was also
clear from his side could serve at least as an internal guarantee not to repeat
political mistakes of the past when making decisions in a capacity of the local
politician. As it turned out after the elections, this young politician who made
his first step into regional politics did not win, but this fact does have a
perspective: next time with such political principles and at his age he may not
only run, but also win his race to be another “Eurooptimist” on the regional level
to change the country.
c) “Saakashvili’s case”: local elections, October 2015

Recent local elections in Ukraine and in Odessa in particularly also
brought some if not innovations, but at least visible peculiarities concerning the
involvement of youth into active participation during the election process. They
were associated with the Governor of the Odessa oblast Mikheil Saakashvili and
his nominee on the position of the mayor of the city of Odessa Sasha Borovik
who ran with the support of the former president of Georgia. Their election
76
campaign was built on attracting a wide range of volunteers to work in their
campaign on their side. It was both passive - through announcements - and
active attraction of the students into the political process of the election
campaign, unusual practice for the Odessa before. For many years I did not
remember such analogous experience. Never the less, their election headquarter
representative, by the way, another former student, one day asked permission to
spread a questionnaire (which served also as an application form) among my
students to get to know their opinion as to the most problematic issues in the city
and the feedback advises on how to deal with them in order to resolve issues as
soon as possible. Everyone, who completed this questionnaire got a chance to be
invited into the team of young reformers not only as a volunteer on a short term,
but as an expert on a long term basis to work in the team of Saakashvili. For
Mikheil Saakashvili who was a new comer into the region it was a comfortable
and cheap mechanism to form a wide circle of supporters from the side of active
and motivated young people, students all over the city. For them it was a good
chance to taste the real politics in action. Yes, that was that type of the so-called
“social elevator”, who could bring young people without connections into the
sphere of good governance. Yes, that was just an episode, this is not even a
tendency so far, but such involvement has already taken place and it was shown,
that such mechanisms have to be part of the social life in Ukraine. It was
important to have such experience in Odessa, as far as there was important and
still is acute a discourse in Ukraine as to the absence of “social elevators” for the
young people. Such “social elevators” are rather an exception and they are not
working properly nowadays, as in the Ukrainian political tradition an invitation
of outsiders into the sphere of local or state politics was almost prohibited and
not welcomed in the times of exclusive political techniques. It is understandable
why: giving a chance to the youth, inviting them into politics, its traditional
agents making politics transparent and public, - is still not in their interests. Of
course, such openness and friendly attitude towards young people by
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Saakashvili’s team may also be treated as imitation of the dialog between
political elites and regular people. They may use these volunteers to reach short
term interests during the election campaign and leave them outside active
participation just the next day after the elections. At the same time, such tactics
do not work on the local level in case those, who may follow it (as far as in this
case Mikheil Saakashvili and his team), pursue long term political interests and
careers in the Odessa region and in Ukraine in general. In case of cheating with
volunteers or failed promises to work hard for public interests this fact would be
transmitted all over the city and region almost immediately and not only by
media and social nets. Those volunteers themselves expand such information
among their circle of activity, including relatives and friends. Such a situation
would make a huge impact on the political image of those politicians who would
definitely lose sympathy and support from the side of the local electorate; all
that means that it is quite dangerous flirting with the young generation by
promising active participation and trampling their hopes the same time.
d) Youth and anticorruption: the case of the 24-year old Customs

Chief for Odessa region
As far as we already touched upon the case of Mikheil Saakashvili, this is
among the very characteristics of his managerial preferences to involve young
Ukrainians into good governance within his Odessa state administration and the
Odessa region. Why nominate on October 16, 2015 a 24-year old Ukrainian
activist Yulia Marushevska – the member of the Saakashvili’s team, his deputy
– to become the new Customs Chief for Odessa region? The young lady, without
relevant experience and skills, definitely not a professional in custom
regulations and management, was incorporated as the outsider into one of the
most powerful elements of the state corrupted system to combat corruption
schemes and reform the country. The task was not only to beat corruption, but to
simplify procedures for the traders, to reform the traditional way of the shadow
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relationship between business and the state, and to ban illegal trafficking in
goods, etc., including the most profitable segment of the Odessa sea trade port.
The purpose of such nomination was to have the manager outside the system,
who has no corrupted connections and business ties, who has no involvement
into any schemes. Understandably, there are specialists in the custom procedures
with the professional experience as her deputies and advisors, but Yulia
Marushevska has to be the filter and honest manager of the reformed customs to
sign only legal documents and take only legal decisions. Will it be the case –
time will show very soon, at least it is worth hoping that this operation with the
young manager was aimed at the real reforming of the system, but not for the
purpose of changing old schemes into the new one.
e) The case of patriotism

As it was already mentioned, a wish to change Ukraine for the better is a
sign not only of young generation, but of all ages. During the tragic events of the
Revolution of Dignity in 2014 in Kyiv Hundred of Heaven sacrificed their lives
for the better Ukraine. There were patriots of Ukraine: the youngest was 17, the
oldest 83. Many young people all over Ukraine, basically students, initiated
Euromaidans in their cities on November 22-23, 2013 as a protest and reaction
on the decision taken by Yanukovych and Azarov not to sign the Association
Agreement with the EU. I remember students of the Lviv National Ivan Franko
University who were among pioneers of the protests in Ukraine to organize
resistance to the Yanukovych regime. Many young people also became the
members of the self-defense units during events in Kyiv Maidan and were ready
to fight until the end. The annexation of Crimea and war in Donbass collected
young Ukrainian patriots to serve in the Army or National Guard also as
volunteers to defend the country. No doubt, many of them will become
politicians or will be involved into the process of good governance in Ukraine
sooner or later, because they knew what they were fighting for and they will not
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tolerate corruption and imitation of reforms in Ukraine too long. That is why
there is an acute image in the political air of Ukraine which shows the risk of the
“Third Maidan” in Ukraine with the direct involvement of patriotic youth.
At the same time, the Revolution of Dignity also revealed the downside of
the youth participation in the social life of Ukraine. In order to defend
Yanukovych's regime there were recruited hundreds if not thousands of young
athletic men to fight protesters of all ages and gender on the streets for money,
especially in Kyiv. That type of youngsters (many of them were sportsmen in
martial arts with criminal background) better known now in Ukraine as
“Tityshkas.”4 Many of them were ready to execute illegal and criminal orders
(and out of the further criminal prosecution) from the side of their client – the
regime. Unfortunately, they are also part of the Ukrainian youth and reality as
far as “tityshkas” even now are being used during political actions, raider
attacks, business conflicts or criminal clashes.
f) The “success story”: new patrol police in Ukraine

Contrary to the last fact, there is a promising example of youth
participation in the social life of changing Ukraine. There is almost a unique
consensus in Ukraine, that probably so far the only one and the most successful
reform in Ukraine was introducing a new patrol police in 2015. It substituted the
Soviet-style militia on the streets and the roads with the young policeman
between 21 and 35 who previously in their vast majority had no experience in
serving in the militia. The reaction from the side of the Ukrainian citizens
appeared very positive, the level of trust towards new police increased from 5%
to 85% compared to the militia. 5 Yes, they may have less experience so far, less
training and skills, many of them just becoming professionals, but the Ukrainian

“Tityshkas.” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Titushky
5
85% of Ukrainians trust new patrol police – Avakov, October 3, 2015.
http://en.censor.net.ua/news/354691/85_of_ukrainians_trust_new_patrol_police_avakov
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society welcomed this new service even in a look it has now. It will take some
time but very soon there will be a professional police. At least now we have a
hope, that the new police will continue to work under the world-wide
professional slogan “to protect and to serve”, rather than under a suspicion, that
they remain to work like former corrupted militia representatives (not all of
them, but a majority) under the slogan “not to serve and not to protect, but to
earn.” Having experience in both talking to the representatives of the old militia
and new police, there was an evident difference in favor of new police. As one
of the policemen explained to me recently, they are serving now in the law
enforcement agency whose mission is not to punish, but to assist and to deliver
service on protection.
Conclusion
With high probability we may say that after 2013 Ukrainian youth is not
an object of the state policy anymore, but a subject of its own future. “Youth” in
Ukraine, as well as “young generation”, or “independent” Ukrainian generation,
are not that much the subjects of age, but subjects of readiness to be a patriot
with goodwill to change the country to meet universal democratic values and
European standards of good governance. At the same time, young people
between 20-30 with no great professional experience, but with a good education
and European Ukrainian identity could form a civil society basis for the totally
new political elites to substitute the failed generation of the corrupted “fathers”.
There are certain risks, that older generation of political and business elites
would resist renovation of the political system with young leaders and activists.
That means that Ukrainian youth stepped onto the thorny road of real
transformation. Never the less, without active participation of youth in political
life, there are fewer chances for Ukraine to achieve European standards of good
governance in the foreseeable future.
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82
#ELECTRIC YEREVAN: ENERGISING DEMOCRACY OR
INSTRUMENTALISING YOUTH?
Gevorg MELIKYAN
Independent Political Analyst, Yerevan, Armenia
A17 percent electricity price hike decision in Armenia (in force since August 1st,
2015) sparked a wave of public discontent and triggered a series of 24-hours
street protests with a very decisive presence of thousands of mainly young
people in the central streets of Armenia’s capital Yerevan for seven consecutive
days, demanding the government to cancel the decision and even, lower the
prices. The “Electric Networks of Armenia” (ENA)- a monopoly power
distribution company owned by Russian Inter RAO United Energy Systems in
which the Kremlin is the majority shareholder - was accused of billions in tax
evasions, financial abuse, corruption, poor management, and nepotism resulting
in millions of debts. Meantime, the overall energy of protests and public unrest,
which was largely coordinated and boosted through social media and online
activism, made the hashtag of #ElectricYerevan a new symbol of civic
awakening and became widespread both in local and international media. It also
became a new momentum for Armenia’s civic engagement by youth who felt
themselves as important agents of change in a country where alternatives are
needed and new aspirations are crucial. The active part of #ElectricYerevan was
claiming that the initiative is totally apolitical.
The positive narrative of the raising awareness among the Armenian youth and
other citizens was a new topic of interest for Western analytical resources and
media outlets which described the movement as something democratically
important and pointed out the likelihood of fostering real democratic changes in
Armenia which could also lead, among others, to weakening of Russia’s
influence there. For Russia, these electrified protests raised fears about the

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likelihood of new color revolutions in Armenia generally referred by Russia-
oriented political and public figures, experts and journalists as “Electric
Maidan” or just “Maidan”, a pejorative term recently circulated by the Russian
propaganda to generally characterize the allegedly destructive character of
“West-orchestrated and financed” civic activism in the post-Soviet space.
However, the most important aspect in #ElectricYerevan civic movement

locally known as “No to robbery” initiative was its revealing potential to
become a challenging test both for the civil society and Armenia’s political
leadership in terms of their commitments to democratic values and ideals, and
the willingness to bring real changes. One could ask whether the movement was
a sign of the existence of democratic engagement and vibrant civic society
which is highly concerned by Armenia’s future, or a presence of a
democratically mature political leadership who wants to be accountable and is
ready for a dialogue with its active citizens – but neither was it an engaged
society, nor a democratic maturity, but something else.
Transition countries such as Armenia are in permanent quest of alternatives and

diversifications, new ideas and new forces to achieve better results in a short
time-period. The younger generation has the creativity to deliver new insights
and can position itself as an important player in shaping the country’s socio-
political landscape and contributing to main processes leading to the
implementation of good practices of governance and accountable leadership.
This is a two-way street where the more the young civil society and the political
leadership have result-oriented and effective dialogue over important challenges,
the better for the country and democracy. And youth engagement, as a crucial
driving force, is an important asset for nation- and state-building activities.

