THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO,
Intended as a ―splendid symmetry to the
et al . v . THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al .
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in line with
the government‘s policy of pursuing peace
negotiations with the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF), asked Prime Minister Mahathir
Mohammad to convince the MILF to continue
negotiating with the government. MILF,
thereafter, convened its Central Committee and
decided to meet with the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines (GRP). Formal peace
talks were held in Libya which resulted to the
crafting of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on
Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) which consists of
three (3) aspects: a.) security aspect; b.)
rehabilitation aspect; and c.) ancestral domain
aspect. Various negotiations were held which led
to the finalization of the Memorandum of
Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD).
The said memorandum was set to be signed last
August 5, 2008. In its body, it grants ―the
authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral
Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro
to the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE). The
latter, in addition, has the freedom to enter into
any economic cooperation and trade relation with
foreign countries. ―The sharing between the
Central Government and the BJE of total
production pertaining to natural resources is to be
75:25 in favor of the BJE. The MOA-AD further
provides for the extent of the territory of the
Bangsamoro. It describes it as ―the land mass as
well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial
and alluvial domains, including the aerial domain
and the atmospheric space above it, embracing
the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region.
With regard to governance, on the other hand, a
shared responsibility and authority between the
Central Government and BJE was provided. The
relationship was described as ―associative. With
the formulation of the MOA-AD,
petitioners aver that the negotiation and
finalization of the MOA-AD violates constitutional
and statutory provisions on public consultation,
as mandated by Executive Order No. 3, and right
to information. They further contend that it
violates the Constitution and laws. Hence, the
filing of the petition.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the MOA-AD violates
constitutional and statutory provisions on public
consultation and right to information 2) Whether
or not the MOA-AD violates the Constitution and
the laws.
HELD:
The MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of
public concern, involving as it does the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State,
which directly affects the lives of the public at
large.
right to information under the Bill of Rights is the
policy of public disclosure under Section 28,
Article II of the Constitution which provides that
subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by
law, the State adopts and implements a policy of
full public disclosure of all its transactions
involving public interest. Moreover, the policy of
full public disclosure enunciated in above-quoted
Section 28 complements the right of access to
informationon matters of public concern found in
the Bill of Rights. The right to information
guarantees the right of the people to demand
information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty
of officialdom to give information even if nobody
demands. The policy of public disclosure
establishes a concrete ethical principle for the
conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open
democracy, with the people‘s right to know as the
centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be
accountable by following such policy. These
provisions are vital to the exercise of the freedom
of expression and essential to hold public officials
at all times accountable to the
people. Indubitably, the effectivity of the policy of
public disclosure need not await the passing of a
statute. As Congress cannot revoke this principle,
it is merely directed to provide for ―reasonable
safeguards.‖ The complete and effective exercise
of the right to information necessitates that its
complementary provision on public disclosure
derive the same self-executory nature. Since both
provisions go hand-in-hand, it is absurd to say
that the broader right to information on matters
of public concern is already enforceable while the
correlative duty of the State to disclose its
transactions involving public interest is not
enforceable until there is an enabling law.
Respondents cannot thus point to the absence of
an implementing legislation as an excuse in not
effecting such policy. An essential element of
these freedoms is to keep open a continuing
dialogue or process of communication between
the government and the people. It is in the
interest of the State that the channels for free
political discussion be maintained to the end that
the government may perceive and be responsive
to the people‘s will. Envisioned to be corollary to
the twin rights to information and disclosure is
the design for feedback mechanisms. The
imperative of a public consultation, as a species of
the right to information, is evident in the
―marching orders‖ to respondents. The
mechanics for the duty to disclose information
and to conduct public consultation regarding the
peace agenda and process is manifestly provided
by E.O. No. 3. The preambulatory clause of E.O.
No. 3 declares that there is a need to further
enhance the contribution of civil society to the
comprehensive peace process by institutionalizing
the people‘s participation. One of the three
underlying principles of the comprehensive peace
process is that it ―should be community-based,
reflecting the sentiments, values and principles
important to all Filipinos and ―shall be defined
not by the government alone, nor by the different
contending groups only, but by all Filipinos as
one community. Included as a component of the
comprehensive peace process is consensus-
building and empowerment for peace, which
includes ―continuing consultations on both
national and local levels to build consensus for a
peace agenda and process, and the mobilization
and facilitation of people‘s participation in the
peace process.Clearly, E.O. No. 3 contemplates
not just the conduct of a plebiscite to effectuate
“continuing” consultations, contrary to
respondents’ position that plebiscite is “more
than sufficient consultation.Further, E.O. No. 3
enumerates the functions and responsibilities of
the PAPP, one of which is to ―conduct regular
dialogues with the National Peace Forum (NPF)
and other peace partners to seek relevant
information, comments, recommendations as well
as to render appropriate and timely reports on the
progress of the comprehensive peace process.
E.O. No. 3 mandates the establishment of the
NPF to be ―the principal forum for the
Presidential Adviser on Peace Progress (PAPP) to
consult with and seek advi[c]e from the
peace advocates, peace partners and concerned
sectors of society on both national and local
levels, on the implementation of the
comprehensive peace process, as well as for
government[-]civil society dialogue and
consensus-building on peace agenda and
initiatives. In fine, E.O. No. 3 establishes
petitioners’ right to be consulted on the peace
agenda, as a corollary to the constitutional right
to information and disclosure. In general, the
objections against the MOA-AD center on the
extent of the powers conceded therein to the BJE.
Petitioners assert that the powers granted to the
BJE exceed those granted to any local
government under present laws, and even go
beyond those of the present ARMM. Before
assessing some of the specific powers that would
have been vested in the BJE, however, it would be
useful to turn first to a general idea that serves as
a unifying link to the different provisions of the
MOA-AD, namely, the international law concept
of association. Significantly, the MOA-AD
explicitly alludes to this concept, indicating that
the Parties actually framed its provisions with it
in mind. Association is referred to in paragraph 3
on TERRITORY, paragraph 11 on RESOURCES,
and paragraph 4 on GOVERNANCE. It is in the
last mentioned provision, however, that the MOA-
AD most clearly uses it to describe the envisioned
relationship between the BJE and the Central
Government.
4. The relationship between the Central
Government and the Bangsamoro juridical entity
shall be associative characterized by shared
authority and responsibility with a structure of
governance based on executive, legislative,
judicial and administrative institutions with
defined powers and functions in the
comprehensive compact. A period of transition
shall be established in a comprehensive peace
compact specifying the relationship between the
Central Government and the BJE. The nature of
the ―associative relationship may have been
intended to be defined more precisely in the still
to be forged Comprehensive Compact.
Nonetheless, given that there is a concept of
―association in international law, and the MOA-
AD – by its inclusion of international law
instruments in its TOR– placed itself in an
international legal context, that concept of
association may be brought to bear in
understanding the use of the term ―associative in
the MOA-AD. The MOA-AD contains many
provisions which are consistent with the
international legal concept of association,
specifically the following: the BJE‘s capacity to
enter into economic and trade relations with
foreign countries, the commitment of the Central
Government to ensure the BJE‘s participation in
meetings and events in the ASEAN and the
specialized UN agencies, and the continuing
responsibility of the Central Government over
external defense. Moreover, the BJE‘s right to
participate in Philippine official missions bearing
on negotiation of border agreements,
environmental protection, and sharing of
revenues pertaining to the bodies of water
adjacent to or between the islands forming part of
the ancestral domain, resembles the right of the
governments of FSM and the Marshall Islands to
be consulted by the U.S. government on any
foreign affairs matter affecting them. These
provisions of the MOA indicate, among other
things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE
the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a
status closely approximating it. The concept of
association is not recognized under the present
Constitution. No province, city, or municipality,
not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws
as having an ―associative‖ relationship with the
national government. Indeed, the concept implies
powers that go beyond anything ever granted by
the Constitution to any local or regional
government. It also implies the recognition of the
associated entity as a state. The Constitution,
however, does not contemplate any state in this
jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much
less does it provide for a transitory status that
aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory
for independence.
Even the mere concept animating many of the
MOA-AD‘s provisions, therefore, already requires
for its validity the amendment of constitutional
provisions, specifically the following provisions of
Article X:
SECTION 1. The territorial and political
subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are
the provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as
hereinafter provided. SECTION 15. There shall be
created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao
and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces,
cities, municipalities, and geographical areas
sharing common and distinctive historical and The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the
cultural heritage, economic and social structures, present Constitution and laws. Not only its
and other relevant characteristics within the specific provisions but the very concept
framework of this Constitution and the national underlying them, namely, the associative
sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the relationship envisioned between the GRP and the
Republic of the Philippines. BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept
It is not merely an expanded version of the presupposes that the associated entity is a state
ARMM, the status of its relationship with the and implies that the same is on its way to
national government being fundamentally independence.
different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating
state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the
state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, present legal framework will not be effective until
namely, a permanent population, a defined that framework is amended, the same does not
territory, a government, and a capacity to enter cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in the
into relations with other states. MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is,
between the national government and the BJE itself, a violation of the Memorandum of
being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it Instructions from the President dated March 1,
is not surprising that many of the specific 2001, addressed to the government peace panel.
provisions of the M OA-AD on the formation and Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually
powers of the BJE are in conflict with the guarantees that the necessary amendments to the
Constitution and the laws. Article X, Section 18 of Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in
the Constitution provides that ―[t]he creation of place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the
the autonomous region shall be effective when President herself is authorized to make such a
approved by a majority of the votes cast by the guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount
constituent units in a plebiscite called for the to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent
purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional
geographic areas voting favorably in such Convention, or the people themselves through the
plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous process of initiative, for the only way that the
region. Executive can ensure the outcome of the
The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous amendment process is through an undue
region. But even assuming that it is covered by the influence or interference with that process.
term ―autonomous region in the constitutional
provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be
in conflict with it. Under paragraph 2(c) on
TERRITORY in relation to 2(d) and 2(e), the
present geographic area of the ARMM and, in
addition, the municipalities of Lanao del Norte
which voted for inclusion in the ARMM during
the 2001 plebiscite – Baloi, Munai, Nunungan,
Pantar, Tagoloan and Tangkal – are automatically
part of the BJE without need of another
plebiscite, in contrast to the areas under
Categories A and B mentioned earlier in the
overview. That the present components of the
ARMM and the above-mentioned municipalities
voted for inclusion therein in 2001, however, does
not render another plebiscite unnecessary under
the Constitution, precisely because what these
areas voted for then was their inclusion in the
ARMM, not the BJE.
Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also
be amended if the scheme envisioned in the
MOA-AD is to be effected. That constitutional
provision states: ―The State recognizes and
promotes the rights of indigenous cultural
communities within the framework of national
unity and development. An associative
arrangement does not uphold national unity.
While there may be a semblance of unity because
of the associative ties between the BJE and the
national government, the act of placing a portion
of Philippine territory in a status which, in
international practice, has generally been a
preparation for independence, is certainly not
conducive to national unity.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 183591, 183572, 183893 and 183951 - THE
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, duly represented
by GOVERNOR JESUS SACDALAN and/or VICE-
GOVERNOR EMMANUEL PINOL, for and in his own
behalf vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL
DOMAIN (GRP), represented by SEC. RODOLFO
GARCIA, ATTY. SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK
RYAN SULLIVAN, and/or GEN. HERMOGENES
ESPERON, JR., the latter in his capacity as the present
and duly-appointed Presidential Adviser on the Peace
Process (OPAPP) or the so-called Office of the
Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process
Promulgated:
October 14, 2008
x--------------------------------------------x
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
PUNO, C.J.:
It is the duty of the government to seek a just,
comprehensive and enduring peace with any rebel group
but the search for peace must always be in accord with
the Constitution. Any search for peace that undercuts the
Constitution must be struck down. Peace in breach of the
Constitution is worse than worthless.
I. Historical Roots
A historical perspective of our Muslim problem is helpful.
From time immemorial, an enduring peace with our
Muslim brothers and sisters in Mindanao has eluded our
grasp. Our Muslim problem exploded in March of 1968
when Muslim trainees were massacred by army officers
at Corregidor. About 180 Muslim trainees had been
recruited in the previous year as a part of a covert force
named Jabidah,1 allegedly formed to wrest away Sabah
from Malaysia. The trainees were massacred when they
reportedly protested their unbearable training and
demanded the return to their home.2 The Jabidah
Massacre fomented the formation of Muslim groups
clamoring for a separate Islamic state. One of these
groups was the Muslim Independence Movement (MIM),
founded by the then Governor of Cotabato, Datu Udtog
Matalam.3 Another was the Nurul Islam, led by Hashim
Salamat.
On September 21, 1972 Martial Law was declared by
President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Among the reasons
cited to justify martial law were the armed conflict
between Muslims and Christians and the Muslim
secessionist movement in the Southern Philippines.4
The imposition of martial law drove some of the Muslim
secessionist movements to the underground. One of
them was the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)
headed by Nur Misuari. In 1974, the MNLF shot to
prominence, when the Organization of Islamic
Conference (OIC) officially gave it recognition. During the
5th ICFM, they strongly urged "the Philippines
Government to find a political and peaceful solution
through negotiation with Muslim leaders, particularly with
representatives of the MNLF in order to arrive at a just
solution to the plight of the Filipino Muslims within the
framework of national sovereignty and territorial integrity
of the Philippines"; and recognized "the problem as an
internal problem with the Philippine Government to
ensure the safety of the Filipino Muslims and the
preservation of their liberties in accordance with the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights."5
In December 1976, the Philippine government and the
MNLF under the auspices of the OIC started their peace
negotiation in Tripoli, Libya. It bore its first fruit when on
January 20, 1977, the parties signed the Tripoli
Agreement in Zamboanga City in the presence of the
OIC Representative.
President Marcos immediately implemented the Tripoli
Agreement. He issued Presidential Proclamation No.
1628, "Declaring Autonomy in Southern Philippines." A
plebiscite was conducted in the provinces covered under
the Tripoli Agreement to determine the will of the people
thereat. Further, the legislature enacted Batasang
Pambansa Blg. 20, "Providing for the Organization of
Sangguniang Pampook (Regional Legislative Assembly)
in Each of Regions IX and XII." President Marcos then
ordered the creation of Autonomous Region IX and XII.
In the meanwhile, the MNLF continued enhancing its
international status. It was accorded the status of an
observer in Tripoli, Libya during the 8th ICFM. In the 15th
ICFM at Sana'a, Yemen, in 1984, the MNLF's status was
further elevated from a mere 'legitimate representative' to
'sole legitimate representative' of the Bangsamoro
people.6
In April 1977, the peace talks between the Government
of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and MNLF Talks
collapsed. Schism split the MNLF leadership. The
irreconcilable differences between Nur Misuari and
Hashim Salamat led to the formation of the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF), headed by Hashim Salamat.
Thus, the Maguindanao-led MILF, parted ways with the
Tausug-led MNLF.
In 1986, the People Power Revolution catapulted
Corazon C. Aquino to the Presidency. Forthwith, she
ordered the peace talks with the MNLF to resume. The
1987 Constitution was ratified by the people. It provided
for the creation of the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao through an act of Congress. But again the
talks with the MNLF floundered in May 1987.7 Be that as
it may, it was during President Aquino's governance that
a culture of peace negotiations with the rebellious MNLF
and MILF was cultivated.8 Thus, the Autonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was created
through Republic Act No. 6734. The law took effect on
August 1, 1989.
Then came the presidency of President Fidel V. Ramos.
He issued on September 15, 1993, Executive Order No.,
125 (E.O. 125) which provided for a comprehensive,
integrated and holistic peace process with the Muslim
rebels. E.O. 125 created the Office of the Presidential
Adviser on the Peace Process to give momentum to the
peace talks with the MNLF.
In 1996, as the GRP-MNLF peace negotiations were
successfully winding down, the government prepared to
deal with the MILF problem. Formal peace talks started
on January of 1997, towards the end of the Ramos
administration. The Buldon Ceasefire Agreement was
signed in July 19979 but time ran out for the negotiations
to be completed.
President Joseph Estrada continued the peace talks with
the MILF. The talks, however, were limited to cessation
of hostilities and did not gain any headway. President
Estrada gave both sides until December 1999 to finish
the peace process.10 They did not meet the deadline.
The year 2000 saw the escalation of acts of violence and
the threats to the lives and security of civilians in
Southern Mindanao. President Estrada then declared an
"all-out war" against the MILF.11 He bowed out of office
with the "war" unfinished.
Thereafter, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo assumed
office. Peace negotiations with the MILF were
immediately set for resumption. Executive Order No. 3,
was issued "Defining Policy and Administrative Structure:
For Government's Comprehensive Peace Efforts." On
March 24, 2001, a General Framework for the
Resumption of Peace Talks between the GRP and the
MILF was signed. Republic Act No. 905412 was also
enacted on March 31, 2001 and took effect on August
14, 2001 to strengthen and expand the Autonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao. Through the Organic Act of
2001, six municipalities in Lanao del Norte voted for
inclusion in the ARMM.
On June 22, 2001, the ancestral domain aspect of the
GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement was signed in Libya.
Several rounds of exploratory talks with the MILF
followed. Unfortunately, on April 2, 2003, Davao was
twice bombed. Again, the peace talks were cancelled
and fighting with the MILF resumed. On July 19, 2003
the GRP and the MILF agreed on "mutual cessation of
hostilities" and the parties returned to the bargaining
table. The parties discussed the problem of ancestral
domain, divided into four strands: concept, territory,
resources, and governance.
On February 7, 2006, the 10th round of Exploratory
Talks between the GRP and the MILF ended. The
parties issued a joint statement of the consensus points
of the Ancestral Domain aspect of GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace of June 22, 2001. The Joint
Statement provides that:
"Among the consensus points reached were:
· Joint determination of the scope of the Bangsamoro
homeland based on the technical maps and data
submitted by both sides;
· Measures to address the legitimate grievances of the
Bangsamoro people arising from the unjust
dispossession and/or marginalization;
· Bangsamoro people's right to utilize and develop their
ancestral domain and ancestral lands;
· Economic cooperation arrangements for the benefit of
the entire Bangsamoro people."
On July 27, 2008, a Joint Statement on the
Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-
AD) was signed by Chairperson Rodolfo C. Garcia on
behalf of the GRP Peace Panel, and Mohagher Iqbal on
behalf of the MILF Panel. In the Joint Statement, it was
declared that the final draft of the MOA-AD has already
been initialed. It was announced that "both sides reached
a consensus to initial the final draft pending its official
signing by the Chairmen of the two peace panels in early
August 2008, in Putrajaya, Malaysia."13
The Joint Statement triggered the filing of the petitions at
bar. These Petitions, sought among others, to restrain
the signing of the MOA-AD. On August 4, 2008, a day
before the intended signing of the initialed MOA-AD, this
Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order stopping
the signing of the MOA-AD. Several petitions-in-
intervention were also filed praying for the same relief.
On August 8, 2008 and September 1, 2008, the
respondents through the Solicitor General, submitted
official copies of the initialed MOA-AD to the Court and
furnished the petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention
with copies of the same.
All the petitions were heard by the Court in three
separate days of oral arguments. In the course of the
arguments, the Solicitor General informed the Court that
the MOA-AD will not be signed "in its present form or any
other form."14 Thereafter, the government Peace Panel
was dismantled by the President.
II. Petitions should be Decided on the Merits
The first threshold issue is whether this Court should
exercise its power of judicial review and decide the
petitions at bar on the merits.
I respectfully submit that the Court should not avoid its
constitutional duty to decide the petitions at bar on their
merit in view of their transcendental importance. The
subject of review in the petitions at bar is the conduct of
the peace process with the MILF which culminated in the
MOA-AD. The constitutionality of the conduct of the
entire peace process and not just the MOA-AD should go
under the scalpel of judicial scrutiny. The review should
not be limited to the initialed MOA-AD for it is merely the
product of a constitutionally flawed process of
negotiations with the MILF.
Let us revisit the steps that led to the contested and
controversial MOA-AD. Peace negotiations with the MILF
commenced with the execution of ceasefire agreements.
The watershed event, however, occurred in 2001, with
the issuance of Executive Order No. 315 entitled
"Defining Policy and Administrative Structure for
Government's Comprehensive Peace Efforts."
Government Peace Negotiating Panels were
immediately constituted to negotiate peace with rebel
groups, which included the MILF. Significantly, Executive
Order No. 3 provides that in the pursuit of social,
economic and political reforms, administrative action,
new legislation or even constitutional amendments may
be required.16 Section 4 of Executive Order No. 3
states, viz:
SECTION 4. The Six Paths to Peace. - The components
of the comprehensive peace process comprise the
processes known as the "Paths to Peace". These
component processes are interrelated and not mutually
exclusive, and must therefore be pursued simultaneously
in a coordinated and integrated fashion. They shall
include, but may not be limited to, the following:
a. PURSUIT OF SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
REFORMS. This component involves the vigorous
implementation of various policies, reforms, programs
and projects aimed at addressing the root causes of
internal armed conflicts and social unrest. This may
require administrative action, new legislation or even
constitutional amendments.
xxxx
c. PEACEFUL, NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WITH
THE DIFFERENT REBEL GROUPS. This component
involves the conduct of face-to-face negotiations to reach
peaceful settlement with the different rebel groups. It
also involves the effective implementation of peace
agreements. (Emphasis supplied)
Executive Order No. 3, was later amended by E.O. No.
555,17 and was followed by the Tripoli Peace Agreement
of 2001. The Tripoli Peace Agreement of 2001 became
the basis for several rounds of exploratory talks between
the GRP Peace Panel and the MILF. These exploratory
talks resulted in the signing of the Joint Statements of
the GRP and MILF peace panels to affirm commitments
that implement the Tripoli Agreement of 2001, including
the ancestral domain aspect. The issuance of the Joint
Statements culminated in the initialing of the MOA-AD.18
It is crystal clear that the initialing of the MOA-AD is but
the evidence of the government peace negotiating
panel's assent to the terms contained therein. If the
MOA-AD is constitutionally infirm, it is because the
conduct of the peace process itself is flawed. It is the
constitutional duty of the Court is to determine whether
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
government peace negotiating panel in the conduct of
the peace negotiations with the MILF. The Court should
not restrict its review on the validity of the MOA-AD
which is but the end product of the flawed conduct of the
peace negotiation with the MILF.
Requirements of Ripeness and
Mootness are not bars to review
In contending that this Court should refrain from
resolving the merits of the petitions at bar, two principal
defenses were deployed by the Solicitor General: the
issues raised for resolution are not ripe for adjudication
and regardless of their ripeness, are moot.
With due respect, the defenses cannot be sustained. To
contend that an issue is not ripe for adjudication is to
invoke prematurity;19 that the issue has not reached a
state where judicial intervention is necessary, hence,
there is in reality no actual controversy. On the other
hand, to urge that an issue has become moot concedes
that judicial intervention was once proper but subsequent
developments make further judicial action unnecessary.
Together, mootness and ripeness act as a two-pronged
pincer, squeezing the resolution of controversies within a
narrow timeframe.20
First, the issues at bar are ripe for resolution. In Ohio
Forestry Ass'n Inc. v. Sierra Club,21 the following factors
were identified as indicative of the ripeness of a
controversy:
1. Whether delayed review would cause hardship to the
plaintiffs;
2. Whether judicial intervention would inappropriately
interfere with further administrative action;
3. Whether the Court would benefit from further factual
development of the issues presented;
Underlying the use of the foregoing factors is first, the
setting of a threshold for review and second, judicial
application of the threshold to the facts extant in a
controversy. I respectfully submit that where a
controversy concerns fundamental constitutional
questions, the threshold must be adjusted to allow
judicial scrutiny, in order that the issues may be resolved
at the earliest stage before anything irreversible is
undertaken under cover of an unconstitutional act.
Schwartz cites one vital consideration in determining
ripeness, viz:
In dealing with ripeness, one must distinguish between
statutes and other acts that are self-executing and those
that are not. If a statute is self executing, it is ripe for
challenge as soon as it is enacted. For such a statute to
be subject to judicial review, it is not necessary that it be
applied by an administrator, a prosecutor, or some other
enforcement officer in a concrete case.22
Although Schwartz employs the term "statute," he
qualifies that the principle enunciated applies to other
governmental acts as well.23
Prescinding from these parameters, it is evident that the
Court is confronted with a MOA-AD that is heavily laden
with self-executing components. Far from the
representation of the Solicitor General, the MOA-AD is
not a mere collection of consensus points,24 still bereft
of any legal consequence. The commitments made by
the government panel under the MOA-AD can be divided
into (1) those which are self-executory or are
immediately effective by the terms of the MOA-AD alone,
(2) those with a period or which are to be effective within
a stipulated time, and (3) those that are conditional or
whose effectivity depends on the outcome of a plebiscite.
Let us cast an eye on the self executory provisions of the
MOA-AD which will demolish the argument of the
respondents that the issues in the petitions at bar are not
ripe for adjudication.
The MOA-AD provides that "the Parties affirm that the
core of the BJE shall constitute the present geographic
area of the ARMM, including the municipalities of Baloi,
Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and Tangkal in the
province of Lanao del Norte that voted for inclusion in the
ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite."
The MOA-AD then proceeds to enumerate the powers
that the BJE possesses within its area. The BJE is
granted powers of governance which it can exercise
without need of amendments to be made to the
Constitution or existing law or without imposing any
condition whatsoever.
The MOA-AD also gives the BJE the unconditional right
to participate in international meetings and events, e.g.,
ASEAN meetings and other specialized agencies of the
United Nations.25 It grants BJE the right to participate in
Philippine official missions and delegations that are
engaged in the negotiation of border agreements or
protocols for environmental protection, equitable sharing
of incomes and revenues, in addition to those of fishing
rights.26 Again, these rights are given to the BJE without
imposing prior conditions such as amendments to the
Constitution, existing law or the enactment of new
legislation.
Next, let us go to provisions of the MOA-AD with a period
which will further demonstrate the lack of merit of
respondents' posture that the petitions at bar are not ripe
for adjudication. The MOA-AD provides that "without
derogating from the requirements of prior agreements27,
the Government stipulates to conduct and deliver, within
twelve (12) months following the signing of the
Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain, a
plebiscite covering the areas as enumerated in the list
and depicted in the map as Category A x x x the Parties
shall endeavor to complete negotiations and resolve all
outstanding issues on the Comprehensive Compact
within fifteen (15) months from signing of the MOA-
AD."28 Once more, it is evident that no conditions were
imposed with respect to the conduct of a plebiscite within
twelve months following the signing of the MOA-AD. The
provision starkly states that within twelve months, the
government will conduct and deliver a plebiscite covering
areas under Category A of the MOA-AD.
We now come to respondents' argument on mootness. In
determining whether a case has been rendered moot,
courts look at the development of events to ascertain
whether the petitioner making the constitutional
challenge is confronted with a continuing harm or a
substantial potential of harm. Mootness is sometimes
viewed as "the doctrine of standing set in a time frame:
The requisite personal interest must exist at the
commencement of the litigation and must continue
throughout its existence."29 Stated otherwise, an actual
controversy must be extant at all stages of judicial
review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.30
Respondents insist that the petitions at bar are moot for
three reasons: (1) the petitioners North Cotabato and
Zamboanga have already been furnished copies of the
MOA-AD; (2) the Executive Secretary has issued a
Memorandum that the government will not sign the
MOA-AD and, (3) the GRP Peace Panel has been
dissolved by the President.
These grounds are barren grounds. For one, the press
statements of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace
Process, Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, Jr., are clear that
the MOA-AD will still be used as a major reference in
future negotiations.31 For another, the MILF considers
the MOA-AD a "done deal," 32 hence, ready for
implementation. On the other hand, the peace panel may
have been temporarily dismantled but the structures set
up by the Executive and their guidelines which gave rise
to the present controversy remain intact. With all these
realities, the petitions at bar fall within that exceptional
class of cases which ought to be decided despite their
mootness because the complained unconstitutional acts
are "capable of repetition yet evading review."33
This well-accepted exception to the non-reviewability of
moot cases was first enunciated in the case of Southern
Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC.34 The United States
Supreme Court held that a case is not moot where
interests of a public character are asserted under
conditions that may be immediately repeated, merely
because the particular order involved has expired.
In the petitions at bar, one need not butt heads with the
Solicitor General to demonstrate the numerous
constitutional infirmities of the MOA-AD. There is no
need to iterate and reiterate them. Suffice to stress that it
is because of these evident breaches, that the MOA-AD
requires the present Constitution to undergo radical
revisions. Yet, the unblushing threat is made that the
MOA-AD which shattered to smithereens all respect to
the Constitution will continue to be a reference point in
future peace negotiations with the MILF. In fine, the
MOA-AD is a constitutional nightmare that will come and
torment us again in the near future. It must be slain now.
It is not moot.
Let us adhere to the orthodox thought that once a
controversy as to the application of a constitutional
provision is raised before this Court, it becomes a legal
issue which the Court is hide-bound to decide.35
Supervening events, whether contrived or accidental,
cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision if
there is a grave violation of the Constitution has already
been committed or the threat of being committed again is
not a hypothetical fear.36 It is the function of judicial
review to uphold the Constitution at all cost or we forfeit
the faith of the people.
III. The Deviation from the MNLF
Model of Pursuing Peace with
Rebels is Inexplicable
The MNLF model in dealing with rebels which culminated
in the Peace Agreement of 1996, was free from any
infirmity because it respected the metes and bounds of
the Constitution. While the MNLF model is ostensibly
based on the Tripoli Agreement of 1976, its
implementation was in perfect accord with Philippine
laws. The implementation of the Tripoli Agreement of
1976 came in two phases: the first, under the legislative
power of then President Marcos and the second, under
the provisions of Article X of the 1987 Constitution and
its implementing legislation, Republic Act No. 6734.37
Under President Marcos, autonomy in the affected
provinces was recognized through Presidential
Proclamation No.1628. It declared autonomy in 13
provinces and constituted a provisional government for
the affected areas. The proclamation was followed by a
plebiscite and the final framework for the autonomous
region was embodied in Presidential Decree No.1618.
The establishment of the autonomous region under P.D.
1628 was constitutionalized by the commissioners in the
1987 Constitution as shown by the following exchange of
views:
MR. ALONTO: Madam President, I have stated from the
start of our consideration of this Article on Local
Governments that the autonomous region exists now in
this country. There is a de facto existence of an
autonomous government in what we call now Regions IX
and XII. Region IX is composed of the provinces of Tawi-
Tawi, Sulu, Basilan, Zamboanga City, Zamboanga del
Sur and Zamboanga del Norte, including all the
component cities in the provinces. Region XII is
composed of the Provinces of Lanao del Norte, Lanao
del Sur, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and North
Cotabato. This autonomous region has its central
governmental headquarters in Zamboanga City for
Region IX and in Cotabato City for Region XII. In fact, it
is stated by Commissioner Ople that it has an executive
commission and a legislative assembly.
MR. DE CASTRO: Madam President.
MR. ALONTO: These two regions have been organized
by virtue of P.D. No. 1618 of President Marcos, as
amended by P.D. No. 1843.
MR. DE CASTRO: Madam President.
MR. ALONTO: If the Gentleman will bear with me, I will
explain to him. That is why there is a de facto
autonomous government existing in Mindanao
MR. DE CASTRO: Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT: May we please allow Commissioner
Alonto to finish his remarks before any interruption?
MR. DE CASTRO: Yes Madam President.
MR. ALONTO: Madam President, this autonomous
region is recognized by the present regime for the very
reason that the present regime is now in the process of a
negotiation with the Moro National Liberation Front. In a
way, what we are doing is to give constitutional basis for
the President of this country today to proceed with the
negotiation with the Moro National Liberation Front.
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Uka is recognized.
MR. UKA: Madam President, not only that. President
Corazon C. Aquino has appointed Mr. Albert Tugum as
the Chairman of Region IX and Mr. Datu Zakaria Candau
as chairman of Region XII. They are doing their work
well right now. So there are two recognized autonomous
regions. They have also a complete regional assembly
as the legislative body. So, it is only a matter of putting
this in the Constitution.
THE PRESIDENT: So, what is before the body is the
proposed amendment on Line 11 of Section 1.
Commissioner de Castro is recognized.
MR. DE CASTRO: Madam President, if there is now an
autonomous region in Mindanao and if, according to the
Honorable Ople, this has the recognition of the central
government, what then is the use of creating
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and going
through the process of a plebiscite and enacting an
organic act?
My amendment is simply to clarify the term "Muslim
Mindanao." I really did not expect that this will go this far
--- that it is being placed in the Constitution, that it is a
fait accompli and that all we have to do here is say
"amen" to the whole thing and it we do not say "amen,"
they will still continue to be autonomous regions. I insist
on my amendment, Madam President.
MR. OPLE: May I provide more information to
Commissioner de Castro on this matter.
First of all, we have to correct the misimpression that the
autonomous regions, such as they now exist in
Mindanao, do not enjoy the recognition of the central
government. Secondly, may I point out that the
autonomy existing now in Regions IX and XII is a very
imperfect kind of autonomy. We are not satisfied with the
legal sufficiency of these regions as autonomous regions
and that is the reason the initiative has been taken in
order to guarantee by the Constitution the right to
autonomy of the people embraced in these regions and
not merely on the sufferance of any existing or future
administration. It is a right, moreover, for which they
have waged heroic struggles, not only in this generation
but in previous eras and, therefore, what we seek is
constitutional permanence for this right.
May I also point out, Madam President, that the Tripoli
Agreement was negotiated under the aegis of foreign
powers. No matter how friendly and sympathetic they are
to our country, this is under the aegis of the 42-nation
Islamic Conference. Should our brothers look across the
seas to a conclave of foreign governments so that their
rights may be recognized in the Constitution? Do they
have to depend upon foreign sympathy so that their right
can be recognized in final, constitutional and durable
form.
THE PRESIDENT: Commissioner Ople, the consensus
here is to grant autonomy to the Muslim areas of
Mindanao?
MR. OPLE: Yes.(Emphasis supplied)38
Clearly, the mandate for the creation of the ARMM is
derived principally from the 1987 Constitution.
Thereafter, ARRM was given life by Republic Act No.
6734,39 the Organic Act of the ARMM. Our executive
officials were guided by and did not stray away from
these legal mandates at the negotiation and execution of
the Peace Agreement with the MNLF in 1996. Without ifs
and buts, its Whereas Clauses affirmed our sovereignty
and territorial integrity and completely respected our
Constitution.40
In stark contrast, the peace process with the MILF draws
its mandate principally from Executive Order No. 3. This
executive order provided the basis for the execution of
the Tripoli Agreement of 2001 and thereafter, the MOA-
AD. During the whole process, the government peace
negotiators conducted themselves free from the
strictures of the Constitution. They played fast and loose
with the do's and dont's of the Constitution. They acted
as if the grant of executive power to the President allows
them as agents to make agreements with the MILF in
violation of the Constitution. They acted as if these
violations can anyway be cured by committing that the
sovereign people will change the Constitution to conform
with the MOA-AD. They forgot that the Constitution
grants power but also sets some impotence on power.
IV. The Exercise of Executive Power is
Subject to the Constitution
Clearly, the respondents grossly misunderstood and
patently misapplied the executive powers of the
President.
The MILF problem is a problem of rebellion penalized
under the Revised Penal Code.41 The MILF is but a
rebel group. It has not acquired any belligerency status.
The rebellion of the MILF is recognized expressly by
E.O. No. 342 as well as by E.O. No. 555.43 The
President's powers in dealing with rebellion are spelled
out in Article VII, section 18 of the Constitution, viz:
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all
armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the
public safety requires it, he may, for a period not
exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part
thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from
the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall
submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress.
The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a
majority of all its Members in regular or special session,
may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon
the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the
same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension
for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the
invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety
requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four
hours following such proclamation or suspension,
convene in accordance with its rules without need of a
call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its
decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of
the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil
courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the
conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies
over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor
automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus shall apply only to persons judicially charged for
rebellion or offenses inherent in, or directly connected
with, invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, any person thus arrested or detained
shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise
he shall be released.
These are the well crafted commander-in-chief powers of
the President. They enumerate with exactitude the
powers which the President should use in dealing with
rebellion. They are graduated in degrees. The strongest
of these powers is the power to declare martial law and
worthy to note, its exercise is subject to restraints. But
more important, all these commander-in-chief powers
can only be used to quell the rebellion. They cannot be
utilized to dismember the State or to create a state within
our State and hand it over to the MILF rebels.
In dealing with the MILF rebellion, the President may,
however, opt not to use force but negotiate peace with
the MILF. Undoubtedly, the President as Chief Executive
can negotiate peace with rebels, like the MILF. Article
VII, section 1 of the Constitution vests in the President
the entire panoply of executive power, to reach peace
with rebels. But undoubtedly too, the exercise of
executive power to secure peace with rebels is limited by
the Constitution.
All these are due to the preeminent principle that our
government is fundamentally one of limited and
enumerated powers. As well stated in Angara v.
Electoral Commission,44 viz:
But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with
deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the
executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of
the government. The overlapping and interlacing of
functions and duties between the several departments,
however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the
one leaves off and the other begins. In times of social
disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks
of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if
not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial
department is the only constitutional organ which can be
called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers
between the several departments and among the integral
or constituent units thereof.
In fine, there is no power in the Constitution that can run
riot. There is no power in the Constitution that is
unbounded. There is no power in the Constitution that
can be exercised if it will destroy the Constitution. For all
powers in the Constitution are designed to preserve the
Constitution.
In other words, the President as Chief Executive can
negotiate peace with the MILF but it is peace that will
insure that our laws are faithfully executed. The
President can seek peace with the MILF but without
crossing the parameters of powers marked in the
Constitution to separate the other branches of
government to preserve our democracy. For even in
times of war, our system of checks and balances cannot
be infringed.45 More so in times where the only danger
that faces the State is the lesser danger of rebellion.
Needless to stress, the power of the President to
negotiate peace with the MILF is not plenary. While a
considerable degree of flexibility and breadth is accorded
to the peace negotiating panel, the latitude has its limits -
the Constitution. The Constitution was ordained by the
sovereign people and its postulates may not be
employed as bargaining chips without their prior consent.
V. The Constitution as Compact of the People
The question may be asked: In the process of
negotiating peace with the MILF, why cannot the
Executive commit to do acts which are prohibited by the
Constitution and seek their ratification later by its
amendment or revision?
Many philosophical perspectives have been advanced in
reply to this question. Yet, no theory has been as
influential, nor has been as authoritative, as the social In sum, there is no power nor is there any right to violate
contract theory,46 articulated by John Locke, viz: the Constitution on the part of any official of government.
No one can claim he has a blank check to violate the
Constitution in advance and the privilege to cure the
For when any number of men have, by the consent of violation later through amendment of its provisions.
every individual, made a community, they have thereby Respondents' thesis of violate now, validate later makes
made that community one body, with a power to act as a burlesque of the Constitution.
one body, which is only by the will and determination of
the majority: for that which acts any community, being
only the consent of the individuals of it, and it being I vote to grant the petitions.
necessary to that which is one body to move one way; it
is necessary the body should move that way whither the
greater force carries it, which is the consent of the REYNATO S. PUNO
majority: or else it is impossible it should act or continue
one body, one community, which the consent of every Chief Justice
individual that united into it, agreed that it should; and so
every one is bound by that consent to be concluded by
the majority. And therefore we see, that in assemblies,
empowered to act by positive laws, where no number is
set by that positive law which empowers them, the act of
the majority passes for the act of the whole, and of
course determines, as having, by the law of nature and
reason, the power of the whole.47

The French philosopher, Jean Jacques Rosseau

stressed the non-derogability of this social contract, viz:

But the body politic or sovereign, deriving its existence

only from the sanctity of the contract, can never bind
itself, even to others, in anything that derogates from the
original act, such as alienation of some portion of itself,
or submission to another sovereign. To violate the act by
which it exists would be to annihilate itself; and what is
nothing produces nothing.48

Dean Vicente Sinco of the U.P. College of Law

articulated these precepts in his seminal work, Philippine
Political Law, viz:

As adopted in our system of jurisprudence a constitution

is a written instrument which serves as the fundamental
law of the state. In theory, it is the creation of the will of
the people, who are deemed the source of all political
powers. It provides for the organization of the essential
departments of government, determines and limits their
powers, and prescribes guarantees to the basic rights of
the individual.49

xxxx

Some authorities have also considered the constitution

as a compact, an "agreement of the people, in their
individual capacities, reduced to writing, establishing and
fixing certain principles for the government of
themselves." This notion expresses the old theory of the
social contract obligatory on all parties and revocable by
no one individual or group less than the majority of the
people; otherwise it will not have the attribute of law.50
(Emphasis supplied)
Francisco vs. House of
Representatives, G.R. No
160261, November 10, 2003
FACTS: In late 2001 House of Representatives (HOR) of
the 12th Congress adopted its Rules of Procedure in
Impeachment Proceedings. The new rules superseded
impeachment Rules of the 11th Congress. Secs. 16 and 17
of these Rules state that impeachment proceedings are
deemed initiated (1) if House Committee on Justice deems
the complaint sufficient in substance, or (2) if the House
itself affirms or overturns the findings of the House
Committee on Justice on the substance of the complaint, or
(3) by filing or endorsement before the HOR Secretary
General by one-thirds of the members of the House.
A few months later, HoR passed a resolution directing the
Committee on Justice to conduct an investigation, in aid of
legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by Chief Justice Davide of the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF).”
In June 2003, former President Estrada files the first
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide and 7
Associate Justices of SC for “culpable violation of the
Constitution, betrayal of public trust and other high crimes.”
The complaint was referred to the House Committee on
Justice on August 5, 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2)
of Article XI of the Constitution.
On October 13, 2003, the HOR Committee on Justice found
the first impeachment complaint “sufficient in form.”
However, it also voted to dismiss the same on October 22,
2003 for being insufficient in substance. Ten days later, on
October 23,2003, Teodoro and Fuentebella filed a second
impeachment complaint against CJ Davide, founded on the
alleged results of the legislative inquiry on the JDF. The
second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a
“resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at
least one-third of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.
Several petitions were filed with the SC by members of the
bar, members of the House of Representatives, as well as
private individuals, all asserting their rights, among others,
as taxpayers to stop the illegal spending of public funds for
the impeachment proceedings against the Chief
Justice. The petitioners contend that Article XI, Section 3
(5) of the 1987 Constitution bars the filing of the second
impeachment complaint. The constitutional provision states
that “(n)o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within a period of
one year.”
Speaker Jose de Venecia submitted a manifestaiton to the
SC stating that the High Court does not have jurisdiction to
hear the case as it would mean an encroachment on the
power of HoR, a co-equal branch of government.
ISSUES/HELD: 1.) Whether the filing of the second
impeachment complaint violates Sec. 3(5), Article XI of the
Constitution—YES
2) Whether Sec. 16 & 17 of Rule V of the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings approved by the
HoR are unconstitutional – YES
3.) Whether or not the certiorari jurisdiction of the court may
be invoked – YES
RATIO: 1. The second impeachment complaint falls under
the one-year bar under the Constitution.
2. Sec 16 and 17 of House Impeachment Rule V are
unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court employed three principles in deciding
the case:
1) Whenever possible, the words in the Constitution must
be given their ordinary meaning (verbal egis);
2) If there is ambiguity, the Constitution must be interpreted
according to the intent of the framers; and
3) The Constitution must be interpreted as a whole.
Applying these principles, to “initiate” in its ordinary
acceptation means simply to begin. The records of the
debates by the framers affirm this textual interpretation.
From the records of the Constitutional Convention and the
amicus curiae briefs of its two members (Maambong and
Regalado), the term “to initiate” in Sec 3(5), Art. XI of the
Constitution refers to the filing of the impeachment
complaint coupled with taking initial action by Congress on
the complaint.
By contrast, Secs. 16 and 17 state that impeachment
proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if House Committee
on Justice deems the complaint sufficient in substance, or
(2) if the House itself affirms or overturns the findings of the
House Committee on Justice on the substance of the
complaint, or (3) by filing or endorsement before the HOR
Secretary General by one-thirds of the members of the
House.
In this light, Secs. 16 and 17 of the House Rules of
Procedure for Impeachment are unconstitutional because
the rules clearly contravene Sec. 3 (5), Art. XI since the
rules give the term “initiate” a different meaning from filing
and referral.
Hence, the second impeachment complaint by Teodoro and
Fuentebella violates the constitutional one-year ban.
3. The certiorari jurisdiction of the court may be invoked.
The Supreme Court, in exercising its expanded power of
judicial review, only carried out its duty as stated in Section
1, Article VIII, which mandates the judicial department to
look into cases where there has been a grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the different branches of
government. Here, it only reviewed the constitutionality of
the Rules of Impeachment against the one-year ban
explicitly stated in the Constitution. Consequently, the
contention that judicial review over the case would result in
a crisis is unwarranted.
The judiciary, with the Supreme Court at its helm as the
final arbiter, effectively checks on the other departments in
the exercise of its power to determine the law. It must
declare executive and legislative acts void if they violate the
Constitution. The violation of Article XI, Section 3(5) of the
Constitution is thus within the competence of the Court to
decide.
G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,
NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA
MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG
PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND
MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF
THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-
intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY
SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON,
REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO C. TEODORO,
JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM
B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q.
PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160262 November 10, 2003
SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA,
JR. AND HENEDINA RAZON-ABAD, petitioners,
ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL AND PETE
QUIRINO QUADRA, petitioners-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH
THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR
PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G.
TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTA-TIVE FELIX WILLIAM
B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-
intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160263 November 10, 2003
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M.
CAGAMPANG, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioners-in-intervention,
vs.
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
SENATE PRESIDENT, AND JOSE G. DE VENECIA,
JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-
intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160277 November 10, 2003
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, GILBERT TEODORO, JR., FELIX
WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, JULIO LEDESMA IV,
HENRY LANOT, KIM BERNARDO-LOKIN,
MARCELINO LIBANAN, EMMYLOU TALIÑO-SANTOS,
DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWIN GATCHALIAN, LUIS
BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA SOON-RUIZ, ERNESTO
NIEVA, EDGAR ERICE, ISMAEL MATHAY, SAMUEL
DANGWA, ALFREDO MARAÑON, JR., CECILIA
CARREON-JALOSJOS, AGAPITO AQUINO, FAUSTO
SEACHON, JR., GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSE
CARLOS LACSON, MANUEL ORTEGA, ULIRAN
JUAQUIN, SORAYA JAAFAR, WILHELMINO SY-
ALVARADO, CLAUDE BAUTISTA, DEL DE GUZMAN,
ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT, AUGUSTO BACULIO,
FAUSTINO DY III, AUGUSTO SYJUCO, ROZZANO
RUFINO BIAZON, LEOVIGILDO BANAAG, ERIC
SINGSON, JACINTO PARAS, JOSE SOLIS, RENATO
MATUBO, HERMINO TEVES, AMADO ESPINO, JR.,
EMILIO MACIAS, ARTHUR PINGOY, JR., FRANCIS
NEPOMUCENO, CONRADO ESTRELLA III, ELIAS
BULUT, JR., JURDIN ROMUALDO, JUAN PABLO
BONDOC, GENEROSO TULAGAN, PERPETUO
YLAGAN, MICHAEL DUAVIT, JOSEPH DURANO,
JESLI LAPUS, CARLOS COJUANGCO, GIORGIDI
AGGABAO, FRANCIS ESCUDERRO, RENE
VELARDE, CELSO LOBREGAT, ALIPIO BADELLES,
DIDAGEN DILANGALEN, ABRAHAM MITRA, JOSEPH
SANTIAGO, DARLENE ANTONIO-CUSTODIO, ALETA
SUAREZ, RODOLF PLAZA, JV BAUTISTA,
GREGORIO IPONG, GILBERT REMULLA, ROLEX
SUPLICO, CELIA LAYUS, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI,
BENASING MACARAMBON, JR., JOSEFINA JOSON,
MARK COJUANGCO, MAURICIO DOMOGAN,
RONALDO ZAMORA, ANGELO MONTILLA,
ROSELLER BARINAGA, JESNAR FALCON, REYLINA
NICOLAS, RODOLFO ALBANO, JOAQUIN CHIPECO,
JR., AND RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-
intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160292 November 10, 2003
HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ
BUTUYAN, MA. CECILIA PAPA, NAPOLEON C.
REYES, ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR., ALFREDO C.
LIGON, JOAN P. SERRANO AND GARY S.
MALLARI, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND
ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES,respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-
intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160295 November 10, 2003
SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER
RAUL M. GONZALES, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-TATIVES, THROUGH
THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR
PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G.
TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM
B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-
intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160310 November 10, 2003
LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL
DOCTOR, MELVIN MATIBAG, RAMON MIQUIBAS,
RODOLFO MAGSINO, EDUARDO MALASAGA,
EDUARDO SARMIENTO, EDGARDO NAOE,
LEONARDO GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH, EMETERIO
MENDIOLA, MARIO TOREJA, GUILLERMO
CASTASUS, NELSON A. LOYOLA, WILFREDO
BELLO, JR., RONNIE TOQUILLO, KATE ANN VITAL,
ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN, MONICO PABLES, JR.,
JAIME BOAQUINA, LITA A. AQUINO, MILA P.
GABITO, JANETTE ARROYO, RIZALDY EMPIG,
ERNA LAHUZ, HOMER CALIBAG, DR. BING ARCE,
SIMEON ARCE, JR., EL DELLE ARCE, WILLIE
RIVERO, DANTE DIAZ, ALBERTO BUENAVISTA,
FAUSTO BUENAVISTA, EMILY SENERIS, ANNA
CLARISSA LOYOLA, SALVACION LOYOLA, RAINIER
QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH LEANDRO LOYOLA,
ANTONIO LIBREA, FILEMON SIBULO, MANUEL D.
COMIA, JULITO U. SOON, VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND
NOEL ISORENA, MAU RESTRIVERA, MAX
VILLAESTER, AND EDILBERTO GALLOR, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
REPRESENTED BY HON. SPEAKER JOSE C. DE
VENECIA, JR., THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY
HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON,
HON. FELIX FUENTEBELLA, ET AL., respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160318 November 10, 2003
PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T.
REYES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALL
MEMBERS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON.
SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, AND
ALL MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE SENATE, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160342 November 10, 2003
ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY
AS A MEMBER OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES, MANILA III, AND ENGR. MAXIMO N.
MENEZ JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS A TAXPAYER AND
MEMBER OF THE ENGINEERING
PROFESSION, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES
REPRESENTED BY THE 83 HONORABLE MEMBERS
OF THE HOUSE LED BY HON. REPRESENTATIVE
WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160343 November 10, 2003
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, THROUGH
THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR
PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G.
TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM
B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160360 November 10, 2003
CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE
SPEAKER, AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
THROUGH THE SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160365 November 10, 2003
U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC.,
GOERING G.C. PADERANGA, DANILO V. ORTIZ,
GLORIA C. ESTENZO-RAMOS, LIZA D. CORRO, LUIS
V. DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S. RALLON, ROLANDO
P. NONATO, DANTE T. RAMOS, ELSA R.
DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B. CAPARROS-
ARQUILLANO, SYLVA G. AGUIRRE-PADERANGA,
FOR THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF OTHER
CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, SPEAKER
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN
DRILON, HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES FELIX
FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERTO TEODORO, BY
THEMSELVES AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
GROUP OF MORE THAN 80 HOUSE
REPRESENTATIVES WHO SIGNED AND FILED THE
IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST SUPREME
COURT CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE,
JR. respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160370 November 10, 2003
FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE,
THE HONORABLE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160376 November 10, 2003
NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT
TEODORO, IN REPRESENTATION OF THE 86
SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OF
IMPEACHMENT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO
G. DAVIDE, JR. AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER,
HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160392 November 10, 2003
VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L.
HOFILEÑA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH
SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AND THE SENATE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160397 November 10, 2003
IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT
COMPLAINT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G.
DAVIDE, JR., ATTY. DIOSCORO U. VALLEJOS,
JR., petitioner.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160403 November 10, 2003
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH
THE SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, HON.
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE
GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE
FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELA, THE SENATE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT,
HON. FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160405 November 10, 2003
DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP,
CEBU CITY CHAPTER, MANUEL M. MONZON,
PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBU PROVINCE, VICTOR A.
MAAMBONG, PROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBER,
ADELINO B. SITOY, DEAN OF THE COLLEG EOF
LAW, UNIVERSITY OF CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERS
ASSOCAITION OF CEBU, INC. [YLAC],
REPRSEENTED BY ATTY. MANUEL LEGASPI,
CONFEDERATION OF ACCREDITED MEDIATORS OF
THE PHILIPPINES, INC. [CAMP, INC], REPRESENTED
BY RODERIC R. POCA, MANDAUE LAWYERS
ASSOCIATION, [MANLAW], REPRESENTED BY
FELIPE VELASQUEZ, FEDERACION
INTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS [FIDA],
REPRESENTED BY THELMA L. JORDAN, CARLOS
G. CO, PRESIENT OF CEBU CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND CEBU LADY
LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, INC. [CELLA, INC.],
MARIBELLE NAVARRO AND BERNARDITO
FLORIDO, PAST PRESIDENT CEBU CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES, CEBU CHAPTER, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES,
REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AS
HOUSE SPEAKER AND THE SENATE,
REPRESENTED BY SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON,
AS SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a
conflict, no matter how passionate and seemingly
irreconcilable it may appear to be, over the determination
by the independent branches of government of the
nature, scope and extent of their respective constitutional
powers where the Constitution itself provides for the
means and bases for its resolution.
Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the
often frictional, at times turbulent, dynamics of the
relationship among these co-equal branches. This Court
is confronted with one such today involving the
legislature and the judiciary which has drawn legal
luminaries to chart antipodal courses and not a few of
our countrymen to vent cacophonous sentiments
thereon.
There may indeed be some legitimacy to the
characterization that the present controversy subject of
the instant petitions – whether the filing of the second
impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within
the one year bar provided in the Constitution, and
whether the resolution thereof is a political question –
has resulted in a political crisis. Perhaps even more truth
to the view that it was brought upon by a political crisis of
conscience.
In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our
Constitution is sufficient to address all the issues which
this controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally
pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort to
extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is neither
necessary nor legally permissible. Both its resolution and
protection of the public interest lie in adherence to, not
departure from, the Constitution.
In passing over the complex issues arising from the
controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the essential
truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers
among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of
government by no means prescribes for absolute
autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the
governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign
people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and
balances which has been carefully calibrated by the
Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these
three branches must be given effect without destroying
their indispensable co-equality.
Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of
republican government, intended as they are to insure
that governmental power is wielded only for the good of
the people, mandate a relationship of interdependence
and coordination among these branches where the
delicate functions of enacting, interpreting and enforcing
laws are harmonized to achieve a unity of governance,
guided only by what is in the greater interest and well-
being of the people. Verily, salus populi est suprema lex.
Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XI
Accountability of Public Officers
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public
officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and
lead modest lives.
SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President,
the Members of the Supreme Court, the
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and
the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on
impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery,
graft and corruption, other high crimes, or
betrayal of public trust. All other public officers
and employees may be removed from office as
provided by law, but not by impeachment.
SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives
shall have the exclusive power to initiate all
cases of impeachment.
subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment
according to law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the
purpose of this section. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the
Constitution, the 12th Congress of the House of
Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House
Impeachment Rules) on November 28, 2001,
superseding the previous House Impeachment
Rules1 approved by the 11th Congress.
The relevant distinctions between these two
Congresses' House Impeachment Rules are shown in
the following tabulation:
11TH CONGRESS RULES 12TH CONGRE
RULE II RULE V

