1987 Constitution, Article XII, Section 2-5, 22

SECTION 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources
are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control
and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-
production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be
for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under
such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure
and limit of the grant.

The State shall protect the nation’s marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive
economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.

The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as
cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and
lagoons.

The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or
financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and
other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State
shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.

The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision,
within thirty days from its execution.

SECTION 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and
national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the
uses which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands.
Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by
lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not
to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five hundred
hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead, or grant.

Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to the
requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public
domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions therefor.

SECTION 4. The Congress shall, as soon as possible, determine by law the specific limits of forest lands and
national parks, marking clearly their boundaries on the ground. Thereafter, such forest lands and national
parks shall be conserved and may not be increased nor diminished, except by law. The Congress shall
provide, for such period as it may determine, measures to prohibit logging in endangered forests and
watershed areas.

SECTION 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and
programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their
economic, social, and cultural well-being.

The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in
determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain.

SECTION 22. Acts which circumvent or negate any of the provisions of this Article shall be considered
inimical to the national interest and subject to criminal and civil sanctions, as may be provided by law.

_______________________________________________________________________________________

Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended)

Section 1. The short title of this Act shall be "The Public Land Act."

Section 2. The provisions of this Act shall apply to the lands of the public domain; but timber and mineral
lands shall be governed by special laws and nothing in this Act provided shall be understood or construed
to charge or-modify the government and disposition of the lands commonly called "friar lands" and those
which, being privately owned, have reverted to or become the property of the Philippine Government,
which administration and disposition shall be governed by the laws at present in force or which hereafter be
enacted by the Legislature.

Section 3. While title to lands of the public domain remains in the Government, the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources shall be the executive officer charged with carrying out the provisions of this Act,
through the Director of Lands, who shall act under his immediate control.

Section 4. Subject to said control, the Director of Lands shall have direct executive control of the survey,
classification lease, sale, or any other form of concession or disposition and management of the lands of the
public domain, and his decisions as to questions of fact shall be conclusive when approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.

Section 5. The Director of Lands, with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
shall prepare and issue forms, instructions, rules and regulations consistent with this Act, as may be necessary
and proper to carry into effect the provisions thereof and for the conduct of proceedings arising under such
provisions.

CHAPTER II.

CLASSIFICATION, DELIMITATION AND SURVEY OF LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, FOR THE CONCESSION
THEREOF

Section 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into —

(a) Alienable or disposable

(b) Timber and

(c) Mineral lands

and may it any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the purposes of
their government and disposition.

Section 7. For the purpose of the government and disposition of alienable or disposable public lands, the
Governor-General, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from
time to time declare what lands are open to disposition or concession under this, Act.

Section 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been officially
delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and which have not been reserved for public or
quasi-public uses, not appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner become private property, nor
those on which a private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law may be
claimed, or which, having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so. However, the Governor-
General may, for reasons of public interest, declare lands of the public domain open to disposition before
the same have had their boundaries established or been surveyed, or may, for the same reasons, suspend
their concession or disposition by proclamation duly published or by Act of the Legislature.

Section 9. For the purposes of their government and disposition, the lands of the public domain alienable or
open to disposition shall be classified, according to the use or purposes to which such lands are destined, as
follows:

(a) Agricultural

(b) Commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes.

(c) Educational, charitable, and other similar purposes.

(d) Reservations for town sites, and for public and quasi-public uses.

The Governor-General, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall
from time to time make the classification provided for in this section, and may, at any time and in a similar
manner, transfer lands from one class to another.

Section 10. The words "alienation,'' "disposition," or "Concession" as used in this Act, shall mean any of the
methods authorized by this Act for the acquisition, lease, use or benefit of the lands of the public domain
other than timber or mineral lands.

TITLE II

AGRICULTURAL PUBLIC LANDS

CHAPTER III.

FORMS OF CONCESSION OF AGRICULTURAL LANDS

Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows, and not
otherwise:

(1) For homestead settlement.

(2) By sale.

(3) By lease.

(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.

(a) By judicial legalization.

(b) By administrative legalization (free patent)

CHAPTER IV.

HOMESTEADS

Section 12. Any citizen of the Philippine Islands or of the United States, over the age of eighteen years, or the
head of a family, who does not own more than twenty-four hectares of land in said Islands or has not had
the benefit of any gratuitous allotment of more than twenty-four hectares of land since the occupation of
the Philippine Islands by the United States, may enter a homestead or not exceeding twenty-four hectares
of agricultural land of the public domain.

Section 13. Upon the filing of an application for a homestead, the Director of Lands, if he finds that the
application should be approved, shall do so and authorize the applicant to take possession of the land
upon the payment of five pesos, Philippine currency, as entry fee. Within six months from and after the date
of the approval of the application, the applicant shall begin to work the homestead otherwise he shall lose
his prior right to the land. (As amended by section 1 of Act No. 3517.)

Section 14. No certificate shall be given or patent issued for the land applied for until at least one-fourth of
the land has been improved and cultivated. The period within which the land shall be cultivated shall not
be less than one nor more than five years, from and after the date of the approval of the application. The
applicant shall, within the said period, notify the Director of Lands as soon as he is ready to acquire the title.
If at the date of such notice or at any time within the two years next following the expiration of said period,
the applicant shall prove to the satisfaction of the Director of lands by affidavits of two credible witnesses,
that he has resided in the municipality in which the land is located, or in a municipality adjacent to the
same, and has cultivated at least one-fourth of the land continuously since the approval of the application,
and shall make affidavit that no part of said land has been alienated or encumbered, and that he has
complied with all the requirements of this Act, then, upon the payment of five pesos, he shall be entitled to
a patent. (As amended by section 2 of Act No. 3517).
**************************************************************************************************
Section 22. Any non-Christian native who has not applied for a homestead, desiring to live upon or occupy
land on any of the reservations set aside for the so-called non-Christian tribes may request a permit of
occupation for any tract of land of the public domain reserved for said non-Christian tribes under this Act,
the area of which shall not exceed four hectares. It shall be an essential condition that the applicant for the
permit cultivate and improve the land, and if such cultivation has not been begun within six months from
and after the date on which the permit was received, the permit shall be canceled. The permit shall be for
a term of one year. If at the expiration of this term or at any time therefor, the holder of the permit shall
apply for a homestead under the provisions of this chapter, including the portion for which a permit was
granted to him, he shall have the priority, otherwise the land shall be again open to disposition at the
expiration of the permit.

For each the sum of one peso shall be paid.

(As amended by Sec. 2 of Act 3219 and Sec. 4 of Act 3517).

******************************************************************************************************

Section 29. After at least the second installment has been paid and after the cultivation of the land has
been begun, the purchaser, with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, may
convey or encumber his rights to any person, corporation, or association legally qualified under this Act to
purchase agricultural public lands, provided such conveyance or encumbrance does not affect any right
or interest of the Government in the land. Any sale and encumbrance made without the previous approval
of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources shall be null and void and shall produce the effect of
annulling the acquisition and reverting the property and all rights thereto to the Government, and all
payments on the purchase price theretofore made to the Government shall be forfeited After the sale has
been approved, the vendor shall not lose his right to acquire agricultural public lands under the provisions of
this Act, provided he has the necessary qualifications.

**********************************************************************************************************

Section 33. This chapter shall be held to authorize only one purchase of the maximum amount of land
hereunder by the same person, corporation, association, or partnership; and no corporation, association, or
partnership, any member of which shall have received the benefits of this chapter or of any of the two
preceding chapters, either as an individual or as a member of any other corporation, association, or
partnership, shall purchase any other lands of the public domain under this chapter.

But any purchaser of public land, after having made the last payment upon and cultivated at least one-
fourth of the land purchased, if the same shall be less than the maximum allowed by this Act may purchase
successively additional agricultural public land adjacent to or not distant from the land first purchased, until
the total area of such purchases shall reach the maximum established in this chapter: PROVIDED, That in
making such additional purchase or purchases, the same conditions shall be complied with as prescribed
by this Act for the first purchase. (As amended by sec. 6 of Act No. 3517).

**********************************************************************************************************

Section 44. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby granted time, not to extend
beyond December thirty-first, nineteen hundred and thirty-eight, within which to take advantage of the
benefits of this chapter: PROVIDED, That the several periods of time designated by the Governor-General in
accordance with section forty-two of this Act shall apply also to the lands comprised in the provisions of this
chapter; but this section shall not be construed in the sense of prohibiting any of said persons from acting
under this chapter at any time prior to the period fixed by the Governor-General. (As amended by section 2
of Act 3346).

**********************************************************************************************************

Section 48. Applications for registration under this chapter shall be heard in the Court of First Instance in the
same manner and shall be subject to the same procedure as established in the Land Registration Act for
other applications except that a notice of all such applications, together with a plan of the lands claimed,
shall be immediately forwarded to the Director of Lands, who may appear as a party in such cases:
PROVIDED, That prior to the publication for hearing, all of the papers in said case shall be transmitted by the
clerk of the Attorney-General or officer acting in his stead, in order that he may, if he deems it advisable for
the interests of the Government, investigate all of the alleged in the application or otherwise brought to his
attention. The Attorney-General shall return such papers to the clerk as soon as practicable within three
months.

The final decree of the court shall in every case be the basis for the original certificate of title in favor of the
person entitled to the property under the procedure prescribed in section forty-one of the Land Registration
Act.

*********************************************************************************************************

Section 50. It shall be lawful for the Director of Lands, whenever in the opinion of the Governor-General the
public interests shall require it, to cause to be filed in the proper Court of First Instance, through the Attorney-
General or the officer acting in his stead, a petition against the holder, claimant, possessor, or occupant of
any land who shall not have voluntary come in under the provisions of this chapter or of the Land
Registration Act , stating in substance that the title of such holder, claimant, possessor, or occupant is open
to discussion; or that the boundaries of any such land which has not been brought into court as aforesaid
are open to question; or that it is advisable that the title to such lands be settled and adjudicated, and
praying that the title to any such land or the boundaries thereof or the right to occupancy thereof be
settled and adjudicated. The judicial proceedings under this section shall be in accordance with the laws
on adjudication of title in cadastral proceedings.

*********************************************************************************************************

Section 58. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of section fifty-six shall be disposed of to private
parties by lease only and not otherwise, as soon as the Governor-General, upon recommendation by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall declare that the same are not necessary for the public
service and are open to disposition under this chapter. The lands included in class (d) may be disposed of
by sale or lease under the provisions of this Act.

Section 59. The lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filling, or otherwise shall be surveyed and
may with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, be divided by the Director of
Lands into lots and blocks, with the necessary streets and alleyways between them, and said Director shall
give notice to the public, by publication in the Official Gazette or by other means, that the lots or blocks not
needed for public purposes shall be leased for commercial or industrial or other similar purposes. (As
amended by section 11 of Act 3219).

Section 60. Whenever it is decided that lands covered by this chapter are not needed for public purposes,
the Director of Lands shall ask the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources for authority to dispose of
the same. Upon receipt of such authority, the Director of Lands shall give notice by public advertisement in
the same manner as in the case of leases or sales of agricultural public land, that the Government will lease
or sell, as the case may be, the lots or blocks specified in the advertisement, for the purpose stated in the
notice and subject to the conditions specified in this chapter, (As amended by section 12 of Act 3219 and
section 12 of Act 3517).

Section 61. The leases executed under this chapter by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
shall, among other conditions, contain the following:

(a) The rental shall not be less than three per centum of the appraised and reappraised value of the lands
and one per centum of the appraised or reappraised value of the improvement

(b) The land rented, or the improvements thereon, as the case may be, shall be reappraised every ten years
if the term of the lease is in excess of that period.

(c) The term of the lease shall be as prescribed by section thirty-seven of this Act.

(d) The lessee shall construct permanent improvements appropriate for the purpose for which the lease is
granted, shall commence the construction thereof within six months from the date of the award of the
contract of lease, and shall complete the said construction within eighteen months from the date of the
execution of the contract.

(e) At the expiration of the lease or of any extension of the same, all improvements made by the lessee, his
heirs, executors, administrators, successors, or assigns shall become the property of the Government.
(f) The regulation of all rates and fees charged to the public; and the annual submission to the Government
for approval of all tariffs of such rates and fees.

(g) The continuance of the easements of the coast place and other easements reserved by existing law or
by any laws hereafter enacted by the Legislature.

(h) Subjection to all easements and other rights acquired by the owners of lands bordering upon the
foreshore or marshy land.

The violation of one or any of the conditions specified in the contract shall give rise to the rescission of said
contract. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources may, however, subject to such conditions as
he may prescribe, waive the rescission arising from a violation of the conditions of subsection (d), or extend
the time without which the construction of the improvements shall be commenced and completed. (As
amended by section 13 of Act 3517).

Section 62. The sale of the lands comprised in class (d) of section fifty-six shall, among others, comprise the
following conditions:

(a) The purchaser shall make improvements of a permanent character appropriate for the purpose for
which the land is purchased, shall commence work thereon within six months from the receipt of the
approval of the purchase, and shall complete the construction of said improvements within eighteen
months from the date of such approval or award; otherwise the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources may rescind the contract.

(b) The purchase price shall be paid cash down or in annual installments, not to exceed ten.

The contract of sale may contain other conditions not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. (As
amended by section 13 of Act 3219 and section 14 of Act 3517).

*********************************************************************************************************

Section 58. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of section fifty-six shall be disposed of to private
parties by lease only and not otherwise, as soon as the Governor-General, upon recommendation by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall declare that the same are not necessary for the public
service and are open to disposition under this chapter. The lands included in class (d) may be disposed of
by sale or lease under the provisions of this Act.

Section 59. The lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filling, or otherwise shall be surveyed and
may with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, be divided by the Director of
Lands into lots and blocks, with the necessary streets and alleyways between them, and said Director shall
give notice to the public, by publication in the Official Gazette or by other means, that the lots or blocks not
needed for public purposes shall be leased for commercial or industrial or other similar purposes. (As
amended by section 11 of Act 3219).

Section 60. Whenever it is decided that lands covered by this chapter are not needed for public purposes,
the Director of Lands shall ask the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources for authority to dispose of
the same. Upon receipt of such authority, the Director of Lands shall give notice by public advertisement in
the same manner as in the case of leases or sales of agricultural public land, that the Government will lease
or sell, as the case may be, the lots or blocks specified in the advertisement, for the purpose stated in the
notice and subject to the conditions specified in this chapter, (As amended by section 12 of Act 3219 and
section 12 of Act 3517).

__________________________________________________________________________________________

G.R. No. 133250 July 9, 2002

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,

vs.
PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

CARPIO, J.:
This is an original Petition for Mandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining
order. The petition seeks to compel the Public Estates Authority ("PEA" for brevity) to disclose all facts on PEA's then
on-going renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation ("AMARI" for brevity) to reclaim
portions of Manila Bay. The petition further seeks to enjoin PEA from signing a new agreement with AMARI involving
such reclamation.

The Facts

On November 20, 1973, the government, through the Commissioner of Public Highways, signed a contract with the
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines ("CDCP" for brevity) to reclaim certain foreshore and
offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included the construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite
Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in consideration of fifty percent of the total reclaimed
land.

On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No.
1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire, x x x
lease and sell any and all kinds of lands."1 On the same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No.
1085 transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay" 2 under the Manila-
Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).

On December 29, 1981, then President Marcos issued a memorandum directing PEA to amend its contract with
CDCP, so that "[A]ll future works in MCCRRP x x x shall be funded and owned by PEA." Accordingly, PEA and CDCP
executed a Memorandum of Agreement dated December 29, 1981, which stated:

"(i) CDCP shall undertake all reclamation, construction, and such other works in the MCCRRP as may be
agreed upon by the parties, to be paid according to progress of works on a unit price/lump sum basis for items
of work to be agreed upon, subject to price escalation, retention and other terms and conditions provided for
in Presidential Decree No. 1594. All the financing required for such works shall be provided by PEA.

xxx

(iii) x x x CDCP shall give up all its development rights and hereby agrees to cede and transfer in favor of
PEA, all of the rights, title, interest and participation of CDCP in and to all the areas of land reclaimed by
CDCP in the MCCRRP as of December 30, 1981 which have not yet been sold, transferred or otherwise
disposed of by CDCP as of said date, which areas consist of approximately Ninety-Nine Thousand Four
Hundred Seventy Three (99,473) square meters in the Financial Center Area covered by land pledge No. 5
and approximately Three Million Three Hundred Eighty Two Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty Eight
(3,382,888) square meters of reclaimed areas at varying elevations above Mean Low Water Level located
outside the Financial Center Area and the First Neighborhood Unit."3

On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring to
PEA "the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP)
containing a total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square
meters." Subsequently, on April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Parañaque issued Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands known as
the "Freedom Islands" located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Parañaque City. The
Freedom Islands have a total land area of One Million Five Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Four Hundred and Forty
One (1,578,441) square meters or 157.841 hectares.

On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement ("JVA" for brevity) with AMARI, a private corporation,
to develop the Freedom Islands. The JVA also required the reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of submerged
areas surrounding these islands to complete the configuration in the Master Development Plan of the Southern
Reclamation Project-MCCRRP. PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding.4 On
April 28, 1995, the Board of Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245, confirmed the JVA. 5 On June 8, 1995, then
President Fidel V. Ramos, through then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA. 6

On November 29, 1996, then Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered a privilege speech in the Senate and
denounced the JVA as the "grandmother of all scams." As a result, the Senate Committee on Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,
conducted a joint investigation. The Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation in Senate
Committee Report No. 560 dated September 16, 1997. 7 Among the conclusions of their report are: (1) the reclaimed
lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not
classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the
Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.
On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential Administrative Order No. 365 creating a
Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in view of Senate Committee Report No. 560. The
members of the Legal Task Force were the Secretary of Justice, 8 the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel,9 and the
Government Corporate Counsel.10 The Legal Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions
reached by the Senate Committees.11

On April 4 and 5, 1998, the Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today published reports that there were on-going
renegotiations between PEA and AMARI under an order issued by then President Fidel V. Ramos. According to these
reports, PEA Director Nestor Kalaw, PEA Chairman Arsenio Yulo and retired Navy Officer Sergio Cruz composed the
negotiating panel of PEA.

On April 13, 1998, Antonio M. Zulueta filed before the Court a Petition for Prohibition with Application for the Issuance
of a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction docketed as G.R. No. 132994 seeking to nullify the JVA.
The Court dismissed the petition "for unwarranted disregard of judicial hierarchy, without prejudice to the refiling of the
case before the proper court."12

On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez ("Petitioner" for brevity) as a taxpayer, filed the instant Petition for
Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.
Petitioner contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to
AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28,
Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern. Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a blatant violation of Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations.
Finally, petitioner asserts that he seeks to enjoin the loss of billions of pesos in properties of the State that are of
public dominion.

After several motions for extension of time, 13 PEA and AMARI filed their Comments on October 19, 1998 and June 25,
1998, respectively. Meanwhile, on December 28, 1998, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion: (a) to require PEA to
submit the terms of the renegotiated PEA-AMARI contract; (b) for issuance of a temporary restraining order; and (c) to
set the case for hearing on oral argument. Petitioner filed a Reiterative Motion for Issuance of a TRO dated May 26,
1999, which the Court denied in a Resolution dated June 22, 1999.

In a Resolution dated March 23, 1999, the Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their
respective memoranda.

On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture Agreement ("Amended JVA," for brevity). On
May 28, 1999, the Office of the President under the administration of then President Joseph E. Estrada approved the
Amended JVA.

Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President, petitioner now prays that on "constitutional
and statutory grounds the renegotiated contract be declared null and void." 14

The Issues

The issues raised by petitioner, PEA15 and AMARI16 are as follows:

I. WHETHER THE PRINCIPAL RELIEFS PRAYED FOR IN THE PETITION ARE MOOT AND ACADEMIC
BECAUSE OF SUBSEQUENT EVENTS;

II. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL FOR FAILING TO OBSERVE THE PRINCIPLE
GOVERNING THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS;

III. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL FOR NON-EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE

REMEDIES;

IV. WHETHER PETITIONER HAS LOCUS STANDI TO BRING THIS SUIT;

V. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO INFORMATION INCLUDES OFFICIAL INFORMATION

ON ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE A FINAL AGREEMENT;

VI. WHETHER THE STIPULATIONS IN THE AMENDED JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT FOR THE
TRANSFER TO AMARI OF CERTAIN LANDS, RECLAIMED AND STILL TO BE RECLAIMED, VIOLATE THE
1987 CONSTITUTION; AND
 VII. WHETHER THE COURT IS THE PROPER FORUM FOR RAISING THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE
AMENDED JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT IS GROSSLY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT.

The Court's Ruling

First issue: whether the principal reliefs prayed for in the petition are moot and academic because of
subsequent events.

The petition prays that PEA publicly disclose the "terms and conditions of the on-going negotiations for a new
agreement." The petition also prays that the Court enjoin PEA from "privately entering into, perfecting and/or
executing any new agreement with AMARI."

PEA and AMARI claim the petition is now moot and academic because AMARI furnished petitioner on June 21, 1999
a copy of the signed Amended JVA containing the terms and conditions agreed upon in the renegotiations. Thus, PEA
has satisfied petitioner's prayer for a public disclosure of the renegotiations. Likewise, petitioner's prayer to enjoin the
signing of the Amended JVA is now moot because PEA and AMARI have already signed the Amended JVA on March
30, 1999. Moreover, the Office of the President has approved the Amended JVA on May 28, 1999.

Petitioner counters that PEA and AMARI cannot avoid the constitutional issue by simply fast-tracking the signing and
approval of the Amended JVA before the Court could act on the issue. Presidential approval does not resolve the
constitutional issue or remove it from the ambit of judicial review.

We rule that the signing of the Amended JVA by PEA and AMARI and its approval by the President cannot operate to
moot the petition and divest the Court of its jurisdiction. PEA and AMARI have still to implement the Amended JVA.
The prayer to enjoin the signing of the Amended JVA on constitutional grounds necessarily includes preventing its
implementation if in the meantime PEA and AMARI have signed one in violation of the Constitution. Petitioner's
principal basis in assailing the renegotiation of the JVA is its violation of Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, which
prohibits the government from alienating lands of the public domain to private corporations. If the Amended JVA
indeed violates the Constitution, it is the duty of the Court to enjoin its implementation, and if already implemented, to
annul the effects of such unconstitutional contract.

The Amended JVA is not an ordinary commercial contract but one which seeks to transfer title and ownership to
367.5 hectares of reclaimed lands and submerged areas of Manila Bay to a single private corporation. It now
becomes more compelling for the Court to resolve the issue to insure the government itself does not violate a
provision of the Constitution intended to safeguard the national patrimony. Supervening events, whether intended or
accidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution. In the
instant case, if the Amended JVA runs counter to the Constitution, the Court can still prevent the transfer of title and
ownership of alienable lands of the public domain in the name of AMARI. Even in cases where supervening events
had made the cases moot, the Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate
17
controlling principles to guide the bench, bar, and the public.

Also, the instant petition is a case of first impression. All previous decisions of the Court involving Section 3, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution, or its counterpart provision in the 1973 Constitution, 18 covered agricultural lands sold to
private corporations which acquired the lands from private parties. The transferors of the private corporations claimed
or could claim the right to judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles 19 under Title II of Commonwealth Act. 141
("CA No. 141" for brevity). In the instant case, AMARI seeks to acquire from PEA, a public corporation, reclaimed
lands and submerged areas for non-agricultural purposes by purchase under PD No. 1084 (charter of PEA)
and Title III of CA No. 141. Certain undertakings by AMARI under the Amended JVA constitute the consideration for
the purchase. Neither AMARI nor PEA can claim judicial confirmation of their titles because the lands covered by the
Amended JVA are newly reclaimed or still to be reclaimed. Judicial confirmation of imperfect title requires open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain for at least thirty years since
June 12, 1945 or earlier. Besides, the deadline for filing applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect title expired
on December 31, 1987.20

Lastly, there is a need to resolve immediately the constitutional issue raised in this petition because of the possible
transfer at any time by PEA to AMARI of title and ownership to portions of the reclaimed lands. Under the Amended
JVA, PEA is obligated to transfer to AMARI the latter's seventy percent proportionate share in the reclaimed areas as
the reclamation progresses. The Amended JVA even allows AMARI to mortgage at any time the entire reclaimed area
21
to raise financing for the reclamation project.

Second issue: whether the petition merits dismissal for failing to observe the principle governing the
hierarchy of courts.
PEA and AMARI claim petitioner ignored the judicial hierarchy by seeking relief directly from the Court. The principle
of hierarchy of courts applies generally to cases involving factual questions. As it is not a trier of facts, the Court
cannot entertain cases involving factual issues. The instant case, however, raises constitutional issues of
transcendental importance to the public. 22 The Court can resolve this case without determining any factual issue
related to the case. Also, the instant case is a petition for mandamus which falls under the original jurisdiction of the
Court under Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution. We resolve to exercise primary jurisdiction over the instant case.

Third issue: whether the petition merits dismissal for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.

PEA faults petitioner for seeking judicial intervention in compelling PEA to disclose publicly certain information without
first asking PEA the needed information. PEA claims petitioner's direct resort to the Court violates the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies. It also violates the rule that mandamus may issue only if there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

PEA distinguishes the instant case from Tañada v. Tuvera 23 where the Court granted the petition for mandamus even
if the petitioners there did not initially demand from the Office of the President the publication of the presidential
decrees. PEA points out that in Tañada, the Executive Department had an affirmative statutory duty under Article 2
of the Civil Code24 and Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 63825 to publish the presidential decrees. There was,
therefore, no need for the petitioners in Tañada to make an initial demand from the Office of the President. In the
instant case, PEA claims it has no affirmative statutory duty to disclose publicly information about its renegotiation of
the JVA. Thus, PEA asserts that the Court must apply the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies to the
instant case in view of the failure of petitioner here to demand initially from PEA the needed information.

The original JVA sought to dispose to AMARI public lands held by PEA, a government corporation. Under Section 79
26
of the Government Auditing Code, the disposition of government lands to private parties requires public
bidding. PEA was under a positive legal duty to disclose to the public the terms and conditions for the sale of
its lands. The law obligated PEA to make this public disclosure even without demand from petitioner or from anyone.
PEA failed to make this public disclosure because the original JVA, like the Amended JVA, was the result of
a negotiated contract, not of a public bidding. Considering that PEA had an affirmative statutory duty to make the
public disclosure, and was even in breach of this legal duty, petitioner had the right to seek direct judicial intervention.

Moreover, and this alone is determinative of this issue, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not
apply when the issue involved is a purely legal or constitutional question. 27 The principal issue in the instant case is
the capacity of AMARI to acquire lands held by PEA in view of the constitutional ban prohibiting the alienation of lands
of the public domain to private corporations. We rule that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does
not apply in the instant case.

Fourth issue: whether petitioner has locus standi to bring this suit

PEA argues that petitioner has no standing to institute mandamus proceedings to enforce his constitutional right to
information without a showing that PEA refused to perform an affirmative duty imposed on PEA by the Constitution.
PEA also claims that petitioner has not shown that he will suffer any concrete injury because of the signing or
implementation of the Amended JVA. Thus, there is no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of
judicial review.

The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer's suit because the petition seeks to compel PEA to comply with its
constitutional duties. There are two constitutional issues involved here. First is the right of citizens to information on
matters of public concern. Second is the application of a constitutional provision intended to insure the equitable
distribution of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino citizens. The thrust of the first issue is to compel
PEA to disclose publicly information on the sale of government lands worth billions of pesos, information which the
Constitution and statutory law mandate PEA to disclose. The thrust of the second issue is to prevent PEA from
alienating hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the public domain in violation of the Constitution, compelling PEA
to comply with a constitutional duty to the nation.

Moreover, the petition raises matters of transcendental importance to the public. In Chavez v. PCGG,28 the Court
upheld the right of a citizen to bring a taxpayer's suit on matters of transcendental importance to the public, thus -

"Besides, petitioner emphasizes, the matter of recovering the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses is an issue of
'transcendental importance to the public.' He asserts that ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and
prosecute actions questioning the validity of acts or orders of government agencies or instrumentalities, if the
issues raised are of 'paramount public interest,' and if they 'immediately affect the social, economic and moral
well being of the people.'
 Moreover, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest, when the proceeding
involves the assertion of a public right, such as in this case. He invokes several decisions of this Court which
have set aside the procedural matter of locus standi, when the subject of the case involved public interest.

xxx

In Tañada v. Tuvera, the Court asserted that when the issue concerns a public right and the object of
mandamus is to obtain the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real parties in
interest; and because it is sufficient that petitioner is a citizen and as such is interested in the execution of the
laws, he need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result of the action. In the aforesaid
case, the petitioners sought to enforce their right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right then
recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, in connection with the rule that laws in order to be
valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated. In ruling
for the petitioners' legal standing, the Court declared that the right they sought to be enforced 'is a public right
recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land.'

Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, while reiterating Tañada, further declared that 'when a mandamus
proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the
mere fact that petitioner is a citizen and, therefore, part of the general 'public' which possesses the right.'

Further, in Albano v. Reyes, we said that while expenditure of public funds may not have been involved under
the questioned contract for the development, management and operation of the Manila International Container
Terminal, 'public interest [was] definitely involved considering the important role [of the subject contract] . . . in
the economic development of the country and the magnitude of the financial consideration involved.' We
concluded that, as a consequence, the disclosure provision in the Constitution would constitute sufficient
authority for upholding the petitioner's standing.

Similarly, the instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information and access to official
records, documents and papers — a right guaranteed under Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioner, a former solicitor general, is a Filipino citizen. Because of the satisfaction of the two basic
requisites laid down by decisional law to sustain petitioner's legal standing, i.e. (1) the enforcement of a public
right (2) espoused by a Filipino citizen, we rule that the petition at bar should be allowed."

We rule that since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves the enforcement of constitutional rights - to
information and to the equitable diffusion of natural resources - matters of transcendental public importance, the
petitioner has the requisite locus standi.

Fifth issue: whether the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going
negotiations before a final agreement.

Section 7, Article III of the Constitution explains the people's right to information on matters of public concern in this
manner:

"Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions,
as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." (Emphasis supplied)

The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest reinforces the people's right to
information on matters of public concern. This State policy is expressed in Section 28, Article II of the Constitution,
thus:

"Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of
full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest." (Emphasis supplied)

These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in the operations of the
government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to exercise effectively other constitutional rights.
These twin provisions are essential to the exercise of freedom of expression. If the government does not disclose its
official acts, transactions and decisions to citizens, whatever citizens say, even if expressed without any restraint, will
be speculative and amount to nothing. These twin provisions are also essential to hold public officials "at all times x x
x accountable to the people,"29 for unless citizens have the proper information, they cannot hold public officials
accountable for anything. Armed with the right information, citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the
formulation of government policies and their effective implementation. An informed citizenry is essential to the
existence and proper functioning of any democracy. As explained by the Court in Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.30 –
 "An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication
between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political
discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will.
Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to
formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have
access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit."

31
PEA asserts, citing Chavez v. PCGG, that in cases of on-going negotiations the right to information is limited to
"definite propositions of the government." PEA maintains the right does not include access to "intra-agency or inter-
agency recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of
being formulated or are in the 'exploratory stage'."

Also, AMARI contends that petitioner cannot invoke the right at the pre-decisional stage or before the closing of the
transaction. To support its contention, AMARI cites the following discussion in the 1986 Constitutional Commission:

"Mr. Suarez. And when we say 'transactions' which should be distinguished from contracts, agreements, or
treaties or whatever, does the Gentleman refer to the steps leading to the consummation of the contract, or
does he refer to the contract itself?

Mr. Ople: The 'transactions' used here, I suppose is generic and therefore, it can cover both steps
leading to a contract and already a consummated contract, Mr. Presiding Officer.

Mr. Suarez: This contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the
transaction.

Mr. Ople: Yes, subject only to reasonable safeguards on the national interest.

Mr. Suarez: Thank you."32 (Emphasis supplied)

AMARI argues there must first be a consummated contract before petitioner can invoke the right. Requiring
government officials to reveal their deliberations at the pre-decisional stage will degrade the quality of decision-making
in government agencies. Government officials will hesitate to express their real sentiments during deliberations if there
is immediate public dissemination of their discussions, putting them under all kinds of pressure before they decide.

We must first distinguish between information the law on public bidding requires PEA to disclose publicly, and
information the constitutional right to information requires PEA to release to the public. Before the consummation of
the contract, PEA must, on its own and without demand from anyone, disclose to the public matters relating to the
disposition of its property. These include the size, location, technical description and nature of the property being
disposed of, the terms and conditions of the disposition, the parties qualified to bid, the minimum price and similar
information. PEA must prepare all these data and disclose them to the public at the start of the disposition process,
long before the consummation of the contract, because the Government Auditing Code requires public bidding. If
PEA fails to make this disclosure, any citizen can demand from PEA this information at any time during the bidding
process.

Information, however, on on-going evaluation or review of bids or proposals being undertaken by the bidding or
review committee is not immediately accessible under the right to information. While the evaluation or review is still
on-going, there are no "official acts, transactions, or decisions" on the bids or proposals. However, once the
committee makes its official recommendation, there arises a "definite proposition" on the part of the government.
From this moment, the public's right to information attaches, and any citizen can access all the non-proprietary
information leading to such definite proposition. In Chavez v. PCGG,33 the Court ruled as follows:

"Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, we believe that it is incumbent upon the PCGG and
its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any
proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth.
Such information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the government, not necessarily to intra-
agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions are
still in the process of being formulated or are in the "exploratory" stage. There is need, of course, to observe
the same restrictions on disclosure of information in general, as discussed earlier – such as on matters
involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations, intelligence and other classified information."
(Emphasis supplied)

Contrary to AMARI's contention, the commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional Commission understood that the right
to information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the
transaction." Certainly, a consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to information.
Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may
be too late for the public to expose its defects.1âwphi1.nêt

Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract, which may be grossly
disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes a fait accompli. This negates the State policy of full
transparency on matters of public concern, a situation which the framers of the Constitution could not have intended.
Such a requirement will prevent the citizenry from participating in the public discussion of any proposed contract,
effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill of Rights. We can allow neither an emasculation of a
constitutional right, nor a retreat by the State of its avowed "policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest."

The right covers three categories of information which are "matters of public concern," namely: (1) official records; (2)
documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions and decisions; and (3) government research data used
in formulating policies. The first category refers to any document that is part of the public records in the custody of
government agencies or officials. The second category refers to documents and papers recording, evidencing,
establishing, confirming, supporting, justifying or explaining official acts, transactions or decisions of government
agencies or officials. The third category refers to research data, whether raw, collated or processed, owned by the
government and used in formulating government policies.

The information that petitioner may access on the renegotiation of the JVA includes evaluation reports,
recommendations, legal and expert opinions, minutes of meetings, terms of reference and other documents attached
to such reports or minutes, all relating to the JVA. However, the right to information does not compel PEA to prepare
lists, abstracts, summaries and the like relating to the renegotiation of the JVA. 34 The right only affords access to
records, documents and papers, which means the opportunity to inspect and copy them. One who exercises the right
must copy the records, documents and papers at his expense. The exercise of the right is also subject to reasonable
regulations to protect the integrity of the public records and to minimize disruption to government operations, like rules
specifying when and how to conduct the inspection and copying. 35

The right to information, however, does not extend to matters recognized as privileged information under the
separation of powers.36 The right does not also apply to information on military and diplomatic secrets, information
affecting national security, and information on investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the
prosecution of the accused, which courts have long recognized as confidential.37 The right may also be subject to
other limitations that Congress may impose by law.

There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged information rooted in the
separation of powers. The information does not cover Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions
during closed-door Cabinet meetings which, like internal deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate
courts, or executive sessions of either house of Congress, 38 are recognized as confidential. This kind of information
cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of government. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments,
free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-
making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power. 39 This is not the situation in the instant
case.

We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right to information includes official information on on-going
negotiations before a final contract. The information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the
government and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets
and similar matters affecting national security and public order.40 Congress has also prescribed other limitations on the
right to information in several legislations. 41

Sixth issue: whether stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands, reclaimed or to be
reclaimed, violate the Constitution.

The Regalian Doctrine

The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the Regalian doctrine which holds
that the State owns all lands and waters of the public domain. Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines,
ownership of all "lands, territories and possessions" in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown. 42 The King, as
the sovereign ruler and representative of the people, acquired and owned all lands and territories in the Philippines
except those he disposed of by grant or sale to private individuals.

The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted the Regalian doctrine substituting, however, the State, in lieu of the
King, as the owner of all lands and waters of the public domain. The Regalian doctrine is the foundation of the time-
honored principle of land ownership that "all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or
by grant, belong to the public domain." 43 Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889, which is now Article 420 of the Civil
Code of 1950, incorporated the Regalian doctrine.

Ownership and Disposition of Reclaimed Lands

The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 was the first statutory law governing the ownership and disposition of reclaimed
lands in the Philippines. On May 18, 1907, the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1654 which provided for the
lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the government to corporations and individuals. Later, on
November 29, 1919, the Philippine Legislature approved Act No. 2874, the Public Land Act, which authorized the
lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the government to corporations and individuals. On November 7,
1936, the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act,
which authorized the lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the government to corporations and
individuals. CA No. 141 continues to this day as the general law governing the classification and disposition of lands
of the public domain.

The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 and the Civil Code of 1889

Under the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, the shores, bays, coves, inlets and all waters within the maritime zone of
the Spanish territory belonged to the public domain for public use. 44 The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 allowed the
reclamation of the sea under Article 5, which provided as follows:

"Article 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed by the State, or by the
provinces, pueblos or private persons, with proper permission, shall become the property of the party
constructing such works, unless otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority."

Under the Spanish Law of Waters, land reclaimed from the sea belonged to the party undertaking the reclamation,
provided the government issued the necessary permit and did not reserve ownership of the reclaimed land to the
State.

Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889 defined property of public dominion as follows:

"Art. 339. Property of public dominion is –

1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the
State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a similar character;

2. That belonging exclusively to the State which, without being of general public use, is employed in some
public service, or in the development of the national wealth, such as walls, fortresses, and other works for the
defense of the territory, and mines, until granted to private individuals."

Property devoted to public use referred to property open for use by the public. In contrast, property devoted to public
service referred to property used for some specific public service and open only to those authorized to use the
property.

Property of public dominion referred not only to property devoted to public use, but also to property not so used but
employed to develop the national wealth. This class of property constituted property of public dominion although
employed for some economic or commercial activity to increase the national wealth.

Article 341 of the Civil Code of 1889 governed the re-classification of property of public dominion into private property,
to wit:

"Art. 341. Property of public dominion, when no longer devoted to public use or to the defense of the territory,
shall become a part of the private property of the State."

This provision, however, was not self-executing. The legislature, or the executive department pursuant to law, must
declare the property no longer needed for public use or territorial defense before the government could lease or
alienate the property to private parties. 45

Act No. 1654 of the Philippine Commission

On May 8, 1907, the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1654 which regulated the lease of reclaimed and
foreshore lands. The salient provisions of this law were as follows:
 "Section 1. The control and disposition of the foreshore as defined in existing law, and the title to all
Government or public lands made or reclaimed by the Government by dredging or filling or otherwise
throughout the Philippine Islands, shall be retained by the Government without prejudice to vested rights
and without prejudice to rights conceded to the City of Manila in the Luneta Extension.

Section 2. (a) The Secretary of the Interior shall cause all Government or public lands made or reclaimed by
the Government by dredging or filling or otherwise to be divided into lots or blocks, with the necessary streets
and alleyways located thereon, and shall cause plats and plans of such surveys to be prepared and filed with
the Bureau of Lands.

(b) Upon completion of such plats and plans the Governor-General shall give notice to the public that
such parts of the lands so made or reclaimed as are not needed for public purposes will be leased for
commercial and business purposes, x x x.

xxx

(e) The leases above provided for shall be disposed of to the highest and best bidder therefore, subject
to such regulations and safeguards as the Governor-General may by executive order prescribe." (Emphasis
supplied)

Act No. 1654 mandated that the government should retain title to all lands reclaimed by the government. The
Act also vested in the government control and disposition of foreshore lands. Private parties could lease lands
reclaimed by the government only if these lands were no longer needed for public purpose. Act No. 1654
mandated public bidding in the lease of government reclaimed lands. Act No. 1654 made government reclaimed
lands sui generis in that unlike other public lands which the government could sell to private parties, these reclaimed
lands were available only for lease to private parties.

Act No. 1654, however, did not repeal Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. Act No. 1654 did not prohibit
private parties from reclaiming parts of the sea under Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters. Lands reclaimed from
the sea by private parties with government permission remained private lands.

Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature

On November 29, 1919, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 2874, the Public Land Act. 46 The salient provisions
of Act No. 2874, on reclaimed lands, were as follows:

"Sec. 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into –

(a) Alienable or disposable,

(b) Timber, and

(c) Mineral lands, x x x.

Sec. 7. For the purposes of the government and disposition of alienable or disposable public lands, the
Governor-General, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
shall from time to time declare what lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act."

Sec. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been
officially delimited or classified x x x.

xxx

Sec. 55. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor mineral land, shall be classified
as suitable for residential purposes or for commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes other
than agricultural purposes, and shall be open to disposition or concession, shall be disposed of under the
provisions of this chapter, and not otherwise.

Sec. 56. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:

(a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filling, or other means;

 (b) Foreshore;

(c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores or banks of navigable lakes
or rivers;

(d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes.

x x x.

Sec. 58. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of section fifty-six shall be disposed of to
private parties by lease only and not otherwise, as soon as the Governor-General, upon
recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall declare that the same
are not necessary for the public service and are open to disposition under this chapter. The lands
included in class (d) may be disposed of by sale or lease under the provisions of this Act." (Emphasis
supplied)

Section 6 of Act No. 2874 authorized the Governor-General to "classify lands of the public domain into x x x alienable
or disposable"47 lands. Section 7 of the Act empowered the Governor-General to "declare what lands are open to
disposition or concession." Section 8 of the Act limited alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have
been "officially delimited and classified."

Section 56 of Act No. 2874 stated that lands "disposable under this title 48 shall be classified" as government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands, as well as other lands. All these lands, however, must be suitable for
residential, commercial, industrial or other productive non-agricultural purposes. These provisions vested upon the
Governor-General the power to classify inalienable lands of the public domain into disposable lands of the public
domain. These provisions also empowered the Governor-General to classify further such disposable lands of the
public domain into government reclaimed, foreshore or marshy lands of the public domain, as well as other non-
agricultural lands.

Section 58 of Act No. 2874 categorically mandated that disposable lands of the public domain classified as
government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands "shall be disposed of to private parties by lease only and not
otherwise." The Governor-General, before allowing the lease of these lands to private parties, must formally declare
that the lands were "not necessary for the public service." Act No. 2874 reiterated the State policy to lease and not to
sell government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands of the public domain, a policy first enunciated in 1907 in Act
No. 1654. Government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands remained sui generis, as the only alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain that the government could not sell to private parties.

The rationale behind this State policy is obvious. Government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy public lands for non-
agricultural purposes retain their inherent potential as areas for public service. This is the reason the government
prohibited the sale, and only allowed the lease, of these lands to private parties. The State always reserved these
lands for some future public service.

Act No. 2874 did not authorize the reclassification of government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands into other
non-agricultural lands under Section 56 (d). Lands falling under Section 56 (d) were the only lands for non-agricultural
purposes the government could sell to private parties. Thus, under Act No. 2874, the government could not sell
government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands to private parties, unless the legislature passed a law allowing
their sale.49

Act No. 2874 did not prohibit private parties from reclaiming parts of the sea pursuant to Section 5 of the Spanish Law
of Waters of 1866. Lands reclaimed from the sea by private parties with government permission remained private
lands.

Dispositions under the 1935 Constitution

On May 14, 1935, the 1935 Constitution took effect upon its ratification by the Filipino people. The 1935 Constitution,
in adopting the Regalian doctrine, declared in Section 1, Article XIII, that –

"Section 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum,
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to
the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by
such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the
Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation,
 development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five
years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries,
or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the
measure and limit of the grant." (Emphasis supplied)

The 1935 Constitution barred the alienation of all natural resources except public agricultural lands, which were the
only natural resources the State could alienate. Thus, foreshore lands, considered part of the State's natural
resources, became inalienable by constitutional fiat, available only for lease for 25 years, renewable for another 25
years. The government could alienate foreshore lands only after these lands were reclaimed and classified as
alienable agricultural lands of the public domain. Government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain, being
neither timber nor mineral lands, fell under the classification of public agricultural lands. 50 However, government
reclaimed and marshy lands, although subject to classification as disposable public agricultural lands, could only be
leased and not sold to private parties because of Act No. 2874.

The prohibition on private parties from acquiring ownership of government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public
domain was only a statutory prohibition and the legislature could therefore remove such prohibition. The 1935
Constitution did not prohibit individuals and corporations from acquiring government reclaimed and marshy lands of
the public domain that were classified as agricultural lands under existing public land laws. Section 2, Article XIII of the
1935 Constitution provided as follows:

"Section 2. No private corporation or association may acquire, lease, or hold public agricultural lands
in excess of one thousand and twenty four hectares, nor may any individual acquire such lands by
purchase in excess of one hundred and forty hectares, or by lease in excess of one thousand and
twenty-four hectares, or by homestead in excess of twenty-four hectares. Lands adapted to grazing, not
exceeding two thousand hectares, may be leased to an individual, private corporation, or association."
(Emphasis supplied)

Still, after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the legislature did not repeal Section 58 of Act No. 2874 to open for
sale to private parties government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain. On the contrary, the legislature
continued the long established State policy of retaining for the government title and ownership of government
reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain.

Commonwealth Act No. 141 of the Philippine National Assembly

On November 7, 1936, the National Assembly approved Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land
Act, which compiled the then existing laws on lands of the public domain. CA No. 141, as amended, remains to this
day the existing general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other than
timber and mineral lands.51

Section 6 of CA No. 141 empowers the President to classify lands of the public domain into "alienable or
disposable"52 lands of the public domain, which prior to such classification are inalienable and outside the commerce
of man. Section 7 of CA No. 141 authorizes the President to "declare what lands are open to disposition or
concession." Section 8 of CA No. 141 states that the government can declare open for disposition or concession only
lands that are "officially delimited and classified." Sections 6, 7 and 8 of CA No. 141 read as follows:

"Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall
from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into –

(a) Alienable or disposable,

(b) Timber, and

(c) Mineral lands,

and may at any time and in like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, 53 for the purpose of
their administration and disposition.

Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or disposable public lands, the
President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to
time declare what lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act.

Sec. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have been
officially delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and which have not been reserved
 for public or quasi-public uses, nor appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner become private
property, nor those on which a private right authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid law may
be claimed, or which, having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so. x x x."

Thus, before the government could alienate or dispose of lands of the public domain, the President must first officially
classify these lands as alienable or disposable, and then declare them open to disposition or concession. There must
be no law reserving these lands for public or quasi-public uses.

The salient provisions of CA No. 141, on government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands of the public domain, are
as follows:

"Sec. 58. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor mineral land, is
intended to be used for residential purposes or for commercial, industrial, or other productive
purposes other than agricultural, and is open to disposition or concession, shall be disposed of under
the provisions of this chapter and not otherwise.

Sec. 59. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:

(a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filling, or other means;

(b) Foreshore;

(c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores or banks of navigable lakes
or rivers;

(d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes.

Sec. 60. Any tract of land comprised under this title may be leased or sold, as the case may be, to any
person, corporation, or association authorized to purchase or lease public lands for agricultural purposes. x x
x.

Sec. 61. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of section fifty-nine shall be disposed of to
private parties by lease only and not otherwise, as soon as the President, upon recommendation by the
Secretary of Agriculture, shall declare that the same are not necessary for the public service and are
open to disposition under this chapter. The lands included in class (d) may be disposed of by sale or
lease under the provisions of this Act." (Emphasis supplied)

Section 61 of CA No. 141 readopted, after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, Section 58 of Act No. 2874
prohibiting the sale of government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy disposable lands of the public domain. All these
lands are intended for residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural purposes. As before, Section 61
allowed only the lease of such lands to private parties. The government could sell to private parties only lands falling
under Section 59 (d) of CA No. 141, or those lands for non-agricultural purposes not classified as government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy disposable lands of the public domain. Foreshore lands, however, became
inalienable under the 1935 Constitution which only allowed the lease of these lands to qualified private parties.

Section 58 of CA No. 141 expressly states that disposable lands of the public domain intended for residential,
commercial, industrial or other productive purposes other than agricultural "shall be disposed of under the
provisions of this chapter and not otherwise." Under Section 10 of CA No. 141, the term "disposition" includes
lease of the land. Any disposition of government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy disposable lands for non-
agricultural purposes must comply with Chapter IX, Title III of CA No. 141, 54 unless a subsequent law amended or
repealed these provisions.

In his concurring opinion in the landmark case of Republic Real Estate Corporation v. Court of Appeals,55 Justice
Reynato S. Puno summarized succinctly the law on this matter, as follows:

"Foreshore lands are lands of public dominion intended for public use. So too are lands reclaimed by the
government by dredging, filling, or other means. Act 1654 mandated that the control and disposition of the
foreshore and lands under water remained in the national government. Said law allowed only the 'leasing' of
reclaimed land. The Public Land Acts of 1919 and 1936 also declared that the foreshore and lands reclaimed
by the government were to be "disposed of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise." Before leasing,
however, the Governor-General, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, had first to determine that the land reclaimed was not necessary for the public service. This
requisite must have been met before the land could be disposed of. But even then, the foreshore and lands
 under water were not to be alienated and sold to private parties. The disposition of the reclaimed land
was only by lease. The land remained property of the State." (Emphasis supplied)

As observed by Justice Puno in his concurring opinion, "Commonwealth Act No. 141 has remained in effect at
present."

The State policy prohibiting the sale to private parties of government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands
of the public domain, first implemented in 1907 was thus reaffirmed in CA No. 141 after the 1935 Constitution took
effect. The prohibition on the sale of foreshore lands, however, became a constitutional edict under the 1935
Constitution. Foreshore lands became inalienable as natural resources of the State, unless reclaimed by the
government and classified as agricultural lands of the public domain, in which case they would fall under the
classification of government reclaimed lands.

After the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the public domain
continued to be only leased and not sold to private parties. 56 These lands remained sui generis, as the only alienable
or disposable lands of the public domain the government could not sell to private parties.

Since then and until now, the only way the government can sell to private parties government reclaimed and marshy
disposable lands of the public domain is for the legislature to pass a law authorizing such sale. CA No. 141 does not
authorize the President to reclassify government reclaimed and marshy lands into other non-agricultural lands under
Section 59 (d). Lands classified under Section 59 (d) are the only alienable or disposable lands for non-agricultural
purposes that the government could sell to private parties.

Moreover, Section 60 of CA No. 141 expressly requires congressional authority before lands under Section 59 that
the government previously transferred to government units or entities could be sold to private parties. Section 60 of
CA No. 141 declares that –

"Sec. 60. x x x The area so leased or sold shall be such as shall, in the judgment of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, be reasonably necessary for the purposes for which such sale or lease is
requested, and shall not exceed one hundred and forty-four hectares: Provided, however, That this limitation
shall not apply to grants, donations, or transfers made to a province, municipality or branch or subdivision of
the Government for the purposes deemed by said entities conducive to the public interest; but the land so
granted, donated, or transferred to a province, municipality or branch or subdivision of the
Government shall not be alienated, encumbered, or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its
title, except when authorized by Congress: x x x." (Emphasis supplied)

The congressional authority required in Section 60 of CA No. 141 mirrors the legislative authority required in Section
56 of Act No. 2874.

One reason for the congressional authority is that Section 60 of CA No. 141 exempted government units and entities
from the maximum area of public lands that could be acquired from the State. These government units and entities
should not just turn around and sell these lands to private parties in violation of constitutional or statutory limitations.
Otherwise, the transfer of lands for non-agricultural purposes to government units and entities could be used to
circumvent constitutional limitations on ownership of alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. In the same
manner, such transfers could also be used to evade the statutory prohibition in CA No. 141 on the sale of government
reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain to private parties. Section 60 of CA No. 141 constitutes by operation
of law a lien on these lands.57

In case of sale or lease of disposable lands of the public domain falling under Section 59 of CA No. 141, Sections 63
and 67 require a public bidding. Sections 63 and 67 of CA No. 141 provide as follows:

"Sec. 63. Whenever it is decided that lands covered by this chapter are not needed for public purposes, the
Director of Lands shall ask the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (now the Secretary of Natural
Resources) for authority to dispose of the same. Upon receipt of such authority, the Director of Lands shall
give notice by public advertisement in the same manner as in the case of leases or sales of agricultural public
land, x x x.

Sec. 67. The lease or sale shall be made by oral bidding; and adjudication shall be made to the highest
bidder. x x x." (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, CA No. 141 mandates the Government to put to public auction all leases or sales of alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain.58
Like Act No. 1654 and Act No. 2874 before it, CA No. 141 did not repeal Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of
1866. Private parties could still reclaim portions of the sea with government permission. However, the reclaimed land
could become private land only if classified as alienable agricultural land of the public domain open to
disposition under CA No. 141. The 1935 Constitution prohibited the alienation of all natural resources except public
agricultural lands.

The Civil Code of 1950

The Civil Code of 1950 readopted substantially the definition of property of public dominion found in the Civil Code of
1889. Articles 420 and 422 of the Civil Code of 1950 state that –

"Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the
State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;

(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or
for the development of the national wealth.

x x x.

Art. 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form
part of the patrimonial property of the State."

Again, the government must formally declare that the property of public dominion is no longer needed for public use or
public service, before the same could be classified as patrimonial property of the State. 59 In the case of government
reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain, the declaration of their being disposable, as well as the manner of
their disposition, is governed by the applicable provisions of CA No. 141.

Like the Civil Code of 1889, the Civil Code of 1950 included as property of public dominion those properties of the
State which, without being for public use, are intended for public service or the "development of the national
wealth." Thus, government reclaimed and marshy lands of the State, even if not employed for public use or public
service, if developed to enhance the national wealth, are classified as property of public dominion.

Dispositions under the 1973 Constitution

The 1973 Constitution, which took effect on January 17, 1973, likewise adopted the Regalian doctrine. Section 8,
Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution stated that –

"Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With
the exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the
public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the
exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a
period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, except as to water rights
for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which
cases, beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant." (Emphasis supplied)

The 1973 Constitution prohibited the alienation of all natural resources with the exception of "agricultural, industrial or
commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the public domain." In contrast, the 1935 Constitution barred the
alienation of all natural resources except "public agricultural lands." However, the term "public agricultural lands" in the
1935 Constitution encompassed industrial, commercial, residential and resettlement lands of the public domain. 60 If
the land of public domain were neither timber nor mineral land, it would fall under the classification of agricultural land
of the public domain. Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, therefore, prohibited the alienation of all natural
resources except agricultural lands of the public domain.

The 1973 Constitution, however, limited the alienation of lands of the public domain to individuals who were citizens of
the Philippines. Private corporations, even if wholly owned by Philippine citizens, were no longer allowed to acquire
alienable lands of the public domain unlike in the 1935 Constitution. Section 11, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution
declared that –

"Sec. 11. The Batasang Pambansa, taking into account conservation, ecological, and development
requirements of the natural resources, shall determine by law the size of land of the public domain which may
 be developed, held or acquired by, or leased to, any qualified individual, corporation, or association, and the
conditions therefor. No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area nor may any citizen hold such lands
by lease in excess of five hundred hectares or acquire by purchase, homestead or grant, in excess of twenty-
four hectares. No private corporation or association may hold by lease, concession, license or permit, timber
or forest lands and other timber or forest resources in excess of one hundred thousand hectares. However,
such area may be increased by the Batasang Pambansa upon recommendation of the National Economic and
Development Authority." (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, under the 1973 Constitution, private corporations could hold alienable lands of the public domain only through
lease. Only individuals could now acquire alienable lands of the public domain, and private corporations became
absolutely barred from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. The constitutional ban
extended to all kinds of alienable lands of the public domain, while the statutory ban under CA No. 141 applied only to
government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public domain.

PD No. 1084 Creating the Public Estates Authority

On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1084 creating PEA, a wholly
government owned and controlled corporation with a special charter. Sections 4 and 8 of PD No. 1084, vests PEA
with the following purposes and powers:

"Sec. 4. Purpose. The Authority is hereby created for the following purposes:

(a) To reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas, by dredging, filling or other means, or
to acquire reclaimed land;

(b) To develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and all kinds of
lands, buildings, estates and other forms of real property, owned, managed, controlled and/or operated by the
government;

(c) To provide for, operate or administer such service as may be necessary for the efficient, economical and
beneficial utilization of the above properties.

Sec. 5. Powers and functions of the Authority. The Authority shall, in carrying out the purposes for which it is
created, have the following powers and functions:

(a)To prescribe its by-laws.

xxx

(i) To hold lands of the public domain in excess of the area permitted to private corporations by statute.

(j) To reclaim lands and to construct work across, or otherwise, any stream, watercourse, canal, ditch, flume
x x x.

xxx

(o) To perform such acts and exercise such functions as may be necessary for the attainment of the purposes
and objectives herein specified." (Emphasis supplied)

PD No. 1084 authorizes PEA to reclaim both foreshore and submerged areas of the public domain. Foreshore areas
are those covered and uncovered by the ebb and flow of the tide. 61 Submerged areas are those permanently under
water regardless of the ebb and flow of the tide.62 Foreshore and submerged areas indisputably belong to the public
domain63 and are inalienable unless reclaimed, classified as alienable lands open to disposition, and further declared
no longer needed for public service.

The ban in the 1973 Constitution on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain did not
apply to PEA since it was then, and until today, a fully owned government corporation. The constitutional ban applied
then, as it still applies now, only to "private corporations and associations." PD No. 1084 expressly empowers PEA "to
hold lands of the public domain" even "in excess of the area permitted to private corporations by statute." Thus,
PEA can hold title to private lands, as well as title to lands of the public domain.
In order for PEA to sell its reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public domain, there must be
legislative authority empowering PEA to sell these lands. This legislative authority is necessary in view of Section 60
of CA No.141, which states –

"Sec. 60. x x x; but the land so granted, donated or transferred to a province, municipality, or branch or
subdivision of the Government shall not be alienated, encumbered or otherwise disposed of in a manner
affecting its title, except when authorized by Congress; x x x." (Emphasis supplied)

Without such legislative authority, PEA could not sell but only lease its reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable
lands of the public domain. Nevertheless, any legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its reclaimed alienable lands
of the public domain would be subject to the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands
of the public domain. Hence, such legislative authority could only benefit private individuals.

Dispositions under the 1987 Constitution

The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions before it, has adopted the Regalian doctrine. The 1987
Constitution declares that all natural resources are "owned by the State," and except for alienable agricultural lands
of the public domain, natural resources cannot be alienated. Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
state that –

"Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces
of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are
owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control
and supervision of the State. x x x.

Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and
national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses
which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands.
Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except
by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years,
and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than five
hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead, or grant.

Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to the
requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain
which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions therefor." (Emphasis supplied)

The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning private corporations from acquiring
any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Like the 1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private
corporations to hold alienable lands of the public domain only through lease. As in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions,
the general law governing the lease to private corporations of reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the
public domain is still CA No. 141.

The Rationale behind the Constitutional Ban

The rationale behind the constitutional ban on corporations from acquiring, except through lease, alienable lands of
the public domain is not well understood. During the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the
commissioners probed the rationale behind this ban, thus:

"FR. BERNAS: Mr. Vice-President, my questions have reference to page 3, line 5 which says:

`No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, not to
exceed one thousand hectares in area.'

If we recall, this provision did not exist under the 1935 Constitution, but this was introduced in the 1973
Constitution. In effect, it prohibits private corporations from acquiring alienable public lands. But it has not
been very clear in jurisprudence what the reason for this is. In some of the cases decided in 1982 and
1983, it was indicated that the purpose of this is to prevent large landholdings. Is that the intent of this
provision?

MR. VILLEGAS: I think that is the spirit of the provision.

 FR. BERNAS: In existing decisions involving the Iglesia ni Cristo, there were instances where the Iglesia ni
Cristo was not allowed to acquire a mere 313-square meter land where a chapel stood because the Supreme
Court said it would be in violation of this." (Emphasis supplied)

In Ayog v. Cusi,64 the Court explained the rationale behind this constitutional ban in this way:

"Indeed, one purpose of the constitutional prohibition against purchases of public agricultural lands by private
corporations is to equitably diffuse land ownership or to encourage 'owner-cultivatorship and the economic
family-size farm' and to prevent a recurrence of cases like the instant case. Huge landholdings by
corporations or private persons had spawned social unrest."

However, if the constitutional intent is to prevent huge landholdings, the Constitution could have simply limited the size
of alienable lands of the public domain that corporations could acquire. The Constitution could have followed the
limitations on individuals, who could acquire not more than 24 hectares of alienable lands of the public domain under
the 1973 Constitution, and not more than 12 hectares under the 1987 Constitution.

If the constitutional intent is to encourage economic family-size farms, placing the land in the name of a corporation
would be more effective in preventing the break-up of farmlands. If the farmland is registered in the name of a
corporation, upon the death of the owner, his heirs would inherit shares in the corporation instead of subdivided
parcels of the farmland. This would prevent the continuing break-up of farmlands into smaller and smaller plots from
one generation to the next.

In actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens the constitutional limitation on individuals from acquiring more
than the allowed area of alienable lands of the public domain. Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already
acquired the maximum area of alienable lands of the public domain could easily set up corporations to acquire more
alienable public lands. An individual could own as many corporations as his means would allow him. An individual
could even hide his ownership of a corporation by putting his nominees as stockholders of the corporation. The
corporation is a convenient vehicle to circumvent the constitutional limitation on acquisition by individuals of alienable
lands of the public domain.

The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is to transfer ownership of only a limited area of
alienable land of the public domain to a qualified individual. This constitutional intent is safeguarded by the provision
prohibiting corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain, since the vehicle to circumvent the
constitutional intent is removed. The available alienable public lands are gradually decreasing in the face of an ever-
growing population. The most effective way to insure faithful adherence to this constitutional intent is to grant or sell
alienable lands of the public domain only to individuals. This, it would seem, is the practical benefit arising from the
constitutional ban.

The Amended Joint Venture Agreement

The subject matter of the Amended JVA, as stated in its second Whereas clause, consists of three properties, namely:

1. "[T]hree partially reclaimed and substantially eroded islands along Emilio Aguinaldo Boulevard in
Paranaque and Las Pinas, Metro Manila, with a combined titled area of 1,578,441 square meters;"

2. "[A]nother area of 2,421,559 square meters contiguous to the three islands;" and

3. "[A]t AMARI's option as approved by PEA, an additional 350 hectares more or less to regularize the
65
configuration of the reclaimed area."

PEA confirms that the Amended JVA involves "the development of the Freedom Islands and further reclamation of
about 250 hectares x x x," plus an option "granted to AMARI to subsequently reclaim another 350 hectares x x x."66

In short, the Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only 157.84 hectares of the 750-hectare
reclamation project have been reclaimed, and the rest of the 592.15 hectares are still submerged areas
forming part of Manila Bay.

Under the Amended JVA, AMARI will reimburse PEA the sum of P1,894,129,200.00 for PEA's "actual cost" in partially
reclaiming the Freedom Islands. AMARI will also complete, at its own expense, the reclamation of the Freedom
Islands. AMARI will further shoulder all the reclamation costs of all the other areas, totaling 592.15 hectares, still to be
reclaimed. AMARI and PEA will share, in the proportion of 70 percent and 30 percent, respectively, the total net
usable area which is defined in the Amended JVA as the total reclaimed area less 30 percent earmarked for common
areas. Title to AMARI's share in the net usable area, totaling 367.5 hectares, will be issued in the name of AMARI.
Section 5.2 (c) of the Amended JVA provides that –

"x x x, PEA shall have the duty to execute without delay the necessary deed of transfer or conveyance of the
title pertaining to AMARI's Land share based on the Land Allocation Plan. PEA, when requested in writing
by AMARI, shall then cause the issuance and delivery of the proper certificates of title covering
AMARI's Land Share in the name of AMARI, x x x; provided, that if more than seventy percent (70%) of the
titled area at any given time pertains to AMARI, PEA shall deliver to AMARI only seventy percent (70%) of the
titles pertaining to AMARI, until such time when a corresponding proportionate area of additional land
pertaining to PEA has been titled." (Emphasis supplied)

Indisputably, under the Amended JVA AMARI will acquire and own a maximum of 367.5 hectares of reclaimed
land which will be titled in its name.

To implement the Amended JVA, PEA delegated to the unincorporated PEA-AMARI joint venture PEA's statutory
authority, rights and privileges to reclaim foreshore and submerged areas in Manila Bay. Section 3.2.a of the
Amended JVA states that –

"PEA hereby contributes to the joint venture its rights and privileges to perform Rawland Reclamation and
Horizontal Development as well as own the Reclamation Area, thereby granting the Joint Venture the full and
exclusive right, authority and privilege to undertake the Project in accordance with the Master Development
Plan."

The Amended JVA is the product of a renegotiation of the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 and its supplemental
agreement dated August 9, 1995.

The Threshold Issue

The threshold issue is whether AMARI, a private corporation, can acquire and own under the Amended JVA 367.5
hectares of reclaimed foreshore and submerged areas in Manila Bay in view of Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution which state that:

"Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces
of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are
owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated. x x x.

xxx

Section 3. x x x Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private
corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease,
x x x."(Emphasis supplied)

Classification of Reclaimed Foreshore and Submerged Areas

PEA readily concedes that lands reclaimed from foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay are alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain. In its Memorandum, 67 PEA admits that –

"Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands are classified as alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain:

'Sec. 59. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:

(a) Lands reclaimed by the government by dredging, filling, or other means;

x x x.'" (Emphasis supplied)

Likewise, the Legal Task Force68 constituted under Presidential Administrative Order No. 365 admitted in its Report
and Recommendation to then President Fidel V. Ramos, "[R]eclaimed lands are classified as alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain."69 The Legal Task Force concluded that –

"D. Conclusion
 Reclaimed lands are lands of the public domain. However, by statutory authority, the rights of ownership and
disposition over reclaimed lands have been transferred to PEA, by virtue of which PEA, as owner, may validly
convey the same to any qualified person without violating the Constitution or any statute.

The constitutional provision prohibiting private corporations from holding public land, except by lease (Sec. 3,
Art. XVII,70 1987 Constitution), does not apply to reclaimed lands whose ownership has passed on to PEA by
statutory grant."

Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the
"lands of the public domain, waters x x x and other natural resources" and consequently "owned by the State." As
such, foreshore and submerged areas "shall not be alienated," unless they are classified as "agricultural lands" of the
public domain. The mere reclamation of these areas by PEA does not convert these inalienable natural resources of
the State into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. There must be a law or presidential proclamation
officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to disposition or concession.
Moreover, these reclaimed lands cannot be classified as alienable or disposable if the law has reserved them for
some public or quasi-public use.71

Section 8 of CA No. 141 provides that "only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which
have been officially delimited and classified."72 The President has the authority to classify inalienable lands of the
public domain into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, pursuant to Section 6 of CA No. 141. In Laurel
73
vs. Garcia, the Executive Department attempted to sell the Roppongi property in Tokyo, Japan, which was acquired
by the Philippine Government for use as the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy. Although the Chancery had
transferred to another location thirteen years earlier, the Court still ruled that, under Article 422 74 of the Civil Code, a
property of public dominion retains such character until formally declared otherwise. The Court ruled that –

"The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service does not
automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn
from public use (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 [1975]. A property continues to
be part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership 'until there is a
formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such' (Ignacio v. Director of
Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]." (Emphasis supplied)

PD No. 1085, issued on February 4, 1977, authorized the issuance of special land patents for lands reclaimed by PEA
from the foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay. On January 19, 1988 then President Corazon C. Aquino issued
Special Patent No. 3517 in the name of PEA for the 157.84 hectares comprising the partially reclaimed Freedom
Islands. Subsequently, on April 9, 1999 the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Paranaque issued TCT Nos.
7309, 7311 and 7312 in the name of PEA pursuant to Section 103 of PD No. 1529 authorizing the issuance of
certificates of title corresponding to land patents. To this day, these certificates of title are still in the name of PEA.

PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino's actual issuance of a special patent covering the Freedom Islands, is
equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. PD No. 1085 and President Aquino's issuance of a land patent also constitute a declaration that the Freedom
Islands are no longer needed for public service. The Freedom Islands are thus alienable or disposable lands of
the public domain, open to disposition or concession to qualified parties.

At the time then President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, PEA had already reclaimed the Freedom Islands
although subsequently there were partial erosions on some areas. The government had also completed the necessary
surveys on these islands. Thus, the Freedom Islands were no longer part of Manila Bay but part of the land mass.
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution classifies lands of the public domain into "agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral lands, and national parks." Being neither timber, mineral, nor national park lands, the reclaimed Freedom
Islands necessarily fall under the classification of agricultural lands of the public domain. Under the 1987 Constitution,
agricultural lands of the public domain are the only natural resources that the State may alienate to qualified private
parties. All other natural resources, such as the seas or bays, are "waters x x x owned by the State" forming part of
the public domain, and are inalienable pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

AMARI claims that the Freedom Islands are private lands because CDCP, then a private corporation, reclaimed the
islands under a contract dated November 20, 1973 with the Commissioner of Public Highways. AMARI, citing Article 5
of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, argues that "if the ownership of reclaimed lands may be given to the party
constructing the works, then it cannot be said that reclaimed lands are lands of the public domain which the State may
not alienate."75 Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters reads as follows:

"Article 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed by the State, or by the
provinces, pueblos or private persons, with proper permission, shall become the property of the party
 constructing such works, unless otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority." (Emphasis
supplied)

Under Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, private parties could reclaim from the sea only with "proper
permission" from the State. Private parties could own the reclaimed land only if not "otherwise provided by the terms
of the grant of authority." This clearly meant that no one could reclaim from the sea without permission from the State
because the sea is property of public dominion. It also meant that the State could grant or withhold ownership of the
reclaimed land because any reclaimed land, like the sea from which it emerged, belonged to the State. Thus, a private
person reclaiming from the sea without permission from the State could not acquire ownership of the reclaimed land
which would remain property of public dominion like the sea it replaced. 76 Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of
1866 adopted the time-honored principle of land ownership that "all lands that were not acquired from the government,
either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain." 77

Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters must be read together with laws subsequently enacted on the disposition of
public lands. In particular, CA No. 141 requires that lands of the public domain must first be classified as alienable or
disposable before the government can alienate them. These lands must not be reserved for public or quasi-public
purposes.78 Moreover, the contract between CDCP and the government was executed after the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution which barred private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. This
contract could not have converted the Freedom Islands into private lands of a private corporation.

Presidential Decree No. 3-A, issued on January 11, 1973, revoked all laws authorizing the reclamation of areas under
water and revested solely in the National Government the power to reclaim lands. Section 1 of PD No. 3-A declared
that –

"The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the reclamation of areas under water,
whether foreshore or inland, shall be limited to the National Government or any person authorized by it
under a proper contract. (Emphasis supplied)

x x x."

PD No. 3-A repealed Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 because reclamation of areas under water could
now be undertaken only by the National Government or by a person contracted by the National Government. Private
parties may reclaim from the sea only under a contract with the National Government, and no longer by grant or
permission as provided in Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.

Executive Order No. 525, issued on February 14, 1979, designated PEA as the National Government's implementing
arm to undertake "all reclamation projects of the government," which "shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a
proper contract executed by it with any person or entity." Under such contract, a private party receives
compensation for reclamation services rendered to PEA. Payment to the contractor may be in cash, or in kind
consisting of portions of the reclaimed land, subject to the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring
alienable lands of the public domain. The reclaimed land can be used as payment in kind only if the reclaimed land is
first classified as alienable or disposable land open to disposition, and then declared no longer needed for public
service.

The Amended JVA covers not only the Freedom Islands, but also an additional 592.15 hectares which are still
submerged and forming part of Manila Bay. There is no legislative or Presidential act classifying these
submerged areas as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain open to disposition. These submerged
areas are not covered by any patent or certificate of title. There can be no dispute that these submerged areas form
part of the public domain, and in their present state are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Until
reclaimed from the sea, these submerged areas are, under the Constitution, "waters x x x owned by the State,"
forming part of the public domain and consequently inalienable. Only when actually reclaimed from the sea can these
submerged areas be classified as public agricultural lands, which under the Constitution are the only natural resources
that the State may alienate. Once reclaimed and transformed into public agricultural lands, the government may then
officially classify these lands as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition. Thereafter, the government may
declare these lands no longer needed for public service. Only then can these reclaimed lands be considered alienable
or disposable lands of the public domain and within the commerce of man.

The classification of PEA's reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands into alienable or disposable lands open to
disposition is necessary because PEA is tasked under its charter to undertake public services that require the use of
lands of the public domain. Under Section 5 of PD No. 1084, the functions of PEA include the following: "[T]o own or
operate railroads, tramways and other kinds of land transportation, x x x; [T]o construct, maintain and operate such
systems of sanitary sewers as may be necessary; [T]o construct, maintain and operate such storm drains as may be
necessary." PEA is empowered to issue "rules and regulations as may be necessary for the proper use by private
parties of any or all of the highways, roads, utilities, buildings and/or any of its properties and to impose or
collect fees or tolls for their use." Thus, part of the reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands held by the PEA would
actually be needed for public use or service since many of the functions imposed on PEA by its charter constitute
essential public services.

Moreover, Section 1 of Executive Order No. 525 provides that PEA "shall be primarily responsible for integrating,
directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National Government." The same section
also states that "[A]ll reclamation projects shall be approved by the President upon recommendation of the PEA, and
shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a proper contract executed by it with any person or entity; x x x." Thus,
under EO No. 525, in relation to PD No. 3-A and PD No.1084, PEA became the primary implementing agency of the
National Government to reclaim foreshore and submerged lands of the public domain. EO No. 525 recognized PEA as
the government entity "to undertake the reclamation of lands and ensure their maximum utilization in promoting
public welfare and interests."79 Since large portions of these reclaimed lands would obviously be needed for public
service, there must be a formal declaration segregating reclaimed lands no longer needed for public service from
those still needed for public service.1âwphi1.nêt

Section 3 of EO No. 525, by declaring that all lands reclaimed by PEA "shall belong to or be owned by the PEA," could
not automatically operate to classify inalienable lands into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.
Otherwise, reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands of the public domain would automatically become alienable
once reclaimed by PEA, whether or not classified as alienable or disposable.

The Revised Administrative Code of 1987, a later law than either PD No. 1084 or EO No. 525, vests in the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR" for brevity) the following powers and functions:

"Sec. 4. Powers and Functions. The Department shall:

(1) x x x

xxx

(4) Exercise supervision and control over forest lands, alienable and disposable public lands, mineral
resources and, in the process of exercising such control, impose appropriate taxes, fees, charges, rentals and
any such form of levy and collect such revenues for the exploration, development, utilization or gathering of
such resources;

xxx

(14) Promulgate rules, regulations and guidelines on the issuance of licenses, permits, concessions,
lease agreements and such other privileges concerning the development, exploration and utilization
of the country's marine, freshwater, and brackish water and over all aquatic resources of the country
and shall continue to oversee, supervise and police our natural resources; cancel or cause to cancel
such privileges upon failure, non-compliance or violations of any regulation, order, and for all other causes
which are in furtherance of the conservation of natural resources and supportive of the national interest;

(15) Exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of the public
domain and serve as the sole agency responsible for classification, sub-classification, surveying and
titling of lands in consultation with appropriate agencies."80 (Emphasis supplied)

As manager, conservator and overseer of the natural resources of the State, DENR exercises "supervision and control
over alienable and disposable public lands." DENR also exercises "exclusive jurisdiction on the management and
disposition of all lands of the public domain." Thus, DENR decides whether areas under water, like foreshore or
submerged areas of Manila Bay, should be reclaimed or not. This means that PEA needs authorization from DENR
before PEA can undertake reclamation projects in Manila Bay, or in any part of the country.

DENR also exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the disposition of all lands of the public domain. Hence, DENR
decides whether reclaimed lands of PEA should be classified as alienable under Sections 681 and 782 of CA No. 141.
Once DENR decides that the reclaimed lands should be so classified, it then recommends to the President the
issuance of a proclamation classifying the lands as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain open to
disposition. We note that then DENR Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. countersigned Special Patent No. 3517 in
compliance with the Revised Administrative Code and Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141.

In short, DENR is vested with the power to authorize the reclamation of areas under water, while PEA is vested with
the power to undertake the physical reclamation of areas under water, whether directly or through private contractors.
DENR is also empowered to classify lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable lands subject to the
approval of the President. On the other hand, PEA is tasked to develop, sell or lease the reclaimed alienable lands of
the public domain.

Clearly, the mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged areas does not make the reclaimed
lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA. Likewise, the mere
transfer by the National Government of lands of the public domain to PEA does not make the lands alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA.

Absent two official acts – a classification that these lands are alienable or disposable and open to disposition and a
declaration that these lands are not needed for public service, lands reclaimed by PEA remain inalienable lands of the
public domain. Only such an official classification and formal declaration can convert reclaimed lands into alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain, open to disposition under the Constitution, Title I and Title III83 of CA No. 141
and other applicable laws.84

PEA's Authority to Sell Reclaimed Lands

PEA, like the Legal Task Force, argues that as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, the reclaimed lands
shall be disposed of in accordance with CA No. 141, the Public Land Act. PEA, citing Section 60 of CA No. 141,
admits that reclaimed lands transferred to a branch or subdivision of the government "shall not be alienated,
encumbered, or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when authorized by Congress: x x
85
x." (Emphasis by PEA)

In Laurel vs. Garcia,86 the Court cited Section 48 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which states that –

"Sec. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real property of the Government is
authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the government
by the following: x x x."

Thus, the Court concluded that a law is needed to convey any real property belonging to the Government. The Court
declared that -

"It is not for the President to convey real property of the government on his or her own sole will. Any such
conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive
and legislative concurrence." (Emphasis supplied)

PEA contends that PD No. 1085 and EO No. 525 constitute the legislative authority allowing PEA to sell its reclaimed
lands. PD No. 1085, issued on February 4, 1977, provides that –

"The land reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore area of Manila Bay pursuant to the contract for the
reclamation and construction of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road Project between the Republic of the
Philippines and the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines dated November 20, 1973
and/or any other contract or reclamation covering the same area is hereby transferred, conveyed and
assigned to the ownership and administration of the Public Estates Authority established pursuant to
PD No. 1084; Provided, however, That the rights and interests of the Construction and Development
Corporation of the Philippines pursuant to the aforesaid contract shall be recognized and respected.

Henceforth, the Public Estates Authority shall exercise the rights and assume the obligations of the Republic
of the Philippines (Department of Public Highways) arising from, or incident to, the aforesaid contract between
the Republic of the Philippines and the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines.

In consideration of the foregoing transfer and assignment, the Public Estates Authority shall issue in favor of
the Republic of the Philippines the corresponding shares of stock in said entity with an issued value of said
shares of stock (which) shall be deemed fully paid and non-assessable.

The Secretary of Public Highways and the General Manager of the Public Estates Authority shall execute
such contracts or agreements, including appropriate agreements with the Construction and Development
Corporation of the Philippines, as may be necessary to implement the above.

Special land patent/patents shall be issued by the Secretary of Natural Resources in favor of the
Public Estates Authority without prejudice to the subsequent transfer to the contractor or his
assignees of such portion or portions of the land reclaimed or to be reclaimed as provided for in the
above-mentioned contract. On the basis of such patents, the Land Registration Commission shall
issue the corresponding certificate of title." (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Section 3 of EO No. 525, issued on February 14, 1979, provides that -

"Sec. 3. All lands reclaimed by PEA shall belong to or be owned by the PEA which shall be responsible
for its administration, development, utilization or disposition in accordance with the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 1084. Any and all income that the PEA may derive from the sale, lease or use of reclaimed lands
shall be used in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084."

There is no express authority under either PD No. 1085 or EO No. 525 for PEA to sell its reclaimed lands. PD No.
1085 merely transferred "ownership and administration" of lands reclaimed from Manila Bay to PEA, while EO No. 525
declared that lands reclaimed by PEA "shall belong to or be owned by PEA." EO No. 525 expressly states that PEA
should dispose of its reclaimed lands "in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084," the charter
of PEA.

PEA's charter, however, expressly tasks PEA "to develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose,
lease and sell any and all kinds of lands x x x owned, managed, controlled and/or operated by the
government."87 (Emphasis supplied) There is, therefore, legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its lands,
whether patrimonial or alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may sell to private parties its patrimonial
properties in accordance with the PEA charter free from constitutional limitations. The constitutional ban on private
corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain does not apply to the sale of PEA's patrimonial lands.

PEA may also sell its alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to private individuals since, with the
legislative authority, there is no longer any statutory prohibition against such sales and the constitutional ban does not
apply to individuals. PEA, however, cannot sell any of its alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to private
corporations since Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution expressly prohibits such sales. The legislative
authority benefits only individuals. Private corporations remain barred from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain, including government reclaimed lands.

The provision in PD No. 1085 stating that portions of the reclaimed lands could be transferred by PEA to the
"contractor or his assignees" (Emphasis supplied) would not apply to private corporations but only to individuals
because of the constitutional ban. Otherwise, the provisions of PD No. 1085 would violate both the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions.

