Avsec Basic

Aviation Security Basic
Handout Restricted
Page 1 of 252
Trainee Reference Book
Aviation Security Basic (AVSEC Basic)

Course
For Restricted Circulation

Published by
Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS)
Issue Date: 21 February 2019
AVSEC BASIC Handout/2019 Restricted

Handout Restricted
Page 2 of 252
PREFACE
Civil aviation is a powerful force for progress in our modern global society. A healthy and growing air
transport system creates and supports millions of jobs worldwide. It forms part of the economic lifeline
of many countries. It is a catalyst for travel and tourism and the world's largest industry. Beyond
economics, air transport enriches the social and cultural fabric of society.
In recent years the aviation industry has seen the emergence of world-wide attacks against the safety
and security of the travelling public, airports, aircraft and other persons working within the aviation
industry on and off airport and air navigation facilities.
The counter-measures to these acts against civil aviation can be effective only as long as the
people responsible for protecting civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference receive appropriate
training to carry out their jobs efficiently and effectively.
This Trainee Reference Book has been developed by The Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS), to
enable trainees to acquire the necessary knowledge and skills to be better able to implement Aviation
Security preventive measures. This is in accordance with the appropriate National Civil Aviation
Security Program, Airport / Airline Security Programs and Aviation Security Standards and Recommended
Practices prescribed by ICAO.

Handout Restricted
Page 3 of 252
AVIATION SECURITY TRAINING PROGRAMME
International Legislations
Annex – 17
Standard3.1.7: Each Contracting State shall require the appropriate authority to
ensure the development and implementation of a national training programme for
personnel of all entities involved with or responsible for the implementation of
various aspects of the national civil aviation security programme. This training
programme shall be designed to ensure the effectiveness of the national civil
aviation security programme.
Standard 3.1.8: Each Contracting State shall ensure the development and
implementation of training programmes and an instructor certification system in
accordance with the national civil aviation security programme
Standard 3.4.2: Each Contracting State shall ensure that the persons implementing
security controls possess all competencies required to perform their duties and are
appropriately trained according to the requirements of the national civil aviation
security programme and that appropriate records are maintained up to date.
Relevant standards of performance shall be established and initial and periodic
assessments shall be introduced to maintain those standards.
Standard 3.4.3 Each Contracting State shall ensure that the persons carrying out
screening operations are certified according to the requirements of the national
civil aviation security programme to ensure that performance standards are
consistently and are reliably achieved.
National Legislations
Aviation Security Order / Circular
Order 1 / 2018 The objective of the National Civil Aviation Security

Programme (NCASP) is to safeguard Civil aviation
operations against acts of unlawful interference through
regulations, practices and procedures which take account
of the safety regularly and efficiency of flights.
Order 2/2018 In exercise of powers conferred by Section SA of the Aircraft

Act, 1934 (XXII of 1934), read with rule 3 (b) of the Aircraft
(Security) Rules, 2011 Director General, Bureau of Civil
Aviation Security, for the purpose of the safety of passengers,
crew, ground personnel and the general public in all matters
relating to safeguarding against acts of unlawful interference
with civil aviation" directs that the National Civil Aviation
Security Training Programme (NCASTP) which has been

Handout Restricted
Page 4 of 252
reviewed and updated to comply with Standards of Annex-17

and security related provisions of Annex-9 to the Convention
on International Civil Aviation, shall be implemented by all
agencies connected with aviation security in India.
Aviation Security Training Package (ASTP)
The Aviation Security Basic Training is based on the Aviation Security Training
Package (ASTP) issued by International Civil Aviation Organization

Handout Restricted
Page 5 of 252
AVIATION SECURITY BASIC TRAINING PROGRAM
LIST OF MODULES
Module
Subject Page Number
No.
1 Opening Activities, Course Introduction And Administration
Abbreviation/ Acts & Rule/ Roles of Various Agencies
2 Overview of International civil aviation security
3 Working at the Airport0
4 Access Control-People
5 Access Control-Vehicle
6 Landside security
7 Recognition of Explosive Devices & other prohibited articles
8 Building and Area Search Procedure
9 Patrolling and Guarding
10 Screening & searching of passenger and baggage
11 Conventional X-ray
12 Protection of parked aircraft
13 Physical inspection of baggage
14 Carriage of Arms & Ammunition by Air
15 Emergencies & Contingencies
16 Escorting People & Consignment
17 Protecting aircraft catering uplift
18 Protecting cargo, Mail & Courier
19 Behavior –Detection
20 Insider Threat
21 Cyber Security
22 Profiling
passengerconditionPassenger Profiling and Security

Handout Restricted
Page 6 of 252
Module-1 Introduction to the Course
Module Objective
 To understand the course objective, structure and methodology

 To understand the Terminologies related to Aviation Security and Vital Installations
 Act and rules related to AVSEC
 To learn about the organisations involved in Aviation security and of the applicable
legislation followed for Civil Aviation
 Need for Security Awareness
Teaching Methods
 Slide Presentations
 Lectures by certified instructors
 Group discussions
 Demonstrations
 Role- playing and practical exercises
 Site visits to the Airport
 Tests and Homework
 Overnight reading Assignments
 Progress Tests
 Mastery Test ( Written and Practical )
Course Objective:
After completion of this course, the trainees will be able to:

 Understand the nature of the threats to civil aviation;
 Understand civil aviation from an international, regional and national perspective
 Work in and move around an airport safely;
 Communicate and cooperate with other airport agencies;
 Carry out access control duties to control the movement of people and vehicles ;
 Guard and patrol airport operational facilities, vulnerable areas, and aircraft;
 Recognize ‘Prohibited Articles’ including weapons and explosive and incendiary devices;
 Understand the concepts of screening and searching passengers and baggage; and

Handout Restricted
Page 7 of 252
 Respond to security incidents or airport emergencies.
Terminologies Related To AVSEC and Vital Installations at Airport
Terms that are defined in the I C A O A v i a t i o n S e c u r i t y M a n u a l (Doc

8973) and the Annexes are used in accordance with the meanings and
usages given therein. A wide variety of terms are in use throughout the
world to describe facilities, procedures and concepts for airport operations
and planning. As far as possible, the terms used in this document are those
which have the widest international use.
Accompanied hold baggage: Baggage which is accepted for carriage in the hold of an aircraft
and which is checked in by the passenger who is on board.
Acts of unlawful interference. These are acts or attempted acts such as to jeopardize the safety
of civil aviation, including but not limited to:
• unlawful seizure of aircraft
• destruction of an aircraft in service,
• hostage-taking on board aircraft or on aerodromes,
• forcible intrusion on board an aircraft, at an airport or on the premises of an aeronautical

facility,
• introduction on board an aircraft or at an airport of a weapon or hazardous device or
material intended for criminal purposes,
• use of an aircraft in service for the purpose of causing death, serious bodily injury, or
serious damage to property or the environment,
• communication of false information such as to jeopardize the safety of an aircraft in flight
or on the ground, of passengers, crew, ground personnel or the general public, at an
airport or on the premises of a civil aviation facility.
Aerodrome Entry Permit (AEP). The photo identity card, smart card or temporary permit issued
by the Director General, BCAS, Ministry of Civil Aviation or any person authorized by the Central
Government for entry into the aerodrome or part of an aerodrome. (Ref. rule 2(c) of The
Aircraft (Security) Rules, 2011).
Aerodrome: Any definite or limited ground or water area intended to used, either wholly or in
part, for the landing or departure of aircraft, and includes all buildings, sheds, vessels, piers and
other structures thereon appertaining thereto.
Aerodrome Operator: A person, organization or enterprise responsible for operation and

management of an aerodrome
Aircraft: Any machine that can derive support in the atmosphere from the reactions of the air
other than the reactions of the air against the earth’s surface.

Handout Restricted
Page 8 of 252
Aircraft in flight: An aircraft from the moment when all its external doors are closed following
embarkation until the moment when such doors are opened for disembarkation.
Aircraft in service: An aircraft shall be considered to be “in service” from the beginning of the
pre-flight preparation of the aircraft by ground personnel or by the crew for a specific flight
until twenty-four hours after any landing and in the case of a forced landing, the flight shall be
deemed to continue until the competent authorities take over the responsibility for the aircraft
and for persons and property on board.
Aircraft not in service: An aircraft that either is parked for a period of more than 12 hours or is
not under surveillance sufficient to detect unauthorized access.
Aircraft security check: An inspection of the interior of an aircraft to which passengers may
have had access and an inspection of the hold for the purposes of discovering suspicious
objects, weapons, explosives or other dangerous devices, articles and substances.
Aircraft security search: A thorough inspection of the interior and exterior of the aircraft for
the purpose of discovering suspicious objects, weapons, explosives or other dangerous devices,
articles or substances.
Aircraft stand. A designated area on an apron intended to be used for parking an aircraft.
Airport. Any area in a Member State which is open for commercial aircraft operations
Airside: The movement area of an airport, adjacent terrain and buildings or portions thereof,
access to which is controlled.
Appropriate authority for aviation security: The authority designated by a State within its
administration to be responsible for the development, implementation and maintenance of
the national civil aviation security programme.
Apron: A defined area, on a land aerodrome, intended to accommodate aircraft for purposes of
loading or unloading passengers, mail or cargo, fuelling, parking or maintenance.
Annexure 17 (to the Chicago convention): Annex 17 to the Convention with the title “Standards
and Recommended Practices — Security — Safeguarding International Civil Aviation against
Acts of Unlawful Interference”.
Aviation Security Group. A unit of specialized Government agency authorized by the Director
General, BCAS to safeguard civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference and protection of
property at the aerodrome handling civil aviation. (also see rule 13 of the Aircraft (Security)
Rules, 2011)
Apron passenger vehicle. Any vehicle used to convey passengers between aircraft and
passenger buildings

Handout Restricted
Page 9 of 252
Background check: A check of a person’s identity and previous experience, including, where
legally permissible, any criminal history, as part of the assessment of an individual’s
suitability to implement a security control and/or for unescorted access to a security restricted
area.
Baggage: Personal property of passengers or crew carried on an aircraft by agreement with the
operator.
Baggage Breakup Area: The area where all the arrival passenger’s bags are delivered to them.
Baggage sorting area: Space in which departure baggage is sorted into flight loads. (The area is
also known as Baggage Makeup Area)
Baggage storage area: Space in which checked/hold baggage is stored pending transport to
aircraft and space in which mishandled baggage may be held until forwarded, claimed or
otherwise disposed of.
Behavior Detection Within an aviation security environment, the application of techniques

involving the recognition of behavioural characteristics, including but not limited to
physiological or gestural signs indicative of anomalous behaviour, to identify persons who may
pose a threat to civil aviation
Bomb alert: A status of alert put in place by competent authorities to activate an

intervention plan intended to counter the possible consequences arising from a communicated
threat, anonymous or otherwise, or arising from the discovery of a suspect device or other
suspect item on an aircraft, at an airport or in any civil aviation facilities.
Bomb threat: A communicated threat, anonymous or otherwise, which suggests, or infers,

whether true or false that the safety of an aircraft in flight or on the ground, or any airport or
civil aviation facility or any person may be in danger from an explosive or other item or device.
Cabin baggage: Baggage intended for carriage in the cabin of an aircraft.
Cargo: Any property carried on an aircraft other than mail, stores and accompanied or
mishandled baggage.
Cargo area. All the ground space and facilities provided for cargo handlings. It includes aprons,
cargo buildings and warehouses, vehicle parks and roads associated therewith.
Cargo building. A building through which cargo passes between air and ground transport and in
which processing facilities are located, or in which cargo is stored pending transfer to air or
ground transport
Catering stores: All items, other than catering supplies, associated with passenger in-flight
services, for example newspapers, magazines, headphones, audio and video tapes, pillows and
blankets, and amenity kits.
Catering supplies: Food, beverages, other dry stores and associated equipment used on board an

Handout Restricted
Page 10 of 252
aircraft. Note: Stores (Supplies).

a. For consumption - Goods, whether or not sold, intended for consumption by the
passengers and the crew on board an aircraft, and goods necessary for the operation
and maintenance of the aircraft, including fuel and lubricants.
b. To be taken away - Goods for sale to passengers and crew of an aircraft with a view to be
taken away on landing.
Certification. A formal evaluation and confirmation by or on behalf of the appropriate

authority for aviation security that a person possesses the necessary competencies to
perform assigned functions to an acceptable level as defined by the appropriate authority
Check-in: The process of reporting to an aircraft operator for acceptance on a particular flight.
Co-mail: Abbreviation of aircraft operator company mail, shipped within the company’s
network of stations.
Co-mat: Abbreviation of aircraft operator company materials, shipped within the company’s
network of stations.
Contingency plan: A “proactive” plan to include measures and procedures addressing various
threat levels, risk assessments and the associated security measures to be implemented,
designed in order to anticipate as well as prepare all concerned parties having roles and
responsibilities in the event of an actual act of unlawful interference.
Convention. The convention relating to International Civil Aviation signed at Chicago on the 7th
day of December, 1944
Corporate aviation: The non-commercial operation or use of aircraft by a company for the
carriage of passengers or goods as an aid to the conduct of company business, flown by a
professional pilot employed to fly the aircraft.
(Note that corporate aviation is a subset of general aviation.)
Courier service: An operation whereby shipments tendered by one or more shippers are
transported as the baggage of a courier passenger on board a scheduled aircraft operator
service under normal passenger hold baggage documentation.
Crew member: A person assigned by an operator to duty on an aircraft during a flight duty
period.
Crisis management: Contingency measures implemented in response to increased threat levels

as well as implementation of measures and procedures in response to the emergencies to
include acts of unlawful interference.
Dangerous goods: Articles or substances which are capable of posing a risk to health, safety,
property or the environment and which are shown in the list of dangerous goods in the
Technical Instructions or which are classified according to those Instructions.

Handout Restricted
Page 11 of 252
Deportee: A person who had legally been admitted to a State by its authorities or who had
entered a State illegally, and who at some later time is formally ordered by the competent
authorities to leave that State. Note. — The competent authorities may provide an escort for
such persons.
Diplomatic pouch (bag): A shipping container having diplomatic immunity from search or seizure
when accompanied by the required official documentation.
Direct transit area. A special area established in an international airport, approved by the public
authorities concerned and under their direct supervision or control, where passengers can stay
during transit or transfer without applying for entry to the State.
Disruptive passenger: A passenger who fails to respect the rules of conduct at an airport or on
board an aircraft or to follow the instructions of the airport staff or crew members and
thereby disturbs the good order and discipline at an airport or on board the aircraft.
Emergency plan. A plan setting forth the procedures for coordinating the response of different
aerodrome agencies or services and of those agencies in the surrounding community that
could be of assistance in responding to an emergency.
Explosive Detection System (EDS). A technology system or combination of different

technologies which has the ability to detect, and so to indicate by means of an alarm, explosive
material contained in baggage or other articles, irrespective of the material from which the bag
is made.
Explosive Device Detection System (EDDS). A technology system or combination of different

technologies which has the ability to detect, and so to indicate by means of an alarm, an
explosive device by detecting one or more components of such a device contained in baggage
or other articles, irrespective of the material from which the bag or article is made.
Explosive substance. A solid or liquid substance (or a mixture of substances) which is in itself
capable, by chemical reaction, of producing gas at such a temperature and pressure and at
such a speed as to cause damage to the surroundings. Included are pyrotechnic substances
even when they do not evolve gases. A substance which is not itself an explosive but which can
form an explosive atmosphere of gas, vapour or dust is not included.
Express cargo. Goods other than mail and accompanied or baggage involuntarily or
inadvertently separated from passengers or crew which is required to be carried on priority
basis by an aircraft operator.
Facilitation. The efficient management of the necessary control process, with the objective of
expediting the clearance of persons or goods and preventing unnecessary operational delays.
Freight. See Cargo.
Gate-no Show: Passenger who has checked in (may have registered baggage), but not reported
for boarding.

Handout Restricted
Page 12 of 252
General aviation operation: An aircraft operation other than a commercial air transport
operation or an aerial work operation.
Hijacking (Acts of Unlawful seizure of Aircraft): Any person who on board an aircraft in flight: (i)
Unlawfully, by force or threat thereof, or by any other form of intimidation, seizes, or exercises
control of that aircraft, or attempts to perform any such act, or (ii) is an accomplice of a
person who performs or attempts to perform any such act, commits the offence of
hijacking that aircraft.
High-risk cargo or mail. Cargo or mail presented by an unknown entity or showing signs of
tampering shall be considered high risk if, in addition, it meets one of the following criteria:
a) specific intelligence indicates that the cargo or mail poses a threat to civil aviation; or
b) the cargo or mail shows anomalies that give rise to suspicion; or
c) the nature of the cargo or mail is such that baseline security measures alone are
unlikely to detect prohibited items that could endanger the aircraft.
Regardless of whether the cargo or mail comes from a known or unknown entity, a State’s
specific intelligence about a consignment may render it as high risk.
Human Factors principles. Principles which apply to design, certification, training, operations and
maintenance and which seek safe interface between the human and other system components
by proper consideration to human performance.
Human performance. Human capabilities and limitations which have an impact on the safety,
security and efficiency of aeronautical operations
Identification cards: See Permits.

Inadmissible person: A person who is or will be refused admission to a State by its
authorities. Such persons normally have to be transported back to their State of departure, or
to any other State where the persons are admissible, by the aircraft operator on which they
arrived. (See appropriate Standards in Annex 9 — Facilitation, Chapter 5.)
Interline Baggage: The baggage of passengers subjected to transfer from the aircraft of one operator
to the aircraft of another operator in the course of their journey.
Interline Passenger: Passenger who is transferred between aircraft of different air carriers
during the course of his journey.
In-flight security officer: A person who is authorized by the government of the State of the
Operator and the government of the State of registration to be deployed on an aircraft with
the purpose of protecting that aircraft and its occupants against acts of unlawful
interference. This excludes persons employed to provide exclusive personal protection for
one or more specific people travelling on the aircraft, such as personal bodyguards.
In-flight supplies. All items intended to be taken on board an aircraft for use, consumption or
purchase by passengers or crew during the flight, which typically include catering and cleaning
stores and supplies.
Handout Restricted
Page 13 of 252
Integrated/consolidated cargo. A consignment of multiple packages which has been originated

by more than one person, each of whom has made an agreement for carriage by air with
another person other than a scheduled aircraft operator.
Interline baggage: Baggage of passengers subject to transfer from the aircraft of one
operator to the aircraft of another operator in the course of the passenger’s journey.
Isolation Bay: A designated parking bay at the airport far away from the main passenger
terminal, exclusively designed for the purpose of parking the affected aircraft in order to
handle contingencies and other threat situations. Also known as Isolated Aircraft Parking
Position (IAPP)
LAGs: Liquids, aerosols and gels, in any volume, for sale at airport outlets (excluding food and
beverages for consumption in the airport premises and not intended for carriage into the
aircraft passenger cabin) or on board aircraft during the day(s) of the journey, either in the
airside area or in a security-restricted area.
Landside: Those parts of an airport, adjacent terrain and buildings or portions thereof that are
not airside, as identified by States and relevant entities in their security programmes.
Mail: Dispatches of correspondence and other items tendered by and intended for delivery
to postal services in accordance with the rules of the Universal Postal Union (UPU).
Mishandled baggage: Baggage involuntarily, or inadvertently, separated from passengers or

crew.
Movement area: That part of an aerodrome to be used for the take-off, landing and taxiing
of aircraft, consisting of the maneuvering area and the apron(s).
Non-restricted area: Areas of an airport to which the public have access or to which access is
otherwise unrestricted.
Off-airport processing facilities. A passenger or cargo transport link terminal at an urban

population centre at which processing facilities are provided.
Passenger area. All the ground space and facilities provided for passenger processing, including
aprons, passenger buildings, vehicle parks and roads.
Permits: A permit system consists of cards or other documentation issued to individual persons
employed on airports or who otherwise have need for authorized access to the airport, airside
or security restricted area. Its purpose is to identify the individual and facilitate access. Vehicle
permits are issued and used for similar purposes to allow vehicular access. Permits are
sometimes referred to as airport identity cards or passes.
Person with disabilities (with reduced mobility):Any person whose mobility is reduced due to a
physical incapacity (sensory or locomotor), an intellectual deficiency, age, illness or any other
cause of disability when using transport and whose situation needs special attention and
Handout Restricted
Page 14 of 252
the adaptation to the person’s needs of the services made available to all passengers.
Pier: A corridor at, above or below ground level to connect aircraft stands to a passenger
building
Pilot-in-command: The pilot designated by the operator, or in the case of general aviation, the
owner, as being in command and charged with the safe conduct of a flight.
Prohibited Items. A list of items i.e. weapons, explosives or other dangerous devices, articles or
substances which may be used to commit an act of unlawful interference with civil aviation
operations. Such list is established by the DG, BCAS based on a risk assessment
Regulated agent: An agent, freight forwarder or any other entity who conducts business with
an operator and provides security controls that are accepted or required by the appropriate
authority in respect of cargo, courier and express parcels or mail.
Restricted articles: Articles which are, in the specific context of aviation security, defined as
those articles, devices or substances which may be used to commit an act of unlawful
interference against civil aviation or which may endanger the safety of the aircraft and its
occupants, or installations and the public.
Sabotage: An act or omission, intended to cause malicious or wanton destruction of property,

endangering or resulting in unlawful interference with international civil aviation and its
facilities.
Screening: The application of technical or other means which are intended to identify
and/or detect weapons, explosives or other dangerous devices, articles or substances which
may be used to commit an act of unlawful interference.
Security / Aviation Security: Safeguarding civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference. This
objective is achieved by a combination of measures and human and material resources.
Security audit. An in-depth compliance examination of all aspects of the implementation of the
national civil aviation security programme.
Security accident. An occurrence which results in death or grievous hurt to a person or major
damage to the property.
Security checks for LAGs and STEBs. Visual checks or security controls, performed by security
staff, for signs of interference, in particular tampering with seals, theft and the introduction of
potentially dangerous devices, articles or substances. The checks should be made at the first
point of entry on the airside and should be made on all supplies of LAGs and STEBs to establish
that they have been protected, that there is no evidence or suspicion of tampering, and that
the necessary documentation is in order.
Security clearance. Compliance with the security controls specified in the National Civil Aviation
Security Programme with regard to any aircraft, entity, person or object. It is a status granted
to individuals or entities allowing them access to classified information, access to restricted
Handout Restricted
Page 15 of 252
areas or to conduct business after completion of a background check.
Security control. A means by which the introduction of weapons, explosives or other dangerous
devices, articles or substances which may be used to commit an act of unlawful interference
can be prevented.
Security equipment: Devices of a specialized nature for use, individually or as part of a

system, in the prevention or detection of acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation and its
facilities.
Security exercise. A full-scale security exercise is a simulated act of unlawful interference with
the objective of ensuring the adequacy of a contingency plan to cope with different types of
emergencies. A partial security exercise is a simulated act of unlawful interference with the
objective of ensuring the adequacy of the response to individual participating agencies and
components of the contingency plan, such as the communications system.
Security incident. An occurrence in relation to civil aviation security which takes place either
on the ground or in flight, which results in:
- in injury to a person, damage to property, fire and breakage;
- contravention or breach of security laws, regulations, national civil aviation security
programme and orders issued by the Central Government under the provisions of the
Aircraft Act, 1934.
Security inspection. An examination of the implementation of relevant National Civil Aviation

Security Programme requirements by an aircraft operator, airport or other entity involved in
security.
Security investigation. An inquiry into any act or attempted act of unlawful interference
against civil aviation and/or any alleged or suspected instance of non-compliance with a
State’s National Civil Aviation Security Programme or other legal and/or regulatory
requirements pertaining to civil aviation security.
Security programme. Written measures adopted to safeguard international civil aviation

against acts of unlawful interference.
Security restricted area. Those areas of the airside of an airport which are identified as priority
risk areas where in addition to access control, other security controls are applied. Such areas
will normally include, inter alia, all commercial aviation passenger departure areas between
the screening checkpoint and the aircraft, the ramp, baggage make-up areas, including those
where aircraft are being brought into service and screened baggage and cargo are present,
cargo sheds, mail centres, airside catering and aircraft cleaning premises.
Security survey. An evaluation of security needs including the identification of vulnerabilities

which could be exploited to carry out an act of unlawful interference, and the
recommendation of corrective actions.

Handout Restricted
Page 16 of 252
Security tamper-evident bags (STEBs). Specially designed bags that should only be used for the
sale of LAGs by airport outlets or on board an aircraft.
Security test. A covert or overt trial of an aviation security measure which simulates an
attempt to commit an unlawful act.
Sensitive Aviation Security Information. Information that, if accessed by or disclosed to

unauthorized persons, could create or be used to exploit a vulnerability or facilitate an act of
unlawful interference against civil aviation.
Service panel. Aircraft external access point used for providing aircraft services including
water, lavatories and ground electrical outlets, and other service compartments that have
external clip-down panels.
Small arms. A general description applied to all hand-held firearms.
State of Registry. The State on whose register the aircraft is entered. (See also the definition in
Annex 6.)
State of the Operator. The State in which the operator’s principal place of business is located
or, if there is no such place of business, the operator’s permanent residence.
Sterile area. The area between any passenger inspection or screening checkpoint and aircraft,
into which access is strictly controlled (see also security restricted area.)
Stores (Supplies).
- For consumption - Goods, whether or not sold, intended for consumption by the
passengers and the crew on board an aircraft, and goods necessary for the operation and
maintenance of the aircraft, including fuel and lubricants.
- To be taken away - Goods for sale to passengers and crew of an aircraft with a view to be
taken away on landing.
Terminal: The main building or group of buildings where the processing of commercial
passengers and freight and the boarding of aircraft occurs.
Threat Image Projection (TIP). A software programme approved by the appropriate authority
that can be installed on certain X-ray equipment, which projects virtual images of threat
articles such as guns, knives, and improvised explosive devices within the X-ray image of a real
bag under examination or complete virtual images of bags containing threat articles, and
provides immediate feedback to the X-ray equipment operators of their ability to detect such
images.
Trace detection equipment. A technology system or combination of different technologies

which has the ability to detect very small amounts of explosive materials, and so to indicate, by
means of an alarm, any such materials contained in baggage or other articles subjected for
analysis.
Handout Restricted
Page 17 of 252
Transfer cargo and mail. Cargo and mail departing on an aircraft other than that on which it
arrived of the same operator.
Transfer passengers/baggage: Passengers/baggage making direct connections between two

different flights.
Transit cargo and mail. Cargo and mail departing on the same aircraft as that on which it
arrived.
Transit passengers/Baggage: Passengers/Baggage departing from an airport on the same flight as

that on which they arrived.
Travel document: A passport or other official document of identity issued by a State or

organization which may be used by the rightful holder for international travel.
Unaccompanied baggage: Baggage that is transported as cargo and may or may not be
carried on the same aircraft with the person to whom it belongs.
Unclaimed baggage: Baggage that arrives at an airport and is not picked up or claimed by a
passenger.
Unidentified/Unattended baggage. Baggage at an airport, with or without a baggage tag,

which is not picked up by or identified with a passenger.
Unpredictability. The implementation of security measures in order to increase their deterrent

effect and their efficiency, by applying them at irregular frequencies, different locations and/or
with varying means, in accordance with a defined framework.
Unruly passengers: Persons who commit on board a civil aircraft, from the moment when the
aircraft door is closed prior to take-off to the moment when it is reopened after landing, an act
of:
• assault, intimidation, menace or wilful recklessness which endangers good order or
the safety of property or persons;
• assault, intimidation, menace or interference with a crew member in the
performance of duties or which lessens the ability to perform duties;
• wilful recklessness or damage to an aircraft, its equipment, or attendant structures
and equipment such as to endanger good order and safety of the aircraft or its
occupants;
• communication of information which is known to be false, thereby endangering the
safety of an aircraft in flight;
• Disobedience of lawful commands or instructions for safe, orderly or efficient operations.
Vehicle Entry Permit. Vehicle permits issued and used to allow vehicular access to restricted
areas of the airports.

Handout Restricted
Page 18 of 252
Vital installation. Any facility on or connected with an aerodrome, which, if damaged or

destroyed, would seriously impair the functioning of the aerodrome.
Vulnerable point: Any facility on or connected with an airport, which, if damaged or

destroyed, would seriously impair the functioning of the airport. Example ATC, Fuel storage
area etc

Handout Restricted
Page 19 of 252
ABBREVIATIONS
1. AAI - Airports Authority of India
2. AC – Aerodrome Committee
3. ACCR - Aerodrome Committee Control Room
4. ACI - Airport Council International
5. ADP – Airfield Driving Permit

6. AEP - Aerodrome Entry Permit
7. ASC - Airport Security Committee
8. ASG - Aviation Security Group
9. ASTI – Aviation Security Training Institute
10. ASTP - Aviation Security Training Package

11. ATS – Air Traffic Services
12. AWB – Air Way Bill
13. AVSEC – Aviation Security
14. BBA – Baggage Break-up Area
15. BCAS - Bureau of Civil Aviation Security
16. BDDS - Bomb Detection and Disposal Squad
17. BSA /BMA – Baggage Sorting Area/ Baggage Make-up Area
18. BTAC - Bomb Threat Assessment Committee
19. BTCP - Bomb Threat Contingency Plan
20. BTL - Baggage Tally List
21. BTRC- Bomb Threat Review Committee

22. BWAF - Bomb Warning Assessment Form
23. CASO - Chief Aerodrome Security Officer

24. CAT - Computer Aided Tomography
25. CBD:- Chemical and Biological Device.
26. CBRN – Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear weapon

Handout Restricted
Page 20 of 252
27. CBW- Chemical and Biological weapons
28. CC – Central Committee
29. CCTV - Closed Circuit Television
30. CCS – Cabinet Committee on Security
31. CISF - Central Industrial Security Force
32. CLIP- Caller Line Identification Procedure

33. CMG- Crisis Management Group
34. COE - Controller of Explosives
35. COSAH - Committee of Secretaries on Aircraft Hijacking
36. CRPF – Central Reserve Police Force
37. CTCP – Counter Terrorist Contingency Plan
38. CTP – Combined Test Piece

39. CTX – Computed Tomography X-Ray
40. DAW – Directorate of Air Worthiness
41. DFMD - Door Frame Metal Detector
42. DGR – Dangerous Goods Regulation
43. DGCA - Directorate General of Civil Aviation
44. DIP- Diplomatic Mail
45. EDDS - Explosive Device Detection System
46. EDS - Explosive Detection System
47. ETD - Explosive Trace Detector
48. EPX - Enhanced Performance X-Ray
49. EVD - Explosive Vapour Detector

50. HDB - HIGH DENSITY BLINKING
51. HHMD – Hand Held Metal Detector
52. HUM - Human Remains

Handout Restricted
Page 21 of 252
53. IATA - International Air Transport Association

54. IAPP – Isolated Aircraft Parking Position
55. ICAO - International Civil Aviation Organization
56. IED - Improvised Explosive Device
57. IFSO – In-flight Security Officer

58. IMS – Ion Mobility Spectrometry
59. LAG – Liquids, Aerosols and Gels
60. LTPE - Low Temperature Plastic Explosive
61. LPR – License Plate Reader
62. MANPADS - Man Portable Air Defense System
63. MCA - Ministry of Civil Aviation
64. MHA - Ministry of Home Affairs

65. MRTD - Machine Readable Travel Document
66. MZDFMD - Multi Zone Door Frame Metal Detector
67. NCASTP - National Civil Aviation Security Training Programme
68. NCASQCP - National Civil Aviation Security Quality Control Programme
69. NCASP - National Civil Aviation Security Programme

70. NDA- Non Disclosure agreement
71. NSG – National Security Guards
72. OTP – Operating Test Piece
73. PB-IED – Person Borne Improvised Explosive Device
74. PFNA- Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis

75. PIDS- Perimeter Intruder Detection System
76. PRM – Person with Reduced Mobility
77. PSc - Pseudo Colour
78. PSO – Personal Security Officer
79. PTSD – Post Trauma Stress Disorder
80. QRT – Quick Reaction Team

81. RCB- Resume Current Bag

Handout Restricted
Page 22 of 252
82. RDX -Research& Developed Explosive

83. REM- Roentgen Equivalent Man
84. SARP – Standards and Recommended Practices
85. SLPC – Secondary Ladder Point Checks
86. SOP – Standard Operating Procedure

87. STEB – Security Tampered Evident Bag
88. STP – Standardized Training Package
89. SPG – Special Protection Group
90. TCV - Threat Containment Vessel
91. TIP – Threat Image Projection

92. VB-IED – Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device
93. VCS -Variable Color Stripping

94. VDU - Visual Display Unit
95. VPB- View Previous Bag
96. UVSS - Under Vehicle Search System
97. UVSM - Under Vehicle Search Mirror
98. XBIS – X-ray Baggage Inspection System
Aircraft Acts and Rules of 1934 & 1937
Aircraft Acts of 1934
It extends to the whole of India and applies also-

(a) To citizens of India wherever they may be;
(b) To, and to the persons on, aircraft registered in India wherever they may be;
(c) To, and to the persons on, aircraft registered outside India but for the time being in or over
India; and.
(d) To an aircraft operated by a person who is not a citizen of India but as his principal place of
business or permanent residence in India.

Handout Restricted
Page 23 of 252
Section 5 Power of Central Government to make rules for Civil Aviation
Section 5 A Power to issue directions (DGCA or any other officer empowered by Central
Govt)
Section 10 Penalty for act in contravention of Rule made under Section 5 of the Aircraft
Acts. (2 years imprisonment or fine up to Rs. 10 Lakhs or both)
Section 11 A Penalty forimprisonment

(2-3 years failure to comply withuptoRs.
or fine directions issuedorunder
10 Lakhs both)section 5A (2 years
imprisonment or fine up to Rs. 10 Lakhs or both)
Section 11 B Penalty for failure

imprisonment to comply
or fine uptoRs.with direction
10 Lakhs issued under Section 9A (2 years
or both)
imprisonment or fine up to Rs. 10 Lakhs or both)
imprisonment or fine uptoRs. 10 Lakhs or both)

Aircraft Rules of 1937
The Aircraft Rules 1937, extends to the whole of India and apply also (unless the contrary
intention appears)
(a) To, and to persons on, aircraft registered in India wherever they may be, expect cases
falling under sub-rule (4).
(b) To, and to persons on, all aircraft for the time being in or over India.
Rule 8 Carriage of arms, ammunitions, explosives, military stores etc.