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be INITIATING IMPEACHMENT BAR AGAINST
filed by any Member of the House of IMPEACHMEN
Representatives or by any citizen upon a Section 2. Mode of Initiating AGAINST THE
resolution of endorsement by any Member Impeachment. – Impeachment shall
thereof, which shall be included in the Order of be initiated only by a verified Section 16. – I
Business within ten session days, and referred to complaint for impeachment filed by Proceedings D
the proper Committee within three session days any Member of the House of In cases where
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by Representatives or by any citizen House files a ve
a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its upon a resolution of endorsement by impeachment o
report to the House within sixty session days any Member thereof or by a verified verified compla
from such referral, together with the complaint or resolution of by a Member o
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be impeachment filed by at least one- a resolution of e
calendared for consideration by the House within third (1/3) of all the Members of the against an impe
ten session days from receipt thereof. House. impeachment p
such official are
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members on the day the C
of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a Justice finds tha
favorable resolution with the Articles of complaint and/o
Impeachment of the Committee, or override its such official, as
contrary resolution. The vote of each Member is sufficient in s
shall be recorded. date the House
or affirm the fin
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of Committee that
impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all complaint and/o
the Members of the House, the same shall case may be, is
constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial substance.
by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
In cases where
(5) No impeachment complaint or a r
proceedings shall be initiated against the same impeachment is
official more than once within a period of one as the case ma
year. one-third (1/3) o
the House, imp
proceedings a
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try
initiated at the
and decide all cases of impeachment. When
of such verifie
sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on
resolution of im
oath or affirmation. When the President of the
the Secretary G
Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote.
No person shall be convicted without the
concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of
the Senate. RULE V Section 17. Ba
Initiation Of Im
BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT Proceedings. –
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not one (1) year fro
extend further than removal from office and impeachment p
disqualification to hold any office under the Section 14. Scope of Bar. – No
impeachment proceedings shall be deemed initiate
Republic of the Philippines, but the party Section 16 here
convicted shall nevertheless be liable and initiated against the same official
impeachment p
 more than once within the period of
such, can be initiated
one (1) year.
same official. (Italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring Integrated
supplied)
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted
a Resolution,2 sponsored by Representative Felix
William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on
Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation,
on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF)."3
On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada
filed an impeachment complaint4 (first impeachment
complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and
seven Associate Justices5 of this Court for "culpable
violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust
and other high crimes."6 The complaint was endorsed by
Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora
and Didagen Piang Dilangalen,7 and was referred to the
House Committee on Justice on August 5, 20038 in
accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution which reads:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for
impeachment may be filed by any Member of the
House of Representatives or by any citizen upon
a resolution of endorsement by any Member
thereof, which shall be included in the Order of
Business within ten session days, and referred to
the proper Committee within three session days
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by
a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
report to the House within sixty session days
from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be
calendared for consideration by the House within
ten session days from receipt thereof.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13,
2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient
in form,"9 but voted to dismiss the same on October 22,
2003 for being insufficient in substance.10 To date, the
Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to
the House in plenary in accordance with the said Section
3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2,
2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day
after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it,
the second impeachment complaint11 was filed with the
Secretary General of the House12 by Representatives
Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix
William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur)
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on
the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by
above-mentioned House Resolution. This second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a
"Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at
least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.13
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of
Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend
that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is
unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5
of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official
more than once within a period of one year."
In G.R.
No. 160261,
against the petitioner Atty. Ernesto B.
Francisco, Jr., alleging
that he has a duty as a member
of the
Bar of the Philippines to use all
available legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional
impeachment, that the issues raised in his petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of
transcendental importance, and that he "himself was a
victim of the capricious and arbitrary changes in the
Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings
introduced by the 12th Congress,"14 posits that his right
to bring an impeachment complaint against then
Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been violated due to
the capricious and arbitrary changes in the House
Impeachment Rules adopted and approved on
November 28, 2001 by the House of Representatives
and prays that (1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule
III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof be declared
unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a writ of mandamus
directing respondents House of Representatives et. al. to
comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the
Constitution, to return the second impeachment
complaint and/or strike it off the records of the House of
Representatives, and to promulgate rules which are
consistent with the Constitution; and (3) this Court
permanently enjoin respondent House of
Representatives from proceeding with the second
impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M.
Candelaria, et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, alleging
that the issues of the case are of transcendental
importance, pray, in their petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ "perpetually"
prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from
filing any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief
Justice with the Senate; and for the issuance of a writ
"perpetually" prohibiting respondents Senate and Senate
President Franklin Drilon from accepting any Articles of
Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event
that the Senate has accepted the same, from proceeding
with the impeachment trial.
In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and
Soledad Cagampang, as citizens, taxpayers, lawyers
and members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
alleging that their petition for Prohibition involves public
interest as it involves the use of public funds necessary
to conduct the impeachment trial on the second
impeachment complaint, pray for the issuance of a writ of
prohibition enjoining Congress from conducting further
proceedings on said second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez,
alleging that this Court has recognized that he has locus
standi to bring petitions of this nature in the cases
of Chavez v. PCGG15 and Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal
Bay Development Corporation,16 prays in his petition for
Injunction that the second impeachment complaint be
declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et.
al., as taxpayers and members of the legal profession,
pray in their petition for Prohibition for an order
prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from
drafting, adopting, approving and transmitting to the
Senate the second impeachment complaint, and
respondents De Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting
the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.
In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives
Salacnib F. Baterina and Deputy Speaker Raul M.
Gonzalez, alleging that, as members of the House of
Representatives, they have a legal interest in ensuring
that only constitutional impeachment proceedings are
initiated, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition
that the second impeachment complaint and any act
proceeding therefrom be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et
al., claiming that they have a right to be protected
against all forms of senseless spending of taxpayers'
money and that they have an obligation to protect the
Supreme Court, the Chief Justice, and the integrity of the
Judiciary, allege in their petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition that it is instituted as "a class suit" and pray
that (1) the House Resolution endorsing the second
impeachment complaint as well as all issuances
emanating therefrom be declared null and void; and (2)
this Court enjoin the Senate and the Senate President
from taking cognizance of, hearing, trying and deciding
the second impeachment complaint, and issue a writ of
prohibition commanding the Senate, its prosecutors and
agents to desist from conducting any proceedings or to
act on the impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center,
Inc., whose members are citizens and taxpayers, and its
co-petitioner Crispin T. Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and a
member of the Philippine Bar, both allege in their
petition, which does not state what its nature is, that the
filing of the second impeachment complaint involves
paramount public interest and pray that Sections 16 and
17 of the House Impeachment Rules and the second
impeachment complaint/Articles of Impeachment be
declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R.
Perito, as a citizen and a member of the Philippine Bar
Association and of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
and petitioner Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr., as a
taxpayer, pray in their petition for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and Permanent Injunction
to enjoin the House of Representatives from proceeding
with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, alleging that it is mandated by the Code of
Professional Responsibility to uphold the Constitution,
prays in its petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that
Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
of Rule III of the House Impeachment Rules be declared
unconstitutional and that the House of Representatives
be permanently enjoined from proceeding with the
second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro
Flores prays in his petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
that the House Impeachment Rules be declared
unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu
Foundation Inc., et. al., in their petition for Prohibition
and Injunction which they claim is a class suit filed in
behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa v. Factoran17 which
was filed in behalf of succeeding generations of Filipinos,
pray for the issuance of a writ prohibiting respondents
House of Representatives and the Senate from
conducting further proceedings on the second
impeachment complaint and that this Court declare as
unconstitutional the second impeachment complaint and
the acts of respondent House of Representatives in
interfering with the fiscal matters of the Judiciary.
In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio
Callangan Aquino, alleging that the issues in his petition
for Prohibition are of national and transcendental
significance and that as an official of the Philippine
Judicial Academy, he has a direct and substantial
interest in the unhampered operation of the Supreme
Court and its officials in discharging their duties in
accordance with the Constitution, prays for the issuance
of a writ prohibiting the House of Representatives from
transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate
and the Senate from receiving the same or giving the
impeachment complaint due course.
In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a
taxpayer, alleges in his petition for Prohibition that
respondents Fuentebella and Teodoro at the time they
filed the second impeachment complaint, were
"absolutely without any legal power to do so, as they
acted without jurisdiction as far as the Articles of
Impeachment assail the alleged abuse of powers of the
Chief Justice to disburse the (JDF)."
In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S.
Flores and Hector L. Hofileña, alleging that as professors
of law they have an abiding interest in the subject matter
of their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as it pertains
to a constitutional issue "which they are trying to
inculcate in the minds of their students," pray that the
House of Representatives be enjoined from endorsing
and the Senate from trying the Articles of Impeachment
and that the second impeachment complaint be declared
null and void.
In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos,
Jr., without alleging his locus standi, but alleging that the
second impeachment complaint is founded on the issue
of whether or not the Judicial Development Fund (JDF)
was spent in accordance with law and that the House of
Representatives does not have exclusive jurisdiction in
the examination and audit thereof, prays in his petition
"To Declare Complaint Null and Void for Lack of Cause
of Action and Jurisdiction" that the second impeachment
complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar
Association, alleging that the issues raised in the filing of
the second impeachment complaint involve matters of
transcendental importance, prays in its petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment
complaint and all proceedings arising therefrom be
declared null and void; (2) respondent House of
Representatives be prohibited from transmitting the
Articles of Impeachment to the Senate; and (3)
respondent Senate be prohibited from accepting the
Articles of Impeachment and from conducting any
proceedings thereon.
In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et.
al., as citizens and taxpayers, pray in their petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment
complaint as well as the resolution of endorsement and
impeachment by the respondent House of
Representatives be declared null and void and (2)
respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin
Drilon be prohibited from accepting any Articles of
Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event
that they have accepted the same, that they be
prohibited from proceeding with the impeachment trial.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261,
160262 and 160263, the first three of the eighteen which
were filed before this Court,18 prayed for the issuance of
a Temporary Restraining Order and/or preliminary
injunction to prevent the House of Representatives from
transmitting the Articles of Impeachment arising from the
second impeachment complaint to the Senate. Petition
bearing docket number G.R. No. 160261 likewise prayed
for the declaration of the November 28, 2001 House
Impeachment Rules as null and void for being
unconstitutional.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277,
160292 and 160295, which were filed on October 28,
2003, sought similar relief. In addition, petition bearing
docket number G.R. No. 160292 alleged that House
Resolution No. 260 (calling for a legislative inquiry into
the administration by the Chief Justice of the JDF)
infringes on the constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers and is a direct violation of the constitutional
principle of fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the
House of Representatives, a motion was put forth that
the second impeachment complaint be formally
transmitted to the Senate, but it was not carried because
the House of Representatives adjourned for lack of
quorum,19 and as reflected above, to date, the Articles of
Impeachment have yet to be forwarded to the Senate.
Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
which were filed on or before October 28, 2003, Justices
Puno and Vitug offered to recuse themselves, but the
Court rejected their offer. Justice Panganiban inhibited
himself, but the Court directed him to participate.
Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this
Court in its Resolution of October 28, 2003, resolved to
(a) consolidate the petitions; (b) require respondent
House of Representatives and the Senate, as well as the
Solicitor General, to comment on the petitions not later
than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; (c) set the petitions
for oral arguments on November 5, 2003, at 10:00 a.m.;
and (d) appointed distinguished legal experts as amici
curiae.20 In addition, this Court called on petitioners and
respondents to maintain the status quo, enjoining all the
parties and others acting for and in their behalf to refrain
from committing acts that would render the petitions
moot.
Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of
Representatives through Speaker Jose C. De Venecia,
Jr. and/or its co-respondents, by way of special
appearance, submitted a Manifestation asserting that
this Court has no jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit
or enjoin the House of Representatives, which is an
independent and co-equal branch of government under
the Constitution, from the performance of its
constitutionally mandated duty to initiate impeachment
cases. On even date, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr.,
in his own behalf, filed a Motion to Intervene (Ex
Abudante Cautela)21 and Comment, praying that "the
consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting the
impeachment proceedings and that the sole power,
authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the
impeachment court to try and decide impeachment
cases, including the one where the Chief Justice is the
respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant to the
provisions of Article XI of the Constitution."22
Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently
filed, this Court resolved to (a) consolidate them with the
earlier consolidated petitions; (b) require respondents to
file their comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of November
3, 2003; and (c) include them for oral arguments on
November 5, 2003.
On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines,
through Senate President Franklin M. Drilon, filed a
Manifestation stating that insofar as it is concerned, the
petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in law
or in fact, adding that as of the time of the filing of the
petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before it
since (1) its constitutional duty to constitute itself as an
impeachment court commences only upon its receipt of
the Articles of Impeachment, which it had not, and (2) the
principal issues raised by the petitions pertain exclusively
to the proceedings in the House of Representatives.
On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a
"Petition for Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261,
160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, and 160295,
questioning the status quo Resolution issued by this
Court on October 28, 2003 on the ground that it would
unnecessarily put Congress and this Court in a
"constitutional deadlock" and praying for the dismissal of
all the petitions as the matter in question is not yet ripe
for judicial determination.
On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal
and Pete Quirino Quadra filed in G.R. No. 160262 a
"Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit the
Herein Incorporated Petition in Intervention."
On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga
Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. filed
a Motion for Intervention in G.R. No. 160261. On
November 5, 2003, World War II Veterans Legionnaires
of the Philippines, Inc. also filed a "Petition-in-
Intervention with Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos.
160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and
160310.
The motions for intervention were granted and both
Senator Pimentel's Comment and Attorneys Macalintal
and Quadra's Petition in Intervention were admitted.
On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of
the amici curiae and the arguments of petitioners,
intervenors Senator Pimentel and Attorney Makalintal,
and Solicitor General Alfredo Benipayo on the principal
issues outlined in an Advisory issued by this Court on
November 3, 2003, to wit:
Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court may be invoked; who can invoke it; on
what issues and at what time; and whether it
should be exercised by this Court at this time.
In discussing these issues, the following may be
taken up:
a) locus standi of petitioners;
b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);
c) political question/justiciability;
d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all
cases of impeachment;
e) Senate's "sole" power to try and
decide all cases of impeachment;
f) constitutionality of the House Rules on
Impeachment vis-a-vis Section 3(5) of
Article XI of the Constitution; and
g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)
In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and
substantive issues arising from the instant petitions as
well as the myriad arguments and opinions presented for
and against the grant of the reliefs prayed for, this Court
has sifted and determined them to be as follows: (1) the
threshold and novel issue of whether or not the power of
judicial review extends to those arising from
impeachment proceedings; (2) whether or not the
essential pre-requisites for the exercise of the power of
judicial review have been fulfilled; and (3) the substantive
issues yet remaining. These matters shall now be
discussed in seriatim.
Judicial Review
As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to
exercise the power of judicial review to determine the
validity of the second impeachment complaint.
This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the
judicial branch of the government in Section 1, Article
VIII of our present 1987 Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in
one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts
of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the government. (Emphasis supplied)
Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively
expounded upon by Justice Jose P. Laurel in the
definitive 1936 case of Angara v. Electoral
Commission23 after the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution whose provisions, unlike the present
Constitution, did not contain the present provision in
Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power
includes. Thus, Justice Laurel discoursed:
x x x In times of social disquietude or political
excitement, the great landmarks of the
Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if
not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the
judicial department is the only constitutional
organ which can be called upon to determine
the proper allocation of powers between the
several departments and among the integral
or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of
course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as
much as it was within the power of our people,
acting through their delegates to so provide, that
instrument which is the expression of their
sovereignty however limited, has established a
republican government intended to operate and
function as a harmonious whole, under a system
of checks and balances, and subject to specific
limitations and restrictions provided in the said
instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no
uncertain language the restrictions and
limitations upon governmental powers and
agencies. If these restrictions and limitations
are transcended it would be inconceivable if
the Constitution had not provided for a
mechanism by which to direct the course of
government along constitutional channels,for
then the distribution of powers would be mere
verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of
sentiment, and the principles of good
government mere political apothegms. Certainly,
the limitations and restrictions embodied in our
Constitution are real as they should be in any
living constitution. In the United States where no
express constitutional grant is found in their
constitution, the possession of this moderating
power of the courts, not to speak of its historical
origin and development there, has been set at
rest by popular acquiescence for a period of
more than one and a half centuries. In our case,
this moderating power is granted, if not
expressly, by clear implication from section 2
of article VIII of our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of
government. Who is to determine the nature,
scope and extent of such powers? The
Constitution itself has provided for the
instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational
way. And when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not
assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or
invalidate an act of the legislature, but only
asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority
under the Constitution and to establish for
the parties in an actual controversy the rights
which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is
involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy"
which properly is the power of judicial review
under the Constitution. Even then, this power
of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full
opportunity of argument by the parties, and
limited further to the constitutional question
raised or the very lis mota presented. Any
attempt at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions and to
sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the
judiciary does not pass upon questions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.
More than that, courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not
only because the legislature is presumed to
abide by the Constitution but also because the
judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice
of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of the government.24 (Italics in the
original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power"
to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the
different branches of government and "to direct the
course of government along constitutional channels" is
inherent in all courts25 as a necessary consequence of
the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable."26
Thus, even in the United States where the power of
judicial review is not explicitly conferred upon the courts
by its Constitution, such power has "been set at rest by
popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and
a half centuries." To be sure, it was in the 1803 leading
case of Marbury v. Madison27 that the power of judicial
review was first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall, to
wit:
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation,
that in declaring what shall be the supreme law
of the land, the constitution itself is first
mentioned; and not the laws of the United States
generally, but those only which shall be made in
pursuance of the constitution, have that rank.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the
constitution of the United States confirms and
strengthens the principle, supposed to be
essential to all written constitutions, that a
law repugnant to the constitution is void; and
that courts, as well as other departments, are
bound by that instrument.28(Italics in the
original; emphasis supplied)
In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before
its express grant in the 1935 Constitution, the power of
judicial review was exercised by our courts to invalidate
constitutionally infirm acts.29 And as pointed out by noted
political law professor and former Supreme Court Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza,30 the executive and legislative
branches of our government in fact effectively
acknowledged this power of judicial review in Article 7 of
the Civil Code, to wit:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent
ones, and their violation or non-observance shall
not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice
to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be
inconsistent with the Constitution, the former
shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and
regulations shall be valid only when they are
not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial
review is indeed an integral component of the delicate
system of checks and balances which, together with the
corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the
bedrock of our republican form of government and
insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the
benefit of the people for which it serves.
The separation of powers is a fundamental
principle in our system of government. It
obtains not through express provision but by
actual division in our Constitution. Each
department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and
is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not
follow from the fact that the three powers are to
be kept separate and distinct that the
Constitution intended them to be absolutely
unrestrained and independent of each other. The
Constitution has provided for an elaborate
system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government. x x x And the
judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as
the final arbiter, effectively checks the other
departments in the exercise of its power to
determine the law, and hence to declare
executive and legislative acts void if violative
of the Constitution.32 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court
Justice Florentino Feliciano, "x x x judicial review is
essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the
separation of powers and the balancing of powers
among the three great departments of government
through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries
of authority and control between them."33 To him,
"[j]udicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of
participation – or instrument of intervention – of the
judiciary in that balancing operation."34
To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to
curb grave abuse of discretion by "any branch or
instrumentalities of government," the afore-quoted
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution engraves, for
the first time into its history, into block letter law the so-
called "expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this Court, the
nature of and rationale for which are mirrored in the
following excerpt from the sponsorship speech of its
proponent, former Chief Justice Constitutional
Commissioner Roberto Concepcion:
xxx
The first section starts with a sentence copied from
former Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional
law. I will read it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is
actually a product of our experience during
martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some
antecedents in the past, but the role of the
judiciary during the deposed regime was
marred considerably by the circumstance that
in a number of cases against the government,
which then had no legal defense at all, the
solicitor general set up the defense of
political questions and got away with it. As a
consequence, certain principles concerning
particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the
authority of courts to order the release of political
detainees, and other matters related to the
operation and effect of martial law failed because
the government set up the defense of political
question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well,
since it is political, we have no authority to pass
upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels
that this was not a proper solution of the
questions involved. It did not merely request
an encroachment upon the rights of the
people, but it, in effect, encouraged further
violations thereof during the martial law
regime. x x x
xxx
 Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the
limits of power of the agencies and offices of
the government as well as those of its
officers. In other words, the judiciary is the
final arbiter on the question whether or not a
branch of government or any of its officials
has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to
constitute an abuse of discretion amounting
to excess of jurisdiction or lack of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power
but a duty to pass judgment on matters of
this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section
1, which means that the courts cannot
hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of
this nature, by claiming that such matters
constitute a political question.35 (Italics in the
original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To determine the merits of the issues raised in the
instant petitions, this Court must necessarily turn to the
Constitution itself which employs the well-settled
principles of constitutional construction.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words
used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed.
Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure
Administration,36 this Court, speaking through Chief
Justice Enrique Fernando, declared:
We look to the language of the document
itself in our search for its meaning. We do not
of course stop there, but that is where we
begin. It is to be assumed that the words in
which constitutional provisions are couched
express the objective sought to be attained.
They are to be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are
employed in which case the significance thus
attached to them prevails. As the Constitution
is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being
essential for the rule of law to obtain that it
should ever be present in the people's
consciousness, its language as much as possible
should be understood in the sense they have in
common use. What it says according to the
text of the provision to be construed compels
acceptance and negates the power of the courts
to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers
and the people mean what they say. Thus these
are the cases where the need for construction is
reduced to a minimum.37 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima.
The words of the Constitution should be interpreted in
accordance with the intent of its framers. And so did this
Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary38 in this wise:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction
is the intention underlying the provision under
consideration. Thus, it has been held that the
Court in construing a Constitution should bear in
mind the object sought to be accomplished by its
adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be
prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will
be examined in the light of the history of the
times, and the condition and circumstances
under which the Constitution was framed. The
object is to ascertain the reason which
induced the framers of the Constitution to
enact the particular provision and the
purpose sought to be accomplished
thereby, in order to construe the whole as to
make the words consonant to that reason and
calculated to effect that purpose.39 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal
Revenue40 where, speaking through Madame Justice
Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it declared:
x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in
keeping with the fundamental principle of
constitutional construction that the intent of
the framers of the organic law and of the
people adopting it should be given effect. The
primary task in constitutional construction is to
ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of
the purpose of the framers and of the people in
the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be
safely assumed that the people in ratifying
the Constitution were guided mainly by the
explanation offered by the
framers.41 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is
to be interpreted as a whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De
Leon,42 this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel Moran
declared:
x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional
Convention could not have dedicated a
provision of our Constitution merely for the
benefit of one person without considering
that it could also affect others.When they
adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not
willed, that said provision should function to
the full extent of its substance and its terms,
not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all
other provisions of that great
document.43 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary,44 this Court affirmed that:
It is a well-established rule in constitutional
construction that no one provision of the
Constitution is to be separated from all the
others, to be considered alone, but that all the
provisions bearing upon a particular subject
are to be brought into view and to be so
interpreted as to effectuate the great
purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing
on a particular subject should be considered
and interpreted together as to effectuate the
whole purpose of the Constitution and one
section is not to be allowed to defeat another,
if by any reasonable construction, the two
can be made to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if
practicable, and must lean in favor of a
construction which will render every word
operative, rather than one which may make the
words idle and nugatory.45 (Emphasis supplied)
If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to
be clear, resort to other aids is available. In still the same
case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this
Court expounded:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to
consult the debates and proceedings of the
constitutional convention in order to arrive at the
reason and purpose of the resulting
Constitution, resort thereto may be had only
when other guides fail as said proceedings
are powerless to vary the terms of the
Constitution when the meaning is clear.
Debates in the constitutional convention "are of
value as showing the views of the individual
members, and as indicating the reasons for their
votes, but they give us no light as to the views of
the large majority who did not talk, much less of
the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at
the polls gave that instrument the force of
fundamental law. We think it safer to construe
the constitution from what appears upon its
face." The proper interpretation therefore
depends more on how it was understood by
the people adopting it than in the framers's
understanding thereof.46 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of
constitutional refinement and jurisprudential application
of the power of judicial review that respondents Speaker
De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel raise
the novel argument that the Constitution has excluded
impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial
review.
Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker
De Venecia et. al. that impeachment is a political action
which cannot assume a judicial character. Hence, any
question, issue or incident arising at any stage of the
impeachment proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial
review.47
For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that
the Senate's "sole power to try" impeachment cases48 (1)
entirely excludes the application of judicial review over it;
and (2) necessarily includes the Senate's power to
determine constitutional questions relative to
impeachment proceedings.49
In furthering their arguments on the proposition that
impeachment proceedings are outside the scope of
judicial review, respondents Speaker De Venecia, et.
al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel rely heavily on
American authorities, principally the majority opinion in
the case of Nixon v. United States.50 Thus, they contend
that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment
proceedings is inappropriate since it runs counter to the
framers' decision to allocate to different fora the powers
to try impeachments and to try crimes; it disturbs the
system of checks and balances, under which
impeachment is the only legislative check on the
judiciary; and it would create a lack of finality and
difficulty in fashioning relief.51 Respondents likewise point
to deliberations on the US Constitution to show the intent
to isolate judicial power of review in cases of
impeachment.
Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American
jurisprudence, the American Constitution and American
authorities cannot be credited to support the proposition
that the Senate's "sole power to try and decide
impeachment cases," as provided for under Art. XI, Sec.
3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to
impeachment to the legislature, to the total exclusion of
the power of judicial review to check and restrain any
grave abuse of the impeachment process. Nor can it
reasonably support the interpretation that it necessarily
confers upon the Senate the inherently judicial power to
determine constitutional questions incident to
impeachment proceedings.
Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less
the American Constitution, are of dubious application for
these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and
have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine
constitutional law is concerned. As held in the case
of Garcia vs. COMELEC,52 "[i]n resolving constitutional
disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign
jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable
because they have been dictated by different
constitutional settings and needs."53 Indeed, although the
Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the
United States, their paths of development have long
since diverged. In the colorful words of Father Bernas,
"[w]e have cut the umbilical cord."
The major difference between the judicial power of the
Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme
Court is that while the power of judicial review is
only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is
discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine
Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided
for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also
a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to
include the power to correct any grave abuse of
discretion on the part of any government branch or
instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S.
Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with respect
to the power of the House of Representatives over
impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution
bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of
Representatives without limitation,54 our Constitution,
though vesting in the House of Representatives the
exclusive power to initiate impeachment
cases,55 provides for several limitations to the exercise of
such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5),
Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner
of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar
on the impeachment of one and the same official.
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of
impeachments undermines their finality and may also
lead to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary.
Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise judicial
statesmanship on the principle that "whenever possible,
the Court should defer to the judgment of the people
expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of
judicial willfulness and pride."56
But did not the people also express their will when they
instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the
Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did not
intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole
discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain
well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v.
Carr,57"judicially discoverable standards" for determining
the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the
power of judicial review.
The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez58 and Alejandrino v.
Quezon,59 cited by respondents in support of the
argument that the impeachment power is beyond the
scope of judicial review, are not in point. These cases
concern the denial of petitions for writs of mandamus to
compel the legislature to perform non-ministerial acts,
and do not concern the exercise of the power of judicial
review.
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court
exercised the power of judicial review over congressional
action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.,60 this Court
ruled that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the
Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials
committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse
of discretion in the exercise of their functions and
prerogatives. In Tanada v. Angara,61 in seeking to nullify
an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it
contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition
raises a justiciable controversy and that when an action
of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right
but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.
In Bondoc v. Pineda,62 this Court declared null and void a
resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing
the nomination, and rescinding the election, of a
congressman as a member of the House Electoral
Tribunal for being violative of Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra,63 it held that the
resolution of whether the House representation in the
Commission on Appointments was based on proportional
representation of the political parties as provided in
Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to
judicial review. In Daza v. Singson,64 it held that the act
of the House of Representatives in removing the
petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is
subject to judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,65 it held
that although under the Constitution, the legislative
power is vested exclusively in Congress, this does not
detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the
constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v.
Electoral Commission,66 it ruled that confirmation by the
National Assembly of the election of any member,
irrespective of whether his election is contested, is not
essential before such member-elect may discharge the
duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the
National Assembly.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the
contention that the exercise of judicial review over
impeachment proceedings would upset the system of
checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be
interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be
allowed to defeat another."67 Both are integral
components of the calibrated system of independence
and interdependence that insures that no branch of
government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the
Constitution.
Essential Requisites for Judicial Review
As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the
courts' power of judicial review, like almost all powers
conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several
limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy
calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person
challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge;
he must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct
injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be
the very lis mota of the case.
x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is
limited to actual cases and controversies to be
exercised after full opportunity of argument by
the parties, and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis
mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could
only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions
and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the
judiciary does not pass upon questions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation.
More than that, courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not
only because the legislature is presumed to
abide by the Constitution but also because the
judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice
of the people as expressed through their
representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of the government.68 (Italics in the
original)
Standing
Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the governmental act that is being challenged.
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party
alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.69
Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the
petitions, contends that petitioners do not have standing
since only the Chief Justice has sustained and will
sustain direct personal injury. Amicus curiae former
Justice Minister and Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza
similarly contends.
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that
petitioners have standing since this Court had, in the
past, accorded standing to taxpayers, voters, concerned
citizens, legislators in cases involving paramount public
interest70 and transcendental importance,71 and that
procedural matters are subordinate to the need to
determine whether or not the other branches of the
government have kept themselves within the limits of the
Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused
the discretion given to them.72 Amicus curiae Dean Raul
Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law is of the same
opinion, citing transcendental importance and the well-
entrenched rule exception that, when the real party in
interest is unable to vindicate his rights by seeking the
same remedies, as in the case of the Chief Justice who,
for ethical reasons, cannot himself invoke the jurisdiction
of this Court, the courts will grant petitioners standing.
There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-
party-in-interest and the rule on standing, for the former
is a concept of civil procedure73 while the latter has
constitutional underpinnings.74 In view of the arguments
set forth regarding standing, it behooves the Court to
reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato75 to
clarify what is meant by locus standi and to distinguish it
from real party-in-interest.
The difference between the rule on standing and
real party in interest has been noted by
authorities thus: "It is important to note . . . that
standing because of its constitutional and public
policy underpinnings, is very different from
questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff
is the real party in interest or has capacity to sue.
Although all three requirements are directed
 towards ensuring that only certain parties can
maintain an action, standing restrictions require a
partial consideration of the merits, as well as
broader policy concerns relating to the proper
role of the judiciary in certain areas.
Standing is a special concern in constitutional
law because in some cases suits are brought not
by parties who have been personally injured by
the operation of a law or by official action taken,
but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters
who actually sue in the public interest. Hence the
question in standing is whether such parties have
"alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions."
xxx
On the other hand, the question as to "real party
in interest" is whether he is "the party who would
be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the
'party entitled to the avails of the
suit.'"76 (Citations omitted)
While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been
injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House
of Representatives, none of the petitioners before us
asserts a violation of the personal rights of the Chief
Justice. On the contrary, they invariably invoke the
vindication of their own rights – as taxpayers; members
of Congress; citizens, individually or in a class suit; and
members of the bar and of the legal profession – which
were supposedly violated by the alleged unconstitutional
acts of the House of Representatives.
In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens,
taxpayers and legislators when specific requirements
have been met have been given standing by this Court.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner
assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct
and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the
law or any government act is invalid, but also that he
sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some
direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not
merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It
must appear that the person complaining has been or is
about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is
lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to
some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act
complained of.77 In fine, when the proceeding involves
the assertion of a public right,78 the mere fact that he is a
citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where
there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed,
or that public money is being deflected to any improper
purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds
through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional
law.79 Before he can invoke the power of judicial review,
however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money
raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct
injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned
statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely
a general interest common to all members of the public.80
At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to
whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be
entertained.81 This Court opts to grant standing to most
of the petitioners, given their allegation that any
impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of
Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice
will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the
validity of any official action which he claims infringes his
prerogatives as a legislator.82 Indeed, a member of the
House of Representatives has standing to maintain
inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested
by the Constitution in his office.83
While an association has legal personality to represent
its members,84 especially when it is composed of
substantial taxpayers and the outcome will affect their
vital interests,85 the mere invocation by the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal
profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and
nothing more, although undoubtedly true, does not
suffice to clothe it with standing. Its interest is too
general. It is shared by other groups and the whole
citizenry. However, a reading of the petitions shows that
it has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the
attention of this Court in view of their seriousness,
novelty and weight as precedents.86 It, therefore,
behooves this Court to relax the rules on standing and to
resolve the issues presented by it.
In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in
behalf of all citizens, persons intervening must be
sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests of all
concerned87 to enable the court to deal properly with all
interests involved in the suit,88 for a judgment in a class
suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, is,
under the res judicata principle, binding on all members
of the class whether or not they were before the
court.89 Where it clearly appears that not all interests can
be sufficiently represented as shown by the divergent
issues raised in the numerous petitions before this Court,
G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit ought to fail. Since
petitioners additionallyallege standing as citizens and
taxpayers, however, their petition will stand.
The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403,
invokes the sole ground of transcendental importance,
while Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in G.R. No. 160397, is
mum on his standing.
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental
importance, the following instructive determinants
formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino
P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds
or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of
a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory
prohibition by the public respondent agency or
instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any
other party with a more direct and specific interest in
raising the questions being raised.90 Applying these
determinants, this Court is satisfied that the issues raised
herein are indeed of transcendental importance.
In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a
liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where
the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental
significance to the people, as when the issues raised are
of paramount importance to the public.91 Such liberality
does not, however, mean that the requirement that a
party should have an interest in the matter is totally
eliminated. A party must, at the very least, still plead the
existence of such interest, it not being one of which
courts can take judicial notice. In petitioner Vallejos'
case, he failed to allege any interest in the case. He
does not thus have standing.
With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19,
Section 2 of the Rules of Court requires an intervenor to
possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in
the success of either of the parties, or an interest against
both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a
distribution or other disposition of property in the custody
of the court or of an officer thereof. While intervention is
not a matter of right, it may be permitted by the courts
when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the
requirements of the law authorizing intervention.92
In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete
Quirino Quadra's case, they seek to join petitioners
Candelaria, et. al. in G.R. No. 160262. Since, save for
one additional issue, they raise the same issues and the
same standing, and no objection on the part of
petitioners Candelaria, et. al. has been interposed, this
Court as earlier stated, granted the Motion for Leave of
Court to Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga
Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et. al. sought to join
petitioner Francisco in G.R. No. 160261. Invoking their
right as citizens to intervene, alleging that "they will suffer
if this insidious scheme of the minority members of the
House of Representatives is successful," this Court
found the requisites for intervention had been complied
with.
Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R.
Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292,
160295, and 160310 were of transcendental importance,
World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines,
Inc. filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to
Intervene" to raise the additional issue of whether or not
the second impeachment complaint against the Chief
Justice is valid and based on any of the grounds
prescribed by the Constitution.
Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng
mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al. and World War
II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. possess
a legal interest in the matter in litigation the respective
motions to intervene were hereby granted.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to
intervene for the limited purpose of making of record and
arguing a point of view that differs with Senate President
Drilon's. He alleges that submitting to this Court's
jurisdiction as the Senate President does will undermine
the independence of the Senate which will sit as an
impeachment court once the Articles of Impeachment
are transmitted to it from the House of Representatives.
Clearly, Senator Pimentel possesses a legal interest in
the matter in litigation, he being a member of Congress
against which the herein petitions are directed. For this
reason, and to fully ventilate all substantial issues
relating to the matter at hand, his Motion to Intervene
was granted and he was, as earlier stated, allowed to
argue.
Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the
same must be denied for, while he asserts an interest as
a taxpayer, he failed to meet the standing requirement
for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v.
Comelec,93 to wit:
x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held
involve the expenditure of public moneys,
nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners
allege that their tax money is "being extracted
and spent in violation of specific constitutional
protection against abuses of legislative power,"
or that there is a misapplication of such funds by
respondent COMELEC, or that public money is
being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither
do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from
wasting public funds through the enforcement of
an invalid or unconstitutional law.94 (Citations
omitted)
In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano
failed even to allege that the act of petitioners will result
in illegal disbursement of public funds or in public money
being deflected to any improper purpose. Additionally,
his mere interest as a member of the Bar does not
suffice to clothe him with standing.
Ripeness and Prematurity
In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice
Fernando, held that for a case to be considered ripe for
adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that something had by
then been accomplished or performed by either branch
before a court may come into the picture."96 Only then
may the courts pass on the validity of what was done, if
and when the latter is challenged in an appropriate legal
proceeding.
The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the
validity of the filing of the second impeachment complaint
against the Chief Justice in accordance with the House
Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, the
constitutionality of which is questioned. The questioned
acts having been carried out, i.e., the second
impeachment complaint had been filed with the House of
Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been
already promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that
the alleged unconstitutional act should be accomplished
and performed before suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds,
has been complied with.
Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of
whether the instant petitions are premature. Amicus
curiae former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga opines
that there may be no urgent need for this Court to render
a decision at this time, it being the final arbiter on
questions of constitutionality anyway. He thus
recommends that all remedies in the House and Senate
should first be exhausted.
Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the
U.P. College of Law who suggests to this Court to take
judicial notice of on-going attempts to encourage
signatories to the second impeachment complaint to
withdraw their signatures and opines that the House
Impeachment Rules provide for an opportunity for
members to raise constitutional questions themselves
when the Articles of Impeachment are presented on a
motion to transmit to the same to the Senate. The dean
maintains that even assuming that the Articles are
transmitted to the Senate, the Chief Justice can raise the
issue of their constitutional infirmity by way of a motion to
dismiss.
The dean's position does not persuade. First, the
withdrawal by the Representatives of their signatures
would not, by itself, cure the House Impeachment Rules
of their constitutional infirmity. Neither would such a
withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the questioned second
impeachment complaint since it would only place it under
the ambit of Sections 3(2) and (3) of Article XI of the
Constitution97 and, therefore, petitioners would continue
to suffer their injuries.
Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking
remedies from either or both Houses of Congress before
coming to this Court is shown by the fact that, as
previously discussed, neither the House of
Representatives nor the Senate is clothed with the power
to rule with definitiveness on the issue of
constitutionality, whether concerning impeachment
proceedings or otherwise, as said power is exclusively
vested in the judiciary by the earlier quoted Section I,
Article VIII of the Constitution. Remedy cannot be sought
from a body which is bereft of power to grant it.
Justiciability
In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion defined the term "political
question," viz:
[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal
parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance,
namely, a question of policy. In other words, in
the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers
to "those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislature or executive branch of the
Government." It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure.99(Italics in the original)
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and
seemingly without any rhyme or reason, this Court
vacillated on its stance of taking cognizance of cases
which involved political questions. In some cases, this
Court hid behind the cover of the political question
doctrine and refused to exercise its power of judicial
review.100 In other cases, however, despite the seeming
political nature of the therein issues involved, this Court
assumed jurisdiction whenever it found constitutionally
imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies.101 Even in the landmark 1988 case
of Javellana v. Executive Secretary102 which raised the
issue of whether the 1973 Constitution was ratified,
hence, in force, this Court shunted the political question
doctrine and took cognizance thereof. Ratification by the
people of a Constitution is a political question, it being a
question decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity.
The frequency with which this Court invoked the political
question doctrine to refuse to take jurisdiction over
certain cases during the Marcos regime motivated Chief
Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional
Commissioner, to clarify this Court's power of judicial
review and its application on issues involving political
questions, viz:
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding
Officer.
I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has
made, I suppose, the usual comment that the judiciary is
the weakest among the three major branches of the
service. Since the legislature holds the purse and the
executive the sword, the judiciary has nothing with which
to enforce its decisions or commands except the power
of reason and appeal to conscience which, after all,
reflects the will of God, and is the most powerful of all
other powers without exception. x x x And so, with the
body's indulgence, I will proceed to read the provisions
drafted by the Committee on the Judiciary.
The first section starts with a sentence copied from
former Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional
law. I will read it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is
actually a product of our experience during
martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some
antecedents in the past, but the role of the
judiciary during the deposed regime was
marred considerably by the circumstance that
in a number of cases against the government,
which then had no legal defense at all, the
solicitor general set up the defense of
political questions and got away with it. As a
consequence, certain principles concerning
particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is,
the authority of courts to order the release of
political detainees, and other matters related
to the operation and effect of martial law
failed because the government set up the
defense of political question. And the Supreme
Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have no
authority to pass upon it." The Committee on
the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper
solution of the questions involved. It did not
merely request an encroachment upon the
rights of the people, but it, in effect,
encouraged further violations thereof during
the martial law regime. I am sure the members
of the Bar are familiar with this situation. But for
the benefit of the Members of the Commission
who are not lawyers, allow me to explain. I will
start with a decision of the Supreme Court in
1973 on the case of Javellana vs. the Secretary
of Justice, if I am not mistaken. Martial law was
announced on September 22, although the
proclamation was dated September 21. The
obvious reason for the delay in its publication
was that the administration had apprehended
and detained prominent newsmen on September
21. So that when martial law was announced on
September 22, the media hardly published
anything about it. In fact, the media could not
publish any story not only because our main
writers were already incarcerated, but also
because those who succeeded them in their jobs
were under mortal threat of being the object of
wrath of the ruling party. The 1971 Constitutional
Convention had begun on June 1, 1971 and by
September 21 or 22 had not finished the
Constitution; it had barely agreed in the
fundamentals of the Constitution. I forgot to say
that upon the proclamation of martial law, some
delegates to that 1971 Constitutional Convention,
dozens of them, were picked up. One of them
was our very own colleague, Commissioner
Calderon. So, the unfinished draft of the
Constitution was taken over by representatives of
Malacañang. In 17 days, they finished what the
delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention
had been unable to accomplish for about 14
months. The draft of the 1973 Constitution was
presented to the President around December 1,
1972, whereupon the President issued a decree
calling a plebiscite which suspended the
operation of some provisions in the martial law
decree which prohibited discussions, much less
public discussions of certain matters of public
concern. The purpose was presumably to allow a
free discussion on the draft of the Constitution on
which a plebiscite was to be held sometime in
January 1973. If I may use a word famous by our
colleague, Commissioner Ople, during the
interregnum, however, the draft of the
Constitution was analyzed and criticized with
such a telling effect that Malacañang felt the
danger of its approval. So, the President
suspended indefinitely the holding of the
plebiscite and announced that he would consult
the people in a referendum to be held from
January 10 to January 15. But the questions to
be submitted in the referendum were not
announced until the eve of its scheduled
beginning, under the supposed supervision not of
the Commission on Elections, but of what was
then designated as "citizens assemblies or
barangays." Thus the barangays came into
existence. The questions to be propounded were
released with proposed answers thereto,
suggesting that it was unnecessary to hold a
plebiscite because the answers given in the
referendum should be regarded as the votes cast
in the plebiscite. Thereupon, a motion was filed
with the Supreme Court praying that the holding
of the referendum be suspended. When the
motion was being heard before the Supreme
Court, the Minister of Justice delivered to the
Court a proclamation of the President declaring
that the new Constitution was already in force
because the overwhelming majority of the votes
cast in the referendum favored the Constitution.
Immediately after the departure of the Minister of
Justice, I proceeded to the session room where
the case was being heard. I then informed the
Court and the parties the presidential
proclamation declaring that the 1973 Constitution
had been ratified by the people and is now in
force.
A number of other cases were filed to declare the
presidential proclamation null and void. The main
defense put up by the government was that the
issue was a political question and that the court
had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.
xxx
The government said that in a referendum held
from January 10 to January 15, the vast majority
ratified the draft of the Constitution. Note that all
members of the Supreme Court were residents of
Manila, but none of them had been notified of
any referendum in their respective places of
residence, much less did they participate in the
alleged referendum. None of them saw any
referendum proceeding.
In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like
wild fire. So, a majority of the members of the
Court felt that there had been no referendum.
Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a
plebiscite. There is a big difference between a
referendum and a plebiscite. But another
group of justices upheld the defense that the
issue was a political question. Whereupon,
they dismissed the case. This is not the only
major case in which the plea of "political
question" was set up. There have been a
number of other cases in the past.
x x x The defense of the political question was
rejected because the issue was clearly
justiciable.
xxx
x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary
began to perform its functions, it faced the
following questions: What is judicial power? What
is a political question?
The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one
main function: to settle actual controversies
involving conflicts of rights which are
demandable and enforceable. There are rights
which are guaranteed by law but cannot be
enforced by a judiciary party. In a decided case,
a husband complained that his wife was unwilling
to perform her duties as a wife. The Court said:
"We can tell your wife what her duties as such
are and that she is bound to comply with them,
but we cannot force her physically to discharge
her main marital duty to her husband. There are
some rights guaranteed by law, but they are so
personal that to enforce them by actual
compulsion would be highly derogatory to human
dignity."
This is why the first part of the second paragraph of
Section I provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of courts to
settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable or enforceable . . .
The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much
less decide, hypothetical questions. In a
presidential system of government, the
Supreme Court has, also another important
function. The powers of government are
generally considered divided into three
branches: the Legislative, the Executive and
the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its
own sphere and independent of the others.
Because of that supremacy power to
determine whether a given law is valid or not
is vested in courts of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the
limits of power of the agencies and offices of
the government as well as those of its
officers. In other words, the judiciary is the
final arbiter on the question whether or not a
branch of government or any of its officials
has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to
constitute an abuse of discretion amounting
to excess of jurisdiction or lack of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power
 but a duty to pass judgment on matters of
this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of
Section 1, which means that the courts
cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle
matters of this nature, by claiming that such
matters constitute a political question.
I have made these extended remarks to the end
that the Commissioners may have an initial food
for thought on the subject of the
judiciary.103 (Italics in the original; emphasis
supplied)
During the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission, Chief Justice Concepcion further clarified
the concept of judicial power, thus:
MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term
"judicial power" but judicial power is not
vested in the Supreme Court alone but also in
other lower courts as may be created by law.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an
example?
MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The
Gentleman seems to identify political
questions with jurisdictional questions. But
there is a difference.
MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression
"judicial power"?
MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I
said, refers to ordinary cases but where there
is a question as to whether the government
had authority or had abused its authority to
the extent of lacking jurisdiction or excess of
jurisdiction, that is not a political question.
Therefore, the court has the duty to decide.
xxx
FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always
have to be decided by the Supreme Court
according to the new numerical need for votes.
On another point, is it the intention of Section
1 to do away with the political question
doctrine?
MR. CONCEPCION. No.
FR. BERNAS. It is not.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever
there is an abuse of discretion, amounting to
a lack of jurisdiction. . .
FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the
answer that it is not intended to do away with
the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.
When this provision was originally drafted, it
sought to define what is judicial power. But
the Gentleman will notice it says, "judicial
power includes" and the reason being that
the definition that we might make may not
cover all possible areas.
FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to
solve the problems arising from the political
question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not
eliminate the fact that truly political questions
are beyond the pale of judicial
power.104 (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial
power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which
cannot be abdicated by the mere specter of this creature
called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice
Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1,
Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly
political questions." From this clarification it is gathered
that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly
political questions" and (2) those which "are not truly
political questions."
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review,
the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of
powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can
review questions which are not truly political in nature.
As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico
Agabin of the UP College of Law, this Court has in fact in
a number of cases taken jurisdiction over questions
which are not truly political following the effectivity of the
present Constitution.
In Marcos v. Manglapus,105 this Court, speaking through
Madame Justice Irene Cortes, held:
The present Constitution limits resort to the
political question doctrine and broadens the
scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the
Court, under previous constitutions, would have
normally left to the political departments to
decide.106 x x x
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,107 through
Justice Teodoro Padilla, this Court declared:
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a
task that this Court must perform under the
Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent
case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither
interposes an obstacle to judicial
determination of the rival claims. The
jurisdiction to delimit constitutional
boundaries has been given to this Court. It
cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by
the 1987 Constitution, although said
provision by no means does away with the
applicability of the principle in appropriate
cases."108 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
And in Daza v. Singson,109 speaking through Justice
Isagani Cruz, this Court ruled:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional
objection becomes even less tenable and
decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to
assume that the issue presented before us was
 political in nature, we would still not be precluded
from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction
conferred upon us that now covers, in proper
cases, even the political question.110 x x x
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what
are justiciable political questions and non-justiciable
political questions, however. Identification of these two
species of political questions may be problematic. There
has been no clear standard. The American case of Baker
v. Carr111 attempts to provide some:
x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held
to involve a political question is found a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; or
a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of
a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or
the impossibility of a court's undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of
the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for questioning
adherence to a political decision already made;
or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.112(Underscoring
supplied)
Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first
three: (1) a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; (2) the lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; and (3) the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion.
These standards are not separate and distinct concepts
but are interrelated to each in that the presence of one
strengthens the conclusion that the others are also
present.
The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that
the American concept of judicial review is radically
different from our current concept, for Section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution provides our courts with far less
discretion in determining whether they should pass upon
a constitutional issue.
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political
question from a non-justiciable political question lies in
the answer to the question of whether there are
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our
courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or
instrumentality of the government properly acted within
such limits. This Court shall thus now apply this standard
to the present controversy.
These petitions raise five substantial issues:
I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second
impeachment complaint constitute valid
impeachable offenses under the Constitution.
II. Whether the second impeachment complaint
was filed in accordance with Section 3(4), Article
XI of the Constitution.
III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House
Committee on Justice into the Judicial
Development Fund is an unconstitutional
infringement of the constitutionally mandated
fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the
Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th
Congress are unconstitutional for violating the
provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution.
V. Whether the second impeachment complaint
is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution.
The first issue goes into the merits of the second
impeachment complaint over which this Court
has no jurisdiction. More importantly, any
discussion of this issue would require this Court
to make a determination of what constitutes an
impeachable offense. Such a determination is a
purely political question which the Constitution
has left to the sound discretion of the legislation.
Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission.113
Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution
enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of these,
namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust,
elude a precise definition. In fact, an examination of the
records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows
that the framers could find no better way to approximate
the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high
crimes than by alluding to both positive and negative
examples of both, without arriving at their clear cut
definition or even a standard therefor.114 Clearly, the
issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable
political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial
power under Section 1, Article VIII.
Lis Mota
It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue
assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act
should be avoided whenever possible. Thus, in the case
of Sotto v. Commission on Elections,115 this Court held:
x x x It is a well-established rule that a court
should not pass upon a constitutional question
and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid,
unless such question is raised by the parties and
that when it is raised, if the record also
presents some other ground upon which the
court may rest its judgment, that course will
be adopted and the constitutional question
will be left for consideration until a case
arises in which a decision upon such
question will be unavoidable.116 [Emphasis and
underscoring supplied]
The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform,117 where this Court
invalidated Sections 13 and 32 of Republic Act No. 6657
for being confiscatory and violative of due process, to
wit:
It has been established that this Court will
assume jurisdiction over a constitutional
question only if it is shown that the essential
requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a
question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be
an actual case or controversy involving a conflict
of legal rights susceptible of judicial
determination, the constitutional question must
have been opportunely raised by the proper
 party, and the resolution of the question is
unavoidably necessary to the decision of the
case itself.118 [Emphasis supplied]
Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of
constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the
very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while
all seeking the invalidity of the second impeachment
complaint, collectively raise several constitutional issues
upon which the outcome of this controversy could
possibly be made to rest. In determining whether one,
some or all of the remaining substantial issues should be
passed upon, this Court is guided by the related cannon
of adjudication that "the court should not form a rule of
constitutional law broader than is required by the precise
facts to which it is applied."119
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et
al. argue that, among other reasons, the second
impeachment complaint is invalid since it directly
resulted from a Resolution120 calling for a legislative
inquiry into the JDF, which Resolution and legislative
inquiry petitioners claim to likewise be unconstitutional
for being: (a) a violation of the rules and jurisprudence on
investigations in aid of legislation; (b) an open breach of
the doctrine of separation of powers; (c) a violation of the
constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the
judiciary; and (d) an assault on the independence of the
judiciary.121
Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et.
al.'s claims, it is the studied opinion of this Court that the
issue of the constitutionality of the said Resolution and
resulting legislative inquiry is too far removed from the
issue of the validity of the second impeachment
complaint. Moreover, the resolution of said issue would,
in the Court's opinion, require it to form a rule of
constitutional law touching on the separate and distinct
matter of legislative inquiries in general, which would
thus be broader than is required by the facts of these
consolidated cases. This opinion is further strengthened
by the fact that said petitioners have raised other
grounds in support of their petition which would not be
adversely affected by the Court's ruling.
En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the
conduct of legislative inquiries has already been
enunciated by this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue
Ribbon Commttee,122 viz:
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the
power of both houses of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus, Section 21,
Article VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or
any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with
its duly published rules of procedure. The rights
of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected.
The power of both houses of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not,
therefore absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is
circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of
the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the
investigation must be "in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure" and that "the rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall
be respected." It follows then that the right rights
of persons under the Bill of Rights must be
respected, including the right to due process and
the right not be compelled to testify against one's
self.123
In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal
and Pete Quirino Quadra, while joining the original
petition of petitioners Candelaria, et. al., introduce the
new argument that since the second impeachment
complaint was verified and filed only by Representatives
Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella, the
same does not fall under the provisions of Section 3 (4),
Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or
resolution of impeachment is filed by at least
one-third of all the Members of the House, the
same shall constitute the Articles of
Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall
forthwith proceed.
They assert that while at least 81 members of the House
of Representatives signed a Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment, the same did not satisfy the
requisites for the application of the afore-mentioned
section in that the "verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment" was not filed "by at least one-third of all
the Members of the House." With the exception of
Representatives Teodoro and Fuentebella, the
signatories to said Resolution are alleged to have
verified the same merely as a "Resolution of
Endorsement." Intervenors point to the "Verification" of
the Resolution of Endorsement which states that:
"We are the proponents/sponsors of the
Resolution of Endorsement of the
abovementioned Complaint of Representatives
Gilberto Teodoro and Felix William B.
Fuentebella x x x"124
Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that
what the Constitution requires in order for said second
impeachment complaint to automatically become the
Articles of Impeachment and for trial in the Senate to
begin "forthwith," is that the verified complaint be "filed,"
not merely endorsed, by at least one-third of the
Members of the House of Representatives. Not having
complied with this requirement, they concede that the
second impeachment complaint should have been
calendared and referred to the House Committee on
Justice under Section 3(2), Article XI of the
Constitution, viz:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for
impeachment may be filed by any Member of the
House of Representatives or by any citizen upon
a resolution of endorsement by any Member
thereof, which shall be included in the Order of
Business within ten session days, and referred to
the proper Committee within three session days
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by
a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
report to the House within sixty session days
from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be
calendared for consideration by the House within
ten session days from receipt thereof.
Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice
Maambong who opined that for Section 3 (4), Article XI
of the Constitution to apply, there should be 76 or more
representatives who signed and verified the second
impeachment complaint as complainants, signed and
verified the signatories to a resolution of impeachment.
Justice Maambong likewise asserted that the Resolution
of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-
third of the members of the House of Representatives
as endorsers is not the resolution of impeachment
contemplated by the Constitution, such resolution of
endorsement being necessary only from at least one
Member whenever a citizen files a verified impeachment
complaint.
While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors
Macalintal and Quadra, does indeed limit the scope of
the constitutional issues to the provisions on
impeachment, more compelling considerations militate
against its adoption as the lis mota or crux of the present
controversy. Chief among this is the fact
that only Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra, intervenors in
G.R. No. 160262, have raised this issue as a ground for
invalidating the second impeachment complaint. Thus, to
adopt this additional ground as the basis for deciding the
instant consolidated petitions would not only render for
naught the efforts of the original petitioners in G.R. No.
160262, but the efforts presented by the other petitioners
as well.
Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue
as unnecessary for the determination of the instant
cases is made easier by the fact that said intervenors
Macalintal and Quadra have joined in the petition of
Candelaria, et. al., adopting the latter's arguments and
issues as their own. Consequently, they are not unduly
prejudiced by this Court's decision.
In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues,
inextricably linked as they are, constitute the very lis
mota of the instant controversy: (1) whether Sections 15
and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules
adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for
violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the
second impeachment complaint is barred under Section
3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Judicial Restraint
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial
restraint on the ground that the Senate, sitting as an
impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide
all cases of impeachment. Again, this Court reiterates
that the power of judicial review includes the power of
review over justiciable issues in impeachment
proceedings.
On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et.
al. argue that "[t]here is a moral compulsion for the Court
to not assume jurisdiction over the impeachment
because all the Members thereof are subject to
impeachment."125But this argument is very much like
saying the Legislature has a moral compulsion not to
pass laws with penalty clauses because Members of the
House of Representatives are subject to them.
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is
not an option before this Court. Adjudication may not be
declined, because this Court is not legally disqualified.
Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other
tribunal to which the controversy may be
referred."126 Otherwise, this Court would be shirking from
its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the
Constitution. More than being clothed with authority thus,
this Court is duty-bound to take cognizance of the instant
petitions.127 In the august words of amicus curiae Father
Bernas, "jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn
duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it, even
if it is vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty."
Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court
under our system of government cannot inhibit itself and
must rule upon the challenge because no other office
has the authority to do so.128 On the occasion that this
Court had been an interested party to the controversy
before it, it has acted upon the matter "not with
officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty
and, as always, with detachment and fairness."129 After
all, "by [his] appointment to the office, the public has laid
on [a member of the judiciary] their confidence that [he]
is mentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits of their
varied contentions. For this reason, they expect [him] to
be fearless in [his] pursuit to render justice, to be
unafraid to displease any person, interest or power and
to be equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to resist
the temptations lurking in [his] office."130
The duty to exercise the power of adjudication
regardless of interest had already been settled in the
case of Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal.131 In that
case, the petitioners filed with the respondent Senate
Electoral Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or
Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the
hearing and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the
ground that all of them were interested parties to said
case as respondents therein. This would have reduced
the Tribunal's membership to only its three Justices-
Members whose disqualification was not sought, leaving
them to decide the matter. This Court held:
Where, as here, a situation is created which
precludes the substitution of any Senator sitting
in the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in
the Senate without inviting the same objections
to the substitute's competence, the proposed
mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered,
would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to
abandon a duty that no other court or body can
perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if
shorn of the participation of its entire membership
of Senators.
To our mind, this is the overriding consideration
— that the Tribunal be not prevented from
discharging a duty which it alone has the power
to perform, the performance of which is in the
highest public interest as evidenced by its being
expressly imposed by no less than the
fundamental law.
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned
Resolutions that the framers of the Constitution
could not have been unaware of the possibility of
an election contest that would involve all
Senators—elect, six of whom would inevitably
have to sit in judgment thereon. Indeed, such
possibility might surface again in the wake of the
1992 elections when once more, but for the last
time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake.
Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or
mode for settling such unusual situations or for
the substitution of Senators designated to the
Tribunal whose disqualification may be sought.
Litigants in such situations must simply place
their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness
and sense of justice of the Members of the
Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and
collectively.
 Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no
Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in
judgment on any case before said Tribunal.
Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his
conscience dictates, refrain from participating in
the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels
that his personal interests or biases would stand
in the way of an objective and impartial
judgment. What we are merely saying is that in
the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral
Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent
its entire membership of Senators and that no
amendment of its Rules can confer on the three
Justices-Members alone the power of valid
adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,132 it was
held that:
Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of
the Court, particularly a majority of them, is
nothing short of pro tanto depriving the Court
itself of its jurisdiction as established by the
fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a
deprivation of his judicial power. And if that judge
is the one designated by the Constitution to
exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is the
case with the Justices of this Court, the
deprivation of his or their judicial power is
equivalent to the deprivation of the judicial power
of the court itself. It affects the very heart of
judicial independence. The proposed mass
disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would
leave the Court no alternative but to abandon a
duty which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of
the participation of its entire membership of
Justices.133 (Italics in the original)
Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down
by the Court when it exercises its power of judicial
review.
In Demetria v. Alba,134 this Court, through Justice
Marcelo Fernan cited the "seven pillars" of limitations of
the power of judicial review, enunciated by US Supreme
Court Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA135 as
follows:
1. The Court will not pass upon the
constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non-
adversary proceeding, declining because to
decide such questions 'is legitimate only in the
last resort, and as a necessity in the
determination of real, earnest and vital
controversy between individuals. It never was the
thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party
beaten in the legislature could transfer to the
courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the
legislative act.'
2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of
constitutional law in advance of the necessity of
deciding it.' . . . 'It is not the habit of the Court to
decide questions of a constitutional nature unless
absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.'
3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of
constitutional law broader than is required by the
precise facts to which it is to be applied.'
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional
question although properly presented by the
record, if there is also present some other ground
upon which the case may be disposed of. This
rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a
case can be decided on either of two grounds,
one involving a constitutional question, the other
a question of statutory construction or general
law, the Court will decide only the latter. Appeals
from the highest court of a state challenging its
decision of a question under the Federal
Constitution are frequently dismissed because
the judgment can be sustained on an
independent state ground.
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a
statute upon complaint of one who fails to show
that he is injured by its operation. Among the
many applications of this rule, none is more
striking than the denial of the right of challenge to
one who lacks a personal or property right. Thus,
the challenge by a public official interested only
in the performance of his official duty will not be
entertained . . . In Fairchild v. Hughes, the Court
affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a
citizen who sought to have the Nineteenth
Amendment declared unconstitutional.
In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the challenge of the
federal Maternity Act was not entertained
although made by the Commonwealth on behalf
of all its citizens.
6. The Court will not pass upon the
constitutionality of a statute at the instance of
one who has availed himself of its benefits.
7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is
drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of
constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle
that this Court will first ascertain whether a
construction of the statute is fairly possible by
which the question may be avoided (citations
omitted).
The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review,
summarized in Ashwander v. TVA from different
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, can be
encapsulated into the following categories:
1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a
case
2. that rules of constitutional law shall be
formulated only as required by the facts of the
case
3. that judgment may not be sustained on some
other ground
4. that there be actual injury sustained by the
party by reason of the operation of the statute
5. that the parties are not in estoppel
6. that the Court upholds the presumption of
constitutionality.
As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been
adopted by this Court in the exercise of judicial review:
1. actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power
 2. the person challenging the act must have
"standing" to challenge; he must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement
3. the question of constitutionality must be raised
at the earliest possible opportunity
4. the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota of the case.136
Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another
argument for judicial restraint the possibility that "judicial
review of impeachments might also lead to embarrassing
conflicts between the Congress and the [J]udiciary."
They stress the need to avoid the appearance of
impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial hearings,
and the scenario that it would be confusing and
humiliating and risk serious political instability at home
and abroad if the judiciary countermanded the vote of
Congress to remove an impeachable
official.137 Intervenor Soriano echoes this argument by
alleging that failure of this Court to enforce its Resolution
against Congress would result in the diminution of its
judicial authority and erode public confidence and faith in
the judiciary.
Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the
least. As correctly stated by the Solicitor General, the
possibility of the occurrence of a constitutional crisis is
not a reason for this Court to refrain from upholding the
Constitution in all impeachment cases. Justices cannot
abandon their constitutional duties just because their
action may start, if not precipitate, a crisis.
Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this
Court refuses to act.
x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial
legislative or executive act is not regarded as
settled until the Supreme Court has passed upon
the constitutionality of the act involved, the
judgment has not only juridical effects but also
political consequences. Those political
consequences may follow even where the Court
fails to grant the petitioner's prayer to nullify an
act for lack of the necessary number of votes.
Frequently, failure to act explicitly, one way or the
other, itself constitutes a decision for the
respondent and validation, or at least quasi-
validation, follows." 138
Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary139 where this
Court was split and "in the end there were not enough
votes either to grant the petitions, or to sustain
respondent's claims,"140 the pre-existing constitutional
order was disrupted which paved the way for the
establishment of the martial law regime.
Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also
presumes that the coordinate branches of the
government would behave in a lawless manner and not
do their duty under the law to uphold the Constitution
and obey the laws of the land. Yet there is no reason to
believe that any of the branches of government will
behave in a precipitate manner and risk social upheaval,
violence, chaos and anarchy by encouraging disrespect
for the fundamental law of the land.
Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court
is well guided by the doctrine in People v. Veneracion,
to wit:141
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of
our system of justice. If [public officers], under
the guise of religious or political beliefs were
allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries
within which they are required by law to exercise
the duties of their office, then law becomes
meaningless. A government of laws, not of men
excludes the exercise of broad discretionary
powers by those acting under its authority. Under
this system, [public officers] are guided by the
Rule of Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it
without fear or favor," resist encroachments by
governments, political parties, or even the
interference of their own personal beliefs.142
Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure
for Impeachment Proceedings
adopted by the 12th Congress
Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker
De Venecia, argues that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of
the House Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3
(5) of Article XI of our present Constitution, contending
that the term "initiate" does not mean "to file;" that
Section 3 (1) is clear in that it is the House of
Representatives, as a collective body, which has the
exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment; that
initiate could not possibly mean "to file" because filing
can, as Section 3 (2), Article XI of the Constitution
provides, only be accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a
verified complaint for impeachment by any member of
the House of Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon
a resolution of endorsement by any member; or (3) by at
least 1/3 of all the members of the House. Respondent
House of Representatives concludes that the one year
bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings
against the same officials could not have been violated
as the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been
initiated as the House of Representatives, acting as
the collective body, has yet to act on it.
The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the
interpretation of the term "initiate." Resort to statutory
construction is, therefore, in order.
That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the
Constitution, Commissioner Florenz Regalado, who
eventually became an Associate Justice of this Court,
agreed on the meaning of "initiate" as "to file," as
proffered and explained by Constitutional Commissioner
Maambong during the Constitutional Commission
proceedings, which he (Commissioner Regalado)
as amicus curiae affirmed during the oral arguments on
the instant petitions held on November 5, 2003 at which
he added that the act of "initiating" included the act of
taking initial action on the complaint, dissipates any
doubt that indeed the word "initiate" as it twice appears
in Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution means to file
the complaint and take initial action on it.
"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to
mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or set
going. As Webster's Third New International Dictionary of
the English Language concisely puts it, it means "to
perform or facilitate the first action," which jibes with
Justice Regalado's position, and that of Father Bernas,
who elucidated during the oral arguments of the instant
petitions on November 5, 2003 in this wise:
Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a
single act. It is a comlexus of acts consisting of a
beginning, a middle and an end. The end is the
 transmittal of the articles of impeachment to the
Senate. The middle consists of those deliberative
moments leading to the formulation of the articles
of impeachment. The beginning or the initiation is
the filing of the complaint and its referral to the
Committee on Justice.
Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule
relied upon by Representatives Cojuangco and
Fuentebella says that impeachment is "deemed
initiated" when the Justice Committee votes in
favor of impeachment or when the House
reverses a contrary vote of the Committee. Note
that the Rule does not say "impeachment
proceedings" are initiated but rather are "deemed
initiated." The language is recognition that
initiation happened earlier, but by legal fiction
there is an attempt to postpone it to a time after
actual initiation. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the
Constitution is looking into the intent of the law.
Fortunately, the intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution can be pried from its records:
MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3,
regarding the procedure and the substantive
provisions on impeachment, I understand there
have been many proposals and, I think, these
would need some time for Committee action.
However, I would just like to indicate that I
submitted to the Committee a resolution on
impeachment proceedings, copies of which have
been furnished the Members of this body. This is
borne out of my experience as a member of the
Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good
Government which took charge of the last
impeachment resolution filed before the First
Batasang Pambansa. For the information of
the Committee, the resolution covers several
steps in the impeachment
proceedings starting with initiation, action of
the Speaker committee action, calendaring of
report, voting on the report, transmittal
referral to the Senate, trial and judgment by
the Senate.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not
moving for a reconsideration of the approval of
the amendment submitted by Commissioner
Regalado, but I will just make of record my
thinking that we do not really initiate the filing of
the Articles of Impeachment on the floor. The
procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was
that the initiation starts with the filing of the
complaint. And what is actually done on the
floor is that the committee resolution
containing the Articles of Impeachment is the
one approved by the body.
As the phraseology now runs, which may be
corrected by the Committee on Style, it appears
that the initiation starts on the floor. If we only
have time, I could cite examples in the case of
the impeachment proceedings of President
Richard Nixon wherein the Committee on the
Judiciary submitted the recommendation, the
resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to
the body, and it was the body who approved the
resolution. It is not the body which initiates it.
It only approves or disapproves the
resolution. So, on that score, probably the
Committee on Style could help in rearranging
these words because we have to be very
technical about this. I have been bringing with
me The Rules of the House of
Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The
Senate Rules are with me. The proceedings on
the case of Richard Nixon are with me. I have
submitted my proposal, but the Committee has
already decided. Nevertheless, I just want to
indicate this on record.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a
reconsideration of the approval of Section 3 (3).
My reconsideration will not at all affect the
substance, but it is only in keeping with the exact
formulation of the Rules of the House of
Representatives of the United States regarding
impeachment.
I am proposing, Madam President, without doing
damage to any of this provision, that on page 2,
Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we delete the
words which read: "to initiate impeachment
proceedings" and the comma (,) and insert on
line 19 after the word "resolution" the phrase
WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the
letter "i" in "impeachment" and replace the word
"by" with OF, so that the whole section will now
read: "A vote of at least one-third of all the
Members of the House shall be necessary either
to affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of
Impeachment OF the Committee or to override
its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member
shall be recorded."
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the
initiation, as far as the House of
Representatives of the United States is
concerned, really starts from the filing of the
verified complaint and every resolution to
impeach always carries with it the Articles of
Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words
"Articles of Impeachment" are mentioned on line
25 in the case of the direct filing of a verified
compliant of one-third of all the Members of the
House. I will mention again, Madam President,
that my amendment will not vary the substance in
any way. It is only in keeping with the uniform
procedure of the House of Representatives of the
United States Congress. Thank you, Madam
President.143 (Italics in the original; emphasis and
udnerscoring supplied)
This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong
was clarified and accepted by the Committee on the
Accountability of Public Officers.144
It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to
start with the filing of the complaint. In his amicus
curiae brief, Commissioner Maambong explained that
"the obvious reason in deleting the phrase "to initiate
impeachment proceedings" as contained in the text of
the provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it
understood once and for all that the initiation of
impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of
the complaint, and the vote of one-third of the House in
a resolution of impeachment does not initiate the
impeachment proceedings which was already initiated
by the filing of a verified complaint under Section 3,
paragraph (2), Article XI of the Constitution."145
Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is
of the same view as is Father Bernas, who was also a
member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the
word "initiate" as used in Article XI, Section 3(5) means
to file, both adding, however, that the filing must be
accompanied by an action to set the complaint moving.
During the oral arguments before this Court, Father
Bernas clarified that the word "initiate," appearing in the
constitutional provision on impeachment, viz:
Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall
have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment.
xxx
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year, (Emphasis supplied)
refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and
"impeachment proceeding."
Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the
common verb is "to initiate." The object in the first
sentence is "impeachment case." The object in the
second sentence is "impeachment proceeding."
Following the principle of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the
term "cases" must be distinguished from the term
"proceedings." An impeachment case is the legal
controversy that must be decided by the Senate. Above-
quoted first provision provides that the House, by a vote
of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the
Senate. It is in that sense that the House has "exclusive
power" to initiate all cases of impeachment. No other
body can do it. However, before a decision is made to
initiate a case in the Senate, a "proceeding" must be
followed to arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must be
"initiated." To initiate, which comes from the Latin
word initium, means to begin. On the other hand,
proceeding is a progressive noun. It has a beginning, a
middle, and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but
in the House and consists of several steps: (1) there is
the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of
the House of Representatives or by a private citizen
endorsed by a Member of the House of the
Representatives; (2) there is the processing of this
complaint by the proper Committee which may either
reject the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the
resolution of the Committee rejects or upholds the
complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to the
House for further processing; and (4) there is the
processing of the same complaint by the House of
Representatives which either affirms a favorable
resolution of the Committee or overrides a contrary
resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members. If at
least one third of all the Members upholds the complaint,
Articles of Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to
the Senate. It is at this point that the House "initiates an
impeachment case." It is at this point that an
impeachable public official is successfully impeached.
That is, he or she is successfully charged with an
impeachment "case" before the Senate as impeachment
court.
Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment
proceeding" is not initiated when the complaint is
transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end
of the House proceeding and the beginning of another
proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the
"impeachment proceeding" initiated when the House
deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the
Committee, because something prior to that has already
been done. The action of the House is already a further
step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning.
Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a
verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee
on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which
triggers the series of steps that follow.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation
in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached
the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all
the Members of the House shall be necessary…
to initiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a
proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of
the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but
rather the filing of a complaint does.146 Thus the line was
deleted and is not found in the present Constitution.
Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says,
"No impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against
the same official more than once within a period of one
year," it means that no second verified complaint may be
accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for
action. By his explanation, this interpretation is founded
on the common understanding of the meaning of "to
initiate" which means to begin. He reminds that the
Constitution is ratified by the people, both ordinary and
sophisticated, as they understand it; and that ordinary
people read ordinary meaning into ordinary words and
not abstruse meaning, they ratify words as they
understand it and not as sophisticated lawyers confuse
it.
To the argument that only the House of Representatives
as a body can initiate impeachment proceedings
because Section 3 (1) says "The House of
Representatives shall have the exclusive power to
initiate all cases of impeachment," This is a misreading
of said provision and is contrary to the principle
of reddendo singula singulis by equating "impeachment
cases" with "impeachment proceeding."
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to
the amicus curiae briefs of two former Constitutional
Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to
initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint
coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said
complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the
act of filing and referral or endorsement of the
impeachment complaint to the House Committee on
Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the
members of the House of Representatives with the
Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section
3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment
complaint has been initiated, another impeachment
complaint may not be filed against the same official
within a one year period.
Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment Rules, impeachment proceedings
are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House
Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or
resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the
House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the
Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or
resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing
or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the
House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a
resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the
members of the House. These rules clearly contravene
Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the term
"initiate" a meaning different meaning from filing and
referral.
In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits
that this Court could not use contemporaneous
construction as an aid in the interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of
Article XI, citing Vera v. Avelino147 wherein this Court
stated that "their personal opinions (referring to Justices
who were delegates to the Constitution Convention) on
the matter at issue expressed during this Court's our
deliberations stand on a different footing from the
properly recorded utterances of debates and
proceedings." Further citing said case, he states that this
Court likened the former members of the Constitutional
Convention to actors who are so absorbed in their
emotional roles that intelligent spectators may know
more about the real meaning because of the latter's
balanced perspectives and disinterestedness.148
Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the
present petitions. There are at present only two
members of this Court who participated in the 1986
Constitutional Commission – Chief Justice Davide and
Justice Adolf Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide has not taken
part in these proceedings for obvious reasons. Moreover,
this Court has not simply relied on the personal opinions
now given by members of the Constitutional
Commission, but has examined the records of the
deliberations and proceedings thereof.
Respondent House of Representatives counters that
under Section 3 (8) of Article XI, it is clear and
unequivocal that it and only it has the power to make and
interpret its rules governing impeachment. Its argument
is premised on the assumption that Congress
has absolute power to promulgate its rules. This
assumption, however, is misplaced.
Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress
shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively
carry out the purpose of this section." Clearly, its power
to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the
phrase "to effectively carry out the purpose of this
section." Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very
purpose of the Constitution which said rules were
intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of
Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on
its power to make rules, viz:
Section 3. (1) x x x
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be
filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a
resolution of endorsement by any Member
thereof, which shall be included in the Order of
Business within ten session days, and referred to
the proper Committee within three session days
thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by
a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
report to the House within sixty session days
from such referral, together with the
corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be
calendared for consideration by the House within
ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members
of the House shall be necessary to either affirm a
favorable resolution with the Articles of
Impeachment of the Committee, or override its
contrary resolution. The vote of each Member
shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all
the Members of the House, the same shall
constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial
by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the
Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as alleged
Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would
by necessary implication have the power to alter or
amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of
referendum.
In Osmeña v. Pendatun,149 this Court held that it is within
the province of either House of Congress to interpret its
rules and that it was the best judge of what constituted
"disorderly behavior" of its members. However, in Paceta
v. Secretary of the Commission on
Appointments,150 Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique
Fernando, speaking for this Court and quoting Justice
Brandeis in United States v. Smith,151 declared that
where the construction to be given to a rule affects
persons other than members of the Legislature, the
question becomes judicial in nature. In Arroyo v. De
Venecia,152 quoting United States v. Ballin, Joseph &
Co.,153 Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this Court,
held that while the Constitution empowers each house to
determine its rules of proceedings, it may not by its rules
ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental
rights, and further that there should be a reasonable
relation between the mode or method of proceeding
established by the rule and the result which is sought to
be attained. It is only within these limitations that all
matters of method are open to the determination of the
Legislature. In the same case of Arroyo v. De Venecia,
Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his Concurring and
Dissenting Opinion, was even more emphatic as he
stressed that in the Philippine setting there is even more
reason for courts to inquire into the validity of the Rules
of Congress, viz:
With due respect, I do not agree that the
issues posed by the petitioner are non-
justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will
trivialize the principle of separation of power
if we assume jurisdiction over he case at
bar. Even in the United States, the principle of
separation of power is no longer an impregnable
impediment against the interposition of judicial
power on cases involving breach of rules of
procedure by legislators.
Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v
Ballin (144 US 1) as a window to view the issues
before the Court. It is in Ballin where the US
Supreme Court first defined the boundaries of
the power of the judiciary to review congressional
rules. It held:
"x x x
"The Constitution, in the same section, provides,
that each house may determine the rules of its
proceedings." It appears that in pursuance of this
authority the House had, prior to that day,
passed this as one of its rules:
Rule XV
3. On the demand of any member, or at the
suggestion of the Speaker, the names of
members sufficient to make a quorum in the hall
of the House who do not vote shall be noted by
the clerk and recorded in the journal, and
reported to the Speaker with the names of the
members voting, and be counted and announced
in determining the presence of a quorum to do
business. (House Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)
The action taken was in direct compliance with
this rule. The question, therefore, is as to
the validity of this rule, and not what methods
the Speaker may of his own motion resort to for
determining the presence of a quorum, nor what
matters the Speaker or clerk may of their own
volition place upon the journal. Neither do the
advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or
folly, of such a rule present any matters for
judicial consideration. With the courts the
question is only one of power. The Constitution
empowers each house to determine its rules
of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore
constitutional restraints or violate
fundamental rights, and there should be a
reasonable relation between the mode or
method of proceedings established by the
rule and the result which is sought to be
attained. But within these limitations all matters
of method are open to the determination of the
House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to
say that some other way would be better, more
accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to
the validity of a rule that a different one has been
prescribed and in force for a length of time. The
power to make rules is not one which once
exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power,
always subject to be exercised by the House,
and within the limitations suggested, absolute
and beyond the challenge of any other body or
tribunal."
Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of
courts to pass upon the validity of
congressional rules, i.e, whether they are
constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the
Court and it was found to satisfy the test: (1) that
it did not ignore any constitutional restraint; (2) it
did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its
method had a reasonable relationship with the
result sought to be attained. By examining Rule
XV, the Court did not allow its jurisdiction to be
defeated by the mere invocation of the principle
of separation of powers.154
xxx
In the Philippine setting, there is a more
compelling reason for courts to categorically
reject the political question defense when its
interposition will cover up abuse of power.
For section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution
was intentionally cobbled to empower courts
"x x x to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the
government." This power is new and was not
granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1972
Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from the
US Constitution or any foreign state
constitution. The CONCOM granted this
enormous power to our courts in view of our
experience under martial law where abusive
exercises of state power were shielded from
judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political
question doctrine. Led by the eminent former
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM
expanded and sharpened the checking powers of
the judiciary vis-à-vis the Executive and the
Legislative departments of government.155
xxx
The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it
granted to this Court is not a mere power
which it can decline to exercise. Precisely to
deter this disinclination, the Constitution
imposed it as a duty of this Court to strike
down any act of a branch or instrumentality
of government or any of its officials done with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly,
the Constitution has elongated the checking
powers of this Court against the other branches
of government despite their more democratic
character, the President and the legislators being
elected by the people.156
xxx
The provision defining judicial power as including
the 'duty of the courts of justice. . . to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government' constitutes
the capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional
Commission to upgrade the powers of this court
vis-à-vis the other branches of government. This
provision was dictated by our experience under
martial law which taught us that a stronger and
more independent judiciary is needed to abort
abuses in government. x x x
xxx
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the
duty to annul acts of government committed with
grave abuse of discretion, the new Constitution
transformed this Court from passivity to activism.
This transformation, dictated by our distinct
experience as nation, is not merely evolutionary
but revolutionary.Under the 1935 and the 1973
Constitutions, this Court approached
constitutional violations by initially determining
what it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution,
there is a shift in stress – this Court is
mandated to approach constitutional
violations not by finding out what it should
not do but what it must do. The Court must
discharge this solemn duty by not resuscitating a
past that petrifies the present.
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and
serious consideration to this new constitutional
provision as the case at bar once more calls us
to define the parameters of our power to review
violations of the rules of the House. We will not
be true to our trust as the last bulwark
against government abuses if we refuse to
exercise this new power or if we wield it with
timidity. To be sure, it is this exceeding
timidity to unsheathe the judicial sword that
 has increasingly emboldened other branches
of government to denigrate, if not defy,
orders of our courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed
the view of former Senator Salonga that this
novel provision stretching the latitude of judicial
power is distinctly Filipino and its interpretation
should not be depreciated by undue reliance on
inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In resolving
the case at bar, the lessons of our own history
should provide us the light and not the
experience of foreigners.157 (Italics in the original
emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable
to the instant petitions. Here, the third parties alleging the
violation of private rights and the Constitution are
involved.
Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely
on Nixon v. US158 as basis for arguing that this Court may
not decide on the constitutionality of Sections 16 and 17
of the House Impeachment Rules. As already observed,
the U.S. Federal Constitution simply provides that "the
House of Representatives shall have the sole power of
impeachment." It adds nothing more. It gives no clue
whatsoever as to how this "sole power" is to be
exercised. No limitation whatsoever is given. Thus, the
US Supreme Court concluded that there was a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of a
constitutional power to the House of Representatives.
This reasoning does not hold with regard to
impeachment power of the Philippine House of
Representatives since our Constitution, as earlier
enumerated, furnishes several provisions articulating
how that "exclusive power" is to be exercised.
The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the
House Impeachment Rules which state that
impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if
there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice
that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient
in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or
overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that
the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in
substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the
Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a
verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at
least 1/3 of the members of the House thus clearly
contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the
term "initiate" a meaning different from "filing."
Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the
act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to
the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken
thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI
becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has
been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not
be filed against the same official within a one year period
following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint,
was filed by former President Estrada against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate
justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the
House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the
second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives
Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella
against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates
the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of
impeachment proceedings against the same
impeachable officer within a one-year period.
Conclusion
If there is anything constant about this country, it is that
there is always a phenomenon that takes the center
stage of our individual and collective consciousness as a
people with our characteristic flair for human drama,
conflict or tragedy. Of course this is not to demean the
seriousness of the controversy over the Davide
impeachment. For many of us, the past two weeks have
proven to be an exasperating, mentally and emotionally
exhausting experience. Both sides have fought bitterly a
dialectical struggle to articulate what they respectively
believe to be the correct position or view on the issues
involved. Passions had ran high as demonstrators,
whether for or against the impeachment of the Chief
Justice, took to the streets armed with their familiar
slogans and chants to air their voice on the matter.
Various sectors of society - from the business, retired
military, to the academe and denominations of faith –
offered suggestions for a return to a state of normalcy in
the official relations of the governmental branches
affected to obviate any perceived resulting instability
upon areas of national life.
Through all these and as early as the time when the
Articles of Impeachment had been constituted, this Court
was specifically asked, told, urged and argued to take no
action of any kind and form with respect to the
prosecution by the House of Representatives of the
impeachment complaint against the subject respondent
public official. When the present petitions were knocking
so to speak at the doorsteps of this Court, the same
clamor for non-interference was made through what are
now the arguments of "lack of jurisdiction," "non-
justiciability," and "judicial self-restraint" aimed at halting
the Court from any move that may have a bearing on the
impeachment proceedings.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off
stance as far as the question of the constitutionality of
initiating the impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Davide is concerned. To reiterate what has been
already explained, the Court found the existence in full of
all the requisite conditions for its exercise of its
constitutionally vested power and duty of judicial review
over an issue whose resolution precisely called for the
construction or interpretation of a provision of the
fundamental law of the land. What lies in here is an issue
of a genuine constitutional material which only this Court
can properly and competently address and adjudicate in
accordance with the clear-cut allocation of powers under
our system of government. Face-to-face thus with a
matter or problem that squarely falls under the Court's
jurisdiction, no other course of action can be had but for
it to pass upon that problem head on.
The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially
entangling itself with the process of impeachment has
effectively set up a regime of judicial supremacy, is
patently without basis in fact and in law.
This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial
scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue
of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated
against the Chief Justice transgressed the
constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond
this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it
had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out
of decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all
the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance
over the other two great branches of the government.
Rather, the raison d'etre of the judiciary is to complement
the discharge by the executive and legislative of their
own powers to bring about ultimately the beneficent Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under
effects of having founded and ordered our society upon paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
the rule of law.
SO ORDERED.
It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue
of constitutionality of the impeachment proceedings Bellosillo and Tinga, JJ., see separate opinion.
against the Chief Justice, the members of this Court Puno, and Ynares-Santiago, J., see concurring and
have actually closed ranks to protect a brethren. That the dissenting opinion.
members' interests in ruling on said issue is as much at Vitug, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Callejo, Sr.,
stake as is that of the Chief Justice. Nothing could be JJ., see separate concurring opinion.
farther from the truth. Quisumbing, J., concurring separate opinion received.
Carpio, J., concur.
The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all Austria-Martinez, J., concur in the majority opinion and in
other courts has long held and been entrusted with the the separate opinion of J. Vitug.
judicial power to resolve conflicting legal rights Corona, J., will write a separate concurring opinion.
regardless of the personalities involved in the suits or Azcuna, J., concur in the separate opinion.
actions. This Court has dispensed justice over the
course of time, unaffected by whomsoever stood to
benefit or suffer therefrom, unfraid by whatever
imputations or speculations could be made to it, so long
as it rendered judgment according to the law and the
facts. Why can it not now be trusted to wield judicial
power in these petitions just because it is the highest
ranking magistrate who is involved when it is an
incontrovertible fact that the fundamental issue is not him
but the validity of a government branch's official act as
tested by the limits set by the Constitution? Of course,
there are rules on the inhibition of any member of the
judiciary from taking part in a case in specified instances.
But to disqualify this entire institution now from the suit at
bar is to regard the Supreme Court as likely incapable of
impartiality when one of its members is a party to a case,
which is simply a non sequitur.