The requirement of public auction in the sale of reclaimed lands

Assuming the reclaimed lands of PEA are classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition, and further
declared no longer needed for public service, PEA would have to conduct a public bidding in selling or leasing these
lands. PEA must observe the provisions of Sections 63 and 67 of CA No. 141 requiring public auction, in the absence
of a law exempting PEA from holding a public auction. 88 Special Patent No. 3517 expressly states that the patent is
issued by authority of the Constitution and PD No. 1084, "supplemented by Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended." This is an acknowledgment that the provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the disposition of reclaimed
alienable lands of the public domain unless otherwise provided by law. Executive Order No. 654, 89 which authorizes
PEA "to determine the kind and manner of payment for the transfer" of its assets and properties, does not exempt
PEA from the requirement of public auction. EO No. 654 merely authorizes PEA to decide the mode of payment,
whether in kind and in installment, but does not authorize PEA to dispense with public auction.

Moreover, under Section 79 of PD No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code, the government is
required to sell valuable government property through public bidding. Section 79 of PD No. 1445 mandates that –

"Section 79. When government property has become unserviceable for any cause, or is no longer needed, it
shall, upon application of the officer accountable therefor, be inspected by the head of the agency or his duly
authorized representative in the presence of the auditor concerned and, if found to be valueless or
unsaleable, it may be destroyed in their presence. If found to be valuable, it may be sold at public auction
to the highest bidder under the supervision of the proper committee on award or similar body in the
presence of the auditor concerned or other authorized representative of the Commission, after advertising
by printed notice in the Official Gazette, or for not less than three consecutive days in any newspaper
of general circulation, or where the value of the property does not warrant the expense of publication, by
notices posted for a like period in at least three public places in the locality where the property is to be sold. In
the event that the public auction fails, the property may be sold at a private sale at such price as may
be fixed by the same committee or body concerned and approved by the Commission."

It is only when the public auction fails that a negotiated sale is allowed, in which case the Commission on Audit must
approve the selling price.90 The Commission on Audit implements Section 79 of the Government Auditing Code
through Circular No. 89-29691 dated January 27, 1989. This circular emphasizes that government assets must be
disposed of only through public auction, and a negotiated sale can be resorted to only in case of "failure of public
auction."

At the public auction sale, only Philippine citizens are qualified to bid for PEA's reclaimed foreshore and submerged
alienable lands of the public domain. Private corporations are barred from bidding at the auction sale of any kind of
alienable land of the public domain.

PEA originally scheduled a public bidding for the Freedom Islands on December 10, 1991. PEA imposed a condition
that the winning bidder should reclaim another 250 hectares of submerged areas to regularize the shape of the
Freedom Islands, under a 60-40 sharing of the additional reclaimed areas in favor of the winning bidder. 92 No one,
however, submitted a bid. On December 23, 1994, the Government Corporate Counsel advised PEA it could sell the
Freedom Islands through negotiation, without need of another public bidding, because of the failure of the public
bidding on December 10, 1991.93

However, the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 covered not only the Freedom Islands and the additional 250 hectares
still to be reclaimed, it also granted an option to AMARI to reclaim another 350 hectares. The original JVA, a
negotiated contract, enlarged the reclamation area to 750 hectares.94 The failure of public bidding on December 10,
1991, involving only 407.84 hectares,95 is not a valid justification for a negotiated sale of 750 hectares, almost double
the area publicly auctioned. Besides, the failure of public bidding happened on December 10, 1991, more than three
years before the signing of the original JVA on April 25, 1995. The economic situation in the country had greatly
improved during the intervening period.

Reclamation under the BOT Law and the Local Government Code

The constitutional prohibition in Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is absolute and clear: "Private
corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, x x x." Even
Republic Act No. 6957 ("BOT Law," for brevity), cited by PEA and AMARI as legislative authority to sell reclaimed
lands to private parties, recognizes the constitutional ban. Section 6 of RA No. 6957 states –

"Sec. 6. Repayment Scheme. - For the financing, construction, operation and maintenance of any
infrastructure projects undertaken through the build-operate-and-transfer arrangement or any of its variations
pursuant to the provisions of this Act, the project proponent x x x may likewise be repaid in the form of a share
in the revenue of the project or other non-monetary payments, such as, but not limited to, the grant of a
portion or percentage of the reclaimed land, subject to the constitutional requirements with respect to the
ownership of the land: x x x." (Emphasis supplied)

A private corporation, even one that undertakes the physical reclamation of a government BOT project, cannot acquire
reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain in view of the constitutional ban.

Section 302 of the Local Government Code, also mentioned by PEA and AMARI, authorizes local governments in land
reclamation projects to pay the contractor or developer in kind consisting of a percentage of the reclaimed land, to wit:

"Section 302. Financing, Construction, Maintenance, Operation, and Management of Infrastructure Projects
by the Private Sector. x x x

xxx

In case of land reclamation or construction of industrial estates, the repayment plan may consist of the grant
of a portion or percentage of the reclaimed land or the industrial estate constructed."

Although Section 302 of the Local Government Code does not contain a proviso similar to that of the BOT Law, the
constitutional restrictions on land ownership automatically apply even though not expressly mentioned in the Local
Government Code.

Thus, under either the BOT Law or the Local Government Code, the contractor or developer, if a corporate entity, can
only be paid with leaseholds on portions of the reclaimed land. If the contractor or developer is an individual, portions
of the reclaimed land, not exceeding 12 hectares96 of non-agricultural lands, may be conveyed to him in ownership in
view of the legislative authority allowing such conveyance. This is the only way these provisions of the BOT Law and
the Local Government Code can avoid a direct collision with Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

Registration of lands of the public domain

Finally, PEA theorizes that the "act of conveying the ownership of the reclaimed lands to public respondent PEA
transformed such lands of the public domain to private lands." This theory is echoed by AMARI which maintains that
the "issuance of the special patent leading to the eventual issuance of title takes the subject land away from the land
of public domain and converts the property into patrimonial or private property." In short, PEA and AMARI contend that
with the issuance of Special Patent No. 3517 and the corresponding certificates of titles, the 157.84 hectares
comprising the Freedom Islands have become private lands of PEA. In support of their theory, PEA and AMARI cite
the following rulings of the Court:

1. Sumail v. Judge of CFI of Cotabato,97 where the Court held –

"Once the patent was granted and the corresponding certificate of title was issued, the land ceased to be part
of the public domain and became private property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor
jurisdiction."

2. Lee Hong Hok v. David,98 where the Court declared -

"After the registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title based on a public land
patent, the land covered thereby automatically comes under the operation of Republic Act 496 subject to all
the safeguards provided therein."3. Heirs of Gregorio Tengco v. Heirs of Jose Aliwalas,99 where the Court
ruled -

"While the Director of Lands has the power to review homestead patents, he may do so only so long as the
land remains part of the public domain and continues to be under his exclusive control; but once the patent is
registered and a certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be part of the public domain and becomes
private property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction."

4. Manalo v. Intermediate Appellate Court,100 where the Court held –

"When the lots in dispute were certified as disposable on May 19, 1971, and free patents were issued
covering the same in favor of the private respondents, the said lots ceased to be part of the public domain
and, therefore, the Director of Lands lost jurisdiction over the same."

5.Republic v. Court of Appeals,101 where the Court stated –

"Proclamation No. 350, dated October 9, 1956, of President Magsaysay legally effected a land grant to the
Mindanao Medical Center, Bureau of Medical Services, Department of Health, of the whole lot, validly
sufficient for initial registration under the Land Registration Act. Such land grant is constitutive of a 'fee simple'
title or absolute title in favor of petitioner Mindanao Medical Center. Thus, Section 122 of the Act, which
governs the registration of grants or patents involving public lands, provides that 'Whenever public lands in the
Philippine Islands belonging to the Government of the United States or to the Government of the Philippines
are alienated, granted or conveyed to persons or to public or private corporations, the same shall be brought
forthwith under the operation of this Act (Land Registration Act, Act 496) and shall become registered lands.'"

The first four cases cited involve petitions to cancel the land patents and the corresponding certificates of titles issued
to private parties. These four cases uniformly hold that the Director of Lands has no jurisdiction over private lands or
that upon issuance of the certificate of title the land automatically comes under the Torrens System. The fifth case
cited involves the registration under the Torrens System of a 12.8-hectare public land granted by the National
Government to Mindanao Medical Center, a government unit under the Department of Health. The National
Government transferred the 12.8-hectare public land to serve as the site for the hospital buildings and other facilities
of Mindanao Medical Center, which performed a public service. The Court affirmed the registration of the 12.8-hectare
public land in the name of Mindanao Medical Center under Section 122 of Act No. 496. This fifth case is an example
of a public land being registered under Act No. 496 without the land losing its character as a property of public
dominion.

In the instant case, the only patent and certificates of title issued are those in the name of PEA, a wholly government
owned corporation performing public as well as proprietary functions. No patent or certificate of title has been issued
to any private party. No one is asking the Director of Lands to cancel PEA's patent or certificates of title. In fact, the
thrust of the instant petition is that PEA's certificates of title should remain with PEA, and the land covered by these
certificates, being alienable lands of the public domain, should not be sold to a private corporation.

Registration of land under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 does not vest in the registrant private or public ownership of
the land. Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership but is merely evidence of ownership previously conferred
by any of the recognized modes of acquiring ownership. Registration does not give the registrant a better right than
what the registrant had prior to the registration. 102 The registration of lands of the public domain under the Torrens
103
system, by itself, cannot convert public lands into private lands.

Jurisprudence holding that upon the grant of the patent or issuance of the certificate of title the alienable land of the
public domain automatically becomes private land cannot apply to government units and entities like PEA. The
transfer of the Freedom Islands to PEA was made subject to the provisions of CA No. 141 as expressly stated in
Special Patent No. 3517 issued by then President Aquino, to wit:

"NOW, THEREFORE, KNOW YE, that by authority of the Constitution of the Philippines and in conformity with
the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084, supplemented by Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended, there are hereby granted and conveyed unto the Public Estates Authority the aforesaid tracts of
land containing a total area of one million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894)
square meters; the technical description of which are hereto attached and made an integral part hereof."
(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the Freedom Islands on matters not covered by PD No. 1084. Section 60
of CA No. 141 prohibits, "except when authorized by Congress," the sale of alienable lands of the public domain that
are transferred to government units or entities. Section 60 of CA No. 141 constitutes, under Section 44 of PD No.
1529, a "statutory lien affecting title" of the registered land even if not annotated on the certificate of title. 104 Alienable
lands of the public domain held by government entities under Section 60 of CA No. 141 remain public lands because
they cannot be alienated or encumbered unless Congress passes a law authorizing their disposition. Congress,
however, cannot authorize the sale to private corporations of reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain because
of the constitutional ban. Only individuals can benefit from such law.

The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands in accordance with Section 60 of CA No. 141 does not
automatically convert alienable lands of the public domain into private or patrimonial lands. The alienable lands of the
public domain must be transferred to qualified private parties, or to government entities not tasked to dispose of public
lands, before these lands can become private or patrimonial lands. Otherwise, the constitutional ban will become
illusory if Congress can declare lands of the public domain as private or patrimonial lands in the hands of a
government agency tasked to dispose of public lands. This will allow private corporations to acquire directly from
government agencies limitless areas of lands which, prior to such law, are concededly public lands.

Under EO No. 525, PEA became the central implementing agency of the National Government to reclaim foreshore
and submerged areas of the public domain. Thus, EO No. 525 declares that –

"EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 525

Designating the Public Estates Authority as the Agency Primarily Responsible for all Reclamation Projects

Whereas, there are several reclamation projects which are ongoing or being proposed to be undertaken in
various parts of the country which need to be evaluated for consistency with national programs;

Whereas, there is a need to give further institutional support to the Government's declared policy to provide
for a coordinated, economical and efficient reclamation of lands;

Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 3-A requires that all reclamation of areas shall be limited to the National
Government or any person authorized by it under proper contract;

Whereas, a central authority is needed to act on behalf of the National Government which shall ensure
a coordinated and integrated approach in the reclamation of lands;

Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 1084 creates the Public Estates Authority as a government
corporation to undertake reclamation of lands and ensure their maximum utilization in promoting
public welfare and interests; and

Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 1416 provides the President with continuing authority to reorganize the
national government including the transfer, abolition, or merger of functions and offices.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested in me by the Constitution and pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1416, do hereby order and direct
the following:
 Section 1. The Public Estates Authority (PEA) shall be primarily responsible for integrating, directing,
and coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National Government. All reclamation
projects shall be approved by the President upon recommendation of the PEA, and shall be undertaken by the
PEA or through a proper contract executed by it with any person or entity; Provided, that, reclamation projects
of any national government agency or entity authorized under its charter shall be undertaken in consultation
with the PEA upon approval of the President.

x x x ."

As the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide, with authority to sell
reclaimed lands, PEA took the place of DENR as the government agency charged with leasing or selling reclaimed
lands of the public domain. The reclaimed lands being leased or sold by PEA are not private lands, in the same
manner that DENR, when it disposes of other alienable lands, does not dispose of private lands but alienable lands of
the public domain. Only when qualified private parties acquire these lands will the lands become private lands. In the
hands of the government agency tasked and authorized to dispose of alienable of disposable lands of the
public domain, these lands are still public, not private lands.

Furthermore, PEA's charter expressly states that PEA "shall hold lands of the public domain" as well as "any and
all kinds of lands." PEA can hold both lands of the public domain and private lands. Thus, the mere fact that alienable
lands of the public domain like the Freedom Islands are transferred to PEA and issued land patents or certificates of
title in PEA's name does not automatically make such lands private.

To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a
gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain. PEA will simply turn around, as PEA has now done under the Amended JVA, and transfer several
hundreds of hectares of these reclaimed and still to be reclaimed lands to a single private corporation in only one
transaction. This scheme will effectively nullify the constitutional ban in Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
which was intended to diffuse equitably the ownership of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipinos, now
numbering over 80 million strong.

This scheme, if allowed, can even be applied to alienable agricultural lands of the public domain since PEA can
"acquire x x x any and all kinds of lands." This will open the floodgates to corporations and even individuals acquiring
hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the public domain under the guise that in the hands of PEA these lands are
private lands. This will result in corporations amassing huge landholdings never before seen in this country - creating
the very evil that the constitutional ban was designed to prevent. This will completely reverse the clear direction of
constitutional development in this country. The 1935 Constitution allowed private corporations to acquire not more
than 1,024 hectares of public lands.105 The 1973 Constitution prohibited private corporations from acquiring any kind
of public land, and the 1987 Constitution has unequivocally reiterated this prohibition.

The contention of PEA and AMARI that public lands, once registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529, automatically
become private lands is contrary to existing laws. Several laws authorize lands of the public domain to be registered
under the Torrens System or Act No. 496, now PD No. 1529, without losing their character as public lands. Section
122 of Act No. 496, and Section 103 of PD No. 1529, respectively, provide as follows:

Act No. 496

"Sec. 122. Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the x x x Government of the Philippine
Islands are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or the public or private corporations, the same shall
be brought forthwith under the operation of this Act and shall become registered lands."

PD No. 1529

"Sec. 103. Certificate of Title to Patents. Whenever public land is by the Government alienated, granted or
conveyed to any person, the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Decree." (Emphasis
supplied)

Based on its legislative history, the phrase "conveyed to any person" in Section 103 of PD No. 1529 includes
conveyances of public lands to public corporations.

Alienable lands of the public domain "granted, donated, or transferred to a province, municipality, or branch or
subdivision of the Government," as provided in Section 60 of CA No. 141, may be registered under the Torrens
System pursuant to Section 103 of PD No. 1529. Such registration, however, is expressly subject to the condition in
Section 60 of CA No. 141 that the land "shall not be alienated, encumbered or otherwise disposed of in a manner
affecting its title, except when authorized by Congress." This provision refers to government reclaimed, foreshore
and marshy lands of the public domain that have been titled but still cannot be alienated or encumbered unless
expressly authorized by Congress. The need for legislative authority prevents the registered land of the public domain
from becoming private land that can be disposed of to qualified private parties.

The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 also recognizes that lands of the public domain may be registered under the
Torrens System. Section 48, Chapter 12, Book I of the Code states –

"Sec. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real property of the Government is
authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the government by
the following:

(1) x x x

(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, but titled in the name of any political
subdivision or of any corporate agency or instrumentality, by the executive head of the agency or
instrumentality." (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, private property purchased by the National Government for expansion of a public wharf may be titled in the
name of a government corporation regulating port operations in the country. Private property purchased by the
National Government for expansion of an airport may also be titled in the name of the government agency tasked to
administer the airport. Private property donated to a municipality for use as a town plaza or public school site may
likewise be titled in the name of the municipality. 106 All these properties become properties of the public domain, and if
already registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529, remain registered land. There is no requirement or provision in
any existing law for the de-registration of land from the Torrens System.

Private lands taken by the Government for public use under its power of eminent domain become unquestionably part
of the public domain. Nevertheless, Section 85 of PD No. 1529 authorizes the Register of Deeds to issue in the name
of the National Government new certificates of title covering such expropriated lands. Section 85 of PD No. 1529
states –

"Sec. 85. Land taken by eminent domain. Whenever any registered land, or interest therein, is expropriated or
taken by eminent domain, the National Government, province, city or municipality, or any other agency or
instrumentality exercising such right shall file for registration in the proper Registry a certified copy of the
judgment which shall state definitely by an adequate description, the particular property or interest
expropriated, the number of the certificate of title, and the nature of the public use. A memorandum of the right
or interest taken shall be made on each certificate of title by the Register of Deeds, and where the fee simple
is taken, a new certificate shall be issued in favor of the National Government, province, city,
municipality, or any other agency or instrumentality exercising such right for the land so taken. The legal
expenses incident to the memorandum of registration or issuance of a new certificate of title shall be for the
account of the authority taking the land or interest therein." (Emphasis supplied)

Consequently, lands registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 are not exclusively private or patrimonial lands.
Lands of the public domain may also be registered pursuant to existing laws.

AMARI makes a parting shot that the Amended JVA is not a sale to AMARI of the Freedom Islands or of the lands to
be reclaimed from submerged areas of Manila Bay. In the words of AMARI, the Amended JVA "is not a sale but a joint
venture with a stipulation for reimbursement of the original cost incurred by PEA for the earlier reclamation and
construction works performed by the CDCP under its 1973 contract with the Republic." Whether the Amended JVA is
a sale or a joint venture, the fact remains that the Amended JVA requires PEA to "cause the issuance and delivery of
the certificates of title conveying AMARI's Land Share in the name of AMARI." 107

This stipulation still contravenes Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which provides that private corporations
"shall not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease." The transfer of title and ownership to
AMARI clearly means that AMARI will "hold" the reclaimed lands other than by lease. The transfer of title and
ownership is a "disposition" of the reclaimed lands, a transaction considered a sale or alienation under CA No.
141,108 the Government Auditing Code,109 and Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

The Regalian doctrine is deeply implanted in our legal system. Foreshore and submerged areas form part of the public
domain and are inalienable. Lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas also form part of the public domain
and are also inalienable, unless converted pursuant to law into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.
Historically, lands reclaimed by the government are sui generis, not available for sale to private parties unlike other
alienable public lands. Reclaimed lands retain their inherent potential as areas for public use or public service.
Alienable lands of the public domain, increasingly becoming scarce natural resources, are to be distributed equitably
among our ever-growing population. To insure such equitable distribution, the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions have
barred private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Those who attempt to
dispose of inalienable natural resources of the State, or seek to circumvent the constitutional ban on alienation of
lands of the public domain to private corporations, do so at their own risk.

We can now summarize our conclusions as follows:

1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of
title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private
corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell
these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing
laws.

2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public
domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for
public service. The government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed
these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public domain, which
are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of
submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.

3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34
110
hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain.

4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares 111 of still
submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public
domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed
lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the
transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable
land of the public domain.

Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Under Article
1409112 of the Civil Code, contracts whose "object or purpose is contrary to law," or whose "object is outside the
commerce of men," are "inexistent and void from the beginning." The Court must perform its duty to defend and
uphold the Constitution, and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.

Seventh issue: whether the Court is the proper forum to raise the issue of whether the Amended JVA is
grossly disadvantageous to the government.

Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio, there is no necessity to rule on this last issue. Besides,
the Court is not a trier of facts, and this last issue involves a determination of factual matters.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal Bay Development
Corporation are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from implementing the Amended Joint Venture Agreement which is
hereby declared NULL and VOID ab initio.

SO ORDERED.

__________________________________________________________________________________________

Section 61. The leases executed under this chapter by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
shall, among other conditions, contain the following:

(a) The rental shall not be less than three per centum of the appraised and reappraised value of the lands
and one per centum of the appraised or reappraised value of the improvement

(b) The land rented, or the improvements thereon, as the case may be, shall be reappraised every ten years
if the term of the lease is in excess of that period.

(c) The term of the lease shall be as prescribed by section thirty-seven of this Act.
(d) The lessee shall construct permanent improvements appropriate for the purpose for which the lease is
granted, shall commence the construction thereof within six months from the date of the award of the
contract of lease, and shall complete the said construction within eighteen months from the date of the
execution of the contract.

(e) At the expiration of the lease or of any extension of the same, all improvements made by the lessee, his
heirs, executors, administrators, successors, or assigns shall become the property of the Government.

(f) The regulation of all rates and fees charged to the public; and the annual submission to the Government
for approval of all tariffs of such rates and fees.

(g) The continuance of the easements of the coast place and other easements reserved by existing law or
by any laws hereafter enacted by the Legislature.

(h) Subjection to all easements and other rights acquired by the owners of lands bordering upon the
foreshore or marshy land.

The violation of one or any of the conditions specified in the contract shall give rise to the rescission of said
contract. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources may, however, subject to such conditions as
he may prescribe, waive the rescission arising from a violation of the conditions of subsection (d), or extend
the time without which the construction of the improvements shall be commenced and completed. (As
amended by section 13 of Act 3517).

Section 62. The sale of the lands comprised in class (d) of section fifty-six shall, among others, comprise the
following conditions:

(a) The purchaser shall make improvements of a permanent character appropriate for the purpose for
which the land is purchased, shall commence work thereon within six months from the receipt of the
approval of the purchase, and shall complete the construction of said improvements within eighteen
months from the date of such approval or award; otherwise the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources may rescind the contract.

(b) The purchase price shall be paid cash down or in annual installments, not to exceed ten.

The contract of sale may contain other conditions not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. (As
amended by section 13 of Act 3219 and section 14 of Act 3517).

Section 69. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, if he approves the recommendations of the
Director of Lands, shall submit the matter to the Governor-General to the end that the latter issue a
proclamation reserving the land surveyed, or such part thereof as he may deem proper, as a town site, and
a certified copy of such proclamation shall be sent to the Director of Lands and another to the register of
deeds of the province in which the surveyed land lies.

Section 70. It shall then be the duty of the Director of Lands, after having recorded the proclamation of the
Governor-General and the survey accompanying, the same, and having completed the legal proceedings
prescribed in chapter thirteen of this Act, to direct a subdivision in accordance with the instructions of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, if there shall be such instructions, and if there shall not be
any, then in the manner which may to the Director of Lands seem best adapted to the convenience and
interest of the public and the residents of the future town.

***************************************************************************************************

Section 71. The plat of the subdivision shall designate certain lots for commercial and industrial uses and the
remainder as residence lots, and shall also reserve and note the lots owned by private individuals as
evidenced by record titles, or as possessed or claimed by them as private property. Such lots, whether
public or private, shall be numbered upon a general plan or system.

The plat prepared by the Director of Lands shall be submitted to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources for consideration, modification, amendment, or approval.
Section 72. Unless the necessary reservations are made in the proclamation of the Governor-General, the
Director of Lands, with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall reserve out
of the land by him to be subdivided lots of sufficient size and convenient situation for public use, as well as
the necessary avenue, streets, alleyways, parks, and squares. The avenues, streets, alleys parks plazas, and
lots shall be laid out on the plat as though the lands owned or claimed by private persons were part of the
public domain and part of the reservation, with a view to the possible subsequent purchase or
condemnation thereof, if deemed necessary by the proper authorities.

Section 73. At any time, after the subdivision has been made, the Governor-General may, in case the public
interest requires it, reserve for public purposes any lot or lots of the land so reserved and not disposed of.

Section 74. If, in order to carry out the provisions of this chapter, it shall be necessary to condemn private
lands within the limits of the new town, the Governor-General shall direct the Attorney-General or officer
acting in his stead to at once begin proceedings for condemnation, in accordance with the provisions of
existing law.

Section 75. When the plat of subdivision has been finally approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, the Director of Lands shall record the same in the records of his office and shall forward a
certified copy of such record to the register of deeds of the province in which the land lies, to be by such
register recorded in the records of his office.

Section 76. All lots, except those claimed by or belonging to private parties and those reserved for parks,
buildings, and other public uses, shall be sold, after due notice, at public auction to the highest bidder, after
the approval and recording of the plat of subdivision as above provided, but no bid shall be accepted that
does not equal at lease two-thirds of the appraised value, nor shall bids be accepted from persons,
corporations, associations, or partnerships not authorized to purchase public lands for commercial,
residential or industrial purposes under the provisions of this Act. The provisions of section twenty-seven and
sixty two of this Act shall be observed in so far as they are applicable. Lots for which satisfactory bids have
not been received shall be again offered for sale, under the same conditions as the first time, and if they
then remain unsold, the Director of Lands shall be authorized to sell them at private sale for not less than
two-thirds of their appraised value. (As amended by section 17 of Act No. 3517).

Section 77. All funds derived from the sale of lots shall be covered into the Insular Treasury as part of the
general funds.

Section 78. Not more than two residence lots and two lots for commercial and industrial uses in any one
town site shall be sold to any one person, corporation, or association without the specific approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.

Section 79. This Legislature shall have the power at any time to modify, alter, rescind, repeal, annul, and
cancel, with or without conditions, limitations, exceptions, or reservations, all and any dispositions made by
the executive branch of the Philippine Government by virtue of this chapter, and the exercise of this power
shall be understood as reserved in all cases, as an inherent condition thereof.

CHAPTER XII

RESERVATIONS FOR PUBLIC AND SEMI-PUBLIC PURPOSES

Section 80. Upon receipt of the order of the President of the United States, the Governor-General shall, by
proclamation, designate such land as the President of the United States may set aside for military, naval, or
other reservations for the use of the Government of the United States.

Section 81. Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the Governor-
General may designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public domain as reservations for
the use of the Government of the Philippine Islands or of any of its branches, or of the inhabitants thereof, in
accordance with regulations prescribed for this purpose, or for quasi-public uses or purposes when the
public interest requires it, including reservations for highways, rights of way for railroads, hydraulic power
sites, irrigation system, communal pastures or leguas communales, public parks, public quarries, public
fishponds, and other improvements for the public benefit. (As amended by section 16 of Act No. 3219).

_______________________________________________________________________________________
Read:
A.)

G.R. No. 179987 September 3, 2013

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan), Petitioners,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

For our consideration and resolution are the motions for reconsideration of the parties who both assail the decision
promulgated on April 29, 2009, whereby we upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the application of
the petitioners for the registration of a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the ground that they
had not established by sufficient evidence their right to the registration in accordance with either Section 14(1) or
Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).

Antecedents

The property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite,
more particularly identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with an area of 71,324-square meters. On February 20, 1998,
applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for land
registration covering the property in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the property
formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest
had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than
30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title. 1

To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, Malabanan presented during
trial a certification dated June 11, 2001 issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), which reads:

This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot No. 9864 Cad 452-D, Silang Cadastre as surveyed for Mr.
Virgilio Velasco located at Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite containing an area of 249,734 sq. meters as shown and
described on the Plan Ap-04-00952 is verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification
Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.2

After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting Malabanan’s application for land registration,
disposing thusly:

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under the operation of Act
141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-04-
0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324)
Square Meters, as supported by its technical description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to
other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence
at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.

Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.

SO ORDERED.3

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgment to the CA, arguing that Malabanan had failed to
prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC erred in
finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for
confirmation of imperfect title.

On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the application for
registration of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in Republic v. Herbieto (Herbieto), 4 the CA declared that under Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of possession prior to the classification of the land as alienable
and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Noting
that the CENRO-DENR certification stated that the property had been declared alienable and disposable only on
March 15, 1982, Velazco’s possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for purposes of computing
Malabanan’s period of possession.

Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the CA’s decision of February
23, 2007 to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.

The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Corazon Naguit 5 (Naguit) remains the
controlling doctrine especially if the property involved is agricultural land. In this regard, Naguit ruled that any
possession of agricultural land prior to its declaration as alienable and disposable could be counted in the reckoning of
the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the Property
Registration Decree. They point out that the ruling in Herbieto, to the effect that the declaration of the land subject of
the application for registration as alienable and disposable should also date back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, was a
mere obiter dictum considering that the land registration proceedings therein were in fact found and declared void ab
initio for lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.

The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. 6 to support their argument that the property
had been ipso jure converted into private property by reason of the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession by their predecessors-in-interest of an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years.
According to them, what was essential was that the property had been "converted" into private property through
prescription at the time of the application without regard to whether the property sought to be registered was
previously classified as agricultural land of the public domain.

As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on certiorari because Malabanan failed to establish by sufficient
evidence possession and occupation of the property on his part and on the part of his predecessors-in interest since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.

Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration

In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the mere classification of the land as alienable or
disposable should be deemed sufficient to convert it into patrimonial property of the State. Relying on the rulings in
Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos,7 Menguito v. Republic8 and Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,9 they argue that the
reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable opened it to acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code; that
Malabanan had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco believing in good faith that Velazco and his
predecessors-in-interest had been the real owners of the land with the right to validly transmit title and ownership
thereof; that consequently, the ten-year period prescribed by Article 1134 of the Civil Code, in relation to Section 14(2)
of the Property Registration Decree, applied in their favor; and that when Malabanan filed the application for
registration on February 20, 1998, he had already been in possession of the land for almost 16 years reckoned from
1982, the time when the land was declared alienable and disposable by the State.

The Republic’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration

The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to obtain a clarification with reference to the application of the
rulings in Naguit and Herbieto.

Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the decision has enlarged, by implication, the interpretation of
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree through judicial legislation. It reiterates its view that an applicant is
entitled to registration only when the land subject of the application had been declared alienable and disposable since
June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Ruling

We deny the motions for reconsideration.

In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be imperative to discuss the different classifications of land in
relation to the existing applicable land registration laws of the Philippines.

Classifications of land according to ownership

Land, which is an immovable property,10 may be classified as either of public dominion or of private ownership. 11 Land
is considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b) belongs to the State, without being for
public use, and is intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.12 Land belonging to
the State that is not of such character, or although of such character but no longer intended for public use or for public
service forms part of the patrimonial property of the State. 13 Land that is other than part of the patrimonial property of
the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of private ownership if it belongs to a private individual.

Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the country from the West by
Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, 14 all lands of the public domain belong to the
State.15 This means that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land, and is charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.16

All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands
remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated
them to private persons.17

Classifications of public lands

according to alienability

Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable primarily rests on the classification of public
lands made under the Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution, 18 lands of the public domain were classified into
three, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral.19 Section 10, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified lands of the
public domain into seven, specifically, agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber
or forest, and grazing land, with the reservation that the law might provide other classifications. The 1987 Constitution
adopted the classification under the 1935 Constitution into agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral, but added
national parks.20 Agricultural lands may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they may be
devoted.21 The identification of lands according to their legal classification is done exclusively by and through a
positive act of the Executive Department.22

Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of public land that may be alienated. Under Section
2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public domain may be alienated; all other natural
resources may not be.

Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those
classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code,23 without limitation; and (b) lands of the
public domain, or the public lands as provided by the Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only be
agricultural. Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks are not susceptible of
alienation or disposition unless they are reclassified as agricultural. 24 A positive act of the Government is necessary to
enable such reclassification,25 and the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under existing laws is vested in
the Executive Department, not in the courts. 26 If, however, public land will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral or national park, or when public land is no longer intended for public service or for the development of
the national wealth, thereby effectively removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such
conversion must be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in cases
27
where the President is duly authorized by law to that effect. Thus, until the Executive Department exercises its
prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or the President declares that the State no longer intends
the land to be used for public service or for the development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.

Disposition of alienable public lands

Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by which alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to wit:

Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows, and not otherwise:

(1) For homestead settlement;

(2) By sale;

(3) By lease; and

(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;

(a) By judicial legalization; or

(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).

The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of Section 11(4), in relation to Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, which expressly requires possession by a Filipino citizen of the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
viz:

Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to
own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the
Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied)

Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words "lands of the public domain" or "alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain" to clearly signify that lands otherwise classified, i.e., mineral, forest or timber,
or national parks, and lands of patrimonial or private ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public Land Act. What
the law does not include, it excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase "alienable and disposable" further limits the
coverage of Section 48(b) to only the agricultural lands of the public domain as set forth in Article XII, Section 2 of the
1987 Constitution. Bearing in mind such limitations under the Public Land Act, the applicant must satisfy the following
28
requirements in order for his application to come under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, to wit:

1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has been in possession and occupation of
the property subject of the application;

2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious;

3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership;

4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and

5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the public domain.

Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested with the authority to classify lands of the public
domain, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relation to Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,
presupposes that the land subject of the application for registration must have been already classified as agricultural
land of the public domain in order for the provision to apply. Thus, absent proof that the land is already classified as
agricultural land of the public domain, the Regalian Doctrine applies, and overcomes the presumption that the land is
alienable and disposable as laid down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. However, emphasis is placed on the
requirement that the classification required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is classification or reclassification
of a public land as agricultural.

The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the land as alienable and disposable agricultural land
should likewise have been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier, because any possession of the land prior to such
classification or reclassification produced no legal effects. It observes that the fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be
minimized or glossed over by mere judicial interpretation or by judicial social policy concerns, and insisted that the full
legislative intent be respected.

We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the requisite possession and occupation
was the sole prerogative of Congress, the determination of which should best be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers.
Except that said date qualified the period of possession and occupation, no other legislative intent appears to be
associated with the fixing of the date of June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the plain and literal
meaning of the law as written by the legislators.

Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act indicates that Congress prescribed no requirement
that the land subject of the registration should have been classified as agricultural since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As
such, the applicant’s imperfect or incomplete title is derived only from possession and occupation since June 12,
1945, or earlier. This means that the character of the property subject of the application as alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain determines its eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or title over it.
Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly,
continuously and exclusively during the prescribed statutory period is converted to private property by the mere lapse
or completion of the period.29 In fact, by virtue of this doctrine, corporations may now acquire lands of the public
domain for as long as the lands were already converted to private ownership, by operation of law, as a result of
satisfying the requisite period of possession prescribed by the Public Land Act. 30 It is for this reason that the property
subject of the application of Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the
public domain for the entire duration of the requisite period of possession.

To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified as alienable and disposable agricultural
land at the time of the application for registration is necessary only to dispute the presumption that the land is
inalienable.

The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to determine the point at which prescription may run
against the State. The imperfect or incomplete title being confirmed under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is title
that is acquired by reason of the applicant’s possession and occupation of the alienable and disposable agricultural
land of the public domain. Where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are complied with
through actual physical, open, continuous, exclusive and public possession of an alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, the possessor is deemed to have acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant by
the Government, because it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in order that such a grant be
sanctioned by the courts.31

If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public Land Act to adjudicate and quiet titles to unregistered lands
in favor of qualified Filipino citizens by reason of their occupation and cultivation thereof for the number of years
prescribed by law32 will be defeated. Indeed, we should always bear in mind that such objective still prevails, as a
fairly recent legislative development bears out, when Congress enacted legislation (Republic Act No. 10023) 33 in order
to liberalize stringent requirements and procedures in the adjudication of alienable public land to qualified applicants,
particularly residential lands, subject to area limitations. 34

On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer intended for public use or for the development of national
wealth by declaration of Congress or the President, thereby converting such land into patrimonial or private land of the
State, the applicable provision concerning disposition and registration is no longer Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act but the Civil Code, in conjunction with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. 35 As such, prescription
can now run against the State.

To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of public land or lands of the public domain,
namely:

(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State
and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private ownership are also presumed to belong to the
State and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;

(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:

(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and disposable through any of the
exclusive modes enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land Act. If the mode is judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, the agricultural land subject
of the application needs only to be classified as alienable and disposable as of the time of the
application, provided the applicant’s possession and occupation of the land dated back to June 12,
1945, or earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant has performed all the
conditions essential to a government grant arises, 36 and the applicant becomes the owner of the land
by virtue of an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has already ceased to be part of
the public domain and has become private property. 37

(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer intended for public
use or for the development of national wealth are removed from the sphere of public dominion and
are considered converted into patrimonial lands or lands of private ownership that may be alienated or
disposed through any of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of
acquisition is prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the land has been already
converted to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is a condition sine
qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code) that property of the State not patrimonial
in character shall not be the object of prescription.

To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their predecessors-in-
interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite character and period
of possession - possession and occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or
earlier - the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private property even upon the subsequent declaration
of it as alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land has remained
ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be
ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law
or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth.1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and the respondent's Partial Motion for
Reconsideration for their lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

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B.)

G.R. No. 199537

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
ANDREA TAN, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) from the May 29, 2009
decision1 and October 18, 2011 resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 00702. The CA
denied the Republic's appeal from LRC Case No. N-1443 wherein the Municipal Trial Court in Consolacion, Cebu,
granted respondent Andrea Tan's application for land title registration.

Antecedents

On October 2, 2002, Tan applied for the original registration of title of Lot No. 4080, Cad. 545-D (new) situated in
Casili, Consolacion, Cebu (the subject lot). She alleged that she is the absolute owner in fee simple of the said 7,807
square-meter parcel of residential land she purchased from a certain Julian Gonzaga on September 17, 1992. Her
application was docketed as LRC Case No. N-144.

After complying with the jurisdictional requirements, the land registration court issued an order of general default,
excepting the State which was duly represented by the Solicitor General.

During the trial, Tan proved the following facts:

1. The subject lot is within Block 1, Project No. 28, per LC Map No. 2545 of Consolacion, Cebu;

2. The subject lot was declared alienable and disposable on September 1, 1965, pursuant to Forestry
Administrative Order No. 4-1063;

3. Luciano Gonzaga who was issued Tax Declaration Nos. 01465 in 1965 and 02983 in 1972 initially
possessed the subject lot.

4. After Luciano’s death, Julian Gonzaga inherited the subject lot;

5. Andrea Tan purchased the subject lot from Julian Gonzaga on September 17, 1992;

6. She, through her predecessors, had been in peaceful, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession of the subject lot in the concept of an owner for over thirty (30) years.

On 28 April 2004, the land registration court granted Tan’s application. The court confirmed her title over the subject
lot and ordered its registration.
The Republic appealed the case to the CA, arguing that Tan failed to prove that she is a Filipino citizen who has been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject lot, in the concept of an
owner, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of her application. The appeal was docketed
as CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 00702.

On May 29, 2009, the CA denied the appeal. The CA observed that under the Public Land Act, there are two kinds of
applicants for original registration: (1) those who had possessed the land since June 12, 1945; and (2) those who
already acquired the property through prescription. The respondent’s application fell under the second category.

The CA noted that before land of the public domain can be acquired by prescription, it must have been declared
alienable and disposable agricultural land. The CA pointed to the certification issued by the Community Environment
and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) as evidence that the subject was classified as alienable and disposable on
September 1, 1965, pursuant to Land Classification Project No. 28. The CA concluded that Tan had already acquired
the subject lot by prescription.

On July 2, 2009, the Republic moved for reconsideration. Citing Republic v. Herbieto,4 it argued that an applicant for
judicial confirmation of title must have been in possession and occupation of the subject land since June 12, 1945, or
earlier, and that the subject land has been likewise already declared alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.5

On October 18, 2011, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration citing the then recent case of Heirs of Mario
Malabanan v. Rep. of the Philippines6 which abandoned the ruling in Herbieto. Malabanan declared that our law does
not require that the property should have been declared alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945, as long as the
declaration was made before the application for registration is filed. 7

On January 5, 2012, the Republic filed the present petition for review on certiorari.

The Petition

The Republic argues: (1) that the CA misapplied the doctrine in Malabanan; and (2) that the CENRO certification and
tax declarations presented were insufficient to prove that the subject lot was no longer intended for public use.

Meanwhile, the respondent insists that she has already proven her title over the subject lot. She maintains that the
classification of the subject lot as alienable and disposable public land by the DENR on September 1, 1965, per Land
Classification Project No. 28, converted it into patrimonial property of the State.

From the submissions, the lone issue is whether a declaration that Government-owned land has become alienable
and disposable sufficiently converts it into patrimonial property of the State, making it susceptible to acquisitive
prescription.

Our Ruling

We find the petition meritorious.

All lands of the public domain belong to the State. It is the fountain from which springs any asserted right of ownership
over land. Accordingly, the State owns all lands that are not clearly within private ownership. This is the Regalian
Doctrine which has been incorporated in all of our Constitutions and repeatedly embraced in jurisprudence.8 Under
the present Constitution, lands of the public domain are not alienable except for agricultural lands.9

The Public Land Act10 (PLA) governs the classification, grant, and disposition of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain. It is the primary substantive law on this matter. Section 11 thereof recognizes judicial confirmation of
imperfect titles as a mode of disposition of alienable public lands. 11 Relative thereto, Section 48(b) of the PLA
identifies who are entitled to judicial confirmation of their title:

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. (As amended by PD 1073.)
The Property Registration Decree12 (PRD) complements the PLA by prescribing how registrable lands, including
alienable public lands, are brought within the coverage of the Torrens system. Section 14 of the PRD enumerates the
qualified applicants for original registration of title:

Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier;

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of
existing laws;

(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds by right of accession or
accretion under the existing laws;

(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for by law. 13

The PRD also recognizes prescription as a mode of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. 14 Nevertheless,
prescription under Section 14(2) must not be confused with judicial confirmation of title under Section 14(1). Judicial
confirmation of title requires:

1. That the applicant is a Filipino citizen;15

2. That the applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-ininterest, has been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the property since June 12, 1945; 16

3. That the property had been declared alienable and disposable as of the filing of the application.17

Only private property can be acquired by prescription. Property of public dominion is outside the commerce of
man.18 It cannot be the object of prescription 19 because prescription does not run against the State in its sovereign
capacity.20 However, when property of public dominion is no longer intended for public use or for public service, it
becomes part of the patrimonial property of the State. 21 When this happens, the property is withdrawn from public
dominion and becomes property of private ownership, albeit still owned by the State. 22 The property is now brought
within the commerce of man and becomes susceptible to the concepts of legal possession and prescription.1avvphi1

In the present case, respondent Tan’s application is not anchored on judicial confirmation of an imperfect title because
she does not claim to have possessed the subject lot since June 12, 1945. Her application is based on acquisitive
prescription on the claim that: (1) the property was declared alienable and disposable on September 1, 1965; and (2)
she had been in open continuous, public, and notorious possession of the subject lot in the concept of an owner for
over thirty (30) years.

In our 2009 decision and 2013 resolution 23 in Malabanan, we already held en banc that a declaration that property of
the public dominion is alienable and disposable does not ipso facto convert it into patrimonial property. We said:

Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended
for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into
patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable,
remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by
prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer
intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can
begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in
cases where the President is duly authorized by law. 24

While a prior declaration that the property has become alienable and disposable is sufficient in an application for
judicial confirmation of title under Section 14(1) of the PRD, it does not suffice for the purpose of prescription under
25
the Civil Code. Before prescription can even begin to run against the State, the following conditions must concur to
convert the subject into patrimonial property:

1. The subject lot must have been classified as agricultural land in compliance with Sections 2 and 3 of Article
XII of the Constitution;
 2. The land must have been classified as alienable and disposable; 26

3. There must be a declaration from a competent authority that the subject lot is no longer intended for public
use, thereby converting it to patrimonial property.

Only when these conditions are met can applicants begin their public and peaceful possession of the subject lot in the
concept of an owner.

In the present case, the third condition is absent. Even though it has been declared alienable and disposable, the
property has not been withdrawn from public use or public service. Without this, prescription cannot begin to run
because the property has not yet been converted into patrimonial property of the State. It remains outside the
commerce of man and the respondent’s physical possession and occupation thereof do not produce any legal effect.
In the eyes of the law, the respondent has never acquired legal possession of the property and her physical
possession thereof, no matter how long, can never ripen into ownership.

WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition. The May 29, 2009 decision and October 18, 2011 resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. CEB-CV No. 00702 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The respondent's application for
Land Registration is DENIED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

**************************************************************************************************
C.)

G.R. No. 195097 August 13, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
MARLON MEDIDA, Respondent.

VELASCO, JR.,J.,*

VILLARAMA, JR.,**

DECISION

REYES, J.:

This resolves the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) to assail the
Decision1 dated December 16, 20 I 0 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 01870, entitled Marlon
Medida, Petitioner-appellee, v. Republic of the Philippines, Oppositor-appellant.

On October 22, 2004, herein respondent Marlon Medida (Medida) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Argao,
Cebu a petition for registration of title over two parcels of land situated in Poblacion, Boljoon, Cebu, identified as Lot
Nos. 817 and 597 of Boljoon Cad. 1049-D and measuring 5,972 and 533 square meters, respectively. The petition
was docketed as LRA Case No. AL-31 and raffled to Branch 26 of the RTC, Argao, Cebu.

The initial hearing on the petition was conducted on September 22, 2005, with the attendance of the public prosecutor.
The RTC delegated the reception of evidence to its Clerk of Court. Before the court, Medida testified that he
purchased the subject properties in February 1997 from one Eufemia Romero (Romero), who had previously obtained
the lots from Nabor Derama (Derama). At the time of the lots’ purchase by Medida, the properties were covered by
Tax Declaration No. 08774 under the name of Romero. Medida started occupying the properties in 1997, and had
since then declared the properties for tax purposes under his name. 2

Also among the witnesses presented during the proceedings a quo were Asuncion Derama Binagatan (Binagatan)
and Engineer Rafaela A. Belleza (Engr. Belleza).

Binagatan, daughter of Derama, testified that her father had inherited the subject properties from his uncle, one
Florencio Villareal, who possessed the lots even prior to the Second World War. She presented the old Tax
Declaration No. 08590 under the name of her father and covering the subject properties. 3
Engr. Belleza, the Chief of the Technical Services of the Land Management Services – Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), Region VII, testified that the lots’ survey conducted by Geodetic Engineer Jose V.
Dumaguing (Engr. Dumaguing) was approved by their office. Per the Advance Survey Plans for Lot Nos. 8174 and
5975 identified by Engr. Belleza, the subject properties had already been declared alienable and disposable portions of
the public domain.

On June 21, 2006, the trial court ruled in favor of Medida via a Decision 6 with dispositive portion that reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the petitioner to have sufficient title proper for registration, the petition is hereby GRANTED
and judgment is hereby rendered confirming the title of petitioner Marlon D. Medida, married to Patricia F. Medida,
over the following parcels of land:

1. A parcel of land, Lot 817, Cad. 1049-D, under AP-07-003683, situated in Barangay Poblacion, Municipality of
Boljoon, Province of Cebu, containing an area of FIVE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SEVENTY-TWO (5,972)
SQUARE METERS; and

2. A parcel of land, Lot 597, Cad. 1049-D, under AP 07-003653, situated in Barangay Poblacion, Municipality of
Boljoon, Province of Cebu, containing an area of FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY-THREE (533) SQUARE METERS.

IT IS SO DECIDED.7

Unsatisfied with the decision of the RTC, petitioner Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed
an appeal before the CA based on a lone assignment of error, to wit:

The trial court erred in granting appellee’s petition for registration because the subject lands were not occupied and
possessed for the period required by law. 8

In support of its appeal, the OSG argued that it was only from the subject lands’ date of alienability and disposability
that the reckoning of the thirty (30)-year statutory requirement of possession should begin. Based on the Advance
Survey Plans submitted by the respondent, Lot Nos. 817 and 597 were declared alienable and disposable in 1987 and
1980, respectively.9 The OSG then argued that Medida’s possession of the properties prior to 1987 and 1980, as the
case may be, should not be credited as part of the period of possession required from him as an applicant for land
registration.

On December 16, 2010, the CA rendered the assailed Decision10 dismissing the appeal. It ruled that the doctrine
invoked by the OSG had been abandoned by recent jurisprudence. The appellate court emphasized that the more
reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (P.D. No. 1529), otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree, now merely requires the property for registration to be already declared alienable and
disposable at the time that the application for registration of title is filed in court. The dispositive portion of the CA
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present Appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the Decision dated June 21,
2006, rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Laoang Northern Argao, Cebu, in LRA Case No. AL-31 is
hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.11

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. The Republic invokes in its petition a lone ground, to wit:

THE COURT OF APPEALS’ CONCLUSION THAT THE SUBJECT LANDS ARE PART OF THE ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE PORTION OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN IS WITHOUT BASIS.12

Citing jurisprudence on the matter, the Republic argues that the alienable and disposable character of the subject
parcels of land has not been sufficiently proved by the mere presentation of the surveyor’s notations on the Advance
Survey Plans for Lot Nos. 817 and 597. Petitioner Republic claims that such requirement must be established by the
existence of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an
administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute.

In his Comment,13 Medida maintains that he has sufficiently proved that the subject properties have been declared
alienable and disposable. To further support this assertion, he submitted with his Comment the following certifications
issued by the DENR-Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of Argao, Cebu: (1) the
Certification14 dated June 22, 2011 which states that the parcel of land described as Lot No. 817, Cad/Pls 1049-D, C-1
located at Poblacion, Boljoon, Cebu with an area of 5,972 square meters is within the alienable and disposable area,
Proj. No. 59-A, L.C. Map No. 3280, certified on August 6, 1987, as verified by actual ground verification; and (2) the
15
Certification dated July 5, 2011 which states that the parcel of land described as Lot No. 597, Cad/Pls 1049-D, C-1
located at Poblacion, Boljoon, Cebu with an area of 533 square meters is within the alienable and disposable area,
Proj. No. 59 L.C. Map No. 2876, certified on January 11, 1980, as verified by actual ground verification.

Medida also seeks the petition’s denial on the ground that it raises a question of fact, which is not allowed in petitions
for review under Rule 45. Medida further argues that the OSG is bound conclusively by its declaration before the CA
that the subject parcels of land have been declared alienable and disposable.

Prescinding from the foregoing, the main issue for this Court’s resolution is: whether or not the CA erred in ruling that
the parcels of land subject of the application for registration are part of the alienable and disposable portions of the
public domain.

The petition is meritorious.

First, we address Medida’s argument that the present petition raises a question of fact which is beyond the coverage
of a petition for review on certiorari. The distinction between a "question of law" and a "question of fact" is settled.
There is a "question of law" when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and
which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants. On the
other hand, there is a "question of fact" when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts. Simply put, when there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether or not the conclusion drawn therefrom is
correct, is a question of law.16

Judging by the arguments that are raised by the OSG in its petition, the issue delves on the alleged insufficiency of the
documents presented by the respondent to support the CA’s conclusion that the subject parcels of land have been
validly declared alienable and disposable. In Republic v. Ve g a, 17 we explained that when a petitioner seeks the
review of a lower court’s ruling based on the evidence presented, without delving into their probative value but only on
their sufficiency to support the legal conclusions made, then a question of law is raised. We explained:

The Petition raises a question of law, and not a question of fact. Petitioner Republic simply takes issue against the
conclusions made by the trial and the appellate courts regarding the nature and character of the subject parcel of land,
based on the evidence presented. When petitioner asks for a review of the decisions made by a lower court based on
the evidence presented, without delving into their probative value but simply on their sufficiency to support the legal
conclusions made, then a question of law is raised.

xxxx

Petitioner Republic is not calling for an examination of the probative value or truthfulness of the evidence presented, x
x x. It, however, questions whether the evidence on record is sufficient to support the lower court's conclusion that the
subject land is alienable and disposable. Otherwise stated, considering the evidence presented by respondents Vegas
in the proceedings below, were the trial and the appellate courts justified under the law and jurisprudence in their
findings on the nature and character of the subject land? Undoubtedly, this is a pure question of law, which calls for a
resolution of what is the correct and applicable law to a given set of facts.18 (Emphasis ours)

The issue in the present petition has been limited by the Republic, as it merely concerns the merit of notations in
survey plans to prove that the properties sought to be registered have been declared alienable and disposable. Similar
to the Vega case, the contest rests on the matter of sufficiency of evidence, an issue on a conclusion that was made
by the appellate court without necessarily raising an attack on the authenticity of the documents that were presented
in the proceedings before the RTC. The issue being invoked by the Republic to support its petition is then a question
of law, a matter that is within the purview of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

We now resolve the petition’s substantial issue. Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution,
all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land.
All lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public
lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land, or alienated to a private person
by the State, remain part of the inalienable public domain. The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State
ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration, who must prove that the land
subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
19
presented to establish that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.

On this requirement of proof to establish that a land has become alienable and disposable, the respondent argues that
the Advance Survey Plans20 that were prepared by Engr. Dumaguing and approved by the DENR-Land Management
Bureau, providing notations that the lots indicated therein are within the alienable and disposable properties of the
State, should suffice. We disagree.
As the rule now stands, an applicant must prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable and
disposable by establishing the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act
or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been
possessed for the required number of years is alienable and disposable.21 In a line of cases, we have ruled that mere
notations appearing in survey plans are inadequate proof of the covered properties’ alienable and disposable
character. Our ruling in Republic of the Philippines v. Tri-Plus Corporation22 is particularly instructive:

It must be stressed that incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable.

In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of the subject lands as required by law is the notation
appearing in the Advance Plan stating in effect that the said properties are alienable and disposable. However, this is
hardly the kind of proof required by law. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an
applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order, an administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act
or statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the Government that the lands applied for are alienable
and disposable. In the case at bar, while the Advance Plan bearing the notation was certified by the Lands
Management Services of the DENR, the certification refers only to the technical correctness of the survey plotted in
the said plan and has nothing to do whatsoever with the nature and character of the property surveyed. Respondents
failed to submit a certification from the proper government agency to prove that the lands subject for registration are
indeed alienable and disposable.23 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)

Clearly, even the testimony of Engr. Belleza fails to satisfy the required proof. Before us, Medida attempts to remedy
the deficiency in his application by submitting the Certifications 24 of the CENRO of Argao, Cebu, attached to his
Comment to further substantiate his claim that the subject properties were already declared alienable and disposable.
Unfortunately for the respondent, the said CENRO Certifications remain inadequate to support his intended purpose.

In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,25 this Court explained that a Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Office (PENRO) or CENRO certification, by itself, fails to prove the alienable and disposable
character of a parcel of land. We ruled:

It is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for
land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the
land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for
registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In
addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be
established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondents failed to do so because the
certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and
disposable.26 (Emphasis ours)

We further explained why a CENRO or PENRO certification cannot be considered prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein:

Public documents are defined under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence as follows:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and
tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and

(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.

Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in Section 19(a), when admissible for any
purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody
of the record, or by his deputy x x x. The CENRO is not the official repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the
DENR Secretary declaring public lands as alienable and disposable. The CENRO should have attached an official
publication of the DENR Secretary’s issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable.

Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:

"Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. – Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance
of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. All other public documents are
evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter."

The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not fall within the class of public
documents contemplated in the first sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. The certifications do not reflect "entries in
public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer," such as entries made by the Civil Registrar in
the books of registries, or by a ship captain in the ship’s logbook. The certifications are not the certified copies or
authenticated reproductions of original official records in the legal custody of a government office. The certifications
are not even records of public documents. x x x. 27 (Citations omitted and italics ours)

The present rule on the matter then requires that an application for original registration be accompanied by: (1)
CENRO or PENRO Certification; and (2) a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and
certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. 28 Medida failed in this respect. The records only
include CENRO Certifications on the subject properties’ alienability and disposability, but not a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by its legal custodian.

Furthermore, even the CENRO Certifications filed before this Court deserve scant consideration since these were not
presented during the trial. The genuineness and due execution of these documents had not been duly proven in the
manner required by law.29

In view of the failure of the respondent to establish by sufficient proof that the subject parcels of land had been
classified as part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, his application for registration of title
should be denied.

There is even no merit in the petitioner’s argument that the Republic is bound by an alleged judicial admission on the
subject properties’ alienability and disposability, when the latter included the following statement in its Brief 30 filed
before the CA:

The Advance Survey Plan clearly shows that the Lot No. 817 and Lot No. 597, albeit alienable and disposable land,
were declared only as such in 1987 and 1980, respectively. 31 (Citation omitted)

Said statement cannot be construed as an admission on the alienable and disposable character of the subject
properties, as the Republic merely cited the contents of the Advance Survey Plans to lay its basis in saying that
Medida had not satisfied the required number of years of possession. Furthermore, the afore-quoted statement should
not be interpreted in isolation or taken out of context, as the statements prior to the alleged judicial admission in fact
provide:

Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conversion of such patrimony. The same doctrine also states
that all lands not otherwise appearing within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Hence, anyone
who applies for registration of ownership over a parcel of land has the burden of overcoming the presumption that the
land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.

Such burden was not discharged in the present case. x x x. 32 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)

This Court also holds that the alienability and disposability of land are not among the matters that can be established
by mere admissions, or even the agreement of parties. The law and jurisprudence provide stringent requirements to
33
prove such fact. Our Constitution, no less, embodies the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong
to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. The courts are then empowered, as we
are duty-bound, to ensure that such ownership of the State is duly protected by the proper observance by parties of
the rules and requirements on land registration.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition IS GRANTED. The Decision dated December 16, 20 I 0 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 01870 is hereby SET ASIDE. The application for registration filed by Marlon Medida
is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

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D.
REPUBLIC ACT No. 10023

AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE ISSUANCE OF FREE PATENTS TO RESIDENTAL LANDS

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippine Congress Assembled:

Section 1. Qualifications. - Any Filipino citizen who is an actual occupant of a residential land may apply for a Free
Patent Title under this Act: Provided; That in highly urbanized cities, the land should not exceed two hundred (200)
square meters; in other cities, it should not exceed five hundred (500) square meters; in first class and second class
municipalities, it should not exceed seven hundred fifty (750) square meters; and in all other municipalities, it should
not exceed one thousand (1,000) square meters; Provided, further, That the land applied for is not needed for public
service and/or public use.

Section 2. Coverage. - This Act shall cover all lands that are zoned as residential areas, including townsites as
defined under the Public Land Act; Provided, That none of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 705 shall be
violated.

Zoned residential areas located inside a delisted military reservation or abandoned military camp, and those of local
government units (LGUs) or townsites which preceded Republic Act No. 7586 or the National Integrated Protected
Areas System (NIPAS) law, shall also be covered by this Act.

Section 3. Application. - The application on the land applied for shall be supported by a map based on an actual
survey conducted by a licensed geodetic engineer and approved by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and a technical description of the land applied for together with supporting affidavit of two (2)
disinterested persons who are residing in the barangay of the city or municipality where the land is located, attesting to
the truth of the facts contained in the application to the effect that the applicant thereof has, either by himself or
through his predecessor-in-interest, actually resided on and continuously possessed and occupied, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, the land applied for at least ten (10) years and has complied with the requirements
prescribed in Section 1 hereof.

Section 4. Special Patents. - Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary and subject to private rights, if any,
public land actually occupied and used for public schools, municipal halls, public plazas or parks and other
government institutions for public use or purpose may be issued special patents under the name of the national
agency or LGU concerned: Provided, That all lands titled under this section shall not be disposed of unless sanctioned
by Congress if owned by the national agency or sanctioned by the sanggunian concerned through an approved
ordinance if owned by the LGU.

Section 5. Removal of Restrictions. - The restrictions regarding encumbrances, conveyances, transfers or

dispositions imposed in Sections 118, 119,121, 122 and 123 of Chapter XII, Title VI of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as
amended, shall not apply to patents issued under this Act.

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E.)

Page 131-152 of Agpalo’s the Law on Natural Resources

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Section 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as "The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997."

Section 2. Declaration of State Policies. - The State shall recognize and promote all the rights of Indigenous
Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) hereunder enumerated within the framework of the
Constitution:

a) The State shall recognize and promote the rights of ICCs/IPs within the framework of national unity and
development;

b)The State shall protect the rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains to ensure their economic, social
and cultural well being and shall recognize the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or
relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain;
c) The State shall recognize, respect and protect the rights of ICCs/IPs to preserve and develop their
cultures, traditions and institutions. It shall consider these rights in the formulation of national laws and
policies;

d) The State shall guarantee that members of the ICCs/IPs regardless of sex, shall equally enjoy the full
measure of human rights and freedoms without distinctions or discriminations;

e) The State shall take measures, with the participation of the ICCs/IPs concerned, to protect their rights and
guarantee respect for their cultural integrity, and to ensure that members of the ICCs/IPs benefit on an
equal footing from the rights and opportunities which national laws and regulations grant to other members
of the population and

f) The State recognizes its obligations to respond to the strong expression of the ICCs/IPs for cultural integrity
by assuring maximum ICC/IP participation in the direction of education, health, as well as other services of
ICCs/IPs, in order to render such services more responsive to the needs and desires of these communities.

Towards these ends, the State shall institute and establish the necessary mechanisms to enforce and
guarantee the realization of these rights, taking into consideration their customs, traditions, values, beliefs,
their rights to their ancestral domains.

**********************************************************************************************************
CHAPTER II
DEFINITION OF TERMS

Section 3. Definition of Terms. - For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:

a) Ancestral Domains - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs
comprising lands,inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a claim of
ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs, themselves or through their ancestors, communally or
individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present except when interrupted by war, force
majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any
other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private individuals, corporations, and which are
necessary to ensure their economic, social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral land, forests,
pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable and disposable or
otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural
resources, and lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which their
traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of
ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators;

b) Ancestral Lands - Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied, possessed and utilized by
individuals, families and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual or traditional group ownership,continuously,
to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or
as a consequence of government projects and other voluntary dealings entered into by government and
private individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice terraces or paddies,
private forests, swidden farms and tree lots;

c) Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title - refers to a title formally recognizing the rights of possession and
ownership of ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domains identified and delineated in accordance with this law;

d) Certificate of Ancestral Lands Title - refers to a title formally recognizing the rights of ICCs/IPs over their
ancestral lands;

e) Communal Claims - refer to claims on land, resources and rights thereon, belonging to the whole
community within a defined territory

f) Customary Laws - refer to a body of written and/or unwritten rules, usages, customs and practices
traditionally and continually recognized, accepted and observed by respective ICCs/IPs;

g) Free and Prior Informed Consent - as used in this Act shall mean the consensus of all members of the
ICCs/IPs to; be determined in accordance with their respective customary laws and practices, free from
any external manipulation, interference and coercion, and obtained after fully disclosing the intent and
scope of the activity, in a language an process understandable to the community;

h) Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples - refer to a group of people or homogenous

societies identified by self-ascription and ascription by other, who have continuously lived as organized
community on communally bounded and defined territory, and who have, under claims of ownership since
time immemorial, occupied, possessed customs, tradition and other distinctive cultural traits, or who have,
through resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and
culture, became historically differentiated from the majority of Filipinos. ICCs/IPs shall likewise include
peoples who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited
the country, at the time of conquest or colonization, or at the time of inroads of non-indigenous religions
and cultures, or the establishment of present state boundaries, who retain some or all of their own social,
economic, cultural and political institutions, but who may have been displaced from their traditional
domains or who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains;

i) Indigenous Political Structure - refer to organizational and cultural leadership systems, institutions,
relationships, patterns and processed for decision-making and participation, identified by ICCs/IPs such as,
but not limited to, Council of Elders, Council of Timuays, Bodong Holder, or any other tribunal or body of
similar nature;

j) Individual Claims - refer to claims on land and rights thereon which have been devolved to individuals,
families and clans including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice terraces or paddies and tree lots;

k) National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) - refers to the office created under this Act, which
shall be under the Office of the President, and which shall be the primary government agency responsible
for the formulation and implementation of policies, plans and programs to recognize, protect and promote
the rights of ICCs/IPs;

l) Native Title - refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which, as far back as memory reaches,
have been held under a claim of private ownership by ICCs/IPs, have never been public lands and are thus
indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest;

m) Nongovernment Organization - refers to a private, nonprofit voluntary organization that has been
organized primarily for the delivery of various services to the ICCs/IPs and has an established track record for
effectiveness and acceptability in the community where it serves;

n) People's Organization - refers to a private, nonprofit voluntary organization of members of an ICC/IP

which is accepted as representative of such ICCs/IPs;

o) Sustainable Traditional Resource Rights - refer to the rights of ICCs/IPs to sustainably use,manage, protect
and conserve a) land, air, water, and minerals; b) plants, animals and other organisms; c) collecting, fishing
and hunting grounds; d) sacred sites; and e) other areas of economic, ceremonial and aesthetic value in
accordance with their indigenous knowledge, beliefs, systems and practices; and

p) Time Immemorial - refers to a period of time when as far back as memory can go, certain ICCs/IPs are
known to have occupied, possessed in the concept of owner, and utilized a defined territory devolved to
them, by operation of customary law or inherited from their ancestors, in accordance with their customs
and traditions.

CHAPTER III
RIGHTS TO ANCESTRAL DOMAINS

Section 4. Concept of Ancestral Lands/Domains. - Ancestral lands/domains shall include such concepts of
territories which cover not only the physical environment but the total environment including the spiritual
and cultural bonds to the area which the ICCs/IPs possess, occupy and use and to which they have claims
of ownership.

Section 5. Indigenous Concept of Ownership. - Indigenous concept of ownership sustains the view that
ancestral domains and all resources found therein shall serve as the material bases of their cultural integrity.
The indigenous concept of ownership generally holds that ancestral domains are the ICC's/IP's private but
community property which belongs to all generations and therefore cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed.
It likewise covers sustainable traditional resource rights.
Section 6. Composition of Ancestral Lands/Domains. - Ancestral lands and domains shall consist of all areas
generally belonging to ICCs/IPs as referred under Sec. 3, items (a) and (b) of this Act.

Section 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains. - The rights of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs t their ancestral
domains shall be recognized and protected. Such rights shall include:

a. Rights of Ownership.- The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually
occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made
by them at any time within the domains;

b. Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources. - Subject to Section 56 hereof, right to develop, control
and use lands and territories traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to manage and conserve natural
resources within the territories and uphold the responsibilities for future generations; to benefit and share the
profits from allocation and utilization of the natural resources found therein; the right to negotiate the terms
and conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological,
environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and customary laws; the
right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of any project,
government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair
compensation for any damages which they sustain as a result of the project; and the right to effective
measures by the government to prevent any interfere with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights;

c. Right to Stay in the Territories- The right to stay in the territory and not be removed therefrom. No ICCs/IPs
will be relocated without their free and prior informed consent, nor through any means other than eminent
domain. Where relocation is considered necessary as an exceptional measure, such relocation shall take
place only with the free and prior informed consent of the ICCs/IPs concerned and whenever possible, they
shall be guaranteed the right to return to their ancestral domains, as soon as the grounds for relocation
cease to exist. When such return is not possible, as determined by agreement or through appropriate
procedures, ICCs/IPs shall be provided in all possible cases with lands of quality and legal status at least
equal to that of the land previously occupied by them, suitable to provide for their present needs and
future development. Persons thus relocated shall likewise be fully compensated for any resulting loss or
injury;

d. Right in Case of Displacement. - In case displacement occurs as a result of natural catastrophes, the
State shall endeavor to resettle the displaced ICCs/IPs in suitable areas where they can have temporary life
support system: Provided, That the displaced ICCs/IPs shall have the right to return to their abandoned lands
until such time that the normalcy and safety of such lands shall be determined: Provided, further, That
should their ancestral domain cease to exist and normalcy and safety of the previous settlements are not
possible, displaced ICCs/IPs shall enjoy security of tenure over lands to which they have been resettled:
Provided, furthermore, That basic services and livelihood shall be provided to them to ensure that their
needs are adequately addressed:

e. Right to Regulate Entry of Migrants. - Right to regulate the entry of migrant settlers and organizations into
the domains;

f. Right to Safe and Clean Air and Water. - For this purpose, the ICCs/IPs shall have access to integrated
systems for the management of their inland waters and air space;

g. Right to Claim Parts of Reservations. - The right to claim parts of the ancestral domains which have been
reserved for various purposes, except those reserved and intended for common and public welfare and
service; and

h. Right to Resolve Conflict. - Right to resolve land conflicts in accordance with customary laws of the area
where the land is located, and only in default thereof shall the complaints be submitted to amicable
settlement and to the Courts of Justice whenever necessary.

Section 8. Rights to Ancestral Lands. - The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs, to their ancestral
lands shall be recognized and protected.

a. Right to transfer land/property. - Such right shall include the right to transfer land or property rights
to/among members of the same ICCs/IPs, subject to customary laws and traditions of the community
concerned.
b. Right to Redemption. - In cases where it is shown that the transfer of land/property rights by virtue of any
agreement or devise, to a non-member of the concerned ICCs/IPs is tainted by the vitiated consent of the
ICCs/IPs,or is transferred for an unconscionable consideration or price, the transferor ICC/IP shall have the
right to redeem the same within a period not exceeding fifteen (15) years from the date of transfer.

Section 9. Responsibilities of ICCs/IPs to their Ancestral Domains. - ICCs/IPs occupying a duly certified
ancestral domain shall have the following responsibilities:

a. Maintain Ecological Balance- To preserve, restore, and maintain a balanced ecology in the ancestral
domain by protecting the flora and fauna, watershed areas, and other reserves;

b. Restore Denuded Areas- To actively initiate, undertake and participate in the reforestation of denuded
areas and other development programs and projects subject to just and reasonable remuneration; and

c. Observe Laws- To observe and comply with the provisions of this Act and the rules and regulations for its
effective implementation.

Section 10. Unauthorized and Unlawful Intrusion. - Unauthorized and unlawful intrusion upon, or use of any
portion of the ancestral domain, or any violation of the rights herein before enumerated, shall be
punishable under this law. Furthermore, the Government shall take measures to prevent non-ICCs/IPs from
taking advantage of the ICCs/IPs customs or lack of understanding of laws to secure ownership, possession
of land belonging to said ICCs/IPs.

Section 11. Recognition of Ancestral Domain Rights. - The rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains by
virtue of Native Title shall be recognized and respected. Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs
concerned, shall be embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), which shall recognize the
title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and delineated.

Section 12. Option to Secure Certificate of Title under Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or the Land
Registration Act 496. - Individual members of cultural communities, with respect to individually-owned
ancestral lands who, by themselves or through their predecessors-in -interest, have been in continuous
possession and occupation of the same in the concept of owner since the immemorial or for a period of not
less than thirty (30) years immediately preceding the approval of this Act and uncontested by the members
of the same ICCs/IPs shall have the option to secure title to their ancestral lands under the provisions of
Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or the Land Registration Act 496.

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CHAPTER V
SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 21. Equal Protection and Non-discrimination of ICCs/IPs. - Consistent with the equal protection
clause of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights including the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
and International Human Rights Law, the State shall, with due recognition of their distinct characteristics and
identity, accord to the members of the ICCs/IPs the rights, protections and privileges enjoyed by the rest of
the citizenry. It shall extend to them the same employment rights, opportunities, basic services, educational
and other rights and privileges available to every member of the society. Accordingly, the State shall
likewise ensure that the employment of any form of force of coersion against ICCs/IPs shall be dealt with by
law.

The State shall ensure that the fundamental human rights and freedoms as enshrined in the Constitution and
relevant international instruments are guaranteed also to indigenous women. Towards this end, no provision
in this Act shall be interpreted so as to result in the diminution of rights and privileges already recognized
and accorded to women under existing laws of general application.

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Section 23. Freedom from Discrimination and Right to Equal Opportunity and Treatment. - It shall be the right
of the ICCs/IPs to be free from any form of discrimination, with respect to recruitment and conditions of
employment, such that they may enjoy equal opportunities as other occupationally-related benefits,
informed of their rights under existing labor legislation and of means available to them for redress, not
subject to any coercive recruitment systems, including bonded labor and other forms of debt servitude; and
equal treatment in employment for men and women, including the protection from sexual harassment.

Towards this end, the State shall within the framework of national laws and regulations, and in cooperation
with the ICCs/IPs concerned, adopt special measures to ensure the effective protection with regard to the
recruitment and conditions of employment of persons belonging to these communities, to the extent that
they are not effectively protected by the laws applicable to workers in general.

ICCs/IPs shall have the right to association and freedom for all trade union activities and the right to
conclude collective bargaining agreements with employers' conditions. They shall likewise have the right
not to be subject to working conditions hazardous to their health, particularly through exposure to pesticides
and other toxic substances.

Section 24. Unlawful Acts Pertaining to Employment. - It shall be unlawful for any person:

a. To discriminate against any ICC/IP with respect to the terms and conditions of employment on account
of their descent. Equal remuneration shall be paid to ICC/IP and non-ICC/IP for work of equal value; and

b. To deny any ICC/IP employee any right or benefit herein provided for or to discharge them for the
purpose of preventing them from enjoying any of the rights or benefits provided under this Act.
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Section 33. Rights to Religious, Cultural Sites and Ceremonies. - ICCs/IPs shall have the right to manifest,
practice, develop teach their spiritual and religious traditions, customs and ceremonies; the right to
maintain, protect and have access to their religious and cultural sites; the right to use and control of
ceremonial object; and the right to the repatriation of human remains. Accordingly, the State shall take
effective measures, in cooperation with the burial sites, be preserved, respected and protected. To achieve
this purpose, it shall be unlawful to:

a. Explore, excavate or make diggings on archeological sites of the ICCs/IPs for the purpose of obtaining
materials of cultural values without the free and prior informed consent of the community concerned; and

b. Deface, remove or otherwise destroy artifacts which are of great importance to the ICCs/IPs for the
preservation of their cultural heritage.
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CHAPTER VII
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (NCIP)

Section 38. National Commission on Indigenous Cultural Communities /Indigenous Peoples (NCCP). - to
carry out the policies herein set forth, there shall be created the National Commission on ICCs/IPs (NCIP),
which shall be the primary government agency responsible for the formulation and implementation of
policies, plans and programs to promote and protect the rights and well-being of the ICCs/IPs and the
recognition of their ancestral domains as well as their rights thereto.

Section 39. Mandate. - The NCIP shall protect and promote the interest and well-being of the ICCs/IPs with
due regard to their beliefs, customs, traditions and institutions.

Section 40. Composition. - The NCIP shall be an independent agency under the Office of the President and
shall be composed of seven (7) Commissioners belonging to ICCs/IPs, one (1) of whom shall be the
Chairperson. The Commissioners shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines from a list of
recommendees submitted by authentic ICCs/IPs: Provided, That the seven (7) Commissioners shall be
appointed specifically from each of the following ethnographic areas: Region I and the Cordilleras; Region
II; the rest of Luzon; Island Groups including Mindoro, Palawan, Romblon, Panay and the rest of the Visayas;
Northern and Western Mindanao; Southern and Eastern Mindanao; and Central Mindanao: Provided, That
at least two (2) of the seven (7) Commissioners shall be women.

Section 41. Qualifications, Tenure, Compensation. - The Chairperson and the six (6) Commissioners must be
natural born Filipino citizens, bonafide members of ICCs/IPs as certified by his/her tribe, experienced in
ethnic affairs and who have worked for at least ten (10) years with an ICC/IP community and/or any
government agency involved in ICC/IP, at least 35 years of age at the time of appointment, and must be of
proven honesty and integrity: Provided, That at least two (2) of the seven (7) Commissioners shall be the
members of the Philippine Bar: Provided, further, That the members of the NCIP shall hold office for a period
of three (3) years, and may be subject to re-appointment for another term: Provided, furthermore, That no
person shall serve for more than two (2) terms. Appointment to any vacancy shall only be for the unexpired
term of the predecessor and in no case shall a member be appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity: Provided, finally, That the Chairperson and the Commissioners shall be entitled to
compensation in accordance with the Salary Standardization Law.

Section 42. Removal from Office. - Any member of the NCIP may be removed from office by the President,
on his own initiative or upon recommendation by any indigenous community, before the expiration of his
term for cause and after complying with due process requirement of law.

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Section 44. Powers and Functions. - To accomplish its mandate, the NCIP shall have the following powers,
jurisdiction and function:

e) To issue certificate of ancestral land/domain title;

m) To issue appropriate certification as a pre-condition to the grant of permit, lease, grant, or any other
similar authority for the disposition, utilization, management and appropriation by any private individual,
corporate entity or any government agency, corporation or subdivision thereof on any part or portion of the
ancestral domain taking into consideration the consensus approval of the ICCs/IPs concerned;

n) To decide all appeals from the decisions and acts of all the various offices within the Commission:

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Section 46. Officers within the NCIP. - The NCIP shall have the following offices which shall be responsible for
the implementation of the policies herein after provided:

a. Ancestral Domains Office - The Ancestral Domain Office shall be responsible for the identification,
delineation and recognition of ancestral land/domains. It shall also be responsible for the management of
ancestral lands/domains in accordance with the master plans as well as the implementation of the
ancestral domain rights of the ICCs/IPs as provided in Chapter III of this Act. It shall also issue, upon the free
and prior informed consent of the ICCs/IPs concerned, certification prior to the grant of any license, lease or
permit for the exploitation of natural resources affecting the interests of ICCs/IPs in protecting the territorial
integrity of all ancestral domains. It shall likewise perform such other functions as the Commission may deem
appropriate and necessary;

b. Office on Policy, Planning and Research - The Office on Policy, Planning and Research shall be
responsible for the formulation of appropriate policies and programs for ICCs/IPs such as, but not limited to,
the development of a Five-Year Master Plan for the ICCs/IPs. Such plan shall undergo a process such that
every five years, the Commission shall endeavor to assess the plan and make ramifications in accordance
with the changing situations. The Office shall also undertake the documentation of customary law and shall
establish and maintain a Research Center that would serve as a depository of ethnographic information for
monitoring, evaluation and policy formulation. It shall assist the legislative branch of the national
government in the formulation of appropriate legislation benefiting ICCs/IPs.

c. Office of Education, Culture and Health - The Office on Culture, Education and Health shall be
responsible for the effective implementation of the education, cultural and related rights as provided in this
Act. It shall assist, promote and support community schools, both formal and non-formal, for the benefit of
the local indigenous community, especially in areas where existing educational facilities are not accessible
to members of the indigenous group. It shall administer all scholarship programs and other educational
rights intended for ICC/IP beneficiaries in coordination with the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports and the Commission on Higher Education. It shall undertake, within the limits of available
appropriation, a special program which includes language and vocational training, public health and
family assistance program and related subjects.

It shall also identify ICCs/IPs with potential training in the health profession and encourage and assist them
to enroll in schools of medicine, nursing, physical therapy and other allied courses pertaining to the health
profession.

Towards this end, the NCIP shall deploy a representative in each of the said offices who shall personally
perform the foregoing task and who shall receive complaints from the ICCs/IPs and compel action from
appropriate agency. It shall also monitor the activities of the National Museum and other similar
government agencies generally intended to manage and preserve historical and archeological artifacts of
the ICCs /IPs and shall be responsible for the implementation of such other functions as the NCIP may deem
appropriate and necessary;

d. Office on Socio-Economic Services and Special Concerns - The Office on Socio-Economic Services and
Special Concerns shall serve as the Office through which the NCIP shall coordinate with pertinent
government agencies specially charged with the implementation of various basic socio-economic services,
policies, plans and programs affecting the ICCs/IPs to ensure that the same are properly and directly
enjoyed by them. It shall also be responsible for such other functions as the NCIP may deem appropriate
and necessary;

e. Office of Empowerment and Human Rights - The Office of Empowerment and Human Rights shall ensure
that indigenous socio- political, cultural and economic rights are respected and recognized. It shall ensure
that capacity building mechanisms are instituted and ICCs/IPs are afforded every opportunity, if they so
choose, to participate in all level decision-making. It shall likewise ensure that the basic human rights, and
such other rights as the NCIP may determine, subject to existing laws, rules and regulations are protected
and promoted;

f. Administrative Office - The Administrative Office shall provide the NCIP with economical, efficient and
effective services pertaining to personnel, finance, records, equipment, security, supplies, and related
services. It shall also administer the Ancestral Domains Fund; and

g. Legal Affairs Office - There shall be a Legal Affairs Office which shall advice the NCIP on all legal matters
concerning ICCs/IPs and which shall be responsible for providing ICCs/IPs with legal assistance in litigation
involving community interest. It shall conduct preliminary investigation on the basis of complaints filed by the
ICCs/IPs against a natural or juridical person believed to have violated ICCs/IPs rights. On the basis of its
findings, it shall initiate the filing of appropriate legal or administrative action to the NCIP.

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CHAPTER VIII
DELINEATION AND RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS

Section 51. Delineation and Recognition of Ancestral Domains. - Self-delineation shall be guiding principle in
the identification and delineation of ancestral domains. As such, the ICCs/IPs concerned shall have a
decisive role in all the activities pertinent thereto. The Sworn Statement of the Elders as to the Scope of the
territories and agreements/pacts made with neighboring ICCs/IPs, if any, will be essential to the
determination of these traditional territories. The Government shall take the necessary steps to identify lands
which the ICCs/IPs concerned traditionally occupy and guarantee effective protection of their rights of
ownership and possession thereto. Measures shall be taken in appropriate cases to safeguard the rights of
the ICCs/IPs concerned to land which may no longer be exclusively occupied by them, but to which they
have traditionally had access for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly of ICCs/IPs who are
still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators.