Rule 13 Photograph at aerodromes or from aircraft in-flight.
Rule 24 Prohibition on consumption of intoxicating and psychoactive substances.
Rule 24 A Carriage of persons suffering from mental disorders or epilepsy in aircraft
Rule 24 B Carriage of prisoners in an aircraft
Rule 24 C Carriage of animals, birds and reptiles in aircraft
Rule 25 Prohibition of Smoking in aircraft
Rule 27 Carriage of persons in unauthorized parts of aircraft
Rule 90 Entry into Public Aerodromes (Access Control)
Inspection of aircrafts – (Empowers some of government officials authorized by
Rule 156 Central Government to enter aircraft for inspection, but are not exempted from
frisking/searching)
Rule 159 No person shall voluntarily obstruct any person acting in the exercise of his
powers or in the discharge of his duties under these rules.
The Aircraft (Carriage of Dangerous Goods) Rules, 2003
Rule 12: Requirement of training: No person shall engage himself in any manner in the transport of
dangerous goods unless he has undergone proper training commensurate with his responsibilities.

Handout Restricted
Page 24 of 252
The Aircraft (Security) Rules 2011
Rule 3 Duties of Appropriate Authority

Rule 4 Appeal
Rule 5 Planning, design and layout of the Aerodrome security requirement
Rule 6 Aerodrome perimeter,
Rule 7 Provision of lighting, road, patrolling and observation post
Rule 8 Aerodrome security programme
Rule 9 Security clearance for operations at aerodrome
Rule 10 Handling of unattended or suspect baggage
Rule 11 Business establishment at aerodrome
Rule 12 Protection of facilities owned by aerodrome operator
Rule 13 Aviation Security Group
Rule 14 Duties of Chief Aerodrome Security officer
Rule 15 Ground handling service
Rule 16 Contingency Plan
Rule 17 Disembarkation of Unruly Passenger
Rule 18 Entry into aerodrome
Rule 19 Entry into security restricted area
Rule 20 Prohibition to carry weapons or explosive
Rule 21 Security check before embarkation
Rule 22 Certification of Screeners
Rule 23 Prohibition on carriage of certain goods (in cabin baggage)
Rule 24 Security Programme (Aircraft Operator)
Rule 25 Security clearance for operation (Aircraft)
Rule 26 Deployment of staff (for security duties)
Rule 27 Security search of aircraft
Rule 28 Access control of aircraft
Rule 29 Locking of cockpit door
Rule 30 Deployment of IFSO
Rule 31 Security control for hold baggage
Rule 32 Identification and reconciliation of hold baggage
Rule 33 Transfer baggage
Rule 34 Carriage of prisoners in aircraft
Rule 35 Carriage of cargo, mail, catering items and other stores
Rule 36 Detention of aircraft
Rule 37 Security control for Cargo and Courier bags
Rule 40 Prohibition on carriage of certain goods (in cargo and courier)
Rule 41 Protection of security cleared cargo or mail or courier bag etc
Rule 42 Regulated agent
Rule 43 Catering supplies
Rule 44 Supply of other stores
Rule 45 Reporting of security accident or incident
Rule 46 Investigation of security accident or incident
Rule 47 Power of the Inquiry Officer
Rule 48 Inspection
Handout Restricted
Page 25 of 252
Role of Various Agencies in Aviation Security
Roles / Functions / Duties /Responsibilities of BCAS

International Legislation
Annex 17
Standard 3.1.5 Each Contracting State shall establish a national aviation

security committee or similar arrangements for the
purpose of coordinating security activities between the
departments, agencies and other organizations of the
State, airport and aircraft operators, air traffic service
providers and other entities concerned with or
responsible for the implementation of various aspects of
Laying down AVSEC norms in accordance with ICAO Annex-17 to Chicago convention for Airport
Operators, Airline operators and their security agencies responsible for implementation AVSEC
measures.
Monitoring the implementation of Security rules and regulations and carrying out survey of
security needs. Ensure that the persons implementing security controls are appropriately
trained and possess all competencies required to perform their duties.
Planning policy on civil aviation as per ICAO guidelines, to prepare contingency plan, to prepare
NCASP and formulation of Policies.
Coordination among different organizations on AVSEC matters.
Conducting surprise / dummy checks to test professional efficiency and alertness of security
staff. Conducting mock exercise to efficacy of contingency plan and operational preparedness
of various agencies.
Advisory role the Govt. of India on Security matters
Technical Evaluation of equipment used in aviation security.
Responsibilities of DG,BCAS:
Annex 17
Standard 3.1.2 Each Contracting State shall designate and specify to ICAO
an Appropriate authority within its administration to be
responsible for the development, implementation and
maintenance of the national civil aviation security
programme.
Standard 3.1.4 Each Contracting State shall require the appropriate

authority to define and allocate tasks and coordinate
Handout Restricted
Page 26 of 252
activities between the departments, agencies and other

organizations of the State, airport and aircraft operators,
air traffic service providers and other entities concerned
with or responsible for the implementation of various
aspects of the national civil aviation security programme.
National legislation
Aircraft Security Rules 2011
Rule 03 Duties of DG,BCAS
Responsibilities of DG,BCAS
 Establish, Develop, implement, maintain and review the NCASP, NCASTP, NCASQCP in
India in accordance with Annexure 17.
 Issue necessary directions on AVSEC
 Respond immediately to meet any increased security threat
 Allocate the responsibilities and ensure coordination amongst various agencies
responsible for implementation of the various aspects of the NCASP.
 Designate an authority at each aerodrome serving Civil Aviation who shall be
responsible for coordinating and implementation of security controls.
 Establish Aerodrome Security Committee (ASC) at each aerodrome serving civil aviation for
coordinating the implementation of security controls and procedures as specified in the
airport / aerodrome security programme.
 Arrange for security audit, test, survey and inspection to be conducted on a regular basis
Role of Aviation Security Group (ASG)
National legislations
Aviation (Security) Rules 2011
Rule 13 Aviation Security Group (ASG)
Rule 14 Duties of Chief Aerodrome Security Officer (CASO)

Circular 10/2000 Induction of CISF in the airports for aviation security duties.
Circular 17/2001 Components of ASG
CISF (Central Industrial Security Force)
CISF has been entrusted with security of airports in India since 2000. They are
designated as Aviation Security Group (ASG).
The In-charge of CISF at an airport is designated as the Chief Aerodrome Security

Officer (CASO) and is responsible for enforcement of security measures at an
airport.

Handout Restricted
Page 27 of 252
Unit’s or Components of ASG
 Anti-hijacking unit
 Protection unit
 Intelligence and surveillance unit
 Support unit
These units will perform following functions:
Anti-hijacking unit:
 Guarding of access control points to prevent unauthorized entry.

 Pre-embarkation checks of passengers and hand baggage.
 Security of sterile area, apron and ramp policing
 Guarding of aircraft on ground.
Protection Unit:
 Protection of perimeter, ATC.
 Carry out mobile and foot patrols.
 Guarding of cargo complex.
 Guarding of terminal buildings.
 Functioning as Quick Reaction Team (QRT)
 Cordoning of aircraft in case of in case off unlawful interference.
Intelligence and surveillance unit:

 They will keep surveillance in terminal building, passenger lounge, security hold, apron and
any other area assigned by CASO
 Keep liaison with intelligence agencies to receive regular inputs.
Support Unit:
 Control room which will work round the clock.
 Administrative work.
 Staff for training.
 Supporting service staff.
a. Security aides/ Orderlies
b. Safai Karmacharis,
c. Washer men,
d. Barbers,
e. Cooks,
Handout Restricted
Page 28 of 252
BDDS Unit:
The ASG’s BDDS unit is responsible for the following functions
a) Attend to Bomb Threat Calls

b) Attend to unclaimed baggage calls
c) Detection of suspected baggage for explosives
d) Disposal/demolition of confirmed threat/IED by RSP
e) Store explosives used in demolition/disposal of IEDs
f) Carry out anti-sabotage and random checks of aircraft, airports, terminal building & cargo
complexes with special emphasis on BMA
g) Participate in the Bomb Threat Assessment Committee
Role of Airport Operator National legislations

Part II Security Measures at Aerodrome
NCASP 2018
Chapter 4.2.2 The AVSEC responsibilities of Airport Operators
AVSEC responsibilities of Airport Operators:
 Convene the Aerodrome Committee meetings

 Issuance of vehicle permits & ADP for access of vehicles in operational areas
 Preparation of various Contingency Plans for the airport which is required
to be approved by Appropriate Authority.
 Provision & maintenance of Perimeter / fencing, Perimeter road, perimeter
lighting, apron, gates / entry points, security hold area, frisking points/booth,
Provision of Security Stamps, hand baggage checking counter, isolated parking
bay, Cooling pit etc
 Provision & maintenance of electronic equipment / devices like X-ray BIS, DFMD,
HHMD for passenger screening
 Sign boards for educating the passengers / airport employees
 Co-ordination in the event of any contingency at the airport.
 To conduct Airport Security Committee (ASC) meetings.
 Inline Screening.(Wherever Applicable)
 Airport Fire Services (AFS)
 Air Traffic Services
 All operational and administrative expenses of ASG
Handout Restricted
Page 29 of 252
 Issuance of Temporary airport entry passes
Appreciate the Need for Security Awareness
Security and Non-Security staff shall learn how to recognize suspicious patterns of
behavior, while understanding the importance of avoiding racial and ethnic stereotyping.
Role of Airline Security

Part V Security Measures by Aircraft Operators
Order 03/2009 Security functions to be carried out by Aircraft Operators
Order 05/2009 Norms for deployment of Airline Security staff for Security
functions (Recommendations by Shri Arun Mishra Committee)
Security functions to be carried out by Aircraft Operators
 Security of Aircraft
 Screening of Registered Baggage
 Surveillance in departure hall
 Screening and escorting of screened cargo / unaccompanied baggage
 Security of catering items.
 For security and surveillance in BMA and for accompanying the screened baggage up to aircraft.
 Security in Baggage break-up area.
 Secondary security checks.
 Security of parked / idle aircraft.
 Security of Control Room (including bag tags, boarding cards, etc.)
 Aircraft Search (Pre-flight anti sabotage Checks)
 The Security Supervisor shall ensure that the Aircraft Release certificate is signed by all the
concerned departments and signature is obtained from the Commander of the flight.
A copy of the signed aircraft release certificate shall be kept for record with the security
department, and will be put up for scrutiny during checks and audit by the BCAS officers.

Handout Restricted
Page 30 of 252
AIRCRAFT RELEASE CERTIFICATE- FOR USE AT INDIAN AIRPORTS
FLIGHT NO. DATE

AIRCRAFT REGN NO. TYPE OF AIRCRAFT
AIRPORT OF DEPARTURE TIME OF DEPARTURE
ENGINEERING
This is to certify that anti-sabotage measures as per inspection schedule have been carried out and
no objectionable/suspected item has been found on board:
COMMERCIAL
Signature :
Name :
Designation : Time :
(a) This is to certify that all registered baggage have been identified/reconciled along with
passengers on board.
(b) The total number of passengers as per system has been tallied and all are on board.
(c) All cargo, mail, newspaper, courier bag etc. have been loaded after they have been the
security cleared.
CATERING
Signature :
Name :
This is to certify that all catering items and equipment have been checked by the caterer/ catering
staff/ security staff before being put on board and the crew have received them without any
complaints with regard to the security measures
Signature :
Name :
GROUND SUPPORT

Handout Restricted
Page 31 of 252
This is to certify that all equipment attached to the aircraft were checked thoroughly and only
sealed/security cleared baggage and inspected containers loaded into the aircraft.
SECURITY
Signature :
Name :
This is to certify that all security measures have been carried out for the above flight.
Signature :
Name :
COMMANDER
I accept the aircraft in view of the above certification.
Signature :
Name :

Handout Restricted
Page 32 of 252
Module 2 Overview of International Civil Aviation Security
Module Objective:
 Describe threats to Civil Aviation

 Nuclear , Biological , Chemical and Radio-active material threats
 Sabotage of aircraft , airport and armed attack
 Type of offender (mentally challenged / disgruntled employees, criminals, terrorist etc.)
 Vulnerability of Civil Aviation operations
 Unlawful seizure of aircraft
 Aviation Security Convention
 National Legislations
 Regional Civil aviation Conference
 Key responsibility of states and appropriate authority
 NCASP / SOP
Teaching Methods
 Demonstrations
 Progress Tests
Annex 17
Standard 3.1.1 Each Contracting State shall have as its primary objective the
safety of passengers, crew, ground personnel and the general
public in all matters related to safeguarding against acts of
unlawful interference with civil aviation.
Standard 3.1.2 Each Contracting State shall establish an organization and
develop and implement regulations, practices and procedures
to safeguard civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference
taking into account the safety, regularity and efficiency of

Handout Restricted
Page 33 of 252
flights.
Standard 3.1.3 Each Contracting State shall keep under constant review the
level and nature of threat to civil aviation within its territory
and airspace above it, and establish and implement policies
and procedures to adjust relevant elements of its National
Civil Aviation Security Programme accordingly, based upon a
security risk assessment carried out by the relevant national
authorities
National Legislation
NCASP 2018
Chapter 12 Adjustment of programme and Contingency Plan

Circular 2/2018 Categorization of Airports
Primary Objective of Aviation Security
The primary objective of the Aviation Security is the safety and security of passengers,
crew, ground personnel, general public, airports, aviation installations and all other matters
relating to safeguard against acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation operations.
Aviation Security Principles
 Civil Aviation shall operate from a Safe and Secure environment;
 Develop and implement Legislation and procedures necessary to ensure a safe and
secure environment;
 Security measures shall be consistent with Standards
 Prosecute or extradite persons who carry out acts of unlawful
interference
Nature of Threats
Conventional / Traditional threats to Civil Aviation

 Sabotage of Aircraft
 Sabotage of Airports
 Unlawful seizure of aircraft; and
 Armed attacks on / off airport facilities.
New and Emerging threats to Civil

Aviation
 Suicide Attack on the Airport/Aircraft Facilities
 Use of Aircraft as a weapon of mass destruction

Handout Restricted
Page 34 of 252
 Use of Nuclear weapon, Radioactive Substances and Dangerous Goods.
 Use of Chemical and Biological warfare
 Air to air attack by Missile
 Ground to Air attack by Missile (MANPADS)
 Cyber Terrorism
 Use of Magnetic System
 Attack through the electronic system to misguide the air traffic communication.
TYPES / CHARACTERISTICS OF OFFENDERS
 Mentally deranged persons / Psychotics
 Persons seeking revenge - Disgruntled employees /Dissatisfied passengers
 Terrorists individuals and groups

 Criminals individuals and groups
TERRORISM
Terrorism is an act of placing someone in extreme fear. It is the unlawful use of violence
against the Public to intimidate a Government.
Factors contributing to terrorism:
 Religious factors
 Economic conditions of a country
 Natural disasters
 Political factors
 Social recognition
The supports needed by the terrorist organizations:
 Financial support
 Motivated manpower
 Support of Public
 Arms & Ammunition

 Media
 Training

Handout Restricted
Page 35 of 252
Who are the Terrorists?
 Terrorists are generally people who feel alienated from society and have a grievance or
regard themselves as victims of an injustice.
 Terrorists are devoted to their political or religious cause and do not regard their violent
actions as criminal.
 Terrorists are ruthless and show no fear, pity or remorse.
Characteristics of Terrorists
 Target specific individuals on an aircraft, such as Diplomats or VIPs

 Engender fear of flying in the general public and disrupt normal life; and
 Obtain the release of prisoners, perhaps from their own group
 They operate in small groups or complex networks
 They are usually well organized

 Have access to necessary resources such as money, technical expertise, weapons,
explosives and sometimes supported by governments or States; and
 Aims are political in nature
Characteristics of Criminals
Attacks on Civil Aviation by criminal groups or individuals are rare and their motivation is:
 Monetary gain or
 Extortion
 Personal gains
 Difficult to classify
 Unpredictable
CBRN – chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear attack
 Chemical warfare
 Biological warfare
 Radiological substances
 Nuclear weapons
A growing concern among security professionals is that terrorists will someday use CBRN
materials, in an attack against an unsuspecting public.
Chemical weapons are those that are effective because their chemical action can cause
death, permanent harm or temporary incapacity.
Handout Restricted
Page 36 of 252
Some toxic chemicals, such as phosgene, hydrogen cyanide and tear gas, may be used
for both civil and peaceful, and hostile purposes. When they are used for hostile
purposes, they are considered chemical weapons.
Biological weapons are weapons that achieve their intended effects by infecting people
with deliberate release of dangerous bacteria, viruses or fungi, or biological toxins (e.g.
Anthrax, Small pox, ricin, a natural toxin occurring in plants).
Radiological weapon is designed to spread radioactive material such as uranium,
plutonium etc with the intent to kill and cause disruption upon a city or nation.
Nuclear: Death and injury caused from caused from the effects of an explosion that
includes blinding light, intense heat (thermal radiation), initial nuclear radiation, blast, fires
started by the heat pulse, and secondary fires caused by the destruction.
Why is civil aviation considered as an attractive target?
 Instant Publicity
 Aircraft is mobile
 Different nationalities on board
 Aircraft can be easily taken in control
 Aircraft itself can be used as a missile
 Small amount of explosive is sufficient to cause huge damage to aircraft
 Adverse impact on tourism thereby furthering the terrorist cause
 Excellent Means of extortion
 Economic damage to the country
 Economic damage to the airline
 Airline carry the flag of the nation
 Large number of people in a confined area
Where can the threats come from?

Handout Restricted
Page 37 of 252
 Terrorist disguised as a passenger with the intent to hijack the plane

 A terrorist may infiltrate a piece of luggage containing an explosive device directly onto the
conveyor belt
 Using naïve passenger to infiltrate a bomb into their luggage
 Explosive device concealed at the check in area set to explode during the
operations
 Direct attack
 Explosive device placed at the boarding gate area
 Passenger used after check-in
 Interline passengers and baggage
 Cargo/Courier infiltration
 Catering infiltration
 Airport employees
 Terrorist disguised as an airport worker
 Explosive device or weapon left on board to be used on the second leg of the flight
UNLAWFUL SEIZURE OF AIRCRAFT (HIJACKING)
What are the techniques used for hijacking?
In order to execute a hijack of an aircraft, the perpetrator must be able to coerce the pilot-in-
command. Therefore, it is necessary to:
• Smuggle weapons onto the aircraft (examples of how this has been done ranges from
concealment in toys to false prosthetics)
• Possible collusion with or bribery of airport or airline staff
• Armed assault. This has been has been used on several occasions
The types of weapons used vary and may include pistols, automatic weapons, explosive charges,
knives, or flammable material.
SABOTAGE
Sabotage techniques
Most sabotage devices targeted against aircraft are either explosive or incendiary devices and can
even be a combination of the two.
The saboteur needs to have access to the aircraft to plant the device or place the device on
the aircraft using passenger baggage, air cargo, catering or other stores loaded onto the
aircraft prior to flight. The most common means of infiltrating sabotage devices in the past have
been:
Handout Restricted
Page 38 of 252
 Infiltration of device into baggage;

 Collusion with airport or airline staff to place device on aircraft;
 Subterfuge, use of an unsuspecting dupe
Sabotage of airports
Certain critical areas of an airport are vital to the continued operation of an airport, namely:
 Runway;
 Passenger terminal buildings;

 Navigational aids;
 Electrical power supplies;
 Air Traffic Control communications;
 Aviation fuel storage;
 Rescue and fire-fighting services.
Any sabotage to the above facilities can seriously impair the functioning of the airport.
Suicide bomber
While most successful saboteurs move away from the event of the device activation the
suicidal saboteur is ready to kill himself for the cause.
Whether a religious, political or nationalistic fanatic, these individuals or groups present a
formidable threat to today’s security measures.
These offenders may endeavor to achieve sabotage by:
• Carrying the device on their person; or
• Providing the means to have a device boarded through their checked baggage.

Handout Restricted
Page 39 of 252
Historical Review of the past incidents
1 First hijacking in the world The first recorded aircraft hijack took place on February 21,
1931 in Lima, (Peru).
2 1969 Year of maximum Hijackings

First hijacking in India 30th Jan, 1971, Indian Airlines flight from Srinagar to Jammu
taken to Lahore.
3 Outcome Rule 8 A of Aircraft Rule 1937 was being implemented.

{ superseded by Rule 21 of Aircraft(Security) Rules 2011}
Second hijacking in India Indian Airlines Aircraft hijacked on 10th Sep, 1976, Mumbai
to Delhi taken to Lahore.
4 Outcome Shri B.D. Pandey committee was formed in 1976
18th Jan, 1978 Formation of DCAS as a cell under DGCA on the

recommendation of Shri B.D. Pandey Committee
2nd August, 1984 A Bomb Explosion at Chennai (Meenabakkam) airport.
5 Outcome Bomb Threat Contingency Plan was Implemented.
23rd Jun, 1985

 Sabotage of Air India aircraft Kanishka Tragedy over
Atlantic Ocean.
 Explosion at Narita airport (Japan) during transfer of
baggage to Air India aircraft.
6 Post Kanishka Tragedy Justice B.N Kirpal, Commission was setup. On 1st April 1987
BCAS was formed as a Regulatory Authority on Civil Aviation
Security under MCA.
Following security measures were introduced
 Identification of baggage-Mandatory
 Reconciliation of baggage was introduced
 Re-identification of registered baggage on interline
station by passenger.
 Checking of baggage manually even after X-ray
screening
 Inspection of security arrangements of national air-
carriers at foreign stations by BCAS officers

Handout Restricted
Page 40 of 252
7 3rd May 1986 Sabotage of Air Lanka aircraft at Colombo airport. Explosives send through
tea consignment in cargo. LTTE rebels bombed Air Lanka plane at Colombo
airport, killing 16 people
2nd April 1986 Bombing of TWA 840. 04 passengers died while 117 survived. The bomb
contained one pound of plastic explosive. It is suspected it had been placed
under the seat cushion on a previous journey by a Lebanese woman
8
Outcome Aircraft security check & security search were improved.
29th Nov 1987 Korean Air Bombing resulted in death of 115 persons on board aircraft. A
bomb was planted inside an overhead storage bin in the airplane’s
passenger cabin by North Korean agents.
9
Outcome Transit Security checks were given high importance.
21st Dec 1988 Pan Am 103 incident resulted in death of 259 persons on board aircraft, as
well as 11 persons on the ground at Lockerbie (Scotland).
10
Outcome Marking of Plastic Explosive for the purpose of detection. Golden principle
adopted. No passenger no baggage and all bomb threat calls to be taken
seriously. Procedure for carriage of mishandled baggage was introduced.
11 24th Dec 1994 Air France aircraft seized at Algerian airport by four persons dressed as
airline staff - three hostages killed. Aircraft flown to Marseilles (France)
where four hijackers killed.
12 Nov 1996 ET 961 Ethiopian Airlines was hijacked by asylum seekers. Crashed in
Comoros Island due to insuffient fuel.
24th Dec 1999 Hijack of Indian Airlines (IC-814) operating from Kathmandu (Nepal) to
Delhi (India). Finally taken to Kandahar (Afghanistan)
13
Outcome  Introduction of CISF as ASG in Feb 2000
 Secondary Ladder point checks (SLPC) introduced in January 2000
 Introduction of Sky Marshals
 Modernization / up gradation of electronic detection devices
 Preventing an Hijacked aircraft to take off from Indian soil, once it
lands
 Review of contingency plans
24 July 2001 Colombo Airport (Bandaranaike Airport) attack by LTTE.

Handout Restricted
Page 41 of 252
Outcome  Raising of Perimeter wall to the prescribed height

14  Access control system strengthened
 Security of parked aircraft at night
 Deployment of QRT
11th Attack by Al Qaida using 04 Aircrafts as a weapon of Mass destruction in
September USA.
2001
Outcome  Strengthening of cockpit doors
15  Locking of cockpit doors
 Implementation of strict pre-embarkation security checks
 Deployment of sky marshals
 Ban on steel / metallic cutlery with sharp edges.
22nd December  Richard Reid (Shoe Bomber), a member of Al Qaeda, boarded American
2001 Airlines from Paris to Miami. Passenger was on Aerial suicide mission.
16
Outcome  Shoe Scanning through XBIS was introduced.
 Carriage of Lighters & Matchbox in the aircraft is prohibited.
17 28th November Arkia Airlines (Israel) shot at by shoulder launched surface-to-air missiles on
2002 departure from Mombassa, Kenya.
August 2006 Heathrow Airport Attack: Attempt to blow up 11 aircraft with the liquid
explosive ( TATP)
18
Outcome Restrictions on carriage of more than 100ml of liquid in cabin baggage
30th June 2007 Glasgow Airport Attack. A dark green Jeep Cherokee loaded
cabin baggage
with propane canisters was driven into the glass doors of the Glasgow
International Airport terminal and set ablaze.
19
A second bomb was later found in the car parking.
Outcome Focus on Landside security.
25th December Northwest Airlines Flight 253 was attacked by a man using a small explosive
2009 device hidden in his underwear, causing only a small fire inside the plane,
20
which is extinguished by a flight attendant; the man was subdued by
passengers and crew; there were 3 injuries.
Outcome Introduction of Body Scanners

Handout Restricted
Page 42 of 252
24th January Domodedovo International Airport bombing. A passenger exploded himself

2011 Moscow in the Moscow airport, International arrival hall, baggage claim area.
Airport Attack
21
Outcome Random screening at the entry gate of the terminal building.
Strengthening of security towards city side. Landside security was
recommendation.
08th June 2014 Jinnah International Airport (Karachi) was attacked by 10 militants armed
with automatic weapons, a rocket launcher, suicide vests and grenades
carried out the attack. 36 people were killed, including all 10 attackers, and
at least 18 were wounded.
Outcome Recommended Practices on landside security, security awareness training,
22 Proper implementation of security measures aimed at preventing or
minimizing the effect of ramming vehicle attacks should be incorporated,
such as: physical barriers, for example bollards, crash-rated planters, speed
breakers and chicane to be placed in curbside and other appropriate areas.
17th July 2014 A Malaysian Airline flight MH 17 flying over Ukraine and Russia border was
bought down by a Buck missile fired by the militant. Aircraft crashed near
Grabovo in the Donetsk region. Total Passenger 280, crew 15, Total 295
23 Pax.
Outcome Annex 17 included provision on attacks against MANPADs
24 22nd March Three coordinated nail bombings occurred in Belgium two at Brussels
2016 Airport in Zaventem. Two suicide bombers, carrying explosives in large
suitcases, attacked a departure hall.
12th June 2016 A man has set off a homemade explosive device at Shanghai international
airport, injuring four people as well as himself at Pudong International
Airport, Shanghai. The man then took out a knife and stabbed his own
neck.
25 28th June 2016 The Atatürk Airport terrorist attack, consisting of shootings and suicide
bombings. Gunmen armed with automatic weapons and explosive belts
staged a simultaneous attack at the international terminal.
Outcome Landside security became a standard.
Aviation Security Countermeasures
National regulations on Aviation Security shall comply with the specifications made in the
international conventions and in ICAO's Annex 17.
For example, training programme, quality control programs, airport and airline security
programs can contribute to optimal aviation security on a national level.
The civil aviation industry has developed various countermeasures to counter the threats.

Handout Restricted
Page 43 of 252
These countermeasures can be categorized as:

 Legislative
 Technical
 Physical
Legislative Measures
International Conventions (Legal Instruments)

International Conventions are International legal Instruments by which Contracting States
affirm their intention to enforce the terms and provisions contained in these Conventions.
The Chicago Convention of 1944 on International Civil Aviation was instrumental in the formation
of International Civil Aviation Organization on 4th April 1947. The organization serves as a forum
for cooperation in all fields of Civil Aviation among its 192 member states. India became signatory
to the Chicago Convention on 04th April 1947.
The ICAO is a specialized agency of the United Nations and is responsible to promote safe and
orderly development of International Civil Aviation throughout the world. It sets standards and
regulations necessary for Aviation safety, security, efficiency and regularity, as well as for
Aviation environmental protection.
ICAO has legislative powers by means of the SARPs provided by Annex 17. It also organizes
obligatory security audits at States worldwide. The ICAO Security Manual contains guidelines on
how to implement the SARPs as provided by Annex 17.
International Conventions
Chicago Convention1944
The Chicago Convention, officially called the Convention on International

Civil Aviation, was signed on 7 December 1944. In 1947 it led to the
establishment of International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
The governments that signed this convention agreed on certain

principles and arrangements to allow a safe and orderly development of
International Civil Aviation. Furthermore, this convention defines that
international air transport services should be established on the basis
of equal opportunities.
This convention has 19 Annexes in total. The most important one concerning security issues is
Annex 17, containing a description of Standards and Recommended Practices that apply to aviation
security. Annex 17- Security, Safeguarding civil aviation against the act of unlawful intervention.

Handout Restricted
Page 44 of 252
Tokyo Convention 1963

The Tokyo Convention was established in 1963. The official name of the convention is the
Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft. The Tokyo
convention only applies to offences that are committed on board an aircraft in flight.
This convention focuses on offences that jeopardise:
 The safety of the aircraft.
 The safety of the persons on board the aircraft.

 The good order on board the aircraft.
 The penal code of the State of registry of the aircraft.
This convention grants certain rights to the Pilot in Command (PIC), in order to ensure the
safety and order on board of his aircraft:
 Lawful commander of the aircraft
 Restrain passengers when they cause problems using reasonable measures.

 Allow the crew to ask assistance from other passengers to overpower unruly
passengers.
 Disembark unruly passengers at the next port of call.
This convention also contains some obligations. The State of landing should:
 Restore the control of the aircraft to the pilot in charge.
 Allow the pilot in charge to disembark unruly passengers, disregarding the State's visa or
immigration requirements.
 Take delivery of unruly passengers.
 Take unruly passengers into police custody until the prosecution or extradition is
accomplished.
The Hague Convention 1970

The official name of the Hague Convention, established in 1970, is the
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft. This convention
made the unlawful seizure of an aircraft (hijacking) an international offence.
Contents of the Hague Convention
This convention obliges the States to:

 Make the unlawful seizure of an aircraft punishable by severe penalties.
 Extradite or prosecute offenders without exception. Both the State of landing and the State of
registry of the aircraft can exercise jurisdiction over these offenders.

Handout Restricted
Page 45 of 252
 Restore the control of the aircraft to the pilot in charge, not allowing the aircraft to take off to
another destination while the offenders are still in control of the aircraft.
 Report every occurrence to ICAO.
The Montreal Convention 1971
The official name of the Montreal Convention, established in 1971, is the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation. The primary focus of this
convention was the sabotage of an aircraft.
This convention, established the term aircraft in service, A parked aircraft which is under
surveillance sufficient to detect unauthorized access.
Contents of the Montreal Convention
This convention defines the following offences:

 Violence against a person on the aircraft.
 Destroying or damaging the aircraft, thus endangering the safety of aircraft in flight.
 Placing on board a device likely to endanger the safety of aircraft in flight.
 Destroying or damaging air navigation facilities, likely to endanger the safety of aircraft in service.
 Communicating false information, such as a bomb threat, likely to endanger the
safety of aircraft in flight.

 Make attempts and accomplices to offences also punishable by severe penalties.
 Extradite or prosecute offenders without exception. Both the State of landing as the State of
registry of the aircraft can exercise jurisdiction over these offenders.
 Take all practical measures, like pre-board screening of passengers, in order to prevent offences.
 Restore the control of the aircraft to the pilot in charge, not allowing the aircraft to take off to
another destination while the offenders are still in control of the aircraft.
 Report every occurrence to ICAO.
Protocol to the Montreal Convention 1988
The official name of this protocol, added to the Montreal

Convention in 1988, is the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation.
With this protocol, the definition of offences is broadened to all unlawful acts against a person
or an airport serving international civil aviation, causing or likely to cause:
 Injury or death at an airport
 The destruction or serious damage to the facilities of the airport


The destruction or serious damage to an aircraft not in service located in that airport
Handout Restricted
Page 46 of 252
 The disruption of the airport's services
This protocol was created following a series of attacks on international airports that occurred
after the creation of the Montreal Convention in 1971.
The Marking of Plastic Explosives Convention 1991 (MEX CONVENTION)
The official name of the Marking of Plastic Explosives Convention,

established in Montreal in 1991, is the Marking of Plastic
Explosives for the Purposes of Detection Convention. This
convention focuses on the detection of explosives.
By 1990, a series of explosions on board an aircraft had a taken place, resulting in the loss of
uncountable live s and the destruction of multiple aircrafts. These explosions were most probably
caused by bombs placed in checked baggage of passengers who finally did not board the aircraft.
Contents of the Marking of Plastic Explosives Convention
This convention allows the use of existing vapour detection technology to detect plastic
explosives. Marking agents should be added to plastic explosives by the manufacturer.
 Prevent the production of unmarked explosives
 Prevent the movement of unmarked explosives through their territory
Beijing Convention 2010
The Beijing Convention formally, the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to
International Civil Aviation is a 2010 treaty by which state parties agree to criminalize certain
terrorist actions against civil aviation.
The Beijing Convention modernizes and consolidates the Montreal Convention, 1971 and
Supplementary Protocol, 1988.
Using civil aircraft as a weapon and using dangerous materials to attack aircraft or other targets on
the ground was treated as an offence. The illegal transport of biological, chemical, and nuclear
weapons is also criminalized under the Convention.
The Convention specifically provides for the criminal liability of directors and organizers of an
offence, as well as the liability of those who knowingly assist an offender to evade investigation,
prosecution or punishment. Any person making a threat to commit an offence may be criminally
accountable when the circumstances indicate that the threat is credible. Under certain conditions,
agreement to contribute or contribution to an offence, whether such an offence is actually
committed or not, may be punishable.

