POLIR EV MT POINT ERS (G01) A TT Y.
LOA N ZON , 1ST SEM 2019- 2020
PREAMBLE
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order
to build a just and humane society and establish a Government that shall
embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and
develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity the blessings
of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth,
justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this
Constitution.
ARTICLE I
National Territory
The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands
and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the
Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and
aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular
shelves, and other submarine areas. The waters around, between, and
connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and
dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.
ARTICLE II
Declaration of Principles and State Policies
Principles
SECTION 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty
resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.
SECTION 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy,
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law
of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation, and amity with all nations.
SECTION 3. Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed
Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is
to secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory.
SECTION 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the
people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and,
in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided
by law, to render personal military or civil service.
SECTION 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty,
and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the
enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.
SECTION 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
State Policies
SECTION 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations
with other states the paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty,
territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to self-determination.
SECTION 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and
pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory.
SECTION 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will
ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people
from poverty through policies that provide adequate social services, promote
full employment, a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for
all.
SECTION 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national
development.
SECTION 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights.
SECTION 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally
protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The
natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support
of the Government.
SECTION 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building
and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and
social well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and
encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.
SECTION 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall
ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
SECTION 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the
people and instill health consciousness among them.
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SECTION 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature.
SECTION 17. The State shall give priority to education, science and technology,
arts, culture, and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social
progress, and promote total human liberation and development.
SECTION 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall
protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.
SECTION 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
SECTION 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector,
encourages private enterprise, and provides incentives to needed investments.
SECTION 21. The State shall promote comprehensive rural development and
agrarian reform.
SECTION 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural
communities within the framework of national unity and development.
SECTION 23. The State shall encourage non-governmental, community-based,
or sectoral organizations that promote the welfare of the nation.
SECTION 24. The State recognizes the vital role of communication and
information in nation-building.
SECTION 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
SECTION 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public
service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.
SECTION 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service
and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption.
SECTION 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State
adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest.
ARTICLE VI
The Legislative Department
SECTION 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives,
except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and
referendum.
SECTION 2. The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators who shall be
elected at large by the qualified voters of the Philippines, as may be provided
by law.
SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age,
able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for
not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election.
SECTION 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall
commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of
June next following their election.
No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
SECTION 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more
than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall
be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and
those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party list. For three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by
law, except the religious sector.
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative.
 POLIR EV MT POINT ERS (G01) A TT Y. LOA N ZON , 1ST SEM 2019- 2020
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall
make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards
provided in this section.
SECTION 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless
he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is
at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-
list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected,
and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately
preceding the day of the election.
SECTION 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a
term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon
on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.
No member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the
full term for which he was elected.
SECTION 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the
Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall be held on the
second Monday of May.
SECTION 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives,
a special election may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed
by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected
shall serve only for the unexpired term.
SECTION 10. The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall be determined by law. No increase in said compensation
shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of
the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase.
SECTION 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all
offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from
arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be
held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in
any committee thereof.
SECTION 12. All Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall,
upon assumption of office, make a full disclosure of their financial and business
interests. They shall notify the House concerned of a potential conflict of interest
that may arise from the filing of a proposed legislation of which they are authors.
SECTION 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold
any other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency,
or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat.
Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or
the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.
SECTION 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may
personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral
Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he,
directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any
franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or
controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not
intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary
benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.
SECTION 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday
of July for its regular session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall
continue to be in session for such number of days as it may determine until thirty
days before the opening of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays,
Sundays, and legal holidays. The President may call a special session at any
time.
SECTION 16. (1) The Senate shall elect its President and the House of
Representatives its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective Members.
Each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a
smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance
of absent Members in such manner, and under such penalties, as such House
may provide.
(3) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members
for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its
Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed,
shall not exceed sixty days.
(4) Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time
publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national
security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-
fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal.
Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.
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(5) Neither House during the sessions of the Congress shall, without the consent
of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that
in which the two Houses shall be sitting.
SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices
of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining
six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case
may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from
the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-
list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall
be its Chairman.
SECTION 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the
President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve
Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis
of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The
Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The
Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session
days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a
majority vote of all the Members.
SECTION 19. The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on Appointments shall
be constituted within thirty days after the Senate and the House of
Representatives shall have been organized with the election of the President
and the Speaker. The Commission on Appointments shall meet only while the
Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its Members,
to discharge such powers and functions as are herein conferred upon it.
SECTION 20. The records and books of accounts of the Congress shall be
preserved and be open to the public in accordance with law, and such books
shall be audited by the Commission on Audit which shall publish annually an
itemized list of amounts paid to and expenses incurred for each Member.
SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its
duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected
by such inquiries shall be respected.
SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the
consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of
each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any
matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to
the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at
least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not
be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When
the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so
states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.
SECTION 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint
session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the
existence of a state of war.
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law,
authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it
may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the
Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
SECTION 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of
the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments.
SECTION 25. (1) The Congress may not increase the appropriations
recommended by the President for the operation of the Government as
specified in the budget. The form, content, and manner of preparation of the
budget shall be prescribed by law.
(2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations
bill unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any
such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation
to which it relates.
(3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly
follow the procedure for approving appropriations for other departments and
agencies.
(4) A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended,
and shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by the National
Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue proposed therein.
(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however,
the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in
the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other
items of their respective appropriations.
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(6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed
only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject
to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law.
(7) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the
general appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general
appropriations law for the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed reenacted
and shall remain in force and effect until the general appropriations bill is
passed by the Congress.
SECTION 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three
readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have
been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public
calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto
shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter,
and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
SECTION 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law,
be presented to the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it;
otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House
where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and
proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the
Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with
the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered,
and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become
a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas
or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered
in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House
where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise,
it shall become a law as if he had signed it.
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or
items to which he does not object.
SECTION 28. (1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The
Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified
limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff
rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties
or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the
Government.
(3) Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant
thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and
improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable,
or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.
(4) No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence
of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
SECTION 29. (1) No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance
of an appropriation made by law.
(2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or
employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect,
church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest,
preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when
such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or
to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated
as a special fund and paid out for such purpose only. If the purpose for which
a special fund was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if
any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government.
SECTION 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and
concurrence.
SECTION 31. No law granting a title of royalty or nobility shall be enacted.
SECTION 32. The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of
initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people
can directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part
thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the registration
of a petition therefor signed by at least ten per centum of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at
least three per centum of the registered voters thereof.
CASES
1. MAGALLONA VS. SWIFT
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DOCTRINE:
The fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are subject to both passages
does not place them in lesser footing vis a vis continental coastal states.
Moreover, the Right of Innocent Passage is a customary international law, no
modern state can invoke its sovereignty to forbid such passage.
FACTS:
● This original action for writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 95221 (RA 9522) adjusting the
country’s archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of
nearby territories.
● RA 9522 amended RA 3046 (which followed UNCLOS I). The change
was to make RA 3046 compliant with UNCLOS III.
○ UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour
of baselines of archipelagic States like the Philippines.
● Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal
grounds, namely:
2.
○ RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the
reach of the Philippine state’s sovereign power, in violation of
Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution.
○ RA 9522 opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines
to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining
Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the
country’s nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine
resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions.
● Petitioners theorize that this constitutional definition trumps any treaty
or statutory provision denying the Philippines sovereign control over
waters beyond the territorial sea, recognized at the time of the Treaty
of Paris.
ISSUES
1. WoN RA 9522 is unconstitutional for reducing the state’s sovereign
power over its territorial waters.
2. WoN RA 9522 is incompatible with the constitution in terms of
delineation of internal waters.
RATIO
1. No. RA 9522 is constitutional. Petition dismissed.
UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It
is a multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over
maritime zones.
Baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III
States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones
and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the
international community of the scope of the maritime space and
submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights
UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition,
enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution of territory. Under
traditional international law typology, States acquire (or conversely,
lose) territory through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription,
not by executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights
or enacting statutes to comply with the treaty’s terms to delimit
maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land
features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the rules
on general international law.
No. Whether referred to as Philippine "internal waters" under Article I of
the Constitution or as "archipelagic waters" under UNCLOS III (Article 49
[1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying
landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the
submarine areas underneath. UNCLOS III states:
Article 49. Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space
over archipelagic waters and of their bed and subsoil. –
1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the
waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines drawn in
accordance with article 47, described as archipelagic waters,
regardless of their depth or distance from the coast.
2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the
archipelagic waters, as well as to their bed and subsoil, and
the resources contained therein.
xxxx
4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage established in
this Part shall not in other respects affect the status of the
archipelagic waters, including the sea lanes, or the exercise by
the archipelagic State of its sovereignty over such waters and
their air space, bed and subsoil, and the resources contained
therein. (Emphasis supplied)
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Significantly, the right of innocent passage is a customary international
law, thus automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law. No
modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid
innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary
international law without risking retaliatory measures from the
international community.
2. ARIGO VS. SWIFT
DOCTRINE:
A foreign-owned vessel may pass through territorial waters when it is
performing a governmental function. Under the UNCLOS, however, warships
enjoy a right of innocent passage when a portion of the territorial water of
the coastal state is used for international navigation.
2.
FACTS:
• USS Guardian of the US Navy requested for diplomatic clearance of the
vessel to enter exit territorial waters of the Philippines for replenishment
on its way to Indonesia. However, while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship
ran aground the Tubataha Reef
• U.S. 7th Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Scott Swift expressed his regret
on the unfortunate incident. Afterwards, the US Navy-led team finished
the salvage operations on the grounded ship
• Petitioners on their behalf and in representation of their respective
sector/organization and others, including minors or generations yet
unborn, filed the present petition against Swift in his capacity as
Commander of the US 7th Fleet et. al (US Respondents) and Pres.
Aquino III in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the AFP et. al
(Philippine Respondents)
• Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging
operations of the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause
environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect different
provinces, which events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced
and healthful ecology. Petitioners seek, among others, and issuance of
a Temporary Environment Protection Order (TEPO) against the salvage
efforts being conducted by Respondents.
• In its comment, respndents assert that: ( 1) the grounds relied upon for
the issuance of a TEPO or writ of Kalikasan have become fait accompli
as the salvage operations on the USS Guardian were already
completed; (2) the petition is defective in form and substance; (3) the
petition improperly raises issues involving the VFA between the Republic
of the Philippines and the United States of America; and ( 4) the
determination of the extent of responsibility of the US Government as
regards the damage to the Tubbataha Reefs rests exclusively with the
executive branch
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON petitioner has legal standing to institute the instant petition
a.Yes. In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., it was
recognized that the "public right" of citizens to "a balanced
and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our
constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law."
b. On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners
minors in Oposa, this Court ruled that not only do ordinary
citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of
environmental rights, they can do so in representation of their
own and future generations.
c. The liberalization of standing first enunciated in Oposa, insofar
as it refers to minors and generations yet unborn, is now
enshrined in the Rules which allows the filing of a citizen suit in
environmental cases.
WON the US respondents may be sued for the damage caused
a. Yes. US respondents were sued in their official capacity as
commanding officers of the US Navy who had control and
supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged
act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the
USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they were
performing official military duties. Considering that the
satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require
remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US
government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself.
The principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of
jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift,
Rice and Robling.
b. During the deliberations, SAJ Carpio took the position that the
conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a
restricted area in violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused
damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within
the ambit of Article 31 of the UNCLOS. He explained that while
historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit
as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates
an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with
the rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding
passage through the latter’s internal waters and the territorial
sea.
c. In the case of warships, as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they
continue to enjoy sovereign immunity subject to the following
exceptions:
d. Article 30: Non-compliance by warships with the laws and
regulations of the coastal State
e. If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations
of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial
sea and disregards any request for compliance therewith
which is made to it, the coastal State may require it to leave
the territorial sea immediately.
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f. Article 31: Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused
by a warship or other government ship operated for non-
commercial purposes
g. The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss
or damage to the coastal State resulting from the non-
compliance by a warship or other government ship operated
for non-commercial purposes with the laws and regulations of
the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial
sea or with the provisions of this Convention or other rules of
international law.
h. Article 32: Immunities of warships and other government ships
operated for non-commercial purposes
i. With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and
in articles 30 and 31, nothing in this Convention affects the
immunities of warships and other government ships operated
for non-commercial purposes. A foreign warship’s
unauthorized entry into our internal waters with resulting
damage to marine resources is one situation in which the
above provisions may apply.
j. Non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the US will
disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its
internal waters and territorial sea. We thus expect the US to
bear “international responsibility” under Art. 31 in connection
with the USS Guardian grounding which adversely affected the
Tubbataha reefs.
k. In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present
controversy is beyond dispute. Although the said treaty
upholds the immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of
Coastal States while navigating the latter’s territorial sea, the
flag States shall be required to leave the territorial sea
immediately if they flout the laws and regulations of the Coastal
State, and they will be liable for damages caused by their
warships or any other government vessel operated for non-
commercial purposes under Article 31.
3. WON the waiver of state immunity provided under the VFA applies to
the instant case.
a. No. The waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only
to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as
the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact,
it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a
criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an
environmental law is to be filed separately.
b. The Court considered a view that a ruling on the application
or non-application of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA
to US personnel who may be found responsible for the
grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and
beyond the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan.
c. The Court also found it unnecessary at this point to determine
whether such waiver of State immunity is indeed absolute. In
the same vein, it cannot grant damages which have resulted
from the violation of environmental laws.
d. The Rules allows the recovery of damages, including the
collection of administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a
separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal
action charging the same violation of an environmental law.
3. USA VS. HON RUIZ
Facts:
This is a petition to review, set aside certain orders and restrain perpetually the
proceedings done by Hon. Ruiz for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial
court.
The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base
was one of those provided in the Military Bases Agreement between the
Philippines and the United States. Sometime in May, 1972, the United States
invited the submission of bids for a couple of repair projects. Eligio de Guzman
land Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequent
thereto, the company received from the US two telegrams requesting it to
confirm its price proposals and for the name of its bonding company. The
company construed this as an acceptance of its offer so they complied with
the requests. The company received a letter which was signed by William I.
Collins of Department of the Navy of the United States, also one of the
petitioners herein informing that the company did not qualify to receive an
award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance
rating in repairs, and that the projects were awarded to third parties. For this
reason, a suit for specific performance was filed by him against the US.
Issues:
Whether or not the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise
governmental functions to be able to invoke state immunity.
Discussions:
The traditional role of the state immunity exempts a state from being sued in the
courts of another state without its consent or waiver. This rule is necessary
consequence of the principle of independence and equality of states.