No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a

basic precept in any legal system which recognizes
equality of all men before the law as essential to the
law's moral authority and that of its agents to secure
respect for and obedience to its commands. Perhaps,
there is no other government branch or instrumentality
that is most zealous in protecting that principle of legal
equality other than the Supreme Court which has
discerned its real meaning and ramifications through its
application to numerous cases especially of the high-
profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief
Justice is not above the law and neither is any other
member of this Court. But just because he is the Chief
Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law
than anybody else. The law is solicitous of every
individual's rights irrespective of his station in life.

The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have

no doubt been put to test once again by this
impeachment case against Chief Justice Hilario Davide.
Accordingly, this Court has resorted to no other than the
Constitution in search for a solution to what many feared
would ripen to a crisis in government. But though it is
indeed immensely a blessing for this Court to have found
answers in our bedrock of legal principles, it is equally
important that it went through this crucible of a
democratic process, if only to discover that it can resolve
differences without the use of force and aggression upon
each other.

WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the

Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which
were approved by the House of Representatives on
November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently,
the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives
Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella
with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of

RIZALITO Y. DAVID v. SENATE
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL &
MARY GRACE POE-
LLAMANZARES, GR No.
221538, 2016-09-20
Facts:
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari[1] filed by
petitioner Rizalito Y. David (David). He prays for the
nullification of the assailed November 17, 2015 Decision
and December 3, 2015 Resolution of public respondent
Senate Electoral Tribunal in SET Case No. 001-15.
Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares (Senator Poe) is a
foundling whose biological parents are unknown. As an
infant, she was abandoned at the Parish Church of Jaro,
Iloilo.[6] Edgardo Militar found her outside the church on
September 3, 1968 at about 9:30 a.m.[7] He later turned her
over to Mr. and Mrs. Emiliano Militar.[8] Emiliano Militar
reported to the Office of the Local Civil Registrar that the
infant was found on September 6, 1968.[9] She was given
the name Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar
On May 13, 1974, the Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal
promulgated the Decision granting the Petition for Adoption
of Senator Poe by Spouses Ronald Allan Poe (more
popularly known as Fernando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora
Poe (more popularly known as Susan Roces)
Issues:
judicial review through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. He seeks to annul the
assailed Decision and Resolution of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, which state its findings and conclusions on private
respondent's citizenship.
the breadth of this Court's competence relative to that of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal... the nature of the remedial
vehicle—a petition for certiorari—through which one who is
aggrieved by a judgment of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
may seek relief from this Court.
Ruling:
All constitutional provisions—under the 1935 and 1987
Constitutions—which provide for the creation of electoral
tribunals (or their predecessor, the Electoral Commission),
have been unequivocal in their language. The electoral
tribunal shall be the "sole" judge.
The judgments of these tribunals are not beyond the scope
of any review.
The Court did recognize, of course, its power of judicial
review in exceptional cases. In Robles vs. [House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal], the Court has
explained that while the judgments of the Tribunal are
beyond judicial interference, the Court may do so, however,
but only "in the exercise of this Court's so-called
extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the
Tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered without or in
excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
or paraphrasing
This Court reviews judgments of the House and Senate
Electoral Tribunals not in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction. Our review is limited to a determination of
whether there has been an error in jurisdiction, not an error
in judgment.
There is grave abuse of discretion when a constitutional
organ such as the Senate Electoral Tribunal or the
Commission on Elections, makes manifestly gross errors in
its factual inferences such that critical pieces of evidence,
which have been nevertheless properly introduced by a
party, or admitted, or which were the subject of stipulation,
are ignored or not accounted for
A glaring misinterpretation of the constitutional text or of
statutory provisions, as well as a misreading or
misapplication of the current state of jurisprudence, is also
considered grave abuse of discretion.[126] The
arbitrariness consists in the disregard of the current state of
our law.
We find no basis for concluding that the Senate Electoral
Tribunal acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Acting within this void, the Senate Electoral Tribunal was
only asked to make a reasonable interpretation of the law
while needfully considering the established personal
circumstances of private respondent.
Definitely, foundlings have biological parents, either or both
of whom can be Filipinos. Yet, by the nature of their being
foundlings, they may, at critical times, not know their
parents. Thus, this controversy must consider possibilities
where parentage may be Filipino but, due to no fault of the
foundling, remains unknown.
Though her parents are unknown, private respondent is a
Philippine citizen without the need for an express statement
in the Constitution making her so. Her status as such is but
the logical consequence of a reasonable reading of the
Constitution within its plain text. The Constitution provides
its own cues; there is not even a need to delve into the
deliberations of its framers and the implications of
international legal instruments.
the assumption should be that foundlings are natural-born
unless there is substantial evidence to the contrary. This is
necessarily engendered by a complete consideration of the
whole Constitution, not just its provisions on citizenship.
Private respondent was a Filipino citizen at birth. This
status' commencement from birth means that private
respondent never had to do anything to consummate this
status. By definition, she is natural-born. Though
subsequently naturalized, she reacquired her natural-born
status upon satisfying the requirement of Republic Act No.
9225. Accordingly, she is qualified to hold office as Senator
of the Republic.
As against Section 1's generic listing, Section 2 specifically
articulates those who may count themselves as natural-
born.
Therefore, petitioner's restrictive reliance on Section 1 and
the need to establish bloodline is misplaced.
To determine whether private respondent is a natural-born
citizen, we must look into whether she had to do anything to
perfect her citizenship.
She did not.
At no point has it been substantiated that private
respondent went through the actual naturalization process.
Republic Act No. 9225 is premised on the immutability of
natural-born status. It privileges natural-born citizens and
proceeds from an entirely different premise from the
restrictive process of naturalization.
It should be with the actual process of naturalization that
natural-born status is to be contrasted, not against other
procedures relating to citizenship. Otherwise, the door may
be thrown open for the unbridled diminution of the status of
citizens
Natural-born citizenship is not concerned with being a
human thoroughbred
Section 1(2) does not require one's parents to be natural-
born Filipino citizens. It does not even require them to
conform to traditional conceptions of what is indigenously or
ethnically Filipino. One or both parents can, therefore, be
ethnically foreign.
The citizenship of everyone else in one's ancestry is
irrelevant. There is no need, as petitioner insists, for a pure
Filipino bloodline.
the Constitution sustains a presumption that all foundlings
found in the Philippines are born to at least either a Filipino
father or a Filipino mother and are thus natural-born, unless
there is substantial proof otherwise.
Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born Filipino
citizens is tantamount to permanently discriminating against
our foundling citizens. They can then never be of service to
the country in the highest possible capacities. It is also
tantamount to excluding them from certain means such as
professions and state scholarships, which will enable the
actualization of their aspirations. These consequences
cannot be tolerated by the Constitution, not least of all
through the present politically charged proceedings, the
direct objective of which is merely to exclude a singular
politician from office.
Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born citizens
creates an inferior class of citizens who are made to suffer
that inferiority through no fault of their own.
Accordingly, by the Constitution and by statute, foundlings
cannot be the object of discrimination. They are vested with
the rights to be registered and granted nationality upon
birth. To deny them these rights, deprive them of
citizenship, and render them stateless is to unduly burden
them, discriminate them, and undermine their development.
Not only Republic Act No. 9344, the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights effect the constitutional dictum of
promoting the well-being of children and protecting them
from discrimination.
As it is settled that private respondent's being a foundling is
not a bar to natural-born citizenship, petitioner's proposition
as to her inability to benefit from Republic Act No. 9225
crumbles. Private respondent, a natural-born Filipino
citizen, re-acquired natural-born Filipino citizenship when,
following her naturalization as a citizen of the United States,
she complied with the requisites of Republic Act No. 9225.
Commonwealth Act No. 63, which was in effect when
private respondent was naturalized an American citizen on
October 18, 2001, provided in Section 1(1) that "[a] Filipino
citizen may lose his citizenship . . . [b]y naturalization in a
foreign country." Thus, private respondent lost her
Philippine citizenship when she was naturalized an
American citizen. However, on July 7, 2006, she took her
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines under
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225. Three (3) days later,
July 10, 2006, she filed before the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation a Petition for Reacquisition of her
Philippine citizenship.
Natural-born Philippine citizens who, after Republic Act
9225 took effect, are naturalized in foreign countries
"retain," that is, keep, their Philippine citizenship, although
the effectivity of this retention and the ability to exercise the
rights and capacities attendant to this status are subject to
certain solemnities (i.e., oath of allegiance and other
requirements for specific rights and/or acts, as enumerated
in Section 5).
those who became citizens of another country before the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 9225 "reacquire" their
Philippine citizenship and may exercise attendant rights and
capacities, also upon compliance with certain solemnities.
this reacquisition works to restore natural-born status as
though it was never lost at all.
Thus, natural-born Filipinos who have been naturalized
elsewhere and wish to run for elective public office must
comply with all of the following requirements:
First, taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic.
Second, compliance with Article V, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution,[251] Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known
as the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, and other
existing laws. This is to facilitate the exercise of the right of
suffrage; that is, to allow for voting in elections
Third, "mak[ing] a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath."
Private respondent has complied with all of these
requirements. First, on July 7, 2006, she took the Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.[256] Second,
on August 31, 2006, she became a registered voter of
Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan.[257] This evidences her
compliance with Article V, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution. Since she was to vote within the country, this
dispensed with the need to comply with the Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003. Lastly, on October 20, 2010,
she executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to
the United States of America and Renunciation of American
Citizenship.
Private respondent has, therefore, not only fully reacquired
natural-born citizenship; she has also complied with all of
the other requirements for eligibility to elective public office,
as stipulated in Republic Act No. 9225.
It is incorrect to intimate that private respondent's having
had to comply with Republic Act No. 9225 shows that she is
a naturalized, rather than a natural-born, Filipino citizen. It is
wrong to postulate that compliance with Republic Act No.
9225 signifies the performance of acts to perfect citizenship.
Thus, he or she does not become a Philippine citizen only
from the point of restoration and moving forward. He or she
is recognized, de jure, as a Philippine citizen from birth,
although the intervening fact may have consequences de
facto.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED.
Public respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal did not act
without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
rendering its assailed November 17, 2015 Decision and
December 3, 2015 Resolution.
Principles:
When the names of the parents of a foundling cannot be
discovered despite a diligent search, but sufficient evidence
is presented to sustain a reasonable inference that satisfies
the quantum of proof required to conclude that at least one
or both of his or her parents is Filipino, then this should be
sufficient to establish that he or she is a natural-born citizen.
This case certainly does not decide with finality the
citizenship of every single foundling as natural-born. The
circumstances of each case are unique, and substantial
proof may exist to show that a foundling is not natural-born.
the Constitution segregates from all other judicial and quasi-
judicial bodies (particularly, courts and the Commission on
Elections[113]) the power to rule on contests[114] relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the
Senate (as well as of the House of Representatives).
There are two (2) aspects to the exclusivity of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal's power. The power to resolve such
contests is exclusive to any other body. The resolution of
such contests is its only task; it performs no other function.
The 1935 Constitution similarly created an Electoral
Commission, independent from the National Assembly, to
be the sole judge of all contests relating to members of the
National Assembly... the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the
Jones Law of 1916—which vested the power to resolve
such contests in the legislature itself.
[T]he abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough: it must be
grave
Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution spells out the
requirement that "[n]o person shall be a Senator unless he
[or she] is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines."
The language of the provision being interpreted is the
principal source from which this Court determines
constitutional intent.
To the extent possible, words must be given their ordinary
meaning; this is consistent with the basic precept of verba
legis
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution enumerates
who are citizens of the Philippines:Section 1. The following
are citizens of the Philippines:(1) Those who are citizens of
the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution;(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are
citizens of the Philippines;(3) Those born before January
17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and(4) Those
who are naturalized in accordance with law.
Article IV, Section 2 identifies who are natural-born
citizens:Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be
deemed natural-born citizens. (Emphasis supplied)
Citizenship is a legal device denoting political affiliation.
It is the "right to have rights."[151] It is one's personal and . .
. permanent membership in a political community. . . The
core of citizenship is the capacity to enjoy political rights,
that is, the right to participate in government principally
through the right to vote, the right to hold public office[,] and
the right to petition the government for redress of grievance
Citizenship, therefore, is intimately tied with the notion that
loyalty is owed to the state, considering the benefits and
protection provided by it
Under the Spanish, the native inhabitants of the Philippine
Islands were identified not as citizens but as "Spanish
subjects.
Under the Spanish Constitution of 1876, persons born
within Spanish territory, not just peninsular Spain, were
considered Spaniards, classification, however, did not
extend to the Philippine Islands, as Article 89 expressly
mandated that the archipelago was to be governed by
special laws.
December 18, 1889, upon the effectivity in this jurisdiction
of the Civil Code of Spain, that there existed a categorical
enumeration of who were Spanish citizens,[159] thus:(a)
Persons born in Spanish territory,(b) Children of a Spanish
father or mother, even if they were born outside of Spain,(c)
Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,(d)
Those who, without such papers, may have become
domiciled inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy.
Philippine Organic Act, otherwise known as the Philippine
Bill of 1902:
That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to
reside therein, who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh
day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then
resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent
thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of
the United States, except such as shall have elected to
preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace
between the United States and Spain signed at Paris
December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.
The Philippine Bill of 1902 explicitly covered the status of
children born in the Philippine Islands to its inhabitants who
were Spanish subjects as of April 11, 1899. However, it did
not account for the status of children born in the Islands to
parents who were not Spanish subjects. A view was
expressed that the common law concept of jus soli (or
citizenship by place of birth), which was operative in the
United States, applied to the Philippine Islands.
Jones Law of 1916, replaced the Philippine Bill of 1902.
That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were
Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen
hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands,
and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be
deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands,...
The Jones Law of 1916 provided that a native-born
inhabitant of the Philippine Islands was deemed to be a
citizen of the Philippines as of April 11, 1899 if he or she
was "(1) a subject of Spain on April 11, 1899, (2) residing in
the Philippines on said date, and (3) since that date, not a
citizen of some other country."... the requirement of being
natural-born was introduced as a safeguard against foreign
infiltration in the administration of national government
Today, there are only two (2) categories of Filipino citizens:
natural-born and naturalized.
Republic Act No. 9225 superseded Commonwealth Act No.
63[242] and Republic Act No. 8171[243] specifically "to do
away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 which
takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos
who become naturalized citizens of other countries."
The citizenship regime put in place by Republic Act No.
9225 is designed, in its own words, to ensure "that all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country
shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship."... hat Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual
citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country."
Republic Act No. 9225 made natural-born Filipinos' status
permanent and immutable despite naturalization as citizens
of other countries.
Retention of Philippine Citizenship. — Any provision of law
to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the
Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by
reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country
are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to
the Republic:
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the
effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country
shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
aforesaid oath.
Taking the Oath of Allegiance effects the retention or
reacquisition of natural-born citizenship.
Article XI, Section 18 of the Constitution in that "[p]ublic
officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution
allegiance at all times and any public officer or employee
who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of
an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be
dealt with by law.

RIZALITO Y. DAVID, Petitioner, v. SENATE ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL AND MARY GRACE POE-
LLAMANZARES, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The words of our most fundamental law cannot be read so as
to callously exclude all foundlings from public service.
When the names of the parents of a foundling cannot be
discovered despite a diligent search, but sufficient evidence is
presented to sustain a reasonable inference that satisfies the
quantum of proof required to conclude that at least one or
both of his or her parents is Filipino, then this should be
sufficient to establish that he or she is a natural-born citizen.
When these inferences are made by the Senate Electoral
Tribunal in the exercise of its sole and exclusive prerogative
to decide the qualifications of the members of the Senate,
then there is no grave abuse of discretion remediable by
either Rule 65 of the Rules of Court or Article VIII, Section I
of the Constitution.
This case certainly does not decide with finality the
citizenship of every single foundling as natural-born. The
circumstances of each case are unique, and substantial proof
may exist to show that a foundling is not natural-born. The
nature of the Senate Electoral Tribunal and its place in the
scheme of political powers, as devised by the Constitution,
are likewise different from the other ways to raise questions
of citizenship.
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari1 filed by petitioner
Rizalito Y. David (David). He prays for the nullification of the
assailed November 17, 2015 Decision and December 3, 2015
Resolution of public respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal in
SET Case No. 001-15.2 The assailed November 17, 2015
Decision3 dismissed the Petition for Quo Warranto filed by
David, which sought to unseat private respondent Mary Grace
Poe-Llamanzares as a Senator for allegedly not being a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, therefore, not
being qualified to hold such office under Article VI, Section
34 of the 1987 Constitution. The assailed December 3, 2015
Resolution5 denied David's Motion for Reconsideration.
Senator Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares (Senator Poe) is a
foundling whose biological parents are unknown. As an
infant, she was abandoned at the Parish Church of Jaro,
Iloilo.6 Edgardo Militar found her outside the church on
September 3, 1968 at about 9:30 a.m.7 He later turned her
over to Mr. and Mrs. Emiliano Militar.8 Emiliano Militar
reported to the Office of the Local Civil Registrar that the
infant was found on September 6, 1968.9 She was given the
name Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar.10 Local Civil
Registrar issued a Certificate of Live Birth/Foundling
Certificate stating: ChanRobles Virtualawl ibra ry
Circumstances: THE SUBJECT CHILD WAS FOUND IN THE
PARISH CHURCHD [sic] OF JARO, ON SEPTEMBER 3, 1968 AT
ABOUT 9:30 A.M. BY EDGARDO MILITAR AND THE SAID
CHILD IS PRESENTLY IN THE CUSTODY OF MR. AND MRS.
EMILIANO MILITAR AT STA. ISABEL STREET, JARO . . .11
chanroble svirtual lawlib rary
On May 13, 1974, the Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal
promulgated the Decision granting the Petition for Adoption
of Senator Poe by Spouses Ronald Allan Poe (more popularly
known as Fernando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (more
popularly known as Susan Roces).12 The Decision also
ordered the change in Senator Poe's name from Mary Grace
Natividad Contreras Militar to Mary Grace Natividad Sonora
Poe.13 October 27, 2005, Clerk of Court III Eleanor A. Sorio
certified that the Decision had become final in a Certificate of
Finality.14
chan roble slaw
On April 11, 1980, the Office of Civil Registrar-Iloilo received
the Decision of the San Juan Court Municipal Court and noted
on Senator Poe's foundling certificate that she was adopted
by Spouses Ronald Allan and Jesusa Poe.15 This hand-written
notation appears on Senator Poe's foundling certificate: ChanRob les Vi rtualaw lib rary
NOTE: Adopted child by the Spouses Ronald Allan Poe and
Jesusa Sonora Poe as per Court Order, Mun. Court, San Juan,
Rizal, by Hon. Judge Alfredo M. Gorgonio dated May 13,
1974, under Sp. Proc. No. 138.16 chan roblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
Senator Poe became a registered voter in Greenhills, San
Juan, Metro Manila when she turned 18 years old.17 The
Commission on Elections issued her a Voter's Identification
Card for Precinct No. 196, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila
on December 13, 1986.18 chanro bles law
On April 4, 1988, the Department of Foreign Affairs issued
her a Philippine passport.19 Her passport was renewed on
April 5, 1993, May 19, 1998, October 13, 2009, December
19, 2013, and March 18, 2014.20Having become Senator, she
was also issued a Philippine diplomatic passport on December
19, 2013.21 chanro bles law
Senator Poe took Development Studies at the University of
the Philippines, Manila, but eventually went to the United
States in 1988 to obtain her college degree.22 In 1991, she
earned a bachelor's degree in Political Science from Boston
College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts.23 chanrobles law
On July 27, 1991, Senator Poe married Teodoro Misael Daniel
V. Llamanzares, both an American and Filipino national since
birth.24 The marriage took place in Sanctuario de San Jose
Parish, San Juan, Manila.25 On July 29, 1991, Senator Poe cralawred
returned to the United States with her husband.26 For some
time, she lived with her husband and children in the United
States.27chanrobles law
Senator Poe and her husband had three (3) children: Brian
Daniel (Brian), Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna), and Jesusa Anika
(Anika).28 Brian was born in the United States on April 16,
1992. Hanna was born on July 10, 1998, and Anika on June
5, 2004. Both Hanna and Anika were born in the
Philippines.29 chan rob leslaw
Senator Poe was naturalized and granted American
citizenship on October 18, 2001.30 She was subsequently
given a United States passport.31 chan robles law
Senator Poe's adoptive father, Fernando Poe, Jr., ran for
President of the Republic of the Philippines in the 2004
National Elections.32 To support her father's candidacy,
Senator Poe and her daughter Hanna returned to the
Philippines on April 8, 2004.33 After the Elections, she
returned to the United States on July 8, 2004.34 It was during
her stay in the Philippines that she gave birth to her youngest
daughter, Anika.35 chanrob leslaw
Fernando Poe, Jr. was hospitalized on December 11, 2004
and eventually "slipped into a coma."36Senator Poe returned
to the Philippines on December 13, 2004.37 On December 14,
2004, her father died.38 She stayed in the country until
February 3, 2005 to attend her father's funeral and to attend
to the settling of his estate.39 chan robles law
In 2004, Senator Poe resigned from work in the United
States. She never looked for work again in the United
States.40chanrobles law
Senator Poe decided to return home in 2005.41 After
consulting her children, they all agreed to return to the
Philippines to support the grieving Susan Roces.42 In early
2005, they notified Brian and Hanna's schools Virginia, United
States that they would be transferring to the Philippines the
following semester.43She came back on May 24, 2005.44 Her
children also arrived in the first half of 2005.45 However, her
husband stayed in the United States to "finish pending
projects, and to arrange for the sale of the family home
there."46
chanro bles law
Following her return, Senator Poe was issued by the Bureau
of Internal Revenue a Tax Identification Number (TIN) on
July 22, 2005.47 chan roble slaw
On July 7, 2006, Senator Poe took the Oath of Allegiance to
Republic of the Philippines:48
I, Mary Grace Poe Llamanzares, solemnly swear that I will
support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated
by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I
hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme
authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon
myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion.49 chanro blesvi rt uallawli bra ry
On July 10, 2006, Senator Poe filed a Petition for Retention
and or Re-acquisition of Philippine Citizenship through
Republic Act No. 9225.50 She also "filed applications for
derivative citizenship on behalf of her three children who
were all below eighteen (18) years of age at that time."51
The Petition was granted by the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation on July 18, 2006 through an Order signed by
Associate Commissioner Roy M. Almoro for Commissioner
Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr:52
A careful review of the documents submitted in support of
the instant petition indicate that David was a former citizen of
the Republic of the Philippines being born to Filipino parents
and is presumed to be a natural born Philippine citizen;
thereafter, became an American citizen and is now a holder
of an American passport; was issued an ACT and ICR and has
taken her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
on July 7, 2006 and so is thereby deemed to have re-
acquired her Philippine Citizenship.53 (Emphasis in the
original)
In the same Order, Senator Poe's children were "deemed
Citizens of the Philippines in accordance with Section 4 of
R[epublic] A[ct] No. 9225."54 Until now, the Order "has not
been set aside by the Department of Justice or any other
agency of Government."55 chanrob leslaw
On July 31, 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued
Identification Certificates in the name of Senator Poe and her
children.56 It stated that Senator Poe is a "citizen of the
Philippines pursuant to the Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003 . . . in relation to Administrative Order
No. 91, Series of 2004 and Memorandum Circular No. AFF-2-
005 per Office Order No. AFF-06-9133 signed Associate
Commissioner Roy M. Almoro dated July 18, 2006."57
Senator Poe became a registered voter of Barangay Santa
Lucia, San Juan City on August 31, 2006.58 chanroble slaw
Senator Poe made several trips to the United States of
America between 2006 and 2009 using her United States
Passport No. 170377935.59 She used her passport "after
having taken her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic on 07
July 2006, but not after she has formally renounced her
American citizenship on 20 October 2010."60 The following
are the flight records given by the Bureau of Immigration:
Departures Flight No.
November 1, 2006 SQ071
July 20, 2007 PR730
October 31, 2007 PR300
October 2, 2008 PR358
April 20, 2009 PR104
July 31, 2009 PR730
October 19, 2009 PR102
November 15, 2009 PR103
December 27, 2009 PR112
March 27, 2010 PR102
Arrivals Flight No.
November 4, 2006 SQ076
July 23, 2007 PR731
November 5, 2007 PR337
May 8, 2008 PR103
October 5, 2008 PR359
chan robles law
May 21, 2009 PR105
August 3, 2009 PR733
November 15, 2009 PR10361
On October 6, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III
appointed Senator Poe as Chairperson of the Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB).62 On
October 20, 2010, Senator Poe executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America
and Renunciation of American Citizenship,63 stating:
I, MARY GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES, Filipino, of legal age,
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
and presently residing at No. 107 Rodeo Drive, Corinthian
Hills, Quezon City, Philippines, after having been duly sworn
to in accordance with the law, do hereby depose and state
that with this affidavit, I hereby expressly and voluntarily
renounce my United States nationality/American citizenship,
together with all rights and privileges and all duties and
allegiance and fidelity thereunto pertaining. I make this
renunciation intentionally, voluntarily, and of my own free
will, free of any duress or undue influence.64 (Emphasis in the
original)
The affidavit was submitted to the Bureau of Immigration on
October 21, 2010.65 On October 21, 2010, she took her Oath
chanroble slaw
of Office as MTRCB Chairperson and assumed office on
October 26, 2010.66 Her oath of office stated: ChanRoblesVirt ualawli bra ry
PANUNUMPA SA KATUNGKULAN
Ako, si MARY GRACE POE LLAMANZARES, na itinalaga sa
katungkulan bilang Chairperson, Movie and Television Review
and Classification Board, ay taimtim na nanunumpa na
tutuparin ko nang buong husay at katapatan, sa abot ng
aking kakayahan, ang mga tungkulin ng aking kasalukuyang
katungkulan at ng mga iba pang pagkaraan nito'y
gagampanan ko sa ilalim ng Republika ng Pilipinas; na aking
ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary
itataguyod at ipagtatanggol ang Saligan Batas ng Pilipinas;
na tunay na mananalig at tatalima ako rito; na susundin ko
ang mga batas, mga kautusang lega, at mga dekretong
pinaiiral ng mga sadyang itinakdang may kapangyarihan ng
Republika ng Pilipinas; at kusa kong babalikatin ang
pananagutang ito, nang walang ano mang pasubali o
hangaring umiwas.
Kasihan nawa ako ng Diyos.
NILAGDAAN AT PINANUMPAAN sa harap ko ngayong ika-21
ng Oktubre 2010, Lungsod ng Maynila, Pilipinas.67 (Emphasis
in the original)
Senator Poe executed an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of
Nationality of the United States68 in the presence of Vice-
Consul Somer E. Bessire-Briers on July 12, 2011.69 On this
occasion, she also filled out the Questionnaire Information for
Determining Possible Loss of U.S. Citizenship.70 On December
9, 2011, Vice Consul Jason Galian executed a Certificate of
Loss of Nationality for Senator Poe.71 The certificate was
approved by the Overseas Citizen Service, Department of
State, on February 3, 2012.72 chan roble slaw
Senator Poe decided to run as Senator in the 2013
Elections.73 On September 27, 2012, she executed a
Certificate of Candidacy, which was submitted to the
Commission on Elections on October 2, 2012.74 She won and
was declared as Senator-elect on May 16, 2013.75 chanroble slaw
David, a losing candidate in the 2013 Senatorial Elections,
filed before the Senate Electoral Tribunal a Petition for Quo
Warranto on August 6, 2015.76 He contested the election of
Senator Poe for failing to "comply with the citizenship and
residency requirements mandated by the 1987
Constitution."77 chanrobles law
Thereafter, the Senate Electoral Tribunal issued Resolution
No. 15-01 requiring David "to correct the formal defects of
his petition."78 David filed his amended Petition on August 17,
2015.79 chan robles law
On August 18, 2015, Resolution No. 15-02 was issued by the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, through its Executive Committee,
ordering the Secretary of the Senate Electoral Tribunal to
summon Senator Poe to file an answer to the amended
Petition.80
chan roble slaw
Pending the filing of Senator Poe's answer, David filed a
Motion Subpoena the Record of Application of Citizenship Re-
acquisition and related documents from the Bureau of
Immigration on August 25, 2015.81The documents requested
included Senator Poe's record of travels and NSO kept Birth
Certificate.82 On August 26, 2015, the Senate Electoral
Tribunal issued Resolution No. 15-04 granting the
Motion.83 The same Resolution directed the Secretary of the
Tribunal to issue a subpoena to the concerned officials of the
Bureau of Immigration and the National Statistics
Office.84 The subpoenas ordered the officials to appear on
September 1, 2015 at 10:00 a.m. before the Office of the
Secretary of the Senate bearing three (3) sets of the
requested documents.85 The subpoenas were complied with
by both the Bureau of Immigration and the National Statistics
Office on September 1, 2015.86
On September 1, 2015, Senator Poe submitted her Verified
Answer with (1) Prayer for Summary Dismissal; (2) Motion
for Preliminary Hearing on Grounds for Immediate
Dismissal/Affirmative Defenses; (3) Motion to Cite David for
Direct Contempt of Court; and (4) Counterclaim for Indirect
Contempt of Court.87
chanrob leslaw
On September 2, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal issued
Resolution No. 15-05 requiring the parties to file a
preliminary conference brief on or before September 9,
2015.88 The Resolution also set the Preliminary Conference
on September 11, 2015.89 During the Preliminary Conference,
the parties "agreed to drop the issue of residency on the
ground of prescription."90
cha nrob leslaw
Oral arguments were held by the Senate Electoral Tribunal on
September 21, 2015.91 The parties were then "required to
submit their respective [memoranda], without prejudice to
the submission of DNA evidence by [Senator Poe] within
thirty (30) days from the said date."92
On October 21, 2015, Senator Poe moved to extend for 15
days the submission of DNA test results.93The Senate
Electoral Tribunal granted the Motion on October 27, 2015
through Resolution No. 15-08.94On November 5, 2015,
Senator Poe filed a Manifestation regarding the results of
DNA Testing,95 which stated that "none of the tests that
[Senator Poe] took provided results that would shed light to
the real identity of her biological parents."96 The
Manifestation also stated that Senator Poe was to continue to
find closure regarding the issue and submit any development
to the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Later, Senator Poe
submitted "the issue of her natural-born Filipino citizenship
as a foundling for resolution upon the legal arguments set
forth in her submissions to the Tribunal."97 On November 6,
2015, through Resolution No. 15-10, the Senate Electoral
Tribunal "noted the [M]anifestation and considered the case
submitted for resolution."98 cha nrob lesl aw
On November 17, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal
promulgated its assailed Decision finding Senator Poe to be a
natural-born citizen and, therefore, qualified to hold office as
Senator.99 The Decision stated:
We rule that Respondent is a natural-born citizen under the
1935 Constitution and continue to be a natural-born citizen
as defined under the 1987 Constitution, as she is a citizen of
the Philippines from birth, without having to perform any act
to acquire or perfect (her) Philippine citizenship.
....
In light of our earlier pronouncement that Respondent is a
natural-born Filipino citizen, Respondent validly reacquired
her natural-born Filipino citizenship upon taking her Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, as required
under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225.
Under Section 11 of B.I. Memorandum Circular No. AFF 05-
002 (the Revised Rules Implementing R.A. No. 9225), the
foregoing Oath of Allegiance is the "final act" to reacquire
natural-born Philippine citizenship.
....
To repeat, Respondent never used her USA passport from the
moment she renounced her American citizenship on 20
October 2010. She remained solely a natural-born Filipino
citizen from that time on until today.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for quo
warranto is DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.100 (Citations omitted)
On November 23, 2015, David moved for
reconsideration.101 The Senate Electoral Tribunal issued
Resolution No. 15-11 on November 24, 2015, giving Senator
Poe five (5) days to comment on the Motion for
Reconsideration.102
c hanrobles law
Senator Poe filed her Comment/Opposition to the Motion for
Reconsideration on December 1, 2015.103David's Motion for
Reconsideration was denied by the Senate Electoral Tribunal
on December 3, 2015:104
WHEREFORE, the Tribunal resolves to DENY the Verified
chan robles law
Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision promulgated on
17 November 2015) of David Rizalito Y. David dated 23
November 2015.
The Tribunal further resolves to CONFIRM Resolution No. 15-
11 dated 24 November 2015 issued by the Executive
Committee of the Tribunal; to NOTE the
Comment/Opposition filed by counsel for Respondent on 01
December 2015; to GRANT the motion for leave to appear
and submit memorandum as amici curiae filed by Dean
Arturo de Castro [and to] NOTE the Memorandum (for
Volunteer Amicus Curiae) earlier submitted by Dean de
Castro before the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 15-139
(DC), entitled "Amado D. Valdez, Petitoner, versus Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe Llaman[z]ares, Respondent."
SO ORDERED.105 (Emphasis in the original)
On December 8, 2015, the Senate Electoral Tribunal's
Resolution was received by David.106 On December 9, 2015,
chanroble slaw David filed the pre Petition for Certiorari before this
Court.107
chanrob leslaw
On December 16, 2015, this Court required the Senate
Electoral Tribunal and Senator Poe to comment on the
Petition "within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days
from notice."108 The Resolution also set oral arguments on
January 19, 2016.109 The Senate Electoral Tribunal, through
the Office of the Solicitor General, submitted its Comment on
December 30, 2015.110 Senator Poe submitted her Comment
on January 4, 2016.111 chanrob leslaw
This case was held in abeyance pending the resolution of the
Commission on Elections case on the issue of private
respondent's citizenship.
For resolution is the sole issue of whether the Senate
Electoral Tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing
petitioner's Petition for Quo Warranto based on its finding
that private respondent is a natural-born Filipino citizen,
qualified to hold a seat as Senator under Article VI, Section 3
of the 1987 Constitution.
ChanRoble sVi rt ualawlib ra ry
I
Petitioner comes to this Court invoking our power of judicial
review through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. He seeks to annul the assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
which state its findings and conclusions on private
respondent's citizenship.
Ruling on petitioner's plea for post-judgment relief calls for a
consideration of two (2) factors: first, the breadth of this
Court's competence relative to that of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal; and second, the nature of the remedial vehicle—a
petition for certiorari—through which one who is aggrieved by
a judgment of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may seek relief
from this Court.
I. A
The Senate Electoral Tribunal, along with the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, is a creation of Article VI,
Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution:112
ARTICLE VI
The Legislative Department
....
SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives
shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom
shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by
the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of
the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may
be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral
Tribunal shall be its Chairman. (Emphasis supplied)
Through Article VI, Section 17, the Constitution segregates
from all other judicial and quasi-judicial bodies (particularly,
courts and the Commission on Elections113) the power to rule
on contests114 relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of members of the Senate (as well as of the
House of Representatives). These powers are granted to a
separate and distinct constitutional organ. There are two (2)
aspects to the exclusivity of the Senate Electoral Tribunal's
power. The power to resolve such contests is exclusive to any
other body. The resolution of such contests is its only task; it
performs no other function.
The 1987 Constitution is not the first fundamental law to
introduce into our legal system an "independent, impartial
and non-partisan body attached to the legislature and
specially created for that singular purpose."115 The 1935
Constitution similarly created an Electoral Commission,
independent from the National Assembly, to be the sole
judge of all contests relating to members of the National
Assembly.116 This was a departure from the system
introduced by prior organic acts enforced under American
colonial rule—namely: the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the
Jones Law of 1916—which vested the power to resolve such
contests in the legislature itself. When the 1935 Constitution
was amended to make room for a bicameral legislature, a
corresponding amendment was made for there to be separate
electoral tribunals for each chamber of Congress.117 The 1973
Constitution did away with these electoral tribunals, but they
have since been restored by the 1987 Constitution.
All constitutional provisions—under the 1935 and 1987
Constitutions—which provide for the creation of electoral
tribunals (or their predecessor, the Electoral Commission),
have been unequivocal in their language. The electoral
tribunal shall be the "sole" judge.
In Lazatin v. House Electoral Tribunal:118
The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive
character of the jurisdiction conferred. . . . The exercise of
the power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935
Constitution has been described as "intended to be as
complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in
the legislature[.]" Earlier, this grant of power to the
legislature was characterized by Justice Malcohn as "full,
clear and complete." . . . Under the amended 1935
Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the
Electoral Tribunal . . . and it remained as full, clear and
complete as that previously granted the legislature and the
Electoral Commission. . . . The same may be said with regard
to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunals under the 1987
Constitution.119chanrob lesvi rtua llawlib ra ry
Exclusive, original jurisdiction over contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the elective officials
falling within the scope of their powers is, thus, vested in
these electoral tribunals. It is only before them that post-
election challenges against the election, returns, and
qualifications of Senators and Representatives (as well as of
the President and the Vice-President, in the case of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal) may be initiated.
The judgments of these tribunals are not beyond the scope of
any review. Article VI, Section 17's stipulation of electoral
tribunals' being the "sole" judge must be read in harmony
with Article VIII, Section 1's express statement that
"[j]udicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice . . .
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
Judicial review is, therefore, still possible. In Libanan v.
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal:120
The Court has stressed that ". . . so long as the Constitution
grants the [House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal] the
power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of members of the House
of Representatives, any final action taken by the [House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal] on a matter within its
jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court . . .
the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal . . . excludes the
exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would
in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same."
The Court did recognize, of course, its power of judicial
review in exceptional cases. In Robles vs. [House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal], the Court has explained
that while the judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial
interference, the Court may do so, however, but only "in the
exercise of this Court's so-called extraordinary
jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the Tribunal's
decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or
paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary
and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as
constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a
demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly
constituting such grave abuse of discretion that there has to
be a remedy for such abuse."
In the old, but still relevant, case of Morrero vs. Bocar, the
Court has ruled that the power of the Electoral Commission
"is beyond judicial interference except, in any event, upon a
clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of power
as will constitute a denial of due process." The Court does
not, to paraphrase it in Co vs. [House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal], venture into the perilous area of
correcting perceived errors of independent branches of the
Government; it comes in only when it has to vindicate a
denial of due process or correct an abuse of discretion so
grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution itself calls
for remedial action.121 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
This Court reviews judgments of the House and Senate
Electoral Tribunals not in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction. Our review is limited to a determination of
whether there has been an error in jurisdiction, not an error
in judgment.
I. B
A party aggrieved by the rulings of the Senate or House
Electoral Tribunal invokes the jurisdiction of this Court
through the vehicle of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. An appeal is a
continuation of the proceedings in the tribunal from which the
appeal is taken. A petition for certiorari is allowed in Article
VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution and described in the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure as an independent civil action.122 The
viability of such a petition is premised on an allegation of
"grave abuse of discretion."123 chan roble slaw
The term "grave abuse of discretion" has been generally held
to refer to such arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical exercise of
judgment as is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction: ChanRob les Vi rtualaw lib rary
[T]he abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough: it must be
grave.124chan roble svirtuallaw lib rary
There is grave abuse of discretion when a constitutional
organ such as the Senate Electoral Tribunal or the
Commission on Elections, makes manifestly gross errors in its
factual inferences such that critical pieces of evidence, which
have been nevertheless properly introduced by a party, or
admitted, or which were the subject of stipulation, are
ignored or not accounted for.125 chan robles law
A glaring misinterpretation of the constitutional text or of
statutory provisions, as well as a misreading or
misapplication of the current state of jurisprudence, is also
considered grave abuse of discretion.126 The arbitrariness
consists in the disregard of the current state of our law.

Adjudication that fails to consider the facts and evidence or
frivolously departs from settled principles engenders a strong
suspicion of partiality. This can be a badge of hostile intent
against a party.
Writs of certiorari have, therefore, been issued: (a) where
the tribunal's approach to an issue is premised on wrong
considerations and its conclusions founded on a gross
misreading, if not misrepresentation, of the evidence;127 (b)
where a tribunal's assessment of a case is "far from
reasonable[,] [and] based solely on very personal and
subjective assessment standards when the law is replete with
standards that can be used";128 "(c) where the tribunal's
action on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence
oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of being
grossly unreasonable";129 and (d) where the tribunal invokes
erroneous or irrelevant considerations in resolving an
issue.130
chan roble slaw
I. C
We find no basis for concluding that the Senate Electoral
Tribunal acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
The Senate Electoral Tribunal's conclusions are in keeping
with a faithful and exhaustive reading of the Constitution,
one that proceeds from an intent to give life to all the
aspirations of all its provisions.
Ruling on the Petition for Quo Warranto initiated by
petitioner, the Senate Electoral Tribunal was confronted with
a novel legal question: the citizenship status of children
whose biological parents are unknown, considering that the
Constitution, in Article IV, Section 1(2) explicitly makes
reference to one's father or mother. It was compelled to
exercise its original jurisdiction in the face of a constitutional
ambiguity that, at that point, was without judicial precedent.
Acting within this void, the Senate Electoral Tribunal was only
asked to make a reasonable interpretation of the law while
needfully considering the established personal circumstances
of private respondent. It could not have asked the impossible
of private respondent, sending her on a proverbial fool's
errand to establish her parentage, when the controversy
before it arose because private respondent's parentage was
unknown and has remained so throughout her life.
The Senate Electoral Tribunal knew the limits of human
capacity. It did not insist on burdening private respondent
with conclusively proving, within the course of the few short
months, the one thing that she has never been in a position
to know throughout her lifetime. Instead, it conscientiously
appreciated the implications of all other facts known about
her finding. Therefore, it arrived at conclusions in a manner
in keeping with the degree of proof required in proceedings
before a quasi-judicial body: not absolute certainty, not proof
beyond reasonable doubt or preponderance of evidence, but
"substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify
a conclusion."131 chanroble slaw
In the process, it avoided setting a damning precedent for all
children with the misfortune of having been abandoned by
their biological parents. Far from reducing them to inferior,
second-class citizens, the Senate Electoral Tribunal did
justice to the Constitution's aims of promoting and defending
the well-being of children, advancing human rights, and
guaranteeing equal protection of the laws and equal access to
opportunities for public service.
II
Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution spells out the
requirement that "[n]o person shall be a Senator unless he
[or she] is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines."
Petitioner asserts that private respondent is not a natural-
born citizen and, therefore, not qualified to sit as Senator of
the Republic, chiefly on two (2) grounds. First, he argues that
as a foundling whose parents are unknown, private
respondent fails to satisfy the jus sanguinis principle: that is,
that she failed to establish her Filipino "blood line," which is
supposedly the essence of the Constitution's determination of
who are natural-born citizens of the Philippines. Proceeding
from this first assertion, petitioner insists that as private
respondent was never a natural-born citizen, she could never
leave reverted to natural-born status despite the
performance of acts that ostensibly comply with Republic Act
No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and
Re-acquisition Act of 2003.
Petitioner's case hinges on the primacy he places over Article
IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and its enumeration of
who are Filipino citizens, more specifically on Section 1(2),
which identifies as citizens "[t]hose whose fathers or mothers
are citizens of the Philippines." Petitioner similarly claims
that, as private respondent's foundling status is settled, the
burden to prove Filipino parentage was upon her. With
private respondent having supposedly failed to discharge this
burden, the supposed inevitable conclusion is that she is not
a natural-born Filipino.
III
At the heart of this controversy is a constitutional ambiguity.
Definitely, foundlings have biological parents, either or both
of whom can be Filipinos. Yet, by the nature of their being
foundlings, they may, at critical times, not know their
parents. Thus, this controversy must consider possibilities
where parentage may be Filipino but, due to no fault of the
foundling, remains unknown.132 Resolving this controversy
hinges on constitutional interpretation.
Discerning constitutional meaning is an exercise in
discovering the sovereign's purpose so as to identify which
among competing interpretations of the same text is the
more contemporarily viable construction. Primarily, the actual
words—text—and how they are situated within the whole
document—context—govern. Secondarily, when discerning
meaning from the plain text (i.e., verba legis) fails,
contemporaneous construction may settle what is more
viable. Nevertheless, even when a reading of the plain text is
already sufficient, contemporaneous construction may still be
resorted to as a means for verifying or validating the clear
textual or contextual meaning of the Constitution.
III. A
The entire exercise of interpreting a constitutional provision
must necessarily begin with the text itself. The language of
the provision being interpreted is the principal source from
which this Court determines constitutional intent.133chanrobles law
To the extent possible, words must be given their ordinary
meaning; this is consistent with the basic precept of verba
legis.134 The Constitution is truly a public document in that it
was ratified and approved by a direct act of the People
exercising their right of suffrage, they approved of it through
a plebiscite. The preeminent consideration in reading the
Constitution, therefore, is the People's consciousness: that is,
popular, rather than technical-legal, understanding. Thus: ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary
We look to the language of the document itself in our search
for its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is
where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective
sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed in which
case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the
Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being
essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be
present in the people's consciousness, its language as much
as possible should be understood in the sense they have in
common use. What it says according to the text of the
provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates
the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate
that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus,
these are the cases where the need for construction is
reduced to a minimum.135(Emphasis supplied)
Reading a constitutional provision requires awareness of its
relation with the whole of the Constitution. A constitutional
provision is but a constituent of a greater whole. It is the
framework of the Constitution that animates each of its
components through the dynamism of these components'
interrelations. What is called into operation is the entire
document, not simply a peripheral item. The Constitution
should, therefore, be appreciated and read as a singular,
whole unit—ut magis valeat quam pereat.136 Each provision
must be understood and effected in a way that gives life to
all that the Constitution contains, from its foundational
principles to its finest fixings.137
chan robles law
The words and phrases that establish its framework and its
values color each provision at the heart of a controversy in
an actual case. In Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary:138
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that
no one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from
all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the
provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be
brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate
the great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a
particular subject should be considered and interpreted
together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the
Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat
another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be
made to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if
practicable, and must lean in favor of construction which will
render every word operative, rather than one which may
make the words idle and nugatory.139 (Citations omitted)
Reading a certain text includes a consideration of
jurisprudence that has previously considered that exact same
text, if any. Our legal system is founded on the basic
principle that "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws or the Constitution shall form part of [our] legal
system."140 Jurisprudence is not an independent source of
law. Nevertheless, judicial interpretation is deemed part of or
written into the text itself as of the date that it was originally
passed. This is because judicial construction articulates the
contemporaneous intent that the text brings to
effect.141 Nevertheless, one must not fall into the temptation
of considering prior interpretation as immutable.
Interpretation grounded on textual primacy likewise looks
into how the text has evolved. Unless completely novel, legal
provisions are the result of the re-adoption—often with
accompanying re-calibration—of previously existing rules.
Even when seemingly novel, provisions are often introduced
as a means of addressing the inadequacies and excesses of
previously existing rules.
One may trace the historical development of text by
comparing its current iteration with prior counterpart
provisions, keenly taking note of changes in syntax, along
with accounting for more conspicuous substantive changes
such as the addition and deletion of provisos or items in
enumerations, shifting terminologies, the use of more
emphatic or more moderate qualifiers, and the imposition of
heavier penalties. The tension between consistency and
change galvanizes meaning.
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, which
enumerates who are citizens of the Philippines, may be
compared with counterpart provisions, not only in earlier
Constitutions but even in organic laws142and in similar
mechanisms143 introduced by colonial rulers whose precepts
nevertheless still resonate today.
Even as ordinary meaning is preeminent, a realistic
appreciation of legal interpretation must grapple with the
truth that meaning is not always singular and uniform.
In Social Weather Stations, Inc. v. Commission on
Elections,144 this Court explained the place of a holistic
approach in legal interpretation: ChanRobles Vi rt ualawlib ra ry
Interestingly, both COMELEC and petitioners appeal to what
they (respectively) construe to be plainly evident from
Section 5.2(a)'s text on the part of COMELEC, that the use of
the words "paid for" evinces no distinction between direct
purchasers and those who purchase via subscription
schemes; and, on the part of petitioners, that Section
5.2(a)'s desistance from actually using the word "subscriber"
means that subscribers are beyond its contemplation. The
variance in the parties' positions, considering that they are
both banking on what they claim to be the Fair Election Act's
plain meaning, is the best evidence of an extant ambiguity.
Second, statutory construction cannot lend itself to pedantic
rigor that foments absurdity. The dangers of inordinate
insistence on literal interpretation are commonsensical and
need not be belabored. These dangers are by no means
endemic to legal interpretation. Even in everyday
conversations, misplaced literal interpretations are fodder for
humor. A fixation on technical rules of grammar is no less
innocuous. A pompously doctrinaire approach to text can
stifle, rather than facilitate, the legislative wisdom that
unbridled textualism purports to bolster.
Third, the assumption that there is, in all cases, a universal
plain language is erroneous. In reality, universality and
uniformity in meaning is a rarity. A contrary belief wrongly
assumes that language is static.
The more appropriate and more effective approach is,
thus, holistic rather than parochial: to consider context
and the interplay of the historical, the contemporary,
and even the envisioned. Judicial interpretation entails the
convergence of social realities and social ideals. The latter are
meant to be effected by the legal apparatus, chief of which is
the bedrock of the prevailing legal order: the Constitution.
Indeed, the word in the vernacular that describes the
Constitution — saligan — demonstrates this imperative of
constitutional primacy.
Thus, we refuse to read Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Election Act
in isolation. Here, we consider not an abstruse provision but
a stipulation that is part of the whole, i.e., the statute of
which it is a part, that is aimed at realizing the ideal of fair
elections. We consider not a cloistered provision but a norm
that should have a present authoritative effect to achieve the
ideals of those who currently read, depend on, and demand
fealty from the Constitution.145 (Emphasis supplied)
III. B
Contemporaneous construction and aids that are external to
the text may be resorted to when the text is capable of
multiple, viable meanings.146 It is only then that one can go
beyond the strict boundaries of the document. Nevertheless,
even when meaning has already been ascertained from a
reading of the plain text, contemporaneous construction may
serve to verify or validate the meaning yielded by such
reading.
Limited resort to contemporaneous construction is justified by
the realization that the business of understanding the
Constitution is not exclusive to this Court. The basic
democratic foundation of our constitutional order necessarily
means that all organs of government, and even the People,
read the fundamental law and are guided by it. When
competing viable interpretations arise, a justiciable
controversy may ensue requiring judicial intervention in order
to arrive with finality at which interpretation shall be
sustained. To remain true to its democratic moorings,
however, judicial involvement must remain guided by a
framework or deference and constitutional avoidance. This
same principle underlies the basic doctrine that courts are to
refrain from issuing advisory opinions. Specifically as regards
this Court, only constitutional issues that are narrowly
framed, sufficient to resolve an actual case, may be
entertained.147cha nrob leslaw
When permissible then, one may consider analogous
jurisprudence (that is, judicial decisions on similar, but not
the very same, matters or concerns),148 as well as
thematically similar statutes and international norms that
form part of our legal system. This includes discerning the
purpose and aims of the text in light of the specific facts
under consideration. It is also only at this juncture—when
external aids may be consulted—that the supposedly
underlying notions of the framers, as articulated through
records of deliberations and other similar accounts, can be
illuminating.
III. C
In the hierarchy of the means for constitutional
interpretation, inferring meaning from the supposed intent of
the framers or fathoming the original understanding of the
individuals who adopted the basic document is the weakest
approach.
These methods leave the greatest room for subjective
interpretation. Moreover, they allow for the greatest errors.
The alleged intent of the framers is not necessarily
encompassed or exhaustively articulated in the records of
deliberations. Those that have been otherwise silent and
have not actively engaged in interpellation and debate may
have voted for or against a proposition for reasons entirely
their own and not necessarily in complete agreement with
those articulated by the more vocal. It is even possible that
the beliefs that motivated them were based on entirely
erroneous premises. Fathoming original understanding can
also misrepresent history as it compels a comprehension of
actions made within specific historical episodes through
detached, and not necessarily better-guided, modern lenses.
Moreover, the original intent of the framers of the
Constitution is not always uniform with the original
understanding of the People who ratified it. In Civil Liberties
Union:
ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the
debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention in
order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting
Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other
guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the
terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates
in the constitutional convention "are of value as showing the
views of the individual members, and as indicating the
reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the
views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the
mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave the
instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to
construe the constitution from what appears upon its
face." The proper interpretation therefore depends more on
how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the
framer's understanding thereof.149 (Emphasis supplied)
IV
Though her parents are unknown, private respondent is a
Philippine citizen without the need for an express statement
in the Constitution making her so. Her status as such is but
the logical consequence of a reasonable reading of the
Constitution within its plain text. The Constitution provides its
own cues; there is not even a need to delve into the
deliberations of its framers and the implications of
international legal instruments. This reading proceeds from
several levels.
On an initial level, a plain textual reading readily identifies
the specific provision, which principally governs: the
Constitution's actual definition, in Article IV, Section 2, of
"natural-born citizens." This definition must be harmonized
with Section 1's enumeration, which includes a reference to
parentage. These provisions must then be appreciated in
relation to the factual milieu of this case. The pieces of
evidence before the Senate Electoral Tribunal, admitted facts,
and uncontroverted circumstances adequately justify the
conclusion of private respondent's Filipino parentage.
On another level, the assumption should be that foundlings
are natural-born unless there is substantial evidence to the
contrary. This is necessarily engendered by a complete
consideration of the whole Constitution, not just its provisions
on citizenship. This includes its mandate of defending the
well-being of children, guaranteeing equal protection of the
law, equal access to opportunities for public service, and
respecting human rights, as well as its reasons for requiring
natural-born status for select public offices. Moreover, this is
a reading validated by contemporaneous construction that
considers related legislative enactments, executive and
administrative actions, and international instruments.
V native inhabitants as inferior.157Natives were, thus, reduced
Private respondent was a Filipino citizen at birth. This status'
commencement from birth means that private respondent
never had to do anything to consummate this status. By
definition, she is natural-born. Though subsequently
naturalized, she reacquired her natural-born status upon
satisfying the requirement of Republic Act No. 9225.
Accordingly, she is qualified to hold office as Senator of the
Republic.
V. A
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution enumerates
who are citizens of the Philippines:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
(1) Those who are citizens of the
Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are
citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17,
1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in
accordance with law.150
Article IV, Section 2 identifies who are natural-born
citizens:ChanRob les Vi rtualaw lib rary
Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of
the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be
deemed natural-born citizens. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 2's significance is self-evident. It provides a definition
of the term "natural-born citizens." This is distinct from
Section 1's enumeration of who are citizens. As against
Section 1's generic listing, Section 2 specifically articulates
those who may count themselves as natural-born.
The weight and implications of this categorical definition are
better appreciated when supplemented with an
understanding of how our concepts of citizenship and natural-
born citizenship have evolved. As will be seen, the term
"natural-born citizen" was a transplanted, but tardily defined,
foreign concept.
V. B
Citizenship is a legal device denoting political affiliation. It is
the "right to have rights."151 It is one's personal and . . .
permanent membership in a political community. . . The core
of citizenship is the capacity to enjoy political rights, that is,
the right to participate in government principally through the
right to vote, the right to hold public office[,] and the right to
petition the government for redress of grievance.152 chan robles law
Citizenship also entails obligations to the political community
of which one is part.153 Citizenship, therefore, is intimately
tied with the notion that loyalty is owed to the state,
considering the benefits and protection provided by it. This is
particularly so if these benefits and protection have been
enjoyed from the moment of the citizen's birth.
Tecson v. Commission on Elections154 reckoned with the
historical development of our concept of citizenship,
beginning under Spanish colonial rule.155 Under the Spanish,
the native inhabitants of the Philippine Islands were identified
not as citizens but as "Spanish subjects."156 Church records
show that native inhabitants were referred to as "indios." The
alternative identification of native inhabitants as subjects or
as indios demonstrated the colonial master's regard for
to subservience in their own land.
Under the Spanish Constitution of 1876, persons born within
Spanish territory, not just peninsular Spain, were considered
Spaniards, classification, however, did not extend to the
Philippine Islands, as Article 89 expressly mandated that the
archipelago was to be governed by special laws.158 It was
only on December 18, 1889, upon the effectivity in this
jurisdiction of the Civil Code of Spain, that there existed a
categorical enumeration of who were Spanish
citizens,159 thus:
ChanRoble sVirt ualawli bra ry
(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
ChanRoble sVirtualawli bra ry
(b) Children of a Spanish father or
mother, even if they were born
outside of Spain,
(c) Foreigners who have obtained
naturalization papers,
 treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed
(d) Those who, without such papers, at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight,
may have become domiciled and except such others as have since become citizens of
some other country: Provided, That the Philippine
inhabitants of any town of the Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to
Monarchy.160 provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by
those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come
1898 marked the end of Spanish colonial rule. The Philippine within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular
Islands were ceded by Spain to the United States of America possessions of the United States, and such other persons
under the Treaty of Paris, which was entered into on residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the
December 10, 1898. The Treaty of Paris did not automatically United States, or who could become citizens of the United
convert the native inhabitants to American States under the laws of the United States if residing therein.
citizens.161 Instead, it left the determination of the native
The Jones Law of 1916 provided that a native-born inhabitant
inhabitants' status to the Congress of the United States:
of the Philippine Islands was deemed to be a citizen of the
ChanRobles Virtualawl ibra ry

Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the

Philippines as of April 11, 1899 if he or she was "(1) a subject
territory over which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes
of Spain on April 11, 1899, (2) residing in the Philippines on
or cedes her sovereignty may remain in such territory or may
said date, and (3) since that date, not a citizen of some other
remove therefrom. . . . In case they remain in the territory
country."168
they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by
chanroble slaw

making . . . a declaration of their decision to preserve such

There was previously the view that jus soli may apply as a
allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held
mode of acquiring citizenship. It was the 1935 Constitution
to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of
that made sole reference to parentage vis-a-vis the
the territory in which they may reside.
determination of citizenship.169 Article III, Section 1 of the
1935 Constitution provided:
Thus -
Chan RoblesVirt ualawli bra ry

SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be

determined by Congress.162 c hanro bl esvirt uallawl ibra ry

(1) Those who are citizens of the

Pending legislation by the United States Congress, the native Philippine Islands at the time of the
inhabitants who had ceased to be Spanish subjects were
"issued passports describing them to be citizens of the
adoption of this Constitution.
Philippines entitled to the protection of the United
States."163chanrob leslaw
(2) Those born in the Philippines
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" first appeared in
Islands of foreign parents who,
legislation in the Philippine Organic Act, otherwise known as before the adoption of this
the Philippine Bill of 1902:164 Constitution, had been elected to
Section 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands
continuing to reside therein, who were Spanish subjects on public office in the Philippine
the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, Islands.
and then resided in said Islands, and their children born
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be
citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to (3) Those whose fathers are citizens of
the protection of the United States, except such as shall have the Philippines.
elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace
between the United States and Spain signed at Paris
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of
December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight. the Philippines and upon reaching
(Emphasis supplied) the age of majority, elect Philippine
The Philippine Bill of 1902 explicitly covered the status of citizenship.
children born in the Philippine Islands to its inhabitants who
were Spanish subjects as of April 11, 1899. However, it did
not account for the status of children born in the Islands to (5) Those who are naturalized in
parents who were not Spanish subjects. A view was accordance with law.
expressed that the common law concept of jus soli (or
citizenship by place of birth), which was operative in the The term "natural-born citizen" first appeared in this
United States, applied to the Philippine Islands.165 chanroble slaw jurisdiction in the 1935 Constitution's provision stipulating
the qualifications for President and Vice-President of the
On March 23, 1912, the United States Congress amended Philippines. Article VII, Section 3 read: ChanRobles Virtualawl ibrary

Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902. It was made to SECTION 3. No person may be elected to the office of
include a proviso for the enactment by the legislature of a President or Vice-President, unless he be a natural-born
law on acquiring citizenship. This proviso read: ChanRobles Vi rt ualawlib ra ry citizen of the Philippines, a qualified voter, forty years of age
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, or over, and has been a resident of the Philippines for at least
is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of ten years immediately preceding the election.
Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine
While it used the term "natural-born citizen," the 1935
Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the
Constitution did not define the term.
natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and
such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are
Article II, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution—read with
citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of
the then civil law provisions that stipulated the automatic loss
the United States under the laws of the United States if
of Filipino citizens lip by women who marry alien husbands—
residing therein.166
was discriminatory towards women.170 The 1973 Constitution
c hanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry

In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, otherwise known as rectified this problematic situation: ChanRoblesVirtualawl ibra ry

the Jones Law of 1916, replaced the Philippine Bill of 1902. It SECTION 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
restated the citizenship provision of the Philippine Bill of chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

1902, as amended:167
Section 2.—Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization
(1) Those who are citizens of the
That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Philippines at the time of the
Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen
hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands,
adoption of this Constitution.
and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed
and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such (2) Those whose fathers or mothers are
as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the citizens of the Philippines.
Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the
 army shall not be given to nor devolve on, any but a
(3) Those who elect Philippine natural born Citizen.
citizenship pursuant to the Possibly this letter was motivated by distrust of Baron Von
provisions of the Constitution of Steuben, who had served valiantly in the Revolutionary
forces, but whose subsequent loyalty was suspected by Jay.
nineteen hundred and thirty-five. Another theory is that the Jay letter, and the resulting
constitutional provision, responded to rumors that the
(4) Those who are naturalized in Convention was concocting a monarchy to be ruled by a
foreign monarch.177
accordance with law. chan roblesv irt uallawl ibra ry

In the United States, however, citizenship is based on jus

soli, not jus sanguinis.
SECTION 2. A female citizen of the Philippines who marries
an alien shall retain her Philippine citizenship, unless by her V. C
act or omission she is deemed, under the law, to have
renounced her citizenship.171 chan roblesv irt uallawl ibrary

Today, there are only two (2) categories of Filipino citizens:

The 1973 Constitution was the first instrument to actually natural-born and naturalized.
define the term "natural-born citizen." Article III, Section 4 of
the 1973 Constitution provided: ChanRoble sVi rt ualawlib ra ry
A natural-born citizen is defined in Article IV, Section 2 as
SECTION 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of one who is a citizen of the Philippines "from birth without
the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act having to perform any act to acquire or perfect Philippine
to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.172 chan rob lesvi rtual lawlib rary
citizenship." By necessary implication, a naturalized citizen is
one who is not natural-born. Bengson v. House of
The present Constitution adopted most of the provisions of Representatives Electoral Tribunal178 articulates this definition
the 1973 Constitution on citizenship, "except for subsection by dichotomy:
(3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular situation
ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

[O]nly naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born

generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935 citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who are
Constitution."173 chanrobles law

citizens under the present Constitution that there are only

two classes of citizens: . . . A citizen who is not a naturalized
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution now reads: ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
natural-born Filipino.179 chan roble svirtuallaw lib rary

Former Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban further shed

(1) Those who are citizens of the light on the concept of naturalized citizens in his Concurring
Philippines at the time of the Opinion in Bengson: naturalized citizens, he stated, are
"former aliens or foreigners who had to undergo a rigid
adoption of this Constitution; procedure, in which they had to adduce sufficient evidence to
prove that they possessed all the qualifications and none of
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are the disqualifications provided by law in order to become
Filipino citizens."180
citizens of the Philippines; c hanro bleslaw

One who desires to acquire Filipino citizenship by

(3) Those born before January 17, naturalization is generally required to file a verified
petition.181 He or she must establish. among others, that he
1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect or she is of legal age, is of good moral character, and has the
Philippine citizenship upon reaching capacity to adapt to Filipino culture, tradition, and principles,
the age of majority; and or otherwise has resided in the Philippines for a significant
period of time.182 Further, the applicant must show that he or
she will not be a threat to the state, to the public, and to the
(4) Those who are naturalized in Filipinos' core beliefs.183 c hanro bleslaw

accordance with law.174

V. D
Article IV, Section 2 also calibrated the 1973 Constitution's
previous definition of natural-born citizens, as follows: ChanRobles Vi rt uala wlibra ry
Article IV, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution merely gives an
Sec. 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of enumeration. Section 2 categorically defines "natural-born
the Philippines from birth without having to perform citizens." This constitutional definition is further clarified in
any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine jurisprudence, which delineates natural-born citizenship from
citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in naturalized citizenship. Consistent with Article 8 of the Civil
accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be Code, this jurisprudential clarification is deemed written into
deemed natural-born citizens. (Emphasis supplied) the interpreted text, thus establishing its contemporaneous
Ironically, the concept of "natural-born" citizenship is a intent.
"foreign" concept that was transplanted into this jurisdiction
as part of the 1935 Constitution's eligibility requirements for Therefore, petitioner's restrictive reliance on Section 1 and
President and Vice-President of the Philippines. the need to establish bloodline is misplaced. It is inordinately
selective and myopic. It divines Section 1's mere
In the United States Constitution, from which this concept enumeration but blatantly turns a blind eye to the succeeding
originated, the term "natural-born citizen" appears in only a Section's unequivocal definition.
single instance: as an eligibility requirement for the
presidency.175 It is not defined in that Constitution or in Between Article IV, Section 1(2), which petitioner harps on,
American laws. Its origins and rationale for inclusion as a and Section 2, it is Section 2 that is on point. To determine
requirement for the presidency are not even found in the whether private respondent is a natural-born citizen, we must
records of constitutional deliberations.176 However, it has look into whether she had to do anything to perfect her
been suggested that, as the United States was under British citizenship. In view of Bengson, this calls for an inquiry into
colonial rule before its independence, the requirement of whether she underwent the naturalization process to become
being natural-born was introduced as a safeguard against a Filipino.
foreign infiltration in the administration of national
government: ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
She did not.
It has been suggested, quite plausibly, that this language
was inserted in response to a letter sent by John Jay to At no point has it been substantiated that private respondent
George Washington, and probably to other delegates, on July went through the actual naturalization process. There is no
25, 1787, which stated: more straightforward and more effective way to terminate
this inquiry than this realization of total and utter lack of
ChanRoblesVi rtua lawlib rary