Handout Restricted
Page 47 of 252
Beijing Protocol 2010
In 2010 in Beijing, the Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Seizure of Aircraft was adopted. The Protocol makes amendments and additions to the original
convention.
The Beijing Protocol supplements the Hague Convention, 1970. The Protocol expands the scope of
The Hague Convention to cover different forms of aircraft hijackings, including through modern
technological means.
Enactment of Acts in India to implement International Legal Instruments:-

India is a signatory to all the above conventions. The terms and provisions of international
conventions are given legal backup in India by virtue of following Acts:-
 The Aircraft Act 1934, Section 4 as amended from time-to-time
 The Tokyo Convention Act – 1975

 The Anti-Hijacking Act 1982 and its amendment in 1994 was repealed as new The Anti-
Hijacking Act 2016
 Suppression of Unlawful Acts against Safety of Civil Aviation Act, 1982 Amended in 1994
Other National laws related to implementation and enforcement of National Civil Aviation
Security Programme and other related matters are as under:-
 The Aircraft Act, 1934
 The Aircraft Rules, 1937

 The Aircraft (Carriage of Dangerous Goods) Rules 2003
 The Aircraft (Security) Rules 2011
 The Airport Authority of India Act. 1994
 The Explosive Act
 The Other Minor Acts connected with crimes against civil aviation and related matters.
 Orders and regulations
o Gazette Notifications, AVSEC Orders, AVSEC Circulars and Directions issued by
appropriate authority to implement ‘National Civil Aviation Security Programme’.
o Airports Authority of India Regulations, 2000

Handout Restricted
Page 48 of 252
Technical Measures
Annex 17 Anex 17 to the Chicago Convention was adopted in 1974 by the

Council of ICAO. Its purpose is to safeguard International Civil Aviation
against acts of unlawful interference.
Annex 17 contains Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) that
apply to aviation security
STANDARD PRACTICE: -Specification necessary for the safety and regularity
of international air navigation. ICAO contracting states will conform in
accordance with the Chicago Convention. When they fail to do so, they are
required to inform ICAO about this. In Annex 17, standards always contain
the word shall.
Examples of standard practice:
 Pre-embarkation security checks of passengers, crew, ground
personnel
 Screening of hold baggage’s
 Background checks of personnel
 Each contracting state must have a written NCASP
RECOMMENDED PRACTICE: Specification desirable for the interest of safety and regulatory of
international air navigation. ICAO contracting states will endeavour to conform in accordance
with the Chicago Convention. When a state does not comply with a Recommended Practice,
they are invited to inform ICAO about this. In annex 17, recommended practices always contain
the word should.
Examples of recommended practice:
 SLPC
 Deployment of IFSO (Sky Marshals)
 Use of Body scanners
Contracting states must notify ICAO about every difference to a standard. The Standards and
Recommended Practices are adopted and incorporated as Annexes to the Convention on
International Civil Aviation. There are 19 Annexure to the Chicago Convention.
Annex 17 deals with safe guarding civil Aviation against the act of unlawful interference. The first
edition of Annex 17 was being issued on 22nd March 1974. ICAO conducts Security Audit of each
contacting state in order to review the compliance of Annex-17.
Annex 17: Aviation Security.

Annex 18: The Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air.
ICAO Security Manual
The ICAO Security Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation against Acts of
Unlawful Interference, (Doc 8973) Restricted, is the principal guidance
document developed by ICAO to assist States in the implementation of the
Handout Restricted
Page 49 of 252
technical specifications contained in Annex 17.
Director General of Civil Aviation (DGCA)
Directorate General of Civil Aviation is an attached office of the Ministry

of Civil Aviation.
The Directorate General of Civil Aviation is the regulatory body in the field
of Civil Aviation primarily dealing with safety issues. It is responsible for regulation of air transport
services to/from/within India and for enforcement of civil air regulations, air safety and
airworthiness standards. It also co-ordinates all regulatory functions with International Civil Aviation
Organization.
The headquarters are located in New Delhi with regional offices in the various parts of India.
Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS)

BCAS is the regulatory authority for civil aviation security in India. It is headed by
Director General, Bureau of Civil Aviation (DG, BCAS). DG, BCAS is the appropriate
authority for implementation of Annexure 17 to Chicago convention of
International civil aviation organization (ICAO).
DG, BCAS is responsible for the development, implementation and maintenance
of the National Civil Aviation Security Programme.
Key Responsibilities of States and Appropriate Authority
International legislation
Annex 17
Standard 2.1.1 Each Contracting State shall have as its primary objective
the safety of passengers, crew, ground personnel and
the general public in all matters related to safeguarding
against acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation.
Standard 2.2.1 Each Contracting State shall apply the Standards and
shall endeavor to apply the Recommended Practices
contained in Annex 17 to International civil aviation
operations.
Standard 2.2.2 Each Contracting State shall ensure that measures
designed to safeguard against acts of unlawful
interference are applied to domestic operations to the
extent practicable, based upon a security risk
assessment carried out by the relevant national
authorities.
Standard 4.1.1 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to prevent
weapons, explosives or any other dangerous devices,
articles or substances, which may be used to commit an
act of unlawful interference, the carriage or bearing of
which is not authorized, from being introduced, by any
means whatsoever, on board an aircraft engaged in civil
aviation.
The Aircraft (Security) Rules, 2011
Handout Restricted
Page 50 of 252
Rule 3 Duties of DG, BCAS

NCASP 2018
Chapter 01 Primary Objective
To meet the primary objective of the country the
Government of India has established a dedicated
organization namely the Bureau of Civil Aviation Security
(BCAS) and is in existence since 01st April 1987.
The organization is headed by the Director General, BCAS (DG, BCAS) under the Ministry of Civil Aviation
to develop and implement regulations, practices and procedures to safeguard civil aviation against acts
of unlawful interference.
The Aircraft Security Rules 2011 provide legal structure and clearly defines the responsibilities and
methods of implementation.
CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY SET UP IN INDIA
Annex 17
Standard 2.1.2 Each Contracting State shall establish an organization

and develop and implement regulations, practices and
procedures to safeguard civil aviation against acts of
unlawful interference taking into account the safety,
regularity and efficiency of flights.
Standard 2.1.3 Each Contracting State shall ensure that such an

organization and such regulations, practices and
procedures:
a) Protect the safety of passengers, crew, ground
personnel and the general public in all matters
related to safeguarding against acts of unlawful
interference with civil aviation; and
b) are capable of responding rapidly to meet any
increased security threat.
History
The BCAS initially set up as Directorate of Civil Aviation Security (DCAS) on 18 Jan, 1978, as a
cell under the DGCA on the recommendation of the B D Pandey Committee, in the wake of
the hijacking of Indian airlines on the 10th Sept 1976.
The BCAS was organized into an independent organization on 01st April 1987 under the
Ministry of Civil Aviation on the recommendation of Justice Kirpal Commission formed to
investigate Kanishka tragedy.
BCAS is the regulatory authority for civil aviation security in India. It is headed by an officer of
the rank of Director General of Police and is designated as Director General, Bureau of Civil
Aviation (DG, BCAS)
DG, BCAS is the appropriate authority for implementation of Annexure-17 to Chicago

Handout Restricted
Page 51 of 252
convention of International Civil Aviation Organization.

DG, BCAS is responsible for the development, implementation and maintenance of NCASP.
DG, BCAS under powers conferred to him by Government of India through MCA notification
number 1797 dt. 03rd July 1997 under section 5A of aircraft act 1934, has the authority to
issue the AVSEC Orders and Circulars.
Organization chart of BCAS

Handout Restricted
Page 52 of 252
National Civil Aviation Security Programme (NCASP)
Annex 17
Standard 3.1.1 Each Contracting State shall establish and implement a
written national civil aviation security programme to
safeguard civil aviation operations against acts of unlawful
interference, through regulations practices and procedures
which take into account the safety, regularity and efficiency
of flights.
Aircraft Security Rules 2011

Rule 03 (i) Duties of DG,BCAS
Develop, implement, maintain a NCASQCP to determine
compliance with and validate the effectiveness of its NCASP.
AVSEC Order
01/2018 National civil Aviation Security Programme
National Civil Aviation Security Training programme (NCASTP)

Annex 17
Standard 3.1.6: Each Contracting State shall require the appropriate authority to
ensure the development and implementation of a National
Training Programme for personnel of all entities involved with
or responsible for the implementation of various aspects of the
National Civil Aviation Security Programme. This training
programme shall be designed to ensure the effectiveness of
Aircraft (Security) Rules 2011
Rule 03 (f) Duties of DG, BCAS
Establish, develop and implement NCASTP
NCASP 2018
Para 5.3.8 AVSEC Training Programme
Chapter 09 Personnel
Para 9.4 Training

Handout Restricted
Page 53 of 252

Order 02/2018 National Civil Aviation Security Training Programme
Establish, develop, and implement, a NCASTP for personnel of all entities involved with or
responsible for the implementation of various aspects of the NCASP which shall be designed to
ensure the effectiveness of the Security Programme.
Aerodrome Security Programme
Annex 17
Standard 3.2.1: Each Contracting State shall require each airport serving
civil aviation to establish, implement and maintain a
written airport security programme appropriate to meet
the requirements of the national civil aviation security
programme

Rule 08 Aerodrome Security Programme
AVSEC Order
06/2018 Aerodrome Security Programme
NCASP 2018
4.2.2.1 i) establishing and maintaining a written Airport Security
Programme
Aircraft Operators Security Programme
Annex 17
Standard 3.3.1 Each Contracting State shall ensure that commercial air
transport operators providing service from that State have
established, implemented and maintained a written operator
security programme that meets the requirements of the
national civil aviation security programme of that State.

Rule 24 Security Programme
Every Aircraft Operator shall, with the approval of the DG,
BCAS make and comply with aircraft operator Security
programme in accordance with the National Civil Aviation
Security Programme and any amended to such programme

Handout Restricted
Page 54 of 252
shall be made after the approval of the DG, BCAS.

NCASP 2018
4.3.i No aircraft operator shall commence operation at
aerodrome without obtaining the clearance of security
arrangements and the approval of the aircraft operator
security programme from the Director General, BCAS in
compliance of rule 24 of The Aircraft (Security) Rules, 2011.
Aviation Security Group (ASG)

SOP’s / Aviation Security measures at Airports:
Rule 14 Duties of the Chief Aerodrome Security Officer
Circular 01/2001 Aviation Security measures
Anti hijacking measures

 Frisking of passengers and search of hand baggage
 Armed support to frisking / searching staff
 Escorting of passenger to aircraft
 Apron and perimeter security
 Security of catering items
 Surveillance in Departure areas
 Use of electronic aids-DFMD,HHMD,XBIS,CCTV
 Secondary Ladder Point Checks
 Pre flight security checks / search of aircraft
 Deployment of sky marshals
 On the job supervision by airline staff
Anti sabotage measures
 Screening and protection of registered baggage until loaded into aircraft hold
 Identification / Reconciliation of registered baggage
 Anti sabotage check of aircraft at originating station
 Guarding of aircraft
 Access control of aircraft
 On the job supervision by airline staff
Handout Restricted
Page 55 of 252
 Security of air crew baggage / aircraft document bags / fuel

 Security of catering items
 Security of cargo, courier, human remains, postal mail, company stores
 Non acceptance of last minute items by passengers
 Passengers to ensure they are aware of contents of their baggage’s
Measures against terrorist attacks
 Guarding of aircraft and airport facilities

 Apron / airport access control
 Deployment of Quick Reaction Teams (QRT)
 Perimeter wall of standard height
 Perimeter road for patrolling
 Perimeter lighting
 Watch towers \ Patrolling- foot or mobile
 Police stations in close proximity of airport
 Efficient communication system
Security of personnel
 Aerodrome entry permit (AEP) / Aerodrome Entry Card (AEC) issued after security
vetting/background checks
 Display of AEP/AEC to detect misuse
 Frisking of all AEP/AEC holders before entry to airside
 Never leave your baggage unattended
 Never lend your uniform / AEP to others
 Never accept a packet for carriage without screening
 On the job supervision / surveillance
 Always display a positive security attitude

Handout Restricted
Page 56 of 252
Module-3 Working at the Airport
Module Objective
 Describe and recognize the main features of an airport (Typical airport layout)
 Locate all main airport and airline building and services on an airport
 Visit to airport for familiarization
 Specify the boundaries between non – restricted and restricted area of an airport
 Move about an airport complying with the airport safety rules
 Apply the rules of an airline / airport permit system
 Post review of airport visit
Teaching Methods
 Demonstrations
 Progress Tests
International legislations
Annex 17
Standard 2.3 Security and facilitation.
Standard 3.2 Airport operations
Standard 4.2 Measures relating to access control
Aircraft Rules 1937
Rule 90 Entry into public aerodromes

Handout Restricted
Page 57 of 252

Rule 18 Entries into Aerodrome
Rule 19 Entry into Security Restricted Area
NCASP
6.4.5 Conditions for issue of AEPs
6.6 Aerodrome Entry Permit (AEPs)

Order 02/2008 Authorization for issue of Airport Entry Pass.
Order 04/2010 Issuance of Temporary Airport Entry Passes by the Airport
Operators under Rule-90(1), Rule 90(3) and Rule 90 (4) of
Aircraft Rules 1937.
Order 07/2015 Aerodrome Entry permit Guidelines - Temporary Area
Order 06/2009 Issue of AEP to foreigner(s)
Arrival / Departure Areas Passenger check-in and departure area
Passenger/baggage screening areas

Handout Restricted
Page 58 of 252
Baggage make-up area Arrival Hall / Baggage Claim Area
Airport Administration Building Operations Building
Air Traffic Control Tower (ATC) Fuel storage area
ATC Complex Fuel farms

Handout Restricted
Page 59 of 252
Cargo Complex Cargo Hold
Maintenance area Air Navigation Aids
Catering Establishment
Catering Unit

Handout Restricted
Page 60 of 252
Airport safety rules - moving about the airport
When moving about the airside areas of the airport either on foot or in a vehicle all security
personnel:
 MUST know the boundaries between airside, landside, SRA and Controlled areas.
 MUST know the location and correct name of all airport buildings, services and aircraft
operating areas.
 MUST maintain radio contact with the airport ground operations control (or ATC) when
moving in the vicinity of taxiways and runways.
 MUST use vehicle hazard lights and wear a reflective safety vest.
 MUST observe airport speed limits and comply with movement rules.
 MUST follow prescribed vehicle routes on the apron and other aircraft maneuvering surfaces.
 MUST NOT stand, walk, move, park or drive close to an aircraft when the red revolving light
on top and below the aircraft is lit (shows that engines are running, or that start-up, push-
back or towing is about to take place).
 MUST NOT park any vehicle in a dangerous location.
 MUST NOT assume that it is safe to cross a taxiway or runway because it appears to be clear.
 MUST NOT disobey ground control (or ATC) movement instructions.
 MUST NOT cross a runway unless you have received clearance from ground control or ATC
tower even when responding to a security incident [does not apply if the runway is closed.

Handout Restricted
Page 61 of 252
AIRPORT PERMITS SYSTEMS:-
The airport permit system is a set of rules which controls the access of people and vehicles to
restricted areas
Typical Aerodrome Entry Permit for PEOPLE should contain:

 photograph of the holder
 Airport(s)/ Terminal(s)
 access zones/areas
 period of validity
 name of permit holder
 name of employer/agency/organization
 permit serial number
 Designation of the Holder
 Signature of the issuing Authority and AEP holder
The most usual types of airport permits are:

 PERMANENT VISITOR such as diplomat or Protocol official from national or
foreign diplomatic mission(s)
 TEMPORARY VISITOR
 VEHICLE including airport authority, airlines, agencies, organizations
EXAMPLES OF AIRPORT SRA PERMITS FOR PEOPLE
Photograph Airport Expiry Date Issuing Airport Expiry Date

of Holder Name dd/mm/yy Authority Name dd/mm/yy
(Colour and Logo Date & and Logo
Stamp
coded Name of Permit Holder Name of Permit Holder
background)
Name of Employer Name of Employer
Agency/Organization Agency/Organization
Signature of Signature of Holder Signature Signature of Holder

Issuing of Issuing
Authority Authority
Permit Airport Area of Validity Permit Airport Area of Validity

Serial No. Serial No.
VISITOR SRA PERMIT

Handout Restricted
Page 62 of 252
Issuing Airport Expiry

Authority Name and Time and
Date, Logo Date
Stamp
& Signature
Visitor’s Name
Name of Visitor’s
Sponsoring
Agency/Organization
Permit Signature of Holder
Serial No.
Airport Area TO BE ESCORTED AT

to be ALL TIMES BY SRA
visited PERMIT HOLDER
WITHIN SRA
Height: 6.5cm Width: 8.5cm
The following types of Airport Entry Cards (AEC) are issued in India
Sr. No Alphabets on AEP Area of Access
01 Arrival hall
A
02 Departure Hall
D
03 Terminal Building (Other than security Hold, Custom & immigration
T
but including baggage claim area of domestic terminal).
Terminal Building security hold area.

04 S
Apron area
05 P
Baggage handling area.
06 B
07 F Air traffic control except ATC tower.
07
08 FtF Air Traffic Control tower
08
09 Ft. Cargo Terminal without cargo SHA-Domestic & International
C
10 Cargo Terminal without cargo SHA-Domestic
Cd
11 Cargo Terminal without cargo SHA-International
Ci.
Cargo SHA pertaining to C of Ci
12 Cs.
Boarding gates to immigration/Baggage claim area
13 I
Note : Other permits
1. Web based bar coded photo identity card for casual labour are issued to Casual
workers who are hired on daily wages.

Handout Restricted
Page 63 of 252
2. Members of Parliament can enter Airport up to check in counters & arrival hall without
an AEC, on the basis of showing their ID Card.
3. X Zone for other areas. e.g basement
Typical permit for VEHICLES should contain:

 Registered number of vehicle
 Name of organization
 Area and validity
 Period of validity
 Access gates to be used
 “AIRSIDE” safety status of vehicle
EXAMPLES OF AIRPORT SRA PERMITS FOR VEHICLES
VEHICLE ENTRY PERMIT

BCAS VEP NO.-
Name of the Airport-
NAME OF THE VEHICLE OWNER / OPERATOR-
REGISTRATION NO. OF VEHICLE-
MAKE OF VEHICLE-
VALIDITY OF VEHICLE INSURANCE-
VALIDITY OF VEP-
GATE NO.-
ESCORT REQUIREMENT- Y / N
HOLOGRAM RFID TAG AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY

Handout Restricted
Page 64 of 252
ZONE DEFINITIONS
TR – TARMAC
SR - SERVICE ROAD
MA- MANOEUVERING AREA
PT— PASSENGER TERMINAL
CT- CARGO TERMINAL
VEP GUIDELINES
1. The holder of this permit shall comply with Apron Safety Regulations as
per The Gazette of India notification dated 03rd July 2003
2. The holder of this permit to whom the permit is issued for vehicle/
equipment will be responsible for adherence to all the Rules and
regulations and should carry all the original documents i.e. Registration
certificate , Fitness Certificate , Pollution Certificate and Speed governor
certificate as per the guidelines issue by RTO, DGCA ,BCAS and “Name
of the Airport Operator”
3. Original and valid Permit must be affixed to and permanently displayed on
the front of the vehicle.
4. In case of any incident /accident or loss of this permit, please contact
/inform Airside Apron control on telephone no.______________
5. Vehicle Driver shall possess a valid ADP.
6. Any other guideline as per local requirement of the airport may be
incorporated in addition to the above guidelines.

Handout Restricted
Page 65 of 252

Handout Restricted
Page 66 of 252
MODULE –
4 Access Control – People
Module Objectives
 Understand the operations at a pedestrian security control checkpoint

 List information to be recorded in an access control point logbook
 Be familiar with the use of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)
 Be aware of suspicious or unusual behaviour at access control points.
Teaching Methods
 Demonstrations
 Progress Tests
What is Access Control?
Access control means the security procedure applied to ensure that only authorized
persons, authorized vehicles and authorized items carried by such persons or transported in
such vehicles are allowed access into the premises, area or zone being controlled.
Annexure 17
Standard 4.2.1 Each Contracting State shall ensure that the access to
airside areas at airports serving civil aviation is
controlled in order to prevent unauthorized entry.
Standard 4.2.2 Each Contracting State shall ensure that security

restricted areas are established at each airport serving
civil aviation based upon a security risk assessment
carried out by the relevant national authorities.
Standard 4.2.3 Each Contracting State shall ensure that identification

systems are established in respect of persons and
vehicles in order to prevent unauthorized access to
Handout Restricted
Page 67 of 252
airside areas and security restricted areas. Identity shall

be verified at designated checkpoints before access is
allowed to airside areas and security restricted areas.
Standard 4.2.5 Each Contracting State shall ensure that the movement of
persons and vehicles to and from the aircraft is
supervised in security restricted areas in order to
prevent unauthorized access to aircraft.
Standard 4.2.6 Each Contracting State shall ensure that persons other
than passengers, together with items carried, being
granted access to security restricted areas are screened.
Recommended 4.2.8 Each Contracting State should ensure that identity

documents issued to aircraft crew members provide a
harmonized and reliable international basis for
recognition and validation of documentation to permit
authorized access to airside and security restricted areas
by conforming to the relevant specifications set forth in
Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents.
Recommendation. 4.2.9 Each Contracting State should ensure that checks
specified in 4.2.4 be reapplied on a regular basis to all
persons granted unescorted access to security restricted
areas.
Aircraft Rule 1937
Rule 90 Entry into public aerodromes –

(1) No person shall enter or be in the terminal building of
any Government aerodrome or public aerodrome or part of such
building or any other area in such aerodrome notified in this
behalf by the Central Government unless he holds an admission
ticket issued by the aerodrome operator or an entry pass
issued by the Commissioner of Security (Civil Aviation) or any
person authorized by the Central Government in this behalf.
(2) No person shall, without permission in writing, by general or

special order, of the Central Government or any officer authorized
in this behalf –
(a) Enter or remain or cause any other person to enter or
remain in the Movement area
(b) Leave or throw or cause to be thrown any animal, bird or
property or object of any nature whatsoever in the Movement
area.

Handout Restricted
Page 68 of 252
(c) Permit any animal under his possession or control or

otherwise to stray in the Movement area; and
(d) operate any vehicle in the Movement area.

Part III Aerodrome Access Control
NCASP
6.4 Access Control Persons
6.4.1 No person shall enter or be in the terminal building of
any licensed aerodrome or part of such building or any other
area, including the movement area but excluding runway, unless
he is a benefice passenger or a crew member embarking, dis-
embarking or in transit or holds a valid aerodrome entry permit
issued by the Commissioner, provided that (a) the Airport
Operator may permit visitors to certain areas of the
terminal building specially marked for the visitors.
6.4.2 For short time entry, every individual shall be issued with one
daily permit with a direction to establish his or her identity at the
time of allowing access at the entry point on the basis of identity
card and random screening shall be done at the entry gate of
terminal building. In order to strengthen the security aspects and
prevent misuse of fake/cancelled tickets for entry into the
airport, the following instructions shall be strictly implemented:
(i) Airport operator will coordinate with airlines for arrangement

of 2D bar code scan of the E-tickets at the terminal building entry
gates. All the e-tickets in paper and digital form should be
verified against identity at the entry gates.
(ii) Until the above system is operational, all persons exiting need
to show their AEP/Visitor's Entry Ticket or justification from the
airline concerned through their staff liaising with the ASG staff at
the gate in person. The documents or devices through which the
non-AEP holder entered should be examined by the ASG staff at
the gate. A record of such exits should be kept by the ASG at the
gate and all gates should be immediately alerted against multiple
entry by such persons.
6.4.3 The crew members of foreign airlines operating to / from India
will not be issued AEPs. They will be allowed entries in the
Handout Restricted
Page 69 of 252
aerodrome on the basis of General Declaration and passport and

/ or airline issued ID card / Crew Member Certificate (CMC).
6.4.4 Hon’ble Members of Parliament shall be allowed entry into the

terminal buildings (up to arrival and departure hall) of civil
aerodrome/ civil enclave in the country on the basis of their valid
identity cards issued by Parliament Secretariat, New Delhi.
Order 04/2010 Issuance of Temporary Airport Entry Passes by the Airport

Operators under Rule-90(1), Rule 90(3) and Rule 90 (4) of
Aircraft Rules 1937.
Circular 14/2000 Entry to the airport
Circular 02/2009 Access control of Casual/Daily Labourers
Circular 18/2009 Courtesy to Members of Parliament at airports
Defense in Depth
Layers of security measures build upon each other to protect civil aviation operations.
Therefore if one layer fails or is deficient, another will hopefully prevent the act of unlawful
interference.
These layers may consist of:

 Security Restricted areas and Restricted areas
 Airport identification permits for personnel and vehicles
 Physical Security measures ( fences, gates, locks, patrols etc)
 Detection systems for weapons and Explosives
The first line of defence is the integrity of the airport perimeter and landside / airside
boundaries, while other protective measures for Security Restricted Areas provide another
layer.

Handout Restricted
Page 70 of 252
Purpose of Access Control
To control the movement of people and vehicles from landside (non-security restricted areas)
into airside (controlled and security restricted areas)
Access Control Challenges
 Size of the airport and boundary

 Number of workers at an airport
 The requirement for people and vehicles to have legitimate access to controlled and security
restricted areas for operational purposes
 Airports are often 24-hour per day operations
Access Control Points
 Must be manned at all times they are open or in use, or otherwise locked or closed.
 All persons working at the airport must use the SRA access points when entering SRA, (includes
aircraft crew and airline employees).
External Access Control Points
Internal Access Control Points

Handout Restricted
Page 71 of 252
Access Control Point for Staff
Access control system can be

 Physical
- Controlled by security guard using equipment such as a turnstile for people and a
drop-arm barrier for vehicles
 Automated Access Control Systems (AACS)
-Coded card (with or without PIN)
-Proximity card (RF) (with or without PIN)
-Biometric Systems.
-IRIS
-Face Geometry
Coded card Hand Geometry
IRIS Scan system

Handout Restricted
Page 72 of 252
Requiring Access for legitimate need
 Airport Employees
 Airline & Tenant Employees
 Employees of other Airport Organizations( Police/customs/immigration)
 National Government Representatives
 Diplomatic Representatives
 Emergency Services
 Visitors
Passengers
 Require valid boarding card and Travel Identification documents

 Family and friends should NOT be allowed to accompany passengers into the Security
Restricted Area.
Access Control Point Equipment
 Barriers, gates, turnstiles, etc.

 Communication equipment, such as radio, telephone, etc.
 Weapons & Explosive detection equipment e.g. metal detectors, x-ray equipment ,
explosive trace detection
 Search equipment for vehicles, e.g., lights mirrors
 Control point log/book and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)
 Facilities (location and environmental conditions)
Contents of Access Control Point Log
 Time control point was opened or handed over to a new shift

 The status of check point equipment
 Record of incidents at the control point
 An inventory of items and/or equipment kept at the control point for its operation
Control Point Log Entry
 Control point location

Handout Restricted
Page 73 of 252
 Details of incident to include:-

-Name of visitor and serial number details of permits
-Registration number of vehicle
-Purpose of access
-Additional important details
-Details of who made the log entry
-Dates and times
- Nature of the incident
- Responding agencies etc.
Recognizing behavior that may be suspicious
 Unknown person without a permit.

 Attempt to gain access to restricted area.
 Carrying a parcel.
 Circumstances not normal.
 Incident can be called “suspicious”.
TYPICAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE (SOP) FOR A SPECIFIC ACCESS CONTROL

POINT, EITHER WITHIN A BUILDING OR EXTERNAL, WILL INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING
INSTRUCTIONS:-
 The security personnel on duty at an access control point must ensure that only
authorized persons and embarking passengers, properly documented, are allowed
access into an airport restricted and controlled area.
 Security personnel shall check that all persons entering a controlled area are in
possession and displaying a valid airport identification permit.
 Security staff will also check that embarking passengers are in possession of valid
travel documents including an airline boarding card which indicates the airline flight and
passenger details.
 In the event that any person gains or attempts to gain unauthorized access to an
airport restricted area, security personnel will endeavour to prevent such entry and will
immediately notify the security supervisor.
 Details of all incidents will be recorded in the access control point log.
Note: This typical SOP is to be replaced by the local Standard Operating Procedures.

Handout Restricted
Page 74 of 252
EXAMPLE OF THE CONTENTS OF A TYPICAL CONTROL POINT LOG
CONTROL POINT LOCATION:
LOG ENTRY:
NAME OF VISITOR:
REGISTRATION NUMBER OF VEHICLE:
PURPOSE FOR ACCESS:
COMMENTS : _
LOG ENTRY MADE BY:

Handout Restricted
Page 75 of 252
ACCESS CONTROL - PEOPLE

EXAMPLE ACCESS CONTROL POINT LOG
Checkpoint # …6….Incident log
Date Time Details of Incident Name & Initials
12 Dec 2008 15:30 Took over checkpoint 6 from D Shift. I Guard. All Mr. ABC
equipment listed in SOP accounted for and
serviceable. Comms check to security control.
OK
12 Dec 2008 15:30 Took over checkpoint 6 from D Shift. I Guard Mr. ABC
12 Dec 2008 15:30 All equipment listed in SOP accounted for and
serviceable.
Comms check to security control. OK
12 Dec 2008 16: 30 Visit to check point by B shift supervisor. All in I Supervisor
order
12 Dec 2008 16: 30 Comms check to security control. OK
12 Dec 2008 17:43 A green Toyota car reg. AA - A- 1234 approached Mr. ABC
checkpoint.
Driver requested directions to main cargo
terminal. Driving License MH – 02 – 12 -34567
Name G Driver.
Directions given as requested.
12 Dec 2008 18: 10 Handed over checkpoint to N I Guard Mr. ABC
12 Dec 2008 18: 10 Took over check point 6 from AN Other. All N I Guard
equipment listed in SOP accounted for and
serviceable.
12 Dec 2008 18:30 Comms check to security control. OK N I Guard

Handout Restricted
Page 76 of 252
Module – 5 Access Control – Vehicles
Module Objectives
 Verify that vehicle access control point equipment is in working order

 Carry out control of vehicle access at vehicle access control point.
 Carry out search of vehicles to detect prohibited articles.
 Apply Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for vehicles.
 Describe the procedures for dealing with irregularities or security incidents
Teaching Methods
 Demonstrations
 Progress Tests
General Principles
 Access to airside or Security Restricted Areas must be allowed only to those vehicles with
a clear operational requirement.
 The admission of vehicles to airside areas should be restricted for reasons of security and
safety and to avoid congestion on aircraft movement areas
Annex 17
Standard 4.2.3 Each Contracting State shall ensure that identification

systems are established in respect of persons and
vehicles in order to prevent unauthorized access to
airside areas and security restricted areas. Identity shall
be verified at designated checkpoints before access is
allowed to airside areas and security restricted areas.
Handout Restricted
Page 77 of 252
Standard 4.2.5 Each Contracting State shall ensure that the movement
of persons and vehicles to and from the aircraft is
supervised in security restricted areas in order to
prevent unauthorized access to aircraft.
Standard 4.2.7 Each Contracting State shall ensure that vehicles being
granted access to security restricted areas, together
with items contained within them, are subject to
screening or other appropriate security.
Aircraft Rule 1937

Rule 90 Entry into public aerodromes
Rule 18.7 (c) Entry into aerodrome No person shall:
Operate any vehicle without entry permit from the
DG, BCAS in the movement area.
NCASP 2011
6.5 Control of Access - Vehicles

Circular 36/2005 Access of vehicle up to the Tarmac on Security/ Medical
and Protocol ground
Challenges
 Size of the airport and boundary

 Number of workers at an airport
 Airports are often 24-hour a day operations
 The requirement for people and vehicles to have authorized access to controlled and
security restricted areas for operational purposes
Authorized Vehicles
 Immigration and other Government Agencies

 Airport/Airline vehicles
 Emergency Services
 Visitors
 Vehicles may be required to be searched depending on the local AVSEC Programme
 Special procedures for vehicles carrying aircraft crews, high value goods, prisoners and
deportees
Handout Restricted
Page 78 of 252
Access Control Point Equipment
The security personnel taking over duty at an access control point should always make sure of
the operational status of the access point by checking that all equipment at the control
post is in working order.
 Barriers, gates, turnstiles, etc.

 Communication system, such as radio, telephone
 Weapons & Explosive detection equipment e.g. metal detectors , explosive trace
detection
 Search for vehicles, e.g., lights, angled mirrors
 Control point log/book and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) including stop lists
Access Control Point Log
 Time control point was opened or handed over to a new shift

 The status of check point equipment
 Record of incidents at the control point
 Record visits to the control point by supervisors
 Details of vehicles without passes
 Details of vehicles admitted; ( depending on frequency and local SOP)
Typical Vehicle Permit
All motorized vehicles and equipment used on the airside in the vicinity of aircraft should be
“safety inspected” prior to the issue of an airside access permit. Permits for vehicles should contain
the following information:-
 Registration number of vehicle

 Name of organization/agency
 Area of validity
 Period of validity
 Designated access gate to be used
 AIRSIDE safety status of vehicle
Examining Vehicle Permits
 Vehicle number on permit matches actual vehicle registration number

Handout Restricted
Page 79 of 252
 Name of organization is correct and bona fide

 Permit is valid and not expired
 Permit valid for access point
 Authorizing signature correct / bona fide.
Checks carried out on a vehicle before allowing it access to airside
 Check vehicle permit for validity

 Check the vehicle for presence of any Restricted / Prohibited article
 Only drivers having ADP are allowed to drive in the airside
 Driver/occupants should have AEP
 Frisk the driver/occupants
 Check all items being carried in the vehicle
Search of a vehicle will require a trained vehicle searcher and specialist equipment, but effective
checks can be made by well briefed staff who may not have received formal training on detailed
searching. Before commencing a search of a vehicle, the searcher must have the authority to
search and search for the restricted article. The following search equipment should be available to
conduct the search effectively:-
 Adequate lighting ( flashlight, torches and dragon light )

 Under Vehicle Search System (UVSS)
 Under Vehicle Search Mirror (UVSM), Mirrors on extended or telescopic handle.
Attention to be paid during searching a vehicle
 The interior of the vehicle.