However, the rules of international law are not petrified; they are continually
and evolving and because the activities of states have multiplied. It has been
necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts (jure
imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result
is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperil. The restrictive
application of State immunity is now the rule in the United States, the United
Kingdom and other states in western Europe.
 POLIR EV MT POINT ERS (G01) A TT Y. LOA N ZON , 1ST SEM 2019- 2020
Rulings:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the contract relates to the exercise of its
sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral part of the naval
base which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and the
Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the highest order, they
are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.
The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the
proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign. Its
commercial activities of economic affairs. A state may be descended to the
level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent
to be sued. Only when it enters into business contracts.
4. REPUBLIC VS. HON. HIDALGO
DOCTRINE:
Due process, in its procedural aspect, guarantees in the minimum the opportunity
to be heard. Grave abuse of discretion, however, cannot plausibly be laid at the
doorstep of the respondent judge on account of his having issued the default order
against the petitioner, then proceeding with the hearing and eventually rendering a
default judgment.
The term “grave abuse of discretion,” in its juridical sense, connotes capricious,
despotic, oppressive or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse must be of such degree as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the
power is exercised in a capricious manner. The word “capricious,” usually used in
tandem with “arbitrary,” conveys the notion of willful and unreasoning action.
Facts:
1. Tarcila Laperal Mendoza filed an action for the annulment or
declaration of nullity of the title and deed of sale, reconveyance
and/or recovery of ownership and possession a property against the
Republic of the Philippines in the RTC of Manila.
2. Mendoza averred that since time immemorial, she and her
predecessros-in- interest had been in peaceful and adverse
possession of the property. Such possession continued until the first
week of July 1975 when a group of armed men representing
themselves to be members of the Presidential Security Group of Pres.
Marcos forcibly entered her residence and ordered her to turn over
the TCT and for her and her family members to vacate the same.
Mendoza complied out of fear of their lives.
3. Mendoza is now arguing that the deed of sale was fictitious as she
never executed a deed of conveyance. She prayed for the Republic
to pay her a reasonable compensation for the use of the property, as
well as other costs. She valued the property at P2,388,990.00 and a
reasonable compensation or rental use of P6 Million a year.
4. After declaration of Republic in default, and her presentation of
evidence ex- parte, the RTC rendered a judgment by default in favor
of Mendoza, awarding just compensation for the property amounting
to P143,600,000.00, as well as a reasonable rental of P 1.48 Billion, with
the total amounting to almost 2 Billion pesos.
5. Upon denial of Republic’s motion for new trial, this petition for
certiorari was filed by Republic. Republic was urging the Court to strike
down the order of default, and the judgment that followed. Republic
argued that the respondent judge was in grave abuse of discretion
when he proceeded to hear the case and eventually awarded such
a staggering amount without giving the opportunity to Republic to
present its defense.
6. The Republic also impugned the denial of respondent Judge of its
motion for new trial and notice of appeal, and the issuance of a writ
of execution against the Republic as grave abuse of discretion.
Issue/s:
W/N the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the subject Orders
W/N it was correct to grant the reliefs prayed for by Mendoza
Held:
1. The judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion.
a. First, the Order of Default and Judgment by Default was
correctly issued. The petitioner may have been deprived of
hearing, but this does not mean the right to due process was
violated, as it was deemed to have waived his right to be
heard or to take part in the trial.
b. Second, the notice of appeal was correctly denied as it was
already filed out of time. It received the Order denying the
Motion for New Trial on October 9, 2003 so they only had 1
day to filed a Notice of Appeal. However, instead of filing an
appeal, it filed a motion for reconsideration on November
25 which was later found to be a pro- forma motion. Hence,
the filing of their Notice of Appeal on Novermber 27 was
already too late.
2. The court was correct in granting the relief prayed for by Mendoza.
a. The evidence received supports this conclusion that the
property in question was wrested from Mendoza’s possession
without any legal justification. Although such restoration of
the property to Mendoza is not convenient as the Office of
the President currently uses the property for residence and
office purposes, it is still legally and physically feasible.
 POLIR EV MT POINT ERS (G01) A TT Y. LOA N ZON , 1ST SEM 2019- 2020
b. The Court, however, cannot stop with just restoring Mendoza
to her possession and ownership of her property. The
restoration ought to be complemented by some form of
monetary compensation for having been unjustly deprived
of the beneficial use thereof.
3. The court, however, abused its discretion in awarding an amount
higher than what was prayed for.
a. The amounts and level should not be varying as fixed in the
decision of the trial court and set to be executed by the
equally assailed writ of execution. The monetary award set
forth is erroneous. And the error relates to basic
fundamentals of law as to constitute grave abuse of
discretion.
b. Rule 9, Section 3(d) defines the extent of the relief that
may be awarded in a judgment by default, i.e., only so
much as has been alleged and proved. The court acts
in excess of jurisdiction if it awards an amount beyond
the claim made in the complaint or beyond that proved
by the evidence, which is what respondent Judge in this
case did by awarding an amount higher than what was
prayed for.
c. Given these, an award of P20,000.00 a month for the use and
occupancy of the Arlegui property, while perhaps a little bit
arbitrary, is reasonable and may be granted pro hac vice
considering the following: (1) the property is relatively small in
terms of actual area and had an assessed value of only
P2,388,900.00; (2)The Arlegui property had minimal rental
value during the relatively long martial law years, given the
very restrictive entry and egress conditions prevailing at the
vicinity at that time and even after.
d. Also, the assailed trial courts issuance of the writ of execution
against government funds to satisfy its money judgment is
also nullified. It is basic that government funds and properties
may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to
satisfy such judgments. Republic v. Palacio teaches that a
judgment against the State generally operates merely to
liquidate and establish the plaintiffs claim in the absence of
express provision; otherwise, they can not be enforced by
processes of law.
5. ARNAULT VS. NAZARENO
Facts:
• The Senate investigated the purchase by the government of two
parcels of land, known as Buenavista and Tambobong estates. An
intriguing question that the Senate sought to resolve was the apparent
irregularity of the government’s payment to one Ernest Burt, a non-
resident American citizen, of the total sum of Php1.5 million for his
alleged interest in the two estates that only amounted to Php20,000.00,
which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before. The Senate
sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited
from the transaction at the expense of the government.
• Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of Ernest Burt in the
subject transactions, was one of the witnesses summoned by the
Senate to its hearings. In the course of the investigation, the petitioner
repeatedly refused to divulge the name of the person to whom he
gave the amount of Php440,000.00, which he withdrew from the
Php1.5 million proceeds pertaining to Ernest Burt
• Arnault was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate and was
committed to the custody of the Senate Sergeant-at- Arms for
imprisonment until he answers the questions. He thereafter filed a
petition for habeas corpus directly with the Supreme Court
questioning the validity of his detention.
Issue:
WON the Senate have the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for
refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the
Php440,000.00
WON the Senate have the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a
term beyond its period of legislative session
WON the petitioner may rightfully invoke his right against self-
incrimination
RULING:
1. YES. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of
a legislative body to make, the investigating committee has the power to
require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject of
course to his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be
within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be material or
necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to
legislate, or to expel a Member; and every question which the investigator is
empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to the
subject of the inquiry or investigation. The materiality of the question must be
determined by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by its
indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The reason is, that the
necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and the form and
character of the action itself are determined by the sum total of the
information to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a
fraction of such information elicited from a single question.
 POLIR EV MT POINT ERS (G01) A TT Y. LOA N ZON , 1ST SEM 2019- 2020

2. NO. Senate is a continuing body and which does not cease to exist upon the
periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the House of Representatives. There
is no limit as to time to the Senate’s power to punish for contempt in cases where
that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case. Senate will
not be disposed to exert the power beyond its proper bounds, i.e. abuse their
power and keep the witness in prison for life. If proper limitations are
disregarded, Court isalways open to those whose rights might thus be
transgressed.

3. NO. Court is satisfied that those answers of the witness to the important
question, which is the name of that person to whom witness gave the P440,000,
were obviously false. His insistent claim before the bar of the Senate that if he
should reveal the name he would incriminate himself, necessarily implied that
he knew the name. Moreover, it is unbelievable that he gave P440,000 to a
person to him unknown. “Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is
equivalent to a refusal to testify and is punishable as contempt, assuming that
a refusal to testify would be so punishable.” Since according to the witness
himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the P440,000 to a
representative of Burt in compliance with the latter’s verbal instruction, Court
found no basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that
person might incriminate him.
 POLIR EV MT POINT ERS (G01) A TT Y. LOA N ZON , 1ST SEM 2019- 2020
6. BALAG VS. SENATE
DOCTRINE:
The interests of the Senate and the witnesses appearing in its legislative inquiry
are balanced. The Senate can continuously and effectively exercise its power
of contempt during the legislative inquiry against recalcitrant witnesses, even
during recess. Such power can be exercised by the Senate immediately when
the witness performs a contemptuous act, subject to its own rules and the
constitutional rights of the said witness. However, the Senate will be prevented
from effectively conducting legislative hearings during recess - shall be duly
addressed because it is expressly provided herein that the Senate may still
exercise its power of contempt during legislative hearings while on recess
provided that the period of imprisonment shall only last until the termination of
the legislative inquiry, specifically, upon the approval or disapproval of the
Committee Report. Thus, the Senate's inherent power of contempt is still potent
and compelling even during its recess. At the same time, the rights of the persons
appearing are respected because their detention shall not be indefinite.
FACTS:
• This is a case of petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer of an
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
seeking to annul, set aside and enjoin implementation of the Senate P.S.
Resolution No. 504 and October 18, 2017 Order of Complaint by the Senate
Committee on Public Order and Dangerous Drugs filed by Arvin R. Balag
(petitioner) against the Senate of the Philippines, et. al. (respondent).
• On September 17, 2017, a first-year law student from the University of Santo
Tomas named Horacio Castillo III, died due to hazing-related activities
conducted by the Aegis Juris Fraternity.
• On September 20, 2017, the senate released Senate Resolution No. 504
entitled “a Resolution Directing the Appropriate Senate Committees to
Conduct an Inquiry, In Aid of Legislation, into the Recent Death of Horacio
Castillo III Allegedly due to Hazing-Related Activities” filed by Sen. Paolo
Benigno Aquino IV.
• On the same day, the Senate Committee on Public Order and Dangerous
Drugs chaired by Senator Panfilo Lacson (Senator Lacson) together with the
Committees on Justice and Human Rights and Constitutional Amendment
and Revision of Codes, invited petitioner and several other persons to the
Joint Public Hearing but petitioner did not attend.
• I Spouses Carmina T. Castillo and Horacio M. Castillo, Jr., parents of Horacio
III, filed a Criminal Complaint for Murder and violation of Section 4 of Republic
Act No. 8049, before DOJ against several members of the AJ Fraternity,
including petitioner.
• Senator Lacson as Chairman of Senate Committee on Public Order and
Dangerous Drugs, and as approved by Senate President Aquilino Pimentel III,
issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum addressed to petitioner directing him to
appear before the committee and to testify as to the subject matter under
inquiry.
• When the petitioner attended the hearing dated on October 18, 2017, Sen.
Grace Poe asked the petitioner if he was the president of Aegis Juris Fraternity
however, the petitioner refused to answer and invoked his right to self-
incrimination. Sen. Panfilo Lacson reminded that it was just a “simple question”
to invoke self-incrimination and warned the petitioner that he may be cited
in contempt, but the petitioner still refused to answer.
• According to Sen. Grace Poe, the petitioner’s signature appeared on the
document for the application of the Aegis Juris Fraternity in the organizational
sheet submitted in the school administration and it was indicated therein that
the petitioner was the President, yet he still refuses to answer the simple
question asked.
• The petitioner was then cited in contempt and was ordered to place in
detention under the Senate Sergeant at Arms’ supervision after the senate
hearing. Sen. Panfilo Lacson gave the petitioner a chance to purge out of
contempt, however, the petitioner still refused to answer and invoked his right
to self-incrimination.
• When the petitioner was asked of the question of whose decision it was to
bring the victim to the hospital, the petitioner submitted a plea to lift his
contempt and stated that he was a member of the Aegis Juris Fraternity,
however, he does not know who the president was because he was enrolled
at another university at the time of the incident. Contempt remained and he
was placed under custody of the Senate Sergeant-at-arms.
• Petitioner argues that the legislative inquiry conducted by respondent
committees was not in aid of legislation; rather, it was in aid of prosecution.
He posits that the purpose of SR No. 504 was to hold accountable those
responsible for the senseless act of killing Horacio III, and not to aid legislation.
He says that the transcripts during the committee hearing were used to
prosecute him thus, a violation of his right to due process and would pre-empt
the findings of the DOJ with respect to the criminal complaint filed against
him.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. In the exercise of its power to investigate in aid of legislation, can
Congress cite a person in contempt and detain him indefinitely?
NO. The court denied the petition for being moot and academic. In the present
case, the Court finds that there is no more justiciable controversy to be decided
up since in its resolution dated December 12, 2017, the Court ordered in the
interim the immediate release of petitioner pending resolution of the instant
petition. Thus, petitioner was no longer detained under the Senate's authority.
The Court finds that the period of imprisonment under the inherent power of
contempt by the Senate during inquiries in aid of legislation should only last until
the termination of the legislative inquiry under which the said power is invoked
 POLIR EV MT POINT ERS (G01) A TT Y. LOA N ZON , 1ST SEM 2019- 2020
or when Congress adjourns sine die. If Congress decides to extend the period
of imprisonment for the contempt committed by a witness beyond the duration
of the legislative inquiry or after it has already adjourned, then it may file a
criminal case under the existing statute or enact a new law to increase the
definite period of imprisonment. Further, the Court rules that the legislative
inquiry of the Senate terminates on two instances:
First, upon the approval or disapproval of the Committee Report. Evidently, the
Committee Report is the culmination of the legislative inquiry. Its approval or
disapproval signifies the end of such legislative inquiry and it is now up to the
Senate whether or not to act upon the said Committee Report in the
succeeding order of business. At that point, the power of contempt
simultaneously ceases and the detained witness should be released. As the
legislative inquiry ends, the basis for the detention of the recalcitrant witness
likewise ends.
Second, the legislative inquiry of the Senate also terminates upon the expiration
of one (1) Congress. As stated in Neri, all pending matters and proceedings,
such as unpassed bills and even legislative investigations, of the Senate are
considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and it is merely
optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished
matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for the first time. Again, while
the Senate is a continuing institution, its proceedings are terminated upon the
expiration of that Congress at the final adjournment of its last session. Hence, as
the legislative inquiry ends upon that expiration, the imprisonment of the
detained witnesses likewise ends.
RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for being moot and academic.