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Any democratic society and political leadership may only welcome the presence
of such an active youth who is committed to contribute to multilayer processes.
The key to the success in capitalizing on this natural asset is the presence of a
mature democracy and an environment where efforts contribute to, and not
undermine democratization, while in less democratic regimes there is a tendency
to instrumentilize or weaponize the creative potential of the youth for some
narrow purposes rather than for the sake of the entire society.
In this context, it is compelling to analytically follow further developments

around #ElectricYerevan and try to reveal the underlying intentions behind
visible actions both by the Government and the civil society. To understand
these dynamics and answer some questions, we need to look into domestic
trends which are also closely interconnected with those in Armenia’s foreign
policy.
Link between Domestic and Foreign Policies

Armenia is a small country facing several economic and political challenges due
to its domestic socio-political and economic fabric, and the complexity of its
geopolitical situation. Since its independence in 1991, many in the West
believed that the Soviet legacy would be forgotten and abandoned soon given
that Armenia was among the first Soviet nations to protest against the
Communist regime, and in the early years of the independence it was named an
“island of democracy” compared to its neighbors. However many objective and
subjective factors did not contribute to that process, and instead of promoting
the rule of law, establishing and defending human rights and freedoms, pro-
governmental political parties have been occupied by keeping power almost at
any price, and did not care much about maintaining the level of confidence vis-
à-vis the civil society and strengthening democratic institutions. Gradually,
democracy-building was substituted, or at least, largely reduced by power-

85
keeping attitudes. Democratic statements were only needed when interacting
with international organizations, while keeping power and having control over
the entire chain of social, political and economic capacities became the number
one priority and a precondition for implementing post-soviet policies. For the
political leadership, democratic inspirations were not contributing to their quest
for power because chances are high that the democratization can strengthen the
civil society and weaken their positions. Hence, little attention and ignorance of
democratic processes and civil society in general resulted.
Armenia’s political leadership has always been and still is cautious about
political and civic initiatives from the civil society (may be more than from
political parties) who can challenge their power and integrity. To reduce the
likelihood of being challenged through elections or mass protests and to make
the society entirely dependent on political decision-makers, rather than vice-
versa, the political leaderships resorted to having more control over media (in
most cases, in a very hidden and subtle way), a non-transparent electoral system,
a biased judiciary, financially weak political other forces and groups, a
monopolized or clan-based economy, controlled financial transactions to and
from Armenia, a highly politicized but weak and divided civil society, limited
access to external financial sources and resources, pseudo-patriotic sentiments
and narratives, as well as a highly demonized context of external enemies. In
less democratic countries, the political elite feels itself more comfortable and
secure when there is an easily manipulated youth who would lack an analytical
approach and critical thinking and would not strive for global political reforms
of the system, but rather for individual success far from political ambitions and
without challenging business interests of oligarchs.
This classic arrangement is more or less the same in a number of post-Soviet

and other semi-democratic states, while those states who want to break this

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vicious circle, look into alternatives and more efficient ways of governance
involving mostly the representatives of the younger generations.
Given this context, why then would the Armenian political leadership suddenly
welcome #ElectricYerevan movement if, like some Russian and pro-Western
media outlets and analytical centers described, it could challenge the political
regime? Before answering the question, let us have a look to the context. There
was indeed, an interesting “skirmish” between the government-controlled media
and Russian media outlets over how to label those events-“Electro-Maidan”-
against the regime or an apolitical active youth engagement aiming to foster
dialogue and find constructive ways of solving problems. The Russian side was
keen to push the propaganda in the direction of demonstrating that Armenia’s
political leadership is weak and loses its control over developments like in the
Ukrainian president Yanoukovich’s case in 2013. The same occurred with a
number of journalists, policy analysts, and experts from Russia who, despite
reliable sources telling the opposite story, were unanimously insisting on the
narrative about growing trends of West-backed civic activism in Armenia which
can allegedly turn into large anti-Russian sentiments. Meantime, the Armenian
leadership was reluctant to cancel the decision but was using its tools and
leverage (1) to discourage Moscow’s vision of things, (2) show to its European
partners how democratic and tolerant it is, and (3) keep the street protests
strictly on the civic and social level clear from any political demands and further
political implications.
In the face of everyday ultimatums from the police, thousands of civic activists
of #ElectricYerevan kept blocking Baghramyan Street by standing firm in their
fight for the cancellation of the decision. After clashes with the police just the
first day of protests and a week of energized presence on the central streets of
the Armenian capital, some protesters willingly accepted Armenia’s president

87
Serzh Sargsyan’s offer that the government would carry the burden of the latest
price increase pending a special international audit meant to determine whether
the ENA has been mismanaged1. Many left the arena, while another small group
of activists who formed another initiative “Get up, Armenia”, did not give up
and showed no confidence in what they were told by the Government regarding
the decision. And basically, they were right...
A month ago after the decision to increase the electricity tariff came into force, a
government appointed international consulting company “Deloitte and Touche”
made a statement that the decision of the regulatory body to increase the tariff is
justified, and this, in the presence of a number of heavy arguments, facts,
justifications and any other available material which proved the reverse. Despite
strong street protests and an important momentum that energized many layers of
the Armenian society, it was impossible to make any difference in the face of
the decision which, as many thought, was an attempt to save the power supplier
company from serious accusations of very poor management, a kick-back
system of money, money laundering and many minor or major shortcomings.
Experts and analysts have different explanations and views on why these mass
demonstrations could not achieve tangible results despite, seemingly, all
necessary pre-conditions: momentum, courage, number of protesters, sympathy
of many stakeholders, moral contribution by the majority of the population, etc.
Also, both the Government and pro-governmental media were sending positive
and encouraging messages to demonstrators. What then was missing in this
chain? How to explain that all previous civic initiatives, protests and rallies have
been heavily criticized by the political leadership or pro-governmental
structures, while in the case of #ElectricYerevan whose members were directly
accusing high-ranked officials for corruption and financial manipulations, as

$ "!
$#

88
well as the government for the very poor situation in the electricity sector, the
pro-governmental structures and political forces were unanimously praising the
courage and engagement of the young generation, and were presenting this
move as democratic and important?
The situation seems to be very tricky as the political leadership easily

encouraged the movement and the overall philosophy of protests but at the same
time, it managed to gradually discharge the electrified tension of protests
resulting in a final outcome that was way far from what the protesters have been
expecting. Even when it became clear to demonstrators that, despite protests, the
prices will increase as stipulated by the decision, the protesters could not gain
the same momentum and everything remained as before.
To answer why it was so, let us make two assumptions: (1) it was a zero-sum
situation where the political elite “won”, while the active part of the civil society
and the opposition “lost”, and (2) the overall tolerant approach by the police and
the willingness of the government to find mutually beneficial solutions through
a constructive dialogue are a sign of political and civic maturity on both sides,
despite the result with which the demonstrators were not happy.
The first assumption implies some political benefits for the political leadership
and a weaker position for the civil society. It also implies that political parties
had a vivid interest in those protests as they could use the situation for their own
purposes. However, neither the government nor political parties gained much
from #ElectricYerevan in terms of political dividends in an environment of
permanent domestic tension. Growing mistrust, blocked streets, angry
policemen, and hidden critics and messages from the Russian side for allegedly
allowing “color revolutions” and “New Maidan” to infiltrate Armenia abounded
In other words, although the Armenian leadership thanked the protesters for

89
their enthusiasm and praised their bravery and creativity, it was unhappy and
nervous about such developments and possible implications, especially on the
eve of the constitutional referendum scheduled in December 2015. Events like a
constitutional referendum which allegedly bring significant changes in the
governing system and impact on the entire political landscape, require a strong
mobilization of all necessary resources rather than wasting them on such
initiatives which have a potential to make the system more vulnerable. Similar
to previous other cases with such civic initiatives when the government sought
ways to come away without a scratch, the political leadership demonstrated self-
control aiming to reduce tensions, have less critics from Russia and use the
situation for their own purposes.
Neither did the failure to reach the goal through initiative - to cancel the
Government’s decision to raise electricity prices and punish police officers
responsible for a violent June 23 attempt to break up the demonstration- weaken
the civil society. Despite a high level of activism, only a few initiatives
succeeded in producing, since Armenia’s independence in 1991, some small
results which are important and necessary for democracy, but not enough to
bring tangible progress. In other words, the civil society was not strong enough
to become even weaker.
As for the opposition political parties (at least those who identify themselves as
such) which were already divided and in permanent quest for recognition both
by the society and the political elite, they were not perceived as an ice-breaker in
the context of the initiative and totally failed to impose any political agenda to
this engagement for a number of reasons including the general lack of trust by
society.

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The second assumption implies that Armenia has done some a successful work
in terms of establishing democracy, building an open society, an accountable
government, and implementing good and effective practices of governance. It
also implies a presence of actively vibrant and result-oriented civil society. Only
few will not agree that the civil society in Armenia is not active, creative and is
eager to see changes in the country and in the methods of governance. But at the
same time, only few will disagree on the low level of efficiency of various civic
initiatives, used tools and strategies. While the youth is energetically motivated
to push things forward and contribute to reforms, if there are any, and their
presence and persistence is something the government cannot ignore and takes
into account to some extent, they remain mostly unproductive, divided as
political parties, with no real impact on the decision-making processes and with
very short-term goals.
When it comes to Armenia’s success in democracy-building and good

governance, assessments and indexes are rather modest. Neither Armenia’s
surprise accession to the Euroasian Economic Union in January 2015 as a
geopolitical survival plan contributed to the democratization process and more
efficient reforms in the judiciary, various areas of social life, the electoral
system, etc. Instead, Armenia’s political leadership chose to adopt more
lucrative tactics vis-à-vis the European Union and its various projects and
instruments such as the Eastern Partnership, Twinning, etc., as well as Euro-
Atlantic institutions. If for the European Union the “more for more” principle
implies that the more and the faster a country progresses in its internal reforms,
building and consolidating democracy and respect for the rule of law, the more
support it will get from the EU, in Armenia’s case it may mostly mean the more
the EU wants to keep its presence in Armenia, the more money is needed to do
so. Armenia is ready, why not, to accept that money, no matter what the level of
efficiency of the money is spent on reforms.

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Yet, there can be another assumption as well which would differ from two
previous ones and may shed some light on underlying trends. Armenia’s energy
sector, if managed correctly, is one of the profitable ones in the country and
gives its owners leverage and financial power. CJSC Electric Networks of
Armenia was founded in 1997 and was privatized by British "Midland
Resources Holding LTD," which paid US$37m to acquire the company without
an international tender in 2002. In 2006 the ownership was fully transferred to
the Russian energy giant Inter RAO UES for US$73m. The Armenian power
utility remained profitable until 2010. However, its financial position has
deteriorated sharply since then. It currently has an estimated US$225m in
outstanding debts to Armenian power plants and commercial banks2.
Almost a month after the unrest in June 2015, the Russian company made a
decision to sell ENA to a Cyprus-registered firm which is a shell company and
is linked to Samvel Karapetyan, an Armenian-born billionaire based in Russia.
The interesting fact is that information about this possible deal over ENA was
leaked a long time before the regulatory body announced the electricity price
hike and mass protests started. And when demonstrations took on momentum,
there was already a clearly defined intention to acquire ENA at the lowest price
possible. Mass protests could play a role of catalyst, and more visible and public
critics by the active layers of the civil society for the poor management and
financial abuses in the company could potentially lower the price for the new
owner.
The reality is that the young generation demonstrated a strong will and readiness
to fight for its rights and be agents of change. It performed at its best and
consolidated many active and creative people around well formulated
objectives. What it failed to do is to be more ambitious and more visionary.

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Mass protests lacked strategy and consistency. The energy of the unrest was
used for purposes other than reinforcing dialogue between the civil society and
the government. Rather, it was instrumentalized to keep the society dependent
on political decisions and to push forward narrow economic interests. Some
believe that the new owners of the electric company will provide more
transparency and more efficiency. Some others are more skeptical about positive
changes in a company which was mismanaged for almost five years. Yet, the
good news is that ENA was and remains profitable if managed well, and many
from the political elite have a direct interest in seeing the recovery of the
company. If it happens, it can be beneficial for private consumers as well, like
those who were on the streets demanding the cancellation of the decision.
If the political leadership fears new waves of unrest which, this time, can be out
of its control, and is forced to make reforms with or without the EU’s support it
has to involve more youth into its decision-making processes, otherwise, if felt
underused or instrumentalized again, the new generation can boycott its
everyday work and leave the country as well.
The government, which now faces hard times of geopolitical instability,

economic recession, domestic socio-political tensions, especially after highly
disputed constitutional reforms and the unresolved conflict of Nagorno-
Karabakh, needs more commitment and more inclusive policies if it wants keep
the relative stability in the country and record new achievements. Whatever the
underlying intention was behind #ElectricYerevan initiative from the political
leadership’s perspective, and regardless how the energy of mass protests was
capitalized for some narrow commercial purposes, the young protesters
demonstrated how important their activism is and the extent to which the
decision-makers are indeed dependent on them.

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The youth and the active part of the society are an important asset Armenia
needs more and more. With vibrant global changes coming through education,
internet, exchange programs and other tools and instruments, the society is
evolving leaving less room for narrow-mindedness and authoritarianism.
Democracy, slowly but surely gains the hearts and minds of many, and
Armenia’s new generations will bring this change regardless of the resistance of
others who benefit from monopolies, corruption and nepotism.
#ElectricYerevan demonstrated the power of creativity in action, and also, the

limits of political power when faced with the real potential of the youth and a
strong mobilization. Armenia can be proud of its people who can be owners of
the present and build a better future.