 The trunk, boot or load carrying area .
 The engine compartment.
 The underside of the vehicle.
 The roof of a vehicle
 Any external apertures.

Handout Restricted
Page 80 of 252
 Some vehicles such as those carrying bonded goods, high value cargo or in-flight catering
will often be sealed.
 The driver however is often in possession of a document that shows the number of the
seal that was affixed when the load area was sealed.
 By ensuring that the serial number of the seal corresponds with that shown in the
document and shows no sign of being tampered with, access may be granted without
further search or check.
To control the movement of vehicle at access point following equipment is required:-

Handout Restricted
Page 81 of 252
 Physical Controls equipment  Barriers in front of gate

 Crash Rated Electro-hydraulic Bollard System
 Crash Rated Electro-Hydraulic Tyre Killer
 Crash Rated Electro-Hydraulic Road Blocker
 Communication system  Radio /Telephone/Alarm
 Search Equipment  Under Vehicle Search Mirror (UVSM)
 HHMD for checking of personnel
 ETD/ EVD
 Dragon Light
 Flash Light
 Under Vehicle Search System
 Documentation  Log book/Record book.
 Other facilities  Signs/Adequate lighting.
Physical Controls equipment
Crash Rated Electro‐hydraulic Bollard System Crash Rated Electro‐Hydraulic Tyre Killer
Crash Rated Electro‐Hydraulic Road Blocker

Handout Restricted
Page 82 of 252
PROCEDURE FOR DEALING WITH SECURITY INCIDENTS / ATTEMPTS
The procedures for dealing with irregularities, or security incidents at an access control point. In
case of discovery of suspect explosive device
 Do not touch the device

 Do not open
 Do not unwrap
 Do not shake or handle
 Do not turn or unscrew
 Do not cut strings, etc.
 Do not lift or remove covers
 Notify a supervisor
Discovery of suspect person
 Check for valid AEP, reason for entry

 Frisk / search for suspect items
 In case of any doubt Notify supervisor
GUIDELINES FOR THE CONTENTS OF A LOCAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE (SOP) FOR DEALING
WITH A PROHIBITED OR “SUSPECT” ITEM DISCOVERED DURING SEARCH OF A VEHICLE.
 Remain calm and polite.
 Do not alarm vehicle driver.
 Do not allow the vehicle to enter the airport.
 Do not try to restrain the driver or use physical force.
 Immediately notify supervisor.
NOTE: These guidelines are to be replaced with the local airport Standard Operating Procedures

Handout Restricted
Page 83 of 252
Module-06 LANDSIDE SECURITY
Module Objective:
 Understand What is Landside Security
 Determine the measures on ground
 Determine Scope, responsibilities, threats & vulnerabilities
 Determine Enhanced Security Measures
 Determine Physical Measures
Teaching Methods
 Demonstrations
 Progress Tests
Legal framework
Annex 17
Standard 4.8.1 Each Contracting State shall ensure that landside
areas are identified.
Standard 4.8.2 Each Contracting State shall ensure that security
measures are established for landside areas to
mitigate the risk of and to prevent possible acts of
unlawful interference in accordance with risk
assessments carried out by the relevant authorities or
entities.
Standard 4.8.3 Each Contracting State shall ensure coordination of
landside security measures in accordance with
Standards 3.1.6, 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 between relevant
departments, agencies, other organizations of the
State, and other entities, and identify appropriate
AVSEC BASIC Handout/2019

Restricted
Handout Restricted
Page 84 of 252
responsibilities for landside security in its national civil

aviation security programme.
NCASP 2018
6.11 Measures relating to Landside---Objectives and principle
AVSEC Order
18/2011 Strengthening of security towards cityside of airports
AVSEC Circular
02/2007 Minimum Standards for Civil Aviation Security Equipment
Crash Rated Electro-hydraulic Bollard System. Appendix-A
Crash Rated Electro-Hydraulic Tyre Killer. Appendix-B
Crash Rated Electro-Hydraulic Road Blocker. Appendix-C
09/2005 Security regulations for Off-airport Check-in facility
22/2010 Security Announcement and Security signages
Security in the landside area is difficult to monitor and control due to public accessibility and the
limitations of implementing security measures. There are many obstacles to overcome while
keeping focused on terminal design, passenger throughput and the generation of revenues from
sources like retail operations. When considering basic requirements for airport security, all
landside area operations remain as vulnerable targets and yet basic tenants of physical security
are applicable. Improved technologies and prudent use of CCTV have been considered for
airport security in coordination with airport law enforcement, airport operations and the
cooperation of tenants.
The physical security measures and the operational security measures described in this
chapter shall be implemented to protect the landside, public areas of the airport.
The development and implementation of appropriate security measures shall be based on a

security risk assessment process carried out by the relevant authorities and/ or entities, in
collaboration with national and local authorities and the airport operator, to detect, deter
and mitigate the risk in landside areas.
Landside security measures should be adapted to the airport environment by States and
relevant entities, and implemented by the relevant local entities in accordance with national
requirements. These measures should be commensurate to the threat and risk, and should be
described in the Counter Terrorist Contingency Plan (CTCP).
Random Screening of passenger and baggage at entry gates on the basis of behavior detection
and risk assessment.
A coordinated approach - The Appropriate Authority, in coordination with all stakeholders

including law enforcement agencies (e.g. police, port authority and border control), aircraft
operators, security service providers, local public transport and retail representatives shall include
all concerned stakeholders when developing and implementing landside security measures.
Restricted
Handout Restricted
Page 85 of 252
Landside mitigation measures — key elements
Attacks on landside may be carried out on public areas of an airport where attackers may not
need to defeat the security measures normally in place prior to entering security restricted
areas. Potential modes of attack may include, but are not limited to, the following:
a) Person – Borne IED (PBIED) and MANPADS;

b) IED placed inside or near airport key points (non – suicide attack);
c) Armed assault at a public area of an airport;
d) Vehicle – Borne IED (VBIED) attacks and terminal ram-raiding; and
e) An attack by means of chemical, biological and/ or radiological agents.
Landside security arrangements:
It is necessary to ensure that security measures are established for landside areas to mitigate
the risk of and to prevent possible acts of unlawful interference in coordination with
relevant departments and agencies; and in accordance with risk assessments carried out by
the relevant authorities or entities. The following aspects will be implemented by airport
operator, ASG (CISF/ State Police), State/ UT administration and other entities concerned;
a) The identification of landside/ airside barriers;
b) CTCP, the mock drill frequencies, participation and appropriate responsibilities of all
concerned for coordination of landside security measures between relevant
departments, agencies.
c) Airport – level training programme to impart required security training for securing
landside areas.
d) Provision of physical security measures like check points/ barriers on the access road to
airport terminal and Bullet resistant equipment;
e) CCTV surveillance on the landside areas – coverage and recording system;
f) Security arrangements in the funnel area, particularly landing and take – off points;
g) Appropriate security measures for landside areas to mitigate the risk and to
prevent possible acts of unlawful interference in accordance with risk assessments
carried out by the relevant authorities.
Arrangements to mitigate the risk of vehicles being used to crash into the terminal building with
improvised explosive devices
(i) Manned vehicle inspection stations to control access in and around the airport
terminal during elevated threat levels are necessary at the airport to provide a
location at a safe distance in which to inspect vehicles that are approaching the airport
terminal on the access roadway. In some instances, vehicle inspection stations are also
necessary at vehicle parking locations if they are located within the proximity to the
terminal building. Consideration has been given to including the following features at
vehicle inspection stations:
(ii) Turnstiles roll gates, or vehicular crash barriers that will stop or impede “gate crashing”. A
Restricted
Handout Restricted
Page 86 of 252
sheltered checkpoint station has been provided on each vehicle gate to permit
maximum visibility over the immediate area of the gate and to provide easy access for
the guard to carry out inspecting duties.
(iii) Sufficient space has been provided to direct a person or vehicle to one side for
further inspection without blocking access for those following. Sufficient space has
also been provided for emergency vehicles and other authorized vehicles to by-pass the
vehicle inspection stations.
(iv) Communications, including emergency and duress alarms, between any sheltered
security checkpoint station and the airport security services office, as well as a duress
alarm by which emergency assistance may be summoned shall be provided at the
vehicle entry points on the landside.
(v) Vehicle check system with License Plate Reader (LPR) have been installed on the approach
road to the terminals.
(vi)Armed personnel at alighting and boarding point shall be deployed by ASG.
As per the BCAS Circular No. 2/2007 dated 14.2.2007, Crash Rated Electro hydraulic bollards
have been installed on the approach road to the airport terminals.
Arrangements to protect and police the passenger drop-off and pick-up areas and terminal
frontages to prevent vehicles being left unattended
(i) Roads to the terminal shall allow for un-congested flow during peak hours so as to ensure
law enforcement personnel have the ability to effectively monitor and move vehicles.
(ii) Drop off and loading zones have been set as far away from the terminal as practical to
minimize the blast effects of a vehicle bomb. The use of moving sidewalks or access to
luggage carts to help Passengers Bridge the gap shall be essential.
(iii) Emergency Vehicle (Fire and Police) Parking / staging areas near the terminal,
potential inspection areas, and congested areas have been provided.
(iv) During periods of heightened security, it shall be ensured that vehicles cannot gain
access to the terminal by bypassing inspection area. It will also be ensured to evaluate
the ability of the potential to “jump curbs”, travel across open landscaping, or drive the
wrong way down a road.
(v) In order to minimize traffic to the terminal, alternative routes to non-terminal
based operations, such as access to the Air Cargo operations, Rental Car agencies,
hotels, etc. have been provided. Clear signage and sufficient dedicated driving lanes to
permit drivers unfamiliar with the airport to find their destinations quickly and easily.
(vi) During periods of heightened security, exit points with alternate routes have
been provided to enable customers to choose other options or means to access the
terminal (such as buses or pedestrian). This will help in de-congestion and inspection
requirements. The security arrangement is vested with ASG.
(vii) CISF will ensure that No vehicle shall be left unattended at any point of time in front of
the terminal building. Immediately after drop-off and pick-up the vehicle shall be removed
from the frontage zone of the terminal.
(viii) It shall be the responsibility of CISF and local police to protect the passenger
drop-off and pick-up areas and terminal frontages to prevent vehicles being left
Restricted
Handout Restricted
Page 87 of 252
unattended which can be used to commit an act of unlawful interference.

(ix) NAKAS on approach road of the airport terminals shall be established for
checking of vehicles at these points;
Surveillance and patrols of the public areas of the terminal:
Securing the public area from terrorist attack to provide safe and secure environment at the
airport is of paramount importance to ensure safety and security of general public, passengers,
employees and materials. The following tasks shall be carried by the concerned entities at the
airport for the purpose:-
a) Deployment of armed patrols on the city side of the terminals

b) Patrolling in the parking lots on city side of the airport terminals;
c) Backup support on city side of the Terminals through deployment of QRT to strengthen
protection level and to react in the event of any contingency;
d) Hand Free RT sets for Morcha / pickets sentries for communication
e) Surveillance /Patrolling in General parking situated around 100 m away from the Terminals
f) Surveillance/ Patrolling in General parking lot
g) Surveillance /Patrolling in VIP parking lot
h) A dedicated road has been constructed for the movement of VIP Vehicles from and to
Terminals.
i) Only authorized VIP vehicles allowed parking in the VIP parking area by CISF,for which the
Airport Operator issue passes
j) VIP parking area will be secured by the ASG armed patrolling and barrier checking
k) Car parking area is situated at a distance of 100 meters (approx.) from the Terminal
building;
l) The vehicle check system installed at the entrance lane to Parking and it is under CCTV
surveillance.
m) Bullet Proof Morchas
n) The vehicles cleared from the road outside Terminals by local Traffic Police & assisted by
the ASG patrolling parties;
o) A component of CISF/ local police personnel shall be deployed for patrolling on the city
side.
p) Gypsies shall be provided for the QRT of ASG duly equipped with VHF sets;
q) Sufficient RT Sets shall be provided to the QRT of ASG;
r) 02 elevated concrete fortified Morchas / pickets , covered with cone type roofs & anti
grenade nets have been provided at entry naka to the terminals, departure and
arrival forecourt.
s) Hydraulic Bollards & Manual Tyre killers have been provided at all the roads leading to
terminals.
Procedures for the protection of tickets, boarding passes, baggage tags and other documents
The following procedures shall be followed:

Restricted
Handout Restricted
Page 88 of 252
(i) Responsibility of checking of travel documents and establishing the bonafide of

passengers, their baggage and cargo consignment to be transported by air rests with
the aircraft operator.
(ii) Documentation: Tickets presented by passengers shall be examined to confirm they are
genuine, in date and appropriate to the intended flight and destination. Where there
are doubts about the validity of any document produced by a passenger, check-in is
to be discontinued until the matter has been resolved satisfactorily.
(iii) Passenger identity checks: Each passenger’s passport or identity d o c u m e n t
shall be examined at check-in for normal security procedures, for immigration
obligations and for the prevention of fraud. The purpose of identity checks at check-in is
to:
(a) Establish the passport or identity document is genuine and that its period
of validity covers the period of the intended journey
(b) Confirm that the name on the booking matches the name on passport or
ID document
(c) Match the photograph in the passport or ID document with the passenger
and establish that any necessary visa are present (instructions on the
checking of visas are issued separately)
(d) When there is any doubt about a passenger's identity or the validity of
documents presented, check-in is to be discontinued until the doubt has
been cleared
Identity documents shall be carried in original by a bonafide passenger for security control
with respect to departing passengers:
i. Passport;
ii. Voter Photo Identity card issued by Election Commission of India;
iii. Aadhaar or m-Aadhaar issued by Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI);
iv. PAN Card issued by Income Tax Department; v. Driving License issued by RTO;
v. Service Photo Identity Card issued by State/Central Government, Public Sector
Undertakings, local bodies or Public Limited Companies;
vi. Student Photo Identity Cards issued by Government Institutions/Government
recognized Educational Institutions;
vii. Nationalized Bank Passbook with attested Photograph;
viii. Pension card / Pension documents having photograph of the passenger;
ix. Disability Photo ID Card/handicapped medical certificate issued by the respective
State/UT Governments/Administrations
Note:- * serial number ii to iv- if a passenger shows a photo ID Card from a digital locker account
of the departing passenger same shall be considered as a valid document for entry into the
aerodrome.
Arrangements around the check-in facilities to protect passengers on flights deemed to be of

higher risk

Restricted
Handout Restricted
Page 89 of 252
(i) Suspicious activities of persons and passengers shall be kept under surveillance by
CCTV and CISF surveillance staff and prompt action shall be taken to check such
activities to prevent any unlawful interference at the airport.
(ii) The Aviation Security Group's armed personnel shall be deployed in the check-in area to
keep an eye on the movement of passengers and staff in that area and react to a situation.
(iii) The airlines will conduct profiling of passengers prior to check in and any
suspicion will be reported to ASG personnel.
Security awareness public announcements ( e.g., warning passengers not to leave articles
unattended).
(i) Passengers and public awareness is very essential for effective implementation of civil
aviation security in the country. Therefore, frequent public announcement and display of
security signage shall done by the airport operator concerned as per the template
circulated vide BCAS Circular no. 22/2010 dated 1.12.2010
(ii) The passengers shall be advised not to leave the baggage unattended and also not to
touch any unidentified object. If any unidentified object is observed by the passengers,
employees, workers at the airport, they shall report the same to the nearest ASG personnel.
(iii) Signage about Police Post and Control Room details shall be displayed
conspicuously on the city side of the terminals of the airport and same is established by the
Airport Operator.
Possible mitigating measures - Landside security measures should be proportionate to the risk
while remaining operationally sustainable in the long run in order to ensure a reasonable balance
between aviation security, safety and operational requirements, and passenger facilitation.
Ground procedures:
Missiles are easily transportable and can be operated from any open area, including the flat roof
of a building. Consequently, landing, and to a greater extent, take-off paths, which are frequently
over open terrain, are the areas from which attacks are likely to be launched. Contingency plans
should therefore include:
a) A requirement for detailed surveys of probable launch sites to be conducted from time
to time and for similar inspections to be carried out immediately prior to landing or take-
off;
b) Surveillance of probable launch sites by irregularly scheduled security patrols;
c) Recruitment of local residents who can assist by immediately reporting any unusual or
suspicious activity;
d) Prior identification of high-risk flights for which special procedures will be required on
take-off and landing; and
e) Clearance of areas from which attacks may be launched so as to eliminate places of
concealment for launch sites.

Restricted
Handout RESTRICTED
Page 90 of 252
Module 07
Recognition of Explosive Devices and Offensive Weapons
Module Objective:
 Define and classify Prohibited articles

 Recognize prohibited articles
 Recognize dangerous goods
 List and identify the main components of improvised explosive and incendiary device
 Describe security response on discovering a prohibited article
Teaching Methods
 Demonstrations
 Progress Tests
Legal framework
Convention 1991 Montreal Convention on Marking of Plastic Explosives 1991
Annex 17
Standard 4.1.1 Each contracting State shall establish measures
to prevent weapons, explosives or any other
dangerous devices, articles or substances, which
may be used to commit an act of unlawful
interference, the carriage or bearing of which is
not authorised, from being introduced, by any
means whatsoever, on board an aircraft engaged
in civil aviation.

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 91 of 252
Aircraft Act 1934,

Section 10 Penalty for act in contravention of rule made under
this Act:- shall be punishable under Section 10
of Aircraft Act, 1934 with imprisonment which
may extend to two years and shall also be liable
to fine [which may extend to ten lakh rupees.]

Rule 20 Prohibition to carry weapon or explosive
Order 05/ 2005 Permissible & Prohibited Items to be carried by the
passenger
Restricted / Prohibited Article

“Articles which are, in the specific context of aviation security, defined as those
articles, devices or substances which may be used to commit an act of unlawful
interference against civil aviation or which may endanger the safety of the aircraft
and its occupants, or installations, or the public.”
Restricted articles are not allowed to be taken into security restricted areas and, if
feasible, prevented from entering public areas of an airport unless their carriage is
authorized and adequate safety and security measures are in place. Additionally,
restricted articles not allowed be taken inside an aircraft cabin or placed in an
aircraft hold without authorization.
For clarification and identification purposes, potential restricted articles are be

generically grouped as follows:
a) dangerous goods listed in Table 3-1 of Doc 9284:

i) prohibited for transport in accordance with Part 8. Unless proper measures are
taken, Part 8 dangerous goods cannot be carried in passenger baggage, but might
be acceptable as cargo;
ii) permitted for transport in accordance with Part 8, but whose carriage in the
cabin may be restricted by a security ban;
iii) permitted for transport in accordance with Part 8, but whose carriage in the
cabin may not be permitted under aircraft operator policy; or
iv) permitted for transport in accordance with Part 8, but whose carriage in the
cabin is not permitted; and
b) restricted articles that are not considered dangerous goods, but whose carriage is
nonetheless prohibited in the cabin and, for security reasons, are not transferable to hold

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 92 of 252
baggage.
Restricted Articles
Some articles though prohibited from carriage in the cabin of an aircraft may be
transported by passengers in their hold baggage so long as the articles will not
endanger the aircraft, are properly packed, and are authorized for carriage by the
airline operator concerned.
Persons tasked primarily with the detection of prohibited articles should also be aware that
there are certain articles or substances which are classified as “dangerous goods” by the ICAO
Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air. (Doc 9284).
Some of these articles and substances classified as prohibited articles will also fall
under the classification of dangerous goods. With the exception of a small number of
permitted items, dangerous goods must not be carried by passengers on their person
or in their carry-on baggage or hold baggage.
Any article not normally classified as Prohibited articles shall also be excluded
from carriage by passengers or any other person in the cabin of an aircraft or in
hold baggage, or carried into the Security Prohibited Area of an airport based
upon the threat assessment done by the Intelligence bureau.

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 93 of 252
Handling of Prohibited Items
Many prohibited articles may be carried by the public legally, but could be used to
commit an act of unlawful interference or would endanger the safety of the aircraft
when carried in the aircraft passenger cabin, may be transported as hold baggage
provided that they do not endanger the safety of the aircraft and are properly
packed, sealed and authorized for carriage by Aircraft Operator. Such items should
be processed in one of the following ways:
 Placed in the passengers hold baggage, unless the item would endanger
the safety of the aircraft.
 Confiscated and subsequently properly disposed of or destroyed.
 Confiscated and kept in storage by the airport authorities or relevant aircraft
operator for later return to the passenger.
 Removed and once properly prepared and packaged, transported in the
hold of the aircraft for later return to the passenger at his ticketed
destination.
Categories of Restricted Articles
1 Weapons
2 Dangerous Articles
3 Dangerous substances
4 Explosive
Category -1: Weapons
Weapons are articles designed to kill, injure, immobilize or incapacitate a person.
EXAMPLES OF WEAPONS
Handguns, flare guns, blow guns and darts, electric dart guns, rifles, shotguns pellet
guns, spear guns and dart, knives with blades over 10 cms, mace, tear gas shell,
martial arts weapons, pepper spray, blades or spiked finger rings and wrist bands,
sword canes and umbrella swords etc.

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 94 of 252
Category 2 : Dangerous articles

Any article that can be used to threaten the safety of the aircraft.
Any article that can be used to threaten the safety of the aircraft Starter pistols, toy
guns, replica of weapons, sharp pointed scissors and letter openers, chisels, ice
picks, large Screwdrivers and knitting needles, pocket knives with blades over 4cm
but less than 10cms, chilly powder etc.
Category 3: Dangerous Substances
Substances which are capable of posing risk to the health of passengers and crew or
the security / safety of aircraft or property.
 Flammable liquid fuel e.g. Petrol / gasoline, diesel, lighter fluid, alcohol, ethanol.
 Gas & gas containers e.g. Butane, propane, acetylene, oxygen - in large volume.
 Non safety matches
 Turpentine & paint thinner
 Acids and Alkalis e.g. spillable ‘wet’ batteries
 Corrosive or Bleaching Substances - e.g. mercury, chlorine
Handout RESTRICTED
Page 95 of 252
 Radioactive material. - e.g. Medicinal or commercial isotopes

 Poisons
 Infectious or biological hazardous material. - e.g. infected blood, bacteria and
viruses
 Material capable of spontaneous ignition or combustion.
 Fire extinguishers
Additional Items Prohibited for Flights assessed at Higher Risk
A risk assessment made by individual member states may indicate that certain
aircraft operations are at higher risk of an act of unlawful interference being
committed against them. In these circumstances individual member states may
wish to include one or more of the following items in the states’ list of Prohibited
articles which may not be carried on the person and within cabin or hold baggage
as appropriate.
 Knitting needles
 Knives with blades less than 6 cm
 Metal cutlery
 Scissors with blades less than 6 cm
 Liquid Aerosol and Gels (LAG)- each item not exceeding 100ml, total 1litre allowed

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 96 of 252
Category 4: Explosives
Material that causes a sudden, almost instantaneous, release of gas, heat, and
pressure, accompanied by loud noise when subjected to a certain amount of
shock, pressure, or temperature.
The vast majority of explosives manufactured are lawfully used. The armed
forces use propellants to propel bullets, shells and rockets and explosives to
destroy a target. Pyrotechnic materials are used in signaling, in safety devices
such as car air bags, and for entertainment in the form of fireworks and
theatrical pyrotechnics
Low explosives
For many years, black powder was the most common low explosive used throughout
world. But black powder or gun powder as it was commonly called, produced a
large amount of smoke and was dangerous to use.
Pyrotechnic materials and propellants are often known as low explosives. The main
distinction between these materials and high explosives is in the way that they
produce their effect.
Handout RESTRICTED
Page 97 of 252
Pyrotechnics and propellants, when initiated by heat, rapidly change from a small
volume solid or liquid to a large volume of hot gases. Pyrotechnic materials and
propellants are easily bought in the form of matches, fireworks or firearms
propellants or can be improvised. They are therefore commonly misused by terrorists
in incendiaries and blast bombs. The “pipe bomb” is usually a length of steel pipe
with screw-on end caps, filled with a pyrotechnic material.
High explosives
As far as explosives detection is concerned, most modern high explosives

fall into several groups:
 Nitro-glycerine based e x p l o s i v e s are often called “commercial explosives”.

Trade or generic names for Nitroglycerine explosives include “Dynamite”,
“Gelignite”, “Blasting Gelatine”, “Special Gel” and “Frangex”, and usually come
as paper- wrapped sticks.
 TNT based. TNT (trinitrotoluene) is a hard, yellowish white solid that can easily
be melted and cast. For this reason it has long been used to fill bombs and
shells. TNT is sometimes found as blocks and is often supplied in the form of
flakes. Terrorists have sometimes disguised TNT by casting it into any shape.
 Plastic explosives. Plastic explosives are usually mixtures of the powerful
explosives RDX (cyclonite or hexogen) or PETN (pentaerithritol tetra nitrate)
with oil or grease, making a puttylike material. Plastic explosives are easily
moulded into any shape and have many military and industrial uses. They are
commonly used by terrorists. It is well known that a few hundred grammes of
plastic explosives can destroy an airliner. “C4”, “PE4” and “Semtex H” are well
known plastic explosives.
 Fuel/oxidant mixtures. Fuel/oxidant mixtures comprise something that burns,
such as oil, and an oxygen-containing chemical which liberates oxygen quickly
on heating, such as ammonium nitrate. Mixtures of almost any fuel with any
oxidant will produce either a pyrotechnic or high explosive effect.
Most modern commercial explosives are fuel/oxidant mixtures. ANFO
(ammonium nitrate and fuel oil) and “Power gel” are examples.

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 98 of 252
LOW EXPLOSIVES HIGH EXPLOSIVES
It burns It explodes
It requires ignition It requires detonation
Magnitude of destruction is less Magnitude of destruction is more
Unsafe to handle Safe to handle
Unsafe to store Safe to store
Needs confinement to explode Does not need confinement to explode
Hygroscopic in nature Non-Hygroscopic in nature
Identification of explosive
S. No Explosive Color Physical Form
1 RDX White Crystalline
2 PETN White Crystalline
3 Sheet Expl White Flexible
4 C–4 White Plastic/Putty like substances
5 TNT Pale Yellow Block (Brick Shaped)
Cartridge/plastic mass
6 PEK Yellow
7 Tetryl/CE Yellow Granular/Powder
8 Cordtex Chocolate / White / Orange Cord
9 LTPE Black Flexible/cartridge
10 Semtex Black/orange Slurry
11 Gun powder Black Granular
Pyrotechnic
S .No Explosive Color Physical Form

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 99 of 252
1 Safety Fuse Dirty black Yarn/jute bounded
Civil Explosives
1 Gelatin Yellow Stick
2 Dynamites Yellow Cartridge wrapped in paper
3 ANFO Greenish Slurry with white crystal of AN
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Components
An IED is the explosive device designed, fabricated, placed and activated with an
intention of causing injury/death or to create panic and chaos amongst public or to cause
intensive damage to property. IED’s could be of any size and shape.
IED could be manufactured in any innocuous objects such as Brief case, Suitcase, Tiffin
carrier, Sweet packet, Gift item, Radio, Laptop computer, TV, VCR, Telephone, Cycle,
Scooter, Car, Vehicle etc. It may be operated electrically or mechanically and designed to
explode while handling or by use of any delay mechanism or remote control etc. Its
components are:
• Explosive material (main charge)
• Detonator
• Power source
• Switch/ Mechanism
Explosive
To attack the aviation industry the terrorist will prefer using high explosive as it is safe to
carry, small quantity is sufficient to cause a huge damage, it is also easy to conceal.
Detonator
There are various devices used for initiating explosives and connecting charges. These
include detonators, fuses and shock tube. A detonator is a small cylinder containing an
initiating explosive and, usually, a “booster” charge of high explosive. It is used to initiate

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 100 of 252
the detonation of high explosives. In blasting and demolition, the detonator is normally
stored separately from the high explosives and inserted only when the charges are placed
and the area is evacuated.
 Non Electric detonators are open at one end. A fuse is inserted into the open end and the
spark from the fuse impinges on the initiating explosive and fires the detonator. The plain
detonator is sometimes used with percussion caps and other devices which can produce a
flame. This is half filled and half empty for inserting safety fuse.
 Electric detonators have wires emerging at one end. They are fired by passing an electric
current through the wires. In terrorist and criminal use, a battery together with an improvised
electrical delay circuit (timer and power unit) is commonly used to initiate the detonator.

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 101 of 252
Power Source Power sources of bomb could be from normal batteries such as 1.5V,
pencil and torch cells, 6V, 9V etc. There are flat batteries, which can be used for letter
bombs. Latest batteries manufactured in pure plastic containers, which are difficult to
view in x‐ray machine.
IED Initiating Mechanism or Switches used in an IED
These are also known as Bomb Initiating Mechanism. It normally is based on four principles
they employ such as:
 ANTI HANDLING
 DELAYED
 AMBIENT CONDITION
 REMOTE CONTROL/ COMMAND

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 102 of 252
ANTI HANDLING
Anti-Handling Bombs when it is inadvertently removed, lifted or opened it may explode.
Anti-handling switches may vary from a small micro switch to improvised switch such as cloth-
peg or loop made from normal electrical wire. It is otherwise called as “Victim operated
switch”.
DELAYED
Delayed Bombs delay was achieved by normal clockwork mechanism like watch or
timepiece. Delay can also be used by chemicals cleverly concealed in ordinary objects
and these chemicals when come in contact with Improvised explosives causes fire or
explosion. Chemicals such as sulphuric acid, cupric chloride, nitric acid slowly eats away the
metal, the breaking of metallic wire will trigger the firing mechanism.
AMBIENT CONDITION Switches
The triggering mechanism is activated by environmental factors such as gas, smoke acoustic,
barometric, humidity, proximity, light, sound etc.
REMOTE CONTROL
Normal remote control bombs are activated by transmission of electromagnetic waves.
Type of Switches / Mechanism
Anti Handling Delayed Ambient Condition Remote Control
Pressure Clock Work Proximity Radio control

Pressure release Electronic Gas/ smoke FM Transmission
Timer PTD sensitive Command wire
Pull
Timer Barometric/ Infra-red beam
Collapsing Thermal delay humidity Laser
Circuit
Water Drip X-ray sensitive Cell phone
Tension
Water Add Infrared Pager
Vibratory
Pyrotechnics sensitive Metal
Lift Satellite Phones
sensitive
Acoustic sensors
Light / Dark
sensitive
EFFECTS OF EXPLOSION
a) Blast Effect
High pressure -Up to 40, 00,000 PSI.
Velocity of Detonation of TNT -25,000 KMPH.
b) Fragmentation
Speed of fragments may be up to 6000 KMPH.
c) Thermal
High Temperature of 3000 – 4000 0 C.

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 103 of 252
d) Translation
Bodies are lifted 30 to 60 feet above ground level and thrown 100 mts. away.
e) Concussion
In the air a vacuum or suction effect is created behind the moving blast wave.
f) Earth and water shock
Damage takes place miles away.
g) Secondary effects
Fire, damage to building, vehicles etc
It is estimated that 50 PSI of pressure cause eardrum to rupture and 250 PSI of pressure
applied on lungs of a human being, can cause his death. The high pressure of 40 lakh
pounds per square inch (PSI) and high velocity of atmosphere moving at thousands of
KMPH will cause death to anyone situated in the blast zone. This is why we find many
people are killed beyond recognition at the point of detonation.
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN IED AND IID:
IED IID
Four components (Explosives , detonator , Three components {Incendiary material (Low

power source and switch) Explosives) , Initiating mechanism and Igniter
( Lighter)})
It require detonator It requires Igniter
Magnitude of destruction is more Magnitude of destruction is less
Requires triggering mechanism Required ignition mechanism
Difference between Bomb and Improvised explosive device.

BOMB IED
Service Explosives Improvised Explosives

Made by ordnance factory Made by Anti National elements(ANES)
Standard mechanism used Improvised mechanism used
Used by Army & Security forces for safety Used by ANES to kill innocent public & create
& security of the country terror in public
Very difficult to diffuse as mechanism is
Can be diffused easily as mechanism is known
unknown.
Places of Concealment of Explosives
 On the person
 In cabin baggage
 In hold baggage
Handout RESTRICTED
Page 104 of 252
 In Cargo or Mail
 In vehicles
Methods of Concealment
It can be Disguised, Dismantle & Camouflaged
 Explosives in Shaving Cream Tubes

 Liquid Explosives in Whisky Or Wines Bottles
 Explosives in Birth Day Cake
 Blasting Gelatin Embedded in Chocolate
 TNT Cast in Toy Shapes, Doll Head, animals, Wall Painting.
 IED in false Bottom of Baggage.
 Explosive Jacket.
 Preparation Of Explosive From Local Material
 Detonator Hidden In Pen, Calculators and Shoe Sole.