However, the period of imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt of
the Senate during inquiries in aid of legislation should only last until the
termination of the legislative inquiry.
7. KNIGHTS OF RIZAL VS. DMCI
DOCTRINE: The Venice Charter is merely a codification of guiding principles
for the preservation and restoration of ancient monuments, sites, and
buildings. It brings together principles in the field of historical conservation
and restoration that have been developed, agreed upon, and laid down by
experts over the years. Each country, however, remains “responsible for
applying the plan within the framework of its own culture and traditions.” The
Venice Charter is not a treaty and therefore does not become enforceable
as law. The Philippines is not legally bound to follow its directive, as in fact,
these are not directives but mere guidelines- a set of the best practices and
techniques that have been proven over the years to be the most effective
in preserving and restoring historical monuments, sites and buildings.
FACTS:
• DMCI acquired a 7,716 sq.m. lot in Manila located near Taft Avenue,
Ermita. The lost was earmarked for the construction of Torre de Manila
condo project.
• DMCI secured its Brgy Clearance and Zoning Permit from the City of
Manila and was allowed to build a 49-storey condo.
• City Council of Manila issued Resolution No. 121 enjoining the Office of
the Building Official to temporarily suspend the Building Permit of DMCI
stating that it will rise up high above the back of the national
monument and will ruin the sight of the Rizal Shrine from the frontal
Roxas Boulevard vantage point.
• City of Manila and DMCI sought the opinion of National Historical
Commission of the Philippines (NHCP). Dr. Diokno, Executive Director
thereof, maintained that the Torre de Manila project site is outside the
boundaries of the Rizal Park and well to the rear of the Rizal Monument.
• The Manila Zoning Board of Adjustments and Appeals (MZBAA) issued
a Resolution that the Torre de Manila project exceeds the prescribed
maximum percentage of land occupancy and floor area ratio as
prescribed in City Ordinance No. 8119.
• The Knights of Rizal, civic, cultural, nonprofit organization, filed a Petition
for Injunction seeking a temporary restraining order and later a
permanent injunction.
o Suit is of transcendental importance, paramount public
interest, of overarching significance to society – overshadow
monument whether up close or viewed from a distance
o Rizal Monument is a national treasure and entitled to full
protection and the national government must abate the act
or activity that endangers the nation’s culture heritage
o The project violates NHCP’s Guidelines on Monuments
Honoring National Heroes which state that historic monuments
should assert visual dominance over its surroundings
o Violates country’s commitment under the International
Charter for the Conservation and Restoration of Monuments
and Sites (Venice Charter)
ISSUE/RATIO:
1. WON the petition for mandamus to permanently enjoin the construction of
Torre De Manila should be granted – NO
• Section 15, Article XIV of the Constitution, which deals with the subject
of arts and culture, provides that “[t]he State shall conserve, promote
and popularize the nation’s historical and cultural heritage and
resources x x x.”
o Since this provision is not self-executory, Congress passed laws
dealing with the preservation and conservation of our cultural
heritage. One such law is Republic Act No. 10066, or the
National Cultural Heritage Act of 2009, which empowers the
National Commission for Culture and the Arts and other
cultural agencies to issue a cease and desist order “when the
physical integrity of the national cultural treasures or important
 POLIR EV MT POINT ERS (G01) A TT Y. LOA N ZON , 1ST SEM 2019- 2020
cultural properties [is] found to be in danger of destruction or
significant alteration from its original state.”
o Physical integrity refers to the structure itself — how strong and
sound the structure is.
o The same law does not mention that another project, building,
or property, not itself a heritage property or building, may be
the subject of a cease and desist order when it adversely
affects the background view, vista, or sight line of a heritage
property or building. Thus, Republic Act No. 10066 cannot
apply to the Torre de Manila condominium project.
Ordinance No. 8119 not applicable to case at bar
• In the present case, nowhere is it found in Ordinance No. 8119 or in any
law, ordinance, or rule for that matter, that the construction of a
building outside the Rizal Park is prohibited if the building is within the
background sight line or view of the Rizal Monument.
• Thus, there is no legal duty on the part of the City of Manila “to consider
the standards set under Ordinance No. 8119” in relation to the
applications of DMCI-PDI for the Torre de Manila since under the
ordinance these standards can never be applied outside the
boundaries of Rizal Park.
• While the Rizal Park has been declared a National Historical Site, the
area where Torre de Manila is being built is a privately- owned property
that is “not part of the Rizal Park that has been declared as a National
Heritage Site in 1995,” and the Torre de Manila area is in fact “well-
beyond” the Rizal Park.
• Neither has the area of the Torre de Manila been designated as a
“heritage zone, a cultural property, a historical landmark or even a
national treasure.”
No grave abuse of discretion on the part of the City of Manila
• (See doctrine) The Venice Charter is merely a codification of guiding
principles for the preservation and restoration of ancient monuments,
sites, and buildings.
• The Venice Charter is not a treaty and therefore does not become
enforceable as law. The Philippines is not legally bound to follow its
directive, as in fact, these are not directives but mere guidelines
• The City of Manila concedes that DMCI-PDI’s Zoning Permit was
granted without going through the process under Ordinance No. 8119.
However, the same was properly rectified when, faced with mounting
opposition, DMCI-PDI itself sought clarification from the City of Manila
and immediately began complying with the procedure for applying for
a variance.
• The MZBAA did subsequently recommend the approval of the variance
and the City Council of Manila approved the same, ratifying the
licenses and permits already given to DMCI-PDI. Such ratification was
well within the right of the City Council of Manila.
RULING: As there was no GADALEJ on the part of the City of Manila in
granting the permits and allowing the construction of Torre De Manila, the
petition for mandamus is dismissed.
8. MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS
• The Filipino First Policy 2 enshrined in the 1987 Constitution is invoked by
Manila Prince in its bid to acquire 51% of the shares of the MHC, which owns
the historic Manila Hotel.Opposing, respondents maintain that the provision
is not self- executing but requires an implementing legislation for its
enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether the 51% shares form part of the
national economy and patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the
Constitution.
• The controversy arose when GSIS, pursuant to the privatization program of
the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50, decided to sell
through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of
MHC.
• The winning bidder, or the eventual “strategic partner,” is to provide
management expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation
system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and
performance of the Manila Hotel.
• In a close bidding, only 2 bidders participated: Manila Prince, a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15.3M shares at P41.58
per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its
hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per
share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
• Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning
bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts,
Manila Prince, in a letter to GSIS, matched the bid price of P44.00 per share
tendered by Renong Berhad.
• In a subsequent letter, Manila Prince sent a manager’s check issued by
Philtrust Bank for P33M as Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian
Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad x x x x which GSIS refused to accept.
• Perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the
matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by
GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, Manila Prince came to this
Court on prohibition and mandamus.
• The Court issued a TRO enjoining respondents from perfecting and
consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.
• The Court En Banc accepted the instant case after it was referred to it by
the First Division. The case was then set for oral arguments with former Chief
Justice Enrique M. Fernando and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as amici curiae.
• Petitioner’ Arguments:
• Invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and
submits that the
• Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has
practically become a historical monument which reflects the
 POLIR EV MT POINT ERS (G01) A TT Y. LOA N ZON , 1ST SEM 2019- 2020
vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture Therefore, it has become
a part of the national patrimony.
• Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries
with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by
GSIS, a GOCC, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part
of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national
economy.
• Manila Prince should be preferred after it has matched the
bid offer of the Malaysian firm.
• Respondents except. They maintain that:
• Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a
statement of principle and policy since itis not a self-executing
provision and requires implementing legislation(s).
• Granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not
fall under the term national patrimony. According to respondents,
while Manila Prince speaks of the guests who have slept in the hotel
and the events that have transpired therein which make the hotel
historic, these alone do not make the hotel fall under the patrimony
of the nation.
• Granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony,
the constitutional provision invoked is still inapplicable since what is
being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation,
not the hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands.
• The submission by Manila Prince of a matching bid is premature.
ISSUE:
WON Art. 12, sec. 10, par. 2, mandating the State to give preference to
qualified Filipinos is self-executing – YES
WON the Manila Hotel is part of national patrimony, and therefore, the
“Filipino First Policy” must be applied – YES
Art. XII, Sec. 10 , par. 2 is self-executing.
• Respondents argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second
par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the
same section, which
undoubtedly are not self-executing. The argument is flawed.
• A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-
executing in another. Sec. 10, 1st and 3rd paragraphs are not self-executing
but it does not follow that the 2nd par. also is.
• Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement.
•From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. Manila Hotel is part of our national
patrimony [Most imp’t.]
• As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commissionexplains: The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved
and developed refers not only to our rich natural resources but also to the
cultural heritage of our race. It also refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences
and letters. Therefore, we should develop not only our lands, forests, mines and
other natural resources but also the mental ability or faculty of our people.
• In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage.
When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the
natural resources of the Philippines, but also to the cultural heritage of the
Filipinos.
O Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of
various significant events, which have shaped Philippine history. It was called
the Cultural Center of the 1930’s.
O Dubbed as the Official Guest House of the Philippine Government, it plays
host to dignitaries and official visitors who are accorded the traditional
Philippine hospitality.
During World War II, the hotel was converted by the Japanese Military
Administration into a military headquarters.
O When the American forces returned to recapture Manila the hotel was
selected by the Japanese together with Intramuros as the two (2) places for
their final stand. Thereafter, in the 1950’s and 1960’s, the hotel became the
center of political activities, playing host to almost every political convention.
O In 1970 the hotel reopened after a renovation and reaped numerous
international recognitions, an acknowledgment of the Filipino talent and
ingenuity.
O In 1986 the hotel was the site of a failed coup d’ etat where an aspirant for
vice- president was “proclaimed” President of the Philippine Republic.
• For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the
triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is
impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle
for sovereignty, independence and nationhood.
The Filipino First Policy is applicable
• Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and
patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview
of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock,
so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and
management of the hotel.
• The term qualified Filipinos as used in our Constitution also includes
corporations at least 60% of which is owned by Filipinos
• Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the “Pro-Filipino” bias in all
economic concerns. It is better known as the FILIPINO FIRST Policy x x x x This
provision was never found in previous Constitutions x x x x
 POLIR EV MT POINT ERS (G01) A TT Y. LOA N ZON , 1ST SEM 2019- 2020
• The term “qualified Filipinos” simply means that preference shall be given to
those citizens who can make a viable contribution to the common good,
because of credible competence and efficiency.
• It certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and preferential treatment
to Filipino citizens or organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since
such an indiscriminate preference would be counterproductive and inimical
to the common good.
• In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a
choice has to be made between a “qualified foreigner” and a “qualified
Filipino,” the latter shall be chosen over the former.”
• Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so considered
by respondent GSIS and selected as one of the qualified bidders. It was pre-
qualified by respondent GSIS in accordance with its own guidelines so that the
sole inference here is that petitioner has been found to be possessed of
proven management expertise in the hotel industry, or it has significant equity
ownership in another hotel company, or it has an overall management and
marketing proficiency to successfully operate the Manila Hotel.
• Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award
the block of shares immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its
submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive
of a stronger reason than the constitutional injunction itself.
• In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public
bidding
concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino,
there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid
of the foreign entity.
• And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to
the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First
Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution.
• This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may
discourage foreign investors. But the Constitution and laws of the Philippines
are understood to be always open to public scrutiny.
• These are given factors, which investors must consider when venturing into
business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do business
in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to
know his rights and obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the
forum.
. The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any
commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization.
• The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied in
the 1987 Constitution not merely to be used as a guideline for future legislation
but primarily to be enforced; so must it be enforced.
• This Court as the ultimate guardian of the Constitution will never shun, under
any reasonable circumstance, the duty of upholding the majesty of the
Constitution, which it is tasked to defend.
• It is worth emphasizing that it is not the intention of this Court to impede and
diminish, much less undermine, the influx of foreign investments. Far from it, the
Court encourages and welcomes more business opportunities but avowedly
sanctions the preference for Filipinos whenever such preference is ordained
by the Constitution.
• Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its business viability
and preventing further losses, regardless of the character of the asset, should
not take precedence over non- material values.
• A commercial, nay even a budgetary, objective should not be pursued at
the expense of national pride and dignity. For the Constitution enshrines higher
and nobler non- material values.
• Nationalism is inherent in the very concept of the Philippines being a
democratic and republican state, with sovereignty residing in the Filipino
people and from whom all government authority emanates.
• We are talking about a hotel where heads of states would prefer to be
housed as a strong manifestation of their desire to cloak the dignity of the
highest state function to their official visits to the Philippines.
• Thus the Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant role as
an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history and culture. In
this sense, it has become truly a reflection of the Filipino soul - a place with a
history of grandeur; a most historical setting that has played a part in the
shaping of a country.
9. DEMETRIA VS. ALBA
DOCTRINE:
Strict adherence to the constitutional process by which an appropriations
act must be passed; the executive branch cannot interfere with the
prerogative of the legislative branch.
FACTS:
 POLIR EV MT POINT ERS (G01) A TT Y. LOA N ZON , 1ST SEM 2019- 2020
• Petitioners, who filed the instant petition as concerned citizens of this
country, as members of the National Assembly/Batasan Pambansa,
are assailing the constitutionality of Sec. 44 of PD 1177 or the Budget
Reform Decree of 1977
• They contend that Sec. 44 of PD 1177 infringes upon the Fundamental
Law by authorizing illegal transfer of public moneys
• Petitioners also argue that Sec. 44 of the said decree allowed the
president to override the safeguards, form, and procedure prescribed
by the constitution in approving appropriations. Further, it amounts to
an under delegation of legislative powers to the executive.
• Sec. 44 of PD 1177 provides: The President shall have the authority to
transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus,
offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included
in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity
of any department, bureau, or office included in the General
Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.
•
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
4. WON Sec. 44 of PD 1177 should be declared unconstitutional – Yes.
a. Art. VIII, Sec. 16(5) of the Constitution provides: No law shall be
passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the
President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions may
by law be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other
items of their respective appropriations.
b. The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another
was explicit and categorical under the 1973 Constitution. However,
to afford the heads of the different branches of the government
and those of the constitutional commissions considerable flexibility
in the use of public funds and resources, the constitution allowed
the enactment of a law authorizing the transfer of funds for the
purpose of augmenting an item from savings in another item in the
appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body
concerned. The leeway granted was thus limited. The purpose and
conditions for which funds may be transferred were specified, i.e.
transfer may be allowed for the purpose of augmenting an item and
such transfer may be made only if there are savings from another
item in the appropriation of the government branch or
constitutional body.
c. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over extends the
privilege granted under said Section 16[5]. It empowers the
President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department,
bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any
program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office
included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its
enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be
transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are
to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of
augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does
not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental
law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative
powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such
constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and
void.
d. Where the legislature or the executive branch is acting within the
limits of its authority, the judiciary cannot and ought not to interfere
with the former. But where the legislature or the executive acts
beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty
of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the
government had assumed to do as void.