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STATE YOUTH POLICY AND YOUTH PARTICIPATION THROUGH
THE YOUTH COUNCIL ADJUNCT TO THE MAYOR OF YEREVAN
Samvel MERTARJIAN
Vice President of the Youth Council adjunct to the Mayor of Yerevan
Young people are a crucial human resource for promoting the development of a
country. In today’s changing world with economic, political and public
development, young people are also the movers of change and the developers of
innovative solutions for the desired future of the country. The Republic Armenia
state youth policy, which is an important and integral part of the Republic of
Armenia state social policy, has a strategic importance.
The state youth policy aims at ensuring social, economic, legal, political,
educational, religious, cultural, and organizational conditions and guarantees for
developing the young peoples’ national identity, formation of their democratic
and civic consciousness, social empowerment, and use of their creative potential
in the interest of the society.
2013-2017 Strategy for the State Youth Policy of the Republic of Armenia
defines youth-related main priority areas for the Government of Armenia,
suggesting more reasonable and realistic solutions.
The state youth policy is developed and implemented by State authorities and
local self-government bodies with participation of youth NGOs, young people
and other legal and physical persons.
The Strategy is based on the perception that young people are an important
potential of society, and they must be given an opportunity to become free,
highly educated, healthy and responsible citizens.
The state youth policy is being implemented in the Republic of Armenia on a
systematic basis since 1995.
Starting in 2007 the Republic of Armenia Ministry of Sport and Youth Affairs
has been a state authorized body in Armenia responsible for state youth policy.
State Youth Policy programs are funded from a separate line item of the
Republic of Armenia state budget.
Currently youth NGOs play a significant role in the implementation of youth
policy. Being an organized entity to implement the state youth policy, youth
NGOs shall always be its carrier and main implementer.
The objective of the Strategy is to enhance the youth participation level in the
political, economic and cultural life; suggest reasonable and realistic solutions
for youth employment to overcome socio-economic problems; promote healthy
lifestyle; contribute to the development of spiritual and cultural values; promote
military and patriotic upbringing, as well as ensure sustainability of education
and recognition of non-formal education. The youth is a direct beneficiary of the
Strategy, and an important contributor to the ongoing processes.
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The Youth Council adjunct to the Mayor of Yerevan was founded to ensure
active involvement of youth in the programs implemented by the Municipality
of Yerevan. A number of programs are initiated and implemented by the
Council.
The objectives of the Council are:
1. To expose the issues facing youth through involvement of community

residents, non-governmental organizations, associations, as well as
civil society institutions, and to provide opinions (suggestions,
conclusions) on these issues to the Mayor of Yerevan.
2. To study and discuss the suggestions of community residents, non-
governmental organizations, associations, and on the basis of analysis
to provide opinions (suggestions, conclusions) to the Mayor of
Yerevan.
3. Implementation of public control over the management of the youth
sector.
Any young person can submit proposals and can be involved in the programs of
the Youth Council adjunct to the Mayor of Yerevan.
The Youth Council has its page in the social networking site “Facebook”. The
young people ask questions and submit proposals through the page. All the
raised questions are processed and regulated accordingly. The programs of the
Council pay special attention to the development and implementation of projects
for people with disabilities. The Council, which is acting on voluntary basis,
consists of 28 formal and informal youth organizations, including non-
governmental organizations, student councils.
Since 2012 the Youth Council adjunct to the Mayor of Yerevan has
implemented a number of events and programs and has established cooperation
with many organizations and involved a great number of young people in its
programs, who were the initiators, the implementers and the participants of the
program at the same time.
The first big program of the Council “Yerevan is Our Home” was implemented
on October 10-15, 2012. The objective of the program was to support the
effective involvement of young people living in the capital of Armenia in the
urban life through cognitive competitive events; to support young people in
organizing active cognitive process; to raise the relationship between the young
residents of Yerevan and the awareness level on urban issues and promote the
strengthening and development of relationships between young people and the
heads of the administrative districts. Over 500 young people from all
administrative districts of Yerevan participated in the program.
96
Within the framework of the program the young people had the opportunity to
work with the staff of the Police, Traffic Police, Ministry of Emergency
Situations of the Republic of Armenia, who appreciated the works implemented
by the young people. Within the framework of the program youth also had the
opportunity to meet the head of their administrative district and to address their
questions to them. The program ended with a festive concert.
Since 2013, cooperating with “Active Young Citizens Initiative” non-
governmental organization, the project “When the young debate” is being
implemented. The objective of the project is to involve young people in the
process of civil society development and to give them the opportunity to express
their opinions, discuss the opinions of their friends and come to conclusions.
Every year two rounds are implemented: in summer and in autumn, 20 teams are
participating in each round with five members, who initially participate in the
training course “The basics of debate” and get necessary skills for debating,
after which the main round starts. Urgent and important issues at local and
international level are discussed during the debates. The debates had 300
participating young people during three years.
Another important program of the Council is the “Book Bank”, which has been
organized for the third year. Many projects of book donations are carried out
within the framework of this program.
In front of the National Children’s Library named after Khnko Aper there is a
“Book Bank donation booth”, where any person can donate fiction or popular
science books. The whole literature gathered in the “Book Bank” will be
transferred to the Republic of Armenia military units, community libraries, child
care centers and other institutions. The Book Bank” program was launched in
2013. Within the framework of the program more than 1200 books have been
donated, which were given to the Republic of Armenia military units,
community libraries, child care centers and other institutions.
Within the framework of “Yerevan summer 2015” program of the Municipality
of Yerevan, by the initiative of “ Run Armenia” project, “Street workout”
Federation of Armenia and with the assistance of the Youth Council adjunct to
the Mayor of Yerevan “Yerevan Colour Run” race was organized. The run
started in the area adjacent to the Sport and Concert Complex named after K.
Demirchyan. Its main goal was to spread a healthy lifestyle among young
people, to develop mass sports, especially the culture of running.
The members of the Council are also actively involved in all major urban
projects, such as celebration of “Erebuni-Yerevan” and other cultural events,
tree plantings, voluntary works, etc. The Council Attaches particular importance
to the preservation of national holidays and the new meaning of the youth's
participation in them, as they are the carriers and transmitters to the new
generation.
97
It is important to note that the young people are involved in all programs on a
voluntary basis, by their free will.
Therefore, the Council pays constant attention to the idea of volunteering. For
the purpose of promoting the development of the sector, by the initiative of
“Active Young Citizens Initiative” non-governmental organization and the
Youth Council adjunct to the Mayor of Yerevan “Voluntariness, Stimulation,
Perspectives” program was launched from September 1, 2015. The objective of
the program is to promote the development of a volunteering culture,
particularly among the public sector, to develop appropriate tools for mutually
beneficial cooperation of “Volunteers-NGO sector”. Within the framework of
the program a sociological survey has been conducted in the form of focus
groups, the volunteer lawyers are developing rationale from the legal point of
view for the establishment of a concept or law on volunteering and discussions
have been organized between the representatives of NGO sector. The printing
and presentation of the booklet is scheduled for early 2016. The booklet will be
provided to NGO representatives during the presentation.
The presented projects are a brief extract from the implemented programs and
are examples of general activities. The youth of Armenia currently face a
number of problems. We hope that the Youth Council adjunct to the Mayor of
Yerevan will provide an opportunity to expose the issues facing youth through
feedback and attempt to find the most effective ways of solving them through
combined efforts.
98
THE IMPACT AND SUSTAINABILITY OF YOUTH EXCHANGES IN
THE SOUTH CAUCASUS AND GOOD GOVERNANCE
Hovhannes STEPANYAN
Exchanges serve as outstanding opportunities for youth interaction that leads to

an increased level of civic engagement by setting the grounds for independent,
self-expressive and change-making civil societies, which IN turn serves as a pre-
requisite for participatory decision making and good governance 1 . For the
purpose of this article the focus will be on the youth of the South Caucasus
countries and available exchange opportunities for them with European
countries versus the traditional northern line. While historically and culturally
informal ways traditionally exist for the youth of the South Caucasus to interact
with their peers from the northern part of the Eurasian continent, i.e. mainly
with the youth representing some of the most famous regions of Russia, it
should be mentioned that far away vast opportunities are available for formally
promoting the exchanges among the South Caucasian and European youth,
which is mostly the result of the extended European neighbourhood policy
which considers South Caucasus as a neighbouring region for the European
Union2. In order to take a holistic view on the youth exchange opportunities of
the youth of South Caucasus and before developing the gist of this article by
focusing on the youth exchanges among the Europe and South Caucasus, it
should be mentioned that the youth of the South Caucasus region has quite
limited opportunities for getting involved in exchange programs with the Asian
countries, as those are not broadly promoted in the region, but there are also
quite extensive formal exchange opportunities for discovering the United States

Handbook on Youth and Good Governance based on the European Charter for Youth Participation in Local
and Regional Life, Democratic Effective Municipalities Initiative, USAID funded project in Kosovo [URL:
http://demi-ks.org/repository/docs/Youth_and_Good_Governance_eng_FINAL.pdf ]

Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy. The European Perspective of the South Caucasus,
proceedings of the Forum of Young Politicians of the South Caucasus, 29-30.06.2013 [ULR:
http://nimd.ge/documents/FORUM_REPORT.pdf ]

99
and the youth therein, which also has a quite significant impact on the youth
development in the South Caucasus region.
Main Types of Youth Exchanges
Youth exchanges are the key for social innovations, youth motivation and
empowerment, and of course for nurturing tolerance, cultural awareness and
friendship, which in turn builds trust and paves the way for mutually beneficial
collaborations, partnership, as well as for socializing and networking in general
– leading towards a better future3. The funding of such exchanges is usually
financed from the European public funds, as well as from scholarly and
academic foundations. Moreover, there is also a solid tendency of seeing an
increased level of involvement from the private sector, which is done within the
scope of the social-corporate responsibilities programs of the respective global
and multinational companies.
The formal exchanges that focus on building civil societies can be classified as
educational and capacity building activities, which are performed in the form of
study abroad programs leading to a certain academic degree or non-degree
accomplishment, training events addressing special needs of the youth from
certain sectors, summer schools and camps, expert focused group meetings and
targeted discussions through round tables, conferences and workshops, etc. But
it should be mentioned that such opportunities in the South Caucasus are mostly
available for the youth who has some English language skills, in some extent is
classified as active youth or has some exceptional educational skills. However,
this segment usually forms relatively small portion of the whole youth within
the society, and the remaining majority of the youth has relatively limited
international youth exchange opportunities, mainly being dependant from

SALTO | Youth. Examples of Good Practice: Youth in Action Projects in and with South East Europe.
September 2011. [URL: https://www.salto-youth.net/downloads/4-17-
2565/EXAMPLES%20OF%20GOOD%20PRACTICE.pdf? ]

100
secondary or indirect exchanges, such as benefiting from the interactions with
those local youth who have participated in international exchanges and are up
for softly transferring their skills to the others, or in a best case, through the
interactions with international volunteers, missionaries or other experts that are
being temporary located in their communities to whom they might have some
access4. This youth, which conditionally can be called “disadvantaged” youth in
terms of having no access to international youth exchange opportunities, due to
various reasons even lacks the chance to participate in locally or nearby
organized training and international exchange programs, which is mainly
because of lack of accessibility to information, limited number of participant
places, unfamiliarity with the benefits and the new horizons that can be opened
through youth exchanges, unrealized interest towards the topics of discussion,
overwhelming daily work, etc. However, it is firmly believed that the apathy of
the aforementioned disadvantaged youth somewhat serves as a luxuriant ground
for political manipulations, thus significantly hindering good governance
concepts locally, as well generating overall indifference towards social and civic
activeness5.
As for the informal exchanges, those are mostly done on individual or people-to-
people level, mainly through personal networking, which can positively affect
the person individually, but might not have significant societal impact. Informal
exchanges usually do not have strategic goals and do not form a part of a long-
term strategic vision, as these informal exchanges usually bear personal
inspirational or entertaining character, therefore will not be taken as an object of
study for the purposes of this article.

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The ideal formal youth exchanges usually have certain far-reaching goals, and in
most of the cases entail the ‘sustainability’ or ‘follow-up’ component, as well as
lead towards generating some joint stand-alone projects by targeting certain
communities for addressing the societal needs by undertaking new initiatives for
the benefit and further development of the civil society and good governance
mechanisms.
However, there is a gap of measuring the impact of all these exchanges

holistically on the youth of the South Caucasus, and a further research can be
made for evaluating the results that were achieved up to now, by helping to
outline the possible future accompanying steps.
On the other hand, it is obvious that youth exchanges are mostly considered as
positive opportunities, and the youth has always had a vital role for the future of
the country while forming the general societal attitudes towards the local
governments, international cooperation and trends towards the new approaches,
among them tolerance and innovations. The governing bodies at various levels
often pay special attention to the youth, as those have the real power for making
changes and expressing their viewpoints demonstratively, which can be
considered as an important element for leading towards good governance6.
In this respect, youth exchanges give a wonderful opportunity for the young
people to interact with their peers from other countries, to make extended
friendships and not be limited within the national shell and mentality, but also
be quite open-minded and stand for new ideas and experience-sharing, thus
nurturing cosmopolitan attitude in their respective countries versus being radical
and nationalistic-oriented. However, based on the young people’s flexibility of
mind, interest towards accepting the yet new ideologies and openness towards

http://www.voicesofyouth.org/en/posts/youth-participation-in-politics-and-
governance

102
untraditional concepts through critical thinking, disposes the youth under a
certain influence of being affected by various policy impacts that are formed and
served to the youth of the South Caucasus region, which can be classified, in
general, into three levels - national, regional and international, the basic
characteristics of which will be discussed in the following paragraphs.
The national level of the youth policy is mostly emphasizing the patriotism and
traditional values of the given nation, by paying a special attention on the
national, historical memory and backgrounds, where generally national interests
prevail7. It is also attributed by the attitudes of the specific community where the
person lives. This policy towards the youth is systematically injected through
the different instances of the public education system, as well as in most of the
cases creates some general stereotypes and attitudes among the youth of the
respective country through centralized and systematic activities. In other words,
this can be also called the reflection of the national policies and priorities on the
youth, with the purpose of securing the youth support towards the activities that
the government implements. To this end, it should be mentioned that within the
national youth policies also certain elements exist that reflect the international
values, which are basically adapted from the country’s foreign policy and
international cooperation.
The next policy level that impacts the youth is the Regional level, which can be
called the weakest point for youth of the South Caucasus region. Although the
youth of the South Caucasus is having certain opportunities for interacting
among each other, it should be noted that those are mostly organized through
European or other international funding and do not promote the nurturing of
regional identity and stronger ownership, but of course, to a certain extent,
promote mutually beneficial interaction and tolerance among the youth

103
representing the South Caucasus region, which the countries could not have
witnessed without significant external assistance or would have to a very limited
extent, which is true especially for those countries that have certain major
disagreements8.
And the third level of the policy impact on youth is the International level of
youth policy, which is very extensive and complex set of decentralized
activities, which also can be considered as the most attractive for the youth of
the South Caucasus countries. Among those activities are those that provide the
young people opportunities to study in the leading European educational
institutions, participate in different trainings, conference and seminars that are to
promote civic activism, youth activeness and good governance, professional
masterships and exchanges, etc9 . These activities provide the youth of the
Caucasus region a very important opportunity to discover new cultures and see
new countries and societies, to get integrated into the global trends to a certain
extent and benefit from the multiculturalism and pluralism, which is very self-
developing and paves the way for having more independent youth – a youth
which has broader world outlook and is able to enlighten their respective
countries with new values, ideas and approaches, which sometimes is difficult to
fully disclose due to cultural clashes and the societal resistance of conservative
portion of the society. It should be also mentioned that the international level of
the youth activities also play a vital role for the survival of the independent civil
society sector, which promotes alternative thinking and implements various
types of activities that promote civic education and good governance concepts,
without which it would be hard to imagine a progressive youth in the South
Caucasus with certain preconditions and hopes for a better future.

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A Case Study of a Regional Exchange Program: Social Leader Forum
In view of the above made statements, it should be mentioned that all the
attempts for sustaining international youth exchanges in order to build self-
dependent civil-society, true participatory decision making systems and good
governance schemes in the South Caucasus region, are as yet very fragile and
will remain so for quite long as they depend on external funding and locally
reliable structures are not firmly in place for providing fair options for funding
youth oriented projects that are truly for the benefit of civil society and good
governance.
For the purposes of this article, a case study of a regionally implemented

program will be observed and this choice is justified for the following main
reasons, as those enable to do generalizations with other similar events:
- The program was financed by European funds and was targeting the wider
South Caucasus region.
- The program entailed both civic educational components, professional
study visits and formal interactions, which includes the basic types of
exchanges.
- The question of the ability of the program to continue and sustain without
any European funding is a major point of consideration.
The program that we are going to observe is called Social Leader Forum10 and it
was an initiative of CRISP 11 and was funded by German funds. It was
successfully implemented since 2010 by bringing together some distinguished
and diverse representatives of civil society, municipal authorities, youth and
social entrepreneurs from the Caucasus countries, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Georgia, Russia and Turkey, with further optimistic vision to expand and

http://www.crisp-berlin.org/index.php?id=104

http://www.crisp-berlin.org

105
involve other neighboring countries of the region such as Ukraine and Iran in
future. As long as there was a multi-year funding commitment from the external
funding partners from Europe, the program was running quite well and
successfully. Each program was a year-long set of activities that was comprised
of a “Kick-off Meeting”, which was the initial meeting bringing the participants
together for introducing some new concepts in order to set the ground for
initiating new joint civic projects, then supported the mutual study visits for
implementing or furthering the project, and at the end – the third phase,
organized a reflection meeting where the participants were given the chance to
present their achievements and share the challenges that were faced, as well as
discuss and take actions for the continuation and furthering their ongoing joint
projects. The topics of the Social Leader Forum varied from year to year based
on the region-specific interests and priorities of the funding partners, and were
focusing on leadership, social entrepreneurship, youth empowerment and
employability, social innovation and cross-sector cooperation and other inter-
related topics. The program, during the four years of its implementation,
considerably supported the capacity building of over 120 participants, set the
grounds for initiating more than 30 regional joint projects and initiatives, as well
as provided an excellent platform for interaction of the youth from the same
region, who would not have had such opportunity in a regional scale, if such
program had been left to be initiated by their respective countries. Thus, overall,
the flow of this program could have been considered quite successful for its
whole duration while its funding was secured through European sources.
However, when the funding term was over, some real challenges emerged for
the further survival of the Social Leader Forum. Presently, when the external
funding of the program has ended and the alumni of the program try to find
alternatives for funding it in order to sustain the program and its already
established good fame, even after finding an NGO based in one of the South

106
Caucasus countries that wishes to undertake the lead for continuing the Forum,
huge challenges are faced, which relate to being unable to find locally based
funds willing to further fund the project, in-spite of its continuous success.
Furthermore, the initial European funding partners cannot fund anymore as there
are certain funding limitation rules according to their internal policies, the new
possible European funding sources are reluctant to continue funding a program
that has been successfully implemented in the past but has been initiated by
another foundation and not themselves, and others do not find it feasible or do
not commit to funding long-term and large-scale projects, etc.
In view of the above presented case study, one can bring an objection that this is
just a single example and any generalizations made on this case study might be
questionable, but by taking into account that in this Forum, during its
consequent years had more than 120 alumni representing various active NGOs
and civil society partnering organization from the South Caucasus region, this
case study becomes a valid and credible example for demonstrating the
dependency on external funding of the projects that are implemented in the
wider Caucasus region that promote intra-regional collaboration, and likening
this project’s characteristics with other projects that are implemented in a wider
Caucasus region is becoming actual. And indeed, this example is similar to
many other trainings, conferences, workshops and seminars that provide youth
exchange opportunities for the youth of the South Caucasus, which are of course
having an incomparable positive impact on capacity building and raising civil
society oriented youth, but in parallel, it should be mentioned that all these
useful youth exchanges are very vulnerable from bigger country-level political
trends and priorities, as well as are significantly dependent on external funding,
in spite of the fact that during the recent past there are already some signs of
locally emerging foundations and locally funded initiatives that are up for

107
supporting international youth exchanges for the benefit of youth empowerment,
leading to good governance and civic empowerment.
Conclusion and Areas that Need Further Strengthening
It is obvious and more or less indisputable that Youth Exchanges are recognized
as truly effective and positive activities, which possess quite strong multiplier
effect. However, there are a number of recommendations, which can further
improve the effectiveness of such exchanges by having wider positive societal
impact and expanding the scope of beneficiaries.
Particularly, the above-said can be achieved through the following

considerations:
• Elaborate some ways and structures that the relatively disadvantaged

youth, especially those who are from the remote and rural areas and lack
of educational and language skills, can also become beneficiaries of
international youth exchange programs and have the opportunity to
express their social activism. This can be done by going beyond the
formal municipal partnerships and by creating some platforms by
enabling the youth of partnering communities to participate in various
types of youth international exchanges, which will be mutually beneficial,
as well as will make the inhabitants of the cities feel the real partnership
between the partnering municipalities among a South Caucasian and
European communities, thus resulting in good governance and civic
engagement innovative approach by promoting interaction and
exchanging practices.
• Promote more sustainable and permanent ways of the presence of
international volunteers and NGO sector representatives in the rural and
remote areas, by enabling those from disadvantaged areas to have more
socializing and interacting opportunities.

108
• Strengthen the local capacities, especially through introducing and
promoting increased activeness and sound engagement of social-corporate
responsibilities programs of big companies, which could be done through
some tax-incentive mechanisms, as well as by taking into account
successful experiences of the European countries, and firmly support the
nurturing, institutionalizing and establishment of locally generated and
permanently available funds that will enable conduct of more intra-
regional youth exchanges within the South Caucasus region, in order to
fill the gap of the limited regional interaction, thus nurturing regional
ownership towards civic activism, regional joint projects and self-
dependency. In this respect, the European municipalities of the big cities
can play a significant role, by suggesting some ways for their partnering
multinational companies, whose headquarters or branches are located in
their communities, to have somewhat harmonized social and corporate
responsibility programs in their sister communities located in the South
Caucasus, by focusing on supporting locally generated funding for the
projects that promote youth activism and good governance.
• Establish a better monitoring and evaluation system, which will assess
and measure the long-term impact of the youth exchanges that are
implemented for the youth of the South Caucasus by emphasizing the
quality of the follow-up activities and their social impact, rather than
solely focusing on numeric data, quantitative analysis and singular project
reports.
• Be more persistent towards emphasizing the importance of integration of
the youth of South Caucasus with the European Youth, as well as support
in establishing local and independent mechanisms for implementation of
long- term joint projects and publications initiated by the youth.
• Before initiating and funding any joint project, make a real assessment
and forecast about the sustainability of projects and seek for commitments

109
and assurances on how that particular project will be funded and
continued after the initial external funding will be completed, as well as
seek some sound local financial contributions when doing such projects.
In conclusion, it should be emphasized that all the above is achievable both

theoretically and practically. The existing enthusiasm and interest towards the
youth exchanges coming from the youth of the South Caucasus will definitely
add to the process of making the above-made recommendations real in future,
but it should be emphasized that all the above mentioned aspects should also be
realized and duly supported also at the policy making level. And that is the place
where the youth exchanges can have a significant impact when promoting good
governance practices. The latter will make the achievements more tangible, thus
ensuring long-term impact and sustainability, by increasing the role of the youth
involvement in the governance processes by empowering the youth for positive
changes towards securing locally available funds for youth exchange programs,
which will become especially vital when the time for a generation changes
comes.

110
PATERNALISM DISCOVERS YOUTH:
GIVING RIGHTS OR MAKING CONCESSIONS
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Hikmet KIRIK
Department of Political Science and Public Administration
Political Science Faculty; stanbul University
Oh Turkish Youth! Your first duty is to preserve and defend forever Turkish
independence and the Turkish Republic. This is the only foundation of your
existence and of your future. This foundation is your most precious treasure.
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk
Participation and equity are the two essential qualities of good governance.
Today democratic societies are under pressure to maintain both of these qualities
as a result of social, political and technological changes at a global level.
Environmental and health issues, migration, global terrorism and ever-growing
inequalities are issues crossing geographical, social, political and even mental
boundaries that used to stabilize the modern world. Changing patterns of
political participation should also be mentioned as an additional aspect of
current complexity. One cry calls not less but more democracy in the sense of
broader and deeper participation to overcome these problems regardless of
already democratic or democratizing countries. Hence one area of improving
democratic governance implies participation of youth in political decision-
making. Youth participation is important from a number of perspectives. First of
all it crosscuts intra-generational boundaries. Secondly, it strongly implies
equity in proper democratic governance. Finally, it is truly a global issue as it is
an issue for all the countries. This paper will analyze the issue of youth
participation as a matter for proper democratic governance in Turkey. Being one
of the top 20 largest economies in the world yet a developing country, Turkey
has the youngest population in Europe. Yet youth participation in the decision-
making process still needs strong advocacy and support on one side despite
progress made on a number of points. The major problem seems to be a mutual
skepticism between the politics and youth population.
Although a universally agreed definition of good governance has yet to emerge,

the United Nations Public Administration Programme on the Role of Active
Participation and Citizen Engagement in Good Governance identified a number
of qualities that any claim of good governance must admit. These include,

111
constitutionalism, rule of law, justice, security of person and property, electoral
and participatory democracy, respect for human rights and basic freedoms,
transparency, accountability, ethics and integrity in the conduct of public and
private corporate affairs, equity, informed citizenry, effective and efficient
delivery of public services and last but not least, the minimum of a decent
standard of living for all as the guiding objective of any act of governance
(http://www.unpan.org/). For the purpose of this article, two of these qualities
seem particularly relevant, namely, participation and equity. The latter
corresponds to both intra and inter-generational issues such as gender,
environment and health as well as inter-generational demands. Whereas, it has
long been axiomatic that, broad participation in the decision-making processes is
prerequisite for the proper democratic governance.1
Nevertheless, we have been witnessing a general trend of falling voter turnout
since 1990s in advanced democracies. For some scholars, citizens’ increasing
disengagement from the traditional channels of political participation was
already ringing the alarm bell. It was suggested “American democracy is at risk”
because of “an erosion of the activities and capacities of citizenship.”2 Similarly
Putnam has argued that, declining electoral participation in the USA should be
understood as “the most visible symptom of a broader disengagement from
community life.”3 Similar worries have been expressed elsewhere in the UK or
in Europe.4
However, not everyone interprets the electoral decline in a similar manner. It is

generally argued that turnout is a very simple measure, which does not
necessarily reflect the wider health of democracy. Those who take this line of
argument believe that falling turnouts appear to be manifestations of a change in
society generally and politics in particular. Societies, which “risk” manifest
itself as a defining concept. 5 The terms like “social citizenship”, or “citizen
engagement” are more multi-dimensional. Barit and Zani start by distinguishing

1For the well received literature on democracy and participation see for example; Dahl, R. A. Polyarchy; Participation
and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1971; Dahl, R. On democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press
1998. See also; Pateman, C. Participation and Democratic Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.
2 Fort the USA see, Macedo, S. et al. Democracy at Risk: How Political Choices Undermine Citizen Participation, and What We
Can Do About It. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press., 2005; For the UK, see for example, Baston, L. and
K. Ritchie. Turning Out or Turning Off: An Analysis of Political Disengagement and What Can Be Done About It.
A Report Published by Electoral Reform Society, 2004.
3 Putnam, R. Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Renewal of American Community. New York: Simon & Schuster.,
2000, p.35.

Delwit, P. “The End of Voters in Europe? Electoral Turnout in Europe Since WWII” Open Journal of Political
Science 2013. Vol.3, No.1, 44-52 Published Online January 2013 in SciRes (http://www.scirp.org/journal/ojps)
http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ojps.2013.31007
5 Beck, U.Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London: Sage Pub. 1992

112
between political engagement, individual acting through political institutions,
processes and decision-making and civic engagement which refers to the
engagement of an individual with the interests, goals, concerns and common
good of a community in various levels.6 Different forms of active citizenship
have come to the fore, questioning the line that marks the limit between the
political and the social sphere, and blurring the established boundaries. 7 In a
recent article, Lamprianou questioned the validity of the distinction between
conventional and unconventional participation. However, he concluded that it
might be redundant or in need of drastic revision.8 What is more convincing,
however, is the changes in youth values and behaviors in terms of political
participation distancing themselves from the traditional means of political
participation in favor of playing more active role in social and political life.
Definition of youth differs from one society to another. This true even for
international organizations that have not widely agreed upon a definition of
“youth.” The United Nations and the World Bank consider individuals under the
age range of 15–24 as youths whereas the World Health Organization defines
youth in the age range of 15–34. For the European Union, youth is considered as
people between 13-30 years old. In Turkey despite there is no legal definition of
Youth, The National Youth and Sport Policy Document is geared to young
people between the ages of 14-29. It is estimated that there are about 20 million
people between this age group. Turkey has one of the youngest populations in
the World. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report titled
"Youth in Turkey: National Human Development Report 2008," provides very
comprehensive information on Turkish youth. According to the report, the youth
in Turkey is faced with a series of economic, educational, health and social
problems. The recent data produced by the Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜK)
confirm this report. According to the July 2014 Household Workforce data, the
Turkish population in the 15-24 age group is currently 11.7 million and roughly
a third of them are in education while another third is working. The remaining
four million approximately are even outside the workforce. The youth
unemployment reaches 18 percent is almost twice as much as general
unemployment. The picture gets even bleaker in some of industrialized cities
like Bursa and Kocaeli which both see a record high 25 percent.

6 Barrett, M. and Z. ‘Theoretical Understandings, Evidence and Policies’ in Martyn Barrett and Bruna Zani Bruna
(ed) Political and Civic Engagement: Multidisciplinary Perspectives. East Sussex: Routledge, 2015, p. 4.
7 Dalton, R. J. “Citizenship Norms and the Expansion of Political Participation” in Political Studies, 2008 VOL 56, pp.
76–98. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2007.00718.x

Lamprianou, I. Contemporary Political Participation Research: A Critical Assessment in K.N. Demetriou (ed.),
Democracy in Transition, DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-30068-4_2, # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013, pp.21-42
at p. 38

113
The issue of youth participation in politics has always been complicated. Lister
emphasizes the issues of immaturity and financial dependency to adults as an
excuse for not treating young people as equal members of the planning process
and power arrangements.9 This attitude is often reflected upon the
discouragement of young people to involve political processes. Nevertheless,
one can observe that the political engagement of young people directed towards
non- institutional, political processes through which they create an opportunity
to express themselves, yet express critically on institutional politics. In his
analyses of cultural, organizational and personal sources of social movements,
Tarrow observes that, in contemporary societies the way in which the younger
generation participates in politics has often through the engagement in social
and civic activities regardless of being local, national or transnational.10 Youth
participation further blurs the boundaries between social and political hence
resulting in a degree of convergence between the two realms.
Turkish Youth: Missing Political Subjectivty
Youth and being young has been a special reference in the history of Turkish
modernization. The Young Ottomans and the Young Turks during the early 20th
Century both were formed to achieve political reforms in the Ottoman Empire.11
According to Mardin, by initiating a link in the historical chain of Ottoman
Westernization and bureaucratic modernization the Young Ottomans not only
represented the modernist wing of the Ottoman intelligentsia and bureaucracy
but also formed the backbone of the Young Turks. As the Young Ottomans
paved the way to the Young Turks, the latter provided a breeding ground for the
Republican leadership.12 According to Georgeon, the Young Turks’ emphasis
upon “youth” and “generation” come to mean dichotomizing between the old
and the new in every sphere of life be it social, political and cultural.
Turkish republicanism also emphasized the category in a significant manner in
which youth were more than a word for defining certain age groups. It has been
a concept underlining a social construction within the framework of cultural
modernity in Habermasian sense.13 The mystification of youth by the

Lister, Y. “ Why Citizenship: Where, When and How Children?” Theoretical Inquiries in Law Vol. 8. No. 2, 2007,
pp.693-718 at p.
10 Tarrow, S. G. Power in Movement: Collective Action, Social Movements and Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1994.
11 Mardin, . The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought. Syracuse University Press, Syracuse. 2000
12 See for example, M. . Hanioglu, Preparation for a Revolution: The Young Turks, 1902–1908, Oxford University Press
2001, ISBN 0-19-513463-X

13 Habermas, J. ‘Modernity: An Incomplete Project” in Hier, S. P. (eds) Contemporary Social Thought: Themes and Theories.
Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press, 2005, pp. 163-174. http://202.114.108.237/Download/%7B26AE62B3-76F1-

4BE9-B148-

114
Republican political discourse meant the creation of a new type of modern,
secular man and women. It has been a process of interactive construction;
meaning the new men and women had to be constructed by modern, secular
nationalistic ideas who in turn construct the secular nation as a whole. From
here, the crucial axis of children’s citizenship in the contemporary Turkey
appears to be membership in this common-to-be political culture. Therefore,
Republican discourse constructed children in an instrumentalist term at least on
two accounts. First, since the emphasis was given to “the nation”, every
individual child became an instrument of modern, secular Turkish nation.
Secondly, children instrumentalised for the teleology of this imagined society:
rise and progress.14 The key to children’s citizenship lies in their incorporation
into that imaginary political culture.
Examining the concept of youth in modern Turkish political discourse, Lüküslü

has put it elegantly that, through the process of modern nation building, Turkish
youth had emerged “as a social category” and later become “a political actor”.15
One may argue that the latter category has its own transformation from
discursive universality and homogeneity towards particularity and heterogeneity.
“Oh Turkish youth” is a call by Atatürk, conveying his message to all youth,
then, now and in the future. Here youth is a discursively constructed objectified
social entity. During the early days of discursive homogeneity, youth was re-
presented as an “embodiment” of such “new political culture.” Turkish youth
transformed into a political entity when it sees itself as subject and begins to
interpret the message. At this stage, youth representation reflects, as well as
reflected by the dominant political discourse, Kemalizm, as “carrier” or the
“guardian” of a new political culture. Transformation reached its apex in the
sense that youth becomes a truly political entity when the interpretation of
dominant discourse polarized during the 1960s and 70s.

FE80767D8397%7D.%E3%80%8A%E5%BD%93%E4%BB%A3%E7%A4%BE%E4%BC%9A%E5%AD%A6%
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A%E3%80%8B.pdf#page=174
14 The student oath that was recited at the beginning of every school day until 2013 in primary schools reflect this. It
reads:
I am a Turk, honest and hardworking.
My principle is to protect the younger, to respect the elder,
To love my homeland and my nation more than myself.
My ideal is to rise, to progress.
My existence shall be dedicated to the Turkish existence.
15 Lüküslü, G. D. ‘Constructors and constructed: youth as a political actor in modernising Turkey Forbrig, J. (eds)
Revisiting Youth Political Participation Challenges for Research and Democratic Practice in Europe. Printed at the Council of
Europe, March 2005, pp.29-36. See also Lüküslü, G.D. ‘To be a Child in the 1980’s in Turkey: Construction of
Generational Memory and Nostalgia Through Cyberspace’ in Akdenizli, B. (ed) Digital Transformation Current
Perspectives in Communication Studies. London: Lexington Books: 2015, pp. 65-75

115
Following the introduction of a multiparty system in Turkey and Democratic
Party (DP) won the three consecutive elections (1950, 1954, and 1957) ending
twenty-seven years of mono party rule of the Republican Peoples’ Party (RPP).
Although youth did not participate directly in the 1960 coup, they played a
major role in creating intolerably tense pre-coup atmosphere by rioting and
demonstrating in a rather moderate way. 16 Polarization and radicalization got
even more visible during the 1970s as demands were voiced loudly and
insistently and were often expressed violently. Moreover, the dominant
discourse of youth opposition during 1950s and 1960s were anti government,
anti imperialist while during 1970s youth opposition targeted, or at least
perceived to target the regime itself. Therefore, as Neyzi have pointed out
“youth was constructed in public discourse as a ‘threat’ to the national
interest.”17 The violent period ended up when the military intervened modern
Turkish politics yet again in 1980. By using ever-increased political violence as
a pretext, the military regime restructured the political system through legal and
institutional changes, including a new constitution, through which youth
participation in conventional politics was severely limited. The youth branch of
political parties was banned by severing links between youth and political
parties; the student was prohibited even from being active in student politics at
the campus. Combined with liberalization policies this created cynicism against
politics during 1980s and 1990s a period in which consumerism and de-
politization have been rated amongst Turkish youth.
Youth Participation: Dynamics and Results
Nevertheless, partly reflecting the global trend, work with NGOs begun to
spread out amongst mainly urban youth at the turn of the millennium. A recent
study reveals that the involvement of international organizations in cooperation
with NGOs played an important role in terms of bringing issues of youth policy
onto the agenda to the extent that they helped to develop youth work at national,
regional and international level. 18 This form of engagement enabled a section of
urban youth to take part in non- institutional, political processes through which
they create an opportunity to express themselves, yet express critically on
institutional politics. It also confirms Tarrow’s observations that, Turkish youth

16 Landau, J.M. Radical Politics in Modern Turkey. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974, pp. 30-32
17 Neyzi, Leyla (2001), “Object or Subject? The Paradox of ‘Youth’ in Turkey,” International Journal of Middle East
Studies No. 33, p. 419.
18
18
Bozkurt, S.
S. Çok,
Çok,F.,
F., and
and �ener,
Sener,
¸ T.
T. ‘Government Perspectives
Perspectives on
on Civic
Civic and Political Participation
Participationofof Youth
Youth and
and
Turkey: Deriving
Women in Turkey: Deriving Insights
Insights from
frompolicy
policy Documents’
Documents’ininBarret,
Barret,M.,
M., and
and Z.
Z. Bruna
Bruna (eds)
(eds) Political
Political and
and Civic
Civic
Engagment: Multidisciplinary
Engagment: MultidisciplinaryPerspectives.
Perspectives.London: Routledge.
London: 2015,
Routledge. 2015,p.424
p.424

116
is no exception in any other contemporary societies in which youth participate
politics has often through the engagement in social and civic activities
regardless of being local, national or transnational youth work.19
A number of domestic developments during the late 1990s helped civic life
become more vibrant generally and youth engagement in particular. In 1997, the
military, backed by secular sectors of society ousted the coalition government of
the (Islamic) Welfare Party. August 1999 a devastating earthquake hit the most
industrialised region including Istanbul. At the 1999 Helsinki summit, the EU
confirmed that Turkey was a candidate country, destined to join the European
Union, once it fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria. Moreover, the Turkish military
won some decisive victories against the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK),
culminating in the arrest of Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999. The
following cease-fire with the PKK restored a sense of stability to the country. As
a result, the Turkish military was willing to tolerate a greater measure of
individual freedom and political reforms. In 2001, the economic and financial
crisis soon turns out to be a political crisis. Some pragmatic Islamist leaders
create an opportunity out of the crisis through making their peace with Kemalist
secularism and began to espouse a more moderate philosophy and regrouped
under the umbrella of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which won the
2002 election with a clear majority. The JDP presented itself as the party of
reform in line with the requirements of accessing negotiations with the European
Union as well as other transnational organizations like the United Nation.
At policy implication level, Turkey initiated the Local Agenda 21 (LA-21)

National Program. The objectives were first of all bolstering local governance in
most of the major cities by safeguarding civil society contribution in decision-
making. Upgrading Local Agenda 21 action plans, informing the community,
upholding a long-term support and spreading out LA21 throughout the country
was also mentioned. The second phase intended to enhance the awareness about
LA21 activities through participation of local authorities in relevant projects,
which followed by the announcement of the Plan Document in the Official
Newspaper on 22 January 2001. The principal objective is said to build up
better governance through participations of public institutions, local authorities
and civil society organizations in the decision making process.