Permit me to hint, whether it would be wise and seasonable

to provide a strong check to the admission of Foreigners into proof.
the administration of our national Government; and to
declare expressly that the Command in Chief of the American At most, there have been suggestions likening a preferential
approach to foundlings, as well as compliance with Republic
Act No. 9225, with naturalization. These attempts at
analogies are misplaced. The statutory mechanisms for
naturalization are clear, specific, and narrowly devised. The
investiture of citizenship on foundlings benefits children,
individuals whose capacity to act is restricted.184 It is a
glaring mistake to liken them to an adult filing before the
relevant authorities a sworn petition seeking to become a
Filipino, the grant of which is contingent on evidence that he
or she must himself or herself adduce. As shall later be
discussed, Republic Act No. 9225 is premised on the
immutability of natural-born status. It privileges natural-born
citizens and proceeds from an entirely different premise from
the restrictive process of naturalization.
So too, the jurisprudential treatment of naturalization vis-a-
vis natural-born status is clear. It should be with the actual
process of naturalization that natural-born status is to be
contrasted, not against other procedures relating to
citizenship. Otherwise, the door may be thrown open for the
unbridled diminution of the status of citizens.
V. E
Natural-born citizenship is not concerned with being a human
thoroughbred.
Section 2 defines "natural-born citizens." Section 1(2)
stipulates that to be a citizen, either one's father or one's
mother must be a Filipino citizen.
That is all there is to Section 1(2). Physical features,
genetics, pedigree, and ethnicity are not determinative of
citizenship.
Section 1(2) does not require one's parents to be natural-
born Filipino citizens. It does not even require them to
conform to traditional conceptions of what is indigenously or
ethnically Filipino. One or both parents can, therefore, be
ethnically foreign.
Section 1(2) requires nothing more than one ascendant
degree: parentage. The citizenship of everyone else in one's
ancestry is irrelevant. There is no need, as petitioner insists,
for a pure Filipino bloodline.
Section 1(2) requires citizenship, not identity. A conclusion of
Filipino citizenship may be sustained by evidence adduced in
a proper proceeding, which substantially proves that either or
both of one's parents is a Filipino citizen.
V. F
Private respondent has done this. The evidence she adduced
in these proceedings attests to how at least one—if not
both—of her biological parents were Filipino citizens.
Proving private respondent's biological parentage is now
practically impossible. To begin with, she was abandoned as
a newborn infant. She was abandoned almost half a century
ago. By now, there are only a handful of those who, in 1968,
were able-minded adults who can still lucidly render
testimonies on the circumstances of her birth and finding.
Even the identification of individuals against whom DNA
evidence may be tested is improbable, and by sheer
economic cost, prohibitive.
However, our evidentiary rules admit of alternative means for
private respondent to establish her parentage.
In lieu of direct evidence, facts may be proven through
circumstantial evidence. In Suerte-Felipe v. People:185
Direct evidence is that which proves the fact in dispute
without the aid of any inference or presumption; while
circumstantial evidence is the proof of fact or facts from
which, taken either singly or collectively, the existence of a
particular fact in dispute may be inferred as a necessary or
probable consequence.186
cha nro blesvi rtua llawli bra ry
People v. Raganas further defines circumstantial
187
evidence:
ChanRob les Vi rtualaw lib rary
Circumstantial evidence is that which relates to a series of
facts other than the fact in issue, which by experience have
been found so associated with such fact that in a relation of
cause and effect, they lead us to a satisfactory
conclusion.188 (Citation omitted)
Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, for
instance, stipulates when circumstantial evidence is sufficient
to justify a conviction in criminal proceedings: Cha nRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. —
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry (a) There is more than one circumstances;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and cralawlawli bra ry
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Although the Revised Rules on Evidence's sole mention of
circumstantial evidence is in reference to criminal
proceedings, this Court has nevertheless sustained the use of
circumstantial evidence in other proceedings.189 There is no
rational basis for making the use of circumstantial evidence
exclusive to criminal proceedings and for not considering
circumstantial facts as valid means for proof in civil and/or
administrative proceedings.
In criminal proceedings, circumstantial evidence suffices to
sustain a conviction (which may result in deprivation of life,
liberty, and property) anchored on the highest standard or
proof that our legal system would require, i.e., proof beyond
reasonable doubt. If circumstantial evidence suffices for such
a high standard, so too may it suffice to satisfy the less
stringent standard of proof in administrative and quasi-
judicial proceedings such as those before the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, i.e., substantial evidence.190
chan roble slaw
Private respondent was found as a newborn infant outside
the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo on September 3, 1968.191 In
1968, Iloilo, as did most—if not all—Philippine provinces, had
a predominantly Filipino population.192 Private respondent is
described as having "brown almond-shaped eyes, a low nasal
bridge, straight black hair and an oval-shaped face."193 She
stands at 5 feet and 2 inches tall.194 Further, in 1968, there
was no international airport in Jaro, Iloilo.
These circumstances are substantial evidence justifying an
inference that her biological parents were Filipino. Her
abandonment at a Catholic Church is more or less consistent
with how a Filipino who, in 1968, lived in a predominantly
religious and Catholic environment, would have behaved. The
absence of an international airport in Jaro, Iloilo precludes
the possibility of a foreigner mother, along with a foreigner
father, swiftly and surreptitiously coming in and out of Jaro,
Iloilo just to give birth and leave her offspring there. Though
proof of ethnicity is unnecessary, her physical features
nonetheless attest to it.
In the other related case of Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission
on Elections,195 the Solicitor General underscored how it is
statistically more probable that private respondent was born
a Filipino citizen rather than as a foreigner. He submitted the
following table is support of his statistical inference:196
NUMBER OF FOREIGN AND FILIPINO CHILDREN BORN IN THE
PHILIPPINES: 1965-1975 and 2010-2014
FOREIGN FILIPINO
CHILDREN CHILDREN
YEAR
BORN IN THE BORN IN THE
PHILIPPINES PHILIPPINES
1965 1,479 795,415
1966 1,437 823,342
1967 1,440 840,302
1968 1,595 898,570
1969 1,728 946,753
1970 1,521 966,762
1971 1,401 963,749

1972 1,784 968,385
1973 1,212 1,045,290
1974 1,496 1,081,873
1975 1,493 1,223,837
2010 1,244 1,782,877
2011 1,140 1,746,685
2012 1,454 1,790,367
2013 1,315 1,751,523
2014 1,351 1,748,782
Source: Philippine Statistics Authority [illegible] 197
c hanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
Thus, out of the 900,165 recorded births in the Philippines in
1968, only 1,595 or 0.18% newborns were foreigners. This
translates to roughly 99.8% probability that private
respondent was born a Filipino citizen.
Given the sheer difficulty, if not outright impossibility, of
identifying her parents after half a century, a range of
substantive proof is available to sustain a reasonable
conclusion as to private respondent's parentage.
VI
Before a discussion on how private respondent's natural-born
status is sustained by a general assumption on foundlings
arising from a comprehensive reading and validated by a
contemporaneous construction of the Constitution, and
considering that we have just discussed the evidence
pertaining to the circumstances of private respondent's birth,
it is opportune to consider petitioner's allegations that private
respondent bore the burden of proving—through proof of her
bloodline—her natural-born status.
Petitioner's claim that the burden of evidence shifted to
private respondent upon a mere showing that she is a
foundling is a serious error.
Petitioner invites this Court to establish a jurisprudential
presumption that all newborns who have been abandoned in
rural areas in the Philippines are not Filipinos. His emphasis
on private respondent's supposed burden to prove the
circumstances of her birth places upon her an impossible
condition. To require proof from private respondent borders
on the absurd when there is no dispute that the crux of the
controversy—the identity of her biological parents—is simply
not known.
"Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on
the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense
by the amount of evidence required by law." Burden of proof
lies on the party making the allegations;198 that is, the party
who "alleges the affirmative of the issue"199 Burden of proof
never shifts from one party to another. What shifts is the
burden of evidence. This shift happens when a party makes a
prima facie case in his or her favor.200 The other party then
bears the "burden of going forward"201 with the evidence
considering that which has ostensibly been established
against him or her.
In an action for quo warranto, the burden of proof necessarily
falls on the party who brings the action and who alleges that
the respondent is ineligible for the office involved in the
controversy. In proceedings before quasi-judicial bodies such
as the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the requisite quantum of
proof is substantial evidence.202 This burden was petitioner's
to discharge. Once the petitioner makes a prima facie case,
the burden of evidence shifts to the respondent.
Private respondent's admitted status as a foundling does not
establish a prima facie case in favor of petitioner. While it
does establish that the identities of private respondent's
biological parents are not known, it does not automatically
mean that neither her father nor her mother is a Filipino.
The most that petitioner had in his favor was doubt. A taint
of doubt, however, is by no means substantial evidence
establishing a prima facie case and shifting the burden of
evidence to private respondent.
Isolating the fact of private respondent's being a foundling,
petitioner trivializes other uncontroverted circumstances that
we have previously established as substantive evidence of
private respondent's parentage:
ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary
(1) Petitioner was found in front of a
church in Jaro, Iloilo;
(2) She was only an infant when she
was found, practically a newborn;
(3) She was-found sometime in
September 1968;
(4) Immediately after she was found,
private respondent was registered
as a foundling;
(5) There was no international airport in
Jaro, Iloilo; and
(6) Private respondent's physical
features are consistent with those of
typical Filipinos.
Petitioner's refusal to account for these facts demonstrates
an imperceptive bias. As against petitioner's suggested
conclusions, the more reasonable inference from these facts
is that at least one of private respondent's parents is a
Filipino.
VII
Apart from how private respondent is a natural-born Filipino
citizen consistent with a reading that harmonizes Article IV,
Section 2's definition of natural-born citizens and Section
1(2)'s reference to parentage, the Constitution sustains a
presumption that all foundlings found in the Philippines are
born to at least either a Filipino father or a Filipino mother
and are thus natural-born, unless there is substantial proof
otherwise. Consistent with Article IV, Section 1(2), any such
countervailing proof must show that both—not just one—of a
foundling's biological parents are not Filipino citizens.
VII. A
Quoting heavily from Associate Justice Teresita Leonardo-De
Castro's Dissenting Opinion to the assailed November 17,
2015 Decision, petitioner intimates that no inference or
presumption in favor of natural-born citizenship may be
indulged in resolving this case.203 He insists that it is private
respondent's duty to present incontrovertible proof of her
Filipino parentage.
Relying on presumptions is concededly less than ideal.
Common sense dictates that actual proof is preferable.
Nevertheless, resolving citizenship issues based on
presumptions is firmly established in jurisprudence.
In 2004, this Court resolved Tecson on the basis of
presumptions. Ruling on the allegations that former
presidential candidate Ronald Allan Poe (more popularly
known as Fernando Poe, Jr.) was not a natural-born Filipino
citizen, this Court proceeded from the presumptions that:
first, Fernando Poe Jr.'s grandfather, Lorenzo Pou, was born
sometime in 1870, while the country was still under Spanish
colonial rule;204 and second, that Lorenzo Pou's place of
residence, as indicated in his dearth certificate, must have
also been his place of residence before death, which
subjected him to the "en masse Filipinization," or sweeping
investiture of Filipino citizenship effected by the Philippine Bill
of 1902.205 This Court then noted that Lorenzo Pou's
citizenship would have extended to his son and Fernando Poe
Jr.'s father, Allan F. Poe. Based on these, Fernando Poe. Jr.
would then have been a natural-born Filipino as he was born
while the 1935 Constitution, which conferred Filipino
citizenship to those born to Filipino fathers, was in effect:
In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of
discretion has been committed by the COMELEC, it is
necessary to take on the matter of whether or not
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn,
depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan
F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the
affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of
respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino
citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the
Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from
the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old,
when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San
Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in
1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well
been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo
Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization"
that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship
(of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his
son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935
Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen
first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are
Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are
legitimate or illegitimate.206 chan robl esvirt uallawl ibra ry
It is true that there is jurisprudence—Paa v. Chan207 and Go
v. Ramos208 (which merely cites Paa)—to the effect that
presumptions cannot be entertained in citizenship cases.
Paa, decided in 1967, stated:
ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
It is incumbent upon the respondent, who claims Philippine
citizenship, to prove to the satisfaction of the court that he is
really a Filipino. No presumption can be indulged in favor
of the claimant, of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt
regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the
State.209 (Emphasis supplied)
These pronouncements are no longer controlling in light of
this Court's more recent ruling in Tecson.
Moreover, what this Court stated in Paa was that "no
presumption can be indulged in favor of theclaimant of
Philippine citizenship." This reference to "the claimant" was
preceded by a sentence specifically referencing the duty of
"the respondent." The syntax of this Court's
pronouncement—using the definitive article "the"—reveals
that its conclusion was specific only to Chan and to his
circumstances. Otherwise, this Court would have used
generic language. Instead of the definite article "the," it could
have used the indefinite article "a" in that same sentence:
"no presumption can be indulged in favor of aclaimant of
Philippine citizenship." In the alternative, it could have used
other words that would show absolute or sweeping
application, for instance: "no presumption can be indulged in
favor of any/everyclaimant of Philippine citizenship;" or, "no
presumption can be indulged in favor of all claimants of
Philippine citizenship."
The factual backdrop of Paa is markedly different from those
of this case. Its statements, therefore, are inappropriate
precedents for this case. In Paa, clear evidence was adduced
showing that respondent Quintin Chan was registered as an
alien with the Bureau of Immigration. His father was likewise
registered as an alien. These pieces of evidence already
indubitably establish foreign citizenship and shut the door to
any presumption. In contrast, petitioner in this case presents
no proof, direct or circumstantial, of private respondent's or
of both of her parents' foreign citizenship.
Go cited Paa, taking the same quoted portion but revising it
to make it appear that the same pronouncement was
generally applicable: ChanRob les Virtualawl ibra ry
It is incumbent upon one who claims Philippine citizenship to
prove to the satisfaction of the court that he is really a
Filipino. No presumption can be indulged hi favor of the
claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding
citizenship must be resolved in favor of the
state.210 (Emphasis supplied)
ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary
Thus, Paa's essential and pivotal nuance was lost in
proverbial translation. In any case, Go was decided by this
Court sitting in Division. It cannot overturn Tecson, which
was decided by this Court sitting En Banc. Likewise, Go's
factual and even procedural backdrops are different from
those of this case. Goinvolved the deportation of an allegedly
illegal and undesirable alien, not an election controversy.
In Go, copies of birth certificates unequivocally showing the
Chinese citizenship of Go and of his siblings were adduced.
VII. B
The presumption that all foundlings found in the Philippines
are born to at least either a Filipino father or a Filipino
mother (and are thus natural-born, unless there is
substantial proof otherwise) arises when one reads the
Constitution as a whole, so as to "effectuate [its] whole
purpose."211 chan robles law
As much as we have previously harmonized Article IV,
Section 2 with Article IV, Section 1(2), constitutional
provisions on citizenship must not be taken in isolation. They
must be read in light of the constitutional mandate to defend
the well-being of children, to guarantee equal protection of
the law and equal access to opportunities for public service,
and to respect human rights. They must also be read in
conjunction with the Constitution's reasons for requiring
natural-born status for select public offices. Further, this
presumption is validated by contemporaneous construction
that considers related legislative enactments, executive and
administrative actions, and international instruments.
Article II, Section 13 and Article XV, Section 3 of the 1987
Constitution require the state to enhance children's well-
being and to project them from conditions prejudicial to or
that may undermine their development. Fulfilling this
mandate includes preventing discriminatory conditions and,
especially, dismantling mechanisms for discrimination that
hide behind the veneer of the legal apparatus: ChanRoblesVirtualawl ibra ry
ARTICLE II
....
State Policies
....
SECTION 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth
in nation-building and shall promote and protect their
physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-
being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and
nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and
civic affairs.
....
ARTICLE XV
The Family
....
SECTION 3. The State shall defend:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry ....
(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper
care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms
of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other
conditions prejudicial to their development[.] (Emphasis
supplied)
Certain crucial government offices are exclusive to natural-
born citizens of the Philippines. The 1987 Constitution makes
the following offices exclusive to natural-born citizens: ChanRoble sVirt ualawl ibra ry
(1) President;212
(2) Vice-President;213
(3) Senator;214
(4) Member of the House of
Representatives;215
 The equal protection clause serves as a guarantee that
(5) Member of the Supreme Court or "persons under like circumstances and falling within the same
any lower collegiate court;216 class are treated alike, in terms of 'privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced.' It is a guarantee against 'undue favor
and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
(6) Chairperson and Commissioners of discrimination or oppression of inequality.'"228 chan robles law

the Civil Service Commission;217

Other than the anonymity of their biological parents, no
substantial distinction229 differentiates foundlings from
(7) Chairperson and Commissioners of children with known Filipino parents. They are both entitled
the Commission on Elections;218 to the full extent of the state's protection from the moment
of their birth. Foundlings' misfortune in failing to identify the
parents who abandoned them—an inability arising from no
(8) Chairperson and Commissioners of fault of their own—cannot be the foundation of a rule that
the Commission on Audit;219 reduces them to statelessness or, at best, as inferior, second-
class citizens who are not entitled to as much benefits and
protection from the state as those who know their parents.
(9) Ombudsman and his or her Sustaining this classification is not only inequitable; it is
deputies;220 dehumanizing. It condemns those who, from the very
beginning of their lives, were abandoned to a life of
desolation and deprivation.
(10) Board of Governors of the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas;221 and This Court does not exist in a vacuum. It is a constitutional
organ, mandated to effect the Constitution's dictum of
(11) Chairperson and Members of the defending and promoting the well-being and development of
children. It is not our business to reify discriminatory classes
Commission on Human Rights.222 based on circumstances of birth.
Apart from these, other positions that are limited to natural-
Even more basic than their being citizens of the Philippines,
born citizens include, among others, city fiscals,223 assistant
foundlings are human persons whose dignity we value and
city fiscals,224 Presiding Judges and Associate Judges of the
rights we, as a civilized nation, respect. Thus:
Sandiganbayan, and other public offices.225 Certain
ChanRoblesVi rtualaw lib rary

ARTICLE II
professions are also limited to natural-born citizens,226 as are
other legally established benefits and incentives.227
....
chan roble slaw

Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born Filipino

citizens is tantamount to permanently discriminating against
our foundling citizens. They can then never be of service to
the country in the highest possible capacities. It is also
tantamount to excluding them from certain means such as
professions and state scholarships, which will enable the
actualization of their aspirations. These consequences cannot
be tolerated by the Constitution, not least of all through the
present politically charged proceedings, the direct objective
of which is merely to exclude a singular politician from office.
Concluding that foundlings are not natural-born citizens
creates an inferior class of citizens who are made to suffer
that inferiority through no fault of their own.
If that is not discrimination, we do not know what is.
The Constitution guarantees equal protection of the laws and
equal access to opportunities for public service:ChanRoble sVirt ualawli bra ry
ARTICLE II
....
State Policies
....
SECTION 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to
opportunities for public service, and prohibit political
dynasties as may be defined by law.
State Policies
....
SECTION 11. The State values the dignity of every human
person and guarantees full respect for human rights.
(Emphasis supplied)
VII. C
Though the matter is settled by interpretation exclusively
within the confines of constitutional text, the presumption
that foundlings are natural-born citizens of the Philippines
(unless substantial evidence of the foreign citizenship of both
of the foundling's parents is presented) is validated by a
parallel consideration or contemporaneous construction of the
Constitution with acts of Congress, international instruments
in force in the Philippines, as well as acts of executive organs
such as the Bureau of Immigration, Civil Registrars, and the
President of the Philippines.
Congress has enacted statutes founded on the premise that
foundlings are Filipino citizens at birth. It has adopted
mechanisms to effect the constitutional mandate to protect
children. Likewise, the Senate has ratified treaties that put
this mandate into effect.
Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as the Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Act of 2006, provides: ChanRob les Virtualawl ibra ry

SEC. 2. Declaration of State Policy. - The following State

.... policies shall be observed at all times:

ARTICLE III chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry ....

Bill of Rights
(b) The State shall protect the best interests of the
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or child through measures that will ensure the
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be observance of international standards of child
denied the equal protection of the laws. protection, especially those to which the Philippines is
a party. Proceedings before any authority shall be conducted
.... in the best interest of the child and in a manner which allows
the child to participate and to express himself/herself freely.
ARTICLE XIII The participation of children in the program and policy
Social Justice and Human Rights formulation and implementation related to juvenile justice
and welfare shall be ensured by the concerned government
SECTION 1. The Congress shall give highest priority to the agency. (Emphasis supplied)
enactment of measures that protect and enhance the Section 4(b) of the Republic Act No. 9344 defines the "best
right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, interest of the child" as the "totality of the circumstances and
economic, and political inequalities, and remove conditions which are most congenial to the survival,
cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and protection and feelings of security of the child and most
political power for the common good. (Emphasis encouraging to the child's physical, psychological and
supplied) emotional development."
Consistent with this statute is our ratification230 of the United 1. The child, shall be registered immediately
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. This after birth and shall have the right from
specifically requires the states-parties' protection of: first, birth to a name, the right to acquire a
children's rights to immediate registration and nationality nationality and as far as possible, the right
after birth; second, against statelessness; and third, against to know and be cared for by his or her
discrimination on account of their birth status.231 Pertinent parents.
portions of the Convention read: ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary

Preamble 2. States Parties shall ensure the

implementation of these rights in
The State Parties to the present Convention, accordance with their national law and their
obligations under the relevant international
Considering that, in accordance with the principles instruments in this field, in particular
proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations, recognition where the child would otherwise be
of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable stateless. (Emphasis supplied)
rights of all members of the human family is the
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,
The Philippines likewise ratified232 the 1966 International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. As with the Convention
Bearing in mind that the peoples of the United Nations have,
on the Rights of the Child, this treaty requires that children
in the Charter, reaffirmed their faith in fundamental
be allowed immediate registration after birth and to acquire a
human rights and in the dignity and worth of the
nationality. It similarly defends them against
human person, and have determined to promote social
discrimination:
progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,
ChanRo bles Vi rtua lawlib rary

Article 24. . . .
Recognizing that the United Nations has, in the Universal
1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as
Declaration of Human Rights and in the International
to race, colour, sex, language, religion, national or social
Covenants on Human Rights, proclaimed and agreed
origin, property or birth, the right to such measures of
that everyone is entitled to all the rights and
protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the
freedoms set forth therein, without distinction of any
part of his family, society and the State.
kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth
2. Every child shall be registered immediately after
or other status,
birth and shall have a name.
Recalling that, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.
the United Nations has proclaimed that childhood is
entitled to special care and assistance,
....
....
Article 26. All persons are equal before the law and
are entitled without any discrimination to the equal
Have agreed as follows:
protection of the law. In this respect, the law
shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all
....
persons equal and effective protection against
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex,

Article 2
1. State parties shall respect and ensure the
rights set forth in the present Convention to
each child within their jurisdiction without
discrimination of any kind, irrespective
of the child's or his or her parent's or
legal guardian's race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion,
national, ethnic or social origin,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status. (Emphasis supplied)
Treaties are "international agreements] concluded between
state| in written form and governed by international law,
whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more
related instruments and whatever its particular
designation."233 Under Article VII, Section 21 of the 1987
Constitution, treaties require concurrence by the Senate
before they became binding: ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary

property, disability, birth or other
status.
2. States Parties shall take appropriate
measures to ensure that the child is
protected against all forms of
discrimination or punishment on the
basis of the status, activities, expressed
opinions, or beliefs of the child's parents,
legal guardians, or family members.
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children,
whether undertaken by public or private
social welfare institutions, courts of law,
administrative authorities or legislative
bodies, the best interests of the child
shall be a primary consideration.
2. States Parties undertake to ensure the
child such protection and care as is
necessary for his or her well-being,
taking into account the rights and duties of
his or her parents, legal guardians, or other
individuals legally responsible for him or her,
and, to this end, shall take all appropriate
legislative and administrative measures.
....
SECTION 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be
valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds
of all the Members of the Senate.
The Senate's ratification of a treaty makes it legally effective
and binding by transformation. It then has the force and
effect of a statute enacted by Congress. In Pharmaceutical
and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III,
et al.:234
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become
part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation
or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a domestic law through
a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The
incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional
declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of
domestic law.
Treaties become part of the law of the land through
transformation pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the
Constitution which provides that "[n]o treaty or international
agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by
at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate." Thus,
treaties or conventional international law must go through a
process prescribed by the Constitution for it to be
transformed into municipal law that can be applied to
domestic conflicts.235 (Emphasis supplied)
Following ratification by the Senate, no further action,
legislative or otherwise, is necessary. Thereafter, the whole
of government—including the judiciary—is duty-bound to
abide by the treaty, consistent with the maxim pacta sunt
servanda.

Article 7 Accordingly, by the Constitution and by statute, foundlings

cannot be the object of discrimination. They are vested with
the rights to be registered and granted nationality upon birth.
To deny them these rights, deprive them of citizenship, and
render them stateless is to unduly burden them, discriminate
them, and undermine their development.
Not only Republic Act No. 9344, the Convention on the Rights
of the Child, and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights effect the constitutional dictum of promoting
the well-being of children and protecting them from
discrimination. Other legislative enactments demonstrate the
intent to treat foundlings as Filipino citizens from birth.
Republic Act No. 8552, though briefly referred to as the
Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, is formally entitled An Act
Establishing the Rules and Policies on Domestic Adoption of
Filipino Children and for Other Purposes. It was enacted as
a mechanism to "provide alternative protection and
assistance through foster care or adoption of every child who
is neglected, orphaned, or abandoned."236
Foundlings are explicitly among the "Filipino children"
covered by Republic Act No. 8552:237
SECTION 5. Location of Unknown Parent(s). — It shall be the
duty of the Department or the child-placing or child-caring
agency which has custody of the child to exert all efforts to
locate his/her unknown biological parent(s). If such efforts
fail, the child shall be registered as a foundling and
subsequently be the subject of legal proceedings
where he/she shall be declared abandoned. (Emphasis
supplied)
Similarly, Republic Act No. 8043, though briefly referred to as
the Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995, is formally entitled
An Act Establishing the Rules to Govern Inter-
Country Adoption of Filipino Children, and for Other
Purposes. As with Republic Act No. 8552, it expressly
includes foundlings among "Filipino children" who may be
adopted: ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
SECTION 8. Who May Be Adopted. — Only a legally free child
may be the subject of inter-country adoption, hi order that
such child may be considered for placement, the following
documents must be submitted: to the Board:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry a) Child study;
b) Birth certificate/foundling certificate;
c) Deed of voluntary commitment/decree of
abandonment/death certificate of parents;
d) Medical evaluation/history;
e) Psychological evaluation, as necessary; and
f) Recent photo of the child. (Emphasis supplied)
In the case of foundlings, foundling certificates may be
presented in lieu of authenticated birth certificates to satisfy
the requirement for the issuance of passports, which will then
facilitate their adoption by foreigners:
Cha nRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
SECTION 5. If the applicant is an adopted person, he must
present a certified true copy of the Court Order of Adoption,
certified true copy of his original and amended birth
certificates as issued by the OCRG. If the applicant is a
minor, a Clearance from the DSWD shall be required. In case
the applicant is for adoption by foreign parents under R.A.
No. 8043, the following, shall be required:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
a) Certified true copy of the Court
Decree of Abandonment of Child, the
Death Certificate of the child's
parents, or the Deed of Voluntary
Commitment executed after the birth
of the child.
b) Endorsement of child to the
Intercountry Adoption Board by the
DSWD.
c) Authenticated Birth or Foundling
Certificate.238 (Emphasis supplied)
Our statutes on adoption allow for the recognition of
foundlings' Filipino citizenship on account of their birth. They
benefit from this without having to do any act to perfect their
citizenship or without having to complete the naturalization
process. Thus, by definition, they are natural-born citizens.
Specifically regarding private respondent, several acts of
executive organs have recognized her natural-born status.
This status was never questioned throughout her life; that is,
until circumstances made it appear that she was a viable
candidate for President of the Philippines. Until this, as well
as the proceedings in the related case of Poe-Llamanzares,
private respondent's natural-born status has been affirmed
and reaffirmed through various official public acts.
chanroble slaw
First, private respondent was issued a foundling certificate
and benefitted from the domestic adoption process. Second,
on July 18, 2006, she was granted an order of reacquisition
of natural-born citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 by
the Bureau of Immigration. Third, on October 6, 2010, the
President of the Philippines appointed her as MTRCB
Chairperson—an office that requires natural-born
citizenship.239 chan roble slaw
VIII
As it is settled that private respondent's being a foundling is
not a bar to natural-born citizenship, petitioner's proposition
as to her inability to benefit from Republic Act No. 9225
crumbles. Private respondent, a natural-born Filipino citizen,
re-acquired natural-born Filipino citizenship when, following
her naturalization as a citizen of the United States, she
complied with the requisites of Republic Act No. 9225.
VIII. A
"Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the
manner provided by law."240 Commonwealth Act No. 63,
which was in effect when private respondent was naturalized
an American citizen on October 18, 2001, provided in Section
1(1) that "[a] Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship . . . [b]y
naturalization in a foreign country." Thus, private respondent
lost her Philippine citizenship when she was naturalized an
American citizen. However, on July 7, 2006, she took her
Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines under
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225. Three (3) days later, July
10, 2006, she filed before the Bureau of Immigration and
cralawlawlibra ry
Deportation a Petition for Reacquisition of her Philippine
citizenship. Shortly after, this Petition was granted.241 chanrob leslaw
Republic Act No. 9225 superseded Commonwealth Act No.
63242 and Republic Act No. 8171243specifically "to do away
with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 which takes
away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who
become naturalized citizens of other countries."244
chanro bleslaw
The citizenship regime put in place by Republic Act No. 9225
is designed, in its own words, to ensure "that all Philippine
citizens who become citizens of another country shall be
deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship."245 This
Court shed light on this in Calilung v. Commission on
Elections:246 "[w]hat Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual
citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country."247 chanro bles law
Republic Act No. 9225 made natural-born Filipinos' status
permanent and immutable despite naturalization as citizens
of other countries. To effect this, Section 3 of Republic Act
No. 9225 provides:
ChanRob les Virtualawl ibra ry
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. — Any provision
of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens
of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by
reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country
are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship
upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the
Republic: ChanRoble sVirt ualawli bra ry
"I _________________________, solemnly swear (or affirm)
that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic
of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the
Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept
the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain
true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this office; Provided, That they
obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation renounce their oath of
or purpose of evasion."
allegiance to the country where
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the
effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country they took that oath;
shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
aforesaid oath.
Section 3's implications are clear. Natural-born Philippine (4) Those intending to practice their
citizens who, after Republic Act 9225 took effect, are profession in the Philippines
naturalized in foreign countries "retain," that is, keep, their
Philippine citizenship, although the effectivity of this retention
shall apply with the proper
and the ability to exercise the rights and capacities attendant authority for a license or permit
to this status are subject to certain solemnities (i.e., oath of to engage in such practice; and
allegiance and other requirements for specific rights and/or
acts, as enumerated in Section 5). On the other hand, those
who became citizens of another country before the effectivity
of Republic Act No. 9225 "reacquire" their Philippine (5) That the right to vote or be
citizenship and may exercise attendant rights and capacities, elected or appointed to any
also upon compliance with certain solemnities. Read in
conjunction with Section 2's declaration of a policy of public office in the Philippines
immutability, this reacquisition is not a mere restoration that cannot be exercised by, or
leaves a vacuum in the intervening period. Rather, this
reacquisition works to restore natural-born status as though extended to, those who:
it was never lost at all.

VIII. B a. are candidates for or are

Taking the Oath of Allegiance effects the retention or
occupying any public office in
reacquisition of natural-born citizenship. It also facilitates the the country of which they are
enjoyment of civil and political rights, "subject to all naturalized citizens; and/or
attendant liabilities and responsibilities."248 However, other
conditions must be met for the exercise of other faculties: ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary

Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who

retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall b. are in active service as
enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all commissioned or non-
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of
the Philippines and the following conditions: commissioned officers in the
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
armed forces of the country
which they are naturalized
(1) Those intending to exercise their citizens. (Emphasis supplied)
right of suffrage must meet the
Thus, natural-born Filipinos who have been naturalized
requirements under Section 1, elsewhere and wish to run for elective public office must
Article V of the Constitution, comply with all of the following requirements:
Republic Act No. 9189, First, taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. This
otherwise known as "the
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

effects the retention or reacquisition of one's status as a

natural-born Filipino.249 This also enables the enjoyment of
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of full civil and political rights, subject to all attendant liabilities
2003" and other existing laws; and responsibilities under existing laws, provided the
solemnities recited in Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9225 are
satisfied.250 chan rob leslaw

(2) Those seeking elective public Second, compliance with Article V, Section 1 of the 1987
office in the Philippines shall Constitution,251 Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as
meet the qualifications for the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, and other existing
laws. This is to facilitate the exercise of the right of suffrage;
holding such public office as that is, to allow for voting in elections.252 c hanro bles law

required by the Constitution and

Third, "mak[ing] a personal and sworn renunciation of any
existing laws and, at the time and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized
of the filing of the certificate to administer an oath."253 This, along with satisfying the
of candidacy, make a other qualification requirements under relevant laws, makes
one eligible for elective public office.
personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all As explained in Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on
Elections,254 this required sworn renunciation is intended to
foreign citizenship before any complement Article XI, Section 18 of the Constitution in that
public officer authorized to "[p]ublic officers and employees owe the State and this
administer an oath; Constitution allegiance at all times and any public officer or
employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the
status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure
shall be dealt with by law."255 It is also in view of this that
(3) Those appointed to any public Section 5(5) similarly bars those who seek or occupy public
office shall subscribe and swear office elsewhere and/or who are serving in the armed forces
of other countries from being appointed or elected to public
to an oath of allegiance to office in the Philippines.
the Republic of the
VIII. C
Philippines and its duly
constituted authorities prior Private respondent has complied with all of these
to their assumption of requirements. First, on July 7, 2006, she took the Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.256 Second, on
August 31, 2006, she became a registered voter of Barangay
Santa Lucia, San Juan.257 This evidences her compliance with
Article V, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution. Since she was
to vote within the country, this dispensed with the need to
comply with the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003.
Lastly, on October 20, 2010, she executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America
and Renunciation of American Citizenship.258This was
complemented by her execution of an Oath/Affirmation of
Renunciation of Nationality of the United States259 before
Vice-Consul Somer E. Bessire-Briers on July 12,
2011,260 which was, in turn, followed by Vice Consul Jason
Galian's issuance of a Certificate of Loss of Nationality on
December 9, 2011261 and the approval of this certificate by
the Overseas Citizen Service, Department of State, on
February 3, 2012.262 chanrob leslaw
precedent. It is to make this Court an accomplice to injustice.
Equality, the recognition of the humanity of every individual,
and social justice are the bedrocks of our constitutional order.
By the unfortunate fortuity of the inability or outright
irresponsibility of those gave them life, foundlings are
compelled to begin their very existence at a disadvantage.
Theirs is a continuing destitution that can never be truly
remedied by any economic relief.
If we are to make the motives of our Constitution true, then
we an never tolerate an interpretation that condemns
foundlings to an even greater misfortune because of their
being abandoned. The Constitution cannot be rendered inert
and meaningless for them by mechanical judicial fiat.

Private respondent has, therefore, not only fully reacquired Dura lex sed lex is not a callous and unthinking maxim to be
natural-born citizenship; she has also complied with all of the deployed against other reasonable interpretations of our
other requirements for eligibility to elective public office, as basic law. It does command us to consider legal text, but
stipulated in Republic Act No. 9225. always with justice in mind.

VIII. D It is the empowering and ennobling interpretation of the

It is incorrect to intimate that private respondent's having
had to comply with Republic Act No. 9225 shows that she is a
naturalized, rather than a natural-born, Filipino citizen. It is
wrong to postulate that compliance with Republic Act No.
9225 signifies the performance of acts to perfect citizenship.
To do so is to completely disregard the unequivocal policy of
permanence and immutability as articulated in Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 9225 and as illuminated in jurisprudence. It
is to erroneously assume that a natural-born Filipino citizen's
naturalization elsewhere is an irreversible termination of his
or her natural-born status.
To belabor the point, those who take the Oath of Allegiance
under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 reacquire natural-
born citizenship. The prefix "re" signifies reference to the
preceding state of affairs. It is to this status quo ante that
one returns. "Re"-acquiring can only mean a reversion to "the
way things were." Had Republic Act No. 9225 intended to
mean the investiture of an entirely new status, it should not
have used a word such as "reacquire." Republic Act No. 9225,
Constitution that we must always sustain. Not only will this
manner of interpretation edify the less fortunate; it
establishes us, as Filipinos, as a humane and civilized people.
The Senate Electoral Tribunal acted well within the bounds of
its constitutional competence when it ruled that private
respondent is a natural-born citizen qualified to sit as Senator
of the Republic. Contrary to petitioner's arguments, there is
no basis for annulling its assailed Decision and Resolution.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED.
Public respondent Senate Electoral Tribunal did not act
without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
rendering its assailed November 17, 2015 Decision and
December 3, 2015 Resolution.
Private respondent Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-
born Filipino citizen qualified to hold office as Senator of the
Republic.
SO ORDERED. chanRoblesvirt ual Lawlib rary

therefore, does not operate to make new citizens whose

citizenship commences only from the moment of compliance Sereno, C.J., Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Bersamin, Perez,
with its requirements. and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., no part.
Bengson, speaking on the analogous situation of repatriation, Leonardo-De Castro, J., no part.
ruled that repatriation involves the restoration of former Brion, J., no part.
status or the recovery of one's original nationality:ChanRob les Vi rtualawl ib rary
Del Castillo, J., not natural born until proven otherwise.
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original Mendoza, J., with some reservation.
nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his Reyes, J., dissenting.
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Perlas-Bernabe, J., please see dissenting opinion.
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a Jardeleza, J., in result.
natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship,
he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born
Filipino.263 (Emphasis supplied)
Although Bengson was decided while Commonwealth Act No.
63 was in force, its ruling is in keeping with Republic Act No.
9225 's policy of permanence and immutablity: "all Philippine
citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost
their Philippine citizenship."264 In Bengson's words, the once
naturalized citizen is "restored" or brought back to his or her
natural-born status. There may have been an interruption in
the recognition of this status, as, in the interim, he or she
was naturalized elsewhere, but the restoration of natural-
born status expurgates this intervening fact. Thus, he or she
does not become a Philippine citizen only from the point of
restoration and moving forward. He or she is recognized, de
jure, as a Philippine citizen from birth, although the
intervening fact may have consequences de facto.

Republic Act No. 9225 may involve extended processes not

limited to taking the Oath of Allegiance and requiring
compliance with additional solemnities, but these are for
facilitating the enjoyment of other incidents to citizenship,
not for effecting the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship
itself. Therefore, it is markedly different from naturalization
as there is no singular, extended process with which the
former natural-born citizen must comply.

IX

To hold, as petitioner suggests, that private respondent is

stateless265 is not only to set a dangerous and callous

VINUYA VS. SEC. ROMULO
G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010
FACTS
: This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court with an application for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the Office of
the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the DFA, the
Secretary of the DOJ, and the OSG. Petitioners are all
members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit
organization registered with the SEC, established for the
purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese
military forces in the Philippines during the Second World
War. Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached
the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG,
requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese
officials and military
officers who ordered the establishment of the “comfort
women” stations in the Philippines. But officials
of the Executive Department declined to assist the
petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims of
the comfor
t women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by
Japan‟s
compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines
and Japan. Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this
court to (a) declare that respondents committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of discretion in
refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes against
humanity and war crimes committed against them; and (b)
compel the respondents to espouse their claims for official
apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other
international tribunals. Respondents maintain that all claims
of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the war were
dealt with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the
bilateral Reparations Agreement of 1956.
On January 15, 1997, the Asian Women‟s Fund and the
Philippine government signed a Memorandum
of Understanding for medical and welfare support programs
for former comfort women. Over the next five years, these
were implemented by the Department of Social Welfare and
Development.
ISSUE
: international law. All they can do is resort to national law, if
WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of
discretion in not espousing petitioners‟
claims for official apology and other forms of reparations
against Japan.
RULING
: Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the
Executive Department has the exclusive
prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners‟
claims against Japan.
Political questions refer “to those questions which, under the
Constitution,
are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity,
or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality
of a particular measure.”
One type of case of political questions involves questions of
foreign relations. It is well-established
that “the conduct of the foreign relations of our government
is committed by the Constitution to the
executive and legislative
–„the political‟–
departments of the government, and the propriety of what
may be done in the exercise of this political power is not
subject to judicial inquiry or decision.” are
delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy.
They are and should be undertaken only by those directly
responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or
imperil. But not all cases implicating foreign relations present
political questions, and courts certainly possess the authority
to construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements.
However, the question whether the Philippine government
should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign
government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for
which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to
the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the
Executive Department has already decided that it is to the
best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals
for
reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The
wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question. The
President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of
knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and
especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential
sources of information. He has his agents in the form of
diplomatic, consular and other officials.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up
petitioners‟ cause would be inimical to our country‟s foreign
policy interests, and could disrupt our relations
with Japan, thereby creating serious
implications for stability in this region. For the to overturn the
Executive Department‟s determination
would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments
by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make
that judgment has been constitutionally committed. From a
municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a general
principle, where such an
extraordinary length of time has lapsed between the treaty‟s
conclusion and our consideration –
the Executive must be given ample discretion to assess the
foreign policy considerations of espousing a claim against
Japan, from the standpoint of both the interests of the
petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on that
basis if apologies are sufficient, and whether further steps are
appropriate or necessary. In the international sphere,
traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring
a claim within the international legal system has been when
the individual is able to persuade a government
to bring a claim on the individual‟s behalf. By taking up the
case of one of its subjects and by resorting
to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on
his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own right to
ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of
international law. Within the limits prescribed by international
law, a State may exercise diplomatic protection by whatever
means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own
right that the State is asserting. Should the natural or legal
person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their rights
are not adequately protected, they have no remedy in
means are available, with a view to furthering their cause or
obtaining redress. All these questions remain within the
province of municipal law and do not affect the position
internationally. Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and
erga omnes obligations will not alter this analysis. Petitioners
have not shown that the crimes committed by the Japanese
army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty
of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute
perpetrators of international crimes is an erga omnes
obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens. The term
erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international
law has been used as a legal term describing obligations
owed by States towards the community of states as a whole.
Essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations
of a State towards the international community as a whole,
and those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of
diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are
the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the
rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest
in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.
The term “jus cogens” (literally, “compelling law”) refers to
norms that command peremptory
authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus
cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense that
they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be
modified only by general international norms of equivalent
authority WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED
EN BANC
G.R. No. 162230 August 13, 2014
ISABELITA C. VINUYA, VICTORIA C. DELA PENA,
HERMINIHILDA MANIMBO, LEONOR H. SUMA WANG,
CANDELARIA L. SOLIMAN, MARIA L. QUILANTANG,
MARIA L. MAGISA, NATALIA M. ALONZO, LOURDES
M. NAVARO, FRANCISCA M. ATENCIO, ERLINDA
MANALASTAS, TARCILA M. SAMPANG, ESTER M.
PALACIO, MAXIMA R. DELA CRUZ, BELEN A.
SAGUM, FELICIDAD TURLA, FLORENCIA M. DELA
PENA, EUGENIA M. LALU, JULIANA G. MAGAT,
CECILIA SANGUYO, ANA ALONZO, RUFINA P.
MALLARI, ROSARIO M. ALARCON, RUFINA C.
GULAPA, ZOILA B. MANALUS, CORAZON C. CALMA,
MARTA A. GULAPA, TEODORA M. HERNANDEZ,
FERMIN B. DELA PENA, MARIA DELA PAZ B.
CULALA,ESPERANZA MANAPOL, JUANITA M.
BRIONES, VERGINIA M. GUEVARRA, MAXIMA
ANGULO, EMILIA SANGIL, TEOFILA R. PUNZALAN,
JANUARIA G. GARCIA, PERLA B. BALINGIT, BELEN
A. CULALA, PILAR Q. GALANG, ROSARIO C. BUCO,
GAUDENCIA C. DELA PENA, RUFINA Q.
CATACUTAN, FRANCIA A. BUCO, PASTORA C.
GUEVARRA, VICTORIA M. DELA CRUZ, PETRONILA
0. DELA CRUZ, ZENAIDA P. DELA CRUZ, CORAZON
M. SUBA, EMERINCIANA A. VINUYA, LYDIA A.
SANCHEZ, ROSALINA M. BUCO, PATRICIA A.
BERNARDO, LUCILA H. PAYAWAL, MAGDALENA
LIWAG, ESTER C. BALINGIT, JOVITA A. DAVID,
EMILIA C. MANGILIT, VERGINIA M. BANGIT,
GUILERMA S. BALINGIT, TERECITA PANGILINAN,
MAMERTA C. PUNO, CRISENCIANA C. GULAPA,
SEFERINA S. TURLA, MAXIMA B. TURLA, LEONICIA
G. GUEVARRA, ROSALINA M. CULALA, CATALINA Y.
MANIO, MAMERTA T. SAGUM, CARIDAD L. TURLA, et
al. in their capacityand as members of the "Malaya Lolas
Organizations," Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
ALBERTO G. ROMULO, THE HONORABLE
SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS DELIA
DOMINGOALBERT, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY
OF JUSTICE MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, and THE
HONORABLE SOLICITOR GENERAL ALFREDO L.
BENIPAYO, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration1 and a
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration,2 praying that
the Court reverse its decision of April 28, 2010, and grant
their petition for certiorari.
In their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners argue that
our constitutional and jurisprudential histories have
rejected the Court’s ruling that the foreign policy
prerogatives ofthe Executive Branch are unlimited; that
under the relevant jurisprudence and constitutional
provisions, such prerogatives are proscribed by
international human rights and international conventions
of which the Philippines is a party; that the Court, in
holding that the Chief Executive has the prerogative
whether to bring petitioners’ claims against Japan, has
read the foreign policy powers of the Office of the
President in isolation from the rest of the constitutional
protections that expressly textualize international human
rights; that the foreign policy prerogatives are subject to
obligations to promote international humanitarian law as
incorporated intothe laws of the land through the
Incorporation Clause; that the Court must re-visit its
decisions in Yamashita v. Styer3 and Kuroda v.
Jalandoni4 which have been noted for their prescient
articulation of the import of laws of humanity; that in said
decision, the Court ruled that the State was bound to
observe the laws of war and humanity; that in
Yamashita, the Court expressly recognized rape as an
international crime under international humanitarian law,
and in Jalandoni, the Court declared that even if the
Philippines had not acceded or signed the Hague
Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land
Warfare, the Rules and Regulations formed part of the
law of the nation by virtue of the Incorporation Clause;
that such commitment to the laws ofwar and humanity
has been enshrined in Section 2, Article II of the 1987
Constitution, which provides "that the
Philippines…adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation, and amity with all nations."
The petitioners added that the statusand applicability of
the generally accepted principles of international law
within the Philippine jurisdiction would be uncertain
without the Incorporation Clause, and that the clause
implied that the general international law forms part of
Philippine law only insofar as they are expressly
adopted; that in its rulings in The Holy See, v. Rosario,
Jr.5 and U.S. v. Guinto6 the Court has said that
international law is deemed part of the Philippine law as
a consequence of Statehood; that in Agustin v. Edu,7 the
Court has declared that a treaty, though not yet ratified
by the Philippines, was part of the law of the land
through the Incorporation Clause; that by virtue of the
Incorporation Clause, the Philippines is bound to abide
by the erga omnesobligations arising from the jus
cogensnorms embodied in the laws of war and humanity
that include the principle of the imprescriptibility of war
crimes; that the crimes committed against petitioners are
proscribed under international human rights law as there
were undeniable violations of jus cogensnorms; that the
need to punish crimes against the laws of humanity has
long become jus cogensnorms, and that international
legal obligations prevail over national legal norms; that
the Court’s invocation of the political doctrine in the
instant case is misplaced; and that the Chief Executive
has the constitutional duty to afford redress and to give
justice to the victims ofthe comfort women system in the
Philippines.8
Petitioners further argue that the Court has confused
diplomatic protection with the broader responsibility of
states to protect the human rights of their citizens,
especially where the rights asserted are subject of erga
omnesobligations and pertain to jus cogensnorms; that
the claims raised by petitioners are not simple private
claims that are the usual subject of diplomatic protection;
that the crimes committed against petitioners are
shocking to the conscience of humanity; and that the
atrocities committed by the Japanese soldiers against
petitionersare not subject to the statute of limitations
under international law.9
Petitioners pray that the Court reconsider its April 28,
2010 decision, and declare: (1) that the rapes, sexual
slavery, torture and other forms of sexual violence
committed against the Filipina comfort women are crimes
against humanity and war crimes under customary
international law; (2) that the Philippines is not bound by
the Treaty of Peace with Japan, insofar as the waiver of
the claims of the Filipina comfort women against Japan
is concerned; (3) that the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
and the Executive Secretary committed grave abuse of
discretion in refusing to espouse the claims of Filipina
comfort women; and (4) that petitioners are entitled to
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against
the respondents.
Petitioners also pray that the Court order the Secretary
of Foreign Affairs and the Executive Secretary to
espouse the claims of Filipina comfort women for an
official apology,legal compensation and other forms of
reparation from Japan.10
In their Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration,
petitioners stress that it was highly improper for the April
28, 2010 decision to lift commentaries from at least three
sources without proper attribution – an article published
in 2009 in the Yale Law Journal of International Law; a
book published by the Cambridge University Press in
2005; and an article published in 2006 in the Western
ReserveJournal of International Law – and make it
appear that such commentaries supported its arguments
for dismissing the petition, when in truth the plagiarized
sources even made a strong case in favour of
petitioners’ claims.11
In their Comment,12 respondents disagree
withpetitioners, maintaining that aside from the
statements on plagiarism, the arguments raised by
petitioners merely rehashed those made in their June 7,
2005 Memorandum; that they already refuted such
arguments in their Memorandumof June 6, 2005 that the
Court resolved through itsApril 28, 2010 decision,
specifically as follows:
1. The contentions pertaining tothe alleged plagiarism
were then already lodged withthe Committee on Ethics
and Ethical Standards of the Court; hence, the matter of
alleged plagiarism should not be discussed or resolved
herein.13
2. A writ of certioraridid not lie in the absence of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Hence, in view of the failureof petitioners to
show any arbitrary or despotic act on the part of
respondents,the relief of the writ of certiorariwas not
warranted.14
3. Respondents hold that the Waiver Clause in the
Treaty of Peace with Japan, being valid, bound the
Republic of the Philippines pursuant to the international
law principle of pacta sunt servanda.The validity of the
Treaty of Peace was the result of the ratification by two
mutually consenting parties. Consequently, the
obligations embodied in the Treaty of Peace must be
carried out in accordance with the common and real
intention of the parties at the time the treaty was
concluded.15
4. Respondents assert that individuals did not have
direct international remedies against any State that
violated their human rights except where such remedies
are provided by an international agreement. Herein,
neither of the Treaty of Peace and the Reparations
Agreement,the relevant agreements affecting herein
petitioners, provided for the reparation of petitioners’
claims. Respondents aver that the formal apology by the
Government of Japan and the reparation the
Government of Japan has provided through the Asian
Women’s Fund (AWF) are sufficient to recompense
petitioners on their claims, specifically:
a. About 700 million yen would be paid from the national
treasury over the next 10 years as welfare and medical
services;
b. Instead of paying the money directly to the former
comfort women, the services would be provided through
organizations delegated by governmental bodies in the
recipient countries (i.e., the Philippines, the Republic of
Korea,and Taiwan); and
c. Compensation would consist of assistance for nursing
services (like home helpers), housing, environmental
development, medical expenses, and medical goods.16
Ruling
The Court DENIESthe Motion for Reconsiderationand
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration for being
devoid of merit.
1. Petitioners did not show that their resort was timely
under the Rules of Court.
Petitioners did not show that their bringing ofthe special
civil action for certiorariwas timely, i.e., within the 60-day
period provided in Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, to wit:
Section 4. When and where position filed. – The petition
shall be filed not later than sixty (60) daysfrom notice of
judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for
reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such
motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall
be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.
As the rule indicates, the 60-day period starts to run from
the date petitioner receives the assailed judgment, final
order or resolution, or the denial of the motion for
reconsideration or new trial timely filed, whether such
motion is required or not. To establish the timeliness of
the petition for certiorari, the date of receipt of the
assailed judgment, final order or resolution or the denial
of the motion for reconsideration or new trial must be
stated in the petition;otherwise, the petition for
certiorarimust be dismissed. The importance of the dates
cannot be understated, for such dates determine the
timeliness of the filing of the petition for certiorari. As the
Court has emphasized in Tambong v. R. Jorge
Development Corporation:17
There are three essential dates that must be stated in a
petition for certiorari brought under Rule 65. First, the
date when notice of the judgment or final order or
resolution was received; second, when a motion for new
trial or reconsideration was filed; and third, when notice
of the denial thereof was received. Failure of petitioner to
comply with this requirement shall be sufficient ground
for the dismissal of the petition. Substantial compliance
will not suffice in a matter involving strict observance with
the Rules. (Emphasis supplied)
The Court has further said in Santos v. Court of
Appeals:18
The requirement of setting forth the three (3) dates in a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is for the purpose of
determining its timeliness. Such a petition is required to
be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the
judgment, order or Resolution sought to be assailed.
Therefore, that the petition for certiorariwas filed forty-
one (41) days from receipt of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration is hardly relevant. The Court of Appeals
was notin any position to determine when this period
commenced to run and whether the motion for
reconsideration itself was filed on time since the material
dates were not stated. It should not be assumed that in
no event would the motion be filed later than fifteen (15)
days. Technical rules of procedure are not designed to
frustrate the ends of justice. These are provided to effect
the proper and orderly disposition of cases and thus
effectively prevent the clogging of court dockets. Utter
disregard of the Rules cannot justly be rationalized by
harking on the policy ofliberal construction.19
The petition for certioraricontains the following
averments, viz:
82. Since 1998, petitioners and other victims of the
"comfort women system," approached the Executive
Department through the Department of Justice in order
to request for assistance to file a claim against the
Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the
establishment of the "comfort women" stations in the
Philippines;
83. Officials of the Executive Department ignored their
request and refused to file a claim against the said
Japanese officials and military officers;
84. Undaunted, the Petitioners in turnapproached the
Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of Justice
and Office of the of the Solicitor General to file their claim
against the responsible Japanese officials and military
officers, but their efforts were similarly and carelessly
disregarded;20
The petition thus mentions the year 1998 only as the
time when petitioners approached the Department
ofJustice for assistance, but does not specifically state
when they received the denial of their request for
assistance by the Executive Department of the
Government. This alone warranted the outright dismissal
of the petition.
Even assuming that petitioners received the notice of the
denial of their request for assistance in 1998, their filing
of the petition only on March 8, 2004 was still way
beyond the 60-day period. Only the most compelling
reasons could justify the Court’s acts of disregarding and
lifting the strictures of the rule on the period. As we
pointed out inMTM Garment Mfg. Inc. v. Court of
Appeals:21
All these do not mean, however, that procedural rules
are to be ignored or disdained at will to suit the
convenience of a party. Procedural law has its own
rationale in the orderly administration of justice, namely:
to ensure the effective enforcement of substantive rights
by providing for a system that obviates arbitrariness,
caprice, despotism, or whimsicality in the settlement of
disputes. Hence, it is a mistake to suppose that
substantive law and procedural law are contradictory to
each other, or as often suggested, that enforcement of
procedural rules should never be permitted if it would
result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the
litigants.
As we have repeatedly stressed, the right to file a special
civil action of certiorariis neither a natural right noran
essential element of due process; a writ of certiorariis a
prerogative writ, never demandable as a matter of right,
and never issued except in the exercise of judicial
discretion. Hence, he who seeks a writ of certiorarimust
apply for it only in the manner and strictly in accordance
with the provisions of the law and the Rules.
Herein petitioners have not shown any compelling
reason for us to relax the rule and the requirements
under current jurisprudence. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
2. Petitioners did not show that the assailed act was
either judicial or quasi-judicial on the part of respondents.
Petitioners were required to show in their petition for
certiorarithat the assailed act was either judicial or quasi-
judicial in character. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Courtrequires such showing, to wit:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari.—When any tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal,
nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may
file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be
rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such
tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental
reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true
copy of the judgment, order, or resolution subject
thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant
and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of
nonforum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of
Section 3, Rule 46. However, petitioners did notmake
such a showing.
3. Petitioners were not entitled to the injunction.
The Court cannot grant petitioners’ prayer for the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction. Preliminary injunction
is merely a provisional remedy that is adjunct to the main
case, and is subject to the latter’s outcome. It is not a
cause of action itself.22 It is provisional because it
constitutes a temporary measure availed of during the
pendency of the action; and it is ancillary because it is a
mere incident in and is dependent upon the result of the
main action.23 Following the dismissal of the petition for
certiorari, there is no more legal basis to issue the writ of
injunction sought. As an auxiliary remedy, the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction cannot be issued
independently of the principal action.24
In any event, a mandatory injunction requires the
performance of a particular act.1âwphi1 Hence, it is an
extreme remedy,25 to be granted only if the following
requisites are attendant, namely:
(a) The applicant has a clear and unmistakable right, that
is, a right in esse;
 Associate Justice

(b) There is a material and substantial invasion of such DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

right; and
Associate Justice (no part)
(c) There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent
irreparable injury to the applicant; and no other ordinary, MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the
infliction of irreparable injury.26 Associate Justice

In Marquez v. The Presiding Judge (Hon. Ismael B. MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Sanchez), RTC Br. 58, Lucena City,27 we expounded as
follows:
Associate Justice JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
It is basic that the issuance of a writ of preliminary
Associate Justice
injunction is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
court, conditioned on the existence of a clear and
positive right of the applicant which should be protected. JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
It is an extraordinary, peremptory remedy available only
on the grounds expressly provided by law, specifically Associate Justice BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court. Moreover,
extreme caution must be observed in the exercise of Associate Justice
such discretion. It should be granted only when the court
is fully satisfied that the law permits it and the emergency ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
demands it. The very foundation of the jurisdiction to
issue a writ of injunction rests in the existence of a cause Associate Justice No part
of action and in the probability of irreparable injury,
inadequacy of pecuniary compensation, and the
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
prevention of multiplicity of suits. Where facts are not
shown to bring the case within these conditions, the relief
of injunction should be refused.28 Associate Justice

Here, the Constitution has entrusted to the Executive CERTIFICATION

Department the conduct of foreign relations for the
Philippines. Whether or not to espouse petitioners' claim Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I
against the Government of Japan is left to the exclusive certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had
determination and judgment of the Executive been reached in consultation before the case was
Department. The Court cannot interfere with or question assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
the wisdom of the conduct of foreign relations by the
Executive Department. Accordingly, we cannot direct the
Executive Department, either by writ of certiorari or
injunction, to conduct our foreign relations with Japan in MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
a certain manner.
Chief Justice
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the Motion for
Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration for their lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice ARTURO D. BRION

Pharmaceutical and
(2) The International Convenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights

Health Care Association of

(3) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women

the Philippines vs. Duque

- These instruments only provide general terms of the steps that
States must take to prevent child mortality. Hence, they do not

III
have anything about the use and marketing of breastmilk
substitutes

(Austria-Martinez, October 9, - The ICMBS and other WHA Resolutions however, are the

2007)
international instruments which have specific provisions on
breastmilk substitutes
- Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of
domestic law in 2 ways:
Nature: Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari (1) Transformation – an international law is transformed into a
domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local
Petitioner: Pharmaceutical and Healthcare Association of the Philippines
legislation
Respondents: DOH Sec. Francisco Duque III, DOH Undersecretaries Dr. ▪ Treaties become part of law of the land through this
Ethelyn Nieto, Dr. Margarita Galon, Atty. Alexander Padilla and Dr. Jade method, pursuant to Art 7, Sec 21 – wherein “no treaty or
Del Mundo; and Asst. Secretaries Dr. Mario Villaverde, Dr. David Lozada international agreement shall be valid.. unless concurred
and Dr. Nemesio Gako by at least 2/3 of Senate”
▪ The ICMBS and WHA Resolutions are NOT treaties as they
Facts: haven’t been concurred in by the required 2/3 vote.
▪ HOWEVER, the ICMBS has been transformed into
- Executive Order No. 51 (The Milk Code - TMC) was issued by Pres.
domestic law through local legislation that is TMC.
Aquino on Oct. 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted
• Therefore, it is not the ICMBS per se that has the
to her under the Freedom Constitution.
force of law but it’s TMC.
(1) One of the preambular clauses of TMC – the law seeks to give
o While TMC is almost a verbatim reproduction of
effect to Article 11 of the International Code of Marketing of
the ICMBS, it did not adopt the latter’s provision
Breastmilk Substituttes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the WHA
on the absolute prohibition on advertising of
(World Health Assembly) in 1981.
products within the scope of the ICMBS. Instead
- In 1990, the Philippine ratified the International Convention on the
the MC provides that advertising promotion or
Rights of the Child. Art. 24 of the instrument mandates that States
other marketing materials may be allowed if
should take measure to diminish infant mortality and should ensure
such materials are approved by a committee.
that all segments of society are informed of the advantages of
(2) Incorporation – by mere constitutional declaration,
breastfeeding.
international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law
- From 1982 – 2006, the WHA adopted several resolutions to the
▪ This is found under Art 2, Sec 2 – The Philippines… adopts
effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and
generally accepted principles of international law as part
protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health
of the law of the land
claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes.
▪ In Mihares v. Ranada: International law becomes
- May 15, 2006 – DOH issues the assailed RIRR (Revised
customary rules accepted as binding as a result of two
Implementing Rules and Regulations of E.O. 51 or A.O. No. 2006-
elements:
0012) which was to take effect on July 7, 2006. – The RIRR
1.) Established, widespread, and consistent practice on
imposes a ban on all advertisements of breastmilk substitutes
part of the state
- June 28, 2006 – Petitioner filed the present Petition for Certiorari
2.) Opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or
and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO or Writ of
necessity.
Preliminary injunction.
▪ Generally accepted principles of international law refer to
- August 15, 2006 – the Court issued a Resolution granting the TRO,
norms of general or customary international law which are
enjoining the respondents from implementing the assailed RIRR.
binding on all states, valid through all kinds of human
- Petitioner assails the RIRR for going beyond the provisions of TMC
societies, and basic to legal systems generally
thereby amending and expanding the coverage of the said law.
▪ Fr. Bernas has a definition similar to the one above.
- DOH meanwhile contends that the RIRR implements not only TMC
Customary international law has two factors:
but also various international instruments regarding infant and
1.) Material factor – how states behave
young child nutrition. They posit that the said international
• The consistency and the generality of the
instruments are deemed part of the law of the land and therefore
practice
may be implemented by the DOH in the RIRR.
2.) Psychological or subjective factor – why they behave
Issue: W/n the RIRR is unconstitutional?
the way they do
Sub-issue(s): W/n the RIRR is in accord with TMC? W/n pertinent • Once state practice has been established, now
international agreements entered into by the Philippines are part of the determine why they behave they do. Is it ouor of
law of the land and may thus be implemented through an RIRR, if so, is courtesy or opinio juris (the belief that a certain
the RIRR in accord with such international agreements? type of behavior is obligatory)
▪ When a law satisfies the two factors it becomes part of
Note: I focused on the parts on international law. The other matters (in customary international law which is then incorporated
case ma’am asks) are at the bottom of the digest. into our domestic system