RULING: Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 is hereby
declared null and void for being unconstitutional.
10. ARAULLO VS. AQUINO
FACTS:
- On September 25, 2013, Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada delivered a
privilege speech in the Senate of the Philippines to reveal that some Senators,
including himself, had been allotted an additional P50 Million each as
"incentive" for voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief Justice Renato C.
Corona.
- Responding to Sen. Estrada’s revelation, Secretary Florencio Abad of
the DBM issued a public statement entitled Abad: Releases to Senators Part of
Spending Acceleration Program, explaining that the funds released to the
Senators had been part of the DAP, a program designed by the DBM to ramp
up spending to accelerate economic expansion.
- The DBM soon came out to claim in its website that the DAP releases
had been sourced from savings generated by the Government, and from
unprogrammed funds; and that the savings had been derived from (1) the
pooling of unreleased and (2) the withdrawal of unobligated allotments also for
slow-moving programs and projects that had been earlier released to the
agencies of the National Government.
- The petitioners brought to the Court’s attention NBC No. 541
(Adoption of Operational Efficiency Measure – Withdrawal of Agencies’
Unobligated Allotments as of June 30, 2012), alleging that NBC No. 541, which
was issued to implement the DAP, directed the withdrawal of unobligated
allotments as of June 30, 2012 of government agencies and offices with low
levels of obligations, both for continuing and current allotments.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
 POLIR EV MT POINT ERS (G01) A TT Y. LOA N ZON , 1ST SEM 2019- 2020
1. Whether or not Whether or not the DAP violates Sec. 29, Art. VI of
the 1987 Constitution, which provides: "No money shall be paid out
of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law?
2. Whether or not the DAP, NBC No. 541, and all other executive
issuances allegedly implementing the DAP violate Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of
the 1987 Constitution insofar as:
2.
(a)They treat the unreleased appropriations and unobligated
allotments withdrawn from government agencies as "savings" as the
term is used in Sec. 25(5), in relation to the provisions of the GAAs of
2011, 2012 and 2013;
(b)They authorize the disbursement of funds for projects or programs
not provided in the GAAs for the Executive Department; and
3. Whether or not the DAP violates: (1) the Equal Protection Clause, (2)
the system of checks and balances, and (3) the principle of public
accountability enshrined in the 1987 Constitution considering that it
authorizes the release of funds upon the request of legislators?
4. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable?
Held/Ratio Decidendi:
1. No. The OSG posits, however, that no law was necessary for the
adoption and implementation of the DAP because of being neither a
fund nor an appropriation, but a program or an administrative system
of prioritizing spending; and that the adoption of the DAP was by virtue
of the authority of the President as the Chief Executive to ensure that
laws were faithfully executed.
We agree with the OSG’s position.
The DAP was a government policy or strategy designed to stimulate the
economy through accelerated spending. In the context of the DAP’s
adoption and implementation being a function pertaining to the
Executive as the main actor during the Budget Execution Stage under
its constitutional mandate to faithfully execute the laws, including the
GAAs, Congress did not need to legislate to adopt or to implement the
DAP. Congress could appropriate but would have nothing more to do
during the Budget Execution Stage.
The President, in keeping with his duty to faithfully execute the laws,
had sufficient discretion during the execution of the budget to adapt
the budget to changes in the country’s economic situation. He could
adopt a plan like the DAP for the purpose. He could pool the savings
and identify the PAPs to be funded under the DAP. The pooling of
savings pursuant to the DAP, and the identification of the PAPs to be
funded under the DAP did not involve appropriation in the strict sense
because the money had been already set apart from the public
treasury by Congress through the GAAs. In such actions, the Executive
did not usurp the power vested in Congress under Section 29(1), Article
VI of the Constitution.
No. The transfer of appropriated funds, to be valid under Section 25(5),
supra, must be made upon a concurrence of the following requisites,
namely:
(1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the
Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional
Commissions to transfer funds within their respective offices;
(2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the
appropriations for their respective offices; and
(3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices.
GAA’s of 2011 and 2012 lacked a law to authorize transfers of funds
under the DAP. Hence, transfers under DAP were unconstitutional.
Section 25(5), supra, not being a self-executing provision of the
Constitution, must have an implementing law for it to be operative.
That law, generally, is the GAA of a given fiscal year. To comply
with the first requisite, the GAAs should expressly authorize the
transfer of funds.
In the 2011 GAA, the provision that gave the President and the
other high officials the authority to transfer funds was Section 59, as
follows:
Section 59. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the
Senate President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional
Commissions enjoying fiscal autonomy, and the Ombudsman are
hereby authorized to augment any item in this Act from savings in
other items of their respective appropriations.
In the 2012 GAA, the empowering provision was Section 53, to wit:
Section 53. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the
Senate President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional
Commissions enjoying fiscal autonomy, and the Ombudsman are
hereby authorized to augment any item in this Act from savings in
other items of their respective appropriations.
A reading shows, however, that the aforequoted provisions of the
GAAs of 2011 and 2012 were textually unfaithful to the Constitution
for not carrying the phrase "for their respective offices" contained
in Section 25(5), supra. The impact of the phrase "for their
respective offices" was to authorize only transfers of funds within
 POLIR EV MT POINT ERS (G01) A TT Y. LOA N ZON , 1ST SEM 2019- 2020
their offices (i.e., in the case of the President, the transfer was to an
item of appropriation within the Executive). The provisions carried
a different phrase ("to augment any item in this Act"), and the
effect was that the 2011 and 2012 GAAs thereby literally allowed
the transfer of funds from savings to augment any item in the GAAs
even if the item belonged to an office outside the Executive. To
that extent did the 2011 and 2012 GAAs contravene the
Constitution.
There were no savings from which funds could be sourced for the
DAP Were the funds used in the DAP actually savings?
The petitioners claim that the funds used in the DAP — the
unreleased appropriations and withdrawn unobligated allotments
— were not actual savings within the context of Section 25(5),
supra, and the relevant provisions of the GAAs
We partially find for the petitioners.
The definition of "savings" in the GAAs, particularly for 2011, 2012
and 2013, reflected this interpretation and made it operational, viz:
Savings refer to portions or balances of any programmed
appropriation in this Act free from any obligation or encumbrance
which are: (i) still available after the completion or final
discontinuance or abandonment of the work, activity or purpose
for which the appropriation is authorized; (ii) from appropriations
balances arising from unpaid compensation and related costs
pertaining to vacant positions and leaves of absence without pay;
and (iii) from appropriations balances realized from the
implementation of measures resulting in improved systems and
efficiencies and thus enabled agencies to meet and deliver the
required or planned targets, programs and services approved in
this Act at a lesser cost.
In ascertaining the meaning of savings, certain principles
should be borne in mind. The first principle is that Congress wields
the power of the purse. Congress decides how the budget will be
spent; what PAPs to fund; and the amounts of money to be spent
for each PAP. The second principle is that the Executive, as the
department of the Government tasked to enforce the laws, is
expected to faithfully execute the GAA and to spend the budget
in accordance with the provisions of the GAA. The Executive is
expected to faithfully implement the PAPs for which Congress
allocated funds, and to limit the expenditures within the
allocations, unless exigencies result to deficiencies for which
augmentation is authorized, subject to the conditions provided by
law. The third principle is that in making the President’s power to
augment operative under the GAA, Congress recognizes the need
for flexibility in budget execution. In so doing, Congress diminishes
its own power of the purse, for it delegates a fraction of its power
to the Executive. But Congress does not thereby allow the
Executive to override its authority over the purse as to let the
Executive exceed its delegated authority. And the fourth principle
is that savings should be actual. "Actual" denotes something that is
real or substantial, or something that exists presently in fact, as
opposed to something that is merely theoretical, possible, potential
or hypothetical.
The foregoing principles caution us to construe savings strictly
against expanding the scope of the power to augment. It is then
indubitable that the power to augment was to be used only when
the purpose for which the funds had been allocated were already
satisfied, or the need for such funds had ceased to exist, for only
then could savings be properly realized. This interpretation prevents
the Executive from unduly transgressing Congress’ power of the
purse.
The DBM declares that part of the savings brought under the
DAP came from "pooling of unreleased appropriations such as
unreleased Personnel Services appropriations which will lapse at
the end of the year, unreleased appropriations of slow moving
projects and discontinued projects per Zero-Based Budgeting
findings. The fact alone that the appropriations are unreleased or
unalloted is a mere description of the status of the items as
unalloted or unreleased. They have not yet ripened into categories
of items from which savings can be generated.
Unobligated allotments, on the other hand, were
encompassed by the first part of the definition of "savings" in the
GAA, that is, as "portions or balances of any programmed
appropriation in this Act free from any obligation or
encumbrance." But the first part of the definition was further
qualified by the three enumerated instances of when savings
would be realized. As such, unobligated allotments could not be
indiscriminately declared as savings without first determining
whether any of the three instances existed. This signified that the
DBM’s withdrawal of unobligated allotments had disregarded the
definition of savings under the GAAs.
No funds from savings could be transferred under DAP to augment
deficient items not provided in the GAA.
The third requisite for a valid transfer of funds is that the purpose
of the transfer should be "to augment an item in the general
appropriations law for the respective offices." The term "augment"
means to enlarge or increase in size, amount, or degree.
The failure of the GAAs to set aside any amounts for an expense
category sufficiently indicated that Congress purposely did not see
fit to fund, much less implement, the PAP concerned. This
 POLIR EV MT POINT ERS (G01) A TT Y. LOA N ZON , 1ST SEM 2019- 2020
indication becomes clearer when even the President himself did
not recommend in the NEP to fund the PAP. The consequence was
that any PAP requiring expenditure that did not receive any
appropriation under the GAAs could only be a new PAP, any
funding for which would go beyond the authority laid down by
Congress in enacting the GAAs.
Cross-border augmentations from savings were prohibited by the
Constitution.
By providing that the President, the President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the Heads of the Constitutional Commissions
may be authorized to augment any item in the GAA "for their
respective offices," Section 25(5), supra, has delineated borders
between their offices, such that funds appropriated for one office
are prohibited from crossing over to another office even in the
guise of augmentation of a deficient item or items. Thus, we call
such transfers of funds cross-border transfers or cross-border
augmentations.
To be sure, the phrase "respective offices" used in Section 25(5),
supra, refers to the entire Executive, with respect to the President;
the Senate, with respect to the Senate President; the House of
Representatives, with respect to the Speaker; the Judiciary, with
respect to the Chief Justice; the Constitutional Commissions, with
respect to their respective Chairpersons.
The records show, indeed, that funds amounting to P143,700,000.00
and P250,000,000.00 were transferred under the DAP respectively
to the COA and the House of Representatives. Those transfers of
funds, which constituted cross-border augmentations for being
from the Executive to the COA and the House of Representatives.
The respondents further stated in their memorandum that the
President "made available" to the "Commission on Elections the
savings of his department upon [its] request for funds…" This was
another instance of a cross-border augmentation.
Regardless of the variant characterizations of the cross-border
transfers of funds, the plain text of Section 25(5), supra, disallowing
cross border transfers was disobeyed. Cross-border transfers,
whether as augmentation, or as aid, was prohibited under Section
25(5), supra.
Sourcing the DAP from unprogrammed funds despite the original
revenue targets not having been exceeded was invalid.
The documents contained in the Evidence Packets by the OSG
have confirmed that the unprogrammed funds were treated as
separate sources of funds. Even so, the release and use of the
unprogrammed funds were still subject to restrictions, for, to start
with, the GAAs precisely specified the instances when the
unprogrammed funds could be released and the purposes for
which they could be used.
The respondents disagree, holding that the release and use of the
unprogrammed funds under the DAP were in accordance with the
pertinent provisions of the GAAs. In particular, the DBM avers that
the unprogrammed funds could be availed of when any of the
following three instances occur, to wit: (1) the revenue collections
exceeded the original revenue targets proposed in the BESFs
submitted by the President to Congress; (2) new revenues were
collected or realized from sources not originally considered in the
BESFs; or(3) newly-approved loans for foreign assisted projects were
secured, or when conditions were triggered for other sources of
funds, such as perfected loan agreements for foreign-assisted
projects. This view of the DBM was adopted by all the respondents
in their Consolidated Comment.
The BESFs for 2011, 2012 and 2013 uniformly defined
"unprogrammed appropriations" as appropriations that provided
standby authority to incur additional agency obligations for priority
PAPs when revenue collections exceeded targets, and when
additional foreign funds are generated. Contrary to the DBM’s
averment that there were three instances when unprogrammed
funds could be released, the BESFs envisioned only two instances.
The third mentioned by the DBM – the collection of new revenues
from sources not originally considered in the BESFs – was not
included. This meant that the collection of additional revenues
from new sources did not warrant the release of the
unprogrammed funds. Hence, even if the revenues not considered
in the BESFs were collected or generated, the basic condition that
the revenue collections should exceed the revenue targets must
still be complied with in order to justify the release of the
unprogrammed funds.
The present controversy on the unprogrammed funds was rooted
in the correct interpretation of the phrase "revenue collections
should exceed the original revenue targets." The petitioners take
the phrase to mean that the total revenue collections must exceed
the total revenue target stated in the BESF, but the respondents
understand the phrase to refer only to the collections for each
source of revenue as enumerated in the BESF, with the condition
being deemed complied with once the revenue collections from
a particular source already exceeded the stated target.
However, the requirement that revenue collections exceed the
original revenue targets was to be construed in light of the purpose
for which the unprogrammed funds were incorporated in the GAAs
as standby appropriations to support additional expenditures for
 POLIR EV MT POINT ERS (G01) A TT Y. LOA N ZON , 1ST SEM 2019- 2020
certain priority PAPs should the revenue collections exceed the
resource targets assumed in the budget or when additional foreign
project loan proceeds were realized. The unprogrammed funds
were included in the GAAs to provide ready cover so as not to
delay the implementation of the PAPs should new or additional
revenue sources be realized during the year. Given the tenor of the
certifications, the unprogrammed funds were thus not yet
supported by the corresponding resources.
The revenue targets stated in the BESF were intended to address
the funding requirements of the proposed programmed
appropriations. In contrast, the unprogrammed funds, as standby
appropriations, were to be released only when there were
revenues in excess of what the programmed appropriations
required. As such, the revenue targets should be considered as a
whole, not individually; otherwise, we would be dealing with
artificial revenue surpluses. The requirement that revenue
collections must exceed revenue target should be understood to
mean that the revenue collections must exceed the total of the
revenue targets stated in the BESF. Moreover, to release the
unprogrammed funds simply because there was an excess
revenue as to one source of revenue would be an unsound fiscal
management measure because it would disregard the budget
plan and foster budget deficits, in contravention of the
Government’s surplus budget policy.