19 Tarrow, Op.Cit.

117
This initiative may be considered as a turning point for youth councils and
children platforms to engage in the decision making process as equals in the
form of city councils. It is estimated that, 75 local youth platforms have been
established in cities throughout the country under the coordination of the Youth
Association for Habitat and Agenda 21 (YfH). These efforts encompassed the
establishment of Youth Councils and Youth Centers in all of these cities. The
Youth Councils bring together the youth organizations, as well as students and
employed and unemployed youth in partner cities. These platforms raise
awareness of youth related issues, encourage youth participation in decision-
making and create an inclusive platform for people of different backgrounds to
come together and share common values. Local youth councils and centers
under the LA-21 Program. During its specified tasks, the program supports
transferability in capacity building of young people with peer education.
Creating a sense of belonging to the city is also one of the intended
achievements. Specific focus was given to develop solutions for the problems of
youth at the local level. Having recognized the plurality of youth coming from
different social and cultural background, providing interaction with different
social youth groups was also given importance.
Further into research, one can realize that, as far as Turkey is concerned, global
initiatives such as LA 21, have been playing an essential role for youth and is to
be taken seriously and systematically not only at policy level but also at the level
of implementation of these policies. The institutionalization of LA21 procedures
and instruments at local and national level with promotions and capacity
building initiatives are a case in point. At the end of the World Summit on
Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg, the global community
reached a consensus for starting the advancement towards the Millennium
Development Goals (MDG) from the local level and delivered an action plan
according to which participatory procedures and cooperation for decision-
making was recognized as an important step.20
Youth was mentioned as one of the vulnerable groups along with women and
children who deserve to be a particular beneficiary of implementation. It aimed
to develop awareness-raising programs on the importance of sustainable
production and consumption patterns among all the relevant segments in society,
particularly among youth. It also recognizes that the specific role should be

20 Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/WSSD_POI_PD/English/WSSD_PlanImpl.pdf.Downloaded at
27.01.2016

118
given to youth, women and indigenous and local communities in conserving and
using biodiversity in a sustainable way. In regards to the development of the
capacity of civil society, inclusion of youth was particularly mentioned to
participate, as appropriate, in designing, implementing and reviewing
sustainable development policies and strategies at all levels. Having said that,
promoting and supporting youth participation in programs and activities relating
to sustainable development through, for example, supporting local youth
councils or their equivalent, and by encouraging their establishment where they
do not exist. A project entitled “Local Agenda 21 Small Grants Program” was
also unveiled for the achievement of Millennium Development Goals.
Giving the importance of city councils as a way of improving participation in

local decision making procedures, a report prepared by the European
Commission in 2008 almost echoed LA 21 program. The report praises good
progress in the areas of education, training, youth and culture, t took a critical
stand when it comes to city councils since they are “designed to be a platform to
enhance citizens' participation in local government, have been functioning
effectively in only a limited number of cities. Efforts are needed to strengthen all
city councils. Accountability systems and transparency also need to be
strengthened.”21 Upon these critics, the last phase of LA21 in Turkey for
strengthening of City Councils and providing the capacity building support
should wait until 2011 to be implemented.
In Turkey, Youth Councils aim to be the umbrella organization for everyone

between the age of 15 to 25, plus youth institutions. In return, Youth Council
formed LA 21 National Youth Parliament (TR-NYP) as a communication
network at 2004. Today TR-NYP has members of the 43 youth Council from 69
Municipalities, 72 civil society organizations and 78 university student clubs.
TR-NYP demands for a common regulatory structure; wish to take a
responsibility to form national youth policies and develop a model for National
Youth Council empowered by youth platforms. All these steps are seen as an
important phase in the process of institutionalization of LA 21. Hence, desired
common regulatory structure should enable youth to follow up and where it is
possible to implement a global agenda and other international documents, which
promotes youth participation in decision-making processes. Strengthening the
relationship between City Councils and Youth Council through establishing

21 CEC, Commission Staff Working Document, Turkey 2008 Progress Report. Brussels, 5.11.2008 SEC (2008) 2699,
p.7. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/press_corner/key-
documents/reports_nov_2008/turkey_progress_report_en.pdf. Downloaded at 28.01.2016

119
democratic governance based on equal partnership. LA 21 youth parliament
defined as ‘a national platform based on democratic and civic participation
empowered by local youth platforms. Its primary aim is to enable youth to
participate for determining, preparation and implication of national youth
policies and programs.22 In its 2009 Youth Declaration TR-NYP presented itself
as the defender of youth rights in the country. It achieves this task through
various successful developmental projects. They also recognized that taking part
in institutional politics is an important means to be part of decision-making
processes. Their demand for changing state attitude as it reflected in the
Constitution (Art.58) from perceiving youth as ones that needs to be protected to
a perspective that enables youth. Finally, they declare that youth parliament
fully supports democracy, development and good governance by all means.23
In March 2008 United Nation Development Program (UNDP) published a

comprehensive report titled “Youth in Turkey (herein after the Report). The
Report seems to be important not only because it contains a very detailed
examination of diverse aspects of the issue, including social, political and
cultural perspectives and suggests possible arenas for action. Hence, as I will
argue through that, the content of the Report seems to be taken seriously by the
policy makers. Before that let me look into the report a little bit in detail. The
report starts with anchoring a general fact that, young men and women in
Turkey have skills and ambitions, as well as vision and energy to realize such
vision. However, they need to be given opportunities to utilize these to the
fullest. If this can be achieved, the county’s future will be assured and
sustainable. As we reflect on how best this can be done, this Report analyses
diverse aspects of the issue and suggests possible arenas for action.
The first important aspect that a report discovers that, Turkey deals with the
issues through problem-based, sectoral approach, rather than with a
comprehensive youth policy and with institutions to ensure follow up action.
The Report also determined that, despite the existence of many categories of
youth in Turkey but not one, this diversity is insufficiently recognized in
government policy and media presentations. There are at least three million
young men and especially women can be counted as “invisible”. What Turkey

22
22
Emrealp,
Emrealp, S.
S. Turkiye
TurkiyeYerel
YerelGündem
Gündem 21Programı:
21Program: Yerel Gündem UygulamalarınaYönelik
Gündem Uygulamalarna YönelikKolaylatrc
Kolaylastırıcı
¸ ElElKitab.
Kitabı.Istanbul:
Istanbul:
IULA-EMME.
IULA-EMME. 2005, 2005, pp. 91-98
23 Ulusal
22
Gençlik Parlamentosu
Ulusal Gençlik ParlamentosuKoordinasyon
KoordinasyonToplants:
Toplantısı:Bili�im
Bilisim
¸ veveKatlm.
Katılım.(National
(NationalYouth
YouthParliament
ParliamentCoordination
Coordination
Meeting: Informatics and
Meeting: Informatics and Participation)
Participation) Ankara:
Ankara:19-21
19-21 Mayıs
Mays 2009
2009

120
needed, however a forward-looking youth policy which, anticipates future needs
and problems as they will emerge. Youth policy as such, must comprise a strong
human rights dimension regardless of gender discrimination or bias. To put it
more directly, the policy should not focus only on students or disproportionately
on boys. It should also focus on all young people who are working, and those
who are not working or studying, especially young women, whether they live in
cities without any skills to participate in the labor market or in rural areas,
pressurized by some socially conservative attitudes. A comprehensive youth
policy, which, encompasses issues like, education, health, employment, social
and political participation, and increase the coordination of youth-related
institutions among all sectors.
Such a youth policy, the Report further argues, needs to be designed in a

participatory manner. Greater participation of youth in decision processes across
the country would contribute significantly to Human Development. Youth need
to be involved in making decisions on matters, which concern them. Obviously
social institutions such as families play a primary role for young people
experiencing to be part of decision-making processes. Nevertheless, local
communities, NGOs, politicians and policy makers at local and national levels
have also great responsibility first of all to promote democracy in the family and
furthering it to social life in general. NGOs and the private sector have major
roles to play in finding new ways to involve youth in the democratic process and
governance. There is a general need to listen more to the voices of young
women and men. All stakeholders such as youth NGOs, academics, private
sector, media and trade unions need to be included. A youth council
encompassing all youth NGOs is needed to help drive the process. The next
paragraph addresses the issue of implementation measures, which might
improve youth participation. The report advises that the creation of a youth
parliament, in the long run, may provide a platform for young people to express
themselves on issues and policies, which affect them.24
These findings and advices directly or indirectly address a high degree of

confusion between the state/society and youth if not distrust. As it has been
shown above, these confusions are a well-founded historical fact. The political
engagement of youth has traditionally been regarded as “dangerous” in Turkey

24UNDP, Human Development Report: Turkey 2008 . Ankara: The United Nation Development Programme in Turkey,
March 2008, pp.4-23 http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/turkey_2008_nhdr_en.pdf Downloaded at 30.01.2016

121
largely based on the perceived meaning “participation” of young people often
coupled with negative connotations such as, radicalism, anti-state and violence,
yet easy to get out of control. At its best young people are considered as a
human resource that needs to be trained in a way ensuring the integrity of the
state and as a group in society that needs to be protected against bad habits. It is
reflected by the General Directorate of Youth and Sports (GDYS), which used
to be the principal institution charged with the implementation of youth policies
until very recently, put more emphasis on “control” and “protection” in line
with the Constitution’s relevant articles (Art. 58 and 59).25 The strategic plan
also reflects the functionality declared by the Constitution, namely the
promotion and organization of sport activities, conducting services relating to
youths’ leisure time, strengthening youth’s commitment to Atatürk’s principles
such as patriotism, and taking necessary precautions for the protection of youth
from “bad habits”.26
The Ministry of Youth and Sport (MYS) which is established in 2011, published
a document which seems rather in compliance with the UNDP report as well as
more responsive to the demands of the EU. It has encompassed perspectives and
strategies in relation to the youth. The 2013-17 Strategic Plan of the MYS
implies a reorganization of youth services in general and the adoption of a more
comprehensive approach to youth policies that transcends the above mentioned
emphasis on “control and protection” to a certain extend.27 Furthermore the
National Youth and Sport Policy Document produced by the Ministry, takes into
consideration a variety of aspects including access to education and
employment, sports, the place of youth within the family, the problems faced by
disadvantaged young people, and youth health. The Report also includes a

25
25 The Turkish
Turkish Constitution deal withwith issue
issue under
under Section
Section IX
IX Youth
Youth and Sports
Sports Art. 58 58 titled
titled“Protection
“Protection ofof Youth
Youth
declares
declares “The
“The State
State shall take measures
measures to ensure
ensure the education and development of the youth into into whose
whose keeping
our independence and our Republic are entrusted, in the light of positive science, in line with the the principles
principles and
and
reforms
reforms ofof Atatürk,
Atatürk, and
and 27
27 in opposition to ideas aiming at the destruction of the indivisible integrity of of the State
with its territory and
and nation.
nation. The
The State
State shall
shall take
take necessary
necessary measures
measures to protect youth from addiction to alcohol
alcohol and
drugs, crime, gambling, and and similar
similar vices,
vices, and
and ignorance.”
ignorance.” Article
Article 59
59 under
under the
the title
title “Development
“Development of of sports
sports and
arbitration”
arbitration” “The State shall take measures to develop the physical and mental health health ofof Turkish
Turkish citizens of all ages,
and encourage the spread of sports among the masses. The state shall protect successful successful athletes.”
athletes.” Constitution Of Of
the Republic
Republic ofof Turkey.
Turkey.Oficial
OficialTranslation.
Translation.https://global.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/constitution_en.pdf.
https://global.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/constitution_en.pdf. Downloaded
Downloaded at
31.01.2016.
31.01.2016.
25
ve Spor Genel Müdürlügü ˘ Strategic Plan:2010-2014 (The General Directorate of Youth and Sports
26 Gençlik ve Spor Genel Müdürlü�ü Strategic Plan:2010-2014 (The General Directorate of Youth and Sports
Strategic Plan: 2010-2014)

2010-2014)
http://www.sp.gov.tr/upload/xSPStratejikPlan/files/aeVCS+GenclikSporGenelMudurluguSP1014.pdf
http://www.sp.gov.tr/upload/xSPStratejikPlan/files/aeVCS+GenclikSporGenelMudurluguSP1014.pdf
27
Youth and Sports.,Gençlik ve Bakanlıgı
˘ Stratejik Planı: 2013-2017. Ankara: Gençlik ve Spor
27 Ministry of Youth and Sports.,Gençlik ve Spor Bakanl� Stratejik Plan: 2013-2017. Ankara: Gençlik ve Spor
Bakanlıgı
˘ (Ministry
Bakanl� (Ministry of
ofYouth
YouthandandSports),
Sports),2013,
2013,

122
section on “democratic participation” and “civic consciousness.” It understood
the concept participation from a broader perspective as an involvement in social
processes and essentially linked it with democratic values. It clearly echoes
universal understanding when it says, “democratic, accountable, transparent and
participatory social structure, which respects human rights and has absorbed
universal values can be only established by generations with high civic
consciousness.” In this context, young people’s participation in all areas of
social life is essential. It further recognizes that, establishment of a pluralist and
libertarian democracy in Turkey permanently; young generations need to adopt
democratic values as a lifestyle. Young people’s becoming stakeholders of
politics is indispensable for an advanced democracy. It is also stated that, in
order to have “a participatory youth with high civic consciousness”, young
people should have a say in the social processes “by identifying obstacles in the
way of their participation.”28 These aims should be supported by and
incorporated into educational and training policies that would strengthen
democratic consciousness among young people, the enhancement of youth
participation in national and local assemblies, the removal of the communication
gap between young people and local authorities, and the encouragement of
youth to get involved in non-governmental organizations, are identified as
policies to be pursued.29
Despite the existence of a discourse promoting youth participation, people find

sufficient reasons to be skeptical. One point of criticism might be that, wording
is not necessarily realization. Indeed this may not be a totally unjustified
concern for those who familiar with Turkish political culture. Furthermore,
inclusion of sections on issues such as protection of youth from bad habits, and
the prevention of the alienation of young people from national and moral values
make those who take a critical stance to think that the old habits die-hard. 30
Occupy Gezi movement no doubt was a litmus test for conservative JDP
government which ironically introduced democratic reforms. According to Göle,
Gezi demonstrations can be seen as a “staging ground for the creativity of
micro-practices, and it embodies the importance of the politics of everyday life
… distinguishes itself as a youth movement, with its own generational
characteristics.” Göle further argues that it was also “a public square movement,