Section 52. Delineation Process. - The identification and delineation of ancestral domains shall be done in
accordance with the following procedures:

a. Ancestral Domains Delineated Prior to this Act - The provisions hereunder shall not apply to ancestral
domains/lands already delineated according to DENR Administrative Order No. 2, series of 1993, nor to
ancestral lands and domains delineated under any other community/ancestral domain program prior to
the enactment of his law. ICCs/IPs enactment of this law shall have the right to apply for the issuance of a
Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) over the area without going through the process outlined
hereunder;

b. Petition for Delineation - The process of delineating a specific perimeter may be initiated by the NCIP with
the consent of the ICC/IP concerned, or through a Petition for Delineation filed with the NCIP, by a majority
of the members of the ICCs/IPs;

c. Delineation Paper - The official delineation of ancestral domain boundaries including census of all
community members therein, shall be immediately undertaken by the Ancestral Domains Office upon filing
of the application by the ICCs/IPs concerned. Delineation will be done in coordination with the community
concerned and shall at all times include genuine involvement and participation by the members of the
communities concerned;
d. Proof required - Proof of Ancestral Domain Claims shall include the testimony of elders or community
under oath, and other documents directly or indirectly attesting to the possession or occupation of the area
since time immemorial by such ICCs/IPs in the concept of owners which shall be any one (1) of the following
authentic documents:

1. Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs customs and traditions;

2. Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs political structure and institution;

3. Pictures showing long term occupation such as those of old improvements, burial grounds, sacred places
and old villages;

4. Historical accounts, including pacts and agreements concerning boundaries entered into by the ICCs/IPs
concerned with other ICCs/IPs;

5. Survey plans and sketch maps;

6. Anthropological data;

7. Genealogical surveys;

8. Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional communal forests and hunting grounds;

9. Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional landmarks such as mountains, rivers, creeks, ridges, hills,
terraces and the like; and

10. Write-ups of names and places derived from the native dialect of the community.

e. Preparation of Maps - On the basis of such investigation and the findings of fact based thereon, the
Ancestral Domains Office of the NCIP shall prepare a perimeter map, complete with technical descriptions,
and a description of the natural features and landmarks embraced therein;

f. Report of Investigation and Other Documents - A complete copy of the preliminary census and a report of
investigation, shall be prepared by the Ancestral Domains Office of the NCIP;

g. Notice and Publication - A copy of each document, including a translation in the native language of the
ICCs/IPs concerned shall be posted in a prominent place therein for at least fifteen (15) days. A copy of the
document shall also be posted at the local, provincial and regional offices of the NCIP, and shall be
published in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks to allow other
claimants to file opposition thereto within fifteen (15) days from the date of such publication: Provided, That
in areas where no such newspaper exists, broadcasting in a radio station will be a valid substitute: Provided,
further, That mere posting shall be deemed sufficient if both newspaper and radio station are not available;

h. Endorsement to NCIP - Within fifteen (15) days from publication, and of the inspection process, the
Ancestral Domains Office shall prepare a report to the NCIP endorsing a favorable action upon a claim that
is deemed to have sufficient proof. However, if the proof is deemed insufficient, the Ancestral Domains
Office shall require the submission of additional evidence: Provided, That the Ancestral Domains Office shall
reject any claim that is deemed patently false or fraudulent after inspection and verification: Provided,
further, That in case of rejection, the Ancestral Domains Office shall give the applicant due notice, copy
furnished all concerned, containing the grounds for denial. The denial shall be appealable to the NCIP:
Provided, furthermore, That in cases where there are conflicting claims, the Ancestral Domains Office shall
cause the contending parties to meet and assist them in coming up with a preliminary resolution of the
conflict, without prejudice to its full adjudication according to the selection below.

i. Turnover of Areas Within Ancestral Domains Managed by Other Government Agencies - The Chairperson
of the NCIP shall certify that the area covered is an ancestral domain. The secretaries of the Department of
Agrarian Reform, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Department of the Interior and Local
Government, and Department of Justice, the Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, and
any other government agency claiming jurisdiction over the area shall be notified thereof. Such notification
shall terminate any legal basis for the jurisdiction previously claimed;
j. Issuance of CADT - ICCs/IPs whose ancestral domains have been officially delineated and determined by
the NCIP shall be issued a CADT in the name of the community concerned, containing a list of all those
identified in the census; and

k. Registration of CADTs - The NCIP shall register issued certificates of ancestral domain titles and certificates
of ancestral lands titles before the Register of Deeds in the place where the property is situated.

Section 53. Identification, Delineation and Certification of Ancestral Lands. -

a. The allocation of lands within any ancestral domain to individual or indigenous corporate (family or clan)
claimants shall be left to the ICCs/IPs concerned to decide in accordance with customs and traditions;

b. Individual and indigenous corporate claimants of ancestral lands which are not within ancestral domains,
may have their claims officially established by filing applications for the identification and delineation of
their claims with the Ancestral Domains Office. An individual or recognized head of a family or clan may file
such application in his behalf or in behalf of his family or clan, respectively;

c. Proofs of such claims shall accompany the application form which shall include the testimony under oath
of elders of the community and other documents directly or indirectly attesting to the possession or
occupation of the areas since time immemorial by the individual or corporate claimants in the concept of
owners which shall be any of the authentic documents enumerated under Sec. 52 (d) of this act, including
tax declarations and proofs of payment of taxes;

d. The Ancestral Domains Office may require from each ancestral claimant the submission of such other
documents, Sworn Statements and the like, which in its opinion, may shed light on the veracity of the
contents of the application/claim;

e. Upon receipt of the applications for delineation and recognition of ancestral land claims, the Ancestral
Domains Office shall cause the publication of the application and a copy of each document submitted
including a translation in the native language of the ICCs/IPs concerned in a prominent place therein for at
least fifteen (15) days. A copy of the document shall also be posted at the local, provincial, and regional
offices of the NCIP and shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for two (2)
consecutive weeks to allow other claimants to file opposition thereto within fifteen (15) days from the date
of such publication: Provided, That in areas where no such newspaper exists, broadcasting in a radio station
will be a valid substitute: Provided, further, That mere posting shall be deemed sufficient if both newspapers
and radio station are not available

f. Fifteen (15) days after such publication, the Ancestral Domains Office shall investigate and inspect each
application, and if found to be meritorious, shall cause a parcellary survey of the area being claimed. The
Ancestral Domains office shall reject any claim that is deemed patently false or fraudulent after inspection
and verification. In case of rejection, the Ancestral Domains office shall give the applicant due notice, copy
furnished all concerned, containing the grounds for denial. The denial shall be appealable to the NCIP. In
case of conflicting claims among individual or indigenous corporate claimants, the Ancestral domains
Office shall cause the contending parties to meet and assist them in coming up with a preliminary resolution
of the conflict, without prejudice to its full adjudication according to Sec. 62 of this Act. In all proceedings
for the identification or delineation of the ancestral domains as herein provided, the Director of Lands shall
represent the interest of the Republic of the Philippines; and

g. The Ancestral Domains Office shall prepare and submit a report on each and every application surveyed
and delineated to the NCIP, which shall, in turn, evaluate or corporate (family or clan) claimant over
ancestral lands.

Section 54. Fraudulent Claims. - The Ancestral Domains Office may, upon written request from the ICCs/IPs,
review existing claims which have been fraudulently acquired by any person or community. Any claim
found to be fraudulently acquired by, and issued to, any person or community may be cancelled by the
NCIP after due notice and hearing of all parties concerned.

Section 55. Communal Rights. - Subject to Section 56 hereof, areas within the ancestral domains, whether
delineated or not, shall be presumed to be communally held: Provide, That communal rights under this Act
shall not be construed as co-ownership as provided in Republic Act. No. 386, otherwise known as the New
Civil Code.
Section 56. Existing Property Rights Regimes. - Property rights within the ancestral domains already existing
and/or vested upon effectivity of this Act, shall be recognized and respected.

Section 57. Natural Resources within Ancestral Domains. - The ICCs/IPs shall have the priority rights in the
harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of any natural resources within the ancestral domains. A
non-member of the ICCs/IPs concerned may be allowed to take part in the development and utilization of
the natural resources for a period of not exceeding twenty-five (25) years renewable for not more than
twenty-five (25) years: Provided, That a formal and written agreement is entered into with the ICCs/IPs
concerned or that the community, pursuant to its own decision making process, has agreed to allow such
operation: Provided, finally, That the all extractions shall be used to facilitate the development and
improvement of the ancestral domains.

Section 58. Environmental Consideration. - Ancestral domains or portion thereof, which are found necessary
for critical watersheds, mangroves wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover, or
reforestation as determined by the appropriate agencies with the full participation of the ICCs/IPs
concerned shall be maintained, managed and developed for such purposes. The ICCs/IPs concerned shall
be given the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve such areas with the full and effective
assistance of the government agencies. Should the ICCs/IPs decide to transfer the responsibility over the
areas, said decision must be made in writing. The consent of the ICCs/IPs should be arrived at in
accordance with its customary laws without prejudice to the basic requirement of the existing laws on free
and prior informed consent: Provided, That the transfer shall be temporary and will ultimately revert to the
ICCs/IPs in accordance with a program for technology transfer: Provided, further, That no ICCs/IPs shall be
displaced or relocated for the purpose enumerated under this section without the written consent of the
specific persons authorized to give consent.

Section 59. Certification Precondition. - all department and other governmental agencies shall henceforth
be strictly enjoined from issuing, renewing, or granting any concession, license or lease, or entering into any
production-sharing agreement, without prior certification from the NCIP that the area affected does not
overlap with any ancestral domain. Such certificate shall only be issued after a field-based investigation is
conducted by the Ancestral Domain Office of the area concerned: Provided, That no certificate shall be
issued by the NCIP without the free and prior informed and written consent of the ICCs/IPs concerned:
Provided, further, That no department, government agency or government-owned or -controlled
corporation may issue new concession, license, lease, or production sharing agreement while there is
pending application CADT: Provided, finally, That the ICCs/IPs shall have the right to stop or suspend, in
accordance with this Act, any project that has not satisfied the requirement of this consultation process.

Section 60. Exemption from Taxes. - All lands certified to be ancestral domains shall be exempt from real
property taxes, specially levies, and other forms of exaction except such portion of the ancestral domains as
are actually used for large-scale agriculture, commercial forest plantation and residential purposes and
upon titling by other by private person: Provided, that all exactions shall be used to facilitate the
development and improvement of the ancestral domains.

Section 61. Temporary Requisition Powers. - Prior to the establishment of an institutional surveying capacity
whereby it can effectively fulfill its mandate, but in no case beyond three (3) years after its creation, the
NCIP is hereby authorized to request the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) survey
teams as well as other equally capable private survey teams, through a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA), to delineate ancestral domain perimeters. The DENR Secretary shall accommodate any such
request within one (1) month of its issuance: Provided, That the Memorandum of Agreement shall stipulate,
among others, a provision for technology transfer to the NCIP.

Section 62. Resolution of Conflicts. - In cases of conflicting interest, where there are adverse claims within
the ancestral domains as delineated in the survey plan, and which cannot be resolved, the NCIP shall hear
and decide, after notice to the proper parties, the disputes arising from the delineation of such ancestral
domains: Provided, That if the dispute is between and/or among ICCs/IPs regarding the traditional
boundaries of their respective ancestral domains, customary process shall be followed. The NCIP shall
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to carry out its adjudicatory functions: Provided, further,
That in any decision, order, award or ruling of the NCIP on any ancestral domain dispute or on any matter
pertaining to the application, implementation, enforcement and interpretation of this Act may be brought
for Petition for Review to the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof.

Section 63. Applicable Laws. - Customary laws, traditions and practices of the ICCs/IPs of the land where
the conflict arises shall be applied first with respect to property rights, claims and ownerships, hereditary
succession and settlement of land disputes. Any doubt or ambiguity in the application of laws shall be
resolved in favor of the ICCs/IPs.

Section 64. Remedial Measures. - Expropriation may be resorted to in the resolution of conflicts of interest
following the principle of the "common good". The NCIP shall take appropriate legal action for the
cancellation of officially documented titles which were acquired illegally: Provided, That such procedure
shall ensure that the rights of possessors in good faith shall be respected: Provided, further, That the action
for cancellation shall be initiated within two (2) years from the effectivity of this Act: Provided, finally, That
the action for reconveyance shall be a period of ten (10) years in accordance with existing laws.

CHAPTER IX
JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURES FOR ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS

Section 65. Primary of Customary Laws and Practices. - When disputes involve ICCs/IPs, customary laws and
practices shall be used to resolve the dispute.

Section 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. - The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over all
claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs; Provided, however, That no such dispute shall be brought to
the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws. For this
purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to
settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent
to the filing of a petition with the NCIP.

Section 67. Appeals to the Court of Appeals. - Decisions of the NCIP shall be appealable to the Court of
Appeals by way of a petition for review.

Section 68. Execution of Decisions, Awards, Orders. - Upon expiration of the period here provided and no
appeal is perfected by any of the contending parties, the Hearing Officer of the NCIP, on its own initiative or
upon motion by the prevailing party, shall issue a writ of execution requiring the sheriff or the proper officer
to execute final decisions, orders or awards of the Regional Hearing Officer of the NCIP.

Section 69. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the NCIP. - The NCIP shall have the power and authority:

a. To promulgate rules and regulations governing the hearing and disposition of cases filed before it as well
as those pertaining to its internal functions and such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out
the purposes of this Act;

b. To administer oaths, summon the parties to a controversy, issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and
testimony of witnesses or the production of such books, papers, contracts, records, agreements and other
document of similar nature as may be material to a just determination of the matter under investigation or
hearing conducted in pursuance of this Act;

c. To hold any person in contempt, directly or indirectly, and impose appropriate penalties therefor; and

d. To enjoin any or all acts involving or arising from any case pending therefore it which, if not restrained
forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage to any of the parties to the case or seriously affect social
or economic activity.

Section 70. No restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction. - No inferior court of the Philippines shall have the
jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction against the NCIP or any of its duly
authorized or designated offices in any case, dispute or controversy to, or interpretation of this Act and
other pertinent laws relating to ICCs/IPs and ancestral domains.

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CHAPTER XI
PENALTIES

Section 72. Punishable Acts and Applicable Penalties. - Any person who commits violation of any of the
provisions of this Act, such as, but not limited to, authorized and/or unlawful intrusion upon any ancestral
lands or domains as stated in Sec. 10, Chapter III, or shall commit any of the prohibited acts mentioned in
Sections 21 and 24, Chapter V, Section 33, Chapter VI hereof, shall be punished in accordance with the
customary laws of the ICCs/IPs concerned: Provided, That no such penalty shall be cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment: Provided, further, That neither shall the death penalty or excessive fines be imposed.
This provision shall be without prejudice to the right of any ICCs/IPs to avail of the protection of existing laws.
In which case, any person who violates any provision of this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished by
imprisonment of not less than nine (9) months but not more than twelve (12) years or a fine not less than One
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000) nor more than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000) or both such
fine and imprisonment upon the discretion of the court. In addition, he shall be obliged to pay to the
ICCs/IPs concerned whatever damage may have been suffered by the latter as a consequence of the
unlawful act.

Section 73. Persons Subject to Punishment. - If the offender is a juridical person, all officers such as, but not
limited to, its president, manager, or head of office responsible for their unlawful act shall be criminally liable
therefor, in addition to the cancellation of certificates of their registration and/or license: Provided, That if
the offender is a public official, the penalty shall include perpetual disqualification to hold public office.

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a) Please relate Section 22, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution with the concept of Regalian Doctrine
enshrined under Sections 2-4 vis-à-vis Section 5 on protection of ancestral lands and applicability of
customary laws of the same Article XII..

SECTION 22. Acts which circumvent or negate any of the provisions of this Article shall be considered
inimical to the national interest and subject to criminal and civil sanctions, as may be provided by law.

The Regalian Doctrine as embodied in the Philippine Constitution

The Regalian Doctrine and the Philippine Constitution
The Regalian Doctrine is enshrined in the 1987 Philippine Constitution and the country’s earlier Constitutions. In
the 1987 Constitution, Section 2 of Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) provides the following:
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by
the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The

exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of
the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or
production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of
whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law.
In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of

water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
The abovementioned provision provides that except for agricultural lands for public domain which alone may be
alienated, forest or timber, and mineral lands, as well as all other natural resources must remain with the State,
the exploration, development and utilization of which shall be subject to its full control and supervision albeit

allowing it to enter into coproduction, joint venture or production-sharing agreements, or into agreements with
foreign-owned corporations involving technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development,

and utilization.
The said provision in the 1987 Philippine Constitution had its roots in the 1935 Philippine Constitution. Section 1

of Article XIII (Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources) of the 1935 Philippine Constitution provides
the following:

Section 1. All agricultural timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum,
and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the

State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines
or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens,
subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government
established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not

be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the
natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five

years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
Then in the 1973 Philippine Constitution, the classifications of land and the Regalian Doctrine are provided
under Section 8, Article XIV (The National Economy and The Patrimony of The Nation), which states the

following:
Section 8. All lands of public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With the
exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, or resettlement lands of the public domain,
natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploration, or utilization of
any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twentyfive years, except as to water rights

for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than development of water power, in which cases,
beneficial use may by the measure and the limit of the grant.

As shown in the above provisions, the 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural,

forest or timber. Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the following classifications: agricultural, industrial
or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest and grazing lands, and such other classes as

may be provided by law, giving the government great leeway for classification. However, the 1987 Constitution
reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition—national parks. Of these classifications, only
agricultural lands may be alienated. Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never
been expressly and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified
land of the public domain.

**********************************************************************************************************
G.R. No. 181284

LOLOY UNDURAN, BARANGAY CAPTAIN ROMEO PACANA, NESTOR MACAPAYAG, RUPERTO DOGIA,
JIMMY TALINO, ERMELITO ANGEL, PETOY BESTO, VICTORINO ANGEL, RUEL BOLING, JERMY ANGEL,
BERTING SULOD, RIO BESTO, BENDIJO SIMBALAN, and MARK BRAZIL, Petitioners
vs.
RAMON ABERASTURI, CRISTINA C. LOPEZ, CESAR LOPEZ JR., DIONISIO A. LOPEZ, MERCEDES L.
GASTON, AGNES H. LOPEZ, EUSEBIO S. LOPEZ, JOSE MARIA S. LOPEZ, ANTON B. ABERASTURI, MA.
RAISSA A. VELEZ, ZOILO ANTONIO A. VELEZ, CRISTINA ABERASTURI, EDUARDO LOPEZ JR., ROSARIO S.
LOPEZ, JUAN S. LOPEZ, CESAR ANTHONY R. LOPEZ, VENANCIO L. GASTON, ROSEMARIE S. LOPEZ, JAY
A. ASUNCION, NICOLO ABERASTURI, LISA A. ASUNCION, INEZ A. VERAY, HERNAN A. ASUNCION,
ASUNCION LOPEZ, THOMAS A. VELEZ, LUIS ENRIQUE VELEZ, ANTONIO H. LOPEZ, CHARLES H. LOPEZ,
ANA L. ZAYCO, PILAR L. QUIROS, CRISTINA L. PICAZO, RENATO SANTOS, GERALDINE AGUIRRE, MARIA
CARMENCITA T. LOPEZ, and as represented by attorney-in-fact RAMON ABERASTURI, Respondents

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated August 17, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
3
CA-G.R. SP No. 00204-MIN, and the Resolution dated July 4, 2007, which denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.

Petitioners, except for Mark Brazil and Nestor Macapayag, are members of the Miarayon, Lapok, Lirongan, Talaandig
Tribal Association (MILALITTRA), or Talaandig tribe, who claimed to have been living since birth on the land located
at Barangay Miarayon, Talakag, Bukidnon, Mindanao, which they inherited from their forefathers.

On the other hand, respondents, represented by attorney-in-fact Ramon Aberasturi, claimed to be the lawful owners
and possessor of an unregistered parcel of agricultural land (Lot No. 7367 Cad 630-D), with an area of 105.7361
hectares, which appears to be located within the ancestral domain of the Talaandig tribe.

On March 3, 2004, respondents filed a Petition for Accion Reivindicatoria, with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order or Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction with Damages4 (original complaint for accion reivindicatoria)
against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court of Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon (RTC). Docketed as Civil Case No. 04-
03-01, the petition was raffled off to Branch 11.

On March 20, 2004, petitioners Macapayag and Brazil filed their Answer, alleging that respondents have no cause of
action against them. On March 23, 2004, the rest of the petitioners filed their Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the RTC
had no jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners alleged that with the advent of Republic Act No. (RA) 8371, otherwise
known as the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act (IPRA), they, together with the rest of the tribe members, assisted the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) in the processing, validation, and delineation of their Ancestral
Domain claim in May 2003. On July 25, 2003, Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) No. R-10-TAL-0703-0010
was issued by virtue of NCIP En Banc Resolution No. 08-02003 to the Talaandig tribe over its ancestral domain in
Talakag, Bukidnon, containing an area of 11,105.5657 hectares. On October 30, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo awarded the said CADT to the Talaandig tribe. As awardees of a CADT, petitioners argued that NCIP has
exclusive and original jurisdiction over the case, as the subject matter concerns a dispute and controversy over an
ancestral land/domain of Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs)/Indigenous Peoples (IPs).

On July 1, 2004, the NCIP through Atty. Melanie Pimentel, filed a Motion to Refer the Case to the Regional Hearing
Office-National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (RHO-NCIP), alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter.

On July 5, 2004, respondents filed a Motion to Amend and Supplement Complaint from Accion Reivindicatoria to one
for "Injunction, Damages, and Other Relief," with the attached Amended and Supplemental Complaint 5 (amended
complaint for injunction). On July 30, 2004, petitioners filed an Opposition thereto.

On August 1, 2004, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended and Supplemental Complaint, alleging that the
RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and to issue a writ of injunction therein.

On August 10, 2004, the RTC issued an Order granting the Motion to Amend and Supplement Complaint, and
declared petitioners’ Motion to Refer the Case to the RHO-NCIP and Motion to Dismiss moot and academic as a
consequence of the grant of the said motion to amend and supplement complaint.
On August 17, 2004, petitioners filed a Manifestation praying for an ocular inspection of the disputed land to determine
the last, actual, peaceable, uncontested status of the area.

On August 25, 2004, petitioners filed another Motion to Refer the Case to the RHO-NCIP and Motion to Dismiss the
Amended Complaint.

On September 14, 2004, respondents filed their Opposition and Motion for Judgment by Default.

On February 14, 2005, the RTC issued an Order 6 resolving all pending incidents before it, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant's [herein petitioners’] motion to refer the case to the RHO-NCIP and
its manifestation for an ocular inspection are hereby denied for being bereft of merit. Further, defendants [petitioners],
except Macapayag and Brazil, are hereby declared in default for their failure to file their Answer to the Amended
Complaint. Accordingly, let this case, as against defendants Macapayag and Brazil, be called for pre-trial and ex-parte
presentation of evidence as against the rest of defendants [petitioners] on May 2, 2005 at 9:00 o'clock in the
morning. Furthermore, the injunctive writ prayed for by the plaintiffs is hereby GRANTED for being meritorious.
Accordingly, defendants [petitioners], their agents and privies, or any other or all persons acting for and in their
behalves, are hereby ordered to observe, maintain and preserve the status quo subject of the action and/or the
relation between the parties in order to protect the rights of the plaintiffs while the case is pending in court and to
cease and desist from performing any acts that in one way or another contravene the tenor of this order, while
awaiting final determination of the instant suit or until further orders of this court. Furthermore, to answer for whatever
damage that defendants [petitioners] may sustain by reason of this injunction order if the court should finally decide
that plaintiffs [respondents] are not entitled to the relief it prayed for, plaintiffs [respondents] are hereby directed to put
up a bond in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (₱100,000.00) executed in favor of the party
enjoined.

SO ORDERED.7

On April 12, 2005, petitioners filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order.

On August 17, 2006, the CA rendered a Decision affirming the RTC's February 14, 2005 Order, which in turn denied
the referral of the case to the NCIP, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby partly GRANTED. The assailed Order dated February
14, 2005 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the order of default against petitioners, except Macapayag
and Brazil, is hereby LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.8

The CA ruled that the RTC correctly granted the amendment of the complaint and properly refused to refer the case to
the RHO-NCIP. Based on the allegations of both original complaint [accion reivindicatoria] and amended complaint
[injunction], the CA found that the subject matter of both complaints is well within the jurisdiction of the RTC. The CA
noted that the only substantial amendment made was with regard to the nature of the action which originally was one
of accion reivindicatoria and then changed to one for damages. And except for some amendments as to petitioners'
alleged violent acts and the prayer for declaration of their title to the subject property, the rest of the amended
complaint was basically the same as the original one, including the reliefs prayed for by respondents. Anent the writ of
preliminary injunction, the CA held that the RTC's assailed February 14, 2005 Order is self-explanatory as to why the
issuance of the same was proper considering the circumstances of the case.

On July 4, 2007, the CA denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration of its August 17, 2006 Decision.

Hence, this appeal on certiorari raising the following issues:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT A QUO OVER A
COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTION INVOLVING AN ANCESTRAL DOMAIN OF THE TALAANDIGS.

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RESOLUTION OF THE COURT A QUO ALLOWING
THE AMENDMENT OF THE COMPLAINT, THE SOLE PURPOSE OF WHICH IS TO CONFER JURISDICTION ON
THE LOWER COURT.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RESOLVING THAT EVIDENCE MUST BE PRESENTED BEFORE THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT WHEN IN THE ORIGINAL ACTION FOR SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI
BEFORE IT, THE COURT A QUO HAS ADMITTED THAT A CADT WAS ISSUED IN FAVOR OF PETITIONERS. 9

On the first issue, petitioners contend that the RTC has no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 04-03-0 for Injunction,
Damages and other Relief, because the 105.7361-hectare land claimed by respondents is undisputedly within the
ancestral domain of the Talaandig tribe over which a CADT has already been issued. Petitioners insist that, even
granting that the case is purely a personal action, the NCIP has exclusive and original jurisdiction over it as it concerns
a claim and dispute involving rights of ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domain.

On the second issue, petitioners argue that the amendment of the complaint from accion reivindicatoria to injunction
with damages was clearly meant to oust the NCIP of its jurisdiction over the case and confer it on the RTC by
concealing the real issue in the case, which is the parties' conflicting claims over the 105.7361-hectare land in
Miarayon, Talakag Bukidnon. According to petitioners, the cause of action in the complaint for accion reivindicatoria is
the claim of ownership and recovery of possession of the said land which is undisputedly found within the Talaandig
tribe's ancestral domain covered by CADT No. R10-TAL-0703-0010; hence, a claim within the exclusive and original
jurisdiction of the NCIP. Petitioners contend that respondents amended the complaint to one for injunction to downplay
the real issue which is the dispute over a land that is within the Talaandig tribe's ancestral domain, and mainly
capitalized on the acts complained of, such as harassment, threats, acts of terrorism, among others, supposedly
committed against respondents.

On the third issue, petitioners fault the CA in ruling that whether the complaint is one for Injunction or Accion
Reivindicatoria, the RTC has jurisdiction because nowhere in respondents' original and amended complaints is it
stated that petitioners were members of the ICCs or IPs and that the disputed property was part of their ancestral
domain. Petitioners take exception to the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations
of the complaint, as strict adherence thereto would open the floodgates to the unscrupulous practice of litigants
divesting the NCIP of jurisdiction by crafting their complaints in such a way as would confer jurisdiction on their court
of choice. Petitioners contend that the literal averments of the complaint are not determinative of the jurisdiction over
the subject matter where the actual issues are evidenced by subsequent pleadings; in certain cases, the real nature
and character of the pleadings and issues are not merely found in the complaint, but also in the subsequent pleadings
submitted by both parties. Petitioners stress that although the complaint banners the subject matter as one for
injunction, the pleadings of respondents show that the subject matter is the conflicting ownership claims over the land.
In fact, petitioners point out that the records of the case show that various pieces of evidence have been presented to
prove that the dispute involves conflicting claims over a land covered by a CADT.