We cannot, therefore, subscribe to the respondents’ view.
3. No. With respect to the challenge against the DAP under the Equal
Protection Clause, Luna argues that the implementation of the DAP
was "unfair as it [was] selective" because the funds released under the
DAP was not made available to all the legislators, with some of them
refusing to avail themselves of the DAP funds, and others being
unaware of the availability of such funds. Thus, the DAP practised
"undue favoritism" in favor of select legislators in contravention of the
Equal Protection Clause.
COURAGE contends that the DAP violated the Equal Protection Clause
because no reasonable classification was used in distributing the funds
under the DAP; and that the Senators who supposedly availed
themselves of said funds were differently treated as to the amounts
they respectively received.
The OSG counters the challenges, stating that the supposed
discrimination in the release of funds under the DAP could be raised
only by the affected Members of Congress themselves, and if the
challenge based on the violation of the Equal Protection Clause was
really against the constitutionality of the DAP, the arguments of the
petitioners should be directed to the entitlement of the legislators to the
funds, not to the proposition that all of the legislators should have been
given such entitlement.
Equal Protection Clause
The challenge based on the contravention of the Equal Protection
Clause, which focuses on the release of funds under the DAP to
legislators, lacks factual and legal basis. The allegations about Senators
and Congressmen being unaware of the existence and
implementation of the DAP, and about some of them having refused
to accept such funds were unsupported with relevant data. Also, the
claim that the Executive discriminated against some legislators on the
ground alone of their receiving less than the others could not of itself
warrant a finding of contravention of the Equal Protection Clause. The
denial of equal protection of any law should be an issue to be raised
only by parties who supposedly suffer it, and, in these cases, such
parties would be the few legislators claimed to have been
discriminated against in the releases of funds under the DAP. The
reason for the requirement is that only such affected legislators could
properly and fully bring to the fore when and how the denial of equal
protection occurred, and explain why there was a denial in their
situation. The requirement was not met here. Consequently, the Court
was not put in the position to determine if there was a denial of equal
protection.
Separation of Powers
Although the OSG rightly contends that the Executive was authorized
to spend in line with its mandate to faithfully execute the laws (which
included the GAAs), such authority did not translate to unfettered
discretion that allowed the President to substitute his own will for that of
Congress. He was still required to remain faithful to the provisions of the
GAAs, given that his power to spend pursuant to the GAAs was but a
delegation to him from Congress. Verily, the power to spend the public
wealth resided in Congress, not in the Executive. Moreover, leaving the
spending power of the Executive unrestricted would threaten to undo
the principle of separation of powers.
Congress acts as the guardian of the public treasury in faithful
discharge of its power of the purse whenever it deliberates and acts on
the budget proposal submitted by the Executive. Its power of the purse
is touted as the very foundation of its institutional strength, and
underpins "all other legislative decisions and regulating the balance of
influence between the legislative and executive branches of
government." Such enormous power encompasses the capacity to
generate money for the Government, to appropriate public funds, and
to spend the money. Pertinently, when it exercises its power of the
purse, Congress wields control by specifying the PAPs for which public
money should be spent.
 POLIR EV MT POINT ERS (G01) A TT Y. LOA N ZON , 1ST SEM 2019- 2020
It is the President who proposes the budget but it is Congress that has
the final say on matters of appropriations.For this purpose,
appropriation involves two governing principles, namely: (1) "a Principle
of the Public Fisc, asserting that all monies received from whatever
source by any part of the government are public funds;" and (2) "a
Principle of Appropriations Control, prohibiting expenditure of any
public money without legislative authorization.” To conform to the
governing principles, the Executive cannot circumvent the prohibition
by Congress of expenditure for a PAP by resorting to either public or
private funds. Nor could the Executive transfer appropriated funds
resulting in an increase in the budget for one PAP, for by so doing the
appropriation for another PAP is necessarily decreased. The terms of
both appropriations will thereby be violated.
Principle of Accountability with regard to DAP
Anent the principle of public accountability being transgressed
because the adoption and implementation of the DAP constituted an
assumption by the Executive of Congress’ power of appropriation, we
have already held that the DAP and its implementing issuances were
policies and acts that the Executive could properly adopt and do in
the execution of the GAAs to the extent that they sought to implement
strategies to ramp up or accelerate the economy of the country.
4. Yes. Doctrine of operative fact was applicable.
The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or
executive act prior to the determination of its unconstitutionality as an
operative fact that produced consequences that cannot always be
erased, ignored or disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law or
executive act but sustains its effects. It provides an exception to the
general rule that a void or unconstitutional law produces no effect.
We find the doctrine of operative fact applicable to the adoption and
implementation of the DAP. Its application to the DAP proceeds from
equity and fair play. The consequences resulting from the DAP and its
related issuances could not be ignored or could no longer be undone.
To be clear, the doctrine of operative fact extends to a void or
unconstitutional executive act. The term executive act is broad
enough to include any and all acts of the Executive, including those
that are quasi legislative and quasi-judicial in nature.
Nonetheless, as Justice Brion has pointed out during the deliberations,
the doctrine of operative fact does not always apply, and is not always
the consequence of every declaration of constitutional invalidity. It
can be invoked only in situations where the nullification of the effects
of what used to be a valid law would result in inequity and injustice; but
where no such result would ensue, the general rule that an
unconstitutional law is totally ineffective should apply.
In that context, as Justice Brion has clarified, the doctrine of operative
fact can apply only to the PAPs that can no longer be undone, and
whose beneficiaries relied in good faith on the validity of the DAP, but
cannot apply to the authors, proponents and implementors of the DAP,
unless there are concrete findings of good faith in their favor by the
proper tribunals determining their criminal, civil, administrative and
other liabilities.
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petitions for certiorari and
prohibition; and DECLARES the following acts and practices under the
Disbursement Acceleration Program, National Budget Circular No. 541
and related executive issuances UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being in
violation of Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the
doctrine of separation of powers, namely:
(a) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments from the implementing
agencies, and the declaration of the withdrawn unobligated
allotments and unreleased appropriations as savings prior to the end
of the fiscal year and without complying with the statutory definition of
savings contained in the General Appropriations Acts;
(b) The cross-border transfers of the savings of the Executive to
augment the appropriations of other offices outside the Executive; and
(c) The funding of projects, activities and programs that were not
covered by any appropriation in the General Appropriations Act.
The Court further DECLARES VOID the use of unprogrammed funds
despite the absence of a certification by the National Treasurer that
the revenue collections exceeded the revenue targets for non-
compliance with the conditions provided in the relevant General
Appropriations Acts.
11. BEGICA VS. OCHOA
DOCTRINE: At the outset, suffice it to state that the foregoing provision is
considered as not self-executing due to the qualifying phrase "as may be
defined by law." In this respect, said provision does not, by and of itself, provide
a judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies guideline for
legislative or executive action.
FACTS:
• Several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that
the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional.
• The Alcantara Petition sought the declaration of the "Pork Barrel
System" as unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently
restraining respondents Franklin M. Drilon and Feliciano S. Belmonte, Jr., in their
respective capacities as the incumbent Senate President and Speaker of the
House of Representatives, from further taking any steps to enact legislation
 POLIR EV MT POINT ERS (G01) A TT Y. LOA N ZON , 1ST SEM 2019- 2020
appropriating funds for the "Pork Barrel System," in whatever form and by
whatever name it may be called, and from approving further releases pursuant
thereto.
• The Belgica Petition sought the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently
embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013
PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared
unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of
discretion. Further, they pray that the Court order the foregoing respondents to
release to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the complete schedule/list of
legislators who have availed of their PDAF and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013,
specifying the use of the funds, the project or activity and the recipient entities
or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto"; and (b) "the use of the Executive‘s
lump-sum, discretionary funds, including the proceeds from the x x x
Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013,
specifying the x x x project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals,
and all pertinent data thereto.” Also, they pray for the "inclusion in budgetary
deliberations with the Congress of all presently off-budget, lump-sum,
discretionary funds including, but not limited to, proceeds from the Malampaya
Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR."
• The Nepomuceno Petition sought to restrain President Benigno Simeon
S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing such funds
to Members of Congress and, instead, allow their release to fund priority
projects identified and approved by the Local Development Councils in
consultation with the executive departments, such as the DPWH, the
Department of Tourism, the Department of Health, the Department of
Transportation, and Communication and the National Economic Development
Authority.
• The “Presidential Pork Barrel” questioned by the petitioners include the
Malampaya Fund and the Presidential Social Fund. The Malampaya Fund was
created as a special fund under Section 8, Presidential Decree (PD) 910 by then-
President Ferdinand Marcos to help intensify, strengthen, and consolidate
government efforts relating to the exploration, exploitation, and development
of indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth. The Presidential
Social Fund was created under Section 12, Title IV, PD 1869 (1983) or the Charter
of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), as
amended by PD 1993 issued in 1985. The Presidential Social Fund has been
described as a special funding facility managed and administered by the
Presidential Management Staff through which the President provides direct
assistance to priority programs and projects not funded under the regular
budget. It is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate gross
earnings of PAGCOR.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. WON the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws
similar to it are violative of the following principles of/constitutional provisions
on:
a. Separation of powers
YES. The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the
GAA, is indisputably a function both constitutionally assigned and properly
entrusted to the Executive branch of government. The Legislative branch of
government, much more any of its members, should not cross over the field of
implementing the national budget since, as earlier stated, the same is properly
the domain of the Executive.
At its core, legislators have been consistently accorded post-enactment
authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded through various
Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory
authority of legislators to identify projects post-GAA may be construed from
Special Provisions 1 to 3 and the second paragraph of Special Provision 4.
Legislators have also been accorded post-enactment authority in the areas of
fund release (Special Provision 5 under the 2013 PDAF Article) and realignment
(Special Provision 4, paragraphs 1 and 2 under the 2013 PDAF Article).
Thus, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in
“the various operational aspects of budgeting,” including “the evaluation of
work and financial plans for individual activities” and the “regulation and
release of funds”, in violation of the separation of powers principle. That the said
authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its
unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition covers any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court must
therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa. The Court also points out that
respondents have failed to substantiate their position that the identification
authority of legislators is only of recommendatory import.
b. Non-delegability of legislative power
YES. The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of non-delegability since
legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of
appropriation, which, as settled in Philconsa, is lodged in Congress. The power
to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation, pursuant to Section
29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states: “No money shall be paid
out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” The
power of appropriation, as held by the Court in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice
and Insular Auditor, involves (a) setting apart by law a certain sum from the
public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Under the 2013 PDAF Article,
individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are
able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project
or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. Since these two acts
comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon,
and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform
the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to
legislate which the Constitution does not allow.
 POLIR EV MT POINT ERS (G01) A TT Y. LOA N ZON , 1ST SEM 2019- 2020
c. Checks and balances
YES Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a
collective allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided
among individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum
allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF
funds based on their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are
made by legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the law,
it means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been
written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto
consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification
budgeting system fosters the creation of a “budget within a budget” which
subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs
the President’s power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the President
is forced to decide between (a) accepting the entire P24. 79 Billion PDAF
allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or
may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole
PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.
Even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF
Article would remain constitutionally flawed since the lump-sum amount of
P24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple
purposes of spending (i.e. scholarships, medical missions, assistance to
indigents, preservation of historical materials, construction of roads, flood
control, etc). This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves the actual
amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further determination and,
therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which may be subject to
the President’s power of item veto.
The same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson relays,
“limit[ed] state auditors from obtaining relevant data and information that
would aid in more stringently auditing the utilization of said Funds.” Accordingly,
she recommends the adoption of a “line by line budget or amount per
proposed program, activity or project, and per implementing agency.”
d. Accountability
To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said
legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be
checking on activities in which they themselves participate. Also, this very same
concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution which provides that: “…[A Senator or Member of the
House of Representatives] shall not intervene in any matter before any office of
the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to
act on account of his office.” Allowing legislators to intervene in the various
phases of project implementation renders them susceptible to taking undue
advantage of their own office.
e. Political dynasties (Issue in Syllabus)
NO. One of the petitioners submits that the Pork Barrel System enables politicians
who are members of political dynasties to accumulate funds to perpetuate
themselves in power, in contravention of Section 26, Article II of the 1987
Constitution which states that:
Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public
service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.
At the outset, suffice it to state that the foregoing provision is considered as not
self-executing due to the qualifying phrase "as may be defined by law." In this
respect, said provision does not, by and of itself, provide a judicially
enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies guideline for legislative or
executive action.
Therefore, since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the
policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling
on this issue.
In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be
largely speculative since it has not been properly demonstrated how the Pork
Barrel System would be able to propagate political dynasties.
f. Local autonomy
YES. The Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which actually
belies the avowed intention of “making equal the unequal” (Philconsa, 1994).
The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of
office, without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the
district the legislator represents. As a result, a district representative of a highly-
urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district
representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively
“underdeveloped” compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver
scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List Representatives – and in some years,
even the Vice-President – who do not represent any locality, receive funding
from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well.
The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the
CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of the various Local Development
Councils (LDCs) which are already legally mandated to “assist the
corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social
development, and coordinating development efforts within its territorial
jurisdiction.” Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions are
essentially geared towards managing local affairs, their programs, policies and
resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators,
who are national officers that have no law-making authority except only when
acting as a body.
 POLIR EV MT POINT ERS (G01) A TT Y. LOA N ZON , 1ST SEM 2019- 2020
2. WON the phrases: (a) “and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD 910 relating to the
Malampaya Funds, and (b) “to finance the priority infrastructure development
projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due
to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President
of the Philippines” under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,
relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they
constitute undue delegations of legislative power.
YES. Section 8 of P.D. 910 and Section 12 of PD 1869 constitute undue
delegations of legislative power.
a. Validity of Appropration
Petitioners preliminarily assail Section 8 of PD 910 and Section 12 of PD1869 (now,
amended by PD 1993), which respectively provide for the Malampaya Funds
and the Presidential Social Fund, as invalid appropriations laws since they do
not have the "primary and specific" purpose of authorizing the release of public
funds from the National Treasury. Petitioners submit that Section 8 of PD 910 is
not an appropriation law since the "primary and specific‖ purpose of PD 910 is
the creation of an Energy Development Board and Section 8 thereof only
created a Special Fund incidental thereto. In similar regard, petitioners argue
that Section 12 of PD 1869 is neither a valid appropriations law since the
allocation of the Presidential Social Fund is merely incidental to the "primary and
specific" purpose of PD 1869 which is the amendment of the Franchise and
Powers of PAGCOR.