28
28 Ministry of Youth
Youthand
andSports.,
Sports.,The
The National
National Youth and
and Sports
Sports Policy
PolicyDocument.
Document. Ankara:Ministry
Ankara: MinistryofofYouth
Youthand
andSports,
Sports,
2013, p.29http://www.gsb.gov.tr/public/edit/files/Mevzuat/TheNationalYouthandSportsPolicyDocument(1).pdf
2013, p.29 http://www.gsb.gov.tr/public/edit/files/Mevzuat/TheNationalYouthandSportsPolicyDocument(1).pdf
29
29
Ibid., pp.29-31
pp.29-31
30 Bozkurt, S. Çok, F., and �ener, T. ‘Government Perspectives’, p.424
30
Bozkurt, S. Çok, F., and Sener,
¸ T. ‘Government Perspectives’, p.424

123
which “opened up a new arena of experience and democratic opportunities
growing and resonating from Istanbul, Turkey.”31 Gezi demonstrations seemed
to be “a moment of experience” which has altered both the imaginary of
“apolitical youth” as well as “political engagement.” Through Gezi
demonstrations, long experienced youth political apathy replaced with
discovering enchantment of political action.
A personal anecdote may be worth mentioning here. It was one day during Gezi
demonstrations I was commuting back to home by bus. Just a seat in front of me
there sat two teenage girls conversing about their experience at Gezi Park with
great enthusiasm. At one point one of them said: “You know what Baak, this is
the best day in my whole life.” The other replied with a great excitement “mine
too Zeli, mine too definitely”. These two young girls and their participation
signifies what the UNDP report was mentioning hence what the MYS policy
document is sought after and finally what Arendt calls “action,” in public
sphere, a highest form of human conduct. Nevertheless, the way in which
government handled the issue leaves no doubt that government perceives it
neither as a means of political participation nor a civic engagement on the part
of youth.
Along with such an optimistic interpretation of a social and political experience,

Gezi demonstrations have negative consequences too. The youth’s distrust
towards politics seems to be more widespread and confirmed after Gezi. For the
government side, it may at least cause a delay in implementing what is promised
in policy document. A recent study repeats much founded criticism by pointing
out that, a comprehensive youth policy approach which takes youth’s needs and
prospects as a focal issue and creates and coordinates policies and institutions in
a coherent way toward this goal in different relevant areas from education to
employment, budget allocations, regional policy and social security still missing.
The main critical point that writers argue is “the lack of coherence between
institutional and policy framework concerning youth and scope and
effectiveness.” It further argues that even the “youth-related projects are often
defined according to urgent needs in an ad hoc way, without much
institutionalization or planning.”32 These are rather fair criticisms there is

31
31 Göle,
Göle, N. ‘Gezi
‘Gezi –– Anatomy
AnatomyofofaaPublic
PublicSquare
SquareMovement’
Movement’ininInsight
InsightTurkey Vol.
Turkey 1515
Vol. / No. 3 /32013,
/ No. pp.pp.
/ 2013, 7-14, at p.
7-14, at p.
33 and 12
and 12
32
Goksen, F., Yukseker, D., Kuz, S. Oker, ˙I. ‘Policy
32 Goksen, F., Yukseker, D., Kuz, S. Oker, �. ‘Policy Performance
Performance and Evolution:
and Evolution: Turkey.’,
Turkey.’, STYLESTYLE
WorkingWorking
Papers.Papers.
WP 3.3/TR. TURKEY CROME, University of Brighton, Brighton, 2015, p.5 http://www.style-
WP 3.3/TR. TURKEY CROME, University of Brighton, Brighton, 2015, p.5
http://www.style-research.eu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/ftp/STYLE-Working-Paper-WP3.3-Performance-Turkey-.pdf

124
nevertheless an improvement on the question of youth generally and political
participation in particular. However, when one talks about participation two
questions comes forward: who participates? And what kind of participation? As
is recognized by the UNDP report, although discursive homogeneity of youth as
a political category, it is rather very heterogeneous socially. It applies to
participation. No doubt that, political participation is one of the most important
means for youth to become responsible citizens. But participation itself can
occur in various ways. One can be part of a local, national and global initiatives
on a voluntary base while others may take street action. Some of the issues are
moderate and even considered socially acceptable while some others are more
radical or get radicalized for one reason or another. Therefore, when one talks
about an issue as complex as youth participation in a country like Turkey, what
is at stake is whether it is possible to reach common understanding on the nature
and the limits of participation.
The Y20 Turkey Summit held in Antalya-Turkey in August 2015 may be a case
in point. After taking over the Presidency of the G20 a year earlier it announced
that Y20 would be an official outreach program of the G20 in 2015. Y20 was an
essential component of the Turkish Government’s engagement of stakeholders.
The overall aim to constitute the Y20 Summit was to enable the young
generation to speak up onto G20 Summit. 100 youth representatives, youth
activists, young thinkers, young policymakers and young media-makers come
together to discuss unemployment, education and war.
Five primary objectives were set up. Those includes a.) The creation of Y20’s
strategic agenda and aligning it with the engagement group; b.) To generate
policy recommendations through pragmatic and evidence-based communication;
c.) To sustain and enhance the multilateral accountability framework; d.) To
promote global engagement and activation of youth; e.) To grow the legitimacy,
reach and impact of the Y20 summit, and better integrate the voice of today’s
youth into existing G20 dialogue. Selected themes showed relevance and
timeliness such as the Impact of Technology and Innovation on Youth
Unemployment and Youth’s Contribution to Peace under which special
emphasis were given to communication Between G-20 Youth and low-income
developing countries (LIDC-20) in this case Afghanistan, Madagascar,
Mongolia and Vietnam. War and youth have focused on Syrian Refugee crisis.
The issue of Youth and Education in the 21st century discussed as an issue of

http://www.style-research.eu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/ftp/STYLE-Working-Paper-WP3.3-Performance-Turkey-.pdf
research.eu/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/ftp/STYLE-Working-Paper-WP3.3-Performance-Turkey-.pdf
Downloaded:23/01/2016.
Downloaded: 23/01/2016.

125
investment in youth education, inclusiveness as education for everyone and
finally implementing and monitoring innovative reforms in youth education for
sustaining quality and equality.
Emre Cenker, the President of the Y 20 summarized, to address unemployment,

the Y20 urged G20 leaders to adopt a concrete, quantifiable and collective 10-
year target for the reduction of youth unemployment. Special attention should be
given to create and where it is possible digital accessibility for young people
since jobs are ever deeply rooted in technology. Therefore, higher investment to
bridge the digital divide, and provide universal access to basic infrastructure and
the Internet was demanded. Young delegates also recommended that G20
leaders invest in and promote entrepreneurship education at secondary and
tertiary levels; exchange programs for entrepreneurs; and better financial
conditions and a funding framework for entrepreneurs.
Reflecting the importance of unemployment and technology hence by

understanding that education is key to promoting social mobility and tackling
global poverty and inequality, the quality of education, not just on the quantity
of provision brought to the fore by the representatives of Y20. The
recommendations include demanding an adequate supply of quality teachers,
and urging the elimination of gender disparities and the development of basic
infrastructure in public schools. Finally on the issue of war and the plight of
refugees escaping the numerous violent conflicts raging in Syria and elsewhere,
young delegates recommendsthe recognition of migration as an international
public good, with the proper reception of refugees in G20 member states, and
full recognition of their rights. In light of the current refugee crisis, youth
representatives proposed G20 leaders adopt a legally binding global-resettlement
program to grant humanitarian visas in humanitarian emergencies.33 It seems
that G20 Antalya summit paid an fair attention to youth and issues surrounding
it and it was probably because of young delegates were represented as well as
the importance of the issue. Speaker after speaker addressed youth
employment/unemployment, empowering youth, quality of education for youth,
integrating youth. In response G-20 Leaders declared a commitment to reduce
the share of young people not in employment, training, or education in their

33 Cenker, E. ‘Youth 20: Building a More Succesful Economic Future’. in G20 Turkey: The Antalya Summit e-book.
Antalya: November 2015 Prapared by Munk School of Global Affairs, G 20 Research Group and Toronto
University, pp. 190-191 http://www.g7g20.com/eBooks/G20-2015-web.pdf. Downloaded 01.02.2016

126
respective countries by 15 percent by 2025 in order to tackle what is called one
of the most pernicious challenges to economic opportunity worldwide.
Conclusion
Political participation is one of the most important means for youth to become
responsible citizens. To put it differently, young members of society can be the
true citizens when s/he becomes a political subject. Political subjectivity, (in the
sense of a status as political subject) of youth in Turkey has been largely
determined by the nature of modernization. Youth has been constructed based
on this visionary modernization; members of modern, secular nation,
discursively homogeneous, like the whole nation, youth was more of a social
rather than a political category. As modernization advances, youth demand for
political subjectivity through rebellion largely rejected. Nevertheless, a decade
long mutual skepticism still subsists despite some promising steps taken during
the last decade. One reason may be mutual distrust has been well established in
the political culture supported by paternalistic nature of the state and society.
The other reason might be that recent political reforms came largely as a
concession to domestic as well as global dynamics brought about by political
social and technological changes. Occupy Gezi movements and the way in
which government handled it, may be taken as an evidence of such concessions.
Gezi incident came at a point when the spirit was high thanks to reforms and
National Youth and Sport Policy Document was produced. It raised concerns
that, reforms without effective implementations did not prevent political power
to suppress Turkish youth’s demand to be part of decision-making process by
using conservative values. These may be considered as reasonable criticisms,
but one should be wary of being holistic. For example there may be no problem
with statements such as “protecting youth from bad habits”, and the “prevention
of the alienation of young people from national and moral values” what is
important is how these are conceptualized and interpreted. If national and moral
values are interpreted in line with universal human rights and democratic values
these statements become even desirable. Dealing with youth political
participation in Turkey today and near future is to realize that, there is no unified
segment of society, which one may call “Turkish youth” as an analytical
category. From that perspective, one can talk about very diverse bulk of citizens
coming from different social and cultural backgrounds with fairly different
needs and demands. So too, the way in which these demands wish to express
themselves in public sphere vary. Turkey needs to develop custom made policies
if and when possible, rather than embark upon holistic measures.

127

128
NATURE OF YOUTH ACTIVISM IN GEORGIA:
TRENDS, MOTIVES, IDEOLOGY
Levan KAKHISHVILI and Iveta GOGAVA
Social movements are defined as “involved in conflicting relations with clearly

identified opponents; [they] are linked by dense informal networks; share a
distinct collective identity”.1 Therefore they can be considered as goal-oriented
activities, which include institutional conflict between social entities. These
goals can be either aimed at a specific and narrow policy or be more broadly
aimed at cultural change.
It is widely acknowledged that some forms of activism such as for example

protest rallies have long traditions in Georgia. Even during the Soviet times the
Georgians were the first nation who held an open protest demonstration against
the Soviet authorities when the so-called de-Stalinization process started under
Khrushchev’s leadership. Demonstrations renewed in 1978 as well to protest the
new Soviet constitution and the status of the Georgian language as opposed to
Russian. In the 80s the Georgians were once again at the frontline of the protest
rallies in the Soviet Union demanding independence. Furthermore, the nature of
civic activism has experienced remarkable changes throughout the last two
decades. At the beginning, demonstrations were politically driven, mostly
organised by certain leaders of political parties. They aimed to change the
existing situation in the country via changing the composition of the
government. For example, the 1990s, the early years of independence, witnessed
the whole new level of street action. The period is often referred to as the age of
“street politics” because the first president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, having been
used to street demonstrations would frequently make political decisions in the

1
Porta Donatella D. & Diani M. (2006). Social Movements. Blackwell Publishing. p. 20

129
streets in front of a crowd. This spirit resulted in the Rose revolution in 2003 by
establishing a new government. After that civic activism went into the
transformational phase, when ordinary citizens felt their power to be change
makers, but still most of the demonstrations have political character. Since the
2012 parliamentary elections when Georgia witnessed its first transfer of power
through elections, social movements have become more socially driven and
included political, economic, social and ecological problems.
In order to study the nature of youth activism in Georgia, the paper examines the
trends of youth activism and its possible motives. The paper argues that the
degree of youth activism in Georgia remains low but when young people get
involved they are mostly driven by two major factors: expressing solidarity and
socialization. We provide several cases that have been some of the most visible
youth campaigns and that illustrate the reaction of the Georgian youth to
particular local and global events. Finally, the paper concludes with a discussion
of ideological underpinnings of youth activism in Georgia. We argue that the
young people can serve as an agent of change and revive leftist views in
Georgia.
Trends of Youth Activism in Georgia
Youth activism in Georgia is an understudied topic. Therefore, there is a limited

amount of data available for analysis. However, Caucasus Research Resource
Centers (CRRC) and their databases still provide important insights to
illuminate the issue. This section of the paper outlines the general trends of how
activism can be broken down into age categories and where the youth stands in
comparison to their elder counterparts.

130
The data provided by the CRRC allows for examining three variables that are
directly or indirectly related to activism. These include volunteering without
compensation, attending a public meeting, and cleaning or helping to clean
public space. The data on these variables is available for the years of 2011,
2012, and 2013.
Volunteering without compensation is perhaps one of the most valuable

variables. However, the limitation of this concept is that the quantitative survey
does not investigate how respondents understand volunteering. Some may have
a fixed idea that volunteering has to be institutionalised, e.g. an internship at an
NGO, while others may consider more informal activities as volunteering, e.g.
participating in cleaning up activities of the neighbourhood or other areas. One
way or another, the data suggests that volunteers are not high in numbers in the
Georgian society. From 2011 to 2013 the percentage of respondents for the
Caucasus Barometer survey who had volunteered during the past six months by
the time of the interview was respectively 17, 15 and 20 per cent of the
population aged 18-35.2 Interestingly, the proportion of volunteers was one to
three percentage points higher among the population aged 36-55 in all three
cases.3
Attending a public meeting is another expression of activism. According to

the data, the youth in Georgia is not significantly more active or passive when it
comes to demonstrations. In 2011 20 per cent of the respondents aged between
18 and 35 reported to have attended a public meeting, while the same figure for
2012 rose to two per cent in 2012 and dropped to 18 per cent in 2013. 4 The

2
The Caucasus Research Resource Centers. (2011, 2012, 2013) "Caucasus Barometer". Retrieved
through ODA - http://caucasusbarometer.org
3
4

131
slight peak in 2012 is perhaps caused by the turbulent year for Georgian politics
as that year witnessed large-scale demonstrations especially with participation of
the youth who protested against the inhuman treatment of inmates in Georgian
prisons.5
Finally, the third variable the paper examines is cleaning up or helping

cleaning up a public space. The data for this variable is only available for 2012
and 2013. However, the numbers are not different from the ones reported above.
In 2012 only 18 per cent of the respondents aged 18-35 reported cleaning up the
public space while in 2013 the same figure was 17 per cent.6 Once again, a
higher percentage of those aged 36-55 report being involved in cleaning up the
public space: two and 19 per cent in 2012 and 2013 respectively.7
Judging from this data it is fair to argue that the youth activism in Georgia is
quite limited and has remained at relatively the same level during 2011-2013.
However, it is worth mentioning that surveys do not show the full picture and it
is necessary to examine specific cases to understand the nature of youth activism
in Georgia. In the following sections we provide three hypotheses on what
motivates the youngsters of Georgia to get active and involved. To illustrate our
reasoning we also provide specific cases, which demonstrate that the youth in
Georgia is driven in most cases by the will to express solidarity and the will to
socialise.
Solidarity – Local and Global

5
See: Giorgi Lomsadze. (2012) “Georgia Rocked by Prison Abuse Scandal”, Eurasianet.org,
Available at: http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65929
6
The Caucasus Research Resource Centers. (2012, 2013) "Caucasus Barometer". Retrieved through
ODA - http://caucasusbarometer.org
7
The Caucasus Research Resource Centers. (2012, 2013) "Caucasus Barometer". Retrieved through
ODA - http://caucasusbarometer.org

132
Expressing solidarity for marginalised groups in the society is one of the
primary drives of activism among the youth in general. Georgian youngsters are
no exception and they often try to show their position not only on domestic
issues such as for instance gender equality but also on international events such
as the terrorist attack on the French magazine Charlie Hebdo.
The issue of domestic violence was moved to the forefront of public attention in
Georgia after a series of killings of women by their partners or ex-partners made
headlines in local mass media. This high degree of gender-based physical
violence in a short period of time became a topic for public debates quickly. The
apolitical youth decided to act and express their position regarding the ongoing
problem. A feminist organization Georgian Women’s Movement organized an
exemplary campaign uniting other feminist organizations and young people all
over the country. The campaign included protest rallies in the capital of Tbilisi
and 23 other cities throughout Georgia. The campaign resulted in a petition
addressed to the government calling for special proactive mechanisms to
eliminate violence against women. The campaign was echoed at the state
agencies. High-ranking officials started talking about the importance of the
government’s special policy, in order to reduce violence against women, on the
one hand, and increase women’s participation in politics, on the other.8
Another example of young people’s solidarity towards a marginalized group
was the prison scandal of 2012,9 in which the youth played the crucial role. A
few months before the 2012 parliamentary elections footages was revealed,
which depicted graphic images of how prisoners were treated. These videos
were a complete shock for the whole society but the young people were the ones

8
Dolidze, Nino. (2014) “Georgian Women’s Movement to Stop Violence against Women”, Available
at: http://www.democracyspeaks.org/blog/georgian-women’s-movement-stop-violence-against-
women
9
See: Fairbanks, Charles Jr. (2012) “Georgia's Prison Rape Scandal—and What It Says About the
Rose Revolution”, Available at: http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/09/georgias-
prison-rape-scandal-and-what-it-says-about-the-rose-revolution/262720/

133
who organized large-scale demonstrations against inhumane and degrading
treatment, and torture of prisoners. Although the political temperature was high
due to the upcoming elections, the organizers of the demonstrations did not let
any political actor use the mobilisation of young people as a political tool. It
should be admitted, however, that in the end these protests served the political
goals of the Georgian Dream coalition and discredited the previous ruling party
– United National Movement. Nevertheless, the demonstrators themselves
managed to avoid labelling themselves as supporters or opponents of one or
another political force.
Another prominent example of solidarity was the reaction of the Georgian youth
on the so-called Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris. Georgian students and other
users of social networks and active members of the society started organizing
demonstrations expressing solidarity immediately after the attack, which
happened on January 7, 2015. They gathered at the French Institute in Tbilisi
with flowers and candles to express their solidarity with those who died in the
attack. Sharing the pain of the French people and protecting the right of
expression were the main messages of the protesters.10 Using the hashtag
#JeSuisCharlie many of Twitter and Facebook users replaced their profile photo
with a white-on-black image of the phrase, which translates into “I am Charlie”.
It is important to highlight that the attitudes about what happened were
controversial. Several days after the event, social media users started a new
campaign “I am not Charlie”, “I am Ahmed”. Emergence of these two camps
showed different perspectives on this event. Simultaneously, it opened the floor
for discussions about the topic. Organizers and supporters of the solidarity event
stated that being Charlie highlights their support towards the freedom of speech.
Another group argued that being Ahmed, whose faith was ridiculed by Charlie

10
Georgia Today, (2015) “Tbilisi Joins “Je Suis Charlie” Campaign to Defend Freedom of the Press”,
Available at: http://old.georgiatoday.ge/article_details.php?id=13099

134
Hebdo and who died while defending his rights, means that people can see only
the perspective of terrorists and not the cultural violence Muslim people
experienced as a result of the caricatures.
Socialization and Peer Pressure

One of the motives of participation in social movements can be peer group
socialization. In the words of Macionis and Gerber, peer group is a social group
whose members have interests, social positions and age in common. However,
the peer groups generally affect short-term interests.11 It is worth mentioning
that attendees of the particular demonstrations or online discussions are those
who aspire to be part of the same social group and share their interests for
achieving the same goal for a short period of time.
Online activism, organizing events, demonstrations and campaigns via

Facebook or other social networks illustrate that membership of a concrete
group can be the floor for sharing ideas, expressing solidarity and feeling an
important part of the society. Socialization is the process of learning life
patterns, shared in concrete communities; therefore it includes human
interaction, exchanging ideas and gaining new skills.
In 2011, Tbilisi City Hall, with the support of an international investment

company, started the reconstruction of the square and its surroundings in the
historical centre of Tbilisi. This decision stimulated the citizens to start a
campaign. The main demand of this civic campaign was to protect and preserve
historic buildings in their original form and to keep the public function of the
square. The protest campaign developed a good organization and creative forms
of protest, which lasted for three months. Through this initiative, the Gudiashvili

11
Macionis, John J., Gerber Linda M. (2011). Sociology. Toronto: Pearson Canada.

135
Square
Square became
became aa centre
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for diverse
diverse cultural
cultural events.
events. Protest actions marked
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by an
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wasideas.
a way to meet like-minded people, express their opinion and
listen to other ideas.
Socialization can be viewed as a two-way avenue. On the one hand, it can
emerge unplanned:
Socialization can be the protesters
viewed on Gudiashvili
as a two-way avenue. Square
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one not,
hand,perhaps,
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However, youth that
behavior some
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people led only for showing
to public appreciation of the
volunteers and
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12
Bodroz�
i c N., Botanova K., Galfayan N., Palavandishvili N. and Us Vl. (2014) Imagining the
Public: The Status
and Challenges
of the Independent Cultural Actors in Armenia, Georgia, Moldova
Bodrožić
i N., Botanova K., Galfayan
ofN., Palavandishvili N.N.
and UsUs
Vl.Vl.
(2014)
12
12
andBodroz� c A
Ukraine. SPACES
N., project.
Botanova K., Galfayan N., Palavandishvili Imagining thethe
Ideological Underpinnings Youth Activism inand
Georgia (2014) Imagining
Public:
Public: The
The Status
Status and
and Challenges
Challenges of
of the
the Independent
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A SPACES
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have sketched project.
project.
a picture of the youth activism in Georgia, from which it

136
is clear that the young people in the country, although not extremely active in
general terms, are able to mobilize as a reaction to important local and
international events. They try not to attach themselves to any political force in
off. However, the behavior of the young people led to public appreciation of the
volunteers and was viewed as a generous act of solidarity.
Ideological Underpinnings of Youth Activism in Georgia

We have sketched out a picture of the youth activism in Georgia, from which it
is clear that the young people in the country, although not extremely active in
general terms, are able to mobilize as a reaction to important local and
international events. They try not to attach themselves to any political force in
Georgia, are self-organized and often rely on social media. However, one
interesting aspect is an ideological dimension of the youth activism in Georgia.
As the discussed cases demonstrate the Georgian youngsters more often than not
react to the issues that are leftist in nature such as gender equality,
environmental problems, human rights and freedoms, etc. This is both
understandable and surprising. Of course when the youth activism is discussed it
is expected that the young people will have leftist ideas and values. However, in
a conservative society like Georgia it is to some extent surprising. On the other
hand, such a situation can lead us to arguing that the youth can serve as an agent
of change in the society.
Georgian politics, just like in most of the other post-communist countries, is

characterized by the absence of the unidimensional left-right division of political
parties. Moreover, leftist ideas are often associated with the Soviet past and even
discredited. With the youth mostly problematizing issues that are leftist in
nature, the leftist values may find a new life in the society. In a short-term
perspective these developments have a potential to raise public awareness
regarding these values and partly fill the vacuum existing in the left-wing
politics. The long-term implications of such a scenario is hard to analyse though.
If Georgia witnesses a new generation of leftist politicians representing the
interests of lower classes of the society, which are partly represented now in
Georgian politics by right-wing political parties, it will be highly likely that the

party politics in Georgia will have a tendency to develop into the ideologically
defined parties.
137

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“Anchors of Democracy: the Black Sea”, “The Culture of Governance”,

Civil society is therefore encouraged by our conference series to deepen critical

It is not just important to remember the role of different so-called “coloured

Talking of “The 2012-14 protest movements in Bulgaria” (in: Government and

As for Turkey’s challenges, Hikmet Kirik (Turkey’s Challenges, in: Governance

Speaking of expectations and reality of Good Governance, let us refer to “A

The Democracy Workshop offered by the Austrian Parliament is intended to

The goals of these new installations are to strengthen democratic awareness

Youth Parliaments for Students of the 9th Grade

Workshops of the Democracy Workshop for Students ages 8 to 14

Political Workshop (Topic: "Following the tracks of a law") Where do laws

Participation Workshop (Topic: "My opinion counts")

Workshop "European Union" (Topic: "Getting to know the European Union")

Members of Parliament and the original location of the federal legislation

School and Democracy Workshops

Apprentice Forum of the Democracy Workshop for 15 to 24 year olds

Apprentice forum of the Democracy Workshops – Parliament

Apprentice forum of the Democracy Workshops – Democracy

Apprentice forum of the Democracy Workshops – Politicians

Assembly of European Regions (AER)

This paper is of particular interest for youth empowerment through participation

Recognition of Volunteering Activities in the EU

Furthermore, the Resolution of the European Parliament (A6-0070/2008) on the

Today, according to Eurobarometer recent data, one fourth of the young

Impact of the EU Youth Programmes on Young People

Volunteering activities through the EU youth programmes has a particular

According to the statistics, the Youth in Action (2007-2013) successfully

European Voluntary Service - a Tool to Empower Young Europeans

The non-formal education within volunteering activities is seen as an important

The further development of the EU youth programmes such as Youth in Action,

“The positive correlation between participation in youth work and non-formal

Policy Analyst, Institute for Go-Governance, Vienna

About running, voting and the background of this paper

By voting we tell politicians, which way to go. This political instrument is

Youth – Sweet sixteen, time to vote

The election and the campaign

Table 2: Vienna District Election 2015 – Results Josefstadt10

Table 3: Vienna City Council Election 2015 – Results Josefstadt 11

A True Civic Action? Overview of popular engagement in BiH in 2012-14

The Youth Factor

Perspectives for Youth Participation in BiH

A. Dancasiu, J. Forst-Battaglia, M. Sully, V.Simonyan, J. Mantl

J. Mantl, A. Dancasiu (E. Weingartner)

H. Kirik, S. Ralchev (Go-Governance)

V. Simonyan, T. Resch (Go-Governance)

Conference Yerevan (Go-Governance)

The key challenge to deal with: general observation

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