For their part, respondents contend that petitioners do not have legal capacity or standing and locus standi to file this
petition, since they failed to make prima facie showing that they are members of IPs/ICCs, or that they were
authorized to represent the Talaandig tribe. Respondents insist that based on the allegations in their amended
complaint for injunction and damages, the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter which is a purely personal
action and incapable of pecuniary estimation. Respondents assert that the real issue is whether or not petitioners are
guilty of wrongful acts of violence, terrorism, destruction, intimidation, harassment, etc., to justify a permanent
injunction and hold the latter liable for damages. Respondents also point out that petitioners cannot invoke protection
under the IPRA 8731, because the conflict does not involve an ancestral domain and they (respondents) are not IPs
so the condition precedent before bringing a dispute before the NCIP cannot be satisfied, i.e., exhaustion of remedies
under customary laws by the parties.

The petition has no merit.

On the procedural issue raised by respondents, the Court disagrees with their contention that petitioners do not have
legal capacity or standing and locus standi to file the petition, for failure to show that they are members of IPs/ICCs, or
that they are authorized to represent the Talaandig tribe.

Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In private suits, standing is
governed by the "real parties in interest" rule found in Section 2, 10 Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Such concept of real
party-in-interest is adapted in Section 2,11 Rule VI of the 2014 Revised Rules of Procedure before the NCIP. That
petitioners are the real parties in interest can be gleaned from the Entry of Appearance with

Motion to Refer the Case to the Regional Hearing Office of the NCIP 12 filed by the NCIP Special Transition Team-
Quick Response Unit (STRAT-QRU). The STRAT-QRU counsels alleged therein that the respondents' complaint for
recovery of ownership (accion reinvidicatoria) sought to recover an unregistered real property situated in Miarayon,
Bukidnon, from petitioners, all of whom are, with the exception of Nestor Macapayag and Mark Brazil, member-
beneficiaries of CADT No. R10-TAL-0703-0010 issued by the NCIP in the name of the Talaandig Indigenous Peoples,
located at Talakag, Province of Bukidnon. In support of their allegation, petitioners presented a certification 13 that the
disputed land is within the area covered by the same CADT, and the NCIP List of Beneficiaries of Talaandig Ancestral
Domain of Miarayon, Lirongan, Lapok, San Miguel, Talakag, Bukidnon. 14 In contrast, respondents failed to submit any
evidence to dispute petitioners' claim that they are members of the Talaandig Tribe. Hence, respondents' contention
that petitioners have no legal standing to file the petition, is without merit.

In resolving the pivotal issue of which between the RTC and the NCIP has jurisdiction over the respondents' amended
complaint, foremost in the Court's mind is the principle in "that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the
ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as which court or body has
jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the
complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or
some of the claims asserted therein." 15

Under Section 19 of B.P. 129, as amended (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), the RTC shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, and in
all civil actions which involve title to, possession of, real property or any interest therein where the assessed value of
the property or interest therein exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila,
where such assessed value exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00).

On the other hand, the NCIP's jurisdiction is defined under Section 66 of the IPRA as follows:

Sec. 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. − The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over all claims and
disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs; Provided, however, That no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless
the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws. For this purpose, a certification shall be
issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not
been resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP. 16

On the matter of NCIP's jurisdiction and of procedures for enforcement of rights, NCIP Administrative Order No. 1,
1998, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (NCIP-IRR) of the IPRA, Rule IX, Section 1 states:

Section 1. Primacy of Customary Law. - All conflicts related to the ancestral domain and lands, involving ICCs/IPs,
such as but not limited to the conflicting claims and boundary disputes, shall be resolved by the concerned parties
through the application of customary laws in the area where the disputed ancestral domain or land is located.

All conflicts related to the ancestral domain or lands where one of the parties is non-ICC/IP or where the
dispute could not be resolved through customary law shall be heard and adjudicated in accordance with the
Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure before the NCIP to be adopted hereafter.

All decisions of the NCIP may be brought on Appeal by Petition for Review to the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15)
days from receipt of the Order or Decision. 17

In line with Section 69 of the IPRA on the NCIP's quasi-judicial power to promulgate rules and regulations governing
the hearing and disposition of cases filed before it, the NCIP issued Administrative Circular No. 1-03 dated April 9,
2003, known as the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and Procedure (NCIP Rules), which reiterates its jurisdiction over
claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs and enumerates the actions that may be brought before it. Section 5,
Rule III, of the NCIP Rules provides for the jurisdiction of the NCIP-RHO:

Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. − The NCIP through its Regional Hearing Offices shall exercise jurisdiction over all
claims and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs and all cases pertaining to the implementation, enforcement, and
interpretation of the IPRA 8371, including but not limited to the following:

(1) Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Officer (RHO):

a. Cases involving disputes, controversies over ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs;

b. Cases involving violations of the requirement of free and prior and informed consent of ICC/IPs;

c. Actions for enforcement of decisions of ICCs/IPs involving violations of customary laws or desecration of ceremonial
sites, sacred places, or rituals;

d. Actions for redemption/reconveyance under Section 8(b) of R.A. 8371; and

e. Such other cases analogous to the foregoing.

(2) Original jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Officer:

a. Cases affecting property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession, and settlement of land disputes,
between and among ICCs/IPs that have not been settled under customary laws; and

b. Actions for damages arising out of any violation of Republic Act No. 8371;

(3) Exclusive and Original Jurisdiction of the Commission:

a. Petition for cancellation of Certificate of Ancestral Domain Titles/Certificate of Ancestral Land Titles
(CADTs/CALTs) alleged to have been fraudulently acquired by, and issued to, any person or community as
provided for under Section 54 of R.A. 8371. Provided that such action is filed within one (1) year from the date
of registration.

Anent the condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA, Sections 13 and
14, Rule IV of the NCIP Rules pertinently provide:

Section 13. Certification to File Action. - Upon the request of the proper party, members of the indigenous dispute
settlement group or council of elders shall likewise issue a certification to file action before the NCIP. In giving due
regard to customary laws, the certification may be in any form so long as it states in substance the failure of
settlement notwithstanding the efforts made under customary law or traditional practices.

Section 14. Exceptions. - The certification shall not be required in the following cases:

a. Where one of the parties is a public or private corporation, partnership, association or juridical person or a
public officer or employee and the dispute is in connection with the performance of his official functions;

b. Where one of the parties is non-IP/ICC or does not belong to the same IP/IC Community, except when he
voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the Council of Elders/Leaders;

c. Where the relief sought for in the complaint or petition seeks to prevent any grave, imminent and irreparable
damage or injury that may result if not acted upon immediately; and

d. Where the Council of Elders/Leaders refuse to issue the necessary certification without justifiable reasons. 18

Having spelled out the jurisdictions conferred by law to the RTC and the NCIP over the subject matters of their
respective cases, the Court now examines the allegations in the original and amended complaints to find out which
tribunal may properly exercise jurisdiction over this case.

In their original complaint for accion reivindicatoria, respondents traced the provenance of their title over said land to
one Mamerto Decano, a Chieftain of Talaandig tribe, by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed on July 27, 1957. They
averred that, together with their predecessor-in-interest, they have religiously paid the real estate taxes thereon since
1957 and that they have been in physical, actual, open, prior, notorious, continuous, public and adverse possession of
said land in the concept of owners for more than 50 years, even prior to June 12, 1945. They alleged that said land
was declared alienable and disposable since August 3, 1927 per certification of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources. They claimed that by means of fraud, stealth and surreptitious means, petitioners entered the said
land, without permission and against the consent of the landowners, caused damages therein and harassed
respondents by indiscriminately firing upon their farm workers. They added that petitioners continue such harassment
by means of armed men frequenting the campsite and firing M-16 rifles at them during nighttime, causing great fear
and threat.

Respondents prayed before the RTC for the following reliefs, among others: (1) to cause the preliminary injunction to
be made permanent for the respondents to enjoy possession of their property, free from threats of physical harm,
harassment and undue obstruction caused by petitioners; (2) to order petitioners to respect and not to harass,
intimidate and cause trouble to the prior possession of respondents as the owners by virtue of right of title; (3) to order
petitioners to pay moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, appearance fees and costs of suit; and (4) to
declare respondents' title as having become a vested right, and as such entitled to all right and incident of an absolute
owner.

In their amended complaint for injunction and damages, on the other hand, respondents further alleged that sometime
in November 2003, petitioners harassed, intimidated, threatened, and fired high-powered rifles upon respondents'
farm workers to drive them away from the land, without legal or justifiable reason. They added that, despite having
hired private security guards to secure and protect their property, these violent incidents were followed by more acts of
violence, lawlessness, harassment, terrorism to drive away respondents from the land which they claim to lawfully
own and possess.

Respondents prayed before the RTC for the following reliefs: (1) to order petitioners and their representatives, to stop
and refrain from committing acts of violence, destruction, assault and other forms of lawlessness and terrorism against
respondents, and to maintain the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the 105-hectare land by respondents as an
attribute of ownership; (2) to declare petitioners to have committed acts of violence, harassment, intimidation,
destruction, assault and other forms of lawlessness against respondents, and to permanently order petitioners to stop
and refrain from committing similar acts; and (3) to hold petitioners jointly and severally liable to pay respondents
actual damages, moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and treble costs.

After a perusal of the allegations and prayers in both original and amended complaints, the Court notes that
respondents neither alleged therein that the parties are members of ICCs/IPs nor that the case involves a dispute or
controversy over ancestral lands/domains of ICC/IPs. Rather, the allegations in respondents' original complaint make
up for an accion reivindicatoria, a civil action which involves an interest in a real property with an assessed value of
P683,760.00, while the allegations in their amended complaint make out a case for injunction, a civil action which is
incapable of pecuniary estimation. The Court therefore finds that the CA correctly ruled that the subject matter of the
amended complaint based on allegations therein was within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

Meanwhile, contrary to petitioners' contention, the mere fact that this case involves members of ICCs/IPs and their
ancestral land is not enough to for it to fall under the jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA, to wit:

Sec. 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP. − The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over all claims and
disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs; Provided, however, That no such dispute shall be

brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws. For this
purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the
dispute that the same has not been resolved, which certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a petition
with the NCIP.

A careful review of Section 66 shows that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of
ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP. This can be gathered from
the qualifying provision that "no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all
remedies provided under their customary laws. For this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of
Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved, which
certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP."

The qualifying provision requires two conditions before such disputes may be brought before the NCIP, namely: (1)
exhaustion of remedies under customary laws of the parties, and (2) compliance with condition precedent through the
said certification by the Council of Elders/Leaders. This is in recognition of the rights of ICCs/IPs to use their own
commonly accepted justice systems, conflict resolution institutions, peace building processes or mechanisms and
other customary laws and practices within their respective communities, as may be compatible with the national legal
system and with internationally recognized human rights.19

Section 3 (f) of the IPRA defines customary laws as a body of written and/or unwritten rules, usages, customs and
practices traditionally and continually recognized, accepted and observed by respective ICCs/IPs. From this restrictive
definition, it can be gleaned that it is only when both parties to a case belong to the same ICC/IP that the abovesaid
two conditions can be complied with. If the parties to a case belong to different ICCs/IPs which are recognized to have
their own separate and distinct customary laws and Council of Elders/Leaders, they will fail to meet the abovesaid two
conditions. The same holds true if one of such parties was a non-ICC/IP member who is neither bound by customary
laws as contemplated by the IPRA nor governed by such council. Indeed, it would be violative of the principles of fair
play and due process for those parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP to be subjected to its customary laws
and Council of Elders/Leaders.

Therefore, pursuant to Section 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving
rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP. When such claims
and disputes arise between or among parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP, i.e., parties belonging to different
ICC/IPs or where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP, the case shall fall under the jurisdiction of the proper Courts of
Justice, instead of the NCIP. In this case, while most of the petitioners belong to Talaandig Tribe, respondents do not
belong to the same ICC/IP. Thus, even if the real issue involves a dispute over land which appear to be located within
the ancestral domain of the Talaandig Tribe, it is not the NCIP but the RTC which shall have the power to hear, try and
decide this case.
There are, however, exceptional cases where the NCIP shall still have jurisdiction over such claims and disputes even
if the parties involved do not belong to the same ICC/IP, viz.:

1. Cases under Sections 52 and 62 of the IPRA which contemplate a situation where a dispute over an ancestral
domain involving parties who do not belong to the same, but to different ICCs/IPs, to wit:

SECTION 52. Delineation Process. — The identification and delineation of ancestral domains shall be done in
accordance with the following procedures:

xxxx

h) Endorsement to NCIP. — Within fifteen (15) days from publication, and of the inspection process, the Ancestral
Domains Office shall prepare a report to the NCIP endorsing a favorable action upon a claim that is deemed to have
sufficient proof. However, if the proof is deemed insufficient, the Ancestral Domains Office shall require the
submission of additional evidence: Provided, That the Ancestral Domains Office shall reject any claim that is deemed
patently false or fraudulent after inspection and verification: Provided, further, That in case of rejection, the Ancestral
Domains Office shall give the applicant due notice, copy furnished all concerned, containing the grounds for denial.
The denial shall be appealable to the NCIP: Provided, furthermore, That in cases where there are conflicting claims
among ICCs/IPs on the boundaries of ancestral domain claims, the Ancestral Domains Office shall cause the
contending parties to meet and assist them in coming up with a preliminary resolution of the conflict, without prejudice
to its full adjudication according to the section below.

xxxx

SECTION 62. Resolution of Conflicts. — In cases of conflicting interest, where there are adverse claims within the
ancestral domains as delineated in the survey plan, and which can not be resolved, the NCIP shall hear and decide,
after notice to the proper parties, the disputes arising from the delineation of such ancestral domains:
Provided, That if the dispute is between and/or among ICCs/IPs regarding the traditional boundaries of their
respective ancestral domains, customary process shall be followed. The NCIP shall promulgate the necessary
rules and regulations to carry out its adjudicatory functions: Provided, further, That any decision, order, award or ruling
of the NCIP on any ancestral domain dispute or on any matter pertaining to the application, implementation,
enforcement and interpretation of this Act may be brought for Petition for Review to the Court of Appeals within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of a copy thereof. 20

2. Cases under Section 54 of the IPRA over fraudulent claims by parties who are not members of the same ICC/IP, to
wit:

SECTION 54. Fraudulent Claims. — The Ancestral Domains Office may, upon written request from the ICCs/IPs,
review existing claims which have been fraudulently acquired by any person or community. Any claim found to be
fraudulently acquired by, and issued to, any person or community may be cancelled by the NCIP after due
notice and hearing of all parties concerned.21

Considering the general rule that the jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of the IPRA covers only disputes and
claims between and among members of the same ICCs/IPs involving their rights under the IPRA, as well as the basic
administrative law principle that an administrative rule or regulation must conform, not contradict the provisions of the
enabling law,22 the Court declares Rule IX, Section 1 of the IPRA-IRR23, Rule III, Section 524 and Rule IV, Sections 13
and 14 of the NCIP Rules25 as null and void insofar as they expand the jurisdiction of the NCIP under Section 66 of
the IPRA to include such disputes where the parties do not belong to the same ICC/IP. As the Court held in Paduran
v. DARAB,26 "[j]urisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or the law and rules of procedure yield
to substantive law. Otherwise stated, jurisdiction must exist as a matter of law. 27 Only a statute can confer jurisdiction
on courts and administrative agencies; rules of procedure cannot. 28 In the abovesaid exceptional cases where one of
the parties is a non-ICC/IP or does not belong to the same ICC/IP, however, Rule IV, Section 14 of the NCIP Rules
validly dispenses with the requirement of certification issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the
failed attempt to settle the dispute according to the customary laws of the concerned ICC/IP.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Court of Appeals Decision dated August 17, 2006, and its Resolution
dated July 4, 2007, in CAG.R. SP No. 00204-MIN, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

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4. Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree)
-Section 14 (1 & 2)
CHAPTER III
ORIGINAL REGISTRATION

I
ORDINARY REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS

A. APPLICATIONS

Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of existing laws.

*********************************************************************************************************

A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC

RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CASES

RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CASES

PART I

RULE 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS

Section 2. Scope. — These Rules shall govern the procedure in civil, criminal and special civil actions before the
Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts involving enforcement or violations of environmental and other related laws, rules and regulations
such as but not limited to the following:

(a) Act No. 3572, Prohibition Against Cutting of Tindalo, Akli, and Molave Trees;

(b) P.D. No. 705, Revised Forestry Code;

(c) P.D. No. 856, Sanitation Code;

(d) P.D. No. 979, Marine Pollution Decree;

(e) P.D. No. 1067, Water Code;

(f) P.D. No. 1151, Philippine Environmental Policy of 1977;

(g) P.D. No. 1433, Plant Quarantine Law of 1978;

(h) P.D. No. 1586, Establishing an Environmental Impact Statement System Including Other Environmental
Management Related Measures and for Other Purposes;

(i) R.A. No. 3571, Prohibition Against the Cutting, Destroying or Injuring of Planted or Growing Trees,
Flowering Plants and Shrubs or Plants of Scenic Value along Public Roads, in Plazas, Parks, School
Premises or in any Other Public Ground;

(j) R.A. No. 4850, Laguna Lake Development Authority Act;

(k) R.A. No. 6969, Toxic Substances and Hazardous Waste Act;
 (l) R.A. No. 7076, People’s Small-Scale Mining Act;

(m) R.A. No. 7586, National Integrated Protected Areas System Act including all laws, decrees, orders,
proclamations and issuances establishing protected areas;

(n) R.A. No. 7611, Strategic Environmental Plan for Palawan Act;

(o) R.A. No. 7942, Philippine Mining Act;

(p) R.A. No. 8371, Indigenous Peoples Rights Act;

(q) R.A. No. 8550, Philippine Fisheries Code;

(r) R.A. No. 8749, Clean Air Act;

(s) R.A. No. 9003, Ecological Solid Waste Management Act;

(t) R.A. No. 9072, National Caves and Cave Resource Management Act;

(u) R.A. No. 9147, Wildlife Conservation and Protection Act;

(v) R.A. No. 9175, Chainsaw Act;

(w) R.A. No. 9275, Clean Water Act;

(x) R.A. No. 9483, Oil Spill Compensation Act of 2007; and

(y) Provisions in C.A. No. 141, The Public Land Act; R.A. No. 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988; R.A. No. 7160, Local Government Code of 1991; R.A. No. 7161, Tax Laws Incorporated in the Revised
Forestry Code and Other Environmental Laws (Amending the NIRC); R.A. No. 7308, Seed Industry
Development Act of 1992; R.A. No. 7900, High-Value Crops Development

Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases Act; R.A. No. 8048, Coconut Preservation Act; R.A. No. 8435,
Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act of 1997; R.A. No. 9522, The Philippine Archipelagic Baselines Law; R.A.
No. 9593, Renewable Energy Act of 2008; R.A. No. 9637, Philippine Biofuels Act; and other existing laws that relate to
the conservation, development, preservation, protection and utilization of the environment and natural resources.

Section 3. Objectives. - The objectives of these Rules are:

(a) To protect and advance the constitutional right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology;

(b) To provide a simplified, speedy and inexpensive procedure for the enforcement of environmental rights
and duties recognized under the Constitution, existing laws, rules and regulations, and international
agreements;

(c) To introduce and adopt innovations and best practices ensuring the effective enforcement of remedies and
redress for violation of environmental laws; and

(d) To enable the courts to monitor and exact compliance with orders and judgments in environmental cases.

Section 4. Definition of Terms. -

(a) By-product or derivatives means any part taken or substance extracted from wildlife, in raw or in
processed form including stuffed animals and herbarium specimens. 1avvphi1

(b) Consent decree refers to a judicially-approved settlement between concerned parties based on public
interest and public policy to protect and preserve the environment.

(c) Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an environmental case directing any agency or
instrumentality of the government or officer thereof to perform an act or series of acts decreed by final
judgment which shall remain effective until judgment is fully satisfied.
 (d) Environmental protection order (EPO) refers to an order issued by the court directing or enjoining any
person or government agency to perform or desist from performing an act in order to protect, preserve or
rehabilitate the environment.

(e) Mineral refers to all naturally occurring inorganic substance in solid, gas, liquid, or any intermediate state
excluding energy materials such as coal, petroleum, natural gas, radioactive materials and geothermal
energy.

(f) Precautionary principle states that when human activities may lead to threats of serious and irreversible
damage to the environment that is scientifically plausible but uncertain, actions shall be taken to avoid or
diminish that threat.

(g) Strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) refers to an action whether civil, criminal or
administrative, brought against any person, institution or any government agency or local government unit or
its officials and employees, with the intent to harass, vex, exert undue pressure or stifle any legal recourse
that such person, institution or government agency has taken or may take in the enforcement of
environmental laws, protection of the environment or assertion of environmental rights.

(h) Wildlife means wild forms and varieties of flora and fauna, in all developmental stages including those
which are in captivity or are being bred or propagated.

PART II
CIVIL PROCEDURE

RULE 2
PLEADINGS AND PARTIES

Section 1. Pleadings and motions allowed. — The pleadings and motions that may be filed are complaint, answer
which may include compulsory counterclaim and cross-claim, motion for intervention, motion for discovery and motion
for reconsideration of the judgment.

Motion for postponement, motion for new trial and petition for relief from judgment shall be allowed in highly
meritorious cases or to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.

Section 2. Prohibited pleadings or motions. — The following pleadings or motions shall not be allowed:

(a) Motion to dismiss the complaint;

(b) Motion for a bill of particulars;

(c) Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, except to file answer, the extension not to exceed fifteen (15)
days;

(d) Motion to declare the defendant in default;

(e) Reply and rejoinder; and

(f) Third party complaint.

Section 3. Verified complaint. — The verified complaint shall contain the names of the parties, their addresses, the
cause of action and the reliefs prayed for.

The plaintiff shall attach to the verified complaint all evidence proving or supporting the cause of action consisting of
the affidavits of witnesses, documentary evidence and if possible, object evidence. The affidavits shall be in question
and answer form and shall comply with the rules of admissibility of evidence.

The complaint shall state that it is an environmental case and the law involved. The complaint shall also include a
certification against forum shopping. If the complaint is not an environmental complaint, the presiding judge shall refer
it to the executive judge for re-raffle.

Section 4. Who may file. — Any real party in interest, including the government and juridical entities authorized by
law, may file a civil action involving the enforcement or violation of any environmental law.
Section 5. Citizen suit. — Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or generations yet unborn,
may file an action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court
shall issue an order which shall contain a brief description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring
all interested parties to manifest their interest to intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The
plaintiff may publish the order once in a newspaper of a general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected
barangays copies of said order.

Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall be governed by their respective provisions.

Section 8. Issuance of Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO). - If it appears from the verified complaint
with a prayer for the issuance of an Environmental Protection Order (EPO) that the matter is of extreme urgency and
the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive judge of the multiple-sala court before
raffle or the presiding judge of a single-sala court as the case may be, may issue ex parte a TEPO effective for only
seventy-two (72) hours from date of the receipt of the TEPO by the party or person enjoined. Within said period, the
court where the case is assigned, shall conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the TEPO may be extended
until the termination of the case.

The court where the case is assigned, shall periodically monitor the existence of acts that are the subject matter of the
TEPO even if issued by the executive judge, and may lift the same at any time as circumstances may warrant.

The applicant shall be exempted from the posting of a bond for the issuance of a TEPO.

Section 9. Action on motion for dissolution of TEPO. - The grounds for motion to dissolve a TEPO shall be supported
by affidavits of the party or person enjoined which the applicant may oppose, also by affidavits.

The TEPO may be dissolved if it appears after hearing that its issuance or continuance would cause irreparable
damage to the party or person enjoined while the applicant may be fully compensated for such damages as he may
suffer and subject to the posting of a sufficient bond by the party or person enjoined.

Section 10. Prohibition against temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction. - Except the Supreme
Court, no court can issue a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction against lawful actions of government agencies that
enforce environmental laws or prevent violations thereof.

Section 11. Report on TEPO, EPO, TRO or preliminary injunction. - The judge shall report any action taken on a
TEPO, EPO, TRO or a preliminary injunction, including its modification and dissolution, to the Supreme Court, through
the Office of the Court Administrator, within ten (10) days from the action taken.

RULE 6
STRATEGIC LAWSUIT AGAINST PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

Section 1. Strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP). - A legal action filed to harass, vex, exert undue
pressure or stifle any legal recourse that any person, institution or the government has taken or may take in the
enforcement of environmental laws, protection of the environment or assertion of environmental rights shall be treated
as a SLAPP and shall be governed by these Rules.

Section 2. SLAPP as a defense; how alleged. - In a SLAPP filed against a person involved in the enforcement of
environmental laws, protection of the environment, or assertion of environmental rights, the defendant may file an
answer interposing as a defense that the case is a SLAPP and shall be supported by documents, affidavits, papers
and other evidence; and, by way of counterclaim, pray for damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit.

The court shall direct the plaintiff or adverse party to file an opposition showing the suit is not a SLAPP, attaching
evidence in support thereof, within a non-extendible period of five (5) days from receipt of notice that an answer has
been filed.

The defense of a SLAPP shall be set for hearing by the court after issuance of the order to file an opposition within
fifteen (15) days from filing of the comment or the lapse of the period.

Section 3. Summary hearing. - The hearing on the defense of a SLAPP shall be summary in nature. The parties must
submit all available evidence in support of their respective positions. The party seeking the dismissal of the case must
prove by substantial evidence that his act for the enforcement of environmental law is a legitimate action for the
protection, preservation and rehabilitation of the environment. The party filing the action assailed as a SLAPP shall
prove by preponderance of evidence that the action is not a SLAPP and is a valid claim.
Section 4. Resolution of the defense of a SLAPP. - The affirmative defense of a SLAPP shall be resolved within thirty
(30) days after the summary hearing. If the court dismisses the action, the court may award damages, attorney’s fees
and costs of suit under a counterclaim if such has been filed. The dismissal shall be with prejudice.

If the court rejects the defense of a SLAPP, the evidence adduced during the summary hearing shall be treated as
evidence of the parties on the merits of the case. The action shall proceed in accordance with the Rules of Court.

RULE 7
WRIT OF KALIKASAN

Section 1. Nature of the writ. - The writ is a remedy available to a natural or juridical person, entity authorized by law,
people’s organization, non-governmental organization, or any public interest group accredited by or registered with
any government agency, on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
violated, or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private
individual or entity, involving environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of
inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.

RULE 8
WRIT OF CONTINUING MANDAMUS

Section 1. Petition for continuing mandamus. - When any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer
thereof unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust or station in connection with the enforcement or violation of an environmental law rule or regulation or a
right therein, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of such right and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty, attaching thereto supporting evidence, specifying that the petition
concerns an environmental law, rule or regulation, and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent to do an act or series of acts until the judgment is fully satisfied, and to pay damages sustained by the
petitioner by reason of the malicious neglect to perform the duties of the respondent, under the law, rules or
regulations. The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping.

PART V
EVIDENCE

RULE 20
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE

Section 1. Applicability. - When there is a lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a causal link between human
activity and environmental effect, the court shall apply the precautionary principle in resolving the case before it.

The constitutional right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology shall be given the benefit of the doubt.

Section 2. Standards for application. - In applying the precautionary principle, the following factors, among others,
may be considered: (1) threats to human life or health; (2) inequity to present or future generations; or (3) prejudice to
the environment without legal consideration of the environmental rights of those affected.