"An appropriation made by law under the contemplation of Section 29(1),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution exists when a provision of law (a) sets apart a
determinate or determinable amount of money and (b) allocates the same for
a particular public purpose. These two minimum designations of amount and
purpose stem from the very definition of the word "appropriation," which means
"to allot, assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose," and hence, if
written into the law, demonstrate that the legislative intent to appropriate exists.
As the Constitution "does not provide or prescribe any particular form of words
or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall
be made, except that it be ‘made by law,‘" an appropriation law may –
according to Philconsa – be "detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be"
for as long as the intent to appropriate may be gleaned from the same.
Analyzing the legal text vis-à-vis the above-mentioned principles, it may then
be concluded that (a) Section 8 of PD 910, which creates a Special Fund
comprised of "all fees, revenues, and receipts of the Energy Development
Board from any and all sources" (a determinable amount) "to be used to
finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects
of the government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed
by the President" (a specified public purpose), and (b) Section 12 of PD 1869,
as amended by PD 1993, which similarly sets aside, "after deducting five (5%)
percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the Government in
the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR, or 60%, if the aggregate gross
earnings be less than ₱150,000,000.00" (also a determinable amount) "to
finance the priority infrastructure development projects and x x x the restoration
of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and
authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines" (also a specified
public purpose), are legal appropriations under Section 29(1), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.
b. Undue Delegation
Petitioners contend that Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation
of legislative power since the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" gives the President "unbridled discretion to
determine for what purpose the funds will be used.
While the designation of a determinate or determinable amount for a particular
public purpose is sufficient for a legal appropriation to exist, the appropriation
law must contain adequate legislative guidelines if the same law delegates
rule-making authority to the Executive either for the purpose of (a) filling up the
details of the law for its enforcement, known as supplementary rule-making, or
(b) ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation, referred to as
contingent rule-making.
There are two (2) fundamental tests to ensure that the legislative guidelines for
delegated rule-making are indeed adequate. The first test is called the
"completeness test." Case law states that a law is complete when it sets forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the
delegate.
On the other hand, the second test is called the "sufficient standard test."
Jurisprudence holds that a law lays down a sufficient standard when it provides
adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the
delegate‘s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be
sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate‘s authority,
announce the legislative policy, and identify the conditions under which it is to
be implemented.
In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase "and
for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under
Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar
as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits
of the President‘s authority with respect to the purpose for which the
Malampaya Funds may be used.
The phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the
President” under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to
adequately determine the limits of the President’s authority with respect to the
 POLIR EV MT POINT ERS (G01) A TT Y. LOA N ZON , 1ST SEM 2019- 2020
purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said
phrase gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any
other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally
appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.
That the subject phrase may be confined only to “energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of the government”
under the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the general word or
phrase is to be construed to include – or be restricted to – things akin to,
resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned, is
belied by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase “energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government” states a singular and
general class and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specific
things from which the general phrase “for such other purposes” may be limited;
second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it represents, namely energy
development programs of the government; and, third, the Executive
department has used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes
under the subject phrase, thereby contradicting respondents’ own position that
it is limited only to “energy resource development and exploitation programs
and projects of the government.”
However, the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya
Funds “to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs
and projects of the government,” remains legally effective and subsisting.
Regarding the Presidential Social Fund: Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by
PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential Social Fund may be used “to [first,]
finance the priority infrastructure development projects and [second,] to
finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as
may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the
Philippines.”
The second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the President
to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for restoration purposes which arise
from calamities. The first indicated purpose, however, gives him carte blanche
authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure project he may so
determine as a “priority“. Verily, the law does not supply a definition of “priority
infrastructure development projects” and hence, leaves the President without
any guideline to construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a project as
one of “infrastructure” is too broad of a classification since the said term could
pertain to any kind of facility. Thus, the phrase “to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects” must be stricken down as unconstitutional
since – similar to Section 8 of PD 910 – it lies independently unfettered by any
sufficient standard of the delegating law. As they are severable, all other
provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, remains legally
effective and subsisting.
12. OPLE VS. TORRES
FACTS
1. A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on December 12, 1996.
1. It was published in 4 newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997
and January 23, 1997.
2. On January 24, 1997, Ople filed this PETITION to review the decision of the
Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the Members of the Inter-Agency
Coordinating Committee who are charged with the implementation of
A.O. No. 308.
3. On April 8, 1997, SC issued a TRO enjoining its implementation.
ON LEGAL STANDING
RESPONDENTS: Petitioner has no legal interest to uphold and that the
implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated.
SC: DISAGREE.
1. Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate and as such, he is possessed
of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of
A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of legislative power.
2. As taxpayer and member of the GSIS, Ople can also impugn the legality of
the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement
A.O. No. 308.
3. The ripeness for adjudication of the petition at bar is not affected by the
fact that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be
promulgated.
a. Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its
face. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be
promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects.
b. Respondents themselves have started the implementation of A.O.
No. 308 without waiting for the rules.
i. As early as January 19, 1997, SSS caused the publication of
a notice to bid for the manufacture of the National
Identification (ID) card.
ii. Executive Secretary Torres has publicly announced that
representatives from the GSIS and the SSS have completed
the guidelines for the national identification system
iii. All signals from the respondents show their unswerving will
to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait for the
formality of the rules to pass judgment on its
constitutionality.
ON USURPATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
PETITIONER: A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and
hence, beyond the power of the President to issue. A.O. No. 308 establishes a
system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and
liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more particularly,
violates their right to privacy.
 POLIR EV MT POINT ERS (G01) A TT Y. LOA N ZON , 1ST SEM 2019- 2020
SC: The blurring of the demarcation line between the power of the Legislature
to make laws and the power of the Executive to execute laws will disturb their
delicate balance of power and cannot be allowed.
Corollary to his power of control, the President also has the duty of supervising
the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public
order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under
his control to enable him to discharge his duties effectively.
1. Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and
enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs.
2. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency
and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue
administrative orders, rules and regulations.
A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an
administrative order.
1. An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which
relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government.
2. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of
implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.
A.O. No. 308 does not implement the legislative policy of the Administrative
Code of 1987.
1. The Code is a general law and “incorporates in a unified document the
major structural, functional and procedural principles of governance” and
“embodies changes in administrative structures and procedures designed
to serve the people.”
2. A.O. No. 308 establishes for the first time a National Computerized
Identification Reference System which requires a delicate adjustment of
various contending state policies—the primacy of national security, the
extent of privacy interest against dossier gathering by government, the
choice of policies, etc.
3. A.O. No. 308 redefines the parameters of some basic rights of our citizenry
vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the administrative power
of the President to make rules and the legislative power of Congress, it
ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be covered by
law.
Dissenters cannot argue that A.O. No. 308 is not a law because it confers no
right, imposes no duty, affords no protection, and creates no office.
1. Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot transact business with government
agencies delivering basic services to the people without the contemplated
identification card.
2. No citizen will refuse to get this identification card for no one can avoid
dealing with government.
3. Without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying
his privileges.
Again, with due respect, the dissenting opinions unduly expand the limits of
administrative legislation and consequently erodes the plenary power of
Congress to make laws. This is contrary to the established approach defining
the traditional limits of administrative legislation.
Many regulations however, bear directly on the public. It is here that
administrative legislation must be restricted in its scope and application.
Regulations are not supposed to be a substitute for the general policy-making
that Congress enacts in the form of a public law. Although administrative
regulations are entitled to respect, the authority to prescribe rules and
regulations is not an independent source of power to make laws.
ON THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
A.O. No. 308 cannot pass constitutional muster as an administrative legislation
because facially it violates the right to privacy.
1. The essence of privacy is the “right to be let alone.”
2. The right has a constitutional foundation: First (right of association), Third
(prohibition against the quartering of soldiers ‘in any house’ in time of
peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy),
Fourth (right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.), Fifth (Self-
Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which
government may not force him to surrender to his detriment) and Ninth
Amendment (The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.)
3. The right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution,
hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified
by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn.
A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations:
(1) the need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the facility to
conveniently transact business with basic service and social security providers
and other government instrumentalities and
(2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and
misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services.
It is debatable whether these interests are compelling enough to warrant the
issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not arguable is the broadness, the
vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our
people’s right to privacy in clear and present danger.
The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population
Reference Number (PRN) as a “common reference number to establish a
linkage among concerned agencies” through the use of “Biometrics
Technology” and “computer application designs.”
1. A.O. No. 308 does not state what specific biological characteristics and
what particular biometrics technology shall be used to identify people who
will seek its coverage. Considering the banquet of options available to the
 POLIR EV MT POINT ERS (G01) A TT Y. LOA N ZON , 1ST SEM 2019- 2020
implementors of A.O. No. 308, the fear that it threatens the right to privacy
of our people is not groundless.
2. A.O. No. 308 does not state whether encoding of data is limited to
biological information alone for identification purposes. Solicitor General
claims that the adoption of the Identification Reference System will
contribute to the “generation of population data for development
planning” which impliedly means that the PRN will not be used solely for
identification but for the generation of other data with remote relation to
the avowed purposes of A.O. No. 308. This indefiniteness can give the
government the roving authority to store and retrieve information for a
purpose other than the identification of the individual through his PRN.
3. Pursuant to A.O., an individual must present his PRN every time he deals with
a government agency to avail of basic services and security. The more
frequent the use of the PRN, the better the chance of building a huge and
formidable information base through the electronic linkage of the files. The
data may be gathered for gainful and useful government purposes; but the
existence of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert
invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some of our
authorities to resist. Moreover, A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that
personal information which will be gathered about our people will only be
processed for unequivocally specified purposes.
The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass
society. The threats emanate from various sources—governments, journalists,
employers, social scientists, etc. Here, the threat comes from the executive
branch of government which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to
surrender their privacy by giving information about themselves on the pretext
that it will facilitate delivery of basic services. Given the record-keeping power
of the computer, only the indifferent will fail to perceive the danger that A.O.
No. 308 gives the government the power to compile a devastating dossier
against unsuspecting citizens. The disturbing result could be that everyone will
live burdened by an unerasable record of his past and his limitations. In a way,
the threat is that because of its recordkeeping, the society will have lost its
benign capacity to forget.
13. KMU VS. NEDA
This case involves two consolidated petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the nullification of
Executive Order No. 420 (EO 420) on the ground that it is unconstitutional.
EO 420, issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on 13 April 2005, reads:
REQUIRING ALL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND
CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS TO STREAMLINE AND HARMONIZE THEIR
IDENTIFICATION (ID) SYSTEMS, AND AUTHORIZING FOR SUCH PURPOSE THE
DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY TO
IMPLEMENT THE SAME, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
WHEREAS, good governance is a major thrust of this Administration;
WHEREAS, the existing multiple identification systems in government have
created unnecessary and costly redundancies and higher costs to
government, while making it inconvenient for individuals to be holding several
identification cards;
WHEREAS, there is urgent need to streamline and integrate the processes and
issuance of identification cards in government to reduce costs and to provide
greater convenience for those transacting business with government;
WHEREAS, a unified identification system will facilitate private businesses,
enhance the integrity and reliability of government-issued identification cards
in private transactions, and prevent violations of laws involving false names and
identities.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Republic
of the Philippines by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby direct
the following:
Section 1. Adoption of a unified multi-purpose identification (ID) system for
government.1avvphil.net – All government agencies, including government-
owned and controlled corporations, are hereby directed to adopt a unified
multi-purpose ID system to ensure the attainment of the following objectives:
a. To reduce costs and thereby lessen the financial burden on both the
government and the public brought about by the use of multiple ID cards and
the maintenance of redundant database containing the same or related
information;
b. To ensure greater convenience for those transacting business with the
government and those availing of government services;
c. To facilitate private businesses and promote the wider use of the unified ID
card as provided under this executive order;
d. To enhance the integrity and reliability of government-issued ID cards; and
e. To facilitate access to and delivery of quality and effective government
service.
Section 2. Coverage – All government agencies and government-owned and
controlled corporations issuing ID cards to their members or constituents shall
be covered by this executive order.
 POLIR EV MT POINT ERS (G01) A TT Y. LOA N ZON , 1ST SEM 2019- 2020

Section 3. Data requirement for the unified ID system – The data to be collected Section 5. Functions and responsibilities of the Director-General, National
and recorded by the participating agencies shall be limited to the following: Economic and Development Authority. – In addition to his organic functions
and responsibilities, the Director-General, National Economic and
Name Development Authority, shall have the following functions and responsibilities:

Home Address a. Adopt within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of this executive order a
unified government ID system containing only such data and features, as
indicated in Section 3 above, to validly establish the identity of the card holder:
Sex

b. Enter into agreements with local governments, through their respective

Picture leagues of governors or mayors, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), and
with other branches or instrumentalities of the government, for the purpose of
Signature ensuring government-wide adoption of and support to this effort to streamline
the ID systems in government;
Date of Birth
b. Call on any other government agency or institution, or create sub–
Place of Birth committees or technical working groups, to provide such assistance as may be
necessary or required for the effective performance of its functions; and
Marital Status
d. Promulgate such rules or regulations as may be necessary in pursuance of
the objectives of this executive order.
Names of Parents

Section 6. Safeguards. – The Director-General, National Economic and

Height
Weight
Two index fingers and two thumbmarks
Any prominent distinguishing features like moles and others
Tax Identification Number (TIN)
Provided that a corresponding ID number issued by the participating agency
and a common reference number shall form part of the stored ID data and,
together with at least the first five items listed above, including the print of the
right thumbmark, or any of the fingerprints as collected and stored, shall appear
on the face or back of the ID card for visual verification purposes.
Section 4. Authorizing the Director-General, National Economic and
Development Authority, to Harmonize All Government Identification Systems. –
The Director-General, National Economic Development Authority, is hereby
authorized to streamline and harmonize all government ID systems.
Development Authority, and the pertinent agencies shall adopt such safeguard
as may be necessary and adequate to ensure that the right to privacy of an
individual takes precedence over efficient public service delivery. Such
safeguards shall, as a minimum, include the following:
a. The data to be recorded and stored, which shall be used only for purposes
of establishing the identity of a person, shall be limited to those specified in
Section 3 of this executive order;
b. In no case shall the collection or compilation of other data in violation of a
person’s right to privacy shall be allowed or tolerated under this order;
c. Stringent systems of access control to data in the identification system shall
be instituted;
d. Data collected and stored for this purpose shall be kept and treated as strictly
confidential and a personal or written authorization of the Owner shall be
required for access and disclosure of data;
e. The identification card to be issued shall be protected by advanced security
features and cryptographic technology; and
 POLIR EV MT POINT ERS (G01) A TT Y. LOA N ZON , 1ST SEM 2019- 2020
f. A written request by the Owner of the identification card shall be required for
any correction or revision of relevant data, or under such conditions as the
participating agency issuing the identification card shall prescribe.
Section 7. Funding. – Such funds as may be recommended by the Department
of Budget and Management shall be provided to carry out the objectives of
this executive order.
Section 8. Repealing clause. – All executive orders or issuances, or portions
thereof, which are inconsistent with this executive order, are hereby revoked,
amended or modified accordingly.
Section 9. Effectivity. – This executive order shall take effect fifteen (15) days
after its publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 13th day of April, in the year of Our Lord, Two
Thousand and Five.
Thus, under EO 420, the President directs all government agencies and
government-owned and controlled corporations to adopt a uniform data
collection and format for their existing identification (ID) systems.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 167798 allege that EO 420 is unconstitutional because it
constitutes usurpation of legislative functions by the executive branch of the
government. Furthermore, they allege that EO 420 infringes on the citizen’s right
to privacy.1
Petitioners in G.R. No. 167930 allege that EO 420 is void based on the following
grounds:
1. EO 420 is contrary to law. It completely disregards and violates the decision
of this Honorable Court in Ople v. Torres et al., G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998. It
also violates RA 8282 otherwise known as the Social Security Act of 1997.
2. The Executive has usurped the legislative power of Congress as she has no
power to issue EO 420. Furthermore, the implementation of the EO will use public
funds not appropriated by Congress for that purpose.
3. EO 420 violates the constitutional provisions on the right to privacy
(i) It allows access to personal confidential data without the owner’s consent.
(ii) EO 420 is vague and without adequate safeguards or penalties for any
violation of its provisions.
(iii) There are no compelling reasons that will legitimize the necessity of EO 420.
4. Granting without conceding that the President may issue EO 420, the
Executive Order was issued without public hearing.
5. EO 420 violates the Constitutional provision on equal protection of laws and
results in the discriminatory treatment of and penalizes those without ID. 2
Issues
Essentially, the petitions raise two issues. First, petitioners claim that EO 420 is a
usurpation of legislative power by the President. Second, petitioners claim that
EO 420 infringes on the citizen’s right to privacy.
Respondents question the legal standing of petitioners and the ripeness of the
petitions. Even assuming that petitioners are bereft of legal standing, the Court
considers the issues raised under the circumstances of paramount public
concern or of transcendental significance to the people. The petitions also
present a justiciable controversy ripe for judicial determination because all
government entities currently issuing identification cards are mandated to
implement EO 420, which petitioners claim is patently unconstitutional. Hence,
the Court takes cognizance of the petitions.
The Court’s Ruling
The petitions are without merit.
On the Alleged Usurpation of Legislative Power
Section 2 of EO 420 provides, "Coverage. – All government agencies and
government-owned and controlled corporations issuing ID cards to their
members or constituents shall be covered by this executive order." EO 420
applies only to government entities that issue ID cards as part of their functions
under existing laws. These government entities have already been issuing ID
cards even prior to EO 420. Examples of these government entities are the
GSIS,3 SSS,4 Philhealth,5 Mayor’s Office,6 LTO,7 PRC,8 and similar government
entities.
Section 1 of EO 420 directs these government entities to "adopt a unified multi-
purpose ID system." Thus, all government entities that issue IDs as part of their
functions under existing laws are required to adopt a uniform data collection
and format for their IDs. Section 1 of EO 420 enumerates the purposes of the
uniform data collection and format, namely:
 POLIR EV MT POINT ERS (G01) A TT Y. LOA N ZON , 1ST SEM 2019- 2020
a. To reduce costs and thereby lessen the financial burden on both the
government and the public brought about by the use of multiple ID cards and
the maintenance of redundant database containing the same or related
information;
b. To ensure greater convenience for those transacting business with the
government and those availing of government services;
c. To facilitate private businesses and promote the wider use of the unified ID
card as provided under this executive order;
d. To enhance the integrity and reliability of government-issued ID cards; and
e. To facilitate access to and delivery of quality and effective government
service.
In short, the purposes of the uniform ID data collection and ID format are to
reduce costs, achieve efficiency and reliability, insure compatibility, and
provide convenience to the people served by government entities.
Section 3 of EO 420 limits the data to be collected and recorded under the
uniform ID system to only 14 specific items, namely: (1) Name; (2) Home Address;
(3) Sex; (4) Picture; (5) Signature; (6) Date of Birth; (7) Place of Birth; (8) Marital
Status; (9) Name of Parents; (10) Height; (11) Weight; (12) Two index fingers and
two thumbmarks; (13) Any prominent distinguishing features like moles or others;
and (14) Tax Identification Number.
These limited and specific data are the usual data required for personal
identification by government entities, and even by the private sector. Any one
who applies for or renews a driver’s license provides to the LTO all these 14
specific data.
At present, government entities like LTO require considerably more data from
applicants for identification purposes. EO 420 will reduce the data required to
be collected and recorded in the ID databases of the government entities.
Government entities cannot collect or record data, for identification purposes,
other than the 14 specific data.
Various laws allow several government entities to collect and record data for
their ID systems, either expressly or impliedly by the nature of the functions of
these government entities. Under their existing ID systems, some government
entities collect and record more data than what EO 420 allows. At present, the
data collected and recorded by government entities are disparate, and the
IDs they issue are dissimilar.
In the case of the Supreme Court,9 the IDs that the Court issues to all its
employees, including the Justices, contain 15 specific data, namely: (1) Name;
(2) Picture; (3) Position; (4) Office Code Number; (5) ID Number; (6) Height; (7)
Weight; (8) Complexion; (9) Color of Hair; (10) Blood Type; (11) Right
Thumbmark; (12) Tax Identification Number; (13) GSIS Policy Number; (14) Name
and Address of Person to be Notified in Case of Emergency; and (15) Signature.
If we consider that the picture in the ID can generally also show the sex of the
employee, the Court’s ID actually contains 16 data.
In contrast, the uniform ID format under Section 3 of EO 420 requires only "the
first five items listed" in Section 3, plus the fingerprint, agency number and the
common reference number, or only eight specific data. Thus, at present, the
Supreme Court’s ID contains far more data than the proposed uniform ID for
government entities under EO 420. The nature of the data contained in the
Supreme Court ID is also far more financially sensitive, specifically the Tax
Identification Number.
Making the data collection and recording of government entities unified, and
making their ID formats uniform, will admittedly achieve substantial benefits.
These benefits are savings in terms of procurement of equipment and supplies,
compatibility in systems as to hardware and software, ease of verification and
thus increased reliability of data, and the user-friendliness of a single ID format
for all government entities.
There is no dispute that government entities can individually limit the collection
and recording of their data to the 14 specific items in Section 3 of EO 420. There
is also no dispute that these government entities can individually adopt the ID
format as specified in Section 3 of EO 420. Such an act is certainly within the
authority of the heads or governing boards of the government entities that are
already authorized under existing laws to issue IDs.
A unified ID system for all these government entities can be achieved in either
of two ways. First, the heads of these existing government entities can enter into
a memorandum of agreement making their systems uniform. If the government
entities can individually adopt a format for their own ID pursuant to their regular
functions under existing laws, they can also adopt by mutual agreement a
uniform ID format, especially if the uniform format will result in substantial
savings, greater efficiency, and optimum compatibility. This is purely an
administrative matter, and does not involve the exercise of legislative power.
Second, the President may by executive or administrative order direct the
government entities under the Executive department to adopt a uniform ID
data collection and format. Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
provides that the "President shall have control of all executive departments,
bureaus and offices." The same Section also mandates the President to "ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed."
 POLIR EV MT POINT ERS (G01) A TT Y. LOA N ZON , 1ST SEM 2019- 2020
Certainly, under this constitutional power of control the President can direct all
government entities, in the exercise of their functions under existing laws, to
adopt a uniform ID data collection and ID format to achieve savings, efficiency,
reliability, compatibility, and convenience to the public. The President’s
constitutional power of control is self-executing and does not need any
implementing legislation.
Of course, the President’s power of control is limited to the Executive branch of
government and does not extend to the Judiciary or to the independent
constitutional commissions. Thus, EO 420 does not apply to the Judiciary, or to
the COMELEC which under existing laws is also authorized to issue voter’s ID
cards.10 This only shows that EO 420 does not establish a national ID system
because legislation is needed to establish a single ID system that is compulsory
for all branches of government.
The Constitution also mandates the President to ensure that the laws are
faithfully executed. There are several laws mandating government entities to
reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in general, improve public services. 11 The
adoption of a uniform ID data collection and format under EO 420 is designed
to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in general, improve public services.
Thus, in issuing EO 420, the President is simply performing the constitutional duty
to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
Clearly, EO 420 is well within the constitutional power of the President to
promulgate. The President has not usurped legislative power in issuing EO 420.
EO 420 is an exercise of Executive power – the President’s constitutional power
of control over the Executive department. EO 420 is also compliance by the
President of the constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully
executed.
Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them. In
issuing EO 420, the President did not make, alter or repeal any law but merely
implemented and executed existing laws. EO 420 reduces costs, as well as
insures efficiency, reliability, compatibility and user-friendliness in the
implementation of current ID systems of government entities under existing laws.
Thus, EO 420 is simply an executive issuance and not an act of legislation.
The act of issuing ID cards and collecting the necessary personal data for
imprinting on the ID card does not require legislation. Private employers
routinely issue ID cards to their employees. Private and public schools also
routinely issue ID cards to their students. Even private clubs and associations
issue ID cards to their members. The purpose of all these ID cards is simply to
insure the proper identification of a person as an employee, student, or member
of a club. These ID cards, although imposed as a condition for exercising a
privilege, are voluntary because a person is not compelled to be an employee,
student or member of a club.
What require legislation are three aspects of a government maintained ID card
system. First, when the implementation of an ID card system requires a special
appropriation because there is no existing appropriation for such purpose.
Second, when the ID card system is compulsory on all branches of government,
including the independent constitutional commissions, as well as compulsory on
all citizens whether they have a use for the ID card or not. Third, when the ID
card system requires the collection and recording of personal data beyond
what is routinely or usually required for such purpose, such that the citizen’s right
to privacy is infringed.
In the present case, EO 420 does not require any special appropriation because
the existing ID card systems of government entities covered by EO 420 have the
proper appropriation or funding. EO 420 is not compulsory on all branches of
government and is not compulsory on all citizens. EO 420 requires a very narrow
and focused collection and recording of personal data while safeguarding the
confidentiality of such data. In fact, the data collected and recorded under
EO 420 are far less than the data collected and recorded under the ID systems
existing prior to EO 420.
EO 420 does not establish a national ID card system. EO 420 does not compel
all citizens to have an ID card. EO 420 applies only to government entities that
under existing laws are already collecting data and issuing ID cards as part of
their governmental functions. Every government entity that presently issues an
ID card will still issue its own ID card under its own name. The only difference is
that the ID card will contain only the five data specified in Section 3 of EO 420,
plus the fingerprint, the agency ID number, and the common reference number
which is needed for cross-verification to ensure integrity and reliability of
identification.
This Court should not interfere how government entities under the Executive
department should undertake cost savings, achieve efficiency in operations,
insure compatibility of equipment and systems, and provide user-friendly
service to the public. The collection of ID data and issuance of ID cards are
day-to-day functions of many government entities under existing laws. Even the
Supreme Court has its own ID system for employees of the Court and all first and
second level courts. The Court is even trying to unify its ID system with those of
the appellate courts, namely the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan and Court
of Tax Appeals.
There is nothing legislative about unifying existing ID systems of all courts within
the Judiciary. The same is true for government entities under the Executive
department. If government entities under the Executive department decide to
unify their existing ID data collection and ID card issuance systems to achieve
savings, efficiency, compatibility and convenience, such act does not involve
the exercise of any legislative power. Thus, the issuance of EO 420 does not
constitute usurpation of legislative power.
 POLIR EV MT POINT ERS (G01) A TT Y. LOA N ZON , 1ST SEM 2019- 2020
On the Alleged Infringement of the Right to Privacy
All these years, the GSIS, SSS, LTO, Philhealth and other government entities have
been issuing ID cards in the performance of their governmental functions. There
have been no complaints from citizens that the ID cards of these government
entities violate their right to privacy. There have also been no complaints of
abuse by these government entities in the collection and recording of personal
identification data.
In fact, petitioners in the present cases do not claim that the ID systems of
government entities prior to EO 420 violate their right to privacy. Since
petitioners do not make such claim, they even have less basis to complain
against the unified ID system under EO 420. The data collected and stored for
the unified ID system under EO 420 will be limited to only 14 specific data, and
the ID card itself will show only eight specific data. The data collection,
recording and ID card system under EO 420 will even require less data
collected, stored and revealed than under the disparate systems prior to EO
420.
Prior to EO 420, government entities had a free hand in determining the kind,
nature and extent of data to be collected and stored for their ID systems. Under
EO 420, government entities can collect and record only the 14 specific data
mentioned in Section 3 of EO 420. In addition, government entities can show in
their ID cards only eight of these specific data, seven less data than what the
Supreme Court’s ID shows.
Also, prior to EO 420, there was no executive issuance to government entities
prescribing safeguards on the collection, recording, and disclosure of personal
identification data to protect the right to privacy. Now, under Section 5 of EO
420, the following safeguards are instituted:
a. The data to be recorded and stored, which shall be used only for purposes
of establishing the identity of a person, shall be limited to those specified in
Section 3 of this executive order;
b. In no case shall the collection or compilation of other data in violation of a
person’s right to privacy be allowed or tolerated under this order;
c. Stringent systems of access control to data in the identification system shall
be instituted;
d. Data collected and stored for this purpose shall be kept and treated as strictly
confidential and a personal or written authorization of the Owner shall be
required for access and disclosure of data;
e. The identification card to be issued shall be protected by advanced security
features and cryptographic technology;
f. A written request by the Owner of the identification card shall be required for
any correction or revision of relevant data, or under such conditions as the
participating agency issuing the identification card shall prescribe.
On its face, EO 420 shows no constitutional infirmity because it even narrowly
limits the data that can be collected, recorded and shown compared to the
existing ID systems of government entities. EO 420 further provides strict
safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the data collected, in contrast to
the prior ID systems which are bereft of strict administrative safeguards.
The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by
government entities. Some one hundred countries have compulsory national ID
systems, including democracies such as Spain, France, Germany, Belgium,
Greece, Luxembourg, and Portugal. Other countries which do not have
national ID systems, like the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand,
Ireland, the Nordic Countries and Sweden, have sectoral cards for health, social
or other public services.12 Even with EO 420, the Philippines will still fall under the
countries that do not have compulsory national ID systems but allow only
sectoral cards for social security, health services, and other specific purposes.
Without a reliable ID system, government entities like GSIS, SSS, Philhealth, and
LTO cannot perform effectively and efficiently their mandated functions under
existing laws. Without a reliable ID system, GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and similar
government entities stand to suffer substantial losses arising from false names
and identities. The integrity of the LTO’s licensing system will suffer in the absence
of a reliable ID system.
The dissenting opinion cites three American decisions on the right to privacy,
namely, Griswold v. Connecticut,13 U.S. Justice Department v. Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press,14 and Whalen v. Roe.15 The last two
decisions actually support the validity of EO 420, while the first is inapplicable to
the present case.
In Griswold, the U.S. Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a state law that
prohibited the use and distribution of contraceptives because enforcement of
the law would allow the police entry into the bedrooms of married couples.
Declared the U.S. Supreme Court: "Would we allow the police to search the
sacred precincts of the marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of
contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding
the marriage relationship." Because the facts and the issue involved in Griswold
are materially different from the present case, Griswold has no persuasive
bearing on the present case.
 POLIR EV MT POINT ERS (G01) A TT Y. LOA N ZON , 1ST SEM 2019- 2020
In U.S. Justice Department, the issue was not whether the State could collect
and store information on individuals from public records nationwide but
whether the State could withhold such information from the press. The premise
of the issue in U.S. Justice Department is that the State can collect and store in
a central database information on citizens gathered from public records across
the country. In fact, the law authorized the Department of Justice to collect
and preserve fingerprints and other criminal identification records nationwide.
The law also authorized the Department of Justice to exchange such
information with "officials of States, cities and other institutions." The Department
of Justice treated such information as confidential. A CBS news correspondent
and the Reporters Committee demanded the criminal records of four members
of a family pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. The U.S. Supreme Court
ruled that the Freedom of Information Act expressly exempts release of
information that would "constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy," and the information demanded falls under that category of exempt
information.
With the exception of the 8 specific data shown on the ID card, the personal
data collected and recorded under EO 420 are treated as "strictly confidential"
under Section 6(d) of EO 420. These data are not only strictly confidential but
also personal matters. Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution grants the
"right of the people to information on matters of public concern." Personal
matters are exempt or outside the coverage of the people’s right to information
on matters of public concern. The data treated as "strictly confidential" under
EO 420 being private matters and not matters of public concern, these data
cannot be released to the public or the press. Thus, the ruling in U.S. Justice
Department does not collide with EO 420 but actually supports the validity EO
420.
Whalen v. Roe is the leading American case on the constitutional protection for
control over information. In Whalen, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity
of a New York law that required doctors to furnish the government reports
identifying patients who received prescription drugs that have a potential for
abuse. The government maintained a central computerized database
containing the names and addresses of the patients, as well as the identity of
the prescribing doctors. The law was assailed because the database allegedly
infringed the right to privacy of individuals who want to keep their personal
matters confidential. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the privacy claim, and
declared:
Disclosures of private medical information to doctors, to hospital personnel, to
insurance companies, and to public health agencies are often an essential part
of modern medical practice even when the disclosure may reflect unfavorably
on the character of the patient. Requiring such disclosures to representatives of
the State having responsibility for the health of the community does not
automatically amount to an impermissible invasion of privacy. (Emphasis
supplied)
Compared to the personal medical data required for disclosure to the New York
State in Whalen, the 14 specific data required for disclosure to the Philippine
government under EO 420 are far less sensitive and far less personal. In fact, the
14 specific data required under EO 420 are routine data for ID systems, unlike
the sensitive and potentially embarrassing medical records of patients taking
prescription drugs. Whalen, therefore, carries persuasive force for upholding the
constitutionality of EO 420 as non-violative of the right to privacy.
Subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decisions have reiterated Whalen. In Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,16 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
validity of a law that required doctors performing abortions to fill up forms,
maintain records for seven years, and allow the inspection of such records by
public health officials. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that "recordkeeping and
reporting requirements that are reasonably directed to the preservation of
maternal health and that properly respect a patient’s confidentiality and
privacy are permissible."
Again, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 17 the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld a law that required doctors performing an abortion to
file a report to the government that included the doctor’s name, the woman’s
age, the number of prior pregnancies and abortions that the woman had, the
medical complications from the abortion, the weight of the fetus, and the
marital status of the woman. In case of state-funded institutions, the law made
such information publicly available. In Casey, the U.S. Supreme Court stated:
"The collection of information with respect to actual patients is a vital element
of medical research, and so it cannot be said that the requirements serve no
purpose other than to make abortion more difficult."
Compared to the disclosure requirements of personal data that the U.S.
Supreme Court have upheld in Whalen, Danforth and Casey as not violative of
the right to privacy, the disclosure requirements under EO 420 are far benign
and cannot therefore constitute violation of the right to privacy. EO 420 requires
disclosure of 14 personal data that are routine for ID purposes, data that cannot
possibly embarrass or humiliate anyone.
Petitioners have not shown how EO 420 will violate their right to privacy.
Petitioners cannot show such violation by a mere facial examination of EO 420
because EO 420 narrowly draws the data collection, recording and exhibition
while prescribing comprehensive safeguards. Ople v. Torres18 is not authority to
hold that EO 420 violates the right to privacy because in that case the assailed
executive issuance, broadly drawn and devoid of safeguards, was annulled
solely on the ground that the subject matter required legislation. As then
Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban noted in his
concurring opinion in Ople v. Torres, "The voting is decisive only on the need for
appropriate legislation, and it is only on this ground that the petition is granted
by this Court."
 POLIR EV MT POINT ERS (G01) A TT Y. LOA N ZON , 1ST SEM 2019- 2020
EO 420 applies only to government entities that already maintain ID systems and
issue ID cards pursuant to their regular functions under existing laws. EO 420 does
not grant such government entities any power that they do not already possess
under existing laws. In contrast, the assailed executive issuance in Ople v. Torres
sought to establish a "National Computerized Identification Reference
System,"19 a national ID system that did not exist prior to the assailed executive
issuance. Obviously, a national ID card system requires legislation because it
creates a new national data collection and card issuance system where none
existed before.
In the present case, EO 420 does not establish a national ID system but makes
the existing sectoral card systems of government entities like GSIS, SSS, Philhealth
and LTO less costly, more efficient, reliable and user-friendly to the public.
Hence, EO 420 is a proper subject of executive issuance under the President’s
constitutional power of control over government entities in the Executive
department, as well as under the President’s constitutional duty to ensure that
laws are faithfully executed.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. Executive Order No. 420 is
declared VALID.
14. ARROYO VS. DE VENECIA
DOCTRINE:
Laws passed upon by the legislative is conclusive to the Court, and the Court
will not declare it void on account of mere non-compliance with rules of
procedure the legislature itself made
FACTS:
• During the bicameral conference meeting for the House Bill 7198 which
amends certain provisions of the NIRC on excise taxes on manufacture
and sale of beer and cigarettes, Rep. Arroyo interrupted the
sponsorship speech of Rep. Sarmiento;
• Rep. Arroyo, one of the petitioners, moved to adjourn the session for
lack of quorum;
• They had a headcount to determine whether there’s a quorum or not
which eventually was resolved as having a quorum;
• The speech continued and Rep. Arroyo registered to interpellate and
announced that he will raise the question on the quorum;
• However, Rep. Albano, one of the respondents, moved for the
approval and ratification of the conference committee report;
• Such was objected by Rep. Arroyo but Deputy Speaker De Venecia
approved the committee and thereafter suspended the session for the
continued interruption of Rep. Arroyo;
• When the session resumed, Rep. Albano moved to adjourn the session
on a different day;
• Nevertheless, the bill was signed on the same day by the Speaker of
the House and Senate President and was certified by the secretaries of
both houses;
• It was later on enacted into law when it was signed by then President
Ramos the next day.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
5. WON the SC can invalidate an act of the legislature on the basis of non-
compliance with the rules of procedure made by itself – NO
a. Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted
pursuant to the consti provision that “each House may
determine the rules of its proceedings” and such is
enforceable judicially. And that the respondents did not follow
the internal rules of the House; thus, the house bill which was
passed as a law is defective. Likewise, petitioners contend that
the passage of the law was railroaded; that the method was
incorrect.
b. The SC ruled that they have no power to look into the internal
proceedings of a House, and that they cannot invalidate an
act of the legislature just because the latter failed to follow its
own internal rules. The three departments of our government
has its separate sphere which the others may not invade
without upsetting the delicate balance on which our
constitutional order rest. Also, the Court clarified that “it is no
impeachment of the method to say that some other way
would be better, more accurate and even more just. The
advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly of a method
do not present any matter for judicial consideration. 24 In the
words of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, "this Court cannot
provide a second opinion on what is the best procedure.”
6. WON the enrolled bill doctrine is applicable – YES
a. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by
the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate and
the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress
that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its
due enactment. But, where as here there is no evidence to the
contrary, this Court will respect the certification of the presiding
officers of both Houses that a bill has been duly passed. Under
this rule, this Court has refused to determine claims that the
three-fourths vote needed to pass a proposed amendment to
the Constitution had not been obtained, because "a duly
authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verify and is
 POLIR EV MT POINT ERS (G01) A TT Y. LOA N ZON , 1ST SEM 2019- 2020
binding on the courts." The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of
evidence, is well established. It is cited with approval by text
writers here and abroad.
b. Since the Journal of the House clearly shows the approval of
such law and was signed by the heads of each house and
certified by the secretaries of both houses, The Journal is
regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are
required by the Constitution to be recorded therein.
RULING: Petition is dismissed.
15. ALEJANDRINO VS. QUEZON
DOCTRINE:
Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its members, or its officers,
to compel the performance of duties purely legislative in their character
which therefore pertain to their legislative, functions and over which they
have exclusive control. The courts cannot dictate action in this respect
without a gross usurpation of power.
FACTS:
• Petitioner is a Senator representing the Twelfth Senatorial District. He
filed a petition for Mandamus and Injunction against Respondents who
are also Senators.
• The reason for the petition is the adoption of a resolution by the
Philippine Senate whereby petitioner was suspended for a period of
one year and thereby depriving him of all the prerogatives, privileges,
and emoluments of his office during the period.
• Petitioner sought from the Court a writ of mandamus to compel them
to recognize his rights as a Senator and to retract the suspension.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
7. WON MANDAMUS MAY LIE AGAINST THE RESPONDENT-SENATORS - NO
a. No, a writ of mandamus cannot lie against the respondent-
senators. According to the principle of separation of powers
and numerous cases, both in this jurisdiction and from foreign
jurisdiction, “Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body,
its members, or its officers, to compel the performance of
duties purely legislative in their character which therefore
pertain to their legislative, functions and over which they have
exclusive control.” With this in mind, the Court cannot grant the
present petition, nor can it grant a writ directed against the
subordinates of the respondents directing them to not enforce
the questioned resolution since these subordinates cannot act
by themselves but rather only act by reason of the orders of
the respondent-senators thus, a writ directed to them would
potentially create a conflict between the respondents and the
directive of the Court.
b. Judicial decisions and/or findings.
8. WON RESPONDENTS COULD SUSPEND PETITIONER -NO
a. No, the respondents cannot suspend the petitioner. According
to the Organic Law, the Governor-General appoints Senators
and only he can remove them, while the Senators may punish
or expel members of the House. It is apparent from the law that
the power of suspension was not expressly granted, it is beyond
the power of any branch of the Government of the Philippine
Islands to exercise its functions in any other way than that
prescribed by the Organic Law or by local laws which conform
to the Organic Law. Unfortunately, in this case, the Court still
had to dismiss the case as it has no jurisdiction to issue the writ.
RULING: Since the Court has no authority to issue a writ of mandamus and
prohibition against the respondents, being members of a co-equal branch of
government, the case is dismissed.
16. OSMENA VS. PENDATUN
DOCTRINE:
The Supreme Court cannot interfere with the suspension of a Congressman
for disorderly behavior because the HoR is the judge of what constitutes
disorderly behavior.
*Acc. to Atty Loanzon: HOWEVER, under Sec. 1, Art. VIII of the 1987 Const.,
the Supreme Court may inquire as to WON the decision to expel a member
of Congress is tainted with GAODALEJ.
FACTS:
• Congressman Sergio Osmeña Jr., submitted to the SC a verified petition
for "declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction" against Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and 14 other
congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special Committee
created by House Resolution No. 59.
• He asked for (1) the annulment of such Resolution on the ground of
infringement of his parliamentary immunity and (2) that said members
of the special committee be enjoined from proceeding in accordance
with it particularly the portion authorizing them to require him to
substantiate his charges against the President.
 POLIR EV MT POINT ERS (G01) A TT Y. LOA N ZON , 1ST SEM 2019- 2020

• Respondent Pendatun and the other congressmen challenged the

jurisdiction of the SC on the ground of the power of Congress to
discipline its members with suspension.
• The special committee nonetheless continued to perform its task. After
giving Congressman Osmeña a chance to defend himself, it submitted
its reports finding said congressman guilty of serious disorderly behavior.
Acting on such report, the House approved on the same day—before
closing its session—House Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty as
recommended, and suspending him from office for fifteen months.

ISSUE/S & RATIO:

9. WON the SC has jurisdiction over the petition filed by Congressman
Sergio Osmeña Jr.
NO. It has become moot and academic.
• No preliminary injunction had been issued, the Committee performed
its task, reported to the House, and the latter approved the suspension
order. The House had closed it session, and the Committee has ceased
to exist as such. It would seem, therefore, the case should be dismissed
for having become moot or academic.
IMPORTANT CONCEPTS FOUND IN SC DISCUSSION:
1. PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY NOT ABSOLUTE
While parliamentary immunity guarantees the legislator complete freedom
of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil
actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional
Hall, however, it does not protect him from responsibility before the
legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by
the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. For unparliamentary
conduct, members of Congress can be censured, committed to prison,
suspended, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues.
2. POWER OF CONGRESS TO DETERMINE DISORDERLY BEHAVIOUR OF MEMBERS;
SEPARATION OF POWERS
The House of Representatives is the judge of what constitutes disorderly
behaviour. The courts will not assume a jurisdiction in any case which will
amount to an interference by the judicial department with the legislature.
3. POWER OF CONGRESS TO SUSPEND ITS MEMBERS
While under the Jones Law, the Senate had no power to suspend appointive
member at present Congress has the inherent legislative prerogative of
suspension which the Constitution did not impair.

RULING: SC dismisses the petition on the ground that it has become moot and
academic.