Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.

, 211 SCRA 277 (1992)

Facts: Defendant was charged with quarrying without a license in violation of a municipal ordinance. The
offense prescribes in 2 months. The complaint was filed with the prosecutor within 2 months, but the
information was filed in court beyond the 2 months. Prosecution argues that filing of the complaint with
the prosecutor interrupted the period of prescription. Defendant argues that it is the only upon filing of
the information in court that prescription is interrupted based on the rules on Summary Procedure, and
Act No. 3326.

Held: Since the Sec. 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure excluded offenses subject to
summary procedure, the prescription of such offenses are not interrupted by filing a complaint with the
prosecutor. Furthermore, Act 3326 provides that violations of ordinances prescribe in 2 months, and
provides that filing of complaint before the prosecutor does not suspend the prescriptive period.
Therefore, prescription for violations of municipal ordinances is interrupted only when the information is
actually filed in court.

ground of prescription.

de Leon: Note that the new rules no longer exclude offenses governed by Summary Procedure. Hence
prescription of offenses governed by summary procedure is now interrupted by filing a complaint with
the prosecutor. To this extent, Zaldivia v. Reyes has been modified. However, Act 3326 is still operative.
Since the new rules still provide for the exception “otherwise provided in special laws,” prescription for
violation of municipal ordinances are NOT interrupted by filing a complaint with the prosecutor.

Rule on Summary Procedure applies to violations of municipal ordinances; Specifying the prescriptive
period for violations of municipal ordinances; Note that the penalty for such violations CANNOT
exceed six (6) months.The prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was suspended upon the
filing of the complaint against her with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Agreeing with the
respondent judge, the Solicitor General also invokes Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure. SC holds otherwise.

FACTS:

The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor's permit in violation
of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, Rizal.

Timeline:

1. On May 11, 1990 - The offense was allegedly committed.

2. OnMay 30, 1990 - The referral-complaint of the police was received by the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal.
3. On October 2, 1990(5 months after filing of complaint in fiscal’s office) -The corresponding
Information was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez.

The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had prescribed.

Lower Court Decision:MTC denies motion to quash.

Appellate Court Decision: RTC sustains denial.

In the present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner:

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FIRST argues that the charge against her is governed by the following provisions of the Rule on Summary
Procedure, whose scope includes:

Sec. 1. Scope — This rule shall govern the procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the
Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases:

B. Criminal Cases

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3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances;

4. All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offenses charged does not
exceed six months imprisonment, or a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both, irrespective
of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability arising therefrom. . . .
(Emphasis supplied.)

NEXT, petitioner argues that Act No. 3326, 1the law establishing prescriptive periods for violations
penalized by special acts and municipal ordinances which also provides when such periods begin to run
and when the same will be interrupted, accordingly treats the Information against her as having been
filed way beyond the two-month statutory period from the date of the alleged commission of the
offense, the charge against her should have been dismissed on the ground of prescription.

For its part, the prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was suspended upon the filing of the
complaint against her with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. (NOTE: The position of the fiscal seems
to be in accordance with the doctrine of Brillante v. CA, G.R. Nos. 118757 & 121571. October 19, 2004 - -
-That the filing of a complaint with the fiscals office suspends the running of the prescriptive period of a
criminal offense). Agreeing with the respondent judge, the Solicitor General also invokes Section 1, Rule
110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, providing as follows:

Sec. 1. How Instituted — For offenses NOT subject to the rule on summary procedure in
special cases, the institution of criminal action shall be as follows:

a) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, by filing the complaint
with the appropriate officer for the purpose of conducting the requisite preliminary
investigation therein;

b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts, by filing the complaint directly with the said courts, or a complaint with
the fiscal's office. However, in Metropolitan Manila and other chartered cities, the complaint
may be filed only with the office of the fiscal.

In all cases such institution interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Emphasis is laid on the LAST PARAGRAPH. The respondent maintains that the filing of the complaint with
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor comes under the phrase "such institution" and that the phrase "in
all cases" applies to all cases, without distinction, including those falling under the Rule on Summary
Procedure.
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ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure applies to violations of municipal
ordinances. (Specifically, whether or not the CA erred in denying petitioner’s motion to quash the
Information on the ground of prescription, for having applied Section 1, Rule 110, instead of the Rule on
Summary Procedure, as petitioner argues)

HELD:

No, Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure DOES NOT APPLY to violations of municipal
ordinances; it does not apply to offenses which falls under Summary Procedure.

The LASTPARAGRAPH of Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, asargued by
respondent, was an adoption of the doctrine in Francisco v. Court of Appeals - - - “that the filing of the
complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or
investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if
the court where the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on its merits.” 2However,
Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for
offenses NOT subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases," which plainly signifies that
the section does NOT apply to offenses which are subject to summary procedure. The phrase "in all
cases" appearing in the LASTPARAGRAPH obviously refers to the casescovered by the Section, that is,
those offenses NOT governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure. This interpretation conforms to the
canon that words in a statute should be read in relation to and not isolation from the rest of the
measure, to discover the true legislative intent.As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary
Procedure that among the offenses it covers are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should
follow that the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez,
is governed by that Rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.

Where paragraph (b) of the Section 1 Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure does speak of
"offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts,"
the obvious reference is to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts. 3These offenses are not
covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.

Rule on Summary Procedure provides that the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed
in court; Running of prescriptive period tolls on the date of filing in court

Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed directly
in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation."Both parties agree
that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he
wants to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not
the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the
prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date
before that.

This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the period of
prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The
proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of the
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Solicitor General that they include administrative proceedings. His contention is that we must not
distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does.

In case of conflict, the Rule on Summary Procedure as a special law (SPECIALRULE) prevails over
Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure; Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
must yield to Act No. 3326

At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and
Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law.
And if there be a conflict between Act. No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the
latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to
"diminish, increase or modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution.
Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right.

Going back to the Francisco case, we find it relevant to observe that the decision would have been
conformable to Section 1, Rule 110, as the offense involved was grave oral defamation punishable under
the Revised Penal Code with arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period. By contrast, the prosecution in the instant case is for violation of a municipal ordinance, for which
the penalty cannot exceed six months, and is thus covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.

Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner commenced from
its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in
accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial
proceeding that could have interrupted the period was the filing of the information with the Municipal
Trial Court of Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had already
prescribed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.4

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The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor's
office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should
not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain language. The remedy is not
a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought to be corrected.
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