Held: No. However what may be implemented is the RIRR based on the
2. Since the WHA Resolutions have not been embodied in any local
Milk Code which in turn is based on the ICMBS as this is deemed part of
legislation, have they attained the status of customary law and hence
the law of the land. The other WHA Resolutions however cannot be
part of our law of the land?
imposed as they are not deemed part of the law of the land.
- The World Health Organization (WHO) is one of the international
Ratio: specialized agencies of the UN.
- According to the WHO Constitution, it’s the WHA which determines
1. Are the international instruments referred to by the respondents part the policies of the WHO, the former also has the power to “adopt
of the law of the land? regulations concerning advertising and labeling of pharmaceutical
- The various international instruments invoked by respondents are: and similar products” and “to make recommendations to members
(1) The UN Conventions on the Rights of the Child on any matter within the Organization’s competence”
- Note that the legal effect of a regulation as opposed to
recommendation is quite different
(1) Regulations which are duly adopted by the WHA are binding on
member states
(2) On the other hand, recommendations of the WHA do not come
into force for its members unlike regulations. Rather, they carry
moral and political weight as they constitute the judgment on a
health issue of the collective membership of the highest body
in the field of health.
- The WHA resolution adopting the ICMBS and the subsequent WHA
resolutions urging states to implement the ICMBS are merely
recommendatory and legally non-binding.
- Hence, unlike the ICMBS which has become TMC through legislative
enactment, the subsequent WHA Resolutions, which provide for
exclusive breastfeeding and prohibition on advertisements and
promotions of breastmilk have not been adopted as domestic law.
- WHA Resolutions have been viewed to constitute “soft law” or non-
binding norms, which influence state behavior. Soft law has been
noted to be a rapid means of norm creation, in order to reflect and
respond to the changing needs and demands of constituents (of the
UN.)
- As previously discussed, for an international rule to be considered
customary law, it must be established that such rule is followed by
states because it is considered obligatory (opinio juris).
- In the case at bar, respondents have not presented any evidence to
prove that the WHA Resolutions are in fact enforced or practice by
member states. Further, they failed to establish that provisions of
pertinent WHA Resolutions are customary international law that
may be deemed part of law of the land.
- Hence, legislation is necessary to transform the WHA resolutions
into domestic law. They cannot thus be implemented by executive
agencies without the need of a law to be enacted by legislature.
On other issues:
W/n the petitioner is the real party in interest? Yes.
- An association has standing to file suit for its workers despite its
lack of direct interest of its members are affected by the action. An
organization has standing to assert the concerns of its constituents.
(Exec Sec vs CA)
- The Court has rules that an association has the legal personality to
represent its members because the results of the case will affect
their vital interests. (Purok Bagong Silang Association Inc. vs.
Yuipco)
- In the petitioner’s Amended Articles of Incorporation, it states that
the association is formed “to represent directly or through approved
representatives the pharmaceutical and health care industry before
the Philippine Government and any of its agencies, the medical
professions and the general public.”
- Therefore, the petitioner, as an organization, has an interest in
fulfilling its avowed purpose of representing members who are part
of the pharmaceutical and health care industry. Petitioner is duly
authorized to bring to the attention of the government agencies and
courts any grievance suffered by its members which are directly
affected by the assailed RIRR.
- The petitioner, whose legal identity is deemed fused with its
members, should be considered as a legal party-in-interest which
stands to be benefited or injured by any judgment in the case.
W/n the DOH has the power to implement the WHA Resolutions under
the Revised Administrative Code even in the absence of a domestic law?
Only the provisions of the Milk Code. (as per the discussion above)
- Section 3, Chapter 1, Title IX of the RAC of 1987 provides that the
DOH shall define the national health policy and can issue orders and
regulations concerning the implementation of established health
policies.
- A.O. No 2005 -0014 which provides the national policy on infant and
young child feeding, does not declare that as part of its policy, the
advertisement or promotion of breastmilk substitutes should be
absolutely prohibited.
- Only the provisions of the Milk Code, but not those of the
subsequent WHA Resolutions, can be validly implemented by the
DOH through the subject RIRR.
W/n the provisions of the RIRR being in accordance with the Milk Code?
Not all of them
- Assailed provisions: [1] extending the coverage to young children;
[2] imposing exclusive breastfeeding for infants from 0-6 months;
[3] imposes an absolute ban on advertising and promotion for
breastmilk substitutes; [4] requiring additional labeling
requirements; [5] prohibits the dissemination of information on
infant formula; [6] forbids milk manufacturers and distributors to
extend assistance in research and continuing education Although
the DOH has the power under the Milk Code to control information
regarding breastmilk vis-à-vis breastmilk substitutes, this power is
not absolute because it has no power to impose an absolute
prohibition in the marketing, promotion and advertising of
breastmilk substitutes. Several provisions of the Milk Code attest to
the fact that such power to control information is not absolute.
- Sections 11 and 4(f) of the RIRR are clearly violative of the Milk
Code because such provisions impose an absolute prohibition on
advertising, promotion and marketing of breastmilk substitutes,
which is not provided for in the Milk Code. Section 46 is violative of
the Milk Code because the DOH has exceeded its authority in
imposing such fines or sanctions when the Milk Code does not do
so. Other assailed provisions are in accordance with the Milk Code.
W/n Section 13 of the RIRR providing a sufficient standard? Yes.
- Questioned provision, in addition to Section 26 of Rule VII provide
labeling requirements for breastmilk substitutes → found to be in
consonance with the Milk Code
- The provisions in question provide reasonable means of enforcing
related provisions in the Milk Code.
W/n Section 57 of the RIRR repeals existing laws?
- Section in question only repeals orders, issuances and rules and
regulations, not laws. The provision is valid as it is within the DOH’s
rule-making power.
- An administrative agency has quasi-legislative or rule-making
power. However, such power is limited to making rules and
regulation subjected to the boundaries set by the granting statute
and the Constitution. The power is also subject to the doctrine of
non-delegability and separability of powers. The power, which
includes amending, revising, altering or repealing, is granted to
allow for flexibility in the implementation of the laws.
W/n On Section 4, 5(w), 11, 22, 32, 47 and 52 violates the due process
clause of the Constitution (Article III Section 1)?
- Despite the fact that the present Constitution enshrines free
enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the government
the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general
welfare… free enterprise does not call for the removal of protective
regulations. It must be clearly explained and proven by competent
evidence just exactly how such protective regulation would result in
the restraint of trade.
- Section 4 – proscription of milk manufacturers’ participation in any
policymaking body; Section 22 – classes and seminars for women
and children; Section 32 – giving of assistance, support and logistics
or training; Section 52 – giving of donations
- In the instant case, petitioner failed to show how the
aforementioned sections hamper the trade of breastmilk substitutes.
They also failed to establish that these activities are essential and
indispensable to their trade.
Disposition: The Petition is Partially Granted. Only sections 4(f),
11 and 46 of A.O. 2006-0014 are declared null and void for being
ultra vires. The TRO is lifted insofar as the rest of the provisions
of A.O. 2006-0012 is concerned.
G.R. No. 173034 October 9, 2007
PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE
ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES,
petitioner,
vs.
HEALTH SECRETARY FRANCISCO T. DUQUE
III; HEALTH UNDER SECRETARIES DR. ETHELYN P.
NIETO, DR. MARGARITA M. GALON, ATTY.
ALEXANDER A. PADILLA, & DR. JADE F. DEL
MUNDO; and ASSISTANT SECRETARIES DR. MARIO
C. VILLAVERDE, DR. DAVID J. LOZADA, AND DR.
NEMESIO T. GAKO, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
The Court and all parties involved are in agreement that
the best nourishment for an infant is mother's milk. There
is nothing greater than for a mother to nurture her
beloved child straight from her bosom. The ideal is, of
course, for each and every Filipino child to enjoy the
unequaled benefits of breastmilk. But how should this
end be attained?
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify Administrative
Order (A.O.) No. 2006-0012 entitled, Revised
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Executive Order
No. 51, Otherwise Known as The "Milk Code," Relevant
International Agreements, Penalizing Violations Thereof,
and for Other Purposes (RIRR). Petitioner posits that the
RIRR is not valid as it contains provisions that are not
constitutional and go beyond the law it is supposed to
implement.
Named as respondents are the Health Secretary,
Undersecretaries, and Assistant Secretaries of the
Department of Health (DOH). For purposes of herein
petition, the DOH is deemed impleaded as a co-
respondent since respondents issued the questioned
RIRR in their capacity as officials of said executive
agency.1
Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by
President Corazon Aquino on October 28, 1986 by virtue
of the legislative powers granted to the president under
the Freedom Constitution. One of the preambular
clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to
give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of
Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code
adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981.
From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several
Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be
supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be
ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted
for breastmilk substitutes.
In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International
Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said
instrument provides that State Parties should take
appropriate measures to diminish infant and child
mortality, and ensure that all segments of society,
specially parents and children, are informed of the
advantages of breastfeeding.
On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR
which was to take effect on July 7, 2006.
However, on June 28, 2006, petitioner, representing its
members that are manufacturers of breastmilk
substitutes, filed the present Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction.
The main issue raised in the petition is whether
respondents officers of the DOH acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and in
violation of the provisions of the Constitution in
promulgating the RIRR.3
On August 15, 2006, the Court issued a Resolution
granting a TRO enjoining respondents from
implementing the questioned RIRR.
After the Comment and Reply had been filed, the Court
set the case for oral arguments on June 19, 2007. The
Court issued an Advisory (Guidance for Oral Arguments)
dated June 5, 2007, to wit:
The Court hereby sets the following issues:
1. Whether or not petitioner is a real party-in-interest;
2. Whether Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 or the
Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR)
issued by the Department of Health (DOH) is not
constitutional;
2.1 Whether the RIRR is in accord with the provisions of
Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code);
2.2 Whether pertinent international agreements1 entered
into by the Philippines are part of the law of the land and
may be implemented by the DOH through the RIRR; If in
the affirmative, whether the RIRR is in accord with the
international agreements;
2.3 Whether Sections 4, 5(w), 22, 32, 47, and 52 of the
RIRR violate the due process clause and are in restraint
of trade; and
2.4 Whether Section 13 of the RIRR on Total Effect
provides sufficient standards.
_____________
1 (1) United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child; (2) the WHO and Unicef "2002 Global Strategy on
Infant and Young Child Feeding;" and (3) various World
Health Assembly (WHA) Resolutions.
The parties filed their respective memoranda.
The petition is partly imbued with merit.
On the issue of petitioner's standing
With regard to the issue of whether petitioner may
prosecute this case as the real party-in-interest, the
Court adopts the view enunciated in Executive Secretary
v. Court of Appeals,4 to wit:
The modern view is that an association has standing to
complain of injuries to its members. This view fuses the
legal identity of an association with that of its members.
An association has standing to file suit for its workers
despite its lack of direct interest if its members are
affected by the action. An organization has standing to
assert the concerns of its constituents.
xxxx
x x x We note that, under its Articles of Incorporation, the
respondent was organized x x x to act as the
representative of any individual, company, entity or
association on matters related to the manpower
recruitment industry, and to perform other acts and
activities necessary to accomplish the purposes
embodied therein. The respondent is, thus, the
appropriate party to assert the rights of its members,
because it and its members are in every practical sense
identical. x x x The respondent [association] is but the
medium through which its individual members seek to
make more effective the expression of their voices and
the redress of their grievances. 5 (Emphasis supplied)
which was reasserted in Purok Bagong Silang
Association, Inc. v. Yuipco,6 where the Court ruled that
an association has the legal personality to represent its
members because the results of the case will affect their
vital interests.
Herein petitioner's Amended Articles of Incorporation
contains a similar provision just like in Executive
Secretary, that the association is formed "to represent
directly or through approved representatives the
pharmaceutical and health care industry before the
Philippine Government and any of its agencies, the
medical professions and the general public."8 Thus, as
an organization, petitioner definitely has an interest in
fulfilling its avowed purpose of representing members
who are part of the pharmaceutical and health care
industry. Petitioner is duly authorized9 to take the
appropriate course of action to bring to the attention of
government agencies and the courts any grievance
suffered by its members which are directly affected by
the RIRR. Petitioner, which is mandated by its Amended
Articles of Incorporation to represent the entire industry,
would be remiss in its duties if it fails to act on
governmental action that would affect any of its industry
members, no matter how few or numerous they are.
Hence, petitioner, whose legal identity is deemed fused
with its members, should be considered as a real party-
in-interest which stands to be benefited or injured by any
judgment in the present action.
On the constitutionality of the provisions of the RIRR
First, the Court will determine if pertinent international
instruments adverted to by respondents are part of the
law of the land.
Petitioner assails the RIRR for allegedly going beyond
the provisions of the Milk Code, thereby amending and
expanding the coverage of said law. The defense of the
DOH is that the RIRR implements not only the Milk Code
but also various international instruments10 regarding
infant and young child nutrition. It is respondents'
position that said international instruments are deemed
part of the law of the land and therefore the DOH may
implement them through the RIRR.
The Court notes that the following international
instruments invoked by respondents, namely: (1) The
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child; (2)
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights; and (3) the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, only provide in general terms that steps must be
taken by State Parties to diminish infant and child
mortality and inform society of the advantages of
breastfeeding, ensure the health and well-being of
families, and ensure that women are provided with
services and nutrition in connection with pregnancy and
lactation. Said instruments do not contain specific
provisions regarding the use or marketing of breastmilk
substitutes.
The international instruments that do have specific
provisions regarding breastmilk substitutes are the
ICMBS and various WHA Resolutions.
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can
become part of the sphere of domestic law either by
transformation or incorporation.11 The transformation
method requires that an international law be transformed
into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism
such as local legislation. The incorporation method
applies when, by mere constitutional declaration,
international law is deemed to have the force of domestic
law.12
Treaties become part of the law of the land through
transformation pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the
Constitution which provides that "[n]o treaty or
international agreement shall be valid and effective
unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the
members of the Senate." Thus, treaties or conventional
international law must go through a process prescribed
by the Constitution for it to be transformed into municipal
law that can be applied to domestic conflicts.13
The ICMBS and WHA Resolutions are not treaties as
they have not been concurred in by at least two-thirds of
all members of the Senate as required under Section 21,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
However, the ICMBS which was adopted by the WHA in
1981 had been transformed into domestic law through
local legislation, the Milk Code. Consequently, it is the
Milk Code that has the force and effect of law in this
jurisdiction and not the ICMBS per se.
The Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of the
ICMBS, but it is well to emphasize at this point that the
Code did not adopt the provision in the ICMBS
absolutely prohibiting advertising or other forms of
promotion to the general public of products within the
scope of the ICMBS. Instead, the Milk Code expressly
provides that advertising, promotion, or other marketing
materials may be allowed if such materials are duly
authorized and approved by the Inter-Agency Committee
(IAC).
On the other hand, Section 2, Article II of the 1987
Constitution, to wit:
SECTION 2. The Philippines renounces war as an
instrument of national policy, adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law
of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations.
(Emphasis supplied)
embodies the incorporation method.14
In Mijares v. Ranada,15 the Court held thus:
[G]enerally accepted principles of international law, by
virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution,
form part of the laws of the land even if they do not
derive from treaty obligations. The classical formulation
in international law sees those customary rules accepted
as binding result from the combination [of] two elements:
the established, widespread, and consistent practice on
the part of States; and a psychological element known as
the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or
necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that
the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the
existence of a rule of law requiring it.16 (Emphasis
supplied)
"Generally accepted principles of international law" refers
to norms of general or customary international law which
are binding on all states,17 i.e., renunciation of war as an
instrument of national policy, the principle of sovereign
immunity,18 a person's right to life, liberty and due
process,19 and pacta sunt servanda,20 among others.
The concept of "generally accepted principles of law" has
also been depicted in this wise:
Some legal scholars and judges look upon certain
"general principles of law" as a primary source of
international law because they have the "character of jus
rationale" and are "valid through all kinds of human
societies." (Judge Tanaka in his dissenting opinion in the
1966 South West Africa Case, 1966 I.C.J. 296).
O'Connell holds that certain priniciples are part of
international law because they are "basic to legal
systems generally" and hence part of the jus gentium.
These principles, he believes, are established by a
process of reasoning based on the common identity of all
legal systems. If there should be doubt or disagreement,
one must look to state practice and determine whether
the municipal law principle provides a just and
acceptable solution. x x x 21 (Emphasis supplied)
Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas defines customary international
law as follows:
Custom or customary international law means "a general
and consistent practice of states followed by them from a
sense of legal obligation [opinio juris]." (Restatement)
This statement contains the two basic elements of
custom: the material factor, that is, how states behave,
and the psychological or subjective factor, that is, why
they behave the way they do.
xxxx
The initial factor for determining the existence of custom
is the actual behavior of states. This includes several
elements: duration, consistency, and generality of the
practice of states.
The required duration can be either short or long. x x x
xxx
Duration therefore is not the most important element.
More important is the consistency and the generality of
the practice. x x x
xxxx
Once the existence of state practice has been
established, it becomes necessary to determine why
states behave the way they do. Do states behave the
way they do because they consider it obligatory to
behave thus or do they do it only as a matter of
courtesy? Opinio juris, or the belief that a certain form of
behavior is obligatory, is what makes practice an
international rule. Without it, practice is not law.22
(Underscoring and Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, customary international law is deemed
incorporated into our domestic system.23
WHA Resolutions have not been embodied in any local
legislation. Have they attained the status of customary
law and should they then be deemed incorporated as
part of the law of the land?
The World Health Organization (WHO) is one of the
international specialized agencies allied with the United
Nations (UN) by virtue of Article 57,24 in relation to
Article 6325 of the UN Charter. Under the 1946 WHO
Constitution, it is the WHA which determines the policies
of the WHO,26 and has the power to adopt regulations
concerning "advertising and labeling of biological,
pharmaceutical and similar products moving in
international commerce,"27 and to "make
recommendations to members with respect to any matter
within the competence of the Organization."28 The legal
effect of its regulations, as opposed to
recommendations, is quite different.
Regulations, along with conventions and agreements,
duly adopted by the WHA bind member states thus:
Article 19. The Health Assembly shall have authority to
adopt conventions or agreements with respect to any
matter within the competence of the Organization. A two-
thirds vote of the Health Assembly shall be required for
the adoption of such conventions or agreements, which
shall come into force for each Member when accepted
by it in accordance with its constitutional processes.
Article 20. Each Member undertakes that it will, within
eighteen months after the adoption by the Health
Assembly of a convention or agreement, take action
relative to the acceptance of such convention or
agreement. Each Member shall notify the Director-
General of the action taken, and if it does not accept
such convention or agreement within the time limit, it will
furnish a statement of the reasons for non-acceptance.
In case of acceptance, each Member agrees to make an
annual report to the Director-General in accordance with
Chapter XIV.
Article 21. The Health Assembly shall have authority to
adopt regulations concerning: (a) sanitary and
quarantine requirements and other procedures designed
to prevent the international spread of disease; (b)
nomenclatures with respect to diseases, causes of death
and public health practices; (c) standards with respect to
diagnostic procedures for international use; (d) standards
with respect to the safety, purity and potency of
biological, pharmaceutical and similar products moving in
international commerce; (e) advertising and labeling of
biological, pharmaceutical and similar products moving in
interational commerce.
Article 22. Regulations adopted pursuant to Article 21
shall come into force for all Members after due notice
has been given of their adoption by the Health Assembly
except for such Members as may notify the Director-
General of rejection or reservations within the period
stated in the notice. (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, under Article 23, recommendations of
the WHA do not come into force for members, in the
same way that conventions or agreements under Article
19 and regulations under Article 21 come into force.
Article 23 of the WHO Constitution reads:
Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to
make recommendations to Members with respect to any
matter within the competence of the Organization.
(Emphasis supplied)
The absence of a provision in Article 23 of any
mechanism by which the recommendation would come
into force for member states is conspicuous.
The former Senior Legal Officer of WHO, Sami Shubber,
stated that WHA recommendations are generally not
binding, but they "carry moral and political weight, as
they constitute the judgment on a health issue of the
collective membership of the highest international body
in the field of health."29 Even the ICMBS itself was
adopted as a mere recommendation, as WHA Resolution
No. 34.22 states:
"The Thirty-Fourth World Health Assembly x x x adopts,
in the sense of Article 23 of the Constitution, the
International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes
annexed to the present resolution." (Emphasis supplied)
The Introduction to the ICMBS also reads as follows:
In January 1981, the Executive Board of the World
Health Organization at its sixty-seventh session,
considered the fourth draft of the code, endorsed it, and
unanimously recommended to the Thirty-fourth World
Health Assembly the text of a resolution by which it
would adopt the code in the form of a recommendation
rather than a regulation. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The legal value of WHA Resolutions as
recommendations is summarized in Article 62 of the
WHO Constitution, to wit:
Art. 62. Each member shall report annually on the action
taken with respect to recommendations made to it by the
Organization, and with respect to conventions,
agreements and regulations.
Apparently, the WHA Resolution adopting the ICMBS
and subsequent WHA Resolutions urging member states
to implement the ICMBS are merely recommendatory
and legally non-binding. Thus, unlike what has been
done with the ICMBS whereby the legislature enacted
most of the provisions into law which is the Milk Code,
the subsequent WHA Resolutions,30 specifically
providing for exclusive breastfeeding from 0-6 months,
continued breastfeeding up to 24 months, and absolutely
prohibiting advertisements and promotions of breastmilk
substitutes, have not been adopted as a domestic law.
It is propounded that WHA Resolutions may constitute
"soft law" or non-binding norms, principles and practices
that influence state behavior.31
"Soft law" does not fall into any of the categories of
international law set forth in Article 38, Chapter III of the
1946 Statute of the International Court of Justice.32 It is,
however, an expression of non-binding norms, principles,
and practices that influence state behavior.33 Certain
declarations and resolutions of the UN General
Assembly fall under this category.34 The most notable is
the UN Declaration of Human Rights, which this Court
has enforced in various cases, specifically, Government
of Hongkong Special Administrative Region v. Olalia,35
Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,36 Mijares v. Rañada37 and
Shangri-la International Hotel Management, Ltd. v.
Developers Group of Companies, Inc..38
The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), a
specialized agency attached to the UN with the mandate
to promote and protect intellectual property worldwide,
has resorted to soft law as a rapid means of norm
creation, in order "to reflect and respond to the changing
needs and demands of its constituents."39 Other
international organizations which have resorted to soft
law include the International Labor Organization and the
Food and Agriculture Organization (in the form of the
Codex Alimentarius).40
WHO has resorted to soft law. This was most evident at
the time of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
(SARS) and Avian flu outbreaks.
Although the IHR Resolution does not create new
international law binding on WHO member states, it
provides an excellent example of the power of "soft law"
in international relations. International lawyers typically
distinguish binding rules of international law-"hard law"-
from non-binding norms, principles, and practices that
influence state behavior-"soft law." WHO has during its
existence generated many soft law norms, creating a
"soft law regime" in international governance for public
health.
The "soft law" SARS and IHR Resolutions represent
significant steps in laying the political groundwork for
improved international cooperation on infectious
diseases. These resolutions clearly define WHO member
states' normative duty to cooperate fully with other
countries and with WHO in connection with infectious
disease surveillance and response to outbreaks.
This duty is neither binding nor enforceable, but, in the
wake of the SARS epidemic, the duty is powerful
politically for two reasons. First, the SARS outbreak has
taught the lesson that participating in, and enhancing,
international cooperation on infectious disease controls
is in a country's self-interest x x x if this warning is
heeded, the "soft law" in the SARS and IHR Resolution
could inform the development of general and consistent
state practice on infectious disease surveillance and
outbreak response, perhaps crystallizing eventually into
customary international law on infectious disease
prevention and control.41
In the Philippines, the executive department
implemented certain measures recommended by WHO
to address the outbreaks of SARS and Avian flu by
issuing Executive Order (E.O.) No. 201 on April 26, 2003
and E.O. No. 280 on February 2, 2004, delegating to
various departments broad powers to close down
schools/establishments, conduct health surveillance and
monitoring, and ban importation of poultry and
agricultural products.
It must be emphasized that even under such an
international emergency, the duty of a state to implement
the IHR Resolution was still considered not binding or
enforceable, although said resolutions had great political
influence.
As previously discussed, for an international rule to be
considered as customary law, it must be established that
such rule is being followed by states because they
consider it obligatory to comply with such rules (opinio
juris). Respondents have not presented any evidence to
prove that the WHA Resolutions, although signed by
most of the member states, were in fact enforced or
practiced by at least a majority of the member states;
neither have respondents proven that any compliance by
member states with said WHA Resolutions was
obligatory in nature.
Respondents failed to establish that the provisions of
pertinent WHA Resolutions are customary international
law that may be deemed part of the law of the land.
Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the
provisions of the WHA Resolutions into domestic law.
The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be
considered as part of the law of the land that can be
implemented by executive agencies without the need of
a law enacted by the legislature.
Second, the Court will determine whether the DOH may
implement the provisions of the WHA Resolutions by
virtue of its powers and functions under the Revised
Administrative Code even in the absence of a domestic
law.
Section 3, Chapter 1, Title IX of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987 provides that the DOH shall
define the national health policy and implement a
national health plan within the framework of the
government's general policies and plans, and issue
orders and regulations concerning the implementation of
established health policies.
It is crucial to ascertain whether the absolute prohibition
on advertising and other forms of promotion of breastmilk
substitutes provided in some WHA Resolutions has been
adopted as part of the national health policy.
Respondents submit that the national policy on infant
and young child feeding is embodied in A.O. No. 2005-
0014, dated May 23, 2005. Basically, the Administrative
Order declared the following policy guidelines: (1) ideal
breastfeeding practices, such as early initiation of
breastfeeding, exclusive breastfeeding for the first six
months, extended breastfeeding up to two years and
beyond; (2) appropriate complementary feeding, which is
to start at age six months; (3) micronutrient
supplementation; (4) universal salt iodization; (5) the
exercise of other feeding options; and (6) feeding in
exceptionally difficult circumstances. Indeed, the primacy
of breastfeeding for children is emphasized as a national
health policy. However, nowhere in A.O. No. 2005-0014
is it declared that as part of such health policy, the
advertisement or promotion of breastmilk substitutes
should be absolutely prohibited.
The national policy of protection, promotion and support
of breastfeeding cannot automatically be equated with a
total ban on advertising for breastmilk substitutes.
In view of the enactment of the Milk Code which does not
contain a total ban on the advertising and promotion of
breastmilk substitutes, but instead, specifically creates
an IAC which will regulate said advertising and
promotion, it follows that a total ban policy could be
implemented only pursuant to a law amending the Milk
Code passed by the constitutionally authorized branch of
government, the legislature.
Thus, only the provisions of the Milk Code, but not those
of subsequent WHA Resolutions, can be validly
implemented by the DOH through the subject RIRR.
Third, the Court will now determine whether the
provisions of the RIRR are in accordance with those of
the Milk Code.
In support of its claim that the RIRR is inconsistent with
the Milk Code, petitioner alleges the following:
1. The Milk Code limits its coverage to children 0-12
months old, but the RIRR extended its coverage to
"young children" or those from ages two years old and
beyond:
MILK CODE
RIRR
WHEREAS, in order to ensure that safe and adequate
nutrition for infants is provided, there is a need to protect
and promote breastfeeding and to inform the public
about the proper use of breastmilk substitutes and
supplements and related products through adequate,
consistent and objective information and appropriate
regulation of the marketing and distribution of the said
substitutes, suppleents and related products;
SECTION 4(e). "Infant" means a person falling within the
age bracket of 0-12 months.
Section 2. Purpose – These Revised Rules and
Regulations are hereby promulgated to ensure the
provision of safe and adequate nutrition for infants and
young children by the promotion, protection and support
of breastfeeding and by ensuring the proper use of
breastmilk substitutes, breastmilk supplements and
related products when these are medically indicated and
only when necessary, on the basis of adequate
information and through appropriate marketing and
distribution.
Section 5(ff). "Young Child" means a person from the
age of more than twelve (12) months up to the age of
three (3) years (36 months).
2. The Milk Code recognizes that infant formula may be
a proper and possible substitute for breastmilk in certain
instances; but the RIRR provides "exclusive
breastfeeding for infants from 0-6 months" and declares
that "there is no substitute nor replacement for
breastmilk":
MILK CODE
RIRR
WHEREAS, in order to ensure that safe and adequate
nutrition for infants is provided, there is a need to protect
and promote breastfeeding and to inform the public
about the proper use of breastmilk substitutes and
supplements and related products through adequate,
consistent and objective information and appropriate
regulation of the marketing and distribution of the said
substitutes, supplements and related products;
Section 4. Declaration of Principles – The following are
the underlying principles from which the revised rules
and regulations are premised upon:
a. Exclusive breastfeeding is for infants from 0 to six (6)
months.
b. There is no substitute or replacement for breastmilk.
3. The Milk Code only regulates and does not impose
unreasonable requirements for advertising and
promotion; RIRR imposes an absolute ban on such
activities for breastmilk substitutes intended for infants
from 0-24 months old or beyond, and forbids the use of
health and nutritional claims. Section 13 of the RIRR,
which provides for a "total effect" in the promotion of
products within the scope of the Code, is vague:
MILK CODE
RIRR
SECTION 6. The General Public and Mothers. –
(a) No advertising, promotion or other marketing
materials, whether written, audio or visual, for products
within the scope of this Code shall be printed, published,
distributed, exhibited and broadcast unless such
materials are duly authorized and approved by an inter-
agency committee created herein pursuant to the
applicable standards provided for in this Code.
Section 4. Declaration of Principles – The following are
the underlying principles from which the revised rules
and regulations are premised upon:
xxxx
f. Advertising, promotions, or sponsor-ships of infant
formula, breastmilk substitutes and other related
products are prohibited.
Section 11. Prohibition – No advertising, promotions,
sponsorships, or marketing materials and activities for
breastmilk substitutes intended for infants and young
children up to twenty-four (24) months, shall be allowed,
because they tend to convey or give subliminal
messages or impressions that undermine breastmilk and
breastfeeding or otherwise exaggerate breastmilk
substitutes and/or replacements, as well as related
products covered within the scope of this Code.
Section 13. "Total Effect" - Promotion of products within
the scope of this Code must be objective and should not
equate or make the product appear to be as good or
equal to breastmilk or breastfeeding in the advertising
concept. It must not in any case undermine breastmilk or
breastfeeding. The "total effect" should not directly or
indirectly suggest that buying their product would
produce better individuals, or resulting in greater love,
intelligence, ability, harmony or in any manner bring
better health to the baby or other such exaggerated and
unsubstantiated claim.
Section 15. Content of Materials. - The following shall not
be included in advertising, promotional and marketing
materials:
a. Texts, pictures, illustrations or information which
discourage or tend to undermine the benefits or
superiority of breastfeeding or which idealize the use of
breastmilk substitutes and milk supplements. In this
connection, no pictures of babies and children together
with their mothers, fathers, siblings, grandparents, other
relatives or caregivers (or yayas) shall be used in any
advertisements for infant formula and breastmilk
supplements;
b. The term "humanized," "maternalized," "close to
mother's milk" or similar words in describing breastmilk
substitutes or milk supplements;
c. Pictures or texts that idealize the use of infant and milk
formula.
Section 16. All health and nutrition claims for products
within the scope of the Code are absolutely prohibited.
For this purpose, any phrase or words that connotes to
increase emotional, intellectual abilities of the infant and
young child and other like phrases shall not be allowed.
4. The RIRR imposes additional labeling requirements
not found in the Milk Code:
MILK CODE
RIRR
SECTION 10. Containers/Label. –
(a) Containers and/or labels shall be designed to provide
the necessary information about the appropriate use of
the products, and in such a way as not to discourage
breastfeeding.
(b) Each container shall have a clear, conspicuous and
easily readable and understandable message in Pilipino
or English printed on it, or on a label, which message
can not readily become separated from it, and which
shall include the following points:
(i) the words "Important Notice" or their equivalent;
(ii) a statement of the superiority of breastfeeding;
(iii) a statement that the product shall be used only on
the advice of a health worker as to the need for its use
and the proper methods of use; and
(iv) instructions for appropriate preparation, and a
warning against the health hazards of inappropriate
preparation.
Section 26. Content – Each container/label shall contain
such message, in both Filipino and English languages,
and which message cannot be readily separated
therefrom, relative the following points:
(a) The words or phrase "Important Notice" or
"Government Warning" or their equivalent;
(b) A statement of the superiority of breastfeeding;
(c) A statement that there is no substitute for breastmilk;
(d) A statement that the product shall be used only on
the advice of a health worker as to the need for its use
and the poper methods of use;
(e) Instructions for appropriate prepara-tion, and a
warning against the health hazards of inappropriate
preparation; and
(f) The health hazards of unnecessary or improper use of
infant formula and other related products including
information that powdered infant formula may contain
pathogenic microorganisms and must be prepared and
used appropriately.
5. The Milk Code allows dissemination of information on
infant formula to health professionals; the RIRR totally
prohibits such activity:
MILK CODE
RIRR
SECTION 7. Health Care System. –
(b) No facility of the health care system shall be used for
the purpose of promoting infant formula or other products
within the scope of this Code. This Code does not,
however, preclude the dissemination of information to
health professionals as provided in Section 8(b).
SECTION 8. Health Workers. -
(b) Information provided by manufacturers and
distributors to health professionals regarding products
within the scope of this Code shall be restricted to
scientific and factual matters and such information shall
not imply or create a belief that bottle-feeding is
equivalent or superior to breastfeeding. It shall also
include the information specified in Section 5(b).
Section 22. No manufacturer, distributor, or
representatives of products covered by the Code shall be
allowed to conduct or be involved in any activity on
breastfeeding promotion, education and production of
Information, Education and Communication (IEC)
materials on breastfeeding, holding of or participating as
speakers in classes or seminars for women and children
activities and to avoid the use of these venues to market
their brands or company names.
SECTION 16. All health and nutrition claims for products
within the scope of the Code are absolutely prohibited.
For this purpose, any phrase or words that connotes to
increase emotional, intellectual abilities of the infant and
young child and other like phrases shall not be allowed.
6. The Milk Code permits milk manufacturers and
distributors to extend assistance in research and
continuing education of health professionals; RIRR
absolutely forbids the same.
MILK CODE
RIRR
SECTION 8. Health Workers –
(e) Manufacturers and distributors of products within the
scope of this Code may assist in the research,
scholarships and continuing education, of health
professionals, in accordance with the rules and
regulations promulgated by the Ministry of Health.
Section 4. Declaration of Principles –
The following are the underlying principles from which
the revised rules and regulations are premised upon:
i. Milk companies, and their representatives, should not
form part of any policymaking body or entity in relation to
the advancement of breasfeeding.
SECTION 22. No manufacturer, distributor, or
representatives of products covered by the Code shall be
allowed to conduct or be involved in any activity on
breastfeeding promotion, education and production of
Information, Education and Communication (IEC)
materials on breastfeeding, holding of or participating as
speakers in classes or seminars for women and children
activities and to avoid the use of these venues to market
their brands or company names.
SECTION 32. Primary Responsibility of Health Workers -
It is the primary responsibility of the health workers to
promote, protect and support breastfeeding and
appropriate infant and young child feeding. Part of this
responsibility is to continuously update their knowledge
and skills on breastfeeding. No assistance, support,
logistics or training from milk companies shall be
permitted.
7. The Milk Code regulates the giving of donations; RIRR
absolutely prohibits it.
MILK CODE
RIRR
SECTION 6. The General Public and Mothers. –
(f) Nothing herein contained shall prevent donations from
manufacturers and distributors of products within the
scope of this Code upon request by or with the approval
of the Ministry of Health.
Section 51. Donations Within the Scope of This Code -
Donations of products, materials, defined and covered
under the Milk Code and these implementing rules and
regulations, shall be strictly prohibited.
Section 52. Other Donations By Milk Companies Not
Covered by this Code. - Donations of products,
equipments, and the like, not otherwise falling within the
scope of this Code or these Rules, given by milk
companies and their agents, representatives, whether in
kind or in cash, may only be coursed through the Inter
Agency Committee (IAC), which shall determine whether
such donation be accepted or otherwise.
8. The RIRR provides for administrative sanctions not
imposed by the Milk Code.
MILK CODE
RIRR
Section 46. Administrative Sanctions. – The following
administrative sanctions shall be imposed upon any
person, juridical or natural, found to have violated the
provisions of the Code and its implementing Rules and
Regulations:
a) 1st violation – Warning;
b) 2nd violation – Administrative fine of a minimum of
Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) to Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos, depending on the gravity and extent
of the violation, including the recall of the offending
product;
c) 3rd violation – Administrative Fine of a minimum of
Sixty Thousand (P60,000.00) to One Hundred Fifty
Thousand (P150,000.00) Pesos, depending on the
gravity and extent of the violation, and in addition
thereto, the recall of the offending product, and
suspension of the Certificate of Product Registration
(CPR);
d) 4th violation –Administrative Fine of a minimum of
Two Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00) to Five Hundred
(P500,000.00) Thousand Pesos, depending on the
gravity and extent of the violation; and in addition
thereto, the recall of the product, revocation of the CPR,
suspension of the License to Operate (LTO) for one
year;
e) 5th and succeeding repeated violations –
Administrative Fine of One Million (P1,000,000.00)
Pesos, the recall of the offending product, cancellation of
the CPR, revocation of the License to Operate (LTO) of
the company concerned, including the blacklisting of the
company to be furnished the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) and the Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI);
f) An additional penalty of Two Thou-sand Five Hundred
(P2,500.00) Pesos per day shall be made for every day
the violation continues after having received the order
from the IAC or other such appropriate body, notifying
and penalizing the company for the infraction.
For purposes of determining whether or not there is
"repeated" violation, each product violation belonging or
owned by a company, including those of their
subsidiaries, are deemed to be violations of the
concerned milk company and shall not be based on the
specific violating product alone.
9. The RIRR provides for repeal of existing laws to the
contrary.
The Court shall resolve the merits of the allegations of
petitioner seriatim.
1. Petitioner is mistaken in its claim that the Milk Code's
coverage is limited only to children 0-12 months old.
Section 3 of the Milk Code states:
SECTION 3. Scope of the Code – The Code applies to
the marketing, and practices related thereto, of the
following products: breastmilk substitutes, including
infant formula; other milk products, foods and beverages,
including bottle-fed complementary foods, when
marketed or otherwise represented to be suitable, with or
without modification, for use as a partial or total
replacement of breastmilk; feeding bottles and teats. It
also applies to their quality and availability, and to
information concerning their use.
Clearly, the coverage of the Milk Code is not dependent
on the age of the child but on the kind of product being
marketed to the public. The law treats infant formula,
bottle-fed complementary food, and breastmilk substitute
as separate and distinct product categories.
Section 4(h) of the Milk Code defines infant formula as "a
breastmilk substitute x x x to satisfy the normal nutritional
requirements of infants up to between four to six months
of age, and adapted to their physiological
characteristics"; while under Section 4(b), bottle-fed
complementary food refers to "any food, whether
manufactured or locally prepared, suitable as a
complement to breastmilk or infant formula, when either
becomes insufficient to satisfy the nutritional
requirements of the infant." An infant under Section 4(e)
is a person falling within the age bracket 0-12 months. It
is the nourishment of this group of infants or children
aged 0-12 months that is sought to be promoted and
protected by the Milk Code.
But there is another target group. Breastmilk substitute is
defined under Section 4(a) as "any food being marketed
or otherwise presented as a partial or total replacement
for breastmilk, whether or not suitable for that purpose."
This section conspicuously lacks reference to any
particular age-group of children. Hence, the provision of
the Milk Code cannot be considered exclusive for
children aged 0-12 months. In other words, breastmilk
substitutes may also be intended for young children
more than 12 months of age. Therefore, by regulating
breastmilk substitutes, the Milk Code also intends to
protect and promote the nourishment of children more
than 12 months old.
Evidently, as long as what is being marketed falls within
the scope of the Milk Code as provided in Section 3, then
it can be subject to regulation pursuant to said law, even
if the product is to be used by children aged over 12
months.
There is, therefore, nothing objectionable with Sections
242 and 5(ff)43 of the RIRR.
2. It is also incorrect for petitioner to say that the RIRR,
unlike the Milk Code, does not recognize that breastmilk
substitutes may be a proper and possible substitute for
breastmilk.
The entirety of the RIRR, not merely truncated portions
thereof, must be considered and construed together. As
held in De Luna v. Pascual,44 "[t]he particular words,
clauses and phrases in the Rule should not be studied
as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and
every part thereof must be considered in fixing the
meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a
harmonious whole."
Section 7 of the RIRR provides that "when medically
indicated and only when necessary, the use of
breastmilk substitutes is proper if based on complete and
updated information." Section 8 of the RIRR also states
that information and educational materials should include
information on the proper use of infant formula when the
use thereof is eeded.
Hence, the RIRR, just like the Milk Code, also
recognizes that in certain cases, the use of breastmilk
substitutes may be proper.
3. The Court shall ascertain the merits of allegations 345
and 446 together as they are interlinked with each other.
To resolve the question of whether the labeling
requirements and advertising regulations under the RIRR
are valid, it is important to deal first with the nature,
purpose, and depth of the regulatory powers of the DOH,
as defined in general under the 1987 Administrative
Code,47 and as delegated in particular under the Milk
Code.
Health is a legitimate subject matter for regulation by the
DOH (and certain other administrative agencies) in
exercise of police powers delegated to it. The sheer span
of jurisprudence on that matter precludes the need to
further discuss it..48 However, health information,
particularly advertising materials on apparently non-toxic
products like breastmilk substitutes and supplements, is
a relatively new area for regulation by the DOH.49

As early as the 1917 Revised Administrative Code of the
Philippine Islands,50 health information was already
within the ambit of the regulatory powers of the
predecessor of DOH.51 Section 938 thereof charged it
with the duty to protect the health of the people, and
vested it with such powers as "(g) the dissemination of
hygienic information among the people and especially
the inculcation of knowledge as to the proper care of
infants and the methods of preventing and combating
dangerous communicable diseases."
Seventy years later, the 1987 Administrative Code
tasked respondent DOH to carry out the state policy
pronounced under Section 15, Article II of the 1987
Constitution, which is "to protect and promote the right to
health of the people and instill health consciousness
among them."52 To that end, it was granted under
Section 3 of the Administrative Code the power to "(6)
propagate health information and educate the population
on important health, medical and environmental matters
which have health implications."53
When it comes to information regarding nutrition of
infants and young children, however, the Milk Code
specifically delegated to the Ministry of Health
(hereinafter referred to as DOH) the power to ensure that
there is adequate, consistent and objective information
on breastfeeding and use of breastmilk substitutes,
supplements and related products; and the power to
control such information. These are expressly provided
for in Sections 12 and 5(a), to wit:
SECTION 12. Implementation and Monitoring –
xxxx
(b) The Ministry of Health shall be principally responsible
for the implementation and enforcement of the provisions
of this Code. For this purpose, the Ministry of Health
shall have the following powers and functions:
(1) To promulgate such rules and regulations as are
necessary or proper for the implementation of this Code
and the accomplishment of its purposes and objectives.
xxxx
(4) To exercise such other powers and functions as may
be necessary for or incidental to the attainment of the
purposes and objectives of this Code.
SECTION 5. Information and Education –
(a) The government shall ensure that objective and
consistent information is provided on infant feeding, for
use by families and those involved in the field of infant
nutrition. This responsibility shall cover the planning,
provision, design and dissemination of information, and
the control thereof, on infant nutrition. (Emphasis
supplied)
Further, DOH is authorized by the Milk Code to control
the content of any information on breastmilk vis-à-vis
breastmilk substitutes, supplement and related products,
in the following manner:
SECTION 5. x x x
(b) Informational and educational materials, whether
written, audio, or visual, dealing with the feeding of
infants and intended to reach pregnant women and
mothers of infants, shall include clear information on all
the following points: (1) the benefits and superiority of
breastfeeding; (2) maternal nutrition, and the preparation
for and maintenance of breastfeeding; (3) the negative
effect on breastfeeding of introducing partial
bottlefeeding; (4) the difficulty of reversing the decision
not to breastfeed; and (5) where needed, the proper use
of infant formula, whether manufactured industrially or
home-prepared. When such materials contain
information about the use of infant formula, they shall
include the social and financial implications of its use; the
health hazards of inappropriate foods or feeding
methods; and, in particular, the health hazards of
unnecessary or improper use of infant formula and other
breastmilk substitutes. Such materials shall not use any
picture or text which may idealize the use of breastmilk
substitutes.
SECTION 8. Health Workers –
xxxx
(b) Information provided by manufacturers and
distributors to health professionals regarding products
within the scope of this Code shall be restricted to
scientific and factual matters, and such information shall
not imply or create a belief that bottlefeeding is
equivalent or superior to breastfeeding. It shall also
include the information specified in Section 5(b).
SECTION 10. Containers/Label –
(a) Containers and/or labels shall be designed to provide
the necessary information about the appropriate use of
the products, and in such a way as not to discourage
breastfeeding.
xxxx
(d) The term "humanized," "maternalized" or similar
terms shall not be used. (Emphasis supplied)
The DOH is also authorized to control the purpose of the
information and to whom such information may be
disseminated under Sections 6 through 9 of the Milk
Code54 to ensure that the information that would reach
pregnant women, mothers of infants, and health
professionals and workers in the health care system is
restricted to scientific and factual matters and shall not
imply or create a belief that bottlefeeding is equivalent or
superior to breastfeeding.
It bears emphasis, however, that the DOH's power under
the Milk Code to control information regarding breastmilk
vis-a-vis breastmilk substitutes is not absolute as the
power to control does not encompass the power to
absolutely prohibit the advertising, marketing, and
promotion of breastmilk substitutes.
The following are the provisions of the Milk Code that
unequivocally indicate that the control over information
given to the DOH is not absolute and that absolute
prohibition is not contemplated by the Code:
a) Section 2 which requires adequate information and
appropriate marketing and distribution of breastmilk
substitutes, to wit:
SECTION 2. Aim of the Code – The aim of the Code is to
contribute to the provision of safe and adequate nutrition
for infants by the protection and promotion of
breastfeeding and by ensuring the proper use of
breastmilk substitutes and breastmilk supplements when
these are necessary, on the basis of adequate
information and through appropriate marketing and
distribution.
b) Section 3 which specifically states that the Code
applies to the marketing of and practices related to
breastmilk substitutes, including infant formula, and to
information concerning their use;
c) Section 5(a) which provides that the government shall
ensure that objective and consistent information is
provided on infant feeding;
d) Section 5(b) which provides that written, audio or
visual informational and educational materials shall not
use any picture or text which may idealize the use of
breastmilk substitutes and should include information on
the health hazards of unnecessary or improper use of
said product;
e) Section 6(a) in relation to Section 12(a) which creates
and empowers the IAC to review and examine
advertising, promotion, and other marketing materials;
f) Section 8(b) which states that milk companies may
provide information to health professionals but such
information should be restricted to factual and scientific
matters and shall not imply or create a belief that
bottlefeeding is equivalent or superior to breastfeeding;
and
g) Section 10 which provides that containers or labels
should not contain information that would discourage
breastfeeding and idealize the use of infant formula.
It is in this context that the Court now examines the
assailed provisions of the RIRR regarding labeling and
advertising.
Sections 1355 on "total effect" and 2656 of Rule VII of
the RIRR contain some labeling requirements,
specifically: a) that there be a statement that there is no
substitute to breastmilk; and b) that there be a statement
that powdered infant formula may contain pathogenic
microorganisms and must be prepared and used
appropriately. Section 1657 of the RIRR prohibits all
health and nutrition claims for products within the scope
of the Milk Code, such as claims of increased emotional
and intellectual abilities of the infant and young child.
These requirements and limitations are consistent with
the provisions of Section 8 of the Milk Code, to wit:
SECTION 8. Health workers -
xxxx
(b) Information provided by manufacturers and
distributors to health professionals regarding products
within the scope of this Code shall be restricted to
scientific and factual matters, and such information shall
not imply or create a belief that bottlefeeding is
equivalent or superior to breastfeeding. It shall also
include the information specified in Section 5.58
(Emphasis supplied)
and Section 10(d)59 which bars the use on containers
and labels of the terms "humanized," "maternalized," or
similar terms.
These provisions of the Milk Code expressly forbid
information that would imply or create a belief that there
is any milk product equivalent to breastmilk or which is
humanized or maternalized, as such information would
be inconsistent with the superiority of breastfeeding.
It may be argued that Section 8 of the Milk Code refers
only to information given to health workers regarding
breastmilk substitutes, not to containers and labels
thereof. However, such restrictive application of Section
8(b) will result in the absurd situation in which milk
companies and distributors are forbidden to claim to
health workers that their products are substitutes or
equivalents of breastmilk, and yet be allowed to display
on the containers and labels of their products the exact
opposite message. That askewed interpretation of the
Milk Code is precisely what Section 5(a) thereof seeks to
avoid by mandating that all information regarding
breastmilk vis-a-vis breastmilk substitutes be consistent,
at the same time giving the government control over
planning, provision, design, and dissemination of
information on infant feeding.
Thus, Section 26(c) of the RIRR which requires
containers and labels to state that the product offered is
not a substitute for breastmilk, is a reasonable means of
enforcing Section 8(b) of the Milk Code and deterring
circumvention of the protection and promotion of
breastfeeding as embodied in Section 260 of the Milk
Code.
Section 26(f)61 of the RIRR is an equally reasonable
labeling requirement. It implements Section 5(b) of the
Milk Code which reads:
SECTION 5. x x x
xxxx
(b) Informational and educational materials, whether
written, audio, or visual, dealing with the feeding of
infants and intended to reach pregnant women and
mothers of infants, shall include clear information on all
the following points: x x x (5) where needed, the proper
use of infant formula, whether manufactured industrially
or home-prepared. When such materials contain
information about the use of infant formula, they shall
include the social and financial implications of its use; the
health hazards of inappropriate foods or feeding
methods; and, in particular, the health hazards of
unnecessary or improper use of infant formula and other
breastmilk substitutes. Such materials shall not use any
picture or text which may idealize the use of breastmilk
substitutes. (Emphasis supplied)
The label of a product contains information about said
product intended for the buyers thereof. The buyers of
breastmilk substitutes are mothers of infants, and
Section 26 of the RIRR merely adds a fair warning about
the likelihood of pathogenic microorganisms being
present in infant formula and other related products
when these are prepared and used inappropriately.
Petitioner’s counsel has admitted during the hearing on
June 19, 2007 that formula milk is prone to
contaminations and there is as yet no technology that
allows production of powdered infant formula that
eliminates all forms of contamination.62
Ineluctably, the requirement under Section 26(f) of the
RIRR for the label to contain the message regarding
health hazards including the possibility of contamination
with pathogenic microorganisms is in accordance with
Section 5(b) of the Milk Code.
The authority of DOH to control information regarding
breastmilk vis-a-vis breastmilk substitutes and
supplements and related products cannot be questioned.
It is its intervention into the area of advertising,
promotion, and marketing that is being assailed by
petitioner.
In furtherance of Section 6(a) of the Milk Code, to wit:
SECTION 6. The General Public and Mothers. –
(a) No advertising, promotion or other marketing
materials, whether written, audio or visual, for products
within the scope of this Code shall be printed, published,
distributed, exhibited and broadcast unless such
materials are duly authorized and approved by an inter-
agency committee created herein pursuant to the
applicable standards provided for in this Code.
the Milk Code invested regulatory authority over
advertising, promotional and marketing materials to an
IAC, thus:
SECTION 12. Implementation and Monitoring -
(a) For purposes of Section 6(a) of this Code, an inter-
agency committee composed of the following members
is hereby created:
Minister of Health
-------------------
Chairman
Minister of Trade and Industry
-------------------
Member
Minister of Justice
-------------------
Member
Minister of Social Services and Development
-------------------
Member
The members may designate their duly authorized
representative to every meeting of the Committee.
The Committee shall have the following powers and
functions:
(1) To review and examine all advertising. promotion or
other marketing materials, whether written, audio or
visual, on products within the scope of this Code;
(2) To approve or disapprove, delete objectionable
portions from and prohibit the printing, publication,
distribution, exhibition and broadcast of, all advertising
promotion or other marketing materials, whether written,
audio or visual, on products within the scope of this
Code;
(3) To prescribe the internal and operational procedure
for the exercise of its powers and functions as well as the
performance of its duties and responsibilities; and
(4) To promulgate such rules and regulations as are
necessary or proper for the implementation of Section
6(a) of this Code. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
However, Section 11 of the RIRR, to wit:
SECTION 11. Prohibition – No advertising, promotions,
sponsorships, or marketing materials and activities for
breastmilk substitutes intended for infants and young
children up to twenty-four (24) months, shall be allowed,
because they tend to convey or give subliminal
messages or impressions that undermine breastmilk and
breastfeeding or otherwise exaggerate breastmilk
substitutes and/or replacements, as well as related
products covered within the scope of this Code.
prohibits advertising, promotions, sponsorships or
marketing materials and activities for breastmilk
substitutes in line with the RIRR’s declaration of principle
under Section 4(f), to wit:
SECTION 4. Declaration of Principles –
xxxx
(f) Advertising, promotions, or sponsorships of infant
formula, breastmilk substitutes and other related
products are prohibited.
The DOH, through its co-respondents, evidently
arrogated to itself not only the regulatory authority given
to the IAC but also imposed absolute prohibition on
advertising, promotion, and marketing.
Yet, oddly enough, Section 12 of the RIRR reiterated the
requirement of the Milk Code in Section 6 thereof for
prior approval by IAC of all advertising, marketing and
promotional materials prior to dissemination.
Even respondents, through the OSG, acknowledged the
authority of IAC, and repeatedly insisted, during the oral
arguments on June 19, 2007, that the prohibition under
Section 11 is not actually operational, viz:
SOLICITOR GENERAL DEVANADERA:
xxxx
x x x Now, the crux of the matter that is being questioned
by Petitioner is whether or not there is an absolute
prohibition on advertising making AO 2006-12
unconstitutional. We maintained that what AO 2006-12
provides is not an absolute prohibition because Section
11 while it states and it is entitled prohibition it states that
no advertising, promotion, sponsorship or marketing
materials and activities for breast milk substitutes
intended for infants and young children up to 24 months
shall be allowed because this is the standard they tend
to convey or give subliminal messages or impression
undermine that breastmilk or breastfeeding x x x.
We have to read Section 11 together with the other
Sections because the other Section, Section 12,
provides for the inter agency committee that is
empowered to process and evaluate all the advertising
and promotion materials.
xxxx
What AO 2006-12, what it does, it does not prohibit the
sale and manufacture, it simply regulates the
advertisement and the promotions of breastfeeding milk
substitutes.
xxxx
Now, the prohibition on advertising, Your Honor, must be
taken together with the provision on the Inter-Agency
Committee that processes and evaluates because there
may be some information dissemination that are straight
forward information dissemination. What the AO 2006 is
trying to prevent is any material that will undermine the
practice of breastfeeding, Your Honor.
xxxx
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE SANTIAGO:
Madam Solicitor General, under the Milk Code, which
body has authority or power to promulgate Rules and
Regulations regarding the Advertising, Promotion and
Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes?
SOLICITOR GENERAL DEVANADERA:
Your Honor, please, it is provided that the Inter-Agency
Committee, Your Honor.
xxxx
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE SANTIAGO:
x x x Don't you think that the Department of Health
overstepped its rule making authority when it totally
banned advertising and promotion under Section 11
prescribed the total effect rule as well as the content of
materials under Section 13 and 15 of the rules and
regulations?
SOLICITOR GENERAL DEVANADERA:
Your Honor, please, first we would like to stress that
there is no total absolute ban. Second, the Inter-Agency
Committee is under the Department of Health, Your
Honor.
xxxx
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE NAZARIO:
x x x Did I hear you correctly, Madam Solicitor, that there
is no absolute ban on advertising of breastmilk
substitutes in the Revised Rules?
SOLICITOR GENERAL DEVANADERA:
Yes, your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE NAZARIO:
But, would you nevertheless agree that there is an
absolute ban on advertising of breastmilk substitutes
intended for children two (2) years old and younger?
SOLICITOR GENERAL DEVANADERA:
It's not an absolute ban, Your Honor, because we have
the Inter-Agency Committee that can evaluate some
advertising and promotional materials, subject to the
standards that we have stated earlier, which are- they
should not undermine breastfeeding, Your Honor.
xxxx
x x x Section 11, while it is titled Prohibition, it must be
taken in relation with the other Sections, particularly 12
and 13 and 15, Your Honor, because it is recognized that
the Inter-Agency Committee has that power to evaluate
promotional materials, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE NAZARIO:
So in short, will you please clarify there's no absolute
ban on advertisement regarding milk substitute regarding
infants two (2) years below?
SOLICITOR GENERAL DEVANADERA:
We can proudly say that the general rule is that there is a
prohibition, however, we take exceptions and standards
have been set. One of which is that, the Inter-Agency
Committee can allow if the advertising and promotions
will not undermine breastmilk and breastfeeding, Your
Honor.63
Sections 11 and 4(f) of the RIRR are clearly violative of
the Milk Code.
However, although it is the IAC which is authorized to
promulgate rules and regulations for the approval or
rejection of advertising, promotional, or other marketing
materials under Section 12(a) of the Milk Code, said
provision must be related to Section 6 thereof which in
turn provides that the rules and regulations must be
"pursuant to the applicable standards provided for in this
Code." Said standards are set forth in Sections 5(b),
8(b), and 10 of the Code, which, at the risk of being
repetitious, and for easy reference, are quoted
hereunder:
SECTION 5. Information and Education –
xxxx
(b) Informational and educational materials, whether
written, audio, or visual, dealing with the feeding of
infants and intended to reach pregnant women and
mothers of infants, shall include clear information on all
the following points: (1) the benefits and superiority of
breastfeeding; (2) maternal nutrition, and the preparation
for and maintenance of breastfeeding; (3) the negative
effect on breastfeeding of introducing partial
bottlefeeding; (4) the difficulty of reversing the decision
not to breastfeed; and (5) where needed, the proper use
of infant formula, whether manufactured industrially or
home-prepared. When such materials contain
information about the use of infant formula, they shall
include the social and financial implications of its use; the
health hazards of inappropriate foods of feeding
methods; and, in particular, the health hazards of
unnecessary or improper use of infant formula and other
breastmilk substitutes. Such materials shall not use any
picture or text which may idealize the use of breastmilk
substitutes.
xxxx
SECTION 8. Health Workers. –
xxxx
(b) Information provided by manufacturers and
distributors to health professionals regarding products
within the scope of this Code shall be restricted to
scientific and factual matters and such information shall
not imply or create a belief that bottle feeding is
equivalent or superior to breastfeeding. It shall also
include the information specified in Section 5(b).
xxxx
SECTION 10. Containers/Label –
(a) Containers and/or labels shall be designed to provide
the necessary information about the appropriate use of
the products, and in such a way as not to discourage
breastfeeding.
(b) Each container shall have a clear, conspicuous and
easily readable and understandable message in Pilipino
or English printed on it, or on a label, which message
can not readily become separated from it, and which
shall include the following points:
(i) the words "Important Notice" or their equivalent;
(ii) a statement of the superiority of breastfeeding;
(iii) a statement that the product shall be used only on
the advice of a health worker as to the need for its use
and the proper methods of use; and
(iv) instructions for appropriate preparation, and a
warning against the health hazards of inappropriate
preparation.
Section 12(b) of the Milk Code designates the DOH as
the principal implementing agency for the enforcement of
the provisions of the Code. In relation to such
responsibility of the DOH, Section 5(a) of the Milk Code
states that:
SECTION 5. Information and Education –
(a) The government shall ensure that objective and
consistent information is provided on infant feeding, for
use by families and those involved in the field of infant
nutrition. This responsibility shall cover the planning,
provision, design and dissemination of information, and
the control thereof, on infant nutrition. (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, the DOH has the significant responsibility to
translate into operational terms the standards set forth in
Sections 5, 8, and 10 of the Milk Code, by which the IAC
shall screen advertising, promotional, or other marketing
materials.
It is pursuant to such responsibility that the DOH
correctly provided for Section 13 in the RIRR which
reads as follows:
SECTION 13. "Total Effect" - Promotion of products
within the scope of this Code must be objective and
should not equate or make the product appear to be as
good or equal to breastmilk or breastfeeding in the
advertising concept. It must not in any case undermine
breastmilk or breastfeeding. The "total effect" should not
directly or indirectly suggest that buying their product
would produce better individuals, or resulting in greater
love, intelligence, ability, harmony or in any manner bring
better health to the baby or other such exaggerated and
unsubstantiated claim.
Such standards bind the IAC in formulating its rules and
regulations on advertising, promotion, and marketing.
Through that single provision, the DOH exercises control
over the information content of advertising, promotional
and marketing materials on breastmilk vis-a-vis
breastmilk substitutes, supplements and other related
products. It also sets a viable standard against which the
IAC may screen such materials before they are made
public.
In Equi-Asia Placement, Inc. vs. Department of Foreign
Affairs,64 the Court held:
x x x [T]his Court had, in the past, accepted as sufficient
standards the following: "public interest," "justice and
equity," "public convenience and welfare," and
"simplicity, economy and welfare."65
In this case, correct information as to infant feeding and
nutrition is infused with public interest and welfare.
4. With regard to activities for dissemination of
information to health professionals, the Court also finds
that there is no inconsistency between the provisions of
the Milk Code and the RIRR. Section 7(b)66 of the Milk
Code, in relation to Section 8(b)67 of the same Code,
allows dissemination of information to health
professionals but such information is restricted to
scientific and factual matters.
Contrary to petitioner's claim, Section 22 of the RIRR
does not prohibit the giving of information to health
professionals on scientific and factual matters. What it
prohibits is the involvement of the manufacturer and
distributor of the products covered by the Code in
activities for the promotion, education and production of
Information, Education and Communication (IEC)
materials regarding breastfeeding that are intended for
women and children. Said provision cannot be construed
to encompass even the dissemination of information to
health professionals, as restricted by the Milk Code.
5. Next, petitioner alleges that Section 8(e)68 of the Milk
Code permits milk manufacturers and distributors to
extend assistance in research and in the continuing
education of health professionals, while Sections 22 and
32 of the RIRR absolutely forbid the same. Petitioner
also assails Section 4(i)69 of the RIRR prohibiting milk
manufacturers' and distributors' participation in any
policymaking body in relation to the advancement of
breastfeeding.
Section 4(i) of the RIRR provides that milk companies
and their representatives should not form part of any
policymaking body or entity in relation to the
advancement of breastfeeding. The Court finds nothing
in said provisions which contravenes the Milk Code. Note
that under Section 12(b) of the Milk Code, it is the DOH
which shall be principally responsible for the
implementation and enforcement of the provisions of
said Code. It is entirely up to the DOH to decide which
entities to call upon or allow to be part of policymaking
bodies on breastfeeding. Therefore, the RIRR's
prohibition on milk companies’ participation in any
policymaking body in relation to the advancement of
breastfeeding is in accord with the Milk Code.
Petitioner is also mistaken in arguing that Section 22 of
the RIRR prohibits milk companies from giving reasearch
assistance and continuing education to health
professionals. Section 2270 of the RIRR does not pertain
to research assistance to or the continuing education of
health professionals; rather, it deals with breastfeeding
promotion and education for women and children.
Nothing in Section 22 of the RIRR prohibits milk
companies from giving assistance for research or
continuing education to health professionals; hence,
petitioner's argument against this particular provision
must be struck down.
It is Sections 971 and 1072 of the RIRR which govern
research assistance. Said sections of the RIRR provide
that research assistance for health workers and
researchers may be allowed upon approval of an ethics
committee, and with certain disclosure requirements
imposed on the milk company and on the recipient of the
research award.
The Milk Code endows the DOH with the power to
determine how such research or educational assistance
may be given by milk companies or under what
conditions health workers may accept the assistance.
Thus, Sections 9 and 10 of the RIRR imposing limitations
on the kind of research done or extent of assistance
given by milk companies are completely in accord with
the Milk Code.
Petitioner complains that Section 3273 of the RIRR
prohibits milk companies from giving assistance, support,
logistics or training to health workers. This provision is
within the prerogative given to the DOH under Section
8(e)74 of the Milk Code, which provides that
manufacturers and distributors of breastmilk substitutes
may assist in researches, scholarships and the
continuing education, of health professionals in
accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated
by the Ministry of Health, now DOH.
6. As to the RIRR's prohibition on donations, said
provisions are also consistent with the Milk Code.
Section 6(f) of the Milk Code provides that donations
may be made by manufacturers and distributors of
breastmilk substitutes upon the request or with the
approval of the DOH. The law does not proscribe the
refusal of donations. The Milk Code leaves it purely to
the discretion of the DOH whether to request or accept
such donations. The DOH then appropriately exercised
its discretion through Section 5175 of the RIRR which
sets forth its policy not to request or approve donations
from manufacturers and distributors of breastmilk
substitutes.
It was within the discretion of the DOH when it provided
in Section 52 of the RIRR that any donation from milk
companies not covered by the Code should be coursed
through the IAC which shall determine whether such
donation should be accepted or refused. As reasoned
out by respondents, the DOH is not mandated by the
Milk Code to accept donations. For that matter, no
person or entity can be forced to accept a donation.
There is, therefore, no real inconsistency between the
RIRR and the law because the Milk Code does not
prohibit the DOH from refusing donations.
7. With regard to Section 46 of the RIRR providing for
administrative sanctions that are not found in the Milk
Code, the Court upholds petitioner's objection thereto.
Respondent's reliance on Civil Aeronautics Board v.
Philippine Air Lines, Inc.76 is misplaced. The glaring
difference in said case and the present case before the
Court is that, in the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Civil
Aeronautics Administration (CAA) was expressly granted
by the law (R.A. No. 776) the power to impose fines and
civil penalties, while the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)
was granted by the same law the power to review on
appeal the order or decision of the CAA and to determine
whether to impose, remit, mitigate, increase or
compromise such fine and civil penalties. Thus, the
Court upheld the CAB's Resolution imposing
administrative fines.
In a more recent case, Perez v. LPG Refillers
Association of the Philippines, Inc.,77 the Court upheld
the Department of Energy (DOE) Circular No. 2000-06-
10 implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 33. The
circular provided for fines for the commission of
prohibited acts. The Court found that nothing in the
circular contravened the law because the DOE was
expressly authorized by B.P. Blg. 33 and R.A. No. 7638
to impose fines or penalties.
In the present case, neither the Milk Code nor the
Revised Administrative Code grants the DOH the
authority to fix or impose administrative fines. Thus,
without any express grant of power to fix or impose such
fines, the DOH cannot provide for those fines in the
RIRR. In this regard, the DOH again exceeded its
authority by providing for such fines or sanctions in
Section 46 of the RIRR. Said provision is, therefore, null
and void.
The DOH is not left without any means to enforce its
rules and regulations. Section 12(b) (3) of the Milk Code
authorizes the DOH to "cause the prosecution of the
violators of this Code and other pertinent laws on
products covered by this Code." Section 13 of the Milk
Code provides for the penalties to be imposed on
violators of the provision of the Milk Code or the rules
and regulations issued pursuant to it, to wit:
SECTION 13. Sanctions –
(a) Any person who violates the provisions of this Code
or the rules and regulations issued pursuant to this Code
shall, upon conviction, be punished by a penalty of two
(2) months to one (1) year imprisonment or a fine of not
less than One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) nor more
than Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) or both.
Should the offense be committed by a juridical person,
the chairman of the Board of Directors, the president,
general manager, or the partners and/or the persons
directly responsible therefor, shall be penalized.
(b) Any license, permit or authority issued by any
government agency to any health worker, distributor,
manufacturer, or marketing firm or personnel for the
practice of their profession or occupation, or for the
pursuit of their business, may, upon recommendation of
the Ministry of Health, be suspended or revoked in the
event of repeated violations of this Code, or of the rules
and regulations issued pursuant to this Code. (Emphasis
supplied)
8. Petitioner’s claim that Section 57 of the RIRR repeals
existing laws that are contrary to the RIRR is frivolous.
Section 57 reads:
SECTION 57. Repealing Clause - All orders, issuances,
and rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent
with these revised rules and implementing regulations
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 57 of the RIRR does not provide for the repeal of
laws but only orders, issuances and rules and
regulations. Thus, said provision is valid as it is within the
DOH's rule-making power.
An administrative agency like respondent possesses
quasi-legislative or rule-making power or the power to
make rules and regulations which results in delegated
legislation that is within the confines of the granting
statute and the Constitution, and subject to the doctrine
of non-delegability and separability of powers.78 Such
express grant of rule-making power necessarily includes
the power to amend, revise, alter, or repeal the same.79
This is to allow administrative agencies flexibility in
formulating and adjusting the details and manner by
which they are to implement the provisions of a law,80 in
order to make it more responsive to the times. Hence, it
is a standard provision in administrative rules that prior
issuances of administrative agencies that are
inconsistent therewith are declared repealed or modified.
In fine, only Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 are ultra vires,
beyond the authority of the DOH to promulgate and in
contravention of the Milk Code and, therefore, null and
void. The rest of the provisions of the RIRR are in
consonance with the Milk Code.
Lastly, petitioner makes a "catch-all" allegation that:
x x x [T]he questioned RIRR sought to be implemented
by the Respondents is unnecessary and oppressive, and
is offensive to the due process clause of the Constitution,
insofar as the same is in restraint of trade and because a
provision therein is inadequate to provide the public with
a comprehensible basis to determine whether or not they
have committed a violation.81 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner refers to Sections 4(f),82 4(i),83 5(w),84 11,85
22,86 32,87 46,88 and 5289 as the provisions that
suppress the trade of milk and, thus, violate the due
process clause of the Constitution.
The framers of the constitution were well aware that
trade must be subjected to some form of regulation for
the public good. Public interest must be upheld over
business interests.90 In Pest Management Association
of the Philippines v. Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority,91
it was held thus:
x x x Furthermore, as held in Association of Philippine
Coconut Desiccators v. Philippine Coconut Authority,
despite the fact that "our present Constitution enshrines
free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the
government the power to intervene whenever necessary
to promote the general welfare." There can be no
question that the unregulated use or proliferation of
pesticides would be hazardous to our environment.
Thus, in the aforecited case, the Court declared that
"free enterprise does not call for removal of ‘protective
regulations’." x x x It must be clearly explained and
proven by competent evidence just exactly how such
protective regulation would result in the restraint of trade.
[Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
In this case, petitioner failed to show that the proscription
of milk manufacturers’ participation in any policymaking
body (Section 4(i)), classes and seminars for women and
children (Section 22); the giving of assistance, support
and logistics or training (Section 32); and the giving of
donations (Section 52) would unreasonably hamper the
trade of breastmilk substitutes. Petitioner has not
established that the proscribed activities are
indispensable to the trade of breastmilk substitutes.
Petitioner failed to demonstrate that the aforementioned
provisions of the RIRR are unreasonable and oppressive
for being in restraint of trade.
Petitioner also failed to convince the Court that Section
5(w) of the RIRR is unreasonable and oppressive. Said
section provides for the definition of the term "milk
company," to wit:
SECTION 5 x x x. (w) "Milk Company" shall refer to the
owner, manufacturer, distributor of infant formula, follow-
up milk, milk formula, milk supplement, breastmilk
substitute or replacement, or by any other description of
such nature, including their representatives who promote
or otherwise advance their commercial interests in
marketing those products;
On the other hand, Section 4 of the Milk Code provides:
(d) "Distributor" means a person, corporation or any
other entity in the public or private sector engaged in the
business (whether directly or indirectly) of marketing at
the wholesale or retail level a product within the scope of
this Code. A "primary distributor" is a manufacturer's
sales agent, representative, national distributor or broker.
xxxx
(j) "Manufacturer" means a corporation or other entity in
the public or private sector engaged in the business or
function (whether directly or indirectly or through an
agent or and entity controlled by or under contract with it)
of manufacturing a products within the scope of this
Code.
Notably, the definition in the RIRR merely merged
together under the term "milk company" the entities
defined separately under the Milk Code as "distributor"
and "manufacturer." The RIRR also enumerated in
Section 5(w) the products manufactured or distributed by
an entity that would qualify it as a "milk company,"
whereas in the Milk Code, what is used is the phrase
"products within the scope of this Code." Those are the
only differences between the definitions given in the Milk
Code and the definition as re-stated in the RIRR.
Since all the regulatory provisions under the Milk Code
apply equally to both manufacturers and distributors, the
Court sees no harm in the RIRR providing for just one
term to encompass both entities. The definition of "milk
company" in the RIRR and the definitions of "distributor"
and "manufacturer" provided for under the Milk Code are
practically the same.
The Court is not convinced that the definition of "milk
company" provided in the RIRR would bring about any
change in the treatment or regulation of "distributors" and
"manufacturers" of breastmilk substitutes, as defined
under the Milk Code.
Except Sections 4(f), 11 and 46, the rest of the
provisions of the RIRR are in consonance with the
objective, purpose and intent of the Milk Code,
constituting reasonable regulation of an industry which
affects public health and welfare and, as such, the rest of
the RIRR do not constitute illegal restraint of trade nor
are they violative of the due process clause of the
Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of Administrative Order No.
2006-0012 dated May 12, 2006 are declared NULL and
VOID for being ultra vires. The Department of Health and
respondents are PROHIBITED from implementing said
provisions.

The Temporary Restraining Order issued on August 15,

2006 is LIFTED insofar as the rest of the provisions of
Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 is concerned.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chief Justice), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,

Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Corona, Carpio-Morales,
Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia, Velasco, Jr.,
Nachura, Reyes, JJ., concur.
Oposa et al. v. Fulgencio S.
Factoran, Jr. et al (G.R. No.
101083)
Facts
This case is unique in that it is a class suit brought by 44 children,
through their parents, claiming that they bring the case in the
name of “their generation as well as those generations yet
unborn.” Aiming to stop deforestation, it was filed against the
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, seeking to have him cancel all the timber license
agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease and desist from
accepting and approving more timber license agreements. The
children invoked their right to a balanced and healthful ecology
and to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae.
The petitioners claimed that the DENR Secretary's refusal to
cancel the TLAs and to stop issuing them was "contrary to the
highest law of humankind-- the natural law-- and violative of
plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation." The case
was dismissed in the lower court, invoking the law on non-
impairment of contracts, so it was brought to the Supreme Court
on certiorari.
Issue
Did the children have the legal standing to file the case?
Ruling
Yes. The Supreme Court in granting the petition ruled that the
children had the legal standing to file the case based on the
concept of “intergenerational responsibility”. Their right to a
healthy environment carried with it an obligation to preserve
that environment for the succeeding generations. In this, the
Court recognized legal standing to sue on behalf of future
generations. Also, the Court said, the law on non-impairment of
contracts must give way to the exercise of the police power of
the state in the interest of public welfare.
Relevance
The case of Oposa vs. Factoran has been widely cited worldwide
for its concept of intergenerational responsibility, particularly in
cases related to ecology and the environment. For example:
• Oposa vs. Factoran's concept of "intergenerational
responsibility" was cited in a case in Bangladesh.[1]
• The United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP)
considers Oposa vs. Factoran a landmark case in judicial
thinking for environmental governance.[2]
• In the book Public Health Law and Ethics by Larry O.
Gostin, Oposa vs. Factoran is cited as a significant
example of the justiciability of the right to health. [3]
• In the book The Law of Energy for Sustainable
Development by the IUCN Academy of Environmental
Law Research Studies, a study cites Oposa vs. Factoran
as basis for asserting that the right to breathe is part of
the right to life as an acknowledged human right.[4]
Nature of the case
Class action seeking the cancellation and non-issuance of
timber licence agreements which allegedly infringed the
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology
(Section 16); non-impairment of contracts; Environmental
law; judicial review and the political question doctrine; inter-
generational responsibility; Remedial law: cause of action
and standing; Directive principles; Negative obligation on
State
Summary
An action was filed by several minors represented by their
parents against the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources to cancel existing timber license agreements in
the country and to stop issuance of new ones. It was
claimed that the resultant deforestation and damage to the
environment violated their constitutional rights to a balanced
and healthful ecology and to health (Sections 16 and 15,
Article II of the Constitution). The petitioners asserted that
they represented others of their generation as well as
generations yet unborn.
Finding for the petitioners, the Court stated that even
though the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies of the
Constitution and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not
follow that it is less important than any of the rights
enumerated in the latter: “[it] concerns nothing less than
self-preservation and self-perpetuation, the advancement of
which may even be said to predate all governments and
constitutions”. The right is linked to the constitutional right
to health, is “fundamental”, “constitutionalised”, “self-
executing” and “judicially enforceable”. It imposes the
correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
The court stated that the petitioners were able to file a class
suit both for others of their generation and for succeeding
generations as “the minors' assertion of their right to a
sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of
that right for the generations to come.”
Significance of the case
This case has been widely-cited in jurisprudence
worldwide, particularly in cases relating to
forest/timber licensing. However, the approach of the
Philippino Supreme Court to economic, social and
cultural rights has proved somewhat inconsistent, with
some judgments resulting in the enforcement of such
rights (e.g., Del Rosario v Bangzon, 180 SCRA 521
(1989); Manila Prince Hotel v Government Service
Insurance System, G. R. No. 122156 (3 February, 1997)
but at least one instance in which the Court made a
statement that economic, social and cultural rights are
not real rights (see, Brigido Simon v Commission on
Human Rights, G. R. No. 100150, 5 January 1994).
G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE
ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and
represented by their parents ANTONIO and
RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA,
minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and
ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and
PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and
represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDA
FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor,
represented by her parents SIGRID and DOLORES
FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all
surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their
parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN
V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by his parents
ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE
ALFARO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE
and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION
T. CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents
FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA
DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and
ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T.
NARVASA, minor, represented by his parents
GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA,
MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA
and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ,
minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO and
AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY,
GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed
KING, minors, represented by their parents MARIO
and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and
THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA,
minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR and
TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all
surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented by their
parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN,
MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed
CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents
MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN
MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed
OPOSA, minors and represented by their parents
RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH,
STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed
QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents JOSE
MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO,
CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all
surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their
parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL,
and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK,
INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR.,
in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, and THE
HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding
Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of
Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the
petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts
of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-
generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue
of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to
"prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of
Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated
hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems
and continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77
which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila)
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital
Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the
principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and
joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an
additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network,
Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit
corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia,
engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of
our environment and natural resources. The original
defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.,
then Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this
petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C.
Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by
the petitioners.1 The complaint2 was instituted as a
taxpayers' class suit3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are
all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers,
and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the
natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin
tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and
others who are equally concerned about the preservation
of said resource but are "so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The
minors further asseverate that they "represent their
generation as well as generations yet
unborn."4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be
rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting
in his behalf to —
(1) Cancel all existing timber license
agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license
agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and
equitable under the premises."5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that
the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land
area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is
endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which
varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may
be found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological
and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also
the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have
existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial;
scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a
balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land area
should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per
cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%)
for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and
other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this balance
as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a
host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water
shortages resulting from drying up of the water table,
otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers,
brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as
a result of the intrusion therein of salt water,
incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the
island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c)
massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil
fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of
soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000)
cubic meters per annum — approximately the size of the
entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and
extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora
and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural
communities, including the disappearance of the
Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers
and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and
other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine
resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is
presently experienced by the entire country, (h)
increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from
the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of
lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence
of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation
and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams
constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying
water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of
electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's
capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led
to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as
the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as
the "greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental
consequences of continued and deforestation are so
capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same
may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This
notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present
expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic
and film evidence in the course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the
foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the
Philippines had some sixteen (16) million
hectares of rainforests constituting
roughly 53% of the country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal
that there remained no more than 1.2
million hectares of said rainforests or four
per cent (4.0%) of the country's land
area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a
mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-
growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of
the entire land mass of the Philippine
archipelago and about 3.0 million
hectares of immature and uneconomical
secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the
defendant's, predecessors have granted
timber license agreements ('TLA's') to
various corporations to cut the aggregate
area of 3.89 million hectares for
commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the
corresponding areas covered is hereto
attached as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of
deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares
per annum or 25 hectares per hour —
nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and
holidays included — the Philippines will
be bereft of forest resources after the end
of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous
consequences, serious injury and
irreparable damage of this continued
trend of deforestation to the plaintiff
minor's generation and to generations yet
unborn are evident and incontrovertible.
As a matter of fact, the environmental
damages enumerated in paragraph 6
hereof are already being felt, experienced
and suffered by the generation of plaintiff
adults.
14. The continued allowance by
defendant of TLA holders to cut and
deforest the remaining forest stands will
work great damage and irreparable injury
to plaintiffs — especially plaintiff minors
and their successors — who may never
see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare
and unique natural resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a
misappropriation and/or impairment of
the natural resource property he holds in
trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and
succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and
constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology and are entitled to
protection by the State in its capacity as
the parens patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all
administrative remedies with the
defendant's office. On March 2, 1990,
plaintiffs served upon defendant a final
demand to cancel all logging permits in
the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March
1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses
to cancel the existing TLA's to the
continuing serious damage and extreme
prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by
defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act
violative of the rights of plaintiffs,
especially plaintiff minors who may be left
with a country that is desertified (sic),
bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful
flora, fauna and indigenous cultures
which the Philippines had been
abundantly blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the
aforementioned TLA's is manifestly
contrary to the public policy enunciated in
the Philippine Environmental Policy
which, in pertinent part, states that it is
the policy of the State —
 (a) to create, develop, maintain and
improve conditions under which man and
nature can thrive in productive and
enjoyable harmony with each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other
requirements of present and future
generations of Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an
environmental quality that is conductive
to a life of dignity and well-being. (P.D.
1151, 6 June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued
refusal to cancel the aforementioned
TLA's is contradictory to the
Constitutional policy of the State to —
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of
opportunities, income and wealth" and
"make full and efficient use of natural
resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of
the Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth."
(Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's
cultural heritage and resources (sic)"
(Section 14, Article XIV, id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article
II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to
the highest law of humankind — the
natural law — and violative of plaintiffs'
right to self-preservation and
perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in law other than the
instant action to arrest the unabated
hemorrhage of the country's vital life
support systems and continued rape of
Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary
Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint
based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have
no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised
by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly
pertains to the legislative or executive branches of
Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the
Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint
shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the
motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable
question as it involves the defendant's abuse of
discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order
granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss.7 In the
said order, not only was the defendant's claim — that the
complaint states no cause of action against him and that
it raises a political question — sustained, the respondent
Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed
for would result in the impairment of contracts which is
prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court
and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal
order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely
abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the
parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their
children, but have also joined the latter in this case.8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the
petition and required the parties to submit their
respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the
respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and
unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains
sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound
environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil
Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine
Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of
generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept
of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-
perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners
likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation
per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's
right to a healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent
Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting
Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas
for logging than what is available involves a judicial
question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the
Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners
maintain that the same does not apply in this case
because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit
that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the
said clause, it is well settled that they may still be
revoked by the State when the public interest so
requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the
petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific
legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which
any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the
complaint but vague and nebulous allegations
concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly
entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its
capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according
to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then
reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging
should be permitted in the country is a political question
which should be properly addressed to the executive or
legislative branches of Government. They therefore
assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file an
action to court, but to lobby before Congress for the
passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs,
respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the
State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA
remains effective for a certain period of time — usually
for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same
can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder
has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have
violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry
laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all
the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite
hearing would be violative of the requirements of due
process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some
procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No.
90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the
present respondents did not take issue with this matter.
Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is
indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint
is of common and general interest not just to several, but
to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the
parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if
not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the
court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are
numerous and representative enough to ensure the full
protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the
requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section
12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present
both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the
latter being but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element.
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no
difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others
of their generation and for the succeeding generations,
file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the
succeeding generations can only be based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the
created world in its entirety.9 Such rhythm and harmony
indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition,
utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife,
off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end
that their exploration, development and utilization be
equitably accessible to the present as well as future
generations. 10Needless to say, every generation has a
responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and
harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and
healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors'
assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their
obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been
addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the
petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a
meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues
raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not
hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the
respondent Judge's challenged order for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order
reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect
evaluation of the Complaint, the Court
cannot help but agree with the defendant.
For although we believe that plaintiffs
have but the noblest of all intentions, it
(sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient
definiteness, a specific legal right they
are seeking to enforce and protect, or a
specific legal wrong they are seeking to
prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2,
RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that
the Complaint is replete with vague
assumptions and vague conclusions
based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs
fail to state a cause of action in its
Complaint against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes
that the matter before it, being impressed
with political color and involving a matter
of public policy, may not be taken
cognizance of by this Court without doing
violence to the sacred principle of
"Separation of Powers" of the three (3)
co-equal branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression
that it cannot, no matter how we stretch
our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed
for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all
existing timber license agreements in the
country and to cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber license
agreements. For to do otherwise would
amount to "impairment of contracts"
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the
plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a
specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong
committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague
assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data.
A reading of the complaint itself belies these
conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal
right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional
history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.
Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and
advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health
which is provided for in the preceding
section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and
promote the right to health of the people
and instill health consciousness among
them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to
be found under the Declaration of Principles and State
Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not
follow that it is less important than any of the civil and
political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right
belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it
concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-
perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the
petitioners — the advancement of which may even be
said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a
matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be
written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist
from the inception of humankind. If they are now
explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is
because of the well-founded fear of its framers that
unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and
to health are mandated as state policies by the
Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing
importance and imposing upon the state a solemn
obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance
the second, the day would not be too far when all else
would be lost not only for the present generation, but
also for those to come — generations which stand to
inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining
life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with
it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment. During the debates on this right in one of
the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, the following exchange transpired between
Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner
Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section
mandate the State to
provide sanctions against
all forms of pollution —
air, water and noise
pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President.
The right to healthful (sic)
environment necessarily
carries with it the
correlative duty of not
impairing the same and,
therefore, sanctions may
be provided for
impairment of
environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the
judicious management and conservation of the country's
forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or
environmental balance would be irreversiby
disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and
healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the
other related provisions of the Constitution concerning
the conservation, development and utilization of the
country's natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C.
Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No.
192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
"shall be the primary government agency responsible for
the conservation, management, development and proper
use of the country's environment and natural resources,
specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources,
including those in reservation and watershed areas, and
lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and
regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for
by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the
benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present
and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof
makes the following statement of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is
hereby declared the policy of the State to
ensure the sustainable use,
development, management, renewal, and
conservation of the country's forest,
mineral, land, off-shore areas and other
natural resources, including the
protection and enhancement of the
quality of the environment, and equitable
access of the different segments of the
population to the development and the
use of the country's natural resources,
not only for the present generation but for
future generations as well. It is also the
policy of the state to recognize and apply
a true value system including social and
environmental cost implications relative
to their utilization, development and
conservation of our natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title
XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of
1987,15 specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The
State shall ensure, for the benefit of the
Filipino people, the full exploration and
development as well as the judicious
disposition, utilization, management,
renewal and conservation of the country's
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural
resources, consistent with the necessity
of maintaining a sound ecological
balance and protecting and enhancing
the quality of the environment and the
objective of making the exploration,
development and utilization of such
natural resources equitably accessible to
the different segments of the present as
well as future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize
and apply a true value system that takes
into account social and environmental
cost implications relative to the utilization,
development and conservation of our
natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of
maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting
and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2
of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks
of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes
particular reference to the fact of the agency's being
subject to law and higher authority. Said section
provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department
of Environment and Natural Resources
shall be primarily responsible for the
implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher
authority, be in charge of carrying out the
State's constitutional mandate to control
and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization, and
conservation of the country's natural
resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987
have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for
policy formulation, and have defined the powers and
functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes
already paid special attention to the "environmental right"
of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977,
P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and
P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were
issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the
State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve
conditions under which man and nature can thrive in
productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to
fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of
present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to
insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is
conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its
goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation
as trustee and guardian of the environment for
succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the
other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they
represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as
clear as the DENR's duty — under its mandate and by
virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192
and the Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect and
advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the
corelative duty or obligation to respect or protect the
same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain
that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done
with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a
balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection
thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed
or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in
violation of the legal right or rights of the
other; and its essential elements are legal
right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation
of the defendant, and act or omission of
the defendant in violation of said legal
right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss
based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a
cause of action, 19 the question submitted to the court for
resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in
the complaint itself. No other matter should be
considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said
allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is
deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be
resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts
to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in
accordance with the prayer in the
complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid
down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the
utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a
motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof
[cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct
appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed
hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or
recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is
a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in
disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint,
We find the statements under the introductory affirmative
allegations, as well as the specific averments under the
sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate
enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of
their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be
granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears
stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the
TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as party
defendants, the grantees thereof for they are
indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said
to raise a political question. Policy formulation or
determination by the executive or legislative branches of
Government is not squarely put in issue. What is
principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-
vis policies already formulated and expressed in
legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the
political question doctrine is no longer, the
insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power
or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and
legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The
second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine
Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a
distinguished member of this Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents
the traditional concept of judicial power,
involving the settlement of conflicting
rights as conferred as law. The second
part of the authority represents a
broadening of judicial power to enable
the courts of justice to review what was
before forbidden territory, to wit, the
discretion of the political departments of
the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the
judiciary, and particularly the Supreme
Court, the power to rule upon even the
wisdom of the decisions of the executive
and the legislature and to declare their
acts invalid for lack or excess of
jurisdiction because tainted with grave
abuse of discretion. The catch, of course,
is the meaning of "grave abuse of
discretion," which is a very elastic phrase
that can expand or contract according to
the disposition of the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking
for this Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the
jurisdictional objection becomes even
less tenable and decisive. The reason is
that, even if we were to assume that the
issue presented before us was political in
nature, we would still not be precluded
from revolving it under the expanded
jurisdiction conferred upon us that now
covers, in proper cases, even the political
question. Article VII, Section 1, of the
Constitution clearly provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing
the complaint is the non-impairment of contracts clause
found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression
that it cannot, no matter how we stretch
our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed
for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all
existing timber license agreements in the
country and to cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber license
agreements. For to do otherwise would
amount to "impairment of contracts"
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are
amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping
pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent
Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in
his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he
had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity
to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted
benefits and advantages to the timber license holders
because he would have forever bound the Government
to strictly respect the said licenses according to their
terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and
the demands of public interest and welfare. He was
aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners,
into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the
Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national
interest so requires, the President may
amend, modify, replace or rescind any
contract, concession, permit, licenses or
any other form of privilege granted herein
...
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be
revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is
not a contract, property or a property right
protested by the due process clause of the
Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of
Forestry, 25 this Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by
which the State regulates the utilization
and disposition of forest resources to the
end that public welfare is promoted. A
timber license is not a contract within the
purview of the due process clause; it is
only a license or privilege, which can be
validly withdrawn whenever dictated by
public interest or public welfare as in this
case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege
to do what otherwise would be unlawful,
and is not a contract between the
authority, federal, state, or municipal,
granting it and the person to whom it is
granted; neither is it property or a
property right, nor does it create a vested
right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168).
Thus, this Court held that the granting of
license does not create irrevocable rights,
neither is it property or property rights
(People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr.
& Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license
agreements are the principal instruments
by which the State regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest
resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid
that they merely evidence a privilege
granted by the State to qualified entities,
and do not vest in the latter a permanent
or irrevocable right to the particular
concession area and the forest products
therein. They may be validly amended,
modified, replaced or rescinded by the
Chief Executive when national interests
so require. Thus, they are not deemed
contracts within the purview of the due
process of law clause [See Sections
3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as
amended. Also, Tan v. Director of
Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27,
1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-
impairment clause, which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation
of contracts shall be passed. 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the
same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a
law or even an executive issuance declaring the
cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses.
Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be
invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has
actually been passed mandating cancellations or
modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a
violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because
by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have
only been passed in the exercise of the police power of
the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting
their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe
vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our
system of government, is not meant to be
absolute. The same is understood to be
subject to reasonable legislative
regulation aimed at the promotion of
public health, moral, safety and welfare.
In other words, the constitutional
guaranty of non-impairment of obligations
of contract is limited by the exercise of
the police power of the State, in the
interest of public health, safety, moral
and general welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs.
New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life
Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General,30 to wit:
Under our form of government the use of
property and the making of contracts are
normally matters of private and not of
public concern. The general rule is that
both shall be free of governmental
interference. But neither property rights
nor contract rights are absolute; for
government cannot exist if the citizen
may at will use his property to the
 detriment of his fellows, or exercise his
freedom of contract to work them harm.
Equally fundamental with the private right
is that of the public to regulate it in the
common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the
police power of the state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how
the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to
the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving
new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no
contract would have as of yet existed in the other
instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder
is not entitled to it as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant
Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order
of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil
Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners
may therefore amend their complaint to implead as
defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned
timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Romero,
Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Vitug, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J., concurring
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in
the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to my mind,
is one of the most important cases decided by this Court
in the last few years. The seminal principles laid down in
this decision are likely to influence profoundly the
direction and course of the protection and management
of the environment, which of course embraces the
utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial
base of our polity. I have therefore sought to clarify,
basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus
standi necessary to sustain the bringing and,
maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus
standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that their suit
is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus
standi to refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff must
have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the
very broadness of the concept of "class" here involved —
membership in this "class" appears to
embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in
the
future — it appears to me that everyone who may be
expected to benefit from the course of action petitioners
seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with
the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen
therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of
action in the field of environmental protection, as against
both the public administrative agency directly concerned
and the private persons or entities operating in the field
or sector of activity involved. Whether such beneficiaries'
right of action may be found under any and all
circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first
instance, on the part of the governmental agency
concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of
administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the
decision and presumably is left for future determination
in an appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has
alleged and focused upon "one specific fundamental
legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is
"fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been
"constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in
character, I suggest, with very great respect, that it
cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing
excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult
to fashion language more comprehensive in scope and
generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and
healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which can
be subsumed under this rubic appears to be entirely
open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic
fumes and smoke from factories and motor vehicles; of
discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw
sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels,
oil rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of
dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land,
streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land
after strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-
and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs
and other living sea resources through the use of
dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination
of ground water resources; loss of certain species of
fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed
out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192
dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the
1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6
June 1977 — all appear to be formulations of policy, as
general and abstract as the constitutional statements of
basic policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right — to a
balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to
health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The
Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the other hand, a
compendious collection of more "specific environment
management policies" and "environment quality
standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating
to an extremely wide range of topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;
(d) natural resources management and
conservation embracing:
(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;
(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;
 (iv) flood control and natural calamities;
(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization of surface
and ground water
(vii) mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection.
Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has identified the
particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine
Environment Code which give rise to a specific legal right
which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the
Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable care
the particular government agency charged with the
formulation and implementation of guidelines and
programs dealing with each of the headings and sub-
headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment
Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate
action on the part of private persons who are
beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of
action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the
constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in
effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II
of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially
enforceable even in their present form. The implications
of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases;
those implications are too large and far-reaching in
nature even to be hinted at here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the
trial court, show a more specific legal right — a right cast
in language of a significantly lower order of generality
than Article II (15) of the Constitution — that is or may be
violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the
public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court
can validly render judgment granting all or part of the
relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be
understood as simply saying that such a more specific
legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law,
considering the general policy principles found in the
Constitution and the existence of the Philippine
Environment Code, and that the trial court should have
given petitioners an effective opportunity so to
demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a
motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an
essential component of a cause of action be a specific,
operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or
statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that
unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or
disregarded is given specification in operational terms,
defendants may well be unable to defend themselves
intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due
process dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a
specific violation of law or applicable regulation is not
alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall
back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the
second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the
Constitution which reads:
Section 1. . . .
Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
(Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the
right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and "the
right to health" are combined with remedial
standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully
submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted
ocean of social and economic policy making. At
least in respect of the vast area of environmental
protection and management, our courts have no
claim to special technical competence and
experience and professional qualification. Where
no specific, operable norms and standards are
shown to exist, then the policy making
departments — the legislative and executive
departments — must be given a real and
effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate
those norms and standards, and to implement
them before the courts should intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the
timber companies, whose concession agreements or
TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should
cancel, must be impleaded in the proceedings below. It
might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief
demanded is not dependent upon proof of breach by the
timber companies of one or more of the specific terms
and conditions of their concession agreements (and this,
petitioners implicitly assume), what will those companies
litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may
seek to dispute the existence of the specific legal right
petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the
claimed factual nexus between petitioners' specific legal
rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of
public respondent administrative agency. They may also
controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or
remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the
circumstances which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the
protection of the environment, including the forest cover
of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country.
The doctrines set out in the Court's decision issued today
should, however, be subjected to closer examination.
# Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J., concurring
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in
the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to my mind,
is one of the most important cases decided by this Court
in the last few years. The seminal principles laid down in
this decision are likely to influence profoundly the
direction and course of the protection and management
of the environment, which of course embraces the
utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial
base of our polity. I have therefore sought to clarify,
basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus
standi necessary to sustain the bringing and,
maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus
standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that their suit
is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus
standi to refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff must
have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the
very broadness of the concept of "class" here involved —
membership in this "class" appears to
embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in
the
future — it appears to me that everyone who may be
expected to benefit from the course of action petitioners
seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with
the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen
therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of
action in the field of environmental protection, as against
both the public administrative agency directly concerned
and the private persons or entities operating in the field
or sector of activity involved. Whether such beneficiaries'
right of action may be found under any and all
circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first
instance, on the part of the governmental agency
concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of
administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the
decision and presumably is left for future determination
in an appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has
alleged and focused upon "one specific fundamental
legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is
"fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been
"constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in
character, I suggest, with very great respect, that it
cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing
excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult
to fashion language more comprehensive in scope and
generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and
healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which can
be subsumed under this rubic appears to be entirely
open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic
fumes and smoke from factories and motor vehicles; of
discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw
sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels,
oil rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of
dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land,
streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land
after strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-
and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs
and other living sea resources through the use of
dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination
of ground water resources; loss of certain species of
fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed
out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192
dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the
1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6
June 1977 — all appear to be formulations of policy, as
general and abstract as the constitutional statements of
basic policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right — to a
balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to
health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The
Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the other hand, a
compendious collection of more "specific environment
management policies" and "environment quality
standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating
to an extremely wide range of topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;
(d) natural resources management and
conservation embracing:
(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;
(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;
(iv) flood control and natural calamities;
(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization of surface
and ground water
(vii) mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection.
Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has identified the
particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine
Environment Code which give rise to a specific legal right
which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the
Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable care
the particular government agency charged with the
formulation and implementation of guidelines and
programs dealing with each of the headings and sub-
headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment
Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate
action on the part of private persons who are
beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of
action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the
constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in
effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II
of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially
enforceable even in their present form. The implications
of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases;
those implications are too large and far-reaching in
nature even to be hinted at here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the
trial court, show a more specific legal right — a right cast
in language of a significantly lower order of generality
than Article II (15) of the Constitution — that is or may be
violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the
public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court
can validly render judgment granting all or part of the
relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be
understood as simply saying that such a more specific
legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law,
considering the general policy principles found in the
Constitution and the existence of the Philippine
Environment Code, and that the trial court should have
given petitioners an effective opportunity so to
demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a
motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an
essential component of a cause of action be a specific,
operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or
statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that
unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or
disregarded is given specification in operational terms,
defendants may well be unable to defend themselves
intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due
process dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration — where a
specific violation of law or applicable regulation is not
alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall
back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the
second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the
Constitution which reads:

Section 1. . . .

Judicial power includes the duty of the

courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
(Emphasis supplied)

When substantive standards as general as "the

right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and "the
right to health" are combined with remedial
standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully
submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted
ocean of social and economic policy making. At
least in respect of the vast area of environmental
protection and management, our courts have no
claim to special technical competence and
experience and professional qualification. Where
no specific, operable norms and standards are
shown to exist, then the policy making
departments — the legislative and executive
departments — must be given a real and
effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate
those norms and standards, and to implement
them before the courts should intervene.

My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the

timber companies, whose concession agreements or
TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should
cancel, must be impleaded in the proceedings below. It
might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief
demanded is not dependent upon proof of breach by the
timber companies of one or more of the specific terms
and conditions of their concession agreements (and this,
petitioners implicitly assume), what will those companies
litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may
seek to dispute the existence of the specific legal right
petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the
claimed factual nexus between petitioners' specific legal
rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of
public respondent administrative agency. They may also
controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or
remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the
circumstances which exist.

I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the

protection of the environment, including the forest cover
of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country.
The doctrines set out in the Court's decision issued today
should, however, be subjected to closer examination.
MMDA v. Concerned
Residents of Manila
Bay
MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay
(CASE DIGEST)
GR No. 171947-48
18 December 2008
TOPIC: Environmental Law, Mandamus,
PD1152
FACTS:
Respondents filed a complaint before the RTC
against several government agencies, among
them the petitioners, for the cleanup,
rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay.
The complaint alleged that the water quality of the
Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable
standards set by law, specifically PD 1152.
Respondents, as plaintiffs, prayed that petitioners
be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and submit to
the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for
the purpose.
RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondents,
ordering the defendant-government agencies to
clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay.
Petitioners, before the CA, argued that PD 1152
relates only to the cleaning of specific pollution
incidents and do not cover cleaning in general.
Apart from raising concerns about the lack of
funds, petitioners also asserted that the cleaning
of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act, which
can be compelled by mandamus.
The CA denied petitioners’ appeal and affirmed
the Decision of the RTC in toto. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUES:
1. Does PD 1152 include a cleanup in general or is
it limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution
incidents?
2. Whether or not petitioners may be compelled by
mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the
Manila Bay?
RULING:
Issue 1:
PD 1152 does not in any way state that the
government agencies concerned ought to confine
themselves to the containment, removal, and
cleaning operations when a specific pollution
incident occurs. The underlying duty to upgrade
the quality of water is not conditional on the
occurrence of any pollution incident.
Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal
provision specifically prodding petitioners to clean
up the bay, they and the men and women
representing them cannot escape their obligation
to future generations of Filipinos to keep the
waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as
humanly as possible.
Issue 2:
Yes, petitioners may be compelled.
The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste
disposal is set forth not only in the Environment
Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter
as well. This duty of putting up a proper waste
disposal system cannot be characterised as
discretionary, for, as earlier stated, discretion
presupposes the power or right given by law to
public functionaries to act officially according to
their judgment or conscience.
A perusal of other petitioners’ respective charters
would yield to the conclusion that these
government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of
statutory obligation, to perform certain functions
relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup,
rehabilitation, protection, and preservation of the
Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing
not to perform these duties.
The petition is DENIED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 171947-48 December 18, 2008
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, CULTURE AND
SPORTS,1 DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, DEPARTMENT
OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, PHILIPPINE
COAST GUARD, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
MARITIME GROUP, and DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, petitioners,
vs.
CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY,
represented and joined by DIVINA V. ILAS,
SABINIANO ALBARRACIN, MANUEL SANTOS, JR.,
DINAH DELA PEÑA, PAUL DENNIS QUINTERO, MA.
VICTORIA LLENOS, DONNA CALOZA, FATIMA
QUITAIN, VENICE SEGARRA, FRITZIE TANGKIA,
SARAH JOELLE LINTAG, HANNIBAL AUGUSTUS
BOBIS, FELIMON SANTIAGUEL, and JAIME
AGUSTIN R. OPOSA, respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The need to address environmental pollution, as a cause
of climate change, has of late gained the attention of the
international community. Media have finally trained their
sights on the ill effects of pollution, the destruction of
forests and other critical habitats, oil spills, and the
unabated improper disposal of garbage. And rightly so,
for the magnitude of environmental destruction is now on
a scale few ever foresaw and the wound no longer
simply heals by itself.2 But amidst hard evidence and
clear signs of a climate crisis that need bold action, the
voice of cynicism, naysayers, and procrastinators can
still be heard.
This case turns on government agencies and their
officers who, by the nature of their respective offices or
by direct statutory command, are tasked to protect and
preserve, at the first instance, our internal waters, rivers,
shores, and seas polluted by human activities. To most
of these agencies and their official complement, the
pollution menace does not seem to carry the high
national priority it deserves, if their track records are to
be the norm. Their cavalier attitude towards solving, if
not mitigating, the environmental pollution problem, is a
sad commentary on bureaucratic efficiency and
commitment.
At the core of the case is the Manila Bay, a place with a
proud historic past, once brimming with marine life and,
for so many decades in the past, a spot for different
contact recreation activities, but now a dirty and slowly
dying expanse mainly because of the abject official
indifference of people and institutions that could have
otherwise made a difference.
This case started when, on January 29, 1999,
respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a
complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus,
Cavite against several government agencies, among
them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and
protection of the Manila Bay. Raffled to Branch 20 and
docketed as Civil Case No. 1851-99 of the RTC, the
complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay
had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law,
specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the
Philippine Environment Code. This environmental
aberration, the complaint stated, stemmed from:
x x x [The] reckless, wholesale, accumulated and
ongoing acts of omission or commission [of the
defendants] resulting in the clear and present
danger to public health and in the depletion and
contamination of the marine life of Manila Bay,
[for which reason] ALL defendants must be held
jointly and/or solidarily liable and be collectively
ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its
water quality to class B waters fit for swimming,
skin-diving, and other forms of contact
recreation.3
In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged
that the continued neglect of petitioners in abating the
pollution of the Manila Bay constitutes a violation of,
among others:
(1) Respondents’ constitutional right to life,
health, and a balanced ecology;
(2) The Environment Code (PD 1152);
(3) The Pollution Control Law (PD 984);
(4) The Water Code (PD 1067);
(5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856);
(6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD
825);
(7) The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979);
(8) Executive Order No. 192;
(9) The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law
(Republic Act No. 6969);
(10) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and
human relations;
(11) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of
Guardianship; and
(12) International Law
Inter alia, respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that
petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and
submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action
for the purpose.
The trial of the case started off with a hearing at the
Manila Yacht Club followed by an ocular inspection of
the Manila Bay. Renato T. Cruz, the Chief of the Water
Quality Management Section, Environmental
Management Bureau, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), testifying for petitioners,
stated that water samples collected from different
beaches around the Manila Bay showed that the amount
of fecal coliform content ranged from 50,000 to 80,000
most probable number (MPN)/ml when what DENR
Administrative Order No. 34-90 prescribed as a safe
level for bathing and other forms of contact recreational
activities, or the "SB" level, is one not exceeding 200
MPN/100 ml.4
Rebecca de Vera, for Metropolitan Waterworks and
Sewerage System (MWSS) and in behalf of other
petitioners, testified about the MWSS’ efforts to reduce
pollution along the Manila Bay through the Manila
Second Sewerage Project. For its part, the Philippine
Ports Authority (PPA) presented, as part of its evidence,
its memorandum circulars on the study being conducted
on ship-generated waste treatment and disposal, and its
Linis Dagat (Clean the Ocean) project for the cleaning of
wastes accumulated or washed to shore.
The RTC Ordered Petitioners to Clean Up and
Rehabilitate Manila Bay
On September 13, 2002, the RTC rendered a
Decision5 in favor of respondents. The dispositive portion
reads:
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the complaint,
judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
abovenamed defendant-government agencies,
jointly and solidarily, to clean up and rehabilitate
Manila Bay and restore its waters to SB
classification to make it fit for swimming, skin-
diving and other forms of contact recreation. To
attain this, defendant-agencies, with defendant
DENR as the lead agency, are directed, within
six (6) months from receipt hereof, to act and
perform their respective duties by devising a
consolidated, coordinated and concerted scheme
of action for the rehabilitation and restoration of
the bay.
In particular:
Defendant MWSS is directed to install, operate
and maintain adequate [sewerage] treatment
facilities in strategic places under its jurisdiction
and increase their capacities.
Defendant LWUA, to see to it that the water
districts under its wings, provide, construct and
operate sewage facilities for the proper disposal
of waste.
Defendant DENR, which is the lead agency in
cleaning up Manila Bay, to install, operate and
maintain waste facilities to rid the bay of toxic
and hazardous substances.
Defendant PPA, to prevent and also to treat the
discharge not only of ship-generated wastes but
also of other solid and liquid wastes from docking
vessels that contribute to the pollution of the bay.
Defendant MMDA, to establish, operate and
maintain an adequate and appropriate sanitary
landfill and/or adequate solid waste and liquid
disposal as well as other alternative garbage
disposal system such as re-use or recycling of
wastes.
Defendant DA, through the Bureau of Fisheries
and Aquatic Resources, to revitalize the marine
life in Manila Bay and restock its waters with
indigenous fish and other aquatic animals.
Defendant DBM, to provide and set aside an
adequate budget solely for the purpose of
cleaning up and rehabilitation of Manila Bay.
Defendant DPWH, to remove and demolish
structures and other nuisances that obstruct the
free flow of waters to the bay. These nuisances
discharge solid and liquid wastes which
eventually end up in Manila Bay. As the
construction and engineering arm of the
government, DPWH is ordered to actively
participate in removing debris, such as carcass of
sunken vessels, and other non-biodegradable
garbage in the bay.
Defendant DOH, to closely supervise and
monitor the operations of septic and sludge
companies and require them to have proper
facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal
sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks.
Defendant DECS, to inculcate in the minds and
hearts of the people through education the
importance of preserving and protecting the
environment.
Defendant Philippine Coast Guard and the PNP
Maritime Group, to protect at all costs the Manila
Bay from all forms of illegal fishing.
No pronouncement as to damages and costs.
SO ORDERED.
The MWSS, Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA),
and PPA filed before the Court of Appeals (CA)
individual Notices of Appeal which were eventually
consolidated and docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 76528.
On the other hand, the DENR, Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH), Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA), Philippine Coast Guard
(PCG), Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group,
and five other executive departments and agencies filed
directly with this Court a petition for review under Rule
45. The Court, in a Resolution of December 9, 2002,
sent the said petition to the CA for consolidation with the
consolidated appeals of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74944.
Petitioners, before the CA, were one in arguing in the
main that the pertinent provisions of the Environment
Code (PD 1152) relate only to the cleaning of specific
pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general.
And apart from raising concerns about the lack of funds
appropriated for cleaning purposes, petitioners also
asserted that the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a
ministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus.
The CA Sustained the RTC
By a Decision6 of September 28, 2005, the CA denied
petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC
in toto, stressing that the trial court’s decision did not
require petitioners to do tasks outside of their usual basic
functions under existing laws.7
Petitioners are now before this Court praying for the
allowance of their Rule 45 petition on the following
ground and supporting arguments:
 THE [CA] DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE NOT HERETOFORE PASSED
UPON BY THE HONORABLE COURT, I.E., IT
AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION
DECLARING THAT SECTION 20 OF [PD] 1152
REQUIRES CONCERNED GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES TO REMOVE ALL POLLUTANTS
SPILLED AND DISCHARGED IN THE WATER
SUCH AS FECAL COLIFORMS.
ARGUMENTS
I two different concepts. While the implementation of the
[SECTIONS] 17 AND 20 OF [PD] 1152 RELATE
ONLY TO THE CLEANING OF SPECIFIC
POLLUTION INCIDENTS AND [DO] NOT
COVER CLEANING IN GENERAL
II
THE CLEANING OR REHABILITATION OF THE
MANILA BAY IS NOT A MINISTERIAL ACT OF
PETITIONERS THAT CAN BE COMPELLED BY
MANDAMUS.
The issues before us are two-fold. First, do Sections 17
and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of
Water Quality and Clean-up Operations, envisage a
cleanup in general or are they limited only to the cleanup
of specific pollution incidents? And second, can
petitioners be compelled by mandamus to clean up and
rehabilitate the Manila Bay?
On August 12, 2008, the Court conducted and heard the
parties on oral arguments.
Our Ruling
We shall first dwell on the propriety of the issuance of
mandamus under the premises.
The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay
Can be Compelled by Mandamus
Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the
execution of a ministerial duty.8 A ministerial duty is one
that "requires neither the exercise of official discretion
nor judgment."9 It connotes an act in which nothing is left
to the discretion of the person executing it. It is a "simple,
definite duty arising under conditions admitted or proved
to exist and imposed by law."10 Mandamus is available to
compel action, when refused, on matters involving
discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or
discretion one way or the other.
Petitioners maintain that the MMDA’s duty to take
measures and maintain adequate solid waste and liquid
disposal systems necessarily involves policy evaluation
and the exercise of judgment on the part of the agency
concerned. They argue that the MMDA, in carrying out
its mandate, has to make decisions, including choosing
where a landfill should be located by undertaking
feasibility studies and cost estimates, all of which entail
the exercise of discretion.
Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the
statutory command is clear and that petitioners’ duty to
comply with and act according to the clear mandate of
the law does not require the exercise of discretion.
According to respondents, petitioners, the MMDA in
particular, are without discretion, for example, to choose
which bodies of water they are to clean up, or which
discharge or spill they are to contain. By the same token,
respondents maintain that petitioners are bereft of
discretion on whether or not to alleviate the problem of
solid and liquid waste disposal; in other words, it is the
MMDA’s ministerial duty to attend to such services.
We agree with respondents.
First off, we wish to state that petitioners’ obligation to
perform their duties as defined by law, on one hand, and
how they are to carry out such duties, on the other, are
MMDA’s mandated tasks may entail a decision-making
process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of
doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in
nature and may be compelled by mandamus. We said so
in Social Justice Society v. Atienza11 in which the Court
directed the City of Manila to enforce, as a matter of
ministerial duty, its Ordinance No. 8027 directing the
three big local oil players to cease and desist from
operating their business in the so-called "Pandacan
Terminals" within six months from the effectivity of the
ordinance. But to illustrate with respect to the instant
case, the MMDA’s duty to put up an adequate and
appropriate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid
disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal
systems is ministerial, its duty being a statutory
imposition. The MMDA’s duty in this regard is spelled out
in Sec. 3(c) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7924 creating the
MMDA. This section defines and delineates the scope of
the MMDA’s waste disposal services to include:
Solid waste disposal and management which
include formulation and implementation of
policies, standards, programs and projects for
proper and sanitary waste disposal. It shall
likewise include the establishment and
operation of sanitary land fill and related
facilities and the implementation of other
alternative programs intended to reduce, reuse
and recycle solid waste. (Emphasis added.)
The MMDA is duty-bound to comply with Sec. 41 of the
Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003)
which prescribes the minimum criteria for the
establishment of sanitary landfills and Sec. 42 which
provides the minimum operating requirements that each
site operator shall maintain in the operation of a sanitary
landfill. Complementing Sec. 41 are Secs. 36 and 37 of
RA 9003,12 enjoining the MMDA and local government
units, among others, after the effectivity of the law on
February 15, 2001, from using and operating open
dumps for solid waste and disallowing, five years after
such effectivity, the use of controlled dumps.
The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as
may be noted, is set forth not only in the Environment
Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well.
This duty of putting up a proper waste disposal system
cannot be characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier
stated, discretion presupposes the power or right given
by law to public functionaries to act officially according to
their judgment or conscience.13 A discretionary duty is
one that "allows a person to exercise judgment and
choose to perform or not to perform."14 Any suggestion
that the MMDA has the option whether or not to perform
its solid waste disposal-related duties ought to be
dismissed for want of legal basis.
A perusal of other petitioners’ respective charters or like
enabling statutes and pertinent laws would yield this
conclusion: these government agencies are enjoined, as
a matter of statutory obligation, to perform certain
functions relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup,
rehabilitation, protection, and preservation of the Manila
Bay. They are precluded from choosing not to perform
these duties. Consider:
(1) The DENR, under Executive Order No. (EO) 192, is 15
the primary agency responsible for the conservation,
management, development, and proper use of the
country’s environment and natural resources. Sec. 19 of
the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004 (RA 9275), on
the other hand, designates the DENR as the primary
government agency responsible for its enforcement and
implementation, more particularly over all aspects of
water quality management. On water pollution, the
DENR, under the Act’s Sec. 19(k), exercises jurisdiction
"over all aspects of water pollution, determine[s] its
location, magnitude, extent, severity, causes and effects
and other pertinent information on pollution, and [takes]
measures, using available methods and technologies, to
prevent and abate such pollution."
The DENR, under RA 9275, is also tasked to prepare a
National Water Quality Status Report, an Integrated
Water Quality Management Framework, and a 10-year
Water Quality Management Area Action Plan which is
nationwide in scope covering the Manila Bay and
adjoining areas. Sec. 19 of RA 9275 provides:
Sec. 19 Lead Agency.––The [DENR] shall be the
primary government agency responsible for the
implementation and enforcement of this Act x x x
unless otherwise provided herein. As such, it
shall have the following functions, powers and
responsibilities:
a) Prepare a National Water Quality Status report
within twenty-four (24) months from the effectivity
of this Act: Provided, That the Department shall
thereafter review or revise and publish annually,
or as the need arises, said report;
b) Prepare an Integrated Water Quality
Management Framework within twelve (12)
months following the completion of the status
report;
c) Prepare a ten (10) year Water Quality
Management Area Action Plan within 12 months
following the completion of the framework for
each designated water management area. Such
action plan shall be reviewed by the water quality
management area governing board every five (5)
years or as need arises.
The DENR has prepared the status report for the period
2001 to 2005 and is in the process of completing the
preparation of the Integrated Water Quality Management
Framework.16 Within twelve (12) months thereafter, it has
to submit a final Water Quality Management Area Action
Plan.17 Again, like the MMDA, the DENR should be made
to accomplish the tasks assigned to it under RA 9275.
Parenthetically, during the oral arguments, the DENR
Secretary manifested that the DENR, with the assistance
of and in partnership with various government agencies
and non-government organizations, has completed, as of
December 2005, the final draft of a comprehensive
action plan with estimated budget and time frame,
denominated as Operation Plan for the Manila Bay
Coastal Strategy, for the rehabilitation, restoration, and
rehabilitation of the Manila Bay.
The completion of the said action plan and even the
implementation of some of its phases should more than
ever prod the concerned agencies to fast track what are
assigned them under existing laws.
(2) The MWSS, under Sec. 3 of RA 6234,18 is vested with
jurisdiction, supervision, and control over all waterworks
and sewerage systems in the territory comprising what is
now the cities of Metro Manila and several towns of the
provinces of Rizal and Cavite, and charged with the duty:
(g) To construct, maintain, and operate such
sanitary sewerages as may be necessary for the
proper sanitation and other uses of the cities and
towns comprising the System; x x x
(3) The LWUA under PD 198 has the power of
supervision and control over local water districts. It can
prescribe the minimum standards and regulations for the
operations of these districts and shall monitor and
evaluate local water standards. The LWUA can direct
these districts to construct, operate, and furnish facilities
and services for the collection, treatment, and disposal of
sewerage, waste, and storm water. Additionally, under
RA 9275, the LWUA, as attached agency of the DPWH,
is tasked with providing sewerage and sanitation
facilities, inclusive of the setting up of efficient and safe
collection, treatment, and sewage disposal system in the
different parts of the country.19 In relation to the instant
petition, the LWUA is mandated to provide sewerage and
sanitation facilities in Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan,
Pampanga, and Bataan to prevent pollution in the Manila
Bay.
(4) The Department of Agriculture (DA), pursuant to the
Administrative Code of 1987 (EO 292),20 is designated as
the agency tasked to promulgate and enforce all laws
and issuances respecting the conservation and proper
utilization of agricultural and fishery resources.
Furthermore, the DA, under the Philippine Fisheries
Code of 1998 (RA 8550), is, in coordination with local
government units (LGUs) and other concerned sectors,
in charge of establishing a monitoring, control, and
surveillance system to ensure that fisheries and aquatic
resources in Philippine waters are judiciously utilized and
managed on a sustainable basis.21 Likewise under RA
9275, the DA is charged with coordinating with the PCG
and DENR for the enforcement of water quality
standards in marine waters.22 More specifically, its
Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR)
under Sec. 22(c) of RA 9275 shall primarily be
responsible for the prevention and control of water
pollution for the development, management, and
conservation of the fisheries and aquatic resources.
(5) The DPWH, as the engineering and construction arm
of the national government, is tasked under EO 29223 to
provide integrated planning, design, and construction
services for, among others, flood control and water
resource development systems in accordance with
national development objectives and approved
government plans and specifications.
In Metro Manila, however, the MMDA is authorized by
Sec. 3(d), RA 7924 to perform metro-wide services
relating to "flood control and sewerage management
which include the formulation and implementation of
policies, standards, programs and projects for an
integrated flood control, drainage and sewerage system."
On July 9, 2002, a Memorandum of Agreement was
entered into between the DPWH and MMDA, whereby
MMDA was made the agency primarily responsible for
flood control in Metro Manila. For the rest of the country,
DPWH shall remain as the implementing agency for
flood control services. The mandate of the MMDA and
DPWH on flood control and drainage services shall
include the removal of structures, constructions, and
encroachments built along rivers, waterways, and
esteros (drainages) in violation of RA 7279, PD 1067,
and other pertinent laws.
(6) The PCG, in accordance with Sec. 5(p) of PD 601, or
the Revised Coast Guard Law of 1974, and Sec. 6 of PD
979,24 or the Marine Pollution Decree of 1976, shall have
the primary responsibility of enforcing laws, rules, and
regulations governing marine pollution within the
territorial waters of the Philippines. It shall promulgate its
own rules and regulations in accordance with the
national rules and policies set by the National Pollution
Control Commission upon consultation with the latter for
the effective implementation and enforcement of PD 979.
It shall, under Sec. 4 of the law, apprehend violators
who:
a. discharge, dump x x x harmful substances
from or out of any ship, vessel, barge, or any
other floating craft, or other man-made structures
at sea, by any method, means or manner, into or
upon the territorial and inland navigable waters of
the Philippines;
b. throw, discharge or deposit, dump, or cause,
suffer or procure to be thrown, discharged, or
deposited either from or out of any ship, barge,
or other floating craft or vessel of any kind, or
from the shore, wharf, manufacturing
establishment, or mill of any kind, any refuse
matter of any kind or description whatever other
than that flowing from streets and sewers and
passing therefrom in a liquid state into tributary of
any navigable water from which the same shall
float or be washed into such navigable water;
and
c. deposit x x x material of any kind in any place
on the bank of any navigable water or on the
bank of any tributary of any navigable water,
where the same shall be liable to be washed into
such navigable water, either by ordinary or high
tides, or by storms or floods, or otherwise,
whereby navigation shall or may be impeded or
obstructed or increase the level of pollution of
such water.
(7) When RA 6975 or the Department of the Interior and
Local Government (DILG) Act of 1990 was signed into
law on December 13, 1990, the PNP Maritime Group
was tasked to "perform all police functions over the
Philippine territorial waters and rivers." Under Sec. 86,
RA 6975, the police functions of the PCG shall be taken
over by the PNP when the latter acquires the capability
to perform such functions. Since the PNP Maritime
Group has not yet attained the capability to assume and
perform the police functions of PCG over marine
pollution, the PCG and PNP Maritime Group shall
coordinate with regard to the enforcement of laws, rules,
and regulations governing marine pollution within the
territorial waters of the Philippines. This was made clear
in Sec. 124, RA 8550 or the Philippine Fisheries Code of
1998, in which both the PCG and PNP Maritime Group
were authorized to enforce said law and other fishery
laws, rules, and regulations.25
(8) In accordance with Sec. 2 of EO 513, the PPA is
mandated "to establish, develop, regulate, manage and
operate a rationalized national port system in support of
trade and national development."26 Moreover, Sec. 6-c of
EO 513 states that the PPA has police authority within
the ports administered by it as may be necessary to
carry out its powers and functions and attain its purposes
and objectives, without prejudice to the exercise of the
functions of the Bureau of Customs and other law
enforcement bodies within the area. Such police
authority shall include the following:
xxxx
b) To regulate the entry to, exit from, and
movement within the port, of persons and
vehicles, as well as movement within the port of
watercraft.27
Lastly, as a member of the International Marine
Organization and a signatory to the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, as
amended by MARPOL 73/78,28 the Philippines, through
the PPA, must ensure the provision of adequate
reception facilities at ports and terminals for the
reception of sewage from the ships docking in Philippine
ports. Thus, the PPA is tasked to adopt such measures
as are necessary to prevent the discharge and dumping
of solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated
wastes into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked
at ports and apprehend the violators. When the vessels
are not docked at ports but within Philippine territorial
waters, it is the PCG and PNP Maritime Group that have
jurisdiction over said vessels.
(9) The MMDA, as earlier indicated, is duty-bound to put
up and maintain adequate sanitary landfill and solid
waste and liquid disposal system as well as other
alternative garbage disposal systems. It is primarily
responsible for the implementation and enforcement of
the provisions of RA 9003, which would necessary
include its penal provisions, within its area of
jurisdiction.29
Among the prohibited acts under Sec. 48, Chapter VI of
RA 9003 that are frequently violated are dumping of
waste matters in public places, such as roads, canals
or esteros, open burning of solid waste, squatting in
open dumps and landfills, open dumping, burying of
biodegradable or non- biodegradable materials in flood-
prone areas, establishment or operation of open dumps
as enjoined in RA 9003, and operation of waste
management facilities without an environmental
compliance certificate.
Under Sec. 28 of the Urban Development and Housing
Act of 1992 (RA 7279), eviction or demolition may be
allowed "when persons or entities occupy danger areas
such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps,
riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public
places such as sidewalks, roads, parks and
playgrounds." The MMDA, as lead agency, in
coordination with the DPWH, LGUs, and concerned
agencies, can dismantle and remove all structures,
constructions, and other encroachments built in breach
of RA 7279 and other pertinent laws along the rivers,
waterways, and esteros in Metro Manila. With respect to
rivers, waterways, and esteros in Bulacan, Bataan,
Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna that discharge
wastewater directly or eventually into the Manila Bay, the
DILG shall direct the concerned LGUs to implement the
demolition and removal of such structures, constructions,
and other encroachments built in violation of RA 7279
and other applicable laws in coordination with the DPWH
and concerned agencies.
(10) The Department of Health (DOH), under Article 76
of PD 1067 (the Water Code), is tasked to promulgate
rules and regulations for the establishment of waste
disposal areas that affect the source of a water supply or
a reservoir for domestic or municipal use. And under
Sec. 8 of RA 9275, the DOH, in coordination with the
DENR, DPWH, and other concerned agencies, shall
formulate guidelines and standards for the collection,
treatment, and disposal of sewage and the establishment
and operation of a centralized sewage treatment system.
In areas not considered as highly urbanized cities,
septage or a mix sewerage-septage management
system shall be employed.
In accordance with Sec. 72 of PD 856, the Code of
30
Sanitation of the Philippines, and Sec. 5.1.131 of Chapter
XVII of its implementing rules, the DOH is also ordered
to ensure the regulation and monitoring of the proper
disposal of wastes by private sludge companies through
the strict enforcement of the requirement to obtain an
environmental sanitation clearance of sludge collection
treatment and disposal before these companies are
issued their environmental sanitation permit.
(11) The Department of Education (DepEd), under the
Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), is mandated to
integrate subjects on environmental education in its
school curricula at all levels.32 Under Sec. 118 of RA
8550, the DepEd, in collaboration with the DA,
Commission on Higher Education, and Philippine
Information Agency, shall launch and pursue a
nationwide educational campaign to promote the
development, management, conservation, and proper
use of the environment. Under the Ecological Solid
Waste Management Act (RA 9003), on the other hand, it
is directed to strengthen the integration of environmental
concerns in school curricula at all levels, with an
emphasis on waste management principles.33
(12) The Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
is tasked under Sec. 2, Title XVII of the Administrative
Code of 1987 to ensure the efficient and sound utilization
of government funds and revenues so as to effectively
achieve the country’s development objectives.34
One of the country’s development objectives is
enshrined in RA 9275 or the Philippine Clean Water Act
of 2004. This law stresses that the State shall pursue a
policy of economic growth in a manner consistent with
the protection, preservation, and revival of the quality of
our fresh, brackish, and marine waters. It also provides
that it is the policy of the government, among others, to
streamline processes and procedures in the prevention,
control, and abatement of pollution mechanisms for the
protection of water resources; to promote environmental
strategies and use of appropriate economic instruments
and of control mechanisms for the protection of water
resources; to formulate a holistic national program of
water quality management that recognizes that issues
related to this management cannot be separated from
concerns about water sources and ecological protection,
water supply, public health, and quality of life; and to
provide a comprehensive management program for
water pollution focusing on pollution prevention.
Thus, the DBM shall then endeavor to provide an
adequate budget to attain the noble objectives of RA
9275 in line with the country’s development objectives.
All told, the aforementioned enabling laws and issuances
are in themselves clear, categorical, and complete as to
what are the obligations and mandate of each
agency/petitioner under the law. We need not belabor
the issue that their tasks include the cleanup of the
Manila Bay.
Now, as to the crux of the petition. Do Secs. 17 and 20 of
the Environment Code encompass the cleanup of water
pollution in general, not just specific pollution incidents?
Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code
Include Cleaning in General
The disputed sections are quoted as follows:
Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.––Where
the quality of water has deteriorated to a degree
where its state will adversely affect its best
usage, the government agencies concerned shall
take such measures as may be necessary to
upgrade the quality of such water to meet the
prescribed water quality standards.
Section 20. Clean-up Operations.––It shall be the
responsibility of the polluter to contain, remove
and clean-up water pollution incidents at his own
expense. In case of his failure to do so, the
government agencies concerned shall undertake
containment, removal and clean-up operations
and expenses incurred in said operations shall
be charged against the persons and/or entities
responsible for such pollution.
When the Clean Water Act (RA 9275) took effect, its
Sec. 16 on the subject, o, amended the counterpart
provision (Sec. 20) of the Environment Code (PD 1152).
Sec. 17 of PD 1152 continues, however, to be
operational.
The amendatory Sec. 16 of RA 9275 reads:
SEC. 16. Cleanup Operations.––Notwithstanding
the provisions of Sections 15 and 26 hereof, any
person who causes pollution in or pollutes water
bodies in excess of the applicable and prevailing
standards shall be responsible to contain,
remove and clean up any pollution incident at his
own expense to the extent that the same water
bodies have been rendered unfit for utilization
and beneficial use: Provided, That in the event
emergency cleanup operations are necessary
and the polluter fails to immediately undertake
the same, the [DENR] in coordination with other
government agencies concerned, shall undertake
containment, removal and cleanup operations.
Expenses incurred in said operations shall be
reimbursed by the persons found to have caused
such pollution under proper administrative
determination x x x. Reimbursements of the cost
incurred shall be made to the Water Quality
Management Fund or to such other funds where
said disbursements were sourced.
As may be noted, the amendment to Sec. 20 of the
Environment Code is more apparent than real since the
amendment, insofar as it is relevant to this case, merely
consists in the designation of the DENR as lead agency
in the cleanup operations.
Petitioners contend at every turn that Secs. 17 and 20 of
the Environment Code concern themselves only with the
matter of cleaning up in specific pollution incidents, as
opposed to cleanup in general. They aver that the twin
provisions would have to be read alongside the
succeeding Sec. 62(g) and (h), which defines the terms
"cleanup operations" and "accidental spills," as follows:
g. Clean-up Operations [refer] to activities
conducted in removing the pollutants discharged
or spilled in water to restore it to pre-spill
condition.
h. Accidental Spills [refer] to spills of oil or other
hazardous substances in water that result from
accidents such as collisions and groundings.
Petitioners proffer the argument that Secs. 17 and 20 of
PD 1152 merely direct the government agencies
concerned to undertake containment, removal, and
cleaning operations of a specific polluted portion or
portions of the body of water concerned. They maintain
that the application of said Sec. 20 is limited only to
"water pollution incidents," which are situations that
presuppose the occurrence of specific, isolated pollution
events requiring the corresponding containment,
removal, and cleaning operations. Pushing the point
further, they argue that the aforequoted Sec. 62(g)
requires "cleanup operations" to restore the body of
water to pre-spill condition, which means that there must
have been a specific incident of either intentional or
accidental spillage of oil or other hazardous substances,
as mentioned in Sec. 62(h).
As a counterpoint, respondents argue that petitioners
erroneously read Sec. 62(g) as delimiting the application
of Sec. 20 to the containment, removal, and cleanup
operations for accidental spills only. Contrary to
petitioners’ posture, respondents assert that Sec. 62(g),
in fact, even expanded the coverage of Sec. 20.
Respondents explain that without its Sec. 62(g), PD
1152 may have indeed covered only pollution
accumulating from the day-to-day operations of
businesses around the Manila Bay and other sources of
pollution that slowly accumulated in the bay.
Respondents, however, emphasize that Sec. 62(g), far
from being a delimiting provision, in fact even enlarged
the operational scope of Sec. 20, by including accidental
spills as among the water pollution incidents
contemplated in Sec. 17 in relation to Sec. 20 of PD
1152.
To respondents, petitioners’ parochial view on
environmental issues, coupled with their narrow reading
of their respective mandated roles, has contributed to the
worsening water quality of the Manila Bay. Assuming,
respondents assert, that petitioners are correct in saying
that the cleanup coverage of Sec. 20 of PD 1152 is
constricted by the definition of the phrase "cleanup
operations" embodied in Sec. 62(g), Sec. 17 is not
hobbled by such limiting definition. As pointed out, the
phrases "cleanup operations" and "accidental spills" do
not appear in said Sec. 17, not even in the chapter
where said section is found.
Respondents are correct. For one thing, said Sec. 17
does not in any way state that the government agencies
concerned ought to confine themselves to the
containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a
specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec.
17 requires them to act even in the absence of a specific
pollution incident, as long as water quality "has
deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely
affect its best usage." This section, to stress, commands
concerned government agencies, when appropriate, "to
take such measures as may be necessary to meet the
prescribed water quality standards." In fine, the
underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water is not
conditional on the occurrence of any pollution incident.
For another, a perusal of Sec. 20 of the Environment
Code, as couched, indicates that it is properly applicable
to a specific situation in which the pollution is caused by
polluters who fail to clean up the mess they left behind.
In such instance, the concerned government agencies
shall undertake the cleanup work for the polluters’
account. Petitioners’ assertion, that they have to perform
cleanup operations in the Manila Bay only when there is
a water pollution incident and the erring polluters do not
undertake the containment, removal, and cleanup
operations, is quite off mark. As earlier discussed, the
complementary Sec. 17 of the Environment Code comes
into play and the specific duties of the agencies to clean
up come in even if there are no pollution incidents staring
at them. Petitioners, thus, cannot plausibly invoke and
hide behind Sec. 20 of PD 1152 or Sec. 16 of RA 9275
on the pretext that their cleanup mandate depends on
the happening of a specific pollution incident. In this
regard, what the CA said with respect to the impasse
over Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 is at once valid as it is
practical. The appellate court wrote: "PD 1152 aims to
introduce a comprehensive program of environmental
protection and management. This is better served by
making Secs. 17 & 20 of general application rather than
limiting them to specific pollution incidents."35
Granting arguendo that petitioners’ position thus
described vis-à-vis the implementation of Sec. 20 is
correct, they seem to have overlooked the fact that the
pollution of the Manila Bay is of such magnitude and
scope that it is well-nigh impossible to draw the line
between a specific and a general pollution incident. And
such impossibility extends to pinpointing with reasonable
certainty who the polluters are. We note that Sec. 20 of
PD 1152 mentions "water pollution incidents" which may
be caused by polluters in the waters of the Manila Bay
itself or by polluters in adjoining lands and in water
bodies or waterways that empty into the bay. Sec. 16 of
RA 9275, on the other hand, specifically adverts to "any
person who causes pollution in or pollutes water bodies,"
which may refer to an individual or an establishment that
pollutes the land mass near the Manila Bay or the
waterways, such that the contaminants eventually end
up in the bay. In this situation, the water pollution
incidents are so numerous and involve nameless and
faceless polluters that they can validly be categorized as
beyond the specific pollution incident level.
Not to be ignored of course is the reality that the
government agencies concerned are so undermanned
that it would be almost impossible to apprehend the
numerous polluters of the Manila Bay. It may perhaps
not be amiss to say that the apprehension, if any, of the
Manila Bay polluters has been few and far between.
Hence, practically nobody has been required to contain,
remove, or clean up a given water pollution incident. In
this kind of setting, it behooves the Government to step
in and undertake cleanup operations. Thus, Sec. 16 of
RA 9275, previously Sec. 20 of PD 1152, covers for all
intents and purposes a general cleanup situation.
The cleanup and/or restoration of the Manila Bay is only
an aspect and the initial stage of the long-term solution.
The preservation of the water quality of the bay after the
rehabilitation process is as important as the cleaning
phase. It is imperative then that the wastes and
contaminants found in the rivers, inland bays, and other
bodies of water be stopped from reaching the Manila
Bay. Otherwise, any cleanup effort would just be a futile,
cosmetic exercise, for, in no time at all, the Manila Bay
water quality would again deteriorate below the ideal
minimum standards set by PD 1152, RA 9275, and other
relevant laws. It thus behooves the Court to put the
heads of the petitioner-department-agencies and the
bureaus and offices under them on continuing notice
about, and to enjoin them to perform, their mandates and
duties towards cleaning up the Manila Bay and
preserving the quality of its water to the ideal level.
Under what other judicial discipline describes as
"continuing mandamus,"36 the Court may, under
extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the
end in view of ensuring that its decision would not be set
to naught by administrative inaction or indifference. In
India, the doctrine of continuing mandamus was used to
enforce directives of the court to clean up the length of
the Ganges River from industrial and municipal
pollution.37
The Court can take judicial notice of the presence of
shanties and other unauthorized structures which do not
have septic tanks along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan
Rivers, the National Capital Region (NCR) (Parañaque-
Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-
Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycuayan-Marilao-
Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the
Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor
rivers and connecting waterways, river banks, and
esteros which discharge their waters, with all the
accompanying filth, dirt, and garbage, into the major
rivers and eventually the Manila Bay. If there is one
factor responsible for the pollution of the major river
systems and the Manila Bay, these unauthorized
structures would be on top of the list. And if the issue of
illegal or unauthorized structures is not seriously
addressed with sustained resolve, then practically all
efforts to cleanse these important bodies of water would
be for naught. The DENR Secretary said as much.38
Giving urgent dimension to the necessity of removing
these illegal structures is Art. 51 of PD 1067 or the Water
Code,39 which prohibits the building of structures within a
given length along banks of rivers and other waterways.
Art. 51 reads:
The banks of rivers and streams and the
shores of the seas and lakes throughout their
entire length and within a zone of three (3)
meters in urban areas, twenty (20) meters in
agricultural areas and forty (40) meters in forest
areas, along their margins, are subject to the
easement of public use in the interest of
recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing and
salvage. No person shall be allowed to stay in
this zonelonger than what is necessary for
recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or
salvage or to build structures of any kind.
(Emphasis added.)
Judicial notice may likewise be taken of factories and
other industrial establishments standing along or near
the banks of the Pasig River, other major rivers, and
connecting waterways. But while they may not be treated
as unauthorized constructions, some of these
establishments undoubtedly contribute to the pollution of
the Pasig River and waterways. The DILG and the
concerned LGUs, have, accordingly, the duty to see to it
that non-complying industrial establishments set up,
within a reasonable period, the necessary waste water
treatment facilities and infrastructure to prevent their
industrial discharge, including their sewage waters, from
flowing into the Pasig River, other major rivers, and
connecting waterways. After such period, non-complying
establishments shall be shut down or asked to transfer
their operations.
At this juncture, and if only to dramatize the urgency of
the need for petitioners-agencies to comply with their
statutory tasks, we cite the Asian Development Bank-
commissioned study on the garbage problem in Metro
Manila, the results of which are embodied in the The
Garbage Book. As there reported, the garbage crisis in
the metropolitan area is as alarming as it is shocking.
Some highlights of the report:
1. As early as 2003, three land-filled dumpsites in
Metro Manila - the Payatas, Catmon and
Rodriquez dumpsites - generate an alarming
quantity of lead and leachate or liquid run-off.
Leachate are toxic liquids that flow along the
surface and seep into the earth and poison the
surface and groundwater that are used for
drinking, aquatic life, and the environment.
2. The high level of fecal coliform confirms the
presence of a large amount of human waste in
the dump sites and surrounding areas, which is
presumably generated by households that lack
alternatives to sanitation. To say that Manila Bay
needs rehabilitation is an understatement.
3. Most of the deadly leachate, lead and other
dangerous contaminants and possibly strains of
pathogens seeps untreated into ground water
and runs into the Marikina and Pasig River
systems and Manila Bay.40
Given the above perspective, sufficient sanitary landfills
should now more than ever be established as prescribed
by the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA
9003). Particular note should be taken of the blatant
violations by some LGUs and possibly the MMDA of Sec.
37, reproduced below:
Sec. 37. Prohibition against the Use of Open
Dumps for Solid Waste.––No open dumps shall
be established and operated, nor any practice or
disposal of solid waste by any person, including
LGUs which [constitute] the use of open dumps
for solid waste, be allowed after the effectivity of
this Act: Provided, further that no controlled
dumps shall be allowed (5) years following
the effectivity of this Act. (Emphasis added.)
RA 9003 took effect on February 15, 2001 and the
adverted grace period of five (5) years which ended on
February 21, 2006 has come and gone, but no single
sanitary landfill which strictly complies with the
prescribed standards under RA 9003 has yet been set
up.
In addition, there are rampant and repeated violations of
Sec. 48 of RA 9003, like littering, dumping of waste
matters in roads, canals, esteros, and other public
places, operation of open dumps, open burning of solid
waste, and the like. Some sludge companies which do
not have proper disposal facilities simply discharge
sludge into the Metro Manila sewerage system that ends
up in the Manila Bay. Equally unabated are violations of
Sec. 27 of RA 9275, which enjoins the pollution of water
bodies, groundwater pollution, disposal of infectious
wastes from vessels, and unauthorized transport or
dumping into sea waters of sewage or solid waste and of
Secs. 4 and 102 of RA 8550 which proscribes the
introduction by human or machine of substances to the
aquatic environment including "dumping/disposal of
waste and other marine litters, discharge of petroleum or
residual products of petroleum of carbonaceous
materials/substances [and other] radioactive, noxious or
harmful liquid, gaseous or solid substances, from any
water, land or air transport or other human-made
structure."
In the light of the ongoing environmental degradation, the
Court wishes to emphasize the extreme necessity for all
concerned executive departments and agencies to
immediately act and discharge their respective official
duties and obligations. Indeed, time is of the essence;
hence, there is a need to set timetables for the
performance and completion of the tasks, some of them
as defined for them by law and the nature of their
respective offices and mandates.
The importance of the Manila Bay as a sea resource,
playground, and as a historical landmark cannot be over-
emphasized. It is not yet too late in the day to restore the
Manila Bay to its former splendor and bring back the
plants and sea life that once thrived in its blue waters.
But the tasks ahead, daunting as they may be, could
only be accomplished if those mandated, with the help
and cooperation of all civic-minded individuals, would put
their minds to these tasks and take responsibility. This
means that the State, through petitioners, has to take the
lead in the preservation and protection of the Manila Bay.
The era of delays, procrastination, and ad hoc measures
is over. Petitioners must transcend their limitations, real
or imaginary, and buckle down to work before the
problem at hand becomes unmanageable. Thus, we
must reiterate that different government agencies and
instrumentalities cannot shirk from their mandates; they
must perform their basic functions in cleaning up and
rehabilitating the Manila Bay. We are disturbed by
petitioners’ hiding behind two untenable claims: (1) that
there ought to be a specific pollution incident before they
are required to act; and (2) that the cleanup of the bay is
a discretionary duty.
RA 9003 is a sweeping piece of legislation enacted to
radically transform and improve waste management. It
implements Sec. 16, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution,
which explicitly provides that the State shall protect and
advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony
of nature.
So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated
that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need
not even be written in the Constitution for it is assumed,
like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of
Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an
issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational
implications.41 Even assuming the absence of a
categorical legal provision specifically prodding
petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men and
women representing them cannot escape their obligation
to future generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of
the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as possible.
Anything less would be a betrayal of the trust reposed in
them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September
28, 2005 Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 76528
and SP No. 74944 and the September 13, 2002 Decision
of the RTC in Civil Case No. 1851-99 are AFFIRMED but
with MODIFICATIONS in view of subsequent
developments or supervening events in the case.
The fallo of the RTC Decision shall now read:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering the abovenamed defendant-government
agencies to clean up, rehabilitate, and preserve
Manila Bay, and restore and maintain its waters
to SB level (Class B sea waters per Water
Classification Tables under DENR Administrative
Order No. 34 [1990]) to make them fit for
swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact
recreation.
In particular:
(1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR
as the primary agency responsible for the conservation,
management, development, and proper use of the
country’s environment and natural resources, and Sec.
19 of RA 9275, designating the DENR as the primary
government agency responsible for its enforcement and
implementation, the DENR is directed to fully implement
its Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal
Strategy for the rehabilitation, restoration, and
conservation of the Manila Bay at the earliest possible
time. It is ordered to call regular coordination meetings
with concerned government departments and agencies
to ensure the successful implementation of the aforesaid
plan of action in accordance with its indicated completion
schedules.
(2) Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the
Administrative Code of 1987 and Sec. 25 of the Local
Government Code of 1991,42 the DILG, in exercising the
President’s power of general supervision and its duty to
promulgate guidelines in establishing waste
management programs under Sec. 43 of the Philippine
Environment Code (PD 1152), shall direct all LGUs in
Metro Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan,
Pampanga, and Bataan to inspect all factories,
commercial establishments, and private homes along the
banks of the major river systems in their respective areas
of jurisdiction, such as but not limited to the Pasig-
Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Parañaque-Zapote,
Las Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-
Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando
(Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus
(Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor
rivers and waterways that eventually discharge water
into the Manila Bay; and the lands abutting the bay, to
determine whether they have wastewater treatment
facilities or hygienic septic tanks as prescribed by
existing laws, ordinances, and rules and regulations. If
none be found, these LGUs shall be ordered to require
non-complying establishments and homes to set up said
facilities or septic tanks within a reasonable time to
prevent industrial wastes, sewage water, and human
wastes from flowing into these rivers,
waterways, esteros, and the Manila Bay, under pain of
closure or imposition of fines and other sanctions.
(3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275,43 the MWSS is
directed to provide, install, operate, and maintain the
necessary adequate waste water treatment facilities in
Metro Manila, Rizal, and Cavite where needed at the
earliest possible time.
(4) Pursuant to RA 9275,44 the LWUA, through the local
water districts and in coordination with the DENR, is
ordered to provide, install, operate, and maintain
sewerage and sanitation facilities and the efficient and
safe collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage in the
provinces of Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and
Bataan where needed at the earliest possible time.
(5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550,45 the DA, through (10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152,48 Sec. 118 of RA
the BFAR, is ordered to improve and restore the marine 8550, and Sec. 56 of RA 9003,49 the DepEd shall
life of the Manila Bay. It is also directed to assist the integrate lessons on pollution prevention, waste
LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, management, environmental protection, and like subjects
Pampanga, and Bataan in developing, using recognized in the school curricula of all levels to inculcate in the
methods, the fisheries and aquatic resources in the minds and hearts of students and, through them, their
Manila Bay. parents and friends, the importance of their duty toward
achieving and maintaining a balanced and healthful
(6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and ecosystem in the Manila Bay and the entire Philippine
the PNP Maritime Group, in accordance with Sec. 124 of archipelago.
RA 8550, in coordination with each other, shall
apprehend violators of PD 979, RA 8550, and other (11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate
existing laws and regulations designed to prevent marine budget in the General Appropriations Act of 2010 and
pollution in the Manila Bay. succeeding years to cover the expenses relating to the
cleanup, restoration, and preservation of the water
(7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 51346 and the quality of the Manila Bay, in line with the country’s
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution development objective to attain economic growth in a
from Ships, the PPA is ordered to immediately adopt manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and
such measures to prevent the discharge and dumping of revival of our marine waters.
solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes
into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports (12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR,
and apprehend the violators. DepEd, DOH, DA, DPWH, DBM, PCG, PNP Maritime
Group, DILG, and also of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, in
(8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of line with the principle of "continuing mandamus," shall,
programs and projects for flood control projects and from finality of this Decision, each submit to the Court a
drainage services in Metro Manila, in coordination with quarterly progressive report of the activities undertaken
the DPWH, DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, in accordance with this Decision.
Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council
(HUDCC), and other agencies, shall dismantle and No costs.
remove all structures, constructions, and other
encroachments established or built in violation of RA SO ORDERED.
7279, and other applicable laws along the Pasig-
Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Parañaque-Zapote, PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Las Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan- Associate Justice
Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways and
esteros in Metro Manila. The DPWH, as the principal
implementor of programs and projects for flood control
services in the rest of the country more particularly in
Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna, in
coordination with the DILG, affected LGUs, PNP
Maritime Group, HUDCC, and other concerned
government agencies, shall remove and demolish all
structures, constructions, and other encroachments built
in breach of RA 7279 and other applicable laws along
the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the
Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the
Laguna De Bay, and other rivers, connecting waterways,
and esteros that discharge wastewater into the Manila
Bay.

In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate,

and maintain a sanitary landfill, as prescribed by RA
9003, within a period of one (1) year from finality of this
Decision. On matters within its territorial jurisdiction and
in connection with the discharge of its duties on the
maintenance of sanitary landfills and like undertakings, it
is also ordered to cause the apprehension and filing of
the appropriate criminal cases against violators of the
respective penal provisions of RA 9003,47 Sec. 27 of RA
9275 (the Clean Water Act), and other existing laws on
pollution.

(9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and

Sec. 8 of RA 9275, within one (1) year from finality of this
Decision, determine if all licensed septic and sludge
companies have the proper facilities for the treatment
and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from
septic tanks. The DOH shall give the companies, if found
to be non-complying, a reasonable time within which to
set up the necessary facilities under pain of cancellation
of its environmental sanitation clearance.

Imbong vs Ochoa
JAMES M. IMBONG AND LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for
themselves and in behalf of their minor children, LUCIA
CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG
and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC.,
Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., EXECUTIVE Secretary,
HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports
and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of
Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014
FACTS:
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the
Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
2012 (RH Law), challengers from various sectors of society
came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to
wield the sword that strikes down constitutional
disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact that
its decision may produce, the Court now faces the
controversy, as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two
(2) petitions-in-intervention.
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH
Law be declared unconstitutional.
ISSUES:
After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of
the parties, the Court has synthesized and refined them to
the following principal issues:
PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power
of judicial review over the controversy.
Power of Judicial Review
Actual Case or Controversy
Facial Challenge
Locus Standi
Declaratory Relief
One Subject/One Title Rule
2. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:
Right to Life
Right to Health
Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
The Family
Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
Due Process
Equal Protection
Involuntary Servitude
Delegation of Authority to the FDA
Autonomy of Local Governments / ARMM
RULING:
Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and
its implementing rules, it behooves the Court to resolve
some procedural impediments.
The petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy.
Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not
only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute. “The question thus posed is judicial rather than
political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the
supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. Once a
controversy as to the application or interpretation of
constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the
instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is
bound by constitutional mandate to decide. In the scholarly
estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino
Feliciano, “judicial review is essential for the maintenance
and enforcement of the separation of powers and the
balancing of powers among the three great departments of
government through the definition and maintenance of the
boundaries of authority and control between them.” To him,
judicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of
participation – or instrument of intervention – of the judiciary
in that balancing operation. Lest it be misunderstood, it
bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the
unbridled authority to rule on just any and every claim of
constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the
rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four
exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case or
controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi;
(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality
must be the lis mota of the case.
Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law
is enough to awaken judicial duty. In this case, the Court is
of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and
that the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering
that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already
taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the
law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject
petitions present a justiciable controversy. When an action
of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but
also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.
The Court is not persuaded. In United States (US)
constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First
Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the
validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech,
but also all other rights in the First Amendment. These
include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the
right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the
fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press
and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right
to one’s freedom of expression, as they are modes which
one’s thoughts are externalized. In this jurisdiction, the
application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been
generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While
this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges
to strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover
statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those
involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights.
Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a
proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the
supremacy of the Constitution.
The transcendental importance of the issues involved in this
case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and
take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot
deny that the issues raised herein have potentially
pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of
this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just
determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance
with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure
are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to
facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their
strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Considering
that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn which
is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be
taken away before taking action.
Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for
injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions
for prohibition under Rule 65.
The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. It
is well-settled that the “one title-one subject” rule does not
require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment
language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or
catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein.
The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is
comprehensive enough as to include the general object
which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the
persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation.
Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather
than technical construction of the rule “so as not to cripple
or impede legislation.” In this case, a textual analysis of the
various provisions of the law shows that both “reproductive
health” and “responsible parenthood” are interrelated and
germane to the overriding objective to control the population
growth.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
The Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by
Hon. Lagman that life begins at implantation. According to
him, “fertilization and conception are two distinct and
successive stages in the reproductive process. They are not
identical and synonymous.” Citing a letter of the WHO, he
wrote that medical authorities confirm that the implantation
of the fertilized ovum is the commencement of conception
and it is only after implantation that pregnancy can be
medically detected. This theory of implantation as the
beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring.
It does not pertain to the beginning of life but to the viability
of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate
object – it is a living human being complete with DNA and
46 chromosomes. Implantation has been conceptualized
only for convenience by those who had population control in
mind. To adopt it would constitute textual infidelity not only
to the RH Law but also to the Constitution. It is the Court’s
position that life begins at fertilization, not at implantation.
When a fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine wall, its
viability is sustained but that instance of implantation is not
the point of beginning of life.
A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to
health. In this regard, the Constitution is replete with
provisions protecting and promoting the right to health.
These provisions are self-executing. Unless the provisions
clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the
Constitution should be considered self-executory. There is
no need for legislation to implement these self-executing
provisions. In Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, it was stated:
x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a
legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the
constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional
provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of
self-executing, the legislature would have the power to
ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the
fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the
prevailing view is, as it has always been, that –… in case of
doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing
rather than non-self-executing. . . .
Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the
Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a
contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to
determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These
provisions would be subordinated to the will of the
lawmaking body, which could make them entirely
meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed
implementing statute.
It is not within the province of the Court to determine
whether the use of contraceptives or one’s participation in
the support of modem reproductive health measures is
moral from a religious standpoint or whether the same is
right or wrong according to one’s dogma or belief. For the
Court has declared that matters dealing with “faith, practice,
doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and
rule of a church … are unquestionably ecclesiastical
matters which are outside the province of the civil courts.”
The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and
secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court
makes in the case at bench should be understood only in
this realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while
the Court stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical
matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have
authority to determine whether the RH Law contravenes the
guarantee of religious freedom. Consequently, the
petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State
cannot enhance its population control program through the
RH Law simply because the promotion of contraceptive use
is contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not
precluded to pursue its legitimate secular objectives without
being dictated upon by the policies of any one religion. One
cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because it will cloud
his conscience. The demarcation line between Church and
State demands that one render unto Caesar the things that
are Caesar’s and unto God the things that are God’s. The
Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by
the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a
conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner,
against his will, refers a patient seeking information on
modem reproductive health products, services, procedures
and methods, his conscience is immediately burdened as
he has been compelled to perform an act against his
beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas
(Commissioner Bernas) has written, “at the basis of the free
exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the
human conscience.
The Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of
health providers, whether public or private, should be
accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector
should be exempt from compliance with the mandates of
the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to his
religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of “the
principle of non-coercion” enshrined in the constitutional
right to free exercise of religion.
The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty
hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious
group and health care service providers. Considering that
Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes such institutions should
they fail or refuse to comply with their duty to refer under
Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it
must be struck down for being violative of the freedom of
religion.
The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation to
Section 24, considering that in the dissemination of
information regarding programs and services and in the
performance of reproductive health procedures, the
religious freedom of health care service providers should be
respected. The punishment of a healthcare service
provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient to
another, or who declines to perform reproductive health
procedure on a patient because incompatible religious
beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee
which the Court cannot allow.
The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take
over the role of parents in the care and custody of a minor
child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or has
had a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can
justify a state substitution of their parental authority.
Any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is
premature because the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-
appropriate reproductive health education. One can only
speculate on the content, manner and medium of instruction
that will be used to educate the adolescents and whether
they will contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners
and validate their apprehensions. Thus, considering the
premature nature of this particular issue, the Court declines
to rule on its constitutionality or validity.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when
it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ
as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in
two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of
the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a
statute are vague, words must not only be taken in
accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in
relation to other parts of the statute. It is a rule that every
part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the
context, that is, every part of it must be construed together
with the other parts and kept subservient to the general
intent of the whole enactment.
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the
government’s reproductive health care program is not a
violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant
to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution which
recognizes the distinct necessity to address the needs of
the underprivileged by providing that they be given priority
in addressing the health development of the people. Thus:
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and
comprehensive approach to health development which shall
endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social
services available to all the people at affordable cost. There
shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick,
elderly, disabled, women, and children. The State shall
endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers. It should
be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and
marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues
and desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to
the contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the
poor to reduce their number. While the RH Law admits the
use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above,
sanction abortion. As Section 3(1) explains, the “promotion
and/or stabilization of the population growth rate is
incidental to the advancement of reproductive health.”
The notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence
of force, threats, intimidation or other similar means of
coercion and compulsion. A reading of the assailed
provision, however, reveals that it only encourages private
and non- government reproductive healthcare service
providers to render pro bono service. Other than non-
accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should
they choose to do otherwise. Private and non-government
reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the
liberty to choose which kind of health service they wish to
provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to
provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or
threat is made upon them to render pro bono service
against their will. While the rendering of such service was
made a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the
Court does not consider the same to be an unreasonable
burden, but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by
Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate state
interest. Consistent with what the Court had earlier
discussed, however, it should be emphasized that
conscientious objectors are exempt from this provision as
long as their religious beliefs and convictions do not allow
them to render reproductive health service, pro bona or
otherwise.
The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA
does not only have the power but also the competency to
evaluate, register and cover health services and methods. It
is the only government entity empowered to render such
services and highly proficient to do so. It should be
understood that health services and methods fall under the
gamut of terms that are associated with what is ordinarily
understood as “health products.” Being the country’s
premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety of food
and medicines available to the public, the FDA was
equipped with the necessary powers and functions to make
it effective. Pursuant to the principle of necessary
implication, the mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure
public health and safety by permitting only food and
medicines that are safe includes “service” and “methods.”
From the declared policy of the RH Law, it is clear that
Congress intended that the public be given only those
medicines that are proven medically safe, legal, non-
abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and
evidence-based medical research standards. The
philosophy behind the permitted delegation was explained
in Echagaray v. Secretary of Justice, as follows:
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the
government and the growing inability of the legislature to
cope directly with the many problems demanding its
attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities
and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the
legislature cannot be expected reasonably to comprehend.
Specialization even in legislation has become necessary.
To many of the problems attendant upon present day
undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence,
let alone the interest and the time, to provide the required
direct and efficacious, not to say specific solutions.
A reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it
pertains to the establishment of health care facilities, the
hiring of skilled health professionals, or the training of
barangay health workers, it will be the national government
that will provide for the funding of its implementation. Local
autonomy is not absolute. The national government still has
the say when it comes to national priority programs which
the local government is called upon to implement like the
RH Law.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014
JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG,
for themselves and in behalf of their minor children,
LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE
CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD
DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary,
HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department
of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education,
Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204934
ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION
PHILIPPINES, INC. [ALFI], represented by its
President, Maria Concepcion S. Noche, Spouses
Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B . Luistro, Jose S.
Sandejas & Elenita S.A. Sandejas, Arturo M. Gorrez
& Marietta C. Gorrez, Salvador S. Mante, Jr. &
Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M. Bautista & Maria
Felisa S. Bautista, Desiderio Racho & Traquilina
Racho, F emand Antonio A. Tansingco & Carol Anne
C. Tansingco for themselves and on behalf of their
minor children, Therese Antonette C. Tansingco,
Lorenzo Jose C. Tansingco, Miguel F emando C.
Tangsingco, Carlo Josemaria C. Tansingco & Juan
Paolo C. Tansingco, Spouses Mariano V. Araneta &
Eileen Z. Araneta for themselves and on behalf of
their minor children, Ramon Carlos Z. Araneta &
Maya Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses Renato C. Castor
& Mildred C. Castor for themselves and on behalf of
their minor children, Renz Jeffrey C. Castor, Joseph
Ramil C. Castor, John Paul C. Castor & Raphael C.
Castor, Spouses Alexander R. Racho & Zara Z.
Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor
children Margarita Racho, Mikaela Racho, Martin
Racho, Mari Racho & Manolo Racho, Spouses Alfred
R. Racho & Francine V. Racho for themselves and on
behalf of their minor children Michael Racho,
Mariana Racho, Rafael Racho, Maxi Racho, Chessie
Racho & Laura Racho, Spouses David R. Racho &
Armilyn A. Racho for themselves and on behalf of
their minor child Gabriel Racho, Mindy M. Juatas and
on behalf of her minor children Elijah Gerald Juatas
and Elian Gabriel Juatas, Salvacion M. Monteiro,
Emily R. Laws, Joseph R . Laws & Katrina R.
Laws, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary,
HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary,
Department of Education, Culture and Sports, HON.
CORAZON SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of
Social Welfare and Development, HON. MANUELA.
ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and
Local Government, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management,
HON. ARSENIO M. BALISACAN, Socio-Economic
Planning Secretary and NEDA Director-General, THE
PHILIPPINE COMMISSION ON WOMEN, represented
by its Chairperson, Remedios lgnacio-Rikken, THE
PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION,
represented by its President Eduardo Banzon, THE
LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by its President Alfonso Umali, THE
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by its President Oscar Rodriguez, and
THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Donato
Marcos,Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204957
TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE VISAYAS, INC.
and VALERIANO S. AVILA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary;
HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department
of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Education; and HON.
MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of
Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204988
SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC.,
represented by Dr. Nestor B. Lumicao, M.D., as
President and in his personal capacity, ROSEVALE
FOUNDATION INC., represented by Dr. Rodrigo M.
Alenton, M.D., as member of the school board and in
his personal capacity, ROSEMARIE R. ALENTON,
IMELDA G. IBARRA, CPA, LOVENIAP. NACES, Phd.,
ANTHONY G. NAGAC, EARL ANTHONY C. GAMBE
and MARLON I. YAP,Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education and
HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of
Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205003
EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT, HON.
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
and HON. SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205043
EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC
XYBRSPACE APOSTOLATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA, FDA DIRECTOR
SUZETTE H. LAZO, DBM SECRETARY FLORENCIO
B. ABAD, DILG SECRETARY MANUELA. ROXAS II,
DECS SECRETARY ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205138
PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS, INC.
(PAX), herein represented by its National President,
Atty. Ricardo M . Ribo, and in his own behalf, Atty.
Lino E.A. Dumas, Romeo B. Almonte, Osmundo C.
Orlanes, Arsenio Z. Menor, Samuel J. Yap, Jaime F.
Mateo, Rolly Siguan, Dante E. Magdangal, Michael
Eugenio O. Plana, Bienvenido C. Miguel, Jr., Landrito
M. Diokno and Baldomero Falcone, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary,
HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department
of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, HON.
MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of
Interior and Local Government, HON. CORAZON J.
SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare
and Development, HON. ARSENIO BALISACAN,
Director-General, National Economic and
Development Authority, HON. SUZETTE H. LAZO,
Director-General, Food and Drugs Administration,
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, Philippine Health
Insurance Corporation, and THE BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS, Philippine Commission on
Women, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205478
REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D., JACQUELINE H.
KING, M.D., CYNTHIA T. DOMINGO, M.D., AND
JOSEPHINE MILLADO-LUMITAO, M.D., collectively
known as Doctors For Life, and ANTHONY PEREZ,
MICHAEL ANTHONY G. MAPA, CARLOS ANTONIO
PALAD, WILFREDO JOSE, CLAIRE NAVARRO,
ANNA COSIO, and GABRIEL DY LIACCO collectively
known as Filipinos For Life, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary;
HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management; HON.
ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of
Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary of the
Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA.
ROXAS II, Secretary of the Department of Interior
and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205491
SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND MARIA
FENNY C. TATAD & ALA F. PAGUIA, for themselves,
their Posterity, and the rest of Filipino
posterity, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT of the Republic of the
Philippines, Respondent.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205720
PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc.,
represented by Loma Melegrito, as Executive
Director, and in her personal capacity, JOSELYN B.
BASILIO, ROBERT Z. CORTES, ARIEL A.
CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I. GATDULA, CRISTINA A.
MONTES, RAUL ANTONIO A. NIDOY, WINSTON
CONRAD B. PADOJINOG, RUFINO L. POLICARPIO
III, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education and
HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department
of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 206355
MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC., ATTY.
RAMON PEDROSA, ATTY. CITA BORROMEO-
GARCIA, STELLAACEDERA, ATTY. BERTENI
CATALUNA CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207111
JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG,
ANTHONY VICTORIO B. LUMICAO, JOSEPH MARTIN
Q. VERDEJO, ANTONIA EMMA R. ROXAS and LOTA
LAT-GUERRERO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary,
HON. FLORENCIO ABAD, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education,
Culture and Sports and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207172
COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC.,
SPOUSES JUAN CARLOS ARTADI SARMIENTO AND
FRANCESCA ISABELLE BESINGA-SARMIENTO,
AND SPOUSES LUIS FRANCIS A. RODRIGO, JR. and
DEBORAH MARIE VERONICA N.
RODRIGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary,
HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department
of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education,
Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207563
and two (2) petitions- in-intervention, to wit:
ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN M.
KASHIM, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary,
HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department
of Health, and HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,Secretary of
the Department of Budget and
Management,Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by
the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has
consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware
that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty
of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his
conscience directs, to profess his beliefs , and to live as
he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of
others and with the common good."1
To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to the
nation's emergence as a developed country, leaving our
people beleaguered in a state of hunger, illiteracy and
unemployment. While governmental policies have been
geared towards the revitalization of the economy, the
bludgeoning dearth in social services remains to be a
problem that concerns not only the poor, but every
member of society. The government continues to tread
on a trying path to the realization of its very purpose, that
is, the general welfare of the Filipino people and the
development of the country as a whole. The legislative
branch, as the main facet of a representative
government, endeavors to enact laws and policies that
aim to remedy looming societal woes, while the
executive is closed set to fully implement these
measures and bring concrete and substantial solutions
within the reach of Juan dela Cruz. Seemingly distant is
the judicial branch, oftentimes regarded as an inert
governmental body that merely casts its watchful eyes
on clashing stakeholders until it is called upon to
adjudicate. Passive, yet reflexive when called into action,
the Judiciary then willingly embarks on its solemn duty to
interpret legislation vis-a-vis the most vital and enduring
principle that holds Philippine society together - the
supremacy of the Philippine Constitution.
Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years
than the issues of population growth control, abortion
and contraception. As in every democratic society,
diametrically opposed views on the subjects and their
perceived consequences freely circulate in various
media. From television debates2 to sticker
campaigns,3 from rallies by socio-political activists to
mass gatherings organized by members of the clergy4 -
the clash between the seemingly antithetical ideologies
of the religious conservatives and progressive liberals
has caused a deep division in every level of the society.
Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however,
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the
Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of
2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December
21, 2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the
said law, challengers from various sectors of society
came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to
wield the sword that strikes down constitutional
disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact
that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the
iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen (14) petitions
(1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,5 filed by
spouses Attys. James M. Imbong and Lovely Ann
C. Imbong, in their personal capacities as
citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and on behalf of
their minor children; and the Magnificat Child
Leaming Center, Inc., a domestic, privately-
owned educational institution (Jmbong);
(2) Petition for Prohibition,6 filed by the Alliance
for the Family Foundation Philippines, Inc.,
through its president, Atty. Maria Concepcion S.
Noche7 and several others8 in their personal
capacities as citizens and on behalf of the
generations unborn (ALFI);
(3) Petition for Certiorari,9 filed by the Task Force
for Family and Life Visayas, Inc., and Valeriano
S. Avila, in their capacities as citizens and
taxpayers (Task Force Family);
(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,10 filed by
Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc.,11 Rosevale
Foundation, Inc.,12 a domestic, privately-owned
educational institution, and several others,13 in
their capacities as citizens (Serve Life);
(5) Petition,14 filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in
his capacity as a citizen (Bugarin);
(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,15 filed by
Eduardo Olaguer and the Catholic Xybrspace
Apostolate of the Philippines,16 in their capacities
as a citizens and taxpayers (Olaguer);
(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,17 filed by
the Philippine Alliance of Xseminarians Inc.,18 and
several others19 in their capacities as citizens and
taxpayers (PAX);
(8) Petition,20 filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D.
and several others,21 in their capacities as
citizens and taxpayers (Echavez);
(9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,22 filed by
spouses Francisco and Maria Fenny C. Tatad
and Atty. Alan F. Paguia, in their capacities as
citizens, taxpayers and on behalf of those yet
unborn. Atty. Alan F. Paguia is also proceeding
in his capacity as a member of the Bar (Tatad);
(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,23 filed
by Pro-Life Philippines Foundation Inc.24 and
several others,25 in their capacities as citizens
and taxpayers and on behalf of its associates
who are members of the Bar (Pro-Life);
(11) Petition for Prohibition,26 filed by Millennium
Saint Foundation, Inc.,27 Attys. Ramon Pedrosa,
Cita Borromeo-Garcia, Stella Acedera, and
Berteni Catalufia Causing, in their capacities as
citizens, taxpayers and members of the Bar
(MSF);
(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,28 filed
by John Walter B. Juat and several others,29 in
their capacities as citizens (Juat) ;
(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,30 filed
by Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. and
 several others,31in their capacities as citizens
(CFC);
(14) Petition for Prohibition32 filed by Almarim
Centi Tillah and Abdulhussein M. Kashim in their
capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Tillah); and
(15) Petition-In-Intervention,33 filed by Atty.
Samson S. Alcantara in his capacity as a citizen
and a taxpayer (Alcantara); and
(16) Petition-In-Intervention,34 filed by Buhay
Hayaang Yumabong (B UHAY) , an accredited
political party.
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the
petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law
on the following GROUNDS:
• The RH Law violates the right to life of the
unborn. According to the petitioners,
notwithstanding its declared policy against
abortion, the implementation of the RH Law
would authorize the purchase of hormonal
contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and
injectables which are abortives, in violation of
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which
guarantees protection of both the life of the
mother and the life of the unborn from
conception.35
• The RH Law violates the right to health and the
right to protection against hazardous products.
The petitioners posit that the RH Law provides
universal access to contraceptives which are
hazardous to one's health, as it causes cancer
and other health problems.36
• The RH Law violates the right to religious
freedom. The petitioners contend that the RH
Law violates the constitutional guarantee
respecting religion as it authorizes the use of
public funds for the procurement of
contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of
public funds for purposes that are believed to be
contrary to their beliefs is included in the
constitutional mandate ensuring religious
freedom.37
It is also contended that the RH Law threatens
conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution,
imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it
compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who
seek advice on reproductive health programs to other
doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct information on
reproductive health programs and service, although it is
against their religious beliefs and convictions.38
In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of the RH Law (RH-
IRR),39 provides that skilled health professionals who are
public officers such as, but not limited to, Provincial, City,
or Municipal Health Officers, medical officers, medical
specialists, rural health physicians, hospital staff nurses,
public health nurses, or rural health midwives, who are
specifically charged with the duty to implement these
Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious
objectors.40
It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the
formulation of mandatory sex education in schools
should not be allowed as it is an affront to their religious
beliefs.41
While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of
religious freedom is not absolute, they argue that the RH
Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger test"
and the "compelling state interest test" to justify the
regulation of the right to free exercise of religion and the
right to free speech.42
• The RH Law violates the constitutional
provision on involuntary servitude. According to
the petitioners, the RH Law subjects medical
practitioners to involuntary servitude because, to
be accredited under the PhilHealth program, they
are compelled to provide forty-eight (48) hours of
pro bona services for indigent women, under
threat of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and
other forms of punishment.43
The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients
are covered by PhilHealth, a medical practitioner would
effectively be forced to render reproductive health
services since the lack of PhilHealth accreditation would
mean that the majority of the public would no longer be
able to avail of the practitioners services.44
• The RH Law violates the right to equal
protection of the law. It is claimed that the RH
Law discriminates against the poor as it makes
them the primary target of the government
program that promotes contraceptive use. The
petitioners argue that, rather than promoting
reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law
seeks to introduce contraceptives that would
effectively reduce the number of the poor.45
• The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation
of the due process clause of the Constitution. In
imposing the penalty of imprisonment and/or fine
for "any violation," it is vague because it does not
define the type of conduct to be treated as
"violation" of the RH Law.46
In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH
Law violates the right to due process by removing from
them (the people) the right to manage their own affairs
and to decide what kind of health facility they shall be
and what kind of services they shall offer."47 It ignores the
management prerogative inherent in corporations for
employers to conduct their affairs in accordance with
their own discretion and judgment.
• The RH Law violates the right to free speech.
To compel a person to explain a full range of
family planning methods is plainly to curtail his
right to expound only his own preferred way of
family planning. The petitioners note that
although exemption is granted to institutions
owned and operated by religious groups, they
are still forced to refer their patients to another
healthcare facility willing to perform the service or
procedure.48
• The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of
one's family protected by the Constitution. It is
contended that the RH Law providing for
mandatory reproductive health education
intrudes upon their constitutional right to raise
their children in accordance with their beliefs.49
It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the
person who will undergo reproductive health procedure,
the RH Law forsakes any real dialogue between the
spouses and impedes the right of spouses to mutually
decide on matters pertaining to the overall well-being of
their family. In the same breath, it is also claimed that the
parents of a child who has suffered a miscarriage are
deprived of parental authority to determine whether their
child should use contraceptives.50
• The RH Law violates the constitutional principle
of non-delegation of legislative authority. The
petitioners question the delegation by Congress
to the FDA of the power to determine whether a
product is non-abortifacient and to be included in
the Emergency Drugs List (EDL).51
• The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill
rule provision under Section 26( 1 ), Article VI of
the Constitution.52
• The RH Law violates Natural Law.53
• The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy
of Local Government Units (LGUs) and the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
{ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law,
providing for reproductive health measures at the
local government level and the ARMM, infringes
upon the powers devolved to LGUs and the
ARMM under the Local Government Code and
R.A . No. 9054.54
Various parties also sought and were granted leave to
file their respective comments-in-intervention in defense
of the constitutionality of the RH Law. Aside from the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which commented
on the petitions in behalf of the
respondents,55 Congressman Edcel C. Lagman,56 former
officials of the Department of Health Dr. Esperanza I.
Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan, and Dr. Alberto G.
Romualdez,57 the Filipino Catholic Voices for
Reproductive Health (C4RH),58 Ana Theresa "Risa"
Hontiveros,59 and Atty. Joan De Venecia60 also filed their
respective Comments-in-Intervention in conjunction with
several others. On June 4, 2013, Senator Pia Juliana S.
Cayetano was also granted leave to intervene.61
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive
arguments of the petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the
petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no
actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are
not yet ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some
petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; and 3]
the petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief
over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the
enforcement of the assailed legislation took effect.
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and
arguments raised, the Court issued the Status Quo Ante
Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation
of the assailed legislation for a period of one hundred
and twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013.62
On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary
conference with the counsels of the parties to determine
and/or identify the pertinent issues raised by the parties
and the sequence by which these issues were to be
discussed in the oral arguments. On July 9 and 23, 2013,
and on August 6, 13, and 27, 2013, the cases were
heard on oral argument. On July 16, 2013, the SQAO
was ordered extended until further orders of the Court.63
Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their
respective memoranda within sixty (60) days and, at the
same time posed several questions for their clarification
on some contentions of the parties.64
The Status Quo Ante
(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health
Laws
Prior to the RH Law
Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country
has allowed the sale, dispensation and distribution of
contraceptive drugs and devices. As far back as June
18, 1966, the country enacted R.A. No. 4729 entitled "An
Act to Regu,late the Sale, Dispensation, and/or
Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices."
Although contraceptive drugs and devices were allowed,
they could not be sold, dispensed or distributed "unless
such sale, dispensation and distribution is by a duly
licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with
the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner."65
In addition, R.A. No. 5921,66 approved on June 21, 1969,
contained provisions relative to "dispensing of
abortifacients or anti-conceptional substances and
devices." Under Section 37 thereof, it was provided that
"no drug or chemical product or device capable of
provoking abortion or preventing conception as classified
by the Food and Drug Administration shall be delivered
or sold to any person without a proper prescription by a
duly licensed physician."
On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to the
UN Declaration on Population, which recognized that the
population problem should be considered as the principal
element for long-term economic development, enacted
measures that promoted male vasectomy and tubal
ligation to mitigate population growth.67 Among these
measures included R.A. No. 6365, approved on August
16, 1971, entitled "An Act Establishing a National Policy
on Population, Creating the Commission on Population
and for Other Purposes. " The law envisioned that
"family planning will be made part of a broad educational
program; safe and effective means will be provided to
couples desiring to space or limit family size; mortality
and morbidity rates will be further reduced."
To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President
Ferdinand E . Marcos issued Presidential Decree. (P.D.)
No. 79,68 dated December 8, 1972, which, among others,
made "family planning a part of a broad educational
program," provided "family planning services as a part of
over-all health care," and made "available all acceptable
methods of contraception, except abortion, to all Filipino
citizens desirous of spacing, limiting or preventing
pregnancies."
Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives
and family planning methods evolved from being a
component of demographic management, to one
centered on the promotion of public health, particularly,
reproductive health.69 Under that policy, the country gave
priority to one's right to freely choose the method of
family planning to be adopted, in conformity with its
adherence to the commitments made in the International
Conference on Population and Development.70 Thus, on
August 14, 2009, the country enacted R.A. No. 9710 or
"The Magna Carta for Women, " which, among others,
mandated the State to provide for comprehensive health
services and programs for women, including family
planning and sex education.71
The RH Law
Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the
population of the country kept on galloping at an
uncontrollable pace. From a paltry number of just over
27 million Filipinos in 1960, the population of the country
reached over 76 million in the year 2000 and over 92
million in 2010.72 The executive and the legislative, thus,
felt that the measures were still not adequate. To rein in
the problem, the RH Law was enacted to provide
Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized,
access and information to the full range of modem family
planning methods, and to ensure that its objective to
provide for the peoples' right to reproductive health be
achieved. To make it more effective, the RH Law made it
mandatory for health providers to provide information on
the full range of modem family planning methods,
supplies and services, and for schools to provide
reproductive health education. To put teeth to it, the RH
Law criminalizes certain acts of refusals to carry out its
mandates.
Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement
measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on
contraception, women's health and population control.
Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law
be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in
particular, argues that the government sponsored
contraception program, the very essence of the RH Law,
violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of
life, which the State is mandated to protect and promote.
Thus, ALFI prays that "the status quo ante - the situation
prior to the passage of the RH Law - must be
maintained."73 It explains:
x x x. The instant Petition does not question
contraception and contraceptives per se. As provided
under Republic Act No. 5921 and Republic Act No. 4729,
the sale and distribution of contraceptives are prohibited
unless dispensed by a prescription duly licensed by a
physician. What the Petitioners find deplorable and
repugnant under the RH Law is the role that the State
and its agencies - the entire bureaucracy, from the
cabinet secretaries down to the barangay officials in the
remotest areas of the country - is made to play in the
implementation of the contraception program to the
fullest extent possible using taxpayers' money. The State
then will be the funder and provider of all forms of family
planning methods and the implementer of the program
by ensuring the widespread dissemination of, and
universal access to, a full range of family planning
methods, devices and supplies.74
ISSUES
After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions
of the parties, the Court has synthesized and refined
them to the following principal issues:
I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its
power of judicial review over the controversy.
1] Power of Judicial Review
2] Actual Case or Controversy
3] Facial Challenge
4] Locus Standi
5] Declaratory Relief
6] One Subject/One Title Rule
II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is
unconstitutional:
1] Right to Life
2] Right to Health
3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free
Speech
4] The Family
5] Freedom of Expression and Academic
Freedom
6] Due Process
7] Equal Protection
8] Involuntary Servitude
9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA
10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM
DISCUSSION
Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law
and its implementing rules, it behooves the Court to
resolve some procedural impediments.
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can
exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
The Power of Judicial Review
In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial
hand, the OSG asserts that it should submit to the
legislative and political wisdom of Congress and respect
the compromises made in the crafting of the RH Law, it
being "a product of a majoritarian democratic
process"75 and "characterized by an inordinate amount of
transparency."76 The OSG posits that the authority of the
Court to review social legislation like the RH Law by
certiorari is "weak," since the Constitution vests the
discretion to implement the constitutional policies and
positive norms with the political departments, in
particular, with Congress.77 It further asserts that in view
of the Court's ruling in Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-
Terrorism Council,78 the remedies of certiorari and
prohibition utilized by the petitioners are improper to
assail the validity of the acts of the legislature.79
Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied
challenge," it cannot prosper considering that the
assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied to the
petitioners, and that the government has yet to distribute
reproductive health devices that are abortive. It claims
that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it
is not a speech-regulating measure.80
In many cases involving the determination of the
constitutionality of the actions of the Executive and the
Legislature, it is often sought that the Court temper its
exercise of judicial power and accord due respect to the
wisdom of its co-equal branch on the basis of the
principle of separation of powers. To be clear, the
separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our
system of government, which obtains not through
express provision but by actual division in our
Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and
is supreme within its own sphere.81
Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the
legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines;82 (b) the executive power shall be vested in
the President of the Philippines;83 and (c) the judicial
power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.84 The
Constitution has truly blocked out with deft strokes and in
bold lines, the allotment of powers among the three
branches of government.85
In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary
recognizes the doctrine of separation of powers which
imposes upon the courts proper restraint, born of the
nature of their functions and of their respect for the other
branches of government, in striking down the acts of the
Executive or the Legislature as unconstitutional. Verily,
the policy is a harmonious blend of courtesy and
caution.86
It has also long been observed, however, that in times of
social disquietude or political instability, the great
landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or
marred, if not entirely obliterated.87 In order to address
this, the Constitution impresses upon the Court to
respect the acts performed by a co-equal branch done
within its sphere of competence and authority, but at the
same time, allows it to cross the line of separation - but
only at a very limited and specific point - to determine
whether the acts of the executive and the legislative
branches are null because they were undertaken with
grave abuse of discretion.88 Thus, while the Court may
not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of the RH Law, it may do so where an
attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion
results.89 The Court must demonstrate its unflinching
commitment to protect those cherished rights and
principles embodied in the Constitution.
In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of
judicial power of review may be limited, the Constitution
makes no distinction as to the kind of legislation that may
be subject to judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social
legislation or otherwise. The reason is simple and goes
back to the earlier point. The Court may pass upon the
constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the
executive branches, since its duty is not to review their
collective wisdom but, rather, to make sure that they
have acted in consonance with their respective
authorities and rights as mandated of them by the
Constitution. If after said review, the Court finds no
constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more
authority of proscribing the actions under review.90 This is
in line with Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution
which expressly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. [Emphases supplied]
As far back as Tanada v. Angara,91 the Court has
unequivocally declared that certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise
constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify,
when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials,
as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. This ruling was later on
applied in Macalintal v. COMELEC,92 Aldaba v.
COMELEC,93 Magallona v. Ermita,94 and countless
others. In Tanada, the Court wrote:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on
the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the
petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where
an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the
right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the
dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than
political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that
the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. " Once a
"controversy as to the application or interpretation of
constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in
the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the
Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.
[Emphasis supplied]
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court
Justice Florentino Feliciano, "judicial review is essential
for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation
of powers and the balancing of powers among the three
great departments of government through the definition
and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and
control between them. To him, judicial review is the chief,
indeed the only, medium of participation - or instrument
of intervention - of the judiciary in that balancing
operation.95
Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the
Court does not have the unbridled authority to rule on
just any and every claim of constitutional violation.
Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of
judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz :
(a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the
petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be
the lis mota of the case.96
Actual Case or Controversy
Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subj ect
petitions do not present any actual case or controversy
because the RH Law has yet to be implemented.97 They
claim that the questions raised by the petitions are not
yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since no one has
been charged with violating any of its provisions and that
there is no showing that any of the petitioners' rights has
been adversely affected by its operation.98 In short, it is
contended that judicial review of the RH Law is
premature.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or
controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination,
not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the
court would amount to an advisory opinion.99 The rule is
that courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic
questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however
intellectually challenging. The controversy must be
justiciable-definite and concrete, touching on the legal
relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In
other words, the pleadings must show an active
antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand,
and a denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern
a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or
issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial
controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree
conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion
advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state
of facts.100
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or
controversy is the requirement of ripeness.101 A question
is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged
has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for
adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then
been accomplished or performed by either branch before
a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner
must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened
injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He
must show that he has sustained or is immediately in
danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the
act complained of102
In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of
the Republic of the Philippines,103 where the
constitutionality of an unimplemented Memorandum of
Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was put
in question, it was argued that the Court has no authority
to pass upon the issues raised as there was yet no
concrete act performed that could possibly violate the
petitioners' and the intervenors' rights. Citing precedents,
the Court ruled that the fact of the law or act in question
being not yet effective does not negate ripeness.
Concrete acts under a law are not necessary to render
the controversy ripe. Even a singular violation of the
Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial
duty.
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case
or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial
determination. Considering that the RH Law and its
implementing rules have already taken effect and that
budgetary measures to carry out the law have already
been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions
present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when
an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a
right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the
dispute.104
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so
because medical practitioners or medical providers are in
danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law
for vague violations thereof, particularly public health
officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the
service with forfeiture of retirement and other benefits.
They must, at least, be heard on the matter NOW.
Facial Challenge
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial
challenge lodged by the subject petitions, contending
that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it
is not a speech regulating measure.105
The Court is not persuaded.
In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial
challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge,
is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes
concerning not only protected speech, but also all other
rights in the First Amendment.106 These include religious
freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the
people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances.107 After all, the
fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the
press and peaceful assembly are but component rights
of the right to one's freedom of expression, as they are
modes which one's thoughts are externalized.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating
from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with
some modifications. While this Court has withheld the
application of facial challenges to strictly penal
statues,108 it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not
only regulating free speech, but also those involving
religious freedom, and other fundamental rights.109 The
underlying reason for this modification is simple. For
unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its
expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental
Law not only to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but
also to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government.110 Verily, the framers of Our Constitution
envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its
duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions
have seriously alleged that the constitutional human
rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental
rights mentioned above have been violated by the
assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take
cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if
the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To
dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that
there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish
this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting
only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed,
to the detriment of the Filipino people.
Locus Standi
The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the
petitioners to file their respective petitions. It contends
that the "as applied challenge" lodged by the petitioners
cannot prosper as the assailed law has yet to be
enforced and applied against them,111 and the
government has yet to distribute reproductive health
devices that are abortive.112
The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the
"transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as
citizens and taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus
standi.
Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal
and substantial interest in a case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
challenged governmental act.113 It requires a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.114
In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge"
embodies the rule that one can challenge the
constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation
of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging
the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation
of the rights of third persons not before the court. This
rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party
standing.115
Transcendental Importance
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the
rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be
relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so
requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental
importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest."116
In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,117 the
Court held that in cases of paramount importance where
serious constitutional questions are involved, the
standing requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be
allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to
the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the first
Emergency Powers Cases,118 ordinary citizens and
taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality
of several executive orders although they had only an
indirect and general interest shared in common with the
public.
With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH
Law may not be assailed through an "as-applied
challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted
liberally on the locus s tandi requirement. It has accorded
certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly
injured or with material interest affected by a
Government act, provided a constitutional issue of
transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus
standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the
Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or
relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as
concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to
sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been
directly injured by the operation of a law or any other
government act. As held in Jaworski v. PAGCOR:119
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be
properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the
transcendental importance of the issues involved in this
case warrants that we set aside the technical defects
and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One
cannot deny that the issues raised herein have
potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral
well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their
proper and just determination is an imperative need. This
is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that
rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to
hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application,
which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate,
rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents, not only to the public, but also to the bench
and bar, the issues raised must be resolved for the
guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects
the constitutional provisions on the right to life and
health, the freedom of religion and expression and other
constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that
the issues of contraception and reproductive health have
already caused deep division among a broad spectrum
of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the
petitions raise issues of transcendental importance
warranting immediate court adjudication. More
importantly, considering that it is the right to life of the
mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the
Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before
taking action.
The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial
restraint at this time when rights enshrined in the
Constitution are being imperilled to be violated. To do so,
when the life of either the mother or her child is at stake,
would lead to irreparable consequences.
Declaratory Relief
The respondents also assail the petitions because they
are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which
the Court has no original jurisdiction.120 Suffice it to state
that most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs
and so the Court would just consider them as petitions
for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original
jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications
and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider
them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.121
One Subject-One Title
The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the
RH Law, claiming that it violates Section 26(1 ), Article VI
of the Constitution,122 prescribing the one subject-one title
rule. According to them, being one for reproductive
health with responsible parenthood, the assailed
legislation violates the constitutional standards of due
process by concealing its true intent - to act as a
population control measure.123
To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the
RH Law is not a birth or population control
measure,124 and that the concepts of "responsible
parenthood" and "reproductive health" are both
interrelated as they are inseparable.125
Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive
health law, the Court sees it as principally a population
control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared
towards the reduction of the country's population. While it
claims to save lives and keep our women and children
healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing products.
As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to
provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the
marginalized, with access to information on the full range
of modem family planning products and methods. These
family planning methods, natural or modem, however,
are clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy.
For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the
RH Law is to reduce the number of births in the country.
It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to
provide pre-natal and post-natal care as well. A large
portion of the law, however, covers the dissemination of
information and provisions on access to medically-safe,
non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality
reproductive health care services, methods, devices, and
supplies, which are all intended to prevent pregnancy.
The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention
that the whole idea of contraception pervades the entire
RH Law. It is, in fact, the central idea of the RH
Law.126 Indeed, remove the provisions that refer to
contraception or are related to it and the RH Law loses
its very foundation.127 As earlier explained, "the other
positive provisions such as skilled birth attendance,
maternal care including pre-and post-natal services,
prevention and management of reproductive tract
infections including HIV/AIDS are already provided for in
the Magna Carta for Women."128
Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one
subject/one bill rule. In Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. v. The
Commission on Elections and Rep. Francis Joseph G
Escudero, it was written:
It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does
not require the Congress to employ in the title of the
enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully
index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details
therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is
comprehensive enough as to include the general object
which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the
persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation.
Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal
rather than technical construction of the rule "so as not to
cripple or impede legislation." [Emphases supplied]
In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions
of the law shows that both "reproductive health" and
"responsible parenthood" are interrelated and germane
to the overriding objective to control the population
growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2
of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes
and guarantees the human rights of all persons including
their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these
rights, the right to sustainable human development, the
right to health which includes reproductive health, the
right to education and information, and the right to
choose and make decisions for themselves in
accordance with their religious convictions, ethics,
cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible
parenthood.
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that
the title of a law must not be "so uncertain that the
average person reading it would not be informed of the
purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its
contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or
indicating one subject where another or different one is
really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression
or indication of the real subject or scope of the act."129
Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive
health" and "responsible parenthood" which bears to the
attainment of the goal of achieving "sustainable human
development" as stated under its terms, the Court finds
no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought
to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed
legislation.
II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
1-The Right to Life
Position of the Petitioners
The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the
right to life and health of the unborn child under Section
12, Article II of the Constitution. The assailed legislation
allowing access to abortifacients/abortives effectively
sanctions abortion.130
According to the petitioners, despite its express terms
prohibiting abortion, Section 4(a) of the RH Law
considers contraceptives that prevent the fertilized ovum
to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb as an
abortifacient; thus, sanctioning contraceptives that take
effect after fertilization and prior to implantation, contrary
to the intent of the Framers of the Constitution to afford
protection to the fertilized ovum which already has life.
They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows
only "non-abortifacient" hormonal contraceptives,
intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal,
non-abortifacient and effective family planning products
and supplies, medical research shows that
contraceptives use results in abortion as they operate to
kill the fertilized ovum which already has life.131
As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a fundamental
human good, the petitioners assert that the State
sanction of contraceptive use contravenes natural law
and is an affront to the dignity of man.132
Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH
Law requires the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to
certify that the product or supply is not to be used as an
abortifacient, the assailed legislation effectively confirms
that abortifacients are not prohibited. Also considering
that the FDA is not the agency that will actually supervise
or administer the use of these products and supplies to
prospective patients, there is no way it can truthfully
make a certification that it shall not be used for
abortifacient purposes.133
Position of the Respondents
For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that
the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was simply
the prohibition of abortion. They contend that the RH
Law does not violate the Constitution since the said law
emphasizes that only "non-abortifacient" reproductive
health care services, methods, devices products and
supplies shall be made accessible to the public.134
According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative
determination that contraceptives are not abortifacients
by enacting the RH Law. As the RH Law was enacted
with due consideration to various studies and
consultations with the World Health Organization (WHO)
and other experts in the medical field, it is asserted that
the Court afford deference and respect to such a
determination and pass judgment only when a particular
drug or device is later on determined as an abortive.135
For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the
constitutional protection of one's right to life is not
violated considering that various studies of the WHO
show that life begins from the implantation of the
fertilized ovum. Consequently, he argues that the RH
Law is constitutional since the law specifically provides
that only contraceptives that do not prevent the
implantation of the fertilized ovum are allowed.136
The Court's Position
It is a universally accepted principle that every human
being enjoys the right to life.137
Even if not formally established, the right to life, being
grounded on natural law, is inherent and, therefore, not a
creation of, or dependent upon a particular law, custom,
or belief. It precedes and transcends any authority or the
laws of men.
In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than
ample protection. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution
provides:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person
be denied the equal protection of the laws.
As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and
family planning methods in the Philippines is not of
recent vintage. From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729,
entitled "An Act To Regulate The Sale, Dispensation,
and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices
"on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules on contraceptive
drugs and devices which prevent fertilization,138 to the
promotion of male vasectomy and tubal ligation,139 and
the ratification of numerous international agreements, the
country has long recognized the need to promote
population control through the use of contraceptives in
order to achieve long-term economic development.
Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives
and other family planning methods evolved from being a
component of demographic management, to one
centered on the promotion of public health, particularly,
reproductive health.140
This has resulted in the enactment of various measures
promoting women's rights and health and the overall
promotion of the family's well-being. Thus, aside from
R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of
the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as
the "The Magna Carta of Women" were legislated.
Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the Philippine
national population program has always been grounded
two cornerstone principles: "principle of no-abortion" and
the "principle of non-coercion."141 As will be discussed
later, these principles are not merely grounded on
administrative policy, but rather, originates from the
constitutional protection expressly provided to afford
protection to life and guarantee religious freedom.
When Life Begins*
Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position
that the question of when life begins is a scientific and
medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage,
without proper hearing and evidence. During the
deliberation, however, it was agreed upon that the
individual members of the Court could express their own
views on this matter.
In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life
begins at fertilization.
In answering the question of when life begins, focus
should be made on the particular phrase of Section 12
which reads:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family
life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the
life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception. The natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and
the development of moral character shall receive the
support of the Government.
Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the
unborn from conception. This is undisputable because
before conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For
said reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute
as to any proscription prior to conception or when life
begins. The problem has arisen because, amazingly,
there are quarters who have conveniently disregarded
the scientific fact that conception is reckoned from
fertilization. They are waving the view that life begins at
implantation. Hence, the issue of when life begins.
In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that
conception is synonymous with "fertilization" of the
female ovum by the male sperm.142 On the other side of
the spectrum are those who assert that conception refers
to the "implantation" of the fertilized ovum in the uterus.143
Plain and Legal Meaning
It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of
the Constitution should be interpreted in their plain and
ordinary meaning. As held in the recent case of Chavez
v. Judicial Bar Council:144
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory
construction is that where the words of a statute are
clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional
construction that the language employed in the
Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed. As much as
possible, the words of the Constitution should be
understood in the sense they have in common use. What
it says according to the text of the provision to be
construed compels acceptance and negates the power
of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the
framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis
non est recedendum - from the words of a statute there
should be no departure.
The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First,
because it is assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched express the
objective sought to be attained; and second, because the
Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document but
essentially that of the people, in whose consciousness it
should ever be present as an important condition for the
rule of law to prevail.
In conformity with the above principle, the traditional
meaning of the word "conception" which, as described
and defined by all reliable and reputable sources, means
that life begins at fertilization.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it
as the act of becoming pregnant, formation of a viable
zygote; the fertilization that results in a new entity
capable of developing into a being like its parents.145
Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term
"conception" as the fecundation of the female ovum by
the male spermatozoon resulting in human life capable
of survival and maturation under normal conditions.146
Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a
legal personality. In Continental Steel Manufacturing
Corporation v. Hon. Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Allan
S. Montano,147 it was written:
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need
not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die.
Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less
than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn
from conception, that the State must protect equally with
the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then
the cessation thereof even prior to the child being
delivered, qualifies as death. [Emphases in the original]
In Gonzales v. Carhart,148 Justice Anthony Kennedy,
writing for the US Supreme Court, said that the State
"has respect for human life at all stages in the
pregnancy" and "a legitimate and substantial interest in
preserving and promoting fetal life." Invariably, in the
decision, the fetus was referred to, or cited, as a baby or
a child.149
Intent of the Framers
Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light
on the intention of the Framers regarding the term
"conception" used in Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution. From their deliberations, it clearly refers to
the moment of "fertilization." The records reflect the
following:
Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence
which reads:
"The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and
the life of the unborn from the moment of conception."
When is the moment of conception?
xxx
Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it
is when the ovum is fertilized by the sperm that there is
human life. x x x.150
xxx
As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization and,
as such, the beginning of human life, it was explained:
Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a biological
manner. The first question that needs to be answered is:
Is the fertilized ovum alive? Biologically categorically
says yes, the fertilized ovum is alive. First of all, like all
living organisms, it takes in nutrients which it processes
by itself. It begins doing this upon fertilization. Secondly,
as it takes in these nutrients, it grows from within.
Thirdly, it multiplies itself at a geometric rate in the
continuous process of cell division. All these processes
are vital signs of life. Therefore, there is no question that
biologically the fertilized ovum has life.
The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an
equally categorical "yes." At the moment of conception,
the nuclei of the ovum and the sperm rupture. As this
happens 23 chromosomes from the ovum combine with
23 chromosomes of the sperm to form a total of 46
chromosomes. A chromosome count of 46 is found only -
and I repeat, only in human cells. Therefore, the fertilized
ovum is human.
Since these questions have been answered affirmatively,
we must conclude that if the fertilized ovum is both alive
and human, then, as night follows day, it must be human
life. Its nature is human.151
Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the moment
of conception" and not "from the moment of fertilization"
was not because of doubt when human life begins, but
rather, because:
Mr. Tingson: x x x x the phrase from the moment of
conception" was described by us here before with the
scientific phrase "fertilized ovum" may be beyond the
comprehension of some people; we want to use the
simpler phrase "from the moment of conception."152
Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is given
ample protection under the Constitution, it was
discussed:
Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is
sufficient for the purpose of writing a Constitution,
without specifying "from the moment of conception."
Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view
because according to the Commissioner's own
admission, he would leave it to Congress to define when
life begins. So, Congress can define life to begin from six
months after fertilization; and that would really be very,
very, dangerous. It is now determined by science that life
begins from the moment of conception. There can be no
doubt about it. So we should not give any doubt to
Congress, too.153
Upon further inquiry, it was asked:
Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a
question on that point. Actually, that is one of the
questions I was going to raise during the period of
interpellations but it has been expressed already. The
provision, as proposed right now states:
The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and
the life of the unborn from the moment of conception.
When it speaks of "from the moment of conception,"
does this mean when the egg meets the sperm?
Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.
Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress
the right to determine whether certain contraceptives that
we know today are abortifacient or not because it is a
fact that some of the so-called contraceptives deter the
rooting of the ovum in the uterus. If fertilization has
already occurred, the next process is for the fertilized
ovum to travel towards the uterus and to take root. What
happens with some contraceptives is that they stop the
opportunity for the fertilized ovum to reach the uterus.
Therefore, if we take the provision as it is proposed,
these so called contraceptives should be banned.
Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then
that is what is called abortifacient and, therefore, would
be unconstitutional and should be banned under this
provision.
Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is
up to Congress to state whether or not these certain
contraceptives are abortifacient. Scientifically and based
on the provision as it is now proposed, they are already
considered abortifacient.154
From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that
the Framers of the Constitution emphasized that the
State shall provide equal protection to both the mother
and the unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life,
that is, upon fertilization or upon the union of the male
sperm and the female ovum. It is also apparent is that
the Framers of the Constitution intended that to prohibit
Congress from enacting measures that would allow it
determine when life begins.
Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the
Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives for
being unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner Bernardo
Villegas, spearheading the need to have a constitutional
provision on the right to life, recognized that the
determination of whether a contraceptive device is an
abortifacient is a question of fact which should be left to
the courts to decide on based on established evidence.155
From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or
destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an
abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives
that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the
female ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to
fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus,
constitutionally permissible.
As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Gascon: xx xx. As I mentioned in my speech on the
US bases, I am pro-life, to the point that I would like not
only to protect the life of the unborn, but also the lives of
the millions of people in the world by fighting for a
nuclear-free world. I would just like to be assured of the
legal and pragmatic implications of the term "protection
of the life of the unborn from the moment of conception."
I raised some of these implications this afternoon when I
interjected in the interpellation of Commissioner
Regalado. I would like to ask that question again for a
categorical answer.
I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of
the unborn from the moment of conception" we are also
actually saying "no," not "maybe," to certain
contraceptives which are already being encouraged at
this point in time. Is that the sense of the committee or
does it disagree with me?
Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because
contraceptives would be preventive. There is no unborn
yet. That is yet unshaped.
Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was
speaking more about some contraceptives, such as the
intra-uterine device which actually stops the egg which
has already been fertilized from taking route to the
uterus. So if we say "from the moment of conception,"
what really occurs is that some of these contraceptives
will have to be unconstitutionalized.
Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the
fertilization.
Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.156
The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the
1987 Constitution is even admitted by petitioners during
the oral arguments. There it was conceded that tubal
ligation, vasectomy, even condoms are not classified as
abortifacients.157
Atty. Noche:
Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is
no life yet.
Justice Bersamin:
There is no life.
Atty. Noche:
So, there is no life to be protected.
Justice Bersamin:
To be protected.
Atty. Noche:
Under Section 12, yes.
Justice Bersamin:
So you have no objection to condoms?
Atty. Noche:
Not under Section 12, Article II.
Justice Bersamin:
Even if there is already information that condoms
sometimes have porosity?
Atty. Noche:
Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to that
effect, Your Honor, but I am discussing here Section 12,
Article II, Your Honor, yes.
Justice Bersamin:
Alright.
Atty. Noche:
And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your
Honor.158
Medical Meaning
That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of
medical foundation. Mosby s Medical, Nursing, and
Allied Health Dictionary defines conception as "the
beginning of pregnancy usually taken to be the instant a
spermatozoon enters an ovum and forms a viable
zygote."159
It describes fertilization as "the union of male and female
gametes to form a zygote from which the embryo
develops."160
The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological
Obstetrics),161 used by medical schools in the Philippines,
also concludes that human life (human person) begins at
the moment of fertilization with the union of the egg and
the sperm resulting in the formation of a new individual,
with a unique genetic composition that dictates all
developmental stages that ensue.
Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also
reveals that: "Human development begins after the union
of male and female gametes or germ cells during a
process known as fertilization (conception). Fertilization
is a sequence of events that begins with the contact of a
sperm (spermatozoon) with a secondary oocyte (ovum)
and ends with the fusion of their pronuclei (the haploid
nuclei of the sperm and ovum) and the mingling of their
chromosomes to form a new cell. This fertilized ovum,
known as a zygote, is a large diploid cell that is the
beginning, or primordium, of a human being."162
The authors of Human Embryology & Teratology163 mirror
the same position. They wrote: "Although life is a
continuous process, fertilization is a critical landmark
because, under ordinary circumstances, a new,
genetically distinct human organism is thereby formed....
The combination of 23 chromosomes present in each
pronucleus results in 46 chromosomes in the zygote.
Thus the diploid number is restored and the embryonic
genome is formed. The embryo now exists as a genetic
unity."
In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical
Association came out with a "Paper on the Reproductive
Health Bill (Responsible Parenthood Bill)" and therein
concluded that:
CONCLUSION
The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill
at the same time that PMA maintains its strong position
that fertilization is sacred because it is at this stage that
conception, and thus human life, begins. Human lives
are sacred from the moment of conception, and that
destroying those new lives is never licit, no matter what
the purported good outcome would be. In terms of
biology and human embryology, a human being begins
immediately at fertilization and after that, there is no
point along the continuous line of human embryogenesis
where only a "potential" human being can be posited.
Any philosophical, legal, or political conclusion cannot
escape this objective scientific fact.
The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a
zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new
human being commences at a scientifically well defined
"moment of conception." This conclusion is objective,
consistent with the factual evidence, and independent of
any specific ethical, moral, political, or religious view of
human life or of human embryos.164
Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is Reckoned
from
Fertilization
In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or
understood under medical parlance, and more
importantly, following the intention of the Framers of the
Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a zygote
is a human organism and that the life of a new human
being commences at a scientifically well-defined moment
of conception, that is, upon fertilization.
For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the
theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at
implantation.165 According to him, "fertilization and
conception are two distinct and successive stages in the
reproductive process. They are not identical and
synonymous."166 Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that
"medical authorities confirm that the implantation of the
fertilized ovum is the commencement of conception and
it is only after implantation that pregnancy can be
medically detected."167
This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is
devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It does not
pertain to the beginning of life but to the viability of the
fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate
object - it is a living human being complete with DNA and
46 chromosomes.168 Implantation has been
conceptualized only for convenience by those who had
population control in mind. To adopt it would constitute
textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but also to the
Constitution.
Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this
position.
If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly
legitimize the utilization of any drug or device that would
prevent the implantation of the fetus at the uterine wall. It
would be provocative and further aggravate religious-
based divisiveness.
It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes -
abortion and abortifacients.
The RH Law and Abortion
The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the
1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the unborn from
conception was to prevent the Legislature from enacting
a measure legalizing abortion. It was so clear that even
the Court cannot interpret it otherwise. This intent of the
Framers was captured in the record of the proceedings
of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. Commissioner
Bernardo Villegas, the principal proponent of the
protection of the unborn from conception, explained:
The intention .. .is to make sure that there would be no
pro-abortion laws ever passed by Congress or any pro-
abortion decision passed by the Supreme Court.169
A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with
this intent and actually proscribes abortion. While the
Court has opted not to make any determination, at this
stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself
clearly mandates that protection be afforded from the
moment of fertilization. As pointed out by Justice Carpio,
the RH Law is replete with provisions that embody the
policy of the law to protect to the fertilized ovum and that
it should be afforded safe travel to the uterus for
implantation.170
Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a
crime under Article 256 of the Revised Penal Code,
which penalizes the destruction or expulsion of the
fertilized ovum. Thus:
1] xx x.
Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this
Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:
xxx.
(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full
range of methods, facilities, services and supplies that
contribute to reproductive health and well-being by
addressing reproductive health-related problems. It also
includes sexual health, the purpose of which is the
enhancement of life and personal relations. The
elements of reproductive health care include the
following:
xxx.
(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion
complications;
xxx.
2] xx x.
Section 4. x x x.
(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of
individuals and couples, to decide freely and responsibly
whether or not to have children; the number, spacing and
timing of their children; to make other decisions
concerning reproduction, free of discrimination, coercion
and violence; to have the information and means to do
so; and to attain the highest standard of sexual health
and reproductive health: Provided, however, That
reproductive health rights do not include abortion, and
access to abortifacients.
3] xx x.
SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. - Except for prevailing laws
against abortion, any law, presidential decree or
issuance, executive order, letter of instruction,
administrative order, rule or regulation contrary to or is
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act including
Republic Act No. 7392, otherwise known as the
Midwifery Act, is hereby repealed, modified or amended
accordingly.
The RH Law and Abortifacients
In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is
consistent in prohibiting abortifacients. To be clear,
Section 4(a) of the RH Law defines an abortifacient as:
Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces
abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's
womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach
and be implanted in the mother's womb upon
determination of the FDA.
As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection
must be afforded from the moment of fertilization. By
using the word " or," the RH Law prohibits not only drugs
or devices that prevent implantation, but also those that
induce abortion and those that induce the destruction of
a fetus inside the mother's womb. Thus, an abortifacient
is any drug or device that either:
(a) Induces abortion; or
(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the
mother's womb; or
(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother's womb, upon
determination of the FDA.
Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the
Court finds that the RH Law, consistent with the
Constitution, recognizes that the fertilized ovum already
has life and that the State has a bounden duty to protect
it. The conclusion becomes clear because the RH Law,
first, prohibits any drug or device that induces abortion
(first kind), which, as discussed exhaustively above,
refers to that which induces the killing or the destruction
of the fertilized ovum, and, second, prohibits any drug or
device the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in
the mother's womb (third kind).
By expressly declaring that any drug or device that
prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in
the mother's womb is an abortifacient (third kind), the RH
Law does not intend to mean at all that life only begins
only at implantation, as Hon. Lagman suggests. It also
does not declare either that protection will only be given
upon implantation, as the petitioners likewise suggest.
Rather, it recognizes that: one, there is a need to protect
the fertilized ovum which already has life, and two, the
fertilized ovum must be protected the moment it
becomes existent - all the way until it reaches and
implants in the mother's womb. After all, if life is only
recognized and afforded protection from the moment the
fertilized ovum implants - there is nothing to prevent any
drug or device from killing or destroying the fertilized
ovum prior to implantation.
From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it
affords protection to the fertilized ovum, the RH Law
does not sanction abortion. To repeat, it is the Court's
position that life begins at fertilization, not at
implantation. When a fertilized ovum is implanted in the
uterine wall , its viability is sustained but that instance of
implantation is not the point of beginning of life. It started
earlier. And as defined by the RH Law, any drug or
device that induces abortion, that is, which kills or
destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, is
an abortifacient.
Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law
This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso
under Section 9 of the law that "any product or supply
included or to be included in the EDL must have a
certification from the FDA that said product and supply is
made available on the condition that it is not to be used
as an abortifacient" as empty as it is absurd. The FDA,
with all its expertise, cannot fully attest that a drug or
device will not all be used as an abortifacient, since the
agency cannot be present in every instance when the
contraceptive product or supply will be used.171
Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only
to safe, legal and non-abortifacient contraceptives,
however, the Court finds that the proviso of Section 9, as
worded, should bend to the legislative intent and mean
that "any product or supply included or to be included in
the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said
product and supply is made available on the condition
that it cannot be used as abortifacient." Such a
construction is consistent with the proviso under the
second paragraph of the same section that provides:
Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not
purchase or acquire by any means emergency
contraceptive pills, postcoital pills, abortifacients that will
be used for such purpose and their other forms or
equivalent.
Abortifacients under the RH-IRR
At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the
authors of the RH-IRR gravely abused their office when
they redefined the meaning of abortifacient. The RH Law
defines "abortifacient" as follows:
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act,
the following terms shall be defined as follows:
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces
abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's
womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach
and be implanted in the mother's womb upon
determination of the FDA.
Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR, however, redefines
"abortifacient" as:
Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms
shall be defined as follows:
a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily
induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to
reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon
determination of the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA). [Emphasis supplied]
Again in Section 3.0lG) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is
redefined, viz:
j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and
scientifically proven modern family planning method,
device, or health product, whether natural or artificial,
that prevents pregnancy but does not primarily destroy a
fertilized ovum or prevent a fertilized ovum from being
implanted in the mother's womb in doses of its approved
indication as determined by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA).
The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows
"contraceptives" and recognizes as "abortifacient" only
those that primarily induce abortion or the destruction of
a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb.172
This cannot be done.
In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and
Justice Del Castillo are well taken. As they pointed out,
with the insertion of the word "primarily," Section 3.0l(a)
and G) of the RH-IRR173 must be struck down for being
ultra vires.
Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in
Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR is indeed ultra
vires. It contravenes Section 4(a) of the RH Law and
should, therefore, be declared invalid. There is danger
that the insertion of the qualifier "primarily" will pave the
way for the approval of contraceptives which may harm
or destroy the life of the unborn from
conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12
of the Constitution. With such qualification in the RH-
IRR, it appears to insinuate that a contraceptive will only
be considered as an "abortifacient" if its sole known
effect is abortion or, as pertinent here, the prevention of
the implantation of the fertilized ovum.
For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive"
would permit the approval of contraceptives which are
actually abortifacients because of their fail-safe
mechanism.174
Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the
certification by the FDA that these contraceptives cannot
act as abortive. With this, together with the definition of
an abortifacient under Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and
its declared policy against abortion, the undeniable
conclusion is that contraceptives to be included in the
PNDFS and the EDL will not only be those
contraceptives that do not have the primary action of
causing abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the
mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to
reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, but also
those that do not have the secondary action of acting the
same way.
Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy
prohibiting abortion, and in line with the principle that
laws should be construed in a manner that its
constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law and its
implementing rules must be consistent with each other in
prohibiting abortion. Thus, the word " primarily" in
Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR should be declared
void. To uphold the validity of Section 3.0l(a) and G) of
the RH-IRR and prohibit only those contraceptives that
have the primary effect of being an abortive would
effectively "open the floodgates to the approval of
contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the
unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article
II, Section 12 of the Constitution."175
To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of
no abortion" embodied in the constitutional protection of
life must be upheld.
2-The Right to Health
The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right
to health because it requires the inclusion of hormonal
contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and
family products and supplies in the National Drug
Formulary and the inclusion of the same in the regular
purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all
national hospitals.176Citing various studies on the matter,
the petitioners posit that the risk of developing breast
and cervical cancer is greatly increased in women who
use oral contraceptives as compared to women who
never use them. They point out that the risk is decreased
when the use of contraceptives is discontinued. Further,
it is contended that the use of combined oral
contraceptive pills is associated with a threefold
increased risk of venous thromboembolism, a twofold
increased risk of ischematic stroke, and an indeterminate
effect on risk of myocardial infarction.177 Given the
definition of "reproductive health" and "sexual health"
under Sections 4(p)178 and (w)179 of the RH Law, the
petitioners assert that the assailed legislation only seeks
to ensure that women have pleasurable and satisfying
sex lives.180
The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II
of the Constitution is not self-executory, it being a mere
statement of the administration's principle and policy.
Even if it were self-executory, the OSG posits that
medical authorities refute the claim that contraceptive
pose a danger to the health of women.181
The Court's Position
A component to the right to life is the constitutional right
to health. In this regard, the Constitution is replete with
provisions protecting and promoting the right to health.
Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides:
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right
to health of the people and instill health consciousness
among them.
A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the
States' duty to provide for the health of the people, viz:
HEALTH
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and
comprehensive approach to health development which
shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and
other social services available to all the people at
affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of
the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and
children. The State shall endeavor to provide free
medical care to paupers.
Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an
effective food and drug regulatory system and undertake
appropriate health, manpower development, and
research, responsive to the country's health needs and
problems.
Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency
for disabled person for their rehabilitation, self-
development, and self-reliance, and their integration into
the mainstream of society.
Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:
Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade
malpractices and from substandard or hazardous
products.
Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these
provisions are self-executing. Unless the provisions
clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the
Constitution should be considered self-executory. There
is no need for legislation to implement these self-
executing provisions.182 In Manila Prince Hotel v.
GSIS,183 it was stated:
x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a
legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of
the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional
provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of
self-executing, the legislature would have the power to
ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the
fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why
the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that –
... in case of doubt, the Constitution should be
considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing.
. . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions
of the Constitution should be considered self-executing,
as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to
determine when, or whether, they shall be effective.
These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the
lawmaking body, which could make them entirely
meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed
implementing statute. (Emphases supplied)
This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the
petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not question
contraception and contraceptives per se.184 In fact, ALFI
prays that the status quo - under R.A. No. 5921 and R.A.
No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are
not prohibited when they are dispensed by a prescription
of a duly licensed by a physician - be maintained.185
The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in
this regard is to leave intact the provisions of R.A. No.
4729. There is no intention at all to do away with it. It is
still a good law and its requirements are still in to be
complied with. Thus, the Court agrees with the
observation of respondent Lagman that the effectivity of
the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation
of contraceptives since the sale, distribution and
dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices will still
require the prescription of a licensed physician. With
R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate
safeguards to ensure the public that only contraceptives
that are safe are made available to the public. As aptly
explained by respondent Lagman:
D. Contraceptives cannot be
dispensed and used without
prescription
108. As an added protection to voluntary users of
contraceptives, the same cannot be dispensed and used
without prescription.
109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the
Sale, Dispensation, and/ or Distribution of Contraceptive
Drugs and Devices" and Republic Act No. 5921 or "An
Act Regulating the Practice of Pharmacy and Setting
Standards of Pharmaceutical Education in the
Philippines and for Other Purposes" are not repealed by
the RH Law and the provisions of said Acts are not
inconsistent with the RH Law.
110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and
dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices are
particularly governed by RA No. 4729 which provides in
full:
"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person,
partnership, or corporation, to sell, dispense or otherwise
distribute whether for or without consideration, any
contraceptive drug or device, unless such sale,
dispensation or distribution is by a duly licensed drug
store or pharmaceutical company and with the
prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
"Sec. 2 . For the purpose of this Act:
"(a) "Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug,
chemical, or portion which is used exclusively for
the purpose of preventing fertilization of the
female ovum: and
"(b) "Contraceptive device" is any instrument,
device, material, or agent introduced into the
female reproductive system for the primary
purpose of preventing conception.
"Sec. 3 Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating
the provisions of this Act shall be punished with a fine of
not more than five hundred pesos or an imprisonment of
not less than six months or more than one year or both in
the discretion of the Court.
"This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
"Approved: June 18, 1966"
111. Of the same import, but in a general manner,
Section 25 of RA No. 5921 provides:
"Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs
and devices. No medicine, pharmaceutical, or drug of
whatever nature and kind or device shall be
compounded, dispensed, sold or resold, or otherwise be
made available to the consuming public except through a
prescription drugstore or hospital pharmacy, duly
established in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for
in the RH Law and other relevant statutes, the pretension
of the petitioners that the RH Law will lead to the
unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives, whether
harmful or not, is completely unwarranted and
baseless.186 [Emphases in the Original. Underlining
supplied.]
In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:
The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection
with Section 10 of the RH Law which provides:
SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family
Planning Supplies. - The DOH shall procure, distribute to
LGUs and monitor the usage of family planning supplies
for the whole country. The DOH shall coordinate with all
appropriate local government bodies to plan and
implement this procurement and distribution program.
The supply and budget allotments shall be based on,
among others, the current levels and projections of the
following:
 (a) Number of women of reproductive age and
couples who want to space or limit their children;
(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of
method used; and
(c) Cost of family planning supplies.
Provided, That LGUs may implement its own
procurement, distribution and monitoring program
consistent with the overall provisions of this Act and the
guidelines of the DOH.
Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive
drugs and devices, it must consider the provisions of
R.A. No. 4729, which is still in effect, and ensure that the
contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a duly
licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that
the actual dispensation of these contraceptive drugs and
devices will done following a prescription of a qualified
medical practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive
drugs and devices must not be indiscriminately done.
The public health must be protected by all possible
means. As pointed out by Justice De Castro, a heavy
responsibility and burden are assumed by the
government in supplying contraceptive drugs and
devices, for it may be held accountable for any injury,
illness or loss of life resulting from or incidental to their
use.187
At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single
contraceptive has yet been submitted to the FDA
pursuant to the RH Law. It behooves the Court to await
its determination which drugs or devices are declared by
the FDA as safe, it being the agency tasked to ensure
that food and medicines available to the public are safe
for public consumption. Consequently, the Court finds
that, at this point, the attack on the RH Law on this
ground is premature. Indeed, the various kinds of
contraceptives must first be measured up to the
constitutional yardstick as expounded herein, to be
determined as the case presents itself.
At this point, the Court is of the strong view that
Congress cannot legislate that hormonal contraceptives
and intra-uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient.
The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their
inclusion by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL by
using the mandatory "shall" is to be construed as
operative only after they have been tested, evaluated,
and approved by the FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has
the expertise to determine whether a particular hormonal
contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and non-
abortifacient. The provision of the third sentence
concerning the requirements for the inclusion or removal
of a particular family planning supply from the EDL
supports this construction.
Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the
inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine
devices, injectables, and other safe, legal, non-
abortifacient and effective family planning products and
supplies by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL is
not mandatory. There must first be a determination by
the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient
and effective family planning products and supplies.
There can be no predetermination by Congress that the
gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-
abortifacient and effective" without the proper scientific
examination.
3 -Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech
Position of the Petitioners:
1. On Contraception
While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and
tubal ligation are not covered by the constitutional
proscription, there are those who, because of their
religious education and background, sincerely believe
that contraceptives, whether abortifacient or not, are evil.
Some of these are medical practitioners who essentially
claim that their beliefs prohibit not only the use of
contraceptives but also the willing participation and
cooperation in all things dealing with contraceptive use.
Petitioner PAX explained that "contraception is gravely
opposed to marital chastity, it is contrary to the good of
the transmission of life, and to the reciprocal self-giving
of the spouses; it harms true love and denies the
sovereign rule of God in the transmission of Human
life."188
The petitioners question the State-sponsored
procurement of contraceptives, arguing that the
expenditure of their taxes on contraceptives violates the
guarantee of religious freedom since contraceptives
contravene their religious beliefs.189
2. On Religious Accommodation and
The Duty to Refer
Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law
attempts to address religious sentiments by making
provisions for a conscientious objector, the constitutional
guarantee is nonetheless violated because the law also
imposes upon the conscientious objector the duty to
refer the patient seeking reproductive health services to
another medical practitioner who would be able to
provide for the patient's needs. For the petitioners, this
amounts to requiring the conscientious objector to
cooperate with the very thing he refuses to do without
violating his/her religious beliefs.190
They further argue that even if the conscientious
objector's duty to refer is recognized, the recognition is
unduly limited, because although it allows a
conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(3) the option to
refer a patient seeking reproductive health services and
information - no escape is afforded the conscientious
objector in Section 23 (a)(l) and (2), i.e. against a patient
seeking reproductive health procedures. They claim that
the right of other individuals to conscientiously object,
such as: a) those working in public health facilities
referred to in Section 7; b) public officers involved in the
implementation of the law referred to in Section 23(b );
and c) teachers in public schools referred to in Section
14 of the RH Law, are also not recognize.191
Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners
meanwhile, contend that the requirement to refer the
matter to another health care service provider is still
considered a compulsion on those objecting healthcare
service providers. They add that compelling them to do
the act against their will violates the Doctrine of
Benevolent Neutrality. Sections 9, 14 and 1 7 of the law
are too secular that they tend to disregard the religion of
Filipinos. Authorizing the use of contraceptives with
abortive effects, mandatory sex education, mandatory
pro-bono reproductive health services to indigents
encroach upon the religious freedom of those upon
whom they are required.192
Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a
conscientious objector to refer the person seeking
reproductive health care services to another provider
infringes on one's freedom of religion as it forces the
objector to become an unwilling participant in the
commission of a serious sin under Catholic teachings.
While the right to act on one's belief may be regulated by
the State, the acts prohibited by the RH Law are passive
acts which produce neither harm nor injury to the
public.193
Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show
compelling state interest to justify regulation of religious
freedom because it mentions no emergency, risk or
threat that endangers state interests. It does not explain
how the rights of the people (to equality, non-
discrimination of rights, sustainable human development,
health, education, information, choice and to make
decisions according to religious convictions, ethics,
cultural beliefs and the demands of responsible
parenthood) are being threatened or are not being met
as to justify the impairment of religious freedom.194
Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the
RH Law requiring would-be couples to attend family
planning and responsible parenthood seminars and to
obtain a certificate of compliance. They claim that the
provision forces individuals to participate in the
implementation of the RH Law even if it contravenes
their religious beliefs.195 As the assailed law dangles the
threat of penalty of fine and/or imprisonment in case of
non-compliance with its provisions, the petitioners claim
that the RH Law forcing them to provide, support and
facilitate access and information to contraception against
their beliefs must be struck down as it runs afoul to the
constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.
The Respondents' Positions
The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the
RH Law does not provide that a specific mode or type of
contraceptives be used, be it natural or artificial. It
neither imposes nor sanctions any religion or
belief.196 They point out that the RH Law only seeks to
serve the public interest by providing accessible,
effective and quality reproductive health services to
ensure maternal and child health, in line with the State's
duty to bring to reality the social justice health
guarantees of the Constitution,197 and that what the law
only prohibits are those acts or practices, which deprive
others of their right to reproductive health.198 They assert
that the assailed law only seeks to guarantee informed
choice, which is an assurance that no one will be
compelled to violate his religion against his free will.199
The respondents add that by asserting that only natural
family planning should be allowed, the petitioners are
effectively going against the constitutional right to
religious freedom, the same right they invoked to assail
the constitutionality of the RH Law.200 In other words, by
seeking the declaration that the RH Law is
unconstitutional, the petitioners are asking that the Court
recognize only the Catholic Church's sanctioned natural
family planning methods and impose this on the entire
citizenry.201
With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist
that the same does not violate the constitutional
guarantee of religious freedom, it being a carefully
balanced compromise between the interests of the
religious objector, on one hand, who is allowed to keep
silent but is required to refer -and that of the citizen who
needs access to information and who has the right to
expect that the health care professional in front of her will
act professionally. For the respondents, the concession
given by the State under Section 7 and 23(a)(3) is
sufficient accommodation to the right to freely exercise
one's religion without unnecessarily infringing on the
rights of others.202
Whatever burden is placed on the petitioner's religious
freedom is minimal as the duty to refer is limited in
duration, location and impact.203
Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under
Section 15 , the respondents claim that it is a reasonable
regulation providing an opportunity for would-be couples
to have access to information regarding parenthood,
family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It is
argued that those who object to any information received
on account of their attendance in the required seminars
are not compelled to accept information given to them.
They are completely free to reject any information they
do not agree with and retain the freedom to decide on
matters of family life without intervention of the State.204
For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the
notion that natural family planning is the only method
acceptable to Catholics and the Catholic hierarchy.
Citing various studies and surveys on the matter, they
highlight the changing stand of the Catholic Church on
contraception throughout the years and note the general
acceptance of the benefits of contraceptives by its
followers in planning their families.
The Church and The State
At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a
heterogeneous society. It is made up of people of
diverse ethnic, cultural and religious beliefs and
backgrounds. History has shown us that our government,
in law and in practice, has allowed these various
religious, cultural, social and racial groups to thrive in a
single society together. It has embraced minority groups
and is tolerant towards all - the religious people of
different sects and the non-believers. The undisputed
fact is that our people generally believe in a deity,
whatever they conceived Him to be, and to whom they
call for guidance and enlightenment in crafting our
fundamental law. Thus, the preamble of the present
Constitution reads:
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of
Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane
society, and establish a Government that shall embody
our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good,
conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to
ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of
independence and democracy under the rule of law and
a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and
peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.
The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God
" manifested their spirituality innate in our nature and
consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and
historical experience. As this is embodied in the
preamble, it means that the State recognizes with
respect the influence of religion in so far as it instills into
the mind the purest principles of morality.205 Moreover, in
recognition of the contributions of religion to society, the
1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions contain benevolent
and accommodating provisions towards religions such as
tax exemption of church property, salary of religious
officers in government institutions, and optional religious
instructions in public schools.
The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong
barrier so that the State would not encroach into the
affairs of the church, and vice-versa. The principle of
separation of Church and State was, thus, enshrined in
Article II, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be
inviolable.
Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is
based on mutual respect. Generally, the State cannot
1âw phi 1
meddle in the internal affairs of the church, much less
question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot
favor one religion and discriminate against another. On
the other hand, the church cannot impose its beliefs and
convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry. It
cannot demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it
sincerely believes that they are good for the country.
Consistent with the principle that not any one religion
should ever be preferred over another, the Constitution
in the above-cited provision utilizes the term "church" in
its generic sense, which refers to a temple, a mosque, an
iglesia, or any other house of God which metaphorically
symbolizes a religious organization. Thus, the "Church"
means the religious congregations collectively.
Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need
to provide an ample barrier to protect the State from the
pursuit of its secular objectives, the Constitution lays
down the following mandate in Article III, Section 5 and
Article VI, Section 29 (2), of the 1987 Constitution:
Section. 5. No law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test
shall be required for the exercise of civil or political
rights.
Section 29.
xxx.
No public money or property shall be appropriated,
applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the
use, benefit, or support of any sect, church,
denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion,
or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious
teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest,
preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed
forces, or to any penal institution, or government
orphanage or leprosarium.
In short, the constitutional assurance of religious
freedom provides two guarantees: the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.
The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State
from sponsoring any religion or favoring any religion as
against other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in
affairs among religious groups."206 Essentially, it prohibits
the establishment of a state religion and the use of public
resources for the support or prohibition of a religion.
On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause
is the respect for the inviolability of the human
conscience.207 Under this part of religious freedom
guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering
with the outside manifestations of one's belief and
faith.208 Explaining the concept of religious freedom, the
Court, in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers
Union209 wrote:
The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation
for the support of any religious tenets or the modes of
worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law
of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any
form of worship (U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L. ed.
1148, 1153), but also assures the free exercise of one's
chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude.
It has been said that the religion clauses of the
Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest
possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to
believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs,
and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent
with the liberty of others and with the common good. Any
legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the
observance of one or all religions, or to discriminate
invidiously between the religions, is invalid, even though
the burden may be characterized as being only indirect.
(Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S.
Ct. 1970) But if the state regulates conduct by enacting,
within its power, a general law which has for its purpose
and effect to advance the state's secular goals, the
statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious
observance, unless the state can accomplish its purpose
without imposing such burden. (Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599, 6 Led. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144; McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-5 and 449).
As expounded in Escritor,
The establishment and free exercise clauses were not
designed to serve contradictory purposes. They have a
single goal-to promote freedom of individual religious
beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise
clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious
beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice,
while the establishment clause prohibits government
from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for religious
beliefs and practices. In other words, the two religion
clauses were intended to deny government the power to
use either the carrot or the stick to influence individual
religious beliefs and practices.210
Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's
religion is the principle that the guarantee of religious
freedom is comprised of two parts: the freedom to
believe, and the freedom to act on one's belief. The first
part is absolute. As explained in Gerona v. Secretary of
Education:211
The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless
bounded only by one's imagination and thought. So is
the freedom of belief, including religious belief, limitless
and without bounds. One may believe in most anything,
however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same
may appear to others, even heretical when weighed in
the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But
between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said
belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel.212
The second part however, is limited and subject to the
awesome power of the State and can be enjoyed only
with proper regard to the rights of others. It is "subject to
regulation where the belief is translated into external acts
that affect the public welfare."213
Legislative Acts and the
Free Exercise Clause
Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise
clause and the State, the Court adheres to the doctrine
of benevolent neutrality. This has been clearly decided
by the Court in Estrada v. Escritor, (Escritor)214 where it
was stated "that benevolent neutrality-accommodation,
whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent and
framework underlying the Philippine Constitution."215 In
the same case, it was further explained that"
The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with
respect to these governmental actions, accommodation
of religion may be allowed, not to promote the
government's favored form of religion, but to allow
individuals and groups to exercise their religion without
hindrance. "The purpose of accommodation is to remove
a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or
institution's religion."216 "What is sought under the theory
of accommodation is not a declaration of
unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an
exemption from its application or its 'burdensome effect,'
whether by the legislature or the courts."217
In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious
freedom, the compelling state interest test is
proper.218Underlying the compelling state interest test is
the notion that free exercise is a fundamental right and
that laws burdening it should be subject to strict
scrutiny.219 In Escritor, it was written:
Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to
determine these limits. Beginning with the first case on
the Free Exercise Clause, American Bible Society, the
Court mentioned the "clear and present danger" test but
did not employ it. Nevertheless, this test continued to be
cited in subsequent cases on religious liberty. The
Gerona case then pronounced that the test of
permissibility of religious freedom is whether it violates
the established institutions of society and law. The
Victoriano case mentioned the "immediate and grave
danger" test as well as the doctrine that a law of general
applicability may burden religious exercise provided the
law is the least restrictive means to accomplish the goal
of the law. The case also used, albeit inappropriately, the
"compelling state interest" test. After Victoriano , German
went back to the Gerona rule. Ebralinag then employed
the "grave and immediate danger" test and overruled the
Gerona test. The fairly recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo
went back to the " clear and present danger" test in the
maiden case of A merican Bible Society. Not
surprisingly, all the cases which employed the "clear and
present danger" or "grave and immediate danger" test
involved, in one form or another, religious speech as this
test is often used in cases on freedom of expression. On
the other hand, the Gerona and German cases set the
rule that religious freedom will not prevail over
established institutions of society and law. Gerona,
however, which was the authority cited by German has
been overruled by Ebralinag which employed the "grave
and immediate danger" test . Victoriano was the only
case that employed the "compelling state interest" test,
but as explained previously, the use of the test was
inappropriate to the facts of the case.
The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican
Bible Society, Ebralinag and Iglesia ni Cristo where the
"clear and present danger" and "grave and immediate
danger" tests were appropriate as speech has easily
discernible or immediate effects. The Gerona and
German doctrine, aside from having been overruled, is
not congruent with the benevolent neutrality approach,
thus not appropriate in this jurisdiction. Similar to
Victoriano, the present case involves purely conduct
arising from religious belief. The "compelling state
interest" test is proper where conduct is involved for the
whole gamut of human conduct has different effects on
the state's interests: some effects may be immediate and
short-term while others delayed and far-reaching. A test
that would protect the interests of the state in preventing
a substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is
therefore necessary. However, not any interest of the
state would suffice to prevail over the right to religious
freedom as this is a fundamental right that enjoys a
preferred position in the hierarchy of rights - "the most
inalienable and sacred of all human rights", in the words
of Jefferson. This right is sacred for an invocation of the
Free Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher
sovereignty. The entire constitutional order of limited
government is premised upon an acknowledgment of
such higher sovereignty, thus the Filipinos implore the
"aid of Almighty God in order to build a just and humane
society and establish a government." As held in
Sherbert, only the gravest abuses, endangering
paramount interests can limit this fundamental right. A
mere balancing of interests which balances a right with
just a colorable state interest is therefore not appropriate.
Instead, only a compelling interest of the state can
prevail over the fundamental right to religious liberty. The
test requires the state to carry a heavy burden, a
compelling one, for to do otherwise would allow the state
to batter religion, especially the less powerful ones until
they are destroyed. In determining which shall prevail
between the state's interest and religious liberty,
reasonableness shall be the guide. The "compelling state
interest" serves the purpose of revering religious liberty
while at the same time affording protection to the
paramount interests of the state. This was the test used
in Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e. refusal to work
on Saturdays. In the end, the "compelling state interest"
test, by upholding the paramount interests of the state,
seeks to protect the very state, without which, religious
liberty will not be preserved. [Emphases in the original.
Underlining supplied.]
The Court's Position
In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the
Court to determine whether the use of contraceptives or
one's participation in the support of modem reproductive
health measures is moral from a religious standpoint or
whether the same is right or wrong according to one's
dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters
dealing with "faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship,
ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church ... are
unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside
the province of the civil courts."220 The jurisdiction of the
Court extends only to public and secular morality.
Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case
at bench should be understood only in this realm where it
has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands
without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as
vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to
determine whether the RH Law contravenes the
guarantee of religious freedom.
At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and
respects religion and religious beliefs and convictions. It
is replete with assurances the no one can be compelled
to violate the tenets of his religion or defy his religious
convictions against his free will. Provisions in the RH
Law respecting religious freedom are the following:
1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human
rights of all persons including their right to equality and
nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable
human development, the right to health which includes
reproductive health, the right to education and
information, and the right to choose and make decisions
for themselves in accordance with their religious
convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of
responsible parenthood. [Section 2, Declaration of
Policy]
2 . The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social
institution and the foundation of the family which in turn
is the foundation of the nation. Pursuant thereto, the
State shall defend:
(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance
with their religious convictions and the demands of
responsible parenthood." [Section 2, Declaration of
Policy]
3. The State shall promote and provide information and
access, without bias, to all methods of family planning,
including effective natural and modern methods which
have been proven medically safe, legal, non-
abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific
and evidence-based medical research standards such as
those registered and approved by the FDA for the poor
and marginalized as identified through the NHTS-PR and
other government measures of identifying
marginalization: Provided, That the State shall also
provide funding support to promote modern natural
methods of family planning, especially the Billings
Ovulation Method, consistent with the needs of
acceptors and their religious convictions. [Section 3(e),
Declaration of Policy]
4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable
individuals and couples to have the number of children
they desire with due consideration to the health,
particularly of women, and the resources available and
affordable to them and in accordance with existing laws,
public morals and their religious convictions. [Section
3CDJ
5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and
choice of family planning methods that are in accordance
with their religious convictions and cultural beliefs, taking
into consideration the State's obligations under various
human rights instruments. [Section 3(h)]
6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations
(NGOs) , women's and people's organizations, civil
society, faith-based organizations, the religious sector
and communities is crucial to ensure that reproductive
health and population and development policies, plans,
and programs will address the priority needs of women,
the poor, and the marginalized. [Section 3(i)]
7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of
a parent to respond to the needs and aspirations of the
family and children. It is likewise a shared responsibility
between parents to determine and achieve the desired
number of children, spacing and timing of their children
according to their own family life aspirations, taking into
account psychological preparedness, health status,
sociocultural and economic concerns consistent with
their religious convictions. [Section 4(v)] (Emphases
supplied)
While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were
enacted allowing the use of contraceptives. To some
medical practitioners, however, the whole idea of using
contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with the
principle of benevolent neutrality, their beliefs should be
respected.
The Establishment Clause
and Contraceptives
In the same breath that the establishment clause
restricts what the government can do with religion, it also
limits what religious sects can or cannot do with the
government. They can neither cause the government to
adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone,
nor can they not cause the government to restrict other
groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State
to adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establishing a
state religion.
Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their
supposition that the State cannot enhance its population
control program through the RH Law simply because the
promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their
religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded to
pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being
dictated upon by the policies of any one religion. One
cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because it will
cloud his conscience. The demarcation line between
Church and State demands that one render unto Caesar
the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that
are God's.221
The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer
While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote
reproductive health manifestly respects diverse religious
beliefs in line with the Non-Establishment Clause, the
same conclusion cannot be reached with respect to
Sections 7, 23 and 24 thereof. The said provisions
commonly mandate that a hospital or a medical
practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health
care and services under the law to another accessible
healthcare provider despite their conscientious
objections based on religious or ethical beliefs.
In a situation where the free exercise of religion is
allegedly burdened by government legislation or practice,
the compelling state interest test in line with the Court's
espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in
Escritor, finds application. In this case, the conscientious
objector's claim to religious freedom would warrant an
exemption from obligations under the RH Law, unless
the government succeeds in demonstrating a more
compelling state interest in the accomplishment of an
important secular objective. Necessarily so, the plea of
conscientious objectors for exemption from the RH Law
deserves no less than strict scrutiny.
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a
conscientious objector's right to religious freedom has
been burdened. As in Escritor, there is no doubt that an
intense tug-of-war plagues a conscientious objector. One
side coaxes him into obedience to the law and the
abandonment of his religious beliefs, while the other
entices him to a clean conscience yet under the pain of
penalty. The scenario is an illustration of the predicament
of medical practitioners whose religious beliefs are
incongruent with what the RH Law promotes.
The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer
imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and
conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical
practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking
information on modem reproductive health products,
services, procedures and methods, his conscience is
immediately burdened as he has been compelled to
perform an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner
Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written,
"at the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for
the inviolability of the human conscience.222
Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-
out clause, it is, however, a false compromise because it
makes pro-life health providers complicit in the
performance of an act that they find morally repugnant or
offensive. They cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what
they cannot do directly. One may not be the principal, but
he is equally guilty if he abets the offensive act by
indirect participation.
Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is
necessarily intertwined with the right to free speech, it
being an externalization of one's thought and
conscience. This in turn includes the right to be silent.
With the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom
follows the protection that should be afforded to
individuals in communicating their beliefs to others as
well as the protection for simply being silent. The Bill of
Rights guarantees the liberty of the individual to utter
what is in his mind and the liberty not to utter what is not
in his mind.223 While the RH Law seeks to provide
freedom of choice through informed consent, freedom of
choice guarantees the liberty of the religious conscience
and prohibits any degree of compulsion or burden,
whether direct or indirect, in the practice of one's
religion.224
In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and
moral convictions of individuals, on one hand, and the
interest of the State, on the other, to provide access and
information on reproductive health products, services,
procedures and methods to enable the people to
determine the timing, number and spacing of the birth of
their children, the Court is of the strong view that the
religious freedom of health providers, whether public or
private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a
conscientious objector should be exempt from
compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he
would be compelled to act contrary to his religious belief
and conviction, it would be violative of "the principle of
non-coercion" enshrined in the constitutional right to free
exercise of religion.
Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner House
of the Court of Session, found in the case of Doogan and
Wood v. NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health
Board,225 that the midwives claiming to be conscientious
objectors under the provisions of Scotland's Abortion Act
of 1967, could not be required to delegate, supervise or
support staff on their labor ward who were involved in
abortions.226 The Inner House stated "that if 'participation'
were defined according to whether the person was taking
part 'directly' or ' indirectly' this would actually mean
more complexity and uncertainty."227
While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the
applicable principle was the same - they could not be
forced to assist abortions if it would be against their
conscience or will.
Institutional Health Providers
The same holds true with respect to non-maternity
specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by
a religious group and health care service providers.
Considering that Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes
such institutions should they fail or refuse to comply with
their duty to refer under Section 7 and Section 23(a)(3),
the Court deems that it must be struck down for being
violative of the freedom of religion. The same applies to
Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24,
considering that in the dissemination of information
regarding programs and services and in the performance
of reproductive health procedures, the religious freedom
of health care service providers should be respected.
In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines,
Inc. v. Office of the Executive Secretary228 it was
stressed:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by
the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has
consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware
that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty
of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his
conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as
he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of
others and with the common good."10
The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties
provided by law endeavour to ensure compliance.
Without set consequences for either an active violation
or mere inaction, a law tends to be toothless and
ineffectual. Nonetheless, when what is bartered for an
effective implementation of a law is a constitutionally-
protected right the Court firmly chooses to stamp its
disapproval. The punishment of a healthcare service
provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient to
another, or who declines to perform reproductive health
procedure on a patient because incompatible religious
beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee
which the Court cannot allow.
The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)
The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads:
Provided, That skilled health professional such as
provincial, city or municipal health officers, chiefs of
hospital, head nurses, supervising midwives, among
others, who by virtue of their office are specifically
charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the
RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as
conscientious objectors.
This is discriminatory and violative of the equal
protection clause. The conscientious objection clause
should be equally protective of the religious belief of
public health officers. There is no perceptible distinction
why they should not be considered exempt from the
mandates of the law. The protection accorded to other
conscientious objectors should equally apply to all
medical practitioners without distinction whether they
belong to the public or private sector. After all, the
freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the
protective robe that guarantees its free exercise is not
taken off even if one acquires employment in the
government.
It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a
place inferior to none in the hierarchy of human values.
The mind must be free to think what it wills, whether in
the secular or religious sphere, to give expression to its
beliefs by oral discourse or through the media and, thus,
seek other candid views in occasions or gatherings or in
more permanent aggrupation. Embraced in such concept
then are freedom of religion, freedom of speech, of the
press, assembly and petition, and freedom of
association.229
The discriminatory provision is void not only because no
such exception is stated in the RH Law itself but also
because it is violative of the equal protection clause in
the Constitution. Quoting respondent Lagman, if there is
any conflict between the RH-IRR and the RH Law, the
law must prevail.
Justice Mendoza:
I'll go to another point. The RH law .. .in your Comment-
in-Intervention on page 52, you mentioned RH Law is
replete with provisions in upholding the freedom of
religion and respecting religious convictions. Earlier, you
affirmed this with qualifications. Now, you have read, I
presumed you have read the IRR-Implementing Rules
and Regulations of the RH Bill?
Congressman Lagman:
Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a
long IRR and I have not thoroughly dissected the
nuances of the provisions.
Justice Mendoza:
I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I
cannot find in the RH Law. But in the IRR it says: " ....
skilled health professionals such as provincial, city or
municipal health officers, chief of hospitals, head nurses,
supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of
their office are specifically charged with the duty to
implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these
Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors."
Do you agree with this?
Congressman Lagman:
I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.
Justice Mendoza:
In other words, public health officers in contrast to the
private practitioners who can be conscientious objectors,
skilled health professionals cannot be considered
conscientious objectors. Do you agree with this? Is this
not against the constitutional right to the religious belief?
Congressman Lagman:
Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and
the law, the law must prevail.230
Compelling State Interest
The foregoing discussion then begets the question on
whether the respondents, in defense of the subject
provisions, were able to: 1] demonstrate a more
compelling state interest to restrain conscientious
objectors in their choice of services to render; and 2]
discharge the burden of proof that the obligatory
character of the law is the least intrusive means to
achieve the objectives of the law.
Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents'
submissions proved to be in vain. The OSG was
curiously silent in the establishment of a more compelling
state interest that would rationalize the curbing of a
conscientious objector's right not to adhere to an action
contrary to his religious convictions. During the oral
arguments, the OSG maintained the same silence and
evasion. The Transcripts of the Stenographic Notes
disclose the following:
Justice De Castro:
Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious objector to
refer. ..
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Yes, Justice.
Justice De Castro:
... which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice
Abad. What is the compelling State interest in imposing
this duty to refer to a conscientious objector which
refuses to do so because of his religious belief?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Ahh, Your Honor, ..
Justice De Castro:
What is the compelling State interest to impose this
burden?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the
standard is a compelling State interest, this is an
ordinary health legislation involving professionals. This is
not a free speech matter or a pure free exercise matter.
This is a regulation by the State of the relationship
between medical doctors and their patients.231
Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest
which would limit the free exercise clause of the
conscientious objectors, however few in number. Only
the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the
security and welfare of the community can justify the
infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails
to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat,
State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable.232
Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to
believe. It also means the freedom to act or not to act
according to what one believes. And this freedom is
violated when one is compelled to act against one's
belief or is prevented from acting according to one's
belief.233
Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger
to the life or health of an individual in the perceived
scenario of the subject provisions. After all, a couple who
plans the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their
children refers to a future event that is contingent on
whether or not the mother decides to adopt or use the
information, product, method or supply given to her or
whether she even decides to become pregnant at all. On
the other hand, the burden placed upon those who object
to contraceptive use is immediate and occurs the
moment a patient seeks consultation on reproductive
health matters.
Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to
justify the infringement of the conscientious objector's
religious freedom, the respondents have failed to
demonstrate "the gravest abuses, endangering
paramount interests" which could limit or override a
person's fundamental right to religious freedom. Also, the
respondents have not presented any government effort
exerted to show that the means it takes to achieve its
legitimate state objective is the least intrusive
means.234 Other than the assertion that the act of
referring would only be momentary, considering that the
act of referral by a conscientious objector is the very
action being contested as violative of religious freedom,
it behooves the respondents to demonstrate that no
other means can be undertaken by the State to achieve
its objective without violating the rights of the
conscientious objector. The health concerns of women
may still be addressed by other practitioners who may
perform reproductive health-related procedures with
open willingness and motivation. Suffice it to say, a
person who is forced to perform an act in utter reluctance
deserves the protection of the Court as the last vanguard
of constitutional freedoms.
At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken
by the Legislature to ensure that the right to health is
protected. Considering other legislations as they stand
now, R.A . No. 4 729 or the Contraceptive Act, R.A. No.
6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A.
No. 9710, otherwise known as "The Magna Carta of
Women," amply cater to the needs of women in relation
to health services and programs. The pertinent provision
of Magna Carta on comprehensive health services and
programs for women, in fact, reads:
Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a)
Comprehensive Health Services. - The State shall, at all
times, provide for a comprehensive, culture-sensitive,
and gender-responsive health services and programs
covering all stages of a woman's life cycle and which
addresses the major causes of women's mortality and
morbidity: Provided, That in the provision for
comprehensive health services, due respect shall be
accorded to women's religious convictions, the rights of
the spouses to found a family in accordance with their
religious convictions, and the demands of responsible
parenthood, and the right of women to protection from
hazardous drugs, devices, interventions, and
substances.
Access to the following services shall be ensured:
(1) Maternal care to include pre- and
post-natal services to address pregnancy
and infant health and nutrition;
(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;
(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and
effective methods of family planning;
(4) Family and State collaboration in
youth sexuality education and health
services without prejudice to the primary
right and duty of parents to educate their
children;
(5) Prevention and management of
reproductive tract infections, including
sexually transmitted diseases, HIV, and
AIDS;
(6) Prevention and management of
reproductive tract cancers like breast and
cervical cancers, and other gynecological
conditions and disorders;
(7) Prevention of abortion and
management of pregnancy-related
complications;
(8) In cases of violence against women
and children, women and children victims
and survivors shall be provided with
comprehensive health services that
include psychosocial, therapeutic,
medical, and legal interventions and
assistance towards healing, recovery,
and empowerment;
(9) Prevention and management of
infertility and sexual dysfunction pursuant
to ethical norms and medical standards;
(10) Care of the elderly women beyond
their child-bearing years; and
(11) Management, treatment, and
intervention of mental health problems of
women and girls. In addition, healthy
lifestyle activities are encouraged and
promoted through programs and projects
as strategies in the prevention of
diseases.
(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. -
The State shall provide women in all sectors with
appropriate, timely, complete, and accurate information
and education on all the above-stated aspects of
women's health in government education and training
programs, with due regard to the following:
(1) The natural and primary right and duty
of parents in the rearing of the youth and
the development of moral character and
the right of children to be brought up in
an atmosphere of morality and rectitude
for the enrichment and strengthening of
character;
(2) The formation of a person's sexuality
that affirms human dignity; and
(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective
family planning methods including fertility
awareness.
As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay
eventually replied that the compelling state interest was
"Fifteen maternal deaths per day, hundreds of thousands
of unintended pregnancies, lives changed, x x x."235 He,
however, failed to substantiate this point by concrete
facts and figures from reputable sources.
The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health
Organization reported that the Filipino maternal mortality
rate dropped to 48 percent from 1990 to
2008, 236 although there was still no RH Law at that time.
Despite such revelation, the proponents still insist that
such number of maternal deaths constitute a compelling
state interest.
Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the
delivery of social healthcare programs for Filipino
women, they could not be solved by a measure that puts
an unwarrantable stranglehold on religious beliefs in
exchange for blind conformity.
Exception: Life Threatening Cases
All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a
valid exception set forth in the law. While generally
healthcare service providers cannot be forced to render
reproductive health care procedures if doing it would
contravene their religious beliefs, an exception must be
made in life-threatening cases that require the
performance of emergency procedures. In these
situations, the right to life of the mother should be given
preference, considering that a referral by a medical
practitioner would amount to a denial of service, resulting
to unnecessarily placing the life of a mother in grave
danger. Thus, during the oral arguments, Atty. Liban,
representing CFC, manifested: "the forced referral clause
that we are objecting on grounds of violation of freedom
of religion does not contemplate an emergency."237
In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and
the life of a child, the doctor is morally obliged always to
try to save both lives. If, however, it is impossible, the
resulting death to one should not be deliberate. Atty.
Noche explained:
Principle of Double-Effect. - May we please remind the
principal author of the RH Bill in the House of
Representatives of the principle of double-effect wherein
intentional harm on the life of either the mother of the
child is never justified to bring about a "good" effect. In a
conflict situation between the life of the child and the life
of the mother, the doctor is morally obliged always to try
to save both lives. However, he can act in favor of one
(not necessarily the mother) when it is medically
impossible to save both, provided that no direct harm is
intended to the other. If the above principles are
observed, the loss of the child's life or the mother's life is
not intentional and, therefore, unavoidable. Hence, the
doctor would not be guilty of abortion or murder. The
mother is never pitted against the child because both
their lives are equally valuable.238
Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother,
procedures endangering the life of the child may be
resorted to even if is against the religious sentiments of
the medical practitioner. As quoted above, whatever
burden imposed upon a medical practitioner in this case
would have been more than justified considering the life
he would be able to save.
Family Planning Seminars
Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15239 as a
condition for the issuance of a marriage license, the
Court finds the same to be a reasonable exercise of
police power by the government. A cursory reading of
the assailed provision bares that the religious freedom of
the petitioners is not at all violated. All the law requires is
for would-be spouses to attend a seminar on
parenthood, family planning breastfeeding and infant
nutrition. It does not even mandate the type of family
planning methods to be included in the seminar, whether
they be natural or artificial. As correctly noted by the
OSG, those who receive any information during their
attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to
accept the information given to them, are completely free
to reject the information they find unacceptable, and
retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life
without the intervention of the State.
4-The Family and the Right to Privacy
Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section
23(a) (2) (i) thereof violates the provisions of the
Constitution by intruding into marital privacy and
autonomy. It argues that it cultivates disunity and fosters
animosity in the family rather than promote its solidarity
and total development.240
The Court cannot but agree.
The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions
strengthening the family as it is the basic social
institution. In fact, one article, Article XV, is devoted
entirely to the family.
ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the
foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen
its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is
the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State.
Section 3. The State shall defend:
The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with
their religious convictions and the demands of
responsible parenthood;
The right of children to assistance, including proper care
and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions
prejudicial to their development;
The right of the family to a family living wage and
income; and
The right of families or family assoc1at1ons to participate
in the planning and implementation of policies and
programs that affect them.
In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to
control population growth, contains provisions which tend
to wreck the family as a solid social institution. It bars the
husband and/or the father from participating in the
decision making process regarding their common future
progeny. It likewise deprives the parents of their authority
over their minor daughter simply because she is already
a parent or had suffered a miscarriage.
The Family and Spousal Consent
Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:
The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or
private, who shall: ...
(2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe
reproductive health procedures on any person of legal
age on the ground of lack of consent or authorization of
the following persons in the following instances:
(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided,
That in case of disagreement, the decision of the one
undergoing the procedures shall prevail. [Emphasis
supplied]
The above provision refers to reproductive health
procedures like tubal litigation and vasectomy which, by
their very nature, should require mutual consent and
decision between the husband and the wife as they
affect issues intimately related to the founding of a
family. Section 3, Art. XV of the Constitution espouses
that the State shall defend the "right of the spouses to
found a family." One person cannot found a family. The
right, therefore, is shared by both spouses. In the same
Section 3, their right "to participate in the planning and
implementation of policies and programs that affect them
" is equally recognized.
The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this
mutual decision-making. By giving absolute authority to
the spouse who would undergo a procedure, and barring
the other spouse from participating in the decision would
drive a wedge between the husband and wife, possibly
result in bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and
the family, all for the sake of reducing the population.
This would be a marked departure from the policy of the
State to protect marriage as an inviolable social
institution.241
Decision-making involving a reproductive health
procedure is a private matter which belongs to the
couple, not just one of them. Any decision they would
reach would affect their future as a family because the
size of the family or the number of their children
significantly matters. The decision whether or not to
undergo the procedure belongs exclusively to, and
shared by, both spouses as one cohesive unit as they
chart their own destiny. It is a constitutionally guaranteed
private right. Unless it prejudices the State, which has
not shown any compelling interest, the State should see
to it that they chart their destiny together as one family.
As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Section
19( c) of R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "Magna
Carta for Women," provides that women shall have equal
rights in all matters relating to marriage and family
relations, including the joint decision on the number and
spacing of their children. Indeed, responsible
parenthood, as Section 3(v) of the RH Law states, is a
shared responsibility between parents. Section
23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law should not be allowed to betray
the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the
family by giving to only one spouse the absolute
authority to decide whether to undergo reproductive
health procedure.242
The right to chart their own destiny together falls within
the protected zone of marital privacy and such state
intervention would encroach into the zones of spousal
privacy guaranteed by the Constitution. In our
jurisdiction, the right to privacy was first recognized in
Marje v. Mutuc,243 where the Court, speaking through
Chief Justice Fernando, held that "the right to privacy as
such is accorded recognition independently of its
identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of
constitutional protection."244 Marje adopted the ruling of
the US Supreme Court in Griswold v.
Connecticut,245 where Justice William O. Douglas wrote:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of
Rights -older than our political parties, older than our
school system. Marriage is a coming together for better
or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the
degree of being sacred. It is an association that
promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living,
not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or
social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a
purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.
Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute
which made the use of contraceptives a criminal offense
on the ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional
invasion of the right to privacy of married persons.
Nevertheless, it recognized the zone of privacy rightfully
enjoyed by couples. Justice Douglas in Grisworld wrote
that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those
guarantees that help give them life and substance.
Various guarantees create zones of privacy."246
At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the
courts will decide.
The Family and Parental Consent
Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent
in cases where the minor, who will be undergoing a
procedure, is already a parent or has had a miscarriage.
Section 7 of the RH law provides:
SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. – x x x.
No person shall be denied information and access to
family planning services, whether natural or artificial:
Provided, That minors will not be allowed access to
modern methods of family planning without written
consent from their parents or guardian/s except when the
minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage.
There can be no other interpretation of this provision
except that when a minor is already a parent or has had
a miscarriage, the parents are excluded from the
decision making process of the minor with regard to
family planning. Even if she is not yet emancipated, the
parental authority is already cut off just because there is
a need to tame population growth.
It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent
needs the comfort, care, advice, and guidance of her
own parents. The State cannot replace her natural
mother and father when it comes to providing her needs
and comfort. To say that their consent is no longer
relevant is clearly anti-family. It does not promote unity in
the family. It is an affront to the constitutional mandate to
protect and strengthen the family as an inviolable social
institution.
More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the
constitutional mandate that "the natural and primary right
and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character shall
receive the support of the Government."247 In this regard,
Commissioner Bernas wrote:
The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to
modify the right of parents. It imports the assertion that
the right of parents is superior to that of the
State.248 [Emphases supplied]
To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents
to exercise parental control over their minor-child or the
right of the spouses to mutually decide on matters which
very well affect the very purpose of marriage, that is, the
establishment of conjugal and family life, would result in
the violation of one's privacy with respect to his family. It
would be dismissive of the unique and strongly-held
Filipino tradition of maintaining close family ties and
violative of the recognition that the State affords couples
entering into the special contract of marriage to as one
unit in forming the foundation of the family and society.
The State cannot, without a compelling state interest,
take over the role of parents in the care and custody of a
minor child, whether or not the latter is already a parent
or has had a miscarriage. Only a compelling state
interest can justify a state substitution of their parental
authority.
First Exception: Access to Information
Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the
exception provided in the second paragraph of Section 7
or with respect to the consenting spouse under Section
23(a)(2)(i), a distinction must be made. There must be a
differentiation between access to information about
family planning services, on one hand, and access to the
reproductive health procedures and modern family
planning methods themselves, on the other. Insofar as
access to information is concerned, the Court finds no
constitutional objection to the acquisition of information
by the minor referred to under the exception in the
second paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her to
take proper care of her own body and that of her unborn
child. After all, Section 12, Article II of the Constitution
mandates the State to protect both the life of the mother
as that of the unborn child. Considering that information
to enable a person to make informed decisions is
essential in the protection and maintenance of ones'
health, access to such information with respect to
reproductive health must be allowed. In this situation, the
fear that parents might be deprived of their parental
control is unfounded because they are not prohibited to
exercise parental guidance and control over their minor
child and assist her in deciding whether to accept or
reject the information received.
Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases
As in the case of the conscientious objector, an
exception must be made in life-threatening cases that
require the performance of emergency procedures. In
such cases, the life of the minor who has already
suffered a miscarriage and that of the spouse should not
be put at grave risk simply for lack of consent. It should
be emphasized that no person should be denied the
appropriate medical care urgently needed to preserve
the primordial right, that is, the right to life.
In this connection, the second sentence of Section
23(a)(2)(ii)249 should be struck down. By effectively
limiting the requirement of parental consent to "only in
elective surgical procedures," it denies the parents their
right of parental authority in cases where what is
involved are "non-surgical procedures." Save for the two
exceptions discussed above, and in the case of an
abused child as provided in the first sentence of Section
23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should not be deprived of their
constitutional right of parental authority. To deny them of
this right would be an affront to the constitutional
mandate to protect and strengthen the family.
5 - Academic Freedom
It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to
Section 24 thereof, mandating the teaching of Age-and
Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health
Education under threat of fine and/or imprisonment
violates the principle of academic freedom . According to
the petitioners, these provisions effectively force
educational institutions to teach reproductive health
education even if they believe that the same is not
suitable to be taught to their students.250 Citing various
studies conducted in the United States and statistical
data gathered in the country, the petitioners aver that the
prevalence of contraceptives has led to an increase of
out-of-wedlock births; divorce and breakdown of families;
the acceptance of abortion and euthanasia; the
"feminization of poverty"; the aging of society; and
promotion of promiscuity among the youth.251
At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the
validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature
because the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-
appropriate reproductive health education. One can only
speculate on the content, manner and medium of
instruction that will be used to educate the adolescents
and whether they will contradict the religious beliefs of
the petitioners and validate their apprehensions. Thus,
considering the premature nature of this particular issue,
the Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or
validity.
At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
provides that the natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and
development of moral character shall receive the support
of the Government. Like the 1973 Constitution and the
1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms the
State recognition of the invaluable role of parents in
preparing the youth to become productive members of
society. Notably, it places more importance on the role of
parents in the development of their children by
recognizing that said role shall be "primary," that is, that
the right of parents in upbringing the youth is superior to
that of the State.252
It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens
patriae to aid parents in the moral development of the
youth. Indeed, the Constitution makes mention of the
importance of developing the youth and their important
role in nation building.253 Considering that Section 14
provides not only for the age-appropriate-reproductive
health education, but also for values formation; the
development of knowledge and skills in self-protection
against discrimination; sexual abuse and violence
against women and children and other forms of gender
based violence and teen pregnancy; physical, social and
emotional changes in adolescents; women's rights and
children's rights; responsible teenage behavior; gender
and development; and responsible parenthood, and that
Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR and Section 4(t) of
the RH Law itself provides for the teaching of responsible
teenage behavior, gender sensitivity and physical and
emotional changes among adolescents - the Court finds
that the legal mandate provided under the assailed
provision supplements, rather than supplants, the rights
and duties of the parents in the moral development of
their children.
Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the
mandatory reproductive health education program shall
be developed in conjunction with parent-teacher-
community associations, school officials and other
interest groups, it could very well be said that it will be in
line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners. By
imposing such a condition, it becomes apparent that the
petitioners' contention that Section 14 violates Article XV,
Section 3(1) of the Constitution is without merit.254
While the Court notes the possibility that educators might
raise their objection to their participation in the
reproductive health education program provided under
Section 14 of the RH Law on the ground that the same
violates their religious beliefs, the Court reserves its
judgment should an actual case be filed before it.
6 - Due Process
The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from
vagueness and, thus violates the due process clause of
the Constitution. According to them, Section 23 (a)(l)
mentions a "private health service provider" among those
who may be held punishable but does not define who is
a "private health care service provider." They argue that
confusion further results since Section 7 only makes
reference to a "private health care institution."
The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the
assailed legislation exempts hospitals operated by
religious groups from rendering reproductive health
service and modern family planning methods. It is
unclear, however, if these institutions are also exempt
from giving reproductive health information under
Section 23(a)(l), or from rendering reproductive health
procedures under Section 23(a)(2).
Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the
withholding, restricting and providing of incorrect
information, but at the same time fails to define "incorrect
information."
The arguments fail to persuade.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness
when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning
and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the
Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process
for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2)
it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying
out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.255 Moreover, in determining whether
the words used in a statute are vague, words must not
only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning
alone, but also in relation to other parts of the statute. It
is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted
with reference to the context, that is, every part of it must
be construed together with the other parts and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment.256
As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the
definition of "private health care service provider,"
reference must be made to Section 4(n) of the RH Law
which defines a "public health service provider," viz:
(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1)
public health care institution, which is duly licensed and
accredited and devoted primarily to the maintenance and
operation of facilities for health promotion, disease
prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care of individuals
suffering from illness, disease, injury, disability or
deformity, or in need of obstetrical or other medical and
nursing care; (2) public health care professional, who is a
doctor of medicine, a nurse or a midvvife; (3) public
health worker engaged in the delivery of health care
services; or (4) barangay health worker who has
undergone training programs under any accredited
government and NGO and who voluntarily renders
primarily health care services in the community after
having been accredited to function as such by the local
health board in accordance with the guidelines
promulgated by the Department of Health (DOH) .
Further, the use of the term "private health care
institution" in Section 7 of the law, instead of "private
health care service provider," should not be a cause of
confusion for the obvious reason that they are used
synonymously.
The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the
right to be exempt from being obligated to render
reproductive health service and modem family planning
methods, includes exemption from being obligated to
give reproductive health information and to render
reproductive health procedures. Clearly, subject to the
qualifications and exemptions earlier discussed, the right
to be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive
health service and modem family planning methods,
necessarily includes exemption from being obligated to
give reproductive health information and to render
reproductive health procedures. The terms "service" and
"methods" are broad enough to include the providing of
information and the rendering of medical procedures.
The same can be said with respect to the contention that
the RH Law punishes health care service providers who
intentionally withhold, restrict and provide incorrect
information regarding reproductive health programs and
services. For ready reference, the assailed provision is
hereby quoted as follows:
SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are
prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or
private, who shall:
(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the
dissemination thereof, and/ or intentionally provide
incorrect information regarding programs and services
on reproductive health including the right to informed
choice and access to a full range of legal, medically-safe,
non-abortifacient and effective family planning methods;
From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here
denotes failing to agree with a copy or model or with
established rules; inaccurate, faulty; failing to agree with
the requirements of duty, morality or propriety; and failing
to coincide with the truth. 257 On the other hand, the word
"knowingly" means with awareness or deliberateness
that is intentional.258 Used together in relation to Section
23(a)(l), they connote a sense of malice and ill motive to
mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and
effect of programs and services on reproductive health.
Public health and safety demand that health care service
providers give their honest and correct medical
information in accordance with what is acceptable in
medical practice. While health care service providers are
not barred from expressing their own personal opinions
regarding the programs and services on reproductive
health, their right must be tempered with the need to
provide public health and safety. The public deserves no
less.
7-Egual Protection
The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the
equal protection clause under the Constitution as it
discriminates against the poor because it makes them
the primary target of the government program that
promotes contraceptive use . They argue that, rather
than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the
RH Law introduces contraceptives that would effectively
reduce the number of the poor. Their bases are the
various provisions in the RH Law dealing with the poor,
especially those mentioned in the guiding
principles259 and definition of terms260 of the law.
They add that the exclusion of private educational
institutions from the mandatory reproductive health
education program imposed by the RH Law renders it
unconstitutional.
In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission,261 the Court
had the occasion to expound on the concept of equal
protection. Thus:
One of the basic principles on which this government
was founded is that of the equality of right which is
embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is
embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair
discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair
play. It has been embodied in a separate clause,
however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against
any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the
government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged
on the basis of the due process clause. But if the
particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted
partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down
is the equal protection clause.
"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection
simply requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed." It "requires
public bodies and inst itutions to treat similarly situated
individuals in a similar manner." "The purpose of the
equal protection clause is to secure every person within
a state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms
of a statue or by its improper execution through the
state's duly constituted authorities." "In other words, the
concept of equal justice under the law requires the state
to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions
between individuals solely on differences that are
irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective."
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state
actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions
cover all the departments of the government including
the political and executive departments, and extend to all
actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws,
through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.
It, however, does not require the universal application of
the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What
it simply requires is equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification. Indeed,
the equal protection clause permits classification. Such
classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The
classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is
germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all
members of the same class. "Superficial differences do
not make for a valid classification."
For a classification to meet the requirements of
constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons
who naturally belong to the class. "The classification will
be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are
not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and
obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the
classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the
sense that the members of the class should possess the
same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial
similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all
those covered by the classification are to be treated
equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a
class differs from the other members, as long as that
class is substantially distinguishable from all others, does
not justify the non-application of the law to him."
The classification must not be based on existing
circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude
addition to the number included in the class. It must be of
such a nature as to embrace all those who may
thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It
must not leave out or "underinclude" those that should
otherwise fall into a certain classification. [Emphases
supplied; citations excluded]
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the
government's reproductive health care program is not a
violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is
pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution
which recognizes the distinct necessity to address the
needs of the underprivileged by providing that they be
given priority in addressing the health development of
the people. Thus:
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and
comprehensive approach to health development which
shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and
other social services available to all the people at
affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of
the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and
children. The State shall endeavor to provide free
medical care to paupers.
It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law
prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are
suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children.
There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the
RH Law only seeks to target the poor to reduce their
number. While the RH Law admits the use of
contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above,
sanction abortion. As Section 3(1) explains, the
"promotion and/or stabilization of the population growth
rate is incidental to the advancement of reproductive
health."
Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of
children a couple may have and does not impose
conditions upon couples who intend to have children.
While the petitioners surmise that the assailed law seeks
to charge couples with the duty to have children only if
they would raise them in a truly humane way, a deeper
look into its provisions shows that what the law seeks to
do is to simply provide priority to the poor in the
implementation of government programs to promote
basic reproductive health care.
With respect to the exclusion of private educational
institutions from the mandatory reproductive health
education program under Section 14, suffice it to state
that the mere fact that the children of those who are less
fortunate attend public educational institutions does not
amount to substantial distinction sufficient to annul the
assailed provision. On the other hand, substantial
distinction rests between public educational institutions
and private educational institutions, particularly because
there is a need to recognize the academic freedom of
private educational institutions especially with respect to
religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity
towards the teaching of reproductive health education.
8-Involuntary Servitude
The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is
constitutionally infirm as it violates the constitutional
prohibition against involuntary servitude. They posit that
Section 17 of the assailed legislation requiring private
and non-government health care service providers to
render forty-eight (48) hours of pro bono reproductive
health services, actually amounts to involuntary servitude
because it requires medical practitioners to perform acts
against their will.262
The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono
services envisioned in Section 17 can hardly be
considered as forced labor analogous to slavery, as
reproductive health care service providers have the
discretion as to the manner and time of giving pro bono
services. Moreover, the OSG points out that the
imposition is within the powers of the government, the
accreditation of medical practitioners with PhilHealth
being a privilege and not a right.
The point of the OSG is well-taken.
It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine
is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both a
power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in
order to protect and promote the public welfare. Like the
legal profession, the practice of medicine is not a right
but a privileged burdened with conditions as it directly
involves the very lives of the people. A fortiori, this power
includes the power of Congress263 to prescribe the
qualifications for the practice of professions or trades
which affect the public welfare, the public health, the
public morals, and the public safety; and to regulate or
control such professions or trades, even to the point of
revoking such right altogether.264
Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of
involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force,
threats, intimidation or other similar means of coercion
and compulsion.265 A reading of the assailed provision,
however, reveals that it only encourages private and
non- government reproductive healthcare service
providers to render pro bono service. Other than non-
accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed
should they choose to do otherwise. Private and non-
government reproductive healthcare service providers
also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health
service they wish to provide, when, where and how to
provide it or whether to provide it all. Clearly, therefore,
no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to
render pro bono service against their will. While the
rendering of such service was made a prerequisite to
accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not
consider the same to be an unreasonable burden, but
rather, a necessary incentive imposed by Congress in
the furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest.
Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed,
however, it should be emphasized that conscientious
objectors are exempt from this provision as long as their
religious beliefs and convictions do not allow them to
render reproductive health service, pro bona or
otherwise.
9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA
The petitioners likewise question the delegation by
Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether
or not a supply or product is to be included in the
Essential Drugs List (EDL).266
The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The
FDA does not only have the power but also the
competency to evaluate, register and cover health
services and methods. It is the only government entity
empowered to render such services and highly proficient
to do so. It should be understood that health services
and methods fall under the gamut of terms that are
associated with what is ordinarily understood as "health
products."
In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3 720, as
amended by R.A. No. 9711 reads:
SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is
hereby created an office to be called the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) in the Department of Health (DOH).
Said Administration shall be under the Office of the
Secretary and shall have the following functions, powers
and duties:
"(a) To administer the effective implementation of
this Act and of the rules and regulations issued
pursuant to the same;
"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the
collection of samples of health products;
"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in
connection with the implementation of this Act;
"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis
for the preparation of health products standards,
and to recommend standards of identity, purity,
safety, efficacy, quality and fill of container;
"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with
technical requirements to serve as basis for the
issuance of appropriate authorization and spot-
check for compliance with regulations regarding
operation of manufacturers, importers, exporters,
distributors, wholesalers, drug outlets, and other
establishments and facilities of health products,
as determined by the FDA;
"x x x
"(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all
applicable health products prior to the issuance
of appropriate authorizations to ensure safety,
efficacy, purity, and quality;
"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders,
distributors, importers, exporters, wholesalers,
retailers, consumers, and non-consumer users of
health products to report to the FDA any incident
that reasonably indicates that said product has
caused or contributed to the death, serious
illness or serious injury to a consumer, a patient,
or any person;
"(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio
or upon verified complaint for health products,
whether or not registered with the FDA Provided,
That for registered health products, the cease
and desist order is valid for thirty (30) days and
may be extended for sixty ( 60) days only after
due process has been observed;
"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall,
and/or withdrawal of any health product found to
have caused death, serious illness or serious
injury to a consumer or patient, or is found to be
imminently injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or
grossly deceptive, and to require all concerned to
implement the risk management plan which is a
requirement for the issuance of the appropriate
authorization;
x x x.
As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers
and duties of the FDA are specific to enable the agency
to carry out the mandates of the law. Being the country's
premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety of food
and medicines available to the public, the FDA was
equipped with the necessary powers and functions to
make it effective. Pursuant to the principle of necessary
implication, the mandate by Congress to the FDA to
ensure public health and safety by permitting only food
and medicines that are safe includes "service" and
"methods." From the declared policy of the RH Law, it is
clear that Congress intended that the public be given
only those medicines that are proven medically safe,
legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with
scientific and evidence-based medical research
standards. The philosophy behind the permitted
delegation was explained in Echagaray v. Secretary of
Justice,267 as follows:
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the
government and the growing inability of the legislature to
cope directly with the many problems demanding its
attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities
and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the
legislature cannot be expected reasonably to
comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has
become necessary. To many of the problems attendant
upon present day undertakings, the legislature may not
have the competence, let alone the interest and the time,
to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say
specific solutions.
10- Autonomy of Local Governments and the
Autonomous Region
of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners
claim that the RH Law infringes upon the powers
devolved to local government units (LGUs) under
Section 17 of the Local Government Code. Said Section
17 vested upon the LGUs the duties and functions
pertaining to the delivery of basic services and facilities,
as follows:
SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. –
(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be
self-reliant and shall continue exercising the
powers and discharging the duties and functions
currently vested upon them. They shall also
discharge the functions and responsibilities of
national agencies and offices devolved to them
pursuant to this Code. Local government units
shall likewise exercise such other powers and
discharge such other functions and
responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or
incidental to efficient and effective provision of
the basic services and facilities enumerated
herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but
are not limited to, x x x.
While the aforementioned provision charges the
LGUs to take on the functions and
responsibilities that have already been devolved
upon them from the national agencies on the
aspect of providing for basic services and
facilities in their respective jurisdictions,
paragraph (c) of the same provision provides a
categorical exception of cases involving
nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs
and services.268 Thus:
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection
(b) hereof, public works and infrastructure
projects and other facilities, programs and
services funded by the National Government
under the annual General Appropriations Act,
other special laws, pertinent executive orders,
and those wholly or partially funded from foreign
sources, are not covered under this Section,
except in those cases where the local
government unit concerned is duly designated as
the implementing agency for such projects,
facilities, programs and services. [Emphases
supplied]
The essence of this express reservation of power by the
national government is that, unless an LGU is particularly
designated as the implementing agency, it has no power
over a program for which funding has been provided by
the national government under the annual general
appropriations act, even if the program involves the
delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the
LGU.269 A complete relinquishment of central government
powers on the matter of providing basic facilities and
services cannot be implied as the Local Government
Code itself weighs against it.270
In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that
whether it pertains to the establishment of health care
facilities,271 the hiring of skilled health professionals,272 or
the training of barangay health workers,273 it will be the
national government that will provide for the funding of its
implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The
national government still has the say when it comes to
national priority programs which the local government is
called upon to implement like the RH Law.
Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG
Us are merely encouraged to provide these services.
There is nothing in the wording of the law which can be
construed as making the availability of these services
mandatory for the LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be
said that the RH Law amounts to an undue
encroachment by the national government upon the
autonomy enjoyed by the local governments.
The ARMM
The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the
autonomy of local governments can be equally applied to
the ARMM. The RH Law does not infringe upon its
autonomy. Moreover, Article III, Sections 6, 10 and 11 of
R.A. No. 9054, or the organic act of the ARMM, alluded
to by petitioner Tillah to justify the exemption of the
operation of the RH Law in the autonomous region, refer
to the policy statements for the guidance of the regional
government. These provisions relied upon by the
petitioners simply delineate the powers that may be
exercised by the regional government, which can, in no
manner, be characterized as an abdication by the State
of its power to enact legislation that would benefit the
general welfare. After all, despite the veritable autonomy
granted the ARMM, the Constitution and the supporting
jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion of
imperium et imperio in the relationship between the
national and the regional governments.274 Except for the
express and implied limitations imposed on it by the
Constitution, Congress cannot be restricted to exercise
its inherent and plenary power to legislate on all subjects
which extends to all matters of general concern or
common interest.275
11 - Natural Law
With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates
natural law,276 suffice it to say that the Court does not duly
recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating
a law. Our only guidepost is the Constitution. While every
law enacted by man emanated from what is perceived as
natural law, the Court is not obliged to see if a statute,
executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it. To
begin with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate
body. Moreover, natural laws are mere thoughts and
notions on inherent rights espoused by theorists,
philosophers and theologists. The jurists of the
philosophical school are interested in the law as an
abstraction, rather than in the actual law of the past or
present.277 Unless, a natural right has been transformed
into a written law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike
down a law. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,278 the very
case cited by the petitioners, it was explained that the
Court is not duty-bound to examine every law or action
and whether it conforms with both the Constitution and
natural law. Rather, natural law is to be used sparingly
only in the most peculiar of circumstances involving
rights inherent to man where no law is applicable.279
At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not
sanction the taking away of life. It does not allow abortion
in any shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the
population control program of the government by
providing information and making non-abortifacient
contraceptives more readily available to the public,
especially to the poor.
Facts and Fallacies
and the Wisdom of the Law
In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as
unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to
medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal,
affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare services,
methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier pointed out,
however, the religious freedom of some sectors of
society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of what the
law hopes to achieve. After all, the Constitutional
safeguard to religious freedom is a recognition that man
stands accountable to an authority higher than the State.
In conformity with the principle of separation of Church
and State, one religious group cannot be allowed to
impose its beliefs on the rest of the society. Philippine
modem society leaves enough room for diversity and
pluralism. As such, everyone should be tolerant and
open-minded so that peace and harmony may continue
to reign as we exist alongside each other.
As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the
idea does not escape the Court that what it seeks to
address is the problem of rising poverty and
unemployment in the country. Let it be said that the
cause of these perennial issues is not the large
population but the unequal distribution of wealth. Even if
population growth is controlled, poverty will remain as
long as the country's wealth remains in the hands of the
very few.
At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for
the country in the long run. The European and Asian
countries, which embarked on such a program
generations ago , are now burdened with ageing
populations. The number of their young workers is
dwindling with adverse effects on their economy. These
young workers represent a significant human capital
which could have helped them invigorate, innovate and
fuel their economy. These countries are now trying to
reverse their programs, but they are still struggling. For
one, Singapore, even with incentives, is failing.
And in this country, the economy is being propped up by
remittances from our Overseas Filipino Workers. This is
because we have an ample supply of young able-bodied
workers. What would happen if the country would be
weighed down by an ageing population and the fewer
younger generation would not be able to support them?
This would be the situation when our total fertility rate
would go down below the replacement level of two (2)
children per woman.280
Indeed, at the present, the country has a population
problem, but the State should not use coercive measures
(like the penal provisions of the RH Law against
conscientious objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless, the
policy of the Court is non-interference in the wisdom of a
law.
x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the
legislature has laid down. Its duty is to say what the law
is as enacted by the lawmaking body. That is not the
same as saying what the law should be or what is the
correct rule in a given set of circumstances. It is not the
province of the judiciary to look into the wisdom of the
law nor to question the policies adopted by the legislative
branch. Nor is it the business of this Tribunal to remedy
every unjust situation that may arise from the application
of a particular law. It is for the legislature to enact
remedial legislation if that would be necessary in the
premises. But as always, with apt judicial caution and
cold neutrality, the Court must carry out the delicate
function of interpreting the law, guided by the
Constitution and existing legislation and mindful of
settled jurisprudence. The Court's function is therefore
limited, and accordingly, must confine itself to the judicial
task of saying what the law is, as enacted by the
lawmaking body.281
Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a
mere compilation and enhancement of the prior existing
contraceptive and reproductive health laws, but with
coercive measures. Even if the Court decrees the RH
Law as entirely unconstitutional, there will still be the
Population Act (R.A. No. 6365), the Contraceptive Act
(R.A. No. 4729) and the reproductive health for women
or The Magna Carta of Women (R.A. No. 9710), sans
the coercive provisions of the assailed legislation. All the
same, the principle of "no-abortion" and "non-coercion" in
the adoption of any family planning method should be
maintained.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the
following provisions which are declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in
the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private
health facilities and non-maternity specialty
hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a
religious group to refer patients, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined
under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health
facility which is conveniently accessible; and b)
allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered
a miscarriage access to modem methods of
family planning without written consent from their
parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding
provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5
.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any
healthcare service provider who fails and or
refuses to disseminate information regarding
 programs and services on reproductive health
regardless of his or her religious beliefs. With Separate
concurring opinion See: Separate
TERESITA J. Concurring Opinion
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding
LEONARDO-DE ARTURO D. BRION
provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a
CASTRO Associate Justice
married individual, not in an emergency or life-
Associate Justice
threatening case, as defined under Republic Act
No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health
procedures without the consent of the spouse; DIOSDADO M. LUCAS P.
PERALTA BERSAMIN
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding Associate Justice Associate Justice
provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the
requirement of parental consent only to elective See Concurring and
surgical procedures. See Concurring
dissenting
Opinion
MARIANO C. DEL
ROBERTO A. ABAD
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding CASTILLO
Associate Justice
provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 Associate Justice
thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare
service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer MARTIN S. JOSE PORTUGAL
a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening VILLARAMA, JR. PEREZ
case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to Associate Justice Associate Justice
another health care service provider within the
same facility or one which is conveniently
accessible regardless of his or her religious See concurring and See Concurring and
beliefs; dissenting Dissenting Opinion
BIENVENIDO L. ESTELA M.
REYES PERLAS-BERNABE
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision
Associate Justice Associate Justice
in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof,
insofar as they punish any public officer who
refuses to support reproductive health programs See Separate dissent
or shall do any act that hinders the full MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
implementation of a reproductive health program, Associate Justice
regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
CERTIFICATION
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n
in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro
bona reproductive health service in so far as they Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I
affect the conscientious objector in securing hereby certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
PhilHealth accreditation; and had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-
IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as Chief Justice
they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void
for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and
violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on

March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order, dated July 16,
2013 , is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of
R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein declared as
constitutional.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

Tingnan ang aking opinyong

Sumasang-ayon at Sumasalungat
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

See Concurring
Opinion PRESBITERO J.
ANTONIO T. VELASCO, JR.
CARPIO Associate Justice
Associate Justice