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 105 of 252
ACTION ON DETECTION OF EXPLOSIVES DO’s

 Notify Supervisor
 Evacuate immediately to a safe distance.
 Open all windows and doors
 Place sand bags around the suspected object
 Inform bomb disposal squad.
 Inform fire brigade, hospital and ambulance.
 Handle the package alone if you are duty bound to handle.
DONT’s
 Do not touch
 Do not pass any Metallic Objects
 Do not throw Water
 Do not open
 Do not unwrap
 Do not shake or handle
 Do not turn or unscrew
 Do not cut strings
 Do not lift or remove covers
Modern Methods of Explosive Detection (EDDS & EDS)
Most explosives consist of organic compounds of carbon, nitrogen, hydrogen and oxygen.
The explosive detector is designed to detect these organic compounds. When contraband
has narcotics or explosives are handled by a person it leaves microscopic particles behind
the hand and clothes. The same person if touches the handle of bag, zip or lock may
harbor microscopic quantities of substances. These microscopic substances can be detected
with help of explosive vapour / trace detectors.
TYPES OF EXPLOSIVES DETECTORS:
 ETD
 EVD
 Canine (Sniffer dog)
Principle of Explosive Vapor Detector (EVD) Operation:
The explosive vapor detectors are designed to capture vapor emitted from the explosive.
Success of these explosive vapor detectors depend upon sensitivity, selectivity, vapor
concentrations and residence time in which the bomb is concealed and placed in the
environment.
It works on the principle of Gas chromatography.

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 106 of 252
Principle of Explosives Trace Detectors Operation (ETD)
In this method, the particles/ traces of explosives are taken from surfaces. Collection of
sample from surface of bag is very important for better detection. A specialized paper disk
known as sample trap is used to swipe the contaminated surface and inserted into the desk
top analyzer for analysis.
E T D works on the p rinciple of ION Mobility Spectrometry.

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 107 of 252
Advantages and Disadvantages of ETD / EVD

Advantages:
 Portable
 Auto-calibrated.
 Can detect all types of explosives
 Constant adjustment of operating conditions in line with the changes in the atmosphere.
Disadvantages:
 As a machine it may malfunction.
 It may give false alarm.
 Expensive
 Only certified staff can operate.
 Airtight materials will defeat sampling technique, vapour will not be available.
 Warm-up time 20-30 minutes

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 108 of 252
Module 08 Building and Area Search Procedure
Module Objective
 Describe building and search area procedure

 List the three basic types of “sterile” passenger holding areas
 Conduct a physical search of a holding area for prohibited items
 Understand response action to deal with “suspect” items located in a holding area in
accordance with Standard Operating Procedures
 Maintain the sterility of a holding area
Teaching Methods
 Demonstrations
 Progress Tests
Annex 17 Standard 5.1.3

Each Contracting State shall ensure that arrangements are
made to investigate, render safe and/or dispose of, if
necessary, suspected dangerous devices or other potential
hazards at airports.
General Principles for Building and Area search

For searches to be effective they should be conducted systematically by staff familiar
Handout RESTRICTED
Page 109 of 252
with the area concerned. The main reason for this being that outside personnel will be
unlikely to know the layout of the aircraft or terminal building and the various places in
which a device could be concealed and therefore will not so easily be able to spot
anything which is out of place or unfamiliar. Search plans should be prepared in advance
and staff trained to use them. A search Coordinator must be nominated to provide
control of the search process and if necessary take the decision to evacuate.
Searches should be briefed on action to be initiated if suspicious object is found. When a
suspect device is discovered the possibility of secondary devices should not be discounted.
The use of hand-held communications is useful for coordination of the search and is often
the only way of ensuring appropriate and speedy lifesaving procedures for search and
evacuation. However, once a suspect device has been located those using hand-held
communications should immediately move away and ensure that they and anyone else in
the area move outside the cordon as quickly as possible. Radios should not be used to
transmit within 25 metres of a suspect device.
Before starting the search, strict control of access must be implemented in the area being
searched, this is necessary to ensure devices are not introduced into the area once it has
been cleared.
Effective and systematic searching takes time, if the warning received indicated a possible
detonation time for the device which will prevent a thorough search being conducted
then the best and safest option is evacuation of all personnel to a safe area and
waiting for the arrival of specialist explosive disposal personnel.
Sterile Holding Area concepts / Basic Screening plans:

• Decentralized, usually at the aircraft boarding gate
• Semi-centralized, usually after the duty-free shop area

• Centralized, usually before the duty-free shop area
Decentralized
Screening Points at Boarding Gates
TERMINAL
1 2 3
Concourse Pier 4
7 6 5 Screening
Points
Boarding Gates
Decentralized Screening: Screening of passengers is carried out immediately before

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 110 of 252
boarding at the boarding gate, jet-way or terminal door leading directly to an aircraft or
adjacent apron area. Passengers screening takes place when the passenger boarding
process begins.
• Requires screening point at each boarding gate

• Passengers screened immediately before boarding
• Staff/equipment must be available to handle optimum passenger load in limited time
• Screening point manned only when screening is in progress
Semi-centralized
Screening Points at Holding Areas
Screening
Points
1 2 3 Mobile
Lounge
Concourse Pier
4
7 6 5
Boarding Gates
Holding area
Semi-Centralized: Screening of passengers is carried out at the entrance to an area

designed to hold all passengers for a particular flight. This holding area is secured (i.e.
made “sterile”) by means of walls or suitable barriers, together with controlled access
points. The holding area may also be a vehicle designed to carry passengers to a distant
aircraft. Screening takes place as passengers arrive at the holding area and passengers
remain within the holding area until the boarding actually begins.

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 111 of 252
Centralized
Screening Point at Concourse
TERMINAL
1 2 3
Pier 4
7 6 5
Screening
Point Boarding Gates
Centralized: Screening of passengers is carried out at the entrance to a concourse

containing several gates, with no specific relationship to a particular flight. Screening can
therefore take place a considerable time before a particular flight is due to depart
Passenger remain in the concourse area until a short time before their flight commences.
PHYSICAL SEARCH OF A HOLDING AREA FOR PROHIBITED ITEMS
Initiation of a Search
The Coordinator can initiate a search by:

 Sending a message to the search teams over a public address system. It should be
coded to avoid unnecessary disruption and alarm to the public;
 Use of personal radios, pagers or mobile/cell phones; or
 A telephone cascade system: the Coordinator rings, say, three members, who in
turn each ring a further three members and so on until all the teams have been
alerted.
What searchers should look for?
It is difficult to give guidance to search teams about the appearance of suspect

explosive devices as they can be disguised in many ways.
Searchers should be briefed to

 Look for unidentified objects or anything:
 That should not be there
 That cannot be accounted for
Handout RESTRICTED
Page 112 of 252
 That is out of place

 Do NOT TOUCH suspicious objects
 Notify the Search Coordinator of progress of search and discovery of any suspicious
objects.
 Mark the location of suspicious object with a prominent object (but not touching the
device)
 Withdraw from the immediate area and await further instructions
Guidance for Searching Terminal Buildings
Search Plans
It is vital to have search plans prepared in advance, and staff trained in them. The objective
is to make sure that the whole terminal building is checked as quickly and effectively as possible.
Search plans must be readily available at all times, architect’s drawings, checked for accuracy
and appropriately adapted, are suitable for this purpose. Sufficient spare copies should be
available for use during search operations. Searchers and the Coordinator can then eliminate
sections from the plan as they are declared clear.
Search procedure /technique:-
There are three types of search procedure/technique. Before searching an area, searcher
first should divide the area into three level.
Search Sectors
 The first step in preparing a search plan is to divide the terminal building into Sectors. The
building may already be segregated into various zones and therefore it may be convenient make
these the sectors. Each sector must be of manageable size for the number of searchers
nominated to it. Use 02 searcher per room or an area of 250 Sq.ft. Remember that effective and
systematic searching takes time.
The sector may be one large room - such as a check-in area, concourse, baggage reclaim area,
or perhaps a number of small airline operations offices in an office suite. It is most important
that cloakrooms, stairs, corridors and lifts are included in the search plans and also car parks and
other areas outside the building.

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 113 of 252
Search Teams
Search teams should be formed from staff nominated to search those areas with
which they are most familiar. Numbers required will depend upon the size of the search
task. Reserves should be appointed in case of absence. Staff should be trained and
rehearsed.
Search Priorities
Those areas which are to be used as evacuation assembly areas, together with those
areas where the greatest number of the public or staff are likely to be vulnerable, should be
searched first. Consider also, as a priority, those public areas to which the perpetrator may
have had easy access such as restrooms, elevators, stairways and hallways. Those areas to
which access is normally controlled may be searched last. Do not overlook car parks, the
outside area of the terminal building and the perimeter.
How to Search
The conduct of searches will depend on local circumstances and local knowledge. The
overriding principle is that they should be conducted in a systematic and thorough manner
so that no part is left unchecked. The searchers need to practice, to get a feel for the logical
progression through their area (whether it be in a terminal building, baggage reclaim area or
administrative or operations office suite) and the length of time it will take.
With this in mind the method outlined in this typical example is of a Room Search in a sector,
it should be adapted to reflect the peculiarities of the actual area being searched.

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 114 of 252
Example Room Search

 A search should begin at the entrance to the room.
 Each searcher or team should first stand still and look around the room.
 They should note the contents of the room and make a quick assessment of those areas
that will need special attention.
 They should look for any unusual lights (including small light sources knows as Light
Emitting Diodes which are often used in the arming circuits of improvised explosive
devices).
 They should also listen carefully for any unusual noises - particularly ticking or whirring
sounds.
If anything unusual is seen, the searcher or team should alert the Coordinator who will
decide whether to evacuate the building.
If nothing unusual is seen, the search should begin.
The search should be conducted methodically, moving in one direction around the area to be
searched. It should be carried out in three sweeps.
 The first sweep:

- Around the edges of the room,
- Walls from top to bottom and the floor area immediately beneath the wall.
- Look inside fireplaces,
- Behind curtains and window blinds,
- Behind and beside furniture around the edges of the room.
- The sweep should finish at the doorway where it began.
 The second sweep:
- Furniture and the floor.
- Furniture should not be removed but drawers should be opened and searched
- Gaps in and under furniture should be explored.
- If the floor covering shows signs of recent disturbance, it should be lifted.
 The third sweep:
- Cover the ceiling,
- Light Fixtures
- Removable panels
- Areas in which objects might be concealed.
- Start at one corner and systematically search the whole surface.
After the search has been completed, and if nothing has been found, the Coordinator should
Handout RESTRICTED
Page 115 of 252
be informed immediately so that the sector can be marked ‘CLEAR’ on the search plans.
Searching should continue until the whole area has been cleared. Do not forget that
secondary devices are not unknown.
If a suspicious object is found follow the golden rules:

 DO NOT TOUCH OR MOVE THE OBJECT.
 If possible leave a distinctive marker near (not touching) the object.
 Move away from the device to a designated control point, leaving lights on.
 Inform search team leader or Coordinator.
 The Coordinator should implement the evacuation plan.
 Stay at the control point and draw an accurate plan of the location of the suspicious
package or device for the assistance of the police and explosive disposal experts.
 The person finding the object should be immediately available for interview by the
police or security services.
 Don’t use more searcher than necessary.
 Use 02 searcher per room or an area of 250 Sq.ft
 Mark the area after searched
 Don’t assume that only one device is planted
 Don’t trust anything and don’t assume the face value of objects.
If the item detected is a weapon:
 Immediately safeguard the item; and
 Notify the search coordinator (supervisor).

If the item located is an explosive device or object that appears to be an explosive device:
 Do not touch the object;
 Mark the location; and
 Notify the search coordinator (supervisor).
Record the following details in screening point log, when an item is found
 Location of holding area
 Time and date searched and by whom
 Result of Search
 Details of item(s) detected
 Action taken on finding the item(s)/object(s)
 Name of person who found it.
 Time and date of notification
 Action taken for safeguarding/disposal of item(s)/object(s)
Handout RESTRICTED
Page 116 of 252
Module 9 Patrolling & Guarding
Module Objective:
 Know the principle of Defense in Depth
 Understand how physical barriers contribute to Defense in Depth

 Describe how security patrols & guards fit into the concept of security
 Know vulnerable areas in physical barriers at the local airport
 Understand Standard Operating Procedures for dealing with signs of interference or intrusion
of the airport physical barriers
 Comply with the airport regulations governing the airside movement of security vehicles
 An overview of the legislation.
Teaching Methods
 Demonstrations
 Progress Tests
Annex 17
Standard 4.8 Each contracting State shall ensure that security measures in
landside areas are established to mitigate possible threats of
act of unlawful interference in accordance with a risk
assessment carried out by the relevant authorities
Standard 4.2.3 Each contracting state shall ensure that identification systems are
established in respect of persons and vehicles in order to
prevent unauthorized access to airside areas and security
prohibited areas. Identity shall be verified at designated
checkpoints before access is allowed access to airside areas
and security prohibited areas.
Aircraft (Security) Rules 2011, Rule 6

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 117 of 252
Every aerodrome operator shall construct a perimeter wall around the aerodrome.
Aircraft (Security) Rules 2011, Rule 7

Provision of lighting, road for patrolling and observation posts
Airports and aircraft are subject to attack. One of the security measures used to protect
airport and aircraft is by carrying out patrolling and guarding of aviation facilities. During
increased threat conditions it may be necessary to increase security of the airport terminal and
restrict access to only those persons who are actually travelling on a flight that day and
authorized airport and airline personnel.
Basic Concept of Security
• DETER
Observable security infrastructure such as fences, lights, sensors and CCTV and the
obvious presence of well trained and technically skilled security personnel, contributes to
this profile.
• DELAY
Security fences, anti-climbing devices, installation security, and securing of the aircraft
doors can contribute to delay, sufficient to increase the likelihood of apprehension by
security personnel, other airport personnel
• DETECT
Preventing acts of unlawful interference by detecting. Detecting attempts by unauthorized
persons to gain access to aircraft, security restricted areas or controlled areas; detecting
prohibited articles on persons and baggage. Deployment of security personnel at static
security posts or mobile security patrols, may contribute to the detection process.
• RESPOND
Effective response to a security incident requires the availability of security personnel at
short notice to attend the scene of the occurrence within the time bought by the delay
and detection systems in place.
To deter an unlawful act against civil aviation requires the presentation of a security profile,
sufficient to persuade a would-be perpetrator that the airport, airline or air cargo is a "hard
target" and that there is a high risk of failure and/or apprehension.
Defense in Depth
Defense in Depth (also referred to sometimes as layers of security) and that layers of security
measures build upon each other to protect aviation and operations. Therefore if one layer fails
or is deficient, next is designed to prevent the act of unlawful interference being successful.
These layers may consist of:
 Security Restricted areas and Restricted areas
 Airport identification permits for personnel and vehicles
 Physical Security measures ( fences, gates, locks, patrols etc)

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 118 of 252
 Detection systems for weapons and Explosives

Principles of airport protection based on:
 Controlling movement of people and vehicles
 Dividing airport into non-restricted and restricted areas
 Protecting airport with physical barriers
 Preventing penetration of airport barriers
NON RESTRICTED AND RESTRICTED AREA SEPARATION ACHIEVED BY:

 Provision of physical barriers such as fences, use of buildings and natural obstacles
 Limiting authorized access to controlled gates and designated access points
INTEGRITY OF BARRIER CARRYING OUT FOOT OR MOBILE PATROL:
 Search guards protecting access points and vulnerable facilities, building and
installations
 Security personnel carrying out foot or mobile patrols
PHYSICAL BARRIERS
Objectives of Physical Barriers

 Define area to be protected
 Create physical and psychological deterrent

 Delay intrusion and assist detection/apprehension
 Provide controlled access points for people and vehicles
Elements of a Physical Barrier
 Effective security fencing as per ICAO standard
 Efficient security lighting

 Limited access control points
 Use of building, structures. natural barriers such as water, geographic terrain
 Any access points must be protected
Integrity of barriers maintained by
 Security guards protecting access points and vulnerable airport facilities, buildings and
installations
Handout RESTRICTED
Page 119 of 252
 Security personnel carrying out foot or mobile patrols
ADDITIONAL PROTECTION REQUIRED FOR:

 Landside/airside storm sewers, ditches protected by grilles, bars, railings
 monitored by surveillance, patrols, inspections, anti-intrusion alarm devices and additional
lighting In order to be effective physical barriers require guarding and patrolling by security
personnel
 Guarding is basically a static duty
 Patrolling is a mobile function either by foot or in a vehicle
 Increased threat situations require additional guards and patrols
Security patrolling
OBJECTIVE OF SECURITY PATROLLING IS TO:

 Deter and prevent unauthorized access
 Detect attacks and attempted attacks against airport buildings, aircraft, installations
 Ensure effectiveness of physical barriers (door, windows and openings)
 Respond quickly to attacks and attempted attacks
SECURITY GUARDING

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 120 of 252
Objective Of Security Guarding Is To:

 Protect vulnerable areas/vital airport facilities
 Control movement of people/vehicles

 Deter and prevent attacks against airport facilities
Vulnerable Points in Barriers Requiring Special Protection:

 Places where natural barriers used as boundary
 Waterways and storm sewers, service ducts
 Buildings used to form part of boundary
 Uncontrolled access points for vehicles (e.g. public roadways running through airport areas)
Methods for Airport protection
 Effective boundary fencing
 Efficient security lighting
 Controlled movement of people/vehicles
 Buildings protected by physical means (door locks, window bars, alarm systems)
Vulnerable barrier points physically protected (landside/airside sewers, storm drains

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 121 of 252
Guidelines Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) #
Security Guard Duties
Dress
Security Guards assigned to patrol duties are to be dressed smartly in a clean uniform; a high
standard of
Personal appearance is required at all times. They are to ensure that their actions comply with
the Security Unit code of conduct and always present the [state name of airport] in a positive
way.
Patrol Area
[Describe area to be patrolled e.g SRA Apron Area & Controlled Area]
Duration of duties
These duties are to be carried out during the hours of [state time frame – example 06:00 to
20:00hrs]
unless instructed otherwise by the Security Team Leader.
Duties to be performed
When on duty personnel are to:
 Carry out a mobile / foot patrol of the area shown in the attached map.
 Before starting patrol duties and using a vehicle carry out a search of the vehicle and
immediate area for Prohibited items.
 Ensure the vehicle is serviceable and note any unserviceable equipment in the log book. If
the vehicle is considered dangerous to drive then it is not to be used and the situation
reported to the team leader.
 Ensure that the vehicle has a serviceable orange anti-collision light which is to be switched
on when the vehicle is moving within the SRA or controlled area.
 Wear a high visibility jacket or vest at all times when operating the vehicle or moving
around the SRA or Controlled area on foot.
 When on patrol carry out the following specific duties: examples
o Check [list specific buildings] for evidence of intrusion.

o Verify the security of aircraft on remote stands. [state location ]
o Patrol specific vulnerable areas [state location]in perimeter fencing.
o Check all cargo containers (ISO - ULD) and cargo storage areas.
o Escort persons, aircraft as detailed by the Team Leader.
o Ensure all persons operating within the SRA are displaying a valid SRA pass.
 The vehicle and all security equipment is to be operated properly as instructed during
training. Any break down or unserviceable equipment that occurs during the shift is to be
reported in writing to the security manager through the team leader.
Handout RESTRICTED
Page 122 of 252
 Any unserviceable equipment or tasks not completed are to be briefed to the relief shift on
take over.
Action on attempt of unauthorized access
If an unauthorized person attempts to gain access to the SRA or Controlled Area inform the
duty team leader and police by the quickest possible means then detain the person if possible.
Rest and toilet breaks
Rest and toilet breaks are to be taken as notified by the Team Leader.
Communication
Communication from this post is to be made using the radio using the call-sign. [state radio
call-sign for post ].
A communications check is to be carried out every 60 minutes with [the central security control
centre] to ensure the communications equipment is serviceable.
Note: Communications check every 30 minutes during times of darkness.
Reporting procedures for security incidents
All security incidents and other occurrences, which may become the subject of a complaint or
comment about [state name of airport], are to be made both verbally and in writing
according to the standard security department report format and procedures.
The chain of command for reporting procedures is [state chain of command – example
Security Team Leader - Deputy Security Manager – Security Manager.]
Airport Safety Rules
The attached safety rules are to be followed by all security unit personnel whilst operating within
the SRA and Controlled areas of [state name of airport],

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 123 of 252
Guidelines Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) #
Security Patrol Duties Dress
Security Guards assigned to patrol duties are to be dressed smartly in a clean uniform; a high
standard of personal appearance is required at all times. They are to ensure that their actions
comply with the Security Unit code of conduct and always present the [state name of airport] in a
positive way.
Patrol Area
[Describe area to be patrolled e.g SRA Apron Area & Controlled Area]
Duration of duties
These duties are to be carried out during the hours of [state time frame – example 06:00 to
20:00hrs]
unless instructed otherwise by the Security Team Leader.
Duties to be performed
When on duty personnel are to:

• Carry out a mobile / foot patrol of the area shown in the attached map.
• Before starting patrol duties and using a vehicle carry out a search of the vehicle and immediate
area for Prohibited items.
• Ensure the vehicle is serviceable and note any unserviceable equipment in the log book. If the
vehicle is considered dangerous to drive then it is not to be used and the situation reported to
the team leader.
• Ensure that the vehicle has a serviceable orange anti-collision light which is to be switched on
when the vehicle is moving within the SRA or controlled area.
• Wear a high visibility jacket or vest at all times when operating the vehicle or moving around the
SRA or Controlled area on foot.
• When on patrol carry out the following specific duties: examples
 Check [list specific buildings] for evidence of intrusion.

 Verify the security of aircraft on remote stands. [state location ]
 Patrol specific vulnerable areas [state location] in perimeter fencing.
 Check all cargo containers (ISO - ULD) and cargo storage areas.
 Escort persons, aircraft as detailed by the Team Leader.
 Ensure all persons operating within the SRA are displaying a valid SRA pass.
• The vehicle and all security equipment is to be operated properly as instructed during training.
Any break down or unserviceable equipment that occurs during the shift is to be reported in
writing to the security manager through the team leader.

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 124 of 252
• Any unserviceable equipment or tasks not completed are to be briefed to the relief shift on take
over.
Action on attempt of unauthorized access
If an unauthorized person attempts to gain access to the SRA or Controlled Area inform the duty
team leader and police by the quickest possible means then detain the person if possible.
Rest and toilet breaks
Rest and toilet breaks are to be taken as notified by the Team Leader.
Communication
Communication from this post is to be made using the radio using the call-sign. [state radio call-
sign for post ].
A communications check is to be carried out every 60 minutes with [the central security control
centre]
to ensure the communications equipment is serviceable.
Note: Communications check every 30 minutes during times of darkness.
Reporting procedures for security incidents
All security incidents and other occurrences, which may become the subject of a complaint or
comment About [state name of airport], are to be made both verbally and in writing according to
the standard security department report format and procedures.
The chain of command for reporting procedures is [state chain of command – example Security
Team Leader - Deputy Security Manager – Security Manager.]
Airport Safety Rules
The attached safety rules are to be followed by all security unit personnel whilst operating within
the SRA and Controlled areas of [state name of airport],
This SOP comes into force from / Date of Issue Replaces SOP # dated **/**/**
(which is to be destroyed under secure conditions)
Name of Issuing Authority

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 125 of 252
Module – 10 Screening and Searching of Passengers
Module Objectives
The purpose of this module is to:

• Describe how access control procedures for Security Restricted Areas are applied to
passengers and their baggage
• Understand the procedures that apply to passenger screening areas and the use
of Walk through Metal Detectors. Know key elements of an effective search of
passengers and baggage
• Describe procedures for discovery of restricted articles on passengers and in baggage
• Rough Metal Detectors & Hand Held Metal Detectors
• Be familiar with procedures for screening and searching of passengers and baggage
according to local Standard Operating Procedures
Annex 17
Standard 3.4.3 “Each Contracting State shall ensure that the persons
carrying out screening operations are certified
according to the requirements of the national civil
aviation security programme to ensure that
performance standards are consistently and reliably
achieved.”
Standard 4.4.1 “Each Contracting State shall establish measures to

ensure that originating passengers of commercial air
transport operations and their cabin baggage are
screened prior to boarding an aircraft departing from a
security restricted area.”
Recommendation 2.3 “Each Contracting State should whenever possible

arrange for the security controls and procedures to
cause a minimum of interference with, or delay to the
activities of, civil aviation provided the effectiveness of
these controls and procedures is not compromised.”

Rule 21 Security Checks before Embarkation
Rule 23 Prohibition on carriage of certain goods

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 126 of 252
NCASP
Chapter 7.1 Screening of Passengers and carry-on baggage
Order 05/2005 List of banned items

Order 15/2011 Prohibition of articles in Security Restricted Area of airports
Circular 23/ 2005 Procedure for passenger & carryon baggage screening
Circular 16/2010 Screening of Passenger through ETDs
Circular 01/2017 Measures to facilitate transport/Transfer of Organs at
Airport
Access Control Procedure and Passenger Screening
Sterile area is the area between any passenger inspection or screening control point and
aircraft into which access is strictly controlled.
Passengers and their baggage are required to undergo pre embarkation checks before
entering the Sterile area, wherein they are screened (passenger frisking and baggage
screening) so as to prevent prohibited articles being carried aboard aircraft. The
sterility of this area is maintained by searching, securing and ensuring that any
personnel or items other than the passengers entering the sterile area also undergo the
same type of security checks.
Pre embarkation check at an airport and maintaining the sterility of the SHA is the
responsibility of the state and is carried out by ASG.
Levels of Search
There are various levels of search. The table below details the various types and the
degree of intrusiveness.
Level of Remove Touch Comments

Search
Level 1 Clothes?
No Passenge
Yes This is a hand search of the outer levels of the persons
r? clothing (as worn and without removing them) and a hand
search of the passenger’s body through that clothing.
It may involve the use of a Hand Held Metal Detector
(HHMD) to indicate items which may have caused the
Archway
Metal Detector to alarm.
Passengers may request a private search.

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 127 of 252
Level 2 Yes Yes Used after a level 1 search if suspicions till exist that
the person may still be in possession of a prohibited
(outer item, or there is any other reason to search the person
layers to a greater depth than a level 1 search allows. May
only) also be used when person requests a private search.
Carried out in private away from the view of other
persons / passengers. Requires the persons consent and
a witness of the same sex as the person being searched.
Level 3 Yes Yes This level of search is usually only carried out by
personnel who have had specialist training i.e Police or
customs. It is carried out on persons suspected of
attempting to or committing a crime.
It may involve the removal of all clothes examination of
body orifices and the use of x-ray or other detection
equipment.
It may also include detention of the person and
placing that person under observation for a number
of days to allow the examination of body waste.
SEARCH PRINCIPLES
• All hand carried items must be screened and/or searched. Preferably pass through x-ray
equipment.
• It is important to adopt a systematic approach so that no part of the body, items of clothing
or areas of the bag are overlooked.
• Search should normally be carried out in open but should not be exposed to public view:
Classified or Private documents. Large amounts of currency, jewellery etc. For female
passengers privacy shall be maintained.
• Private search used when necessary to search in sufficient depth to establish if
prohibited article is present.
• Two searchers of the same sex as person being searched.
• All indications of metal on the person by technical equipment must be resolved.
• Persons who cannot be cleared by normal screening process must be searched by hand.
• Any person who cannot be cleared by the total screening process must be denied
access to the security restricted area and/or not be allowed to board an aircraft.
Passenger Screening Locations (Refer Module 08 for details) Sterile Holding Area concepts
/ Basic Screening plans:
• Decentralized, usually at the aircraft boarding gate

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 128 of 252
• Semi-centralized, usually after the duty-free shop area

• Centralized, usually before the duty-free shop area
SCREENING POINT LAYOUT
Stages Involved In Passenger Inspection / Screening Process

 Searching and Securing Sterile holding area
 Passenger Screening with technical equipment
 Physical search of passenger
 X-ray examination of baggage
 Physical inspection of baggage
Location No. 1
Direct passengers through walk-through metal detector and ensure baggage loaded
correctly on the X-Ray conveyor belt
Location No. 2
Monitor walk-through metal detector and conduct check with hand-held metal detector
Location No. 3
Observe X-Ray monitor and identify items to be inspected
Location No. 4
Physically inspect items requiring attention
Location No. 5
Supervise busy screening point
Handout RESTRICTED
Page 129 of 252
Screening Checkpoint Manpower AVSEC Circular 23/2005
 Travel Document Checker / X-ray Load officer/ Profiler

 Passenger Searcher
 X-ray Officer (Operator)
 Bag Searchers / ETD Operators
Equipment required for Screening
 Equipment designed to scan persons
DFMD
-
HHMD
-
Body Scanners
-
ETD
-
 Equipment designed to screen baggage
- X-ray BIS
 Equipment designed to detect explosives
- Explosive Trace Detectors
- Explosive Vapour Detectors
 Frisking booths
 Search table
 Room for discreet / consent search
 Disposal bins
 Discreet alarm system
 Communication devices – RT / Telephones
 Security check stamp
 Hand gloves
Screening Equipment checks and Operating Procedure

HHMD
DFMD
Explosive detectors
Door Frame Metal Detector (DFMD)/ Walk Through Metal Detector (WTMD):
The DFMD also known as Walk Through Metal Detector is a

screening equipment which is used to detect metallic items
carried by passenger on person. It detects metallic items
which weigh 30gms or above.
Handout RESTRICTED
Page 130 of 252
Operators Test Piece is used to check the serviceability of

DFMD. DFMD gives an audio and visual alarm.
Advantages
 Helps to identify metallic item including ferrous and non-
ferrous metal
 Gives a rough idea of the location of the metallic item
 High through-put rate
 Easy to operate
 Safe for all passengers including pregnant women,
passengers with cardiac pace makers.
Disadvantages:
 Cannot detect any non-metallic prohibited items.

 Cannot Detects any metal less than 30 gms
 Not portable
 False alarm
Hand Held Metal Detector (HHMD)
HHMD is used to detect the metallic items on a

person’s body. HHMD gives an audio and visual alarm.
Advantages
 Helps to identify metallic item including ferrous and non-
ferrous metal
 Detects even 0.5 grams of metal
 Gives exact location of the metallic item
 Convenient to passenger since it is touch free concept
 Safe for all passengers including pregnant women,
passengers with cardiac pace makers.
Disadvantages:
 Cannot detect any non-metallic prohibited items.

 False alarm
Hand Search
Due to limitations of technical equipment additional manual hand search of

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 131 of 252
passengers by Reasoned Selection may be required.
Advantage of hand search
Hand search of people or baggage has following advantages.

• No special equipment required
• Most senses may be used
• Direct interpretation
Limitations of hand search

 It requires consent and co-operation from person who is being hand searched;
 Electrical, electronic or mechanical items will need to be examined by technical
equipment such as x- ray or trace detection e.g. mobile phones, laptop computers,
cameras etc.;
 It can be time consuming compared to technical screening equipment when many
passengers or bags are involved;
 Hand search is vulnerable to human feelings such as bad habits, inconsistency,
tiredness etc.; and
 It can be unpleasant and unhygienic for the searcher.
Hand search of passengers is also known as Pat down Search

There are two types of pat-down searches.
 Whole body pat-down search.
 Pat-down search limited to the area of an alarm
Special Category Passengers

There is another type of passenger known as Special Category passengers. These
include:
 Passengers with Diplomatic Status
 VIPs
 Potentially Disruptive Passengers-
 Persons in custody
 Dangerous Prisoners and Persons Suffering from Mental Illness
 Deportees
Diplomats and Diplomatic Pouches

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 132 of 252
A passenger may be granted diplomatic immunity under the Vienna Convention, some
States require that such persons should be subjected to screening.
However, sealed diplomatic pouches in their possession must not be manually or
physically searched. All other carry-on items shall be processed in the normal manner.
Searching Baggage (Reference Documents: Avsec Circular 23/2005 & 34/2005)

You should take the same methodical approach to searching bags as is required for
searching people, but bag search is easier in that close personal contact with the person
or passenger is not necessary.
Because of the lack of personal contact with the passenger the bag searcher may
be male or female, irrespective of the sex of the owner of the bag.
Physical Inspection of Baggage required:
 When an X-Ray examination has not been able to accurately determine the contents
of baggage
 When a prescribed percentage check of baggage is required
 In the event of the breakdown of X-Ray equipment
 As prescribed in local Standard Operating Procedures and conducted when higher
level of threat exists either locally or internationally
Sequence of Search
In outline, when you search a passenger's bag the correct sequence is:-
1. Start the search with the bag and it’s owner in front of you. During the search the
bag must remain in the view of the passenger.
2. Ask the passenger for permission to search the bag.
3. When given permission to search, ask the passenger to unlock and open the bag.
4. Turn the bag so that it faces you.
5. Check the outside appearance and construction of the bag for signs of
interference or tampering that might indicate the presence of an IED. Also check the
contents of any outside pockets.
6. Check the contents and the inside of bag for prohibited items and dangerous goods.
7. On completion of your search, replace all the contents neatly, close and fasten the
bag.
Return the Return the bag to the passenger and thank them for their cooperation.
Discovery of Explosive Device
• Remain calm
• Call supervisor covertly
• Supervisor to call for police assistance

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 133 of 252
Discovery of Weapon (Reference Document Avsec Circular 8/2017)

• Close the bag
• Remove it from passenger’s reach or

• Keep the bag within the x-ray equipment tunnel.
• Ask for relevant documents.
If Passenger is holding the relevant documents, then:
a) Examine the weapon to see it is unloaded and packed as per prescribed norms
b) Get the baggage checked-in
c) No need to detain the passenger
d) Complaint to be made to DGCA.
e) Local police to be informed.
If Passenger is not holding relevant documents, then:
a) Not allowed to proceed.
b) Detained and handed over to Police.
If Passenger neither has a license nor claims to possess one, then:
a) Detain the passenger
b) Handover to police for legal action under Arms Act 1959 and Aircraft Act 1934.
If Passenger is a serving Police/ Defence Service/ Central Armed Forces Personnel, then
a) Confirm his identify through a valid photo Identity card issued by the Department/ Ministry
concerned.
b) Check the movement order/ Authority slip.
c) If identity beyond doubt, obtain necessary declaration from him.
d) No need to detain the passenger
e) Get the baggage checked-in
f) Inform local police
g) Copy of complaint to be forwarded to the controlling authority of the person.
Security Procedures for Screening of Passengers with Special Needs and Medical
Condition (Reference document AVSEC CIRCULAR 04/2014)
Persons with special needs:
Certain passengers who will require handling in a special manner when being processed
through the passenger screening checkpoint. These may include the following classes of
person:
 Babies in strollers and Children (will require consent of adult);
 Pregnant women;
 Differently able persons (physically challenged);
 Passengers in wheelchairs;

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 134 of 252
 Persons with medical conditions [limbs in plaster]; and
 Passengers with religious reasons that effect how they are searched by hand
Screening of Wheelchair Passengers

1) When a passenger arrives at a screening point in a wheelchair / scooter, he/she
must be accompanied either by another travelling passenger or a representative of the
airline before he proceeds through security. The accompanying passenger or
representative of the airline is responsible for the passenger throughout the whole process
of screening;
2) If a passenger arrives at a screening point in a wheelchair and he/she is not
accompanied by another travelling passenger or Airline representative, the airline’s
Customer Service should be contacted for assistance;
3) At the screening point, depending upon the ability of the passenger to walk, he/she
will be requested to walk through the DFMD unaided. If he/she cannot walk, it is the
responsibility of the accompanying travelling passenger or airline representative to push
the passenger in the wheelchair unless it is self-driven;
4) There may also be non-travelling support personnel in attendance to board the aircraft
and lift the passenger into his / her seat. This support person must be accompanied.
5) If there is a requirement for the passenger to be lifted at the screening point, the
support person or the airline representative will perform the lifting for the passenger.
6) The support person will be escorted by an airline representative at the time of
boarding/ disembarkation.
7) If the passenger can stand but cannot walk, he/she can be screened by undergoing a pat-
down while he/she stands beside the wheelchair or scooter.
8) If a passenger cannot stand, he/she should be offered a chair for screening and
subjected to a pat-down thereafter.
9) If there is an alarm by the DFMD, HHMD or other technology, the same must be resolved.
If the alarm cannot be resolved, the passenger will not be permitted beyond the checkpoint.
10) The passenger’s wheelchair or scooter will be inspected, including the seat cushions
and any pouches/ pockets. It will be tested for traces of explosives. Removable pouches
will be x-ray screened.
11) Any carry-on bag or document with the wheelchair passenger shall be passed
through the x-ray screening.
12) If a person objects to proceeding through the DFMD on justified medical or other ground,
he/she will be allowed passage through alternative way by the frisking officer and then
subjected to screening by pat down search and HHMD where permissible.
13) If a person refuses to undergo screening, the frisking officer will inform the
supervisor, who will direct what further action is to be taken. The concerned passenger
will not be allowed entry past the screening point.
Handout RESTRICTED
Page 135 of 252
14) Only when satisfied that a person is not carrying any prohibited or dangerous article, the
screening officer shall allow the person to proceed beyond the screening point.
Screening of Passenger with Prosthetics
1) During screening of prosthetics ASG may use X-ray, ETD and visual check
depending on the circumstances.
2) The passenger should inform the ASG of the existence of a prosthetic, his or her
ability and of any need for assistance before screening begins. Passengers can use
Notification Card to communicate discreetly with security officers. However, showing
this card or other medical documentation will not exempt a passenger from additional
screening when necessary.
3) Dignity and privacy of the passengers should be borne in mind during the entire
process of security screening. Where the officer needs to see the prosthetic, care
should be taken against exposing any sensitive areas. ASG will also use technology to
test the prosthetic for traces of explosive material. If explosive material is detected, the
passenger will have to undergo additional screening.
4) Passenger with prosthetics or braces/support appliances must be accompanied by
an airline representative, preferable of the same gender as the passenger.
5) The airline staff and any other accompanying person shall be frisked and checked
before allowing them access to the passenger with prosthetics at the screening point.
6) The passenger will first pass through the DFMD and necessary security checks.
7) The passenger should then be taken to a private screening point and made to sit
comfortably. He/she will receive additional screening including a pat-down. If
necessary, screening through ETD trace will be adopted. While dealing with prosthetic
device and during taking off and putting on of clothes, privacy of the passenger should
be maintained.
8) Screening of the prosthetic appliance will include x-ray screening, ETD detection
and visual inspection. During visual inspection, care should be taken that sensitive parts
are not exposed.
9) The screening in the private screening area will be carried out by two officials, one to
handle the HHMD and pat-down and the other to inspect the prosthetics, braces and
support appliance and subject them to additional screening.
Screening of Passengers who cannot remove Shoes, Medical Device or Bandages
1) Passengers who cannot remove their shoes due to a medical condition should
inform the supervisor, SHA before screening.
2) Passenger can be screened using DFMD and/or a whole body pat-down.
3) The shoes may be subjected to additional screening like ETD, etc.
4) Passengers can be screened without disconnecting external medical devices and
Handout RESTRICTED
Page 136 of 252
submitting them for x-ray. Such devices include Insulin pumps, Hearing aids, Cochlear
implants, Spinal stimulators, Bone growth stimulators and Ostomies.
5) Under most circumstances, a passenger can conduct a self-pat-down of these
devices followed by ETD screening of his/her hands.
6) The devices should also be physically checked against any outside interference in
the manufacturing.
7) Casts, braces and support appliances will be thoroughly inspected without
exposing sensitive areas as far as possible. ETD screening will also be used to test for
traces of explosive materials, where possible.
8) In case of bandages and/or dressing, while caution will be observed during pat-
down, it needs to be ensured that the covered area is free of threat item. Metal
detector, observation and self- pat-down followed by ETD checks may suffice in most
cases.
9) Passengers with metal implants will be subjected to a thorough pat-down, and the
metal alarm should be resolved satisfactorily. The full body pat-down should include the
following:
a) It should concentrate on upper legs and torso;
b) Special attention should be given to the chest and abdomen areas of the body;
c) Particular focus should be on any skin surface abnormalities or wires or tubes
exiting the body that may be signs of an implanted device.
Ambulance Passengers
Due to exigencies of their exceptional medical conditions/illness, some passengers are

directly taken through the security gates to the aircraft for boarding. In such cases, as far as
possible, the Airport Operator should provide its own ambulance.
1) The passenger and all occupants of the vehicle should be subjected to a pre-
embarkation security check at the security gate by the ASG staff under the supervision
of an officer not below the rank of an Inspector. The ambulance should be permitted to
proceed to the aircraft only after this check has been completed;
2) In case the ambulance is privately owned or hospital provided, it must be led by
follow- me vehicle of the airport operator. The ASG staff shall check to ensure that the
vehicles do not carry anything objectionable and are not being accompanied by
unauthorized persons or persons who have no need to be in the vehicles. Such
ambulance will be escorted by ASG staff;
3) All occupants of the vehicles, unless exempted, must be screened at the gate
before allowing entry into the airport;
4) The movement of the ambulance should be coordinated well in advance by the
airline with CASO and airport operator.
Screening of Medication and Associated Supplies
1) All medications and associated supplies (i.e. syringes, sharps disposal container, pens,
infusers … etc) are allowed through the checkpoint only after they have been screened.
2) Medication and related supplies are normally x-rayed.
3) Passengers have the option of requesting a visual inspection of medications and
associated supplies with due reason.
Handout RESTRICTED
Page 137 of 252
4) Any medication that cannot be cleared visually must be submitted for x-ray
screening.
5) BCAS has issued detailed guidelines regarding carriage of liquids, aerosols and
gel (LAGs) on board vide AVSEC Circular No. 18/2006. Medically necessary LAGs are
permitted in excess of 100 ml on need basis after they have been screened. These
items are subject to additional screening through visual inspection and ETD swipe, if
necessary.
If a passenger has medically necessary LAGs, he or she needs to :
1) Limit the amount to what is reasonably necessary for the itinerary;
2) Separate these items from the other LAGs;
3) Declare the items; and,
4) Present these items for additional inspection on reaching the security check point.
X-ray Screening of Respiratory Equipment

1) Supplemental oxygen and other respiratory related equipment are permitted
through the check-point once they have been screened. This will be subject to DGCA
regulations also.
2) If a passenger can disconnect from the oxygen, the oxygen container will
undergo x-ray screening.
3) Passengers who cannot disconnect from respiratory equipment will be screened by
undergoing a pat-down.
4) Respiratory equipment that is not x-rayed will be visually and physically inspected,
and will be subject to ETD screening.
Transportation of Human Organ

All 'Human Organs/Tissues for Transplant' shipped or distributed through airlines shall be securely
packaged with proper labeling, maintenance of preservation and biohazard precautions will be
ensured. 'Human Organs / Tissues for Transplant' shall be carried as an accompanied baggage
provided they meet the appropriate packaging requirements.
Infectious substances, as classified in category A or B vide UN 28141UN 2900/ UN 3373 in ICAO

Technical Instructions for 'the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air, 2005-2006' and as per
The Aircraft (Carriage of dangerous Goods) Rules, 2003 are not permitted for transport in carry-on
or checked baggage and must not be carried on a person. Ministry of Health / NOTTO will sensitize
all authorized hospitals/medical institutes/eye banks accordingly.
'Human Organs / Tissues for Transplant' that have a minimal likelihood of containing pathogens
must be packaged and marked appropriately to further minimize the risk of exposure as under:
 A leak proof primary receptacle (s);
 A leak-proof secondary packaging; and
 An outer packaging of adequate strength for its capacity, mass and intended use, and with
at least one surface having minimum dimensions of 100 mm x 100 mm.
For liquids, absorbent material in sufficient quantity to absorb the entire contents must be placed
between the primary receptacle(s) and the secondary packaging so that, during transportation, any
release or leak of liquid substance will not reach the outer packaging and will not compromise the
integrity of the cushioning material.

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 138 of 252
When multiple fragile primary receptacles are placed in a single secondary packaging, they must be
either individually wrapped or separated to prevent contact between them.
If refrigerated or frozen specimens are to be transported, the following conditions must be met:
When dry ice or liquid nitrogen is used to keep specimens cold, all applicable requirements of these
instructions must be met. When used, ice or dry ice must be placed outside the secondary
packaging or in the outer packaging. Interior supports must be provided to secure the secondary
packaging in the original position after the ice or dry ice has dissipated. If ice is used, the outside
packaging must be leak proof. If carbon dioxide, solid (dry ice) is used, the packaging must be
designed and constructed to permit the release of carbon dioxide gas to prevent build-up of
pressure that could rupture the packaging;
The primary receptacle and the secondary packaging must maintain their integrity at the
temperature of the refrigerant used as well as the temperatures and the pressures which could
result if refrigeration were lost.
Hospitals/Medical Institutes shall ensure that the shipping container will maintain required
temperature for a minimum of 24 hours to avoid any deterioration effect of human organs/tissues
during transportation.
Such packaging must be marked as under:

 Label which says: "Human Organs / Tissues for Transplant".
 Date & Time of departure from the Hospital/Medical Institute/Eye Bank
 Donor/Tissue Information Form or Tissue Detail Form
 Address to be delivered with contact person name and phone number
 Address of the Hospital/Eye bank with contact person name and phone number.
 this label should be kept in water proof condition.
Packaging shall be secured using a tamper-evident seal.

Screening: Such organs/tissues shall be exempted from security screening and will be security
cleared
By means of physical checking of the container as mentioned in Para above.
Such packages, if not accompanied, must be treated as an 'express cargo' and due procedures will
be followed.
Passenger carrying such container shall not be exempted from Pre-embarkation security check.
Passenger's Responsibilities: The passenger who intends to carry such organ/tissue shall carry the
following documents in original:
a. Valid Identity Proof of the passenger;
b. Valid travel documents;
c. A certificate in triplicate with signature, full name, designation and office seal of the
Competent Authority of Hospital/ Medical Institution /Eye Bank in its letter head specifically
mentioned that " The organs/tissues which are supposed to be transported by air is/are free
from pathogens. Packaging was done and sealed under supervision of a responsible officer
of the hospital/medical institution/eye bank and it does not contain anything other than
human specimens. Carriage of such organ by air will not endanger the aircraft and the
Handout RESTRICTED
Page 139 of 252
passengers on board"
(i) Applicable permission of Customs authority for such carnage (in case of carrying to a foreign
country);
(ii) Applicable permission of Indian Mission for such carriage (in case of carrying from a foreign
country);
The passenger carrying such human organ/tissue shall inform the concerned Airlines at the earliest
so that proper and urgent facilitation may be provided on the day of air travel. Airlines shall
endorse the status in passenger's ticket.
Upon reaching airport the passenger has to inform the airline regarding carriage of exempt human
specimens.
Airlines Responsibilities:
1. Airline shall make a provision that carriage of human organs/tissues/corneas will be
incorporated in the passenger's ticket while booking is made online or otherwise;
2. Airline security staff will check and verify all required documents as stated above and being
satisfied will act as under without waste of time:
3. If the package is an accompanied cabin baggage Airline security staff will escort the
passenger till his/her boarding at the aircraft.
4. Security Hold Area (SHA) In-charge of ASG shall be intimated by the airline security
regarding such carriage of live human organ / brain tissues etc. to avoid any delay in security
checks.
5. Pilot In-Command and cabin crew will also be intimated so that proper arrangement may be
made for carrying of such organs in the passenger cabin of the aircraft.
6. Flight Captain/Commander may request Air Traffic Control to accord priority landing and
taking off for the aircraft carrying human organs/tissues for transplant so as to avoid its
deterioration.
7. Airline security shall keep a copy of the certificate issued by the authorized
hospitals/medical institute/eye bank for future record.
8. The container should be kept in the correct position / orientation as indicated.
9. If there is any doubt about the content of the package/box airlines security staff will inform
his/her supervisor for taking further necessary action.
ASG Responsibility:
1. The package/container marked as "Human Organ/Tissue for Transplant" should not be
security screened.
2. ASG security personnel shall security clear such package by means of physical inspection as
mentioned in Para above.
3. ASG security personnel in the SHA shall keep a copy of the certificate issued by the
authorized hospitals/medical institutes (Annexure-II) for future record.
4. If there is any doubt about the contents, Screener will inform it to SHA In-charge for taking
further necessary action.
Miscellaneous:
a. Airport operator will display a signage in a suitable location of the airport depicting the
procedures for passengers' awareness.

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 140 of 252
b. Airport Manager on receipt of such information regarding carriage of human organs for the
purpose he/she will extend all possible facilities to the bonafide passenger and shall
intimate the airlines concerned.
c. ASG (CISF/State Police) and Airlines will train their security personnel accordingly.
Module-11 Conventional X-Ray
Module Objectives
 Switch on a typical x-ray machine and operate it safely

 Interpret images on an x-ray monitor and identify items that may be prohibited or
dangerous
 Know the safety precautions to be followed when using or working around x-ray
equipment
Teaching Methods
 Demonstrations
 Progress Tests
Annex
17
Standard 3.4.3 “Each Contracting State shall ensure that persons

carrying out screening operations are certified
according to the requirements of the national civil
aviation security programme to ensure that
performance standards are consistently and reliably
achieved.”

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 141 of 252
Standard 4.4.1 “Each Contracting State shall establish measures to

ensure that originating passengers of commercial air
transport operations and their cabin baggage are
screened prior to boarding an aircraft departing from a
security restricted area.”
Standard 4.5.1 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to ensure

that originating hold baggage is screened prior to being
loaded onto an aircraft engaged in commercial air
transport operations departing from a security restricted
area.
Standard 4.5.4 Each Contracting State shall ensure that transfer hold
baggage is screened prior to being loaded onto an
aircraft engaged in commercial air transport operations,
unless it has established a validation process and
continuously implements procedures, in collaboration
with the other Contracting State where appropriate, to
ensure that such hold baggage has been screened at the
point of origin and subsequently protected from
unauthorized interference from the originating airport to
the departing aircraft at the transfer airport.
Standard 4.6.1 Each Contracting State shall ensure that appropriate

security controls, including screening where practicable,
are applied to cargo and mail, prior to their being loaded
onto an aircraft engaged in passenger commercial air
transport operations.
NCASP
7.1 Screening of Passengers and carry-on baggage
7.7.3 Screening of hold baggage
7.8.1 to 7.8.3 Air cargo screening

Circular 25/2004 Minimum Specification for X-BIS
Circular 11/2017 Specification of X-BIS
Circular 23/2005 Procedure for Passenger and carryon Baggage
screening Circular 34/2005 Procedure for screening of Hold Baggage
Circular 31/2006 Security Measures of Unaccompanied baggage
X-ray Examination of Baggage – Introduction, Principles & Characteristics
X-rays were invented by Wilhelm Conrad Roentgen, a German physicist when he was
experimenting on Cathode rays in 1895. The standard unit for measuring the quantity

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 142 of 252
of ionizing radiation is ‘Roentgen’ denoted by ‘R’.
Principles of X-ray System

If an x-ray beam is projected on to a fluorescent screen, the coating on that screen
will glow. When an object is placed between the beam and the screen, the object will
absorb some of the x-ray, causing a shadow to appear on the screen. Denser the object,
darker will be the shadow.
Example: A revolver absorbs a high proportion of the x-rays and will therefore case a dark
shadow. A hair dryer, although similar in shape, absorbs fewer x-rays and so produces a
lighter image.
Advantages and Disadvantages of X-ray BIS

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 143 of 252
X-Ray Screening – Advantages
 Less manpower engaged

 Film safe
 Does not cause any hazard to food and drugs
 Time saving
 Convenience to passengers
 Prohibited items can be easily detected without opening the bag.
X-Ray Screening – Disadvantages / Limitations

 Cost of equipment
 Lack of penetration of X-rays makes it difficult to screen dense items
 Operator skills lost if not used regularly
 Image interpretation depends upon screener skills.
 Clarity of image of the baggage depends upon the orientation/ positioning of the
baggage on conveyor belt.
GUIDELINES FOR THE CONTENTS OF A LOCAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE

(SOP) DETAILING X-RAY EQUIPMENT SAFETY RULES
The local SOP should ideally contain the following:

List of "DOs"
• DO check conveyor belt before operating equipment;
• DO check X-Ray chamber before operating equipment;

• DO make sure leaded curtains are not damaged;
• DO check leaded curtains are hanging straight down; and
• DO check exterior of X-Ray for loose wires/connections.
List of "DON'Ts"
• DO NOT reach into the chamber when X-Ray is on;

• DO NOT allow passengers to reach inside the chamber for their baggage;
• DO NOT allow any person to loiter in the area to observe the screening
process;
• DO NOT allow children to play with the leaded curtains or touch the conveyor
belt; and
• DO NOT place objects such as coffee, plants, bottles on top of the X-Ray
machine.
NOTE: These guidelines are to be replaced by the local SOP.
GUIDELINES FOR THE CONTENTS OF A LOCAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE (SOP)

DETAILING THE PROCEDURE FOR THE STARTING UP OF AN X-RAY MACHINE

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 144 of 252
The local SOP should ideally contain the following instructions: Before operating the X-
Ray equipment:
• Check that nothing is obstructing the conveyor belt.
• Make sure there is a table available for physically searching baggage.
• Make sure that the conveyor belt and monitor screen are not dirty.
• Check the exterior of the X-Ray machine for loose wires or connections.
Switching on the X-Ray machine:
• Check that machine is plugged in.
• Insert key into control panel and switch machine on.
• Adjust brightness and contract controls.
• Test the forward, stop and reverse movement of the conveyor belt.
• Test the X-Ray monitor image definition by using the manufacturer's test
piece for 30- gauge wire.
NOTE: These guidelines are to be replaced by the local SOP.
In-line Baggage Screening System for Hold Baggage Screening

Inline hold baggage handling system (HBS) is a multi level X-Ray screening system and has been
installed at various international airports. The inline hold baggage handling system (HBS) has
been integrated with airport baggage handling in order to provide complete hold baggage
processing and screening system
There are various levels of search in an In Line Screening Systems.
Level 1
Level screening is to be undertaken by a CT-EDS machine with automatic explosives detection
facilities. All baggage images will be referred to Level 2 with suspicious area highlighted, if any,
where a certified screener will accept or reject the baggage.

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 145 of 252
Level 2
Level 2 screening is remote workstation(s) whereby operator(s) can analyze the image
generated by the Level 1 CT-EDS machine. The workstation is equipped with enhanced
imaging / manipulation systems to assist operator to diagnoses the screened image. 100% of
level-l screened baggage images should be referred to level 2.
Level 3
There are several technologies available for level 3 screening, and the selection usually
depends upon BCAS regulations and / or budget constraints. These include:
1) A workstation may be installed at level -3 to retrieve the image created by Level - I CT-EDS.
should be able to pull the image of the baggage created by Level-l machine by a barcode
reader/ scanner.
2) A standalone Dual Energy and dual view X-BIS shall be installed at Level-3 to screen the
baggage again.
3) Explosive Trace / Particle detection Check.
4) Explosive Sniffer Dogs.
Cleared bags will be sent to BMA. Unclear baggage shall be sent to Level 4.
Level 4
All un‐cleared / suspected bags at level 3 are reunited with their owners for further inspection
and interview. This process is normally manual and should be done in a safe area.

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 146 of 252
Module 12 Protection and Search of Parked Aircraft

Module Objectives:
 Understand the need for protection of parked aircraft.

 Explain security procedures used to protect unattended aircraft.
 Describe the reasons for aircraft security checks and searches / aircraft access points.
 Define the types and timing of aircraft security checks and searches
 Describe appropriate action to be taken if aircraft security measures are compromised.
Teaching Methods
 Demonstrations
 Progress Tests
Annex 17
Standard 4.3.1 Each Contracting State shall ensure that aircraft
security checks of originating aircraft engaged in
commercial air transport movements are
performed or an aircraft security search is carried
out. The determination of whether it is an aircraft
security check or a search that is appropriate shall
be based upon a security risk assessment carried
out by the relevant national authorities.
Standard 4.3.2 Each Contracting State shall ensure that measures

are taken to ensure that any items left behind by
passengers disembarking from transit flights are
Handout RESTRICTED
Page 147 of 252
removed from the aircraft or otherwise dealt with

appropriately before departure of an aircraft
engaged in commercial flights.
Standard 4.3.3 Each Contracting State shall require its

commercial air transport operators to take
measures as appropriate to ensure that during
flight unauthorized persons are prevented from
entering the flight crew compartment.
Rule 27 Security Search of an Aircraft
NCASP
Chapter 6.6 Protection of Aircraft

Order 05/2009 Norms for deployment of Security Personnel
Order 9/2018 Procedure for aircraft security checks and search
Responsibility of protecting aircraft lies with the aircraft operator (airline).
The Security Principle Defense in Depth

 Levels or layers of security measures build upon each other to protect aircraft and airline
operations
 First line of defense is the integrity of the airport perimeter and landside / airside boundaries
 Security Restricted Area measures provide another layer
 Security staff operating in immediate proximity of aircraft or patrolling the apron provide
another layer
 Crew and other airline staff on board the aircraft provide another layer.
PROTECTION OF AIRCRAFT
Procedures for normal conditions

 Aircraft crew and maintenance staff to challenge and identify all persons attempting to
board the aircraft to ensure only authorized people allowed on board.
 Where security staff are operating in the on or around the aircraft they should identify
all persons approaching, or attempting to access the aircraft or any part thereof
 SRA pass holders are obligated to challenge persons without appropriate identification on
display while in the SRA or attempting to board an aircraft
Aircraft not in service should have all access points secured, access stairs or passenger
loading bridges removed. Stairs left near aircraft should be immobilized.
Handout RESTRICTED
Page 148 of 252
Procedure for Increased threat condition

 Increased threat situation requires the airline concerned to coordinate all security
measures and ensure procedures and measures are properly implemented.
 Dedicated point guards in close proximity to each aircraft
 Increased frequent random foot or mobile security patrols
 Additional portable security lighting and backup power supply.
Control of Access to the aircraft
 During periods of increased threat, security staff must be positioned to observe,

challenge, identify and authorize access.
 Check the credentials of all persons seeking access to the immediate vicinity or to the
interior of the aircraft and confirming that each has a legitimate requirement for that
access
 Search persons, bags, tools and cleaning equipment to ensure they do not conceal
weapons, explosives and/or their components.
 Detect and/or deter unauthorized access, and report to the captain, airline representatives
or security authorities any attempted or unauthorized access and /or discovery of suspect
or prohibited items.
Airline Procedures for Unattended Aircraft
 Aircraft are parked in a well-lit area

 The area should be easily observed
 All external doors must be closed
 Aircraft should be parked away from fences or buildings to prevent easy access
 Access stairs, passenger loading bridges and hold loading equipment must be
removed from the vicinity of the aircraft and immobilized
Guarding Duties
 Establish the integrity of the aircraft upon taking up duty
 Search for suspect explosive devices in immediate area.

 Challenge all persons approaching aircraft
 Check authorization of persons claiming a need to access the aircraft
 Make visual inspection of the exterior
Aircraft Intrusion
 A Security Search of aircraft must be conducted
 Carried out by airline personnel or security staff who are properly trained for aircraft type
Handout RESTRICTED
Page 149 of 252
 In accordance with airline’s specific procedures
Aircraft Security Checks / Searches

Why must an aircraft search be carried out?
There are legal and business reasons for carrying out aircraft searches
What should the Searchers look for?
 That should not be there.

 That is out of place
 That cannot be accounted for
When to search?
There are 4 instances when searches are usually conducted:
 Pre-flight;
 Transit Flight;
 Post flight; and
 When the Aircraft is under increased threat.
Aircraft Security checks should be conducted when Aircraft is in service or during pre-flight
operations. For routine origination flight, checks should be performed immediately after
passengers disembark or immediately prior to loading operations.
Guidelines for Pre Flight Security Check
The search should normally be carried out just prior to the time that the aircraft is taken into
service.
 Regular search of aircraft for suspect explosive devices and weapons shall be
conducted prior to commencing each flight. A similar search will be required when an
aircraft is suspected of being the target of an act of unlawful interference.
 Aircraft operators shall conduct pre-flight security checks only after all maintenance and
cleaning staff have vacated the aircraft and prior to passengers embarking;
 Flight and cabin crew, besides engineering and security staff, may conduct these checks
provided they are adequately trained.
 A security checklist shall be used by airlines staff during such pre-flight security checks.
 Aircraft operators shall ensure that an aircraft is protected from unauthorized
interference from the time the aircraft search or check has commenced until the aircraft
departs.
Guidelines on Pre Flight Security Check for Transit Flights
Searches for Transit Flights are necessary when:

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 150 of 252
 Passengers disembark at the transit station.

 Any catering supplies or stores are loaded.
 Passengers remaining on board must identify their belongings before the search
commences.
 If no passengers disembark, remain in a sterile area and access is limited to persons
authorized and supervised by the airline or its handling agent, no search may be required
Guidelines on Pre Flight Security Check for Post Flights
 Post-flight searches are usually conducted of the areas to which passengers may have
had access to ensure that nothing is left on board that may cause a hazard to the aircraft.
 When an aircraft that has disembarked passengers and has had a post-flight search it may
not need to be searched again before departure provided that access has been controlled
throughout the time it is on the ground. (local procedures will apply)
When the Aircraft is under increased threat Apply SOP
Note: The Security Supervisor shall ensure that the Aircraft Release certificate is signed
by all the concerned departments and signature is obtained from the Commander of the
flight.
A copy of the signed aircraft release certificate shall be kept for record with the security
department, and will be put up for scrutiny during checks and audit by the BCAS officers.
Responsibility for Searches
Searches are to be conducted by the staff members most familiar with the area they are
searching, therefore:
Flight crew and designated airline engineer staff are usually responsible for searching all
those areas that have a direct bearing on the safe operation of the aircraft including:
 Aircraft cockpit; Wheel bays;
 Exterior of the aircraft and control surfaces;

 Engine nacelles; and

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 151 of 252
 Technical areas.
Cabin Crew and/or trained Security staff are usually responsible for searching the interior
of the aircraft including:
 Passenger cabins;
 Seats;
 Baggage storage lockers
 Lavatories / WC;
 Galleys; and
 Other areas such as the baggage hold A Checklist should be employed and samples
will be provided later in module.
Action on locating a SUSPECT ITEM
Action by Searcher:
 Do not touch
 Notify supervisor
 Evacuate Aircraft
 Remember description of object/item
 Mark area where object item is located
Action by supervisor:
 Inform airline manager

 Inform crew if already on board
 Inform airport manager(Airport Operator)
 Inform BDDS

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 152 of 252
Appendix 39
AIRCRAFT SECURITY SEARCH CHECKLIST
1. Regular search of aircraft for suspect explosive devices and weapons may be
conducted prior to commencing each flight, based on a risk assessment conducted by the
appropriate authority. A similar search is required when an aircraft is suspected of being the
target of an act of unlawful interference. The difference between the two types is only in the
degree and thoroughness of the search undertaken, and these will be dictated by the total
circumstances applicable to each situation.
2. The large number of aircraft in service throughout the world makes it impossible to
provide guidance for recommended aircraft inspection procedures that will be adequate in all
cases. Aircraft operators should develop an aircraft search procedure checklist for each type of
aircraft in service and include this checklist as part of flight crew security kits. Use of such a
checklist by ground crews is particularly helpful at locations where the only persons familiar
with the particular type or configuration of aircraft are flight crew compartment and cabin crew
members.
3. An isolated aircraft parking position may be the best location at an airport in which to
search an aircraft subjected to a specific threat, but contingency plans should recognize that it
may not always be possible to access this location.
4. Aircraft searches should be carried out in good lighting conditions. This may require the
use of auxiliary power units or the attachment of ground power lines to an aircraft.
5. To avoid duplication of effort, a search of an aircraft should be conducted systematically
by staff familiar with the particular aircraft, provided with a checklist and assigned to specific
areas of the aircraft. Attention should be given to those areas to which passengers have had
access, such as main cabins, galley areas and toilets, but a search should also include the
flight crew compartment exterior and cargo holds.
6. Control of access to the aircraft should be imposed before starting a search, which
should be carried out with the minimum number of persons on board. Control of access is
necessary in order to ensure that devices are not introduced into an aircraft once it has been
cleared, and should be maintained until aircraft doors are closed prior to push back.
7. Searchers should be briefed not to touch suspicious objects but to notify the search
coordinator, mark the location with a prominent object not touching the device, and withdraw
from the immediate area to await further instructions. If a suspect device is discovered, the
possibility of secondary devices should not be discounted.
8. Hand-held communications are useful for coordination of a search and are often the
only way of ensuring appropriate and rapid lifesaving procedures for search and evacuation.
However, if a suspect device has been located, those using hand-held communications should
immediately move away and ensure that they and anyone else in the area move outside the
cordon as quickly as possible. Radios should not be used to transmit within 25 m of a suspect
device.
9. All entrance doors, hatches, inlet and exhaust ducts, service and access doors, etc.,
should be opened to allow the necessary access to all areas to be inspected. However, a
check should be made to ensure that all doors and covers that were opened for inspection
purposes are closed on conclusion of the search.
10. It is difficult to give guidance to search teams about the appearance of suspect
explosive devices as they can be disguised in many ways. Search teams should be briefed to
Handout RESTRICTED
Page 153 of 252
look for unidentified objects or anything that:

• should not be there;
• cannot be accounted for; or
• is out of place.
11. The following areas should be searched:
a) aircraft interior:
• seats, including pouches, cushions and undersides;
• log book and flight manual stowage;
• crew oxygen mask stowage;
• entire floor, including area forward of rudder pedals and beneath all flight crew
compartment seats;
• ceiling, side and rear walls;
• life jacket stowage;
• crew coatroom and baggage stowage area;
• table and drawer of third crew member’s position;
• area around rudder and/or brake pedals; and
• inside first aid kit;
b) forward entrance:
• stairway, including underside;
• connection of stair to fuselage, as well as shelf at this point;
• escape chute stowage;
• cabin attendant seat, life raft stowage and seat back;
• forward windscreen and storage unit, including compartments;
• oxygen mask compartment;
• walls and ceiling; and
• fire extinguisher stowage;
c) flight deck companionway:
• walls, ceiling and floor;
• coatroom;
• overhead baggage storage – entire area with baggage removed;
• compartments above baggage rack and coatroom;
• drinking fountain, cup dispenser, cup disposal compartment and drain valve access;
and
• area above and along sidewall of stowage compartment, forward side of forward toilet;
d) forward compartment:
• coatrooms and enclosed mask and vest stowage;
• flight attendant and passenger seats, including undersides;
• passenger berth(s);
• crew and passenger life vest stowage;
• portable oxygen stowage cupboard;
• seats, including pouches and oxygen mask compartments;
• table between rear lounge chairs and its compartment;
• escape chute stowage; and
• literature containers;
e) forward galley:

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 154 of 252
• remove all containers, food boxes and ovens, if not already removed;
• open and inspect all galley compartments, bar and refrigerator;
• inspect containers removed from galley and bar;
• oxygen mask stowage at bar;
• galley service door, including tape stowage and hinge recess;
• escape chute stowage; and
• compartments above service doors;
f) forward toilets:
• remove soiled and waste material not already removed;
• remove containers under sinks and inspect contents and areas around sink;
• towel container and tissue dispenser;
• toilet, including seat, lid, shroud, etc.;
• mirror and compartments;
• door;
• oxygen mask stowage;
• access to drinking fountain; and
• waste water receptacle;
g) main cabin:
• seats, including pouches, oxygen mask stowage, cushions and undersides;
• pillow racks, blankets and handrail;
• floor – do not remove carpet unless presence of foreign object is suspected;
• side walls, including windows and curtains;
• bulkheads and foot recesses and oxygen mask stowage;
• ceiling;
• light recesses;
• compartments at aft end of each handrail and behind rear cabin seats;
• stretcher equipment stowage above hat rack;
• demonstration life vest stowage;
• emergency escape rope compartments;
• main door and recess with door closed;
• magazine racks;
• life raft stowage;
• life vest pouches;
• passenger berths;
• oxygen cabinet;
• cargo tie-down stowage;
• literature containers;
• first aid kit, only if unsealed;
• passenger oxygen service units – drop them down and inspect;
• oxygen and CO2 cylinder stowage drawers, forward sides of numbers 1 and 3 galleys
and aft toilets;
• overwing emergency exit release covers;
• aft entry door cabin attendant’s seat;
• drinking fountain, cup dispenser, cup disposal compartment and drain valve access at

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 155 of 252
floor; and
• portable emergency exit lights – remove light and inspect;
h) centre galley and bar:
• remove all containers, food boxes and ovens, if not already done;
• open and inspect all galley compartments, bar and refrigerator;
• inspect all containers removed from the aircraft;
• glass stowage in bulkhead forward of bar;
• first aid kit in compartment aft side of aft unit, only if unsealed;
• compartment above service door;
• service door and recess;
• cabin attendants’ seats in aisle no. 2 galley;
• oxygen mask compartment in ceiling; and
• portable emergency exit light – remove light and inspect;
i) rear galley area and bar:
• flight attendants’ seat;
• galley – remove all containers;
• open and inspect all compartments;
• compartments in front bulkhead;
• inspect containers removed from aircraft;
• diplomatic mail locker;
• galley service door hinge recess;
• escape slide stowage at each door;
• aft entrance door hinge recess;
• life raft stowage; and
• oxygen bottle ceiling stowage;
j) aft toilets:
• remove soiled and waste material not already removed;
• remove containers under sinks and inspect contents and areas around sink;
• towel container and tissue dispenser;
• toilet, including seat, lid, shroud, etc.;
• mirror and compartments;
• door;
• access to drinking fountain; and
• waste water receptacle;
k) aft wardrobes and coatrooms:
• remove coats and cabin baggage and inspect entire area;
• sky cots and flight cradles;
• first aid kit, only if unsealed; and
• life vest stowage;
l) aircraft exterior – fuselage – areas behind and/or in the following doors and openings

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 156 of 252
should be checked:
• ground pneumatic connector panel;
• cabin compressor air inlets, access panels and air outlets;
• doppler navigation antenna door;
• heat exchanger control access panels and outlet guide vanes;
• radio rack air outlet;
• beacon holder with beacon removed;
• security locker and contents;
• flashlights – also check batteries;
• seals of first aid kits and life raft panels for proper condition;
• accessory compartment door;
• auxiliary tank fuel sump doors;
• cabin pressure safety valves and regulator valve;
• aft waste water service panel and waste system service panels;
• access door to stabilizer mechanism;
• tail cone access door;
• aft and forward potable water service panels;
• aft and forward cargo doors;
• ground air conditioning connector door; and
• external power fuser door and receptacle;
m) cabin compressor compartment – entire compartment, especially area of hollow spaces
and cavities;
n) accessory compartment – entire compartment as well as all installations;
o) cargo compartments:
• forward cargo compartment, especially area underneath hinge snap panel of cargo
door;
• waste water tank compartment;
• flight kit boxes;
• aft cargo compartment, especially area of cargo door hinge joints; and
• zone immediately behind aft cargo compartment;
p) landing gear wheel wells and gears:
• nose wheel well – area behind access and zip fastener panels;
• entire main wheel wells and zone of wing roots; and
• gears and wheels, including tires, rims, brakes and other parts such as struts, drag
braces, beams, arms, actuators, frames and trucks;
q) wings:
• trailing edge flap sections;
• snap covers to fuel x-feed tube and to fire extinguisher bottles;
• pressure refuelling adapters; and
• fuel vent openings; and
r) engines and pylons:
• engine air intake, exhaust and fan duct;
• engine oil and pneumatic heat exchanger air inlet scoop;
• engine oil refill cover and heat exchanger air outlet door;
• constant speed drive oil refill cover; and
• open engine cowl doors and fan cascade vanes – entire engine installation and all

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 157 of 252
openings on cowl doors and pylons to be checked.
MODULE 13 Physical Inspection of Baggage
Module Objectives
 Search of various types of carry-on baggage in presence of passenger physically

 Recognize prohibited and dangerous items that may be camouflaged, contained or hidden in
carry-on baggage with specific concerns relating to electronic items
 SOP to deal with prohibited and dangerous items detected in baggage
 Behaviour of search team personnel / selection of bags for physical search and techniques
Teaching Methods
 Demonstrations
 Progress Tests
Annex 17
that originating passengers of commercial air transport
operations and their cabin baggage are screened prior to
boarding an aircraft departing from a security restricted
area.

Rule 14 (iv) Duties of CASO:- Screening of passenger and their hand
baggage
Handout RESTRICTED
Page 158 of 252
Rule 21 Security Check before Embarkation
NCASP 2018
Chapter 7.1.8 Screening of Hand Baggage
Order 05/2005 Permissible & Prohibited Items to be carried by the

passenger
Circular 19/2003 Physical checks of hand baggage
Circular 21/2004 Use of hand gloves for frisking passages and physical check
of their baggage
Circular 23/2005 Procedure for passenger & carryon baggage screening
Circular
Circular 08/2017 Procedure for dealing with cases wherein arms and /or
ammunition are detected during screening of a passenger
or his baggage.
Circular 34 / 2005 Procedure for Screening of Hold Baggage
Technical equipment used for the screening of persons and baggage has limitations. Walk-
through metal detectors and hand-held metal detectors, for example, cannot detect non-metallic
weapons and explosives and even conventional X-ray equipment has difficulty in imaging or
defining explosive material effectively.
To compensate for such limitations or to introduce a random/ unpredictability element into
the selection process, an additional manual hand search of passengers, cabin baggage and
registered baggage is required after being screened by technical means.
Reasoned selection means that the selection is based on the X-ray image, concentrating the
effort on those bags most likely to conceal a prohibited item.
Random selection should be used for hand searching one out of every ten bags in case of
registered baggage; one out of 15 in case of Cargo and one out of 20 in case of hand bag. You
should take the same methodical approach to searching bags as is required for searching people.
Cabin baggage of a female passenger will be searched by a female screener only.
Cardinal Rules
 Courtesy
 Tact and
 Caution
Method for Hand Search
In the interest of effective security and passenger facilitation, a manual search of the baggage
Handout RESTRICTED
Page 159 of 252
should be conducted in accordance with the following basic guidelines:
a) The physical inspection of cabin baggage should always be carried out in the presence of
the person presenting it;
b) Ask the passenger for permission to search the bag. When given permission to search, ask
the passenger to unlock and open the bag. Turn the bag so that it faces you.
c) Baggage should be opened, and examined to ensure that there is no false bottom. A
straightedge gauge rule, rod or other device should be used to establish whether there is a
significant discrepancy in external and internal measurements.
d) Particular attention should be paid to the lining, trim, seams, rims, studs, zip fasteners,
locks, hinges, wheels and handles to identify signs of tampering or repair which may
indicate the concealment of a prohibited article;
e) The contents of the bag should be removed layer by layer, each being examined until the
bag is empty. The empty bag should then be lifted by hand and assessed for balance and
empty weight. If there is suspicion that the bag is not of uniform weight, or not of a weight
consistent with being empty, the bag itself should be examined for concealment of
prohibited items, if necessary, it should be screened by X-ray;
f) Electrical items that might conceal a firearm, weapon or explosive device (e.g. razors,
calculators, radios, clocks, cameras, personal stereos and their cassettes) should be
examined to ensure they have not been tampered with, or of the expected weight, are
balanced and have no additional batteries. If necessary an item should be screened by X-
ray to ensure that it has no additional power source or that there is no organic material
within what should be an inorganic shell;
g) Articles such as vacuum flasks, books, umbrellas and crutches should be examined in
sufficient depth, by X-ray if necessary, to establish their bonafides;
h) Attention should be given to the contents of containers and bottles capable of holding
volatile liquids. Liquids shall be rejected when there are grounds for suspecting that they
may be used to commit an unlawful act;
i) Screener should examine for greasy stains and small holes in the exterior of the case and
for the smell of almonds, nail polish, glue, perfume or other masking vapours ,which might
indicate the presence of explosives;
j) While checking the hand baggage physically, it should be ensured by the screener that the
hand baggage are repacked properly in the presence of the passengers and their
belongings are not left around or tampered with.
k) It shall also be ensured that hand baggage of female passengers are checked by a female
screener only;

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 160 of 252
The Passenger must be present and the Bag Must Be Kept In View of the Passenger.
Why?
Answer:- There are two reasons for this:-

 To prevent any accusation of the planting a prohibited item which is found during the search.
If you find a prohibited item such as a weapon, explosive or incendiary material, or even an IED,
this will need to be proved in court. If the bag is removed from the sight of the passenger, it
could be difficult to rebut a charge of the item being planted, or to disprove a claim of
innocence by the passenger.
 To prevent any accusation of theft from the baggage.
If the bag is lost to sight, and the passenger claims that you had stolen some item from the
bag, it could be difficult to disprove this claim. Even if the accusation could not be supported
by evidence, suspicion could be damaging to both you and your employers reputation.
Ask the passenger to open the bag
Why?
There are three reasons for asking the passenger to unlock the bag.
 It emphasizes the fact that you have been given permission to search.
 It offers you some protection against activating a non-terrorist security protection system: activating
an alarm system (in a courier security bag), a self- destruct mechanism, or a spoiler dye spray built into
the locking mechanism.
 It offers you some protection against activating a terrorist anti-handling device. The owner of the bag is
unlikely to open it, if the owner knows it will endanger him/her.
During the search, withdraw from non-essential social contact with the passenger, remain
polite, but discourage small talk. A terrorist may try to distract you:-
 by offering to help you in your search

 by keeping up a stream of distracting conversation or talk
 by trying to establish a positive rapport with you or try to annoy you with the aim of making you carry
out a less thorough search.
Consider wearing surgical/ disposable gloves when you are searching. There are two reasons for
wearing gloves. First, they can help to make any search more impersonal and secondly, they
offer you some protection.
Before Opening the Bag
Check the construction of the bag for signs of interference or tampering that might indicate the
presence of an IED.

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 161 of 252
Is the balance of the bag right for its size and shape? Does the bag feel lopsided? Also at this time
check all outside pockets.
2
3 2
3
1
When you examine the outside of the bag look for these things:-
1. Are there signs of tampering with, or repair to the outside of the bag?
Look for any loose wires, studs or rings which could be a safety-switch for an IED. Small
holes through which an IED could be armed by pushing a thin rod e.g. a knitting needle
through the shell of the bag.
2. Have the handles been changed or altered?
3. Are all screws, nuts, and rivets used in the construction of the bag the originals or have
they been replaced with other types or altered in some way?
4. Does the bag have more locks than is normal for the type of bag?
Open the Bag
 When the bag is opened, is there a strong smell, e.g. acid, almonds, nail polish, glue, aftershave or
scent, which might hide the smell of explosive or incendiary material?
Look at the lining of the bag:-
 Is the lining original? Has the lining been repaired? Are there traces of glue?

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 162 of 252
 Some explosives leave greasy marks. Are there signs of handling on the fabric of the lining? Are there
oil stains on the lining?
 Feel the lining. Is there a difference, in texture and feel, of any part of the bag?
 If while checking the bag you find something that does not seem quite right about the bag structure,
you should empty the bag completely and have the bag passed through the x-ray machine again. Tell
the x-ray operator what you suspect and the areas to inspect more closely.
Are there any signs of a false bottom?
Make a check on the bag for a false bottom. Use a straight edged rod to check internal and
external measurements. There should not be excessive thickness.
Search Principles
• All hand carried items must be screened and/or searched preferably passed through
x-ray equipment
• It is important to adopt a systematic approach so that no part of the body, items of clothing or
areas of the bag are overlooked
• Search should normally be carried out in open but should not expose to public view:
– Classified or Private documents.
– Large amounts of currency.
– Valuable items. ( jewellery etc.)
• Private search used when necessary to search in sufficient depth to establish if prohibited
article is present.
• 2 searchers of the same sex as person being searched required.

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 163 of 252
• All indications of metal on the person by technical equipment must be resolved

• Persons who cannot be cleared by normal screening process must be searched by hand.
Check the contents of the bag for an IED or weapon.
Throughout your search of the bag contents, remain cool and disassociated from the passenger.
Do not make any verbal comment on the contents, either in admiration or disgust. Your
complimentary comments on an expensive item of clothing or electronic item are just as
uncalled-for as less complimentary remarks you might make on the state of any soiled clothing.
Start your search of the bag contents by feeling round the outer edge of the contents. Make sure
that you reach right into the corners of the bag and right down to the bottom.
You will find that, by using your fingertips, the contents of the bag will separate into definite
layers. Feel between these layers and press them firmly from above and below searching for
hidden items.
Certain bags such as duffle type bags or where the size and contents of the bag makes a
layer search impossible will need to be emptied and the contents searched before being replaced
in the bag.
If you find rolled up clothing or soiled clothing from the bag, unroll and unwrap the clothing
discreetly, an innocent passenger will not thank you for airing ‘dirty linen’ in public.
Attention should be given to the contents of containers and containers capable of holding liquids.
Liquids shall be rejected when there are grounds for suspecting that they may be used to commit
an unlawful act.
Remember only limited amounts of liquids are allowed in cabin baggage.

Items that could conceal an IED, e.g. a pair of binoculars, a vacuum flask, a book which might be
hollowed out, collapsible umbrella, a camera, a soft toy which seems unusually heavy, an aerosol
which dents easily (because it is no longer pressurized) , remove it from the bag and examine it
closely. When examining the item be careful. Accidental damage to an expensive camera or
similar item can be caused quite easily.
If, when checking an item, you find something not seem quite right, you should have that
item passed through the x-ray machine again. Remember to tell the x-ray operator what you
suspect about the item.
You should pay special attention to any electrical or electronic items which could be used to
conceal an IED. For example:-
 Personal electronic equipment. (Laptop computers)
 Calculators
 Radios
 Clocks
 Personal music equipment.
 Battery powered cameras

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 164 of 252
The best option for all electrical and electronic items is to pass them through x-ray equipment
or to use trace detection equipment.
Simply turning on an electrical item either using it’s own power source or external electrical
outlet is not satisfactory since the fact that an item appears to function does not mean it has not
been tampered with or conceals an IED.
When a person requests hand search of a computer, Video camera or similar articles, the articles
must be examined by following means :-
(i) That the equipment being searched operates satisfactory and,
(ii) There is no sign of the case being tempered with or modified including case holding screw
damage and,
(iii) The behavior of the passenger does not give cause for concern and ,
(iv) There is no other reason to be concerned as to the items or its contents.
On completion of your search, close and fasten the bag, then return it to the passenger.
The passenger should leave the search area:-

 With the impression that you were thorough and efficient in your search.
If you are cursory in your inspection, and skimp the search, the passenger may well wonder just
why you did bother searching in the first instance and how safe it is to travel.
 Without cause for complaint.
If you carry out the search impartially, without emotion other than politeness, and hand the
bag back in the same order as you found it, then even the most unreasonable passenger will
find it difficult to fault you.
Standard Operating Procedure

Cabin baggage of a female passenger will be searched by a female screener only. 10% of hold
baggage will be physically searched at random after screening by X-ray BIS.
In case of cabin baggage 20 % of bags will be searched at random after screening by X-ray BIS. 25%
to 30% during alerts
Procedure When a Prohibited or Dangerous Article is found During Screening:
The dangerous goods and prohibited articles shall not be allowed for carriage on persons or
in cabin baggage on board an aircraft. These will be seized by the screening officer. However,
if the screening officer suspects that a person was trying to carry such items on board with the
intention to commit an act of unlawful interference with aviation, the screener will inform his
supervisor, who will take further action, as deemed appropriate.
Different procedure will apply for weapons found on the person and those detected in cabin
baggage. Detection of explosive devices in cabin baggage may dictate yet another different
response.

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 165 of 252
It is important for the searcher to remain calm and not to cause a panic among other passengers,
which may make the situation worse. The searcher’s supervisor should be summoned covertly
and should in turn take action to summon assistance from the local policing authority.
The discovery of a weapon in passenger’s cabin baggage may be dealt with by simply closing the
bag and removing it from the passenger’s reach. If the item is confirmed as a suspect
explosive device DO NOT TOUCH IT but carry out standard suspect explosive device procedures.
In the case of a weapon or explosive device being detected during the screening process, the
relevant person shall be handed over to local police for further action in case he is not in
possession of valid documents. However, in case he is in possession of necessary documents, no
need to detain the passenger. Check the documents, verify the arm is in unloaded condition,
properly packed. The bag shall be checked-in and same procedure will be followed as in the case
of declared weapon. A report shall be sent to DGCA and Local Police will be informed.

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 166 of 252
Module 14 HANDLING OF FIREARMS FOR CARRIAGE BY AUTHORISED

PASSENGERS
Module Objectives
 Search of various types of carry-on baggage in presence of passenger physically

 Recognize prohibited and dangerous items that may be camouflaged, contained or hidden
in carry-on baggage with specific concerns relating to electronic items
 SOP to deal with prohibited and dangerous items detected in baggage
 Behaviour of search team personnel / selection of bags for physical search and techniques
Teaching Methods
 Demonstrations
 Progress Tests
Annex 17
that originating passengers of commercial air transport
operations and their cabin baggage are screened prior
to boarding an aircraft departing from a security
restricted area.

Rule 14 (iv) Duties of CASO:- Screening of passenger and their hand
baggage
Rule 21 Security Check before Embarkation

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 167 of 252
NCASP 2018
Chapter 7.1.8 Screening of Hand Baggage
Order 05/2005 Permissible & Prohibited Items to be carried by the

passenger
Circular 19/2003 Physical checks of hand baggage
Circular 21/2004 Use of hand gloves for frisking passages and physical
check of their baggage
Circular 23/2005 Procedure for passenger & carryon baggage screening
Circular 08/2017 Procedure for dealing with cases wherein arms and /or
ammunition are detected during screening of a passenger
or his baggage.
Circular 34 / 2005 Procedure for Screening of Hold Baggage
Procedure for Carriage of Arms and ammunition
On person or in hand baggage:

 PSO’s of VVIP’s
Can carry weapon in unloaded condition in the cabin baggage. The weapon and ammunition
should be kept separately.
 SPG’s when accompanying SPG Protectee

Can carry weapon in unloaded condition in the cabin baggage. The weapon and ammunition
should be kept separately.
 Sky Marshals
Can carry weapon on board aircraft. They should possess the Weapon Authorization Card
(WAC) issued by BCAS and ID card issued by NSG. They travel as per scheduled given by
BCAS and issued with all airport AEP. They need to undergo Breath Analysis test conducted by
respective airline medical department at the originating station.
Weapon In registered baggage:
 PSO’s of VIP’s
 Can carry weapon in registered baggage. Should produce valid identity card and duty
slip/movement order authorizing them to carry specific weapons and ammunition while on
bonafide duty traveling by air.
 Dignitaries of high risk category
Handout RESTRICTED
Page 168 of 252
 Can carry authorized weapon and ammunition in registered baggage.

 Any person on bonafide duty
 Can carry weapon in registered baggage. Should produce valid identity card and travel order
authorizing them to carry specific weapons and ammunition while on bonafide duty traveling
by air.
 Bonafide passenger holding valid license
 As per the existing instructions, one licensed firearm (revolver/pistol/shot gun) and/ or
50 cartridges are allowed to be carried by a passenger in his/her hold baggage.
 Passenger has to declare carriage of weapon to the airline and fill up a Weapon
Declaration Form.
The airline station manager authorizes the carriage of weapon.
 The passengers license will be checked for expiry date, area of jurisdiction, weapon
number, make and model number, number of cartridges allowed etc.
 The weapon and ammunition is stowed in area inaccessible to the passengers and crew
members during the flight. In case of an aircraft that does not have separate cargo holds
the airline should inform passengers that the weapons cannot be allowed for carriage
in registered baggage of passenger. However if the weapon and ammunition is
required to be carried necessary arrangements for a securely locked, tamper proof
container for keeping registered baggage containing weapon / ammunition shall be made
by the aircraft operator.
Procedure for carriage of licensed arms/ ammunition in hold baggage:
 Station Managers/ Airport Managers of all airlines are permitted to allow the carriage of
one licensed fire arm and/ or fifty cartridges belonging to a bonafide passenger, provided
that:
o The passenger carrying firearms and/ or ammunition is in possession of valid license in

accordance with The Arms Act, 1959. In the case of a foreign national checking of
documents like permission from Government of India and the Government of the
concerned country for carriage of firearms and/ or ammunition by air.
o A passenger can carry his authorized or licensed fire-arm and/ or ammunition in his
accompanied hold baggage, after declaring it to the check-in staff of the airline
operator if screening of hold baggage is done after the check-in process, or to the
screener at the security check point if the screening is done prior to check in process.
o If the passenger does not have a hold baggage, the firearm is stored inside a locked

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 169 of 252
container that is placed in a tamper – proof stowage receptacle in the baggage

compartment, and is inaccessible to unauthorized persons on the ground or during
flight.
o On declaration by the passenger, the check-in staff or security screener, as the case
may be, will refer the passenger to security supervisor of the airline operator.
o The security supervisor will ask the passenger to fill and sign a prescribed form for
carriage of arms/ammunition. The supervisor will verify all the relevant documents
to ensure that the weapon is licensed or authorized in the name of the passenger
concerned.
o The Station Manager/ Airport Manager shall verify all the relevant documents to
ensure that the arms and/ or ammunition are licensed in the name of the passenger
concerned.
o The arms and/ or ammunition shall be carried only in the registered baggage of the
passenger
o The registered baggage containing arms and/ or ammunition shall be carried only in
aircraft having separate cargo holds so as not to be accessible to passenger.
o The arms and/ or ammunition are so packed, protected and secured so as to avoid
the possibility of their being a source of danger.
o Ammunition is transported separately from the firearm in a suitable container, is
placed in the aircraft baggage compartment, and is inaccessible to unauthorized persons
on the ground or during flight.
o Ammunition for personal firearms is carried as hold baggage, in accordance with
ICAO DOC 9284 and the Aircraft (Carriage of Dangerous Goods) Rules, 2003.
o The firearm should be unloaded and, if necessary, dismantled based on threat
perception.
o Fire-arm will be checked by a trained staff of the airline operator or Aviation Security
Group to ensure that it is not loaded.
o The fire-arm will be carried in a hard sided container which must be locked.
o Transported ammunition must be securely packed in fiber (such as cardboard), wood or
metal boxes or other packaging specially designed to carry small amounts of
ammunition.
o Fire - arm magazines/ clips do not satisfy the packaging requirement unless they provide
a complete and secure enclosure of the ammunition.
o The ammunition may also be located in the same hard sided case as the firearm, as
long as it is properly packed as described above.
o The nature of the goods is clearly and conspicuously marked on the package
containing them.
o Black powder and percussion caps used with black powder type fire-arms are not
permitted in cabin baggage as well as in hold baggage.
o The baggage containing fire-arm and/or ammunition will not be conveyed to baggage
make-up area through the conveyor belt. After the baggage has been subjected to
prescribed security controls and cleared, the security staff of the concerned airline
operator will escort it till it is loaded onto the aircraft hold.
o The registered baggage containing fire – arm and/ or ammunition shall be handed over
to the passenger at the destination only in the arrival hall and not on the tarmac.

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 170 of 252
In order to streamline the procedure for carriage of weapons and ammunition by Personal
Security Officers (PSOs) of VVIPs /VIPs and/ or persons / passengers, and to prevent
unauthorized carriage of weapons, explosives or any other dangerous devices within India
which may be used to commit an act of unlawful interference on an aircraft engaged in civil
aviation operations, operating to and from civil airports in India, the following instructions are
issued for compliance by all concerned:-
VVIPs like President, Vice President, Prime Minister and SPG protectees:
The Personal Security Officers shall carry their weapons and ammunition on their
person or in their hand baggage in fully unloaded condition
SPG Personnel are hereby permitted to carry One Pistol with 60 cartridges; and one
Sub Machine Gun/ Assault Rifle with 150 cartridges.

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 171 of 252
 In Flight Security Officers (IFSOs):
In order to provide adequate security coverage to aircrafts registered in India and engaged
in civil aviation operations to and from all civil airports in India, permission has been
granted by the Central Government to IFSO while on duty in such aircraft, for carriage of
weapons and ammunition on board such an aircraft.
o The I F S O shall be in possession of their Identity Cards and authorization, issued by

Director General, BCAS from time to time, for carriage of weapons and ammunition on
board an aircraft.
o Station Manager / Airport Manager of the concerned airlines shall ensure that the pilot- in-
Handout RESTRICTED
Page 172 of 252
command is notified as to the number of armed persons and their seat allocation on board
the aircraft.
 PSO(s) of other VIP / dignitary of high risk category:
Whenever allowed by the government of India to accompany such a VIP/ dignitary during
his/ her journey by air or any person on bonafide duty with weapon and ammunition while
travelling by air shall carry the authorized weapons and ammunition in his/ her
registered baggage only in the manner specified below:
o The Personal Security Officers or the persons on duty mentioned in para above shall carry
with them their valid Identity Cards and Duty Slips / Movement Orders authorizing them
to carry specific weapons and ammunition while on bonafide duty travelling by air and shall
produce the same to the Airport / Airlines Security Officers/ Manager.
o Chief Aerodrome Security Officer of Aviation Security Group (ASG)/ In-charge Airport
Security Unit shall check the Identity Card and Duty Slip/ Movement Order of the PSOs of
VVIP/ SPG protectees and shall ensure their genuineness.
o Concerned Airlines Security Manager / Officer shall check the Identity Card and Duty Slip/
Movement Order of the PSOs and persons mentioned above and shall ensure their
genuineness.
In the case of regular passengers the Station Manager/ Airport Managers of all airlines are
authorized to allow carriage of only one licensed revolver or pistol or shotgun and fifty
cartridges belonging to a bonafide passenger. In case, a passenger is having more than one
weapon and /or 50 cartridges, the passenger must have written approval from DGCA.
The following conditions shall be strictly followed for carriage of weapons and ammunition
in the Registered Baggage by a bonafide passenger, PSOs or VIPs or any dignitary or high risk
category or any person who has been allowed to carry his weapon and ammunition on
duty while travelling by air. Henceforth such categories of persons have been referred to
as passengers:-
o Such a passenger shall declare the carriage of his/ her authorized/ licensed weapon and
ammunition to the concerned air carrier in writing on the prescribed form to be provided
by the airlines operator before security check of his / her Registered Baggage. Original
copy of such declaration shall be retained at the Boarding Station, second copy shall be
kept in the flight’s file and third copy shall be given to the passenger.
o Prior to acceptance of weapon and ammunition from a bonafide passenger having valid
license or authorization issued by the competent authority as mentioned above, the
concerned airlines operator shall ensure that the carriage of weapons and ammunition in
Registered Baggage of such a passenger is allowed only when an authorized and duly
qualified person of the airlines has determined that the weapon is not loaded.
o The Station Manager / Airport Manager of the concerned airlines shall verify all the relevant
Handout RESTRICTED
Page 173 of 252
documents to ensure that the weapon(s) and ammunition is / are licensed / authorized in
the name of the passenger concerned and shall ensure that only authorized number(s)
of weapon and ammunition are allowed in the Registered Baggage.
o The weapons and ammunition shall be stowed in an area that is inaccessible to any person
including air crew while the aircraft is in flight and shall not be carried in the cockpit or
retained by a member of the crew. Therefore, the weapons and ammunition shall be
carried only in the Registered Baggage of the passenger and such baggage shall be stored
in a securely locked, tamper-proof container which shall be located in the baggage
compartment of aircraft or in aircraft having separate cargo holds so as not accessible to
passengers.
o In case an aircraft does not have separate cargo / baggage hold for safe and secure storage
of a securely locked, tamper-proof container for keeping passengers Registered Baggage
containing their authorized weapons and ammunitions, concerned airlines shall be
responsible to inform their passengers not to carry arms and ammunition with them as the
same shall not be allowed to be carried in the Registered Baggage in such an aircraft.
However, if weapons/ ammunition are required to be carried in such an aircraft which does
not have cargo / baggage hold, necessary arrangements for a securely locked , tamper-
proof container for keeping Registered Baggage containing authorized weapons /
ammunition shall be made by the aircraft owner /airlines operator. The Registered Baggage
shall be handed over to the concerned person/ passenger at destination in the arrival hall
only.
o The above procedures are also applicable to Private Aircraft owners (Corporate Aviation/
General Aviation) and their body guards carrying weapons also.
o At foreign airports, where I n d i a n r e g i s t e r e d a i r c r a f t a r e operating, the discretion to
permit the carriage of personal weapon and ammunition in the Registered Baggage will vest
with the Airport Manager of the concerned airlines in consultation with the Airlines
Security Officer if available. Same will be the case vice-a-versa for foreign aircraft
operating from India. In all such cases, the passenger shall carry valid documents and also
subject to the provision that such carriage do not violate the local /national and
International laws, rules and regulations.
o The above instructions shall be subject to any further restrictions applicable in countries
of transit and destination.
 The Units of Armed forces/ para-military forces
While traveling on duty by a civil commercial flight in domestic sectors within India may be
allowed by the concerned aircraft operator to carry their service fire-arms and ammunition
in hold baggage subject to the following conditions:-
o The Unit Commander or his authorized representative must submit to the Chief Aerodrome
Security Officer and to the station In-charge of concerned airlines security the Unit’s
official travel orders and an inventory of weapons and ammunition being transported.
o The Unit commander must declare in writing the weapons & ammunition to the airline
operator.
o Weapon must be unloaded and collectively secured in a crate and banded or
individually locked in a hard-sided case.
Handout RESTRICTED
Page 174 of 252
o Ammunition must also be securely packed in fibre (such as cardboard), wood or metal
boxes or other packaging specifically designed to carry small amounts of ammunition.
o The Unit commander must certify to the station in-charge of the airlines security at the
airport that the weapons are unloaded.
o Live grenades, mines, bombs, explosives, black powder and percussion caps used with
black powder type fire-arms, tear gas shells and munitions and other dangerous
goods/devices shall not be allowed on board the aircraft (neither in Cabin nor in Hold
baggage), without specific written permission from Director General of Civil Aviation, Govt.
of India.
 Carriage of licensed firearm and / or ammunition by a sportsperson while traveling by air.
As per the existing instructions, one licensed firearm and/ or 50 cartridges are allowed to
be carried by a passenger in his/ her hold baggage. If a sportsperson is traveling by air in
domestic sectors to participate in some shooting event within India for which he/ she is
required to carry more than one licensed firearms and/ or more than 50 cartridges, such
sportsperson may be allowed by the concerned aircraft operator to carry the required
number of licensed firearms and/ or ammunition in his hold baggage subject to the following
conditions: -
 The sportsperson must declare orally or in writing about carriage of the firearms and/ or
ammunition and will produce the following documents at the security check point of hold
baggage for inspection by the screener of concerned aircraft operator:
o Valid license/ authorization of fire arms and ammunition;
o Evidence of identity which can be established by a photo identity card issued by a
government agency or the sponsoring sports club.
o Bonafide for carriage of arms and ammunitions on the basis of a written document
issued by the president or secretary of the sports club sponsoring him/ her for the
shooting event.
 The fire-arm must be unloaded.
 The fire-arm must be carried in a hard-sided container.
 The container must be locked.
 Transported ammunition must be securely packed in fibre (such as cardboard), wood or
metal boxes or other packaging specially designed to carry small amounts of
ammunition.
 Fire -arm magazines/clips do not satisfy the packaging requirement unless they provide a
complete and secure enclosure of the ammunition.
 The ammunition may also be located in the same hard sided case as the firearm, as
long as it is properly packed as described above.
 Black powder and percussion caps used with black powder type fire arms are not
permitted neither in cabin nor hold baggage.
 Authorization for carriage of firearms and ammunition by the sports persons in an
aircraft shall be obtained from DGCA in accordance with provisions of the Aircraft
(Carriage of Dangerous Goods) Rules 2003.
Handout RESTRICTED
Page 175 of 252
 Procedure for dealing with cases wherein arms and/ or ammunition are detected during
screening of a passenger or his baggage.
The following procedure shall be followed for dealing with cases wherein arms and/ or
ammunition are detected during screening of a passenger or his baggage.
There may be following possibilities regarding carriage of arms and ammunition together or
separately:
 Arms and/ or ammunition are detected in the registered baggage of a passenger at the time
of X-ray screening and the passenger has failed to declare the same to the Airlines Security
staff as required under the Aircraft (Carriage of Dangerous Goods) Rules 2003.
 Arms and/ or ammunition are detected in the hand baggage or on the person of a
passenger at the time of frisking / x-ray screening of hand baggage in the Security
Restricted Area (SRA) or at the ladder point.
Course of Action:
Authorized arms and/ or ammunition are allowed to be carried only in the hold of an aircraft.
Even if the arms and/ or ammunition are detected in the hand baggage or on person with valid
license/ authorization, the carriage of the same shall be allowed in the hold baggage only and
the following course of action shall be followed by the ASG (CISF/ State Police)/ Airline
operator/ Airport operator (wherever ILBS installed), as the case may be, to deal with the
situations as mentioned in paras above:
 If the passenger is having a valid license with him, the ASG (CISF/ State Police)/ Airline
operator/ Airport operator security staff, as the case may be, shall examine the weapon
physically to see that it is unloaded and packed as per the prescribed norms, obtain
declaration from the passenger as required under the Aircraft (Carriage of Dangerous Goods)
Rules 2003 and thereafter allow him to proceed for check-in etc. There is no need to detain
the passenger. However, a complaint shall be made about the incident to the Director
General, DGCA for necessary action at their end under the Aircraft (Carriage of Dangerous
Goods) Rules 2003. Local police shall also be informed.
 If the passenger does not have a valid arms license with him at that time but claims to
possess the same, he cannot be allowed to proceed. The passenger shall be detained and
handed over to local police for necessary legal action in this regard.
 If the passenger claims that he is a serving Police/ Defence Services/ Central Armed Forces
personnel and is entitled to carry his service arms and ammunition, the ASG (CISF/ State
Police)/ Airline operator / Airport operator security staff shall confirm his identity through a
valid photo identity card issued by the Department/ Ministry concerned and movement order/
authority slip. If his identity and bona fides are beyond doubt, the ASG (CISF/ State Police)/
Airline operator/ Airport operator security staff can obtain necessary declaration from him as
required under the Aircraft (Carriage of Dangerous Goods) Rules 2003 and thereafter allow

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 176 of 252
him to proceed for check-in etc. There is no need to detain the passenger. However, a
complaint shall be made about the incident to the Director General, DGCA for necessary
action at their end under the Aircraft (Carriage of Dangerous Goods) Rules 2003. Local police
shall also be informed and a copy of such complaint shall also be forwarded to the
controlling authority of such person.
 In case the passenger neither has a valid arms license with him nor claims to possess the
same, the ASG (CISF/ State Police)/ Airline operator / Airport operator security staff shall
hand him over to the local police along with the arms and ammunition with a complaint
about the incident for taking necessary legal action under the Arms Act 1959 and Aircraft
Act 1934 and the rules framed there under.

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 177 of 252
MODULE – 15 EMERGENCIES & CONTINGENCIES
Module Objective
 List the different types of emergency/ emergencies involving aircraft / airport and response
 Describe typical response to a bomb threat involving an aircraft / airport/Facility
 Describe the procedure for searching an area in respect to a bomb threat
 Specify the action to be taken when a suspect item is located.
 Contingency plan to deal with unlawful interference
Teaching Methods
 Demonstrations
 Progress Tests
Annex 17
Standard 5.1.4 Each Contracting State shall ensure that contingency

plans are developed and resources made available to
safeguard civil aviation against acts of unlawful
interference. The contingency plans shall be tested on a
regular basis.
Standard 5.1.5 Each Contracting State shall ensure that authorized

and suitably trained personnel are readily available for
deployment at its airports serving civil aviation to assist
in dealing with suspected, or actual, cases of unlawful
interference with civil aviation.
Standard 5.3.1 Each Contracting State concerned with an act of unlawful

interference shall provide ICAO with all pertinent
Handout RESTRICTED
Page 178 of 252
information concerning the security aspects of the act of

unlawful interference as soon as practicable after the act
is resolved.
Recommendation. 5.3.2 Each Contracting State should exchange information with

other Contracting States as considered appropriate on
the management of response to an act of unlawful
interference, at the same time supplying such
information to ICAO.
Standard 3.4.8 Each Contracting State concerned with an act of unlawful
interference shall require its appropriate authority to re-
evaluate security controls and procedures and in a timely
fashion take action necessary to remedy weaknesses so as to
prevent recurrence. These actions shall be shared with ICAO.

Rule 10 Handling of unattended or suspect baggage
Rule 16 Contingency Plan
Rule 45 Reporting of Security Accidents or Incidents to the DG, BCAS
NCASP
Chapter 10 Management of response to acts of unlawful interference
Order 07/2010 Responsibilities of BDDS/ Dog Squad
Order 08/2010 Deployment of IFSO- Sky marshals
Order 02/2011 Deployment of suitably trained personnel to deal with case
of Unlawful interference
Order 08/2011 Potentially disruptive passengers
Order 17/2011 Bomb Threat Contingency Plan
Order 19/2011 Contingency Plan for handling hijacked aircraft
Order 05/2016 Information to other agencies on receipt of bomb threat
calls
Order 06/2016 Establishing and maintaining data base of Hoax Bomb
Threat calls
Circular 43/2005 Contingency Plan for handling aircraft hijack situation.
Circular 29/2006 Anti-hijacking Mock Exercise at Airports.
Circular 01/2009 Counter terrorist Plan at Airports
Circular 08/2009 Formation of CC at IGI Airport
Circular 19/2009 Contingency Plan for handling Hijack Situation
Circular 25/2009 Arrangements in case of hijacked aircraft landing at
defense controlled airports
Circular 08/2010 Operations/ Mock exercise by NSG
Circular 18/2010 Minimum standards for BDDS equipment

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 179 of 252
Circular 20/2010 BDDS equipment for BDDS squads

Circular 21/2010 Prompt Communication of incidents
Circular 03/2017 Minimum standards/ Specification with regard to Bomb Suit
Circular 12/2017 Provision for Bullet Resistant Vehicles to QRT at airports
Circular 13/2017 Prioritizing of BDDS equipment- reg
TYPES OF AIRPORT EMERGENCIES
Emergencies involving aircraft. These include:
 Incidents involving-Aircraft on airport

 Incidents -Aircraft off airport
 Incident-Aircraft in flight
 Incident-Aircraft on ground
 Sabotage, including bomb threat
 Unlawful seizure
Emergencies not involving aircraft. These include:
 Fire
 Sabotage, including bomb threat at airport
 Natural disaster
 Terrorist attack of ATC/terminal building
 Terrorist attack of airport
 Breakdown of runway
 Emergencies at airport(fire, collapse of airport building
Medical emergencies. These include:
 Collapsed person
 Sudden death
 Industrial accidents
 Delivery of newborn
 Communicable disease alert
 Collective food poisoning.
Bomb Threat:
Handout RESTRICTED
Page 180 of 252
Bomb threat can be received to any aircraft which is on ground or in flight, at any airport, vital
installation, or any civil aviation facility like ATC, cargo facility, navigational aid area or any
person. The call received can be genuine, politically motivated, hoax or malicious call to disturb
safe operation of flight .Bomb threat is also conveyed by any helpful person who informs
concerned airline or airport agencies regarding bomb threat, which he overheard or came to
know, etc.
Bomb Threat Calls are made by
 Terrorist in order to check the efficiency of airport security.

 Mentally ill, practical jokers or those who want to play prank.
 Delayed passenger / Disgruntle passenger can give malicious bomb threat call to civil
aviation.
Whenever we receive a bomb threat call for any aircraft or any civil aviation facility, there are
four phases of handling that bomb threat
 Receipt
 Report
 Risk Assessment
 Response
Bomb Threat and its response Action in case of Bomb Threat Call:
Considering that the safety of lives / property under circumstances of a bomb threat is
directly linked to the prompt and appropriate decision of the BTAC, it shall be the moral
obligation on the part of senior most officials within each agency to attend the BTAC
whenever possible. However, also considering that the senior most official within each
agency may not be present at the airport round the clock due to the nature of official duty /
routine work performed, the next senior most official within such agency authorized as
alternate member of BTAC may attend the BTAC.
We often get b o m b t h r e a t calls at airport. Analysis of these calls reveals that such
calls are given by delayed passengers, those who has been denied seats by airlines,
drunken people, trickster, media crazy people, jilted lovers, dismissed or suspended
employees, love birds, competitors, politically motivated people etc.
In case if you ask these callers about the details of bomb or reason for bombing, their
name, place or telephone number etc they will immediately put the receiver down.
It is therefore suggested that telephone operators, Control room staff etc are to be trained to
ask following questions:-

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 181 of 252
 Where is the bomb?

 When will it go off?
 What does it look like?/ What type of device is used?
 Who are you?
 Why are you doing this?
Actions on Receiving a Bomb Threat Call
 Remain calm
 Ensure caller ID has registered calling number and note it down
 Switch on voice recording facility(if it is not automatic)
 Allow the caller to complete his conversation first without interruption.
 Note exact time of call
 Try to prolong call (if possible) to get maximum information.
 Ask open–ended questions instead of leading questions.
 Alert colleagues and supervisors who can also listen to conversation.
 Observe callers sex, voice, language, approx age, background noise etc.
 Note actual words and Record other details
 Inform all details to supervisor
Supervisor to interview the receiver of threat call in order to complete the bomb threat report
form (BTRF) and relay the information without delay to the respective BTAC coordinator of the
affected airport for which the threat has been received for.
Other information to be reported by the recipient of a Bomb Threat Call
 The background noise from where the call is been made

 Identification of gender
 Exact time of call
 Actual wording
 Approximate age
The response to the above questions and background details will help the bomb threat
assessment committee members to evaluate the call to “SPECIFIC” or “NON SPECIFIC”
As per BCAS mandates all publically advertised telephone number must have:-
a) Caller Line Identification Procedure (CLIP) facility.

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 182 of 252
b) BTRF
Actions to be taken by the Aircraft Operator
On receipt of the threat call the air carrier will take immediate actions as under
a) Rush to attend the BTAC meeting after leaving instructions to next senior official to :execute
actions given as under
b) Where passengers have fully/partially boarded, quickly disembark such passengers/ crew in
an orderly manner with hand baggage and bring them back to SHA through departure hall
for further action.
c) Ask crew and ground staff on board / in cargo hold to look for and report any
unidentified article before they themselves finally disembark due to bomb threat. (The
crew and ground staff should be cautioned not to touch, open or attempt to remove any
unclaimed article/device but report to the coordinator).
d) Ask airline Engineers / staff to keep aircraft in ready to tow position for removal to Isolation
Bay/Area in case BTAC declares the threat call as specific
e) Identify passenger’s joining the check in Queue after receipt of bomb threat call and
refer such passengers to Airport Security for inquiry/investigation.
f) Mobilize sufficient staff even if it is recess / relief time to ensure their availability to empty
aircraft holds and to layout all unloaded baggage/stores for their anti-sabotage check as
required under specific/ non-specific threat.
g) Actively participate in the evaluation of threat by BTAC and in deciding follow up actions.
h) Move to the aircraft under threat and get the tasks performed from the staff as decided in
the BTAC and in a coordinated manner with other agencies.
Evaluation of Call
The Bomb Threat Assessment Committee (BTAC) shall be established at the affected airport.
The Bomb Threat Assessment Committee (BTAC)
Bomb Threat Assessment Committee shall consist of the following officials with respective
status as mentioned against each:-
No Officials Agency Status
a Airport Director or his representative Airport Operator Co-ordinator

b CASO or his representative ASG (CISF or State Police) Member
Security Manager / Station Manager of
c affected airlines Aircraft Operator Member
d Watch Supervisory Officer (WSO) ATC Member
e Airworthiness Officer DGCA Member
f Representative of local police State Police Member
Handout RESTRICTED
Page 183 of 252
ASG (CISF\ State Police)

g Officer I/C BDDS Member
h FRRO/Asst FRRO * Immigration Member
i Deputy Commandant * Customs Member
RD, BCAS or his representative
j (Wherever located) BCAS Observer
* (Should be present in case threat relates to international terminal, international airlines or
import/export cargo terminal)
EVALUATION OF THREAT CALL

The BTAC uses the “Bomb Warning Assessment Form (BWAF) as a guideline for systematic
and scientific evaluation of the Bomb Threat Call.
The procedure of building of an assessment system to lead the bomb warning assessors
to a logical conclusion to classify the threat is called as POSITIVE TARGET IDENTIFICATION
(PTI)
Accordingly the call is classified as under:-
SPECIFIC THREAT: A warning where the threat permits identification of a specific target, or
where the caller has positively identified himself or the organization involved and is judged
credible.
The BTAC evaluates the call based on the information given by the caller and threat perception.
The call is evaluated as “Specific”, if the information is of serious and elaborate nature.
NON SPECIFIC THREAT: A warning that can be related to one or more targets but where
there is doubt about its credibility or about the effectiveness of the existing counter measures.
The call is evaluated as “Non Specific”; if the call is of general nature such as there is a bomb in
the evening flight ‘or’ flight going to Mumbai has a bomb.
HOAX CALL: A warning that may not identify a target or a specific group of targets or which
otherwise lacks credibility.
Action in case of Specific Bomb Threat Call
 The aircraft will be shifted to isolated parking bay.

 ASG will cordon the aircraft from a safe distance of 50m and control the
movement of unauthorized people.
 Deploy airline security staff at ladder point to frisk/check belongings of all
authorized persons entering isolation bay / affected aircraft.
 Airline (GSD) will ensure sufficient loaders, bus trolleys are available for speedy off-
loading.
 All registered baggage, cargo; unaccompanied baggage will be off loaded and kept 100
meters away from aircraft. The registered baggage will be line up properly for re-
Handout RESTRICTED
Page 184 of 252
identification by passengers (with sufficient gap for dogs to move around and also
for movement of passengers during re- identification) unclaimed baggage to be
opened / kept in cooling off pit by BDDS.
 Offload Catering items/ bonded stores and place them in the catering vehicle. Catering
vehicle to be parked 100 meters away from the aircraft and searched.
 First aid kits and Engineering stores to be subjected to thorough search. First aid kit may
be opened and resealed by BDDS if doctors are not available for resealing.
 Detail and ensure that senior airline officials from Security, Flight Crew, Engineer,
Catering Cargo, Commercial, GSD, etc. with sufficient staff are available to assist anti
sabotage check.
 Thorough search of aircraft will be conducted by BDDS, Airline Engineers, Airline
Security, ASG, Airworthiness Officer, etc. They work as a team and conduct aircraft
search with checklist.
 Prevent refueling of aircraft till completion of anti- sabotage check of aircraft.
 Cargo, unaccompanied baggage, mail will not be reloaded unless it is X-rayed or sniffed
by dog. It will be kept in a protected area.
 Re- issue of fresh boarding cards and hand baggage tags to passengers who have
deplaned and brought back to departure hall.
 Crowding of too many employees and parking of vehicles near aircraft to be avoided.
 Radios should not be used to transmit within 25 meter of a suspect device.
 Agencies carrying out search will sign a completion certificate and which is given to ATC
by airline
 Rescreen passengers and their 100% hand baggage check by airport security and
hold crew/ passengers in security hold until clearance is received from the coordinator
from isolation bay.
 Deploy sufficient staff to cross check baggage tag numbers on hold baggage, with
counterfoils held with crew/ passengers and ensure proper and uniform marking of
identified hold baggage.
 Upon receiving clearance from coordinator at isolation bay, arrange to escort crew in
airline coaches to isolation bay. Ensure crew alights from bus at a safe distance of 100
M and after identification of hold baggage, crew proceed towards aircraft for secondary
ladder point frisking /100% hand baggage check by airline security before boarding the
aircraft.
 Gets clearance for passenger boarding from the crew
 Arrange to escort passengers in airline coaches (one coach at a time) to isolation bay.
Ensure passengers alight at a safe distance of 100 M and not more than 10
passengers at a time should proceed with their baggage coupons/boarding pass to
identify their hold baggage.
 Upon identification of hold baggage, ensure that crew / passengers proceed to aircraft
under airline escort and do not loiter on airside.
 Secondary ladder point frisking /100% physical hand baggage check by airline.
 Ensure that only identified hold baggage is reloaded in baggage containers for
loading into the aircraft.
 Ensure that hold baggage containers are not released for loading in cargo hold until
passengers / baggage reconciliation is done and head count of passengers in aircraft
Handout RESTRICTED
Page 185 of 252
matches with those checked in and number of boarding card stubs collected at the
ladder point.
 Make efforts to track the passenger of hold baggage which remain unidentified
from details of passenger on baggage tag and through announcement inside aircraft.
 Note: Under no circumstance will unidentified baggage be taken inside the aircraft for
identification by the passenger or baggage loaded on aircraft with verbal reconciliation
arrived on board between the passengers and airline staff).
 Report details of baggage finally left unidentified, to the coordinator.
 Detail a security officer to accompany BDDS when unidentified baggage is decided to
be moved to explosive disposal area.
 Suspend loading of unaccompanied / rush tag baggage.
 Cargo, mail, courier, catering, bonded stores, medical / first aid boxes, company stores
etc, which is searched/checked/cleared by anti-sabotage check team only will be loaded
in the aircraft.
 If any of the above mentioned stores cannot be searched / checked / cleared the same
will not be loaded on the aircraft. Such stores will be further subjected to 24 hrs
cooling off in addition to a thorough screening/physical check.
 Execute any additional security measure as directed by coordinator / BTAC.
 Arrange to get clearance certificate and get the same signed off by airline engineer,
airline security, ASG, airworthiness (DGCA), BDDS, coordinator and hand over one copy
of the same to coordinator for giving RT/telephone clearance to ATC. Thereafter, hand
over one copy each to ATC, BDDS and other agencies for their record.
Action of Non-specific threat call to an aircraft
Action in case of Non-Specific Call by Coordinator
 Inform every agency and ask them to search their own area and report.
 Get confirmation from all about the search having been completed.
 Request BDDS and DGCA to stand-by near aircraft / building under threat until search
is over and clearance certificate is signed by all agencies.
By Air Carrier
 Alert staff at X - ray.
 Carry out inspection of aircraft.
 Look for suspected baggage.
 Increase physical inspection of registered baggage / mail / cargo.
 Proper baggage identification by passengers and crew.
 Ground engineering to carry out scheduled anti sabotage checks.
 Ensure proper Gate- no- show drill to be followed.
 Thoroughly screen air mail.
 Suspend airlift of unaccompanied baggage and rush tag baggage.
 Frisk staff / passengers at ladder point.
Handout RESTRICTED
Page 186 of 252
 Proper passenger baggage reconciliation.
Search of Aircraft under non- specific Bomb Threat
 Airlines Security and Airlines e n g i n e e r s will carry out search of aircraft under
Non Specific Bomb Threat.
 Coordinator, Air carrier and ASG will ensure action as prescribed for their individual
agencies as per Bomb Warning Assessment Form (BWAF).
 Airline will organize clearance certificate and obtain signatures of all official agencies
involved in search.
 Coordinator after ensuring that all officials/agencies have signed the clearance
certificate, will convey the clearance to ATC for release of aircraft.
 BDDS, fire tender and Ambulance must remain stand by near the aircraft until clearance
is conveyed to ATC by the coordinator.
Threat to terminal building
Action on specific threat to terminal building
 Coordinator will make continuous announcement on central PA system and in

different languages for evacuation of the terminal building.
 Announcement made should be deliberate and tactful so as to avoid panic ex. “due
to security reasons all passengers/staff are requested to evacuate the terminal
building and proceed to safe holding area.”
 All heads of airlines, agencies and departments should evacuate their passengers/staff
quietly to the pre designated safe assembly areas.
 Passengers who are not security checked will evacuate to city side.
 Passengers/staff in Security Hold will evacuate to airside.
 All heads of airlines, agencies and departments will ensure to hold back few staff who
are thoroughly familiar with their work area for subsequent search.
 All passengers/staff will carry their baggage/personal belongings with them.
 Staff will leave all doors and windows open.
 Coordinator will ensure to switch off central AC.
 Coordinator will ensure to open all Emergency doors.
 Unclaimed suspect article if spotted during search shall not be handled but reported to
BDDS.
Action on non-specific threat to terminal building
 Evacuation of terminal building not required

 All heads of airlines, agencies & departments should inform their staff of the received
bomb threat
 Search of terminal building to be undertaken by airlines, agencies & departments in
their respective work areas

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 187 of 252
 Search of common areas to be undertaken by coordinator through his care takers,

cleaners & watch and ward staff.
 Upon locating an unclaimed article during search, the terminal building will be
evacuated as in the case of a specific area.
 Unclaimed article if located will not be handled but reported to BDDS
The contents of the Bomb Threat contingency plan are as follows.
 Airport Director designated as coordinator

 Establishment of Bomb Threat Control room
 Evaluation of call by Bomb Threat Assessment Committee guided by Bomb Warning
Assessment Form (BWAF)
 Questioning Technique
 Duties and Responsibilities of various agencies bat airport such as AAI, ASG, Airlines,
BDDS, DGCA, Customs and Immigration.
 Search Procedure
 Evacuation of building under threat.
 Procedure to deal with unidentified / suspected baggage.
Bomb Threat Review Committee (BTRC)
To ensure installation / working of necessary infrastructure and smooth implementation of

bomb threat contingency plan each airport is required to constitute a BTRC. The
committee will meet once in three months.
Action to be taken on finding Suspect Explosive Device
All airports are required to have dedicated BDDS and dog squads. The BDDS should be well
equipped with necessary manpower and equipment to deal with any type of threat.
The four generic steps to be taken by BDDS on finding a suspicious item during a search is as
under:
 CONFIRM that the item found actually look like a suspicious item and needs attention
of security
 CLEAR the area by evacuating all persons including search teams to a safe distance of
100 meters
 CORDON the area to prevent anyone gaining access to the suspect item
 CONTROL the situation until specialized staff arrive and take command
Counters measures for Bomb Incidents at Airports

 Installation of caller ID (CLIP)
 Give wide publicity in local newspaper if caller is identified.

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 188 of 252
 Prompt evaluation of call with help of BWAF

 Training of employees
 Conduct periodical mock up exercise

 Up gradation of EDS / EDDS.
 Centralized monitoring of CCTV by ASG, Customs, Immigration
 Installation of EVD / ETD

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 189 of 252

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 190 of 252

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 191 of 252
Contingency plan to handle aircraft hijack situation

Contingencies related to unlawful seizure of aircraft:
For Hijacking / Forcible seizure of aircraft on ground, a contingency may arise in one of
the following forms:-
 An aircraft registered in India may be hijacked either within India or abroad and may
land in one of the airports in India or abroad.
 A foreign registered aircraft may be hijacked while in India and may land in India or
abroad.
 A foreign registered aircraft hijacked in some other country may land in India or in one
of the neighboring countries, such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, China,
Nepal, Pakistan, Bhutan, Male and Sri Lanka, raising the possibility of its take-off and
likely landing in India.
Management Occurrences
To deal with acts of interference with Civil Aviation, the following Group/ Committee have
been established:
Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) - Apex Body

Committee of Secretaries on Aircraft Hijack (COSAH) - Advisory Role
Central Committee (CC) - Executive Authority/ Command
Aerodrome Committee (AC) - Operational Command
Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS)
The CCS is an apex body headed by the Prime Minister, which decides policies and takes
decisions on strategic issues like response to hijacker’s demands involving national
security, foreign policy, political implications, strategy / approach to negotiations, forcible
termination of hijack etc. Minister of Civil Aviation would also be included in the CCS for
management of aircraft hijack situations.
Prime Minister : Chairman

Assembles at PMO Office
Committee of Secretaries on Aircraft Hijack (COSAH)
The COSAH is an advisory body, which deliberates on the problems arising out of the
contingency. It will brief and advise CCS about developments and decisions to be taken, and
communicate Govt. decisions / directions/ guidance to the CC.
Cabinet Secretary: Chairman

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 192 of 252
Addl. Secretary Cabinet Secretariat: Convener

Assembles at Cabinet Secretariat, Rashtrapati Bhawan
Central Committee (CC)
The CC is the executive authority responsible for dealing with the contingency of hijacking,
forcible seizure of the aircraft on ground or any other acts of unlawful interference with civil
aviation.
Director General, Civil Aviation (DGCA) – Chairman

DG, BCAS - Convener
Assembles at CCCR, ATC Building, IGI Airport New Delhi
The Central Committee shall manage the contingency situation till it is terminated. It is
empowered to deal with the situation in all respects and take appropriate decisions on its own
on the basis of the guidelines of the COSAH.
It shall guide the Aerodrome Committee (AC) for handling the situation on ground including
negotiations with the hijackers /terrorists and /or forcible termination of Hijack in the light of
the policy guidelines laid- down by COSAH / CCS.
Aerodrome Committee (AC)
The AC is established at every airport and shall be activated on the occurrence of the
emergency at the affected airport.
The composition of the AC depends upon the situation of the airport

State Capital- Home Secretary of the state,
District headquarters- District Magistrate
Outside the district headquarters- District Collector
Defence controlled airports- Station Commander
In all the above cases, Airport Director or his representative will be the Convener
The AC of the affected airport shall meet at a place earmarked as Aerodrome Committee
Control Room (ACCR). It shall assemble immediately on receipt of information of a
contingency and take appropriate steps as described in the functions of the AC. The control
room of the AC should have a couple of independent telephone lines, hotline to the Police
Control Room / Police Station and RT facility.
Members of Aerodrome Committee:
Home Secretary of the State/ District Magistrate/ Chairman

District Collector/ Station Commander
Airport Director or his representative Convener

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 193 of 252
Representative from R&AW (on arrival)
A senior most executive of the affected airline
Contingency Plan – For Indian Registered Aircraft
The National Contingency Plan for various contingencies is prepared by the BCAS. Each
airport is required to develop the under mentioned contingency plans for managing any acts
of Unlawful Interference. The same is required to be approved by the BCAS
 Bomb Threat Contingency Plan

 Hijack Threat Contingency Plan
 Counter Terrorist Contingency Plan
The Airport Management will take the following actions for a hijacked aircraft:
On landing, the aircraft is to be directed to the designated isolated aircraft parking position.
Aircraft will not be allowed to take off unless its departure is necessitated by the overriding
duty to protect human life. The aircraft may be immobilized by:
 Positioning of vehicles / fire tenders on runway

 Deflating tyres
 Putting of lights of runway / taxi track
Aircraft Operators Responsibilities:
On receipt of threat Call the receiver will immediately inform his / her supervisor. The
Supervisor will in turn inform the Airport Director / Office / senior most person of airport
operator.
The following actions will be taken by the aircraft operator:
For Flights not yet boarded
 Interiors of pax cabin to be checked.

 100% manual checks of hand baggage.
 100% physical frisking of pax / crew.
 Access control.
 Frisking of all personnel entering the aircraft.
 Maintenance of Access Control Register.
 Pax reporting after hijack call to be questioned by Aviation Security Group.
For Flights in the process of boarding

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 194 of 252
 Pax to be deplaned with Hand baggage if already boarded and brought back to
the check-in counter via arrival hall under escort.
 Interiors of pax cabin to be checked
 100% manual checks of hand baggage
 100% physical frisking of pax / crew
 Access control
 Frisking of all personnel entering the aircraft
 Maintenance of access control register
 Pax reporting after hijack call to be questioned by Aviation Security Group
 Pax headcount to be taken
 No need to offload baggage / cargo etc.
 Pax should not have access to registered baggage
 Security measures to be supervised by senior most security staff
For aircrafts in-flight
 Security measures to be reviewed

 Set up Reception centre
 Documents related to flight to be sealed
 Pax manifest at reception centre
 Assistance to be provided to the meeters and greeters

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 195 of 252
Module-16 Escorting People and Consignment
Module Objective
 Escort disruptive / inadmissible / deportees in the restricted areas of an airport

 Escort consignments over a predetermined route.
 Maintain radio communication with security control centre
 Apply contingency plans for emergencies involving disruptive/inadmissible/
deportees and consignments under escort.
 Primary reason for escorting typical categories of people requiring escort.
Teaching Methods
 Demonstrations
 Progress Tests
Annex 17
Standard 4.7.1 Each Contracting State shall develop requirements for
air carriers for the carriage of potentially disruptive
passengers who are obliged to travel because they have
been the subject of judicial or administrative
proceedings.
Standard 4.7.3 Each Contracting State shall ensure that the aircraft
operator and the pilot-in-command are informed when
passengers are obliged to travel because they have been
the subject of judicial or administrative proceedings, in
order that appropriate security controls can be applied.

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 196 of 252
Aircraft (Security) Rules 2011,

Rule 17 Procedures of disembarkation of unruly passengers.
NCASP
7.6 Persons in custody and under Administrative Control

Order 08/2011 Instructions to handle potentially disruptive passengers.
Circular 42/2005 Instructions for carriage of prisoners / person under judicial

custody / administrative control.
Typical categories of people requiring escort:
 Authorized visitors
 Deportees and inadmissible passenger
 Medical patients and accompanying personnel
 Persons in custody
 VIPs.
The primary responsibility for the movement of people is that of the agency as mentioned below.
Deportee Immigrations
Inadmissible pax Concerned Airlines

Persons in Judicial/ Law enforcement Officer
Administrative custody ( State Police)
Medical Pax Airline
VVIP / VIPs Personal Security officers & Special
Cell of State Police
Disruptive / Unruly Passenger
POLICY FOR UNRULY PASSENGER

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 197 of 252
Unruly passengers – Persons who commit on board a civil aircraft, from the moment
when the aircraft door is closed prior to take-off to the moment when it is reopened after
landing ,an act of :
 Assault, intimidation, menace or wilful recklessness which endangers good order or

the safety of property or persons;
 Assault, intimidation, menace or interference with a crew member in the performance
of duties or which lessens the ability to perform duties;
 Wilful recklessness or damage to an aircraft, its equipment ,or attendant structures
and equipment such as to endanger good order and safely of the aircraft or its occupants;
 Communication of information which is known to be false, there endangering the safely
of an aircraft in flight;
 Disobedience of lawful commands or instructions for safe, orderly or efficient operations.
Who is considered as a disruptive and unruly passenger?
The passenger who creates or has the potential to create disturbance either on board the
aircraft or on ground and in the process could endanger the safety of the aircraft, fellow
passengers, crew members, airline staff or property thereby hampering the operations.
Although such incidents are small as compared to number passengers we carry, it must be
recognized that some of these disruptive and unruly passengers have the potential to
jeopardize the safety and security of our operations.
Besides other factors, the following are the main causes for a passenger becoming unruly,
 Excessive drinking
 Nicotine starvation due to smoking restriction
 Resentment of authority.
 Unreasonable high expectations
 Flying phobia and
 Travelling in crowded environment for extended time.
Passenger Disturbance Threat Level:
Level 1 : UNRULY / VERBAL ABUSIVE BEHAVIOR

Level 2 : PHYSICALLY ABUSIVE BEHAVIOR
Level 3 : LIFE-THREATENING BEHAVIOR AND ATTEMPTED or ACTUAL BREACH OF
FLIGHT CREW COMPARTMENT DOOR.
Unruly passengers are the concern of airline staff involved in one of the many activities of a
flight operation. It begins at check-in and ends at the arrival of a flight at the destination.
It is therefore necessary to have a coherent policy and procedures for all services involved,
be it on ground and in the air.

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 198 of 252
Procedure on ground:
 Staff should at all the times be observant during check-in/lounge/boarding of any

unusual passenger behaviour, if noticed the same should be promptly brought to the
notice of the immediate supervisor.
 If the station manager/Duty manager considers him unfit to fly and safety risk he/she
should be denied boarding.
 Also offload the baggage of said passenger.
Procedure in air:
 Verbal warning to be given to the passenger by senior crew member.

 A w r i t t e n warning letter s i g n e d by the commander to be issued to the unruly
passenger by the senior crew member.
If passenger becomes too violent to be controlled, a restraint should be used on the
passenger until the passenger is handed over to the Law Enforcement Authorities on
landing into the next station of arrival.
Persons in Judicial/ Administrative custody- Carriage of Prisoners
The following general guidance material refers to persons in lawful custody i.e. persons
under arrest or convicted criminals under escort.
Procedure:
 No aircraft operator shall allow a prisoner and escorting officers as passengers unless prior
permission is obtained from the BCAS by the concerned policing authority that is
responsible for transportation of such prisoner with escorts by air.
 The policing authority requiring transportation of a prisoner by air shall send their request in
writing to the DG,BCAS at least 7(seven) days in advance.

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 199 of 252
 The policing authority responsible for carriage of a prisoner by air shall indicate
classification of such prisoner as dangerous or otherwise in their application addressed to
BCAS.
 A prisoner should not be transported on board an aircraft unless escorted by one or
more policing authority officers.
 Policing authority officers or other authorized persons should notify a responsible
representative of the operator well before the date it is proposed to transport a prisoner or
as soon as practicable in an emergency, the identity of the person being escorted, the
flight on which transportation has been arranged, and whether or not the escorted person
is considered dangerous.
 Escorting officers shall ensure that a prisoner does not carry contraband, weapons,
matches or other potentially dangerous items.
 Escorts shall be equipped with adequate restraining devices to be used in the event they
determine that restraint is necessary .Under normal circumstances a prisoner should not be
shackled to any part of the aircraft, including seats, tables etc.
 Escorts shall not carry arms, mace, teargas or similar incapacitating gas generating
devices or any dangerous goods /prohibited items specified by the BCAS on board the
aircraft. Weapon and ammunition if any may be allowed in registered baggage as per
instructions in force.
 Escorts shall adequately identify themselves to security personnel, security check
points, flight attendants and pilot in command.
 Any other security personnel and passengers authorized to carry firearms on board the
aircraft should be made aware of the transportation of a prisoner and escorts and their
location.
 A prisoner along with escorts should be boarded before all other passengers and
disembarked after all other passengers have left the aircraft.
 They should be seated as far as to the rear of the passenger cabin as is possible but not
in a lounge area or next to /directly across from an exit.
 They should only be seated in a row for two or more seats and at least one escort should
sit between the escorted person and any aisle.
 They should be accompanied at all times and kept under surveillance including visits to the
lavatory.
 No intoxicating beverage shall be served to escorts or prisoner while on board the aircraft.
 Prisoner may be served food at the discretion of escorts by should not be provided with
metal utensils or a knife.
 Aircraft operator should not accept a prisoner and escort(s) as passengers unless
concurrence has been obtained in advance from the BCAS and other operators that may be

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 200 of 252
involved en route and at the intended final destination. In such cases sufficient advance
notification must be given to operator so that prior agreements can be obtained.
Dangerous Prisoners
At least two escorts should be required for each prisoner considered dangerous by the
escorting agency or in the judgment of a responsible representative of the operator. Not
more than one such prisoner and escorts should be carried on any one flight.
Persons suffering from mental illness
A person suffering from mental illness that is deemed to be a threat to the safety of a
flight may be accepted for transportation if accompanied by an attendant physically capable
of coping with untoward actions by that person during the flight and skilled in administering
sedatives as required and authorized by an appropriate doctor. If a mentally disturb person
requires sedation prior to departure each portion of the flight should last no longer than
the effective duration of the sedative administered. The aircraft operator, on the advice of
representatives of the operators medical and security staffs, as appropriate, should be
permitted to deny boarding to such a person.
Deportees
A person who had legally been admitted to a State by its authorities or who had entered a
State illegally, and who at some later time is formally ordered by the competent authorities to
leave that State.
Each request for transportation should be evaluated and the operators consulted to
determine if the person is threat to the safety of the flight or if additional measures such as
escorts are necessary.
The administrative and financial arrangements for removal of such persons are the
responsibility of the government ordering the deportation.
The primary responsibility of escorting a deportee is of immigration Law Enforcement
Agency of the deporting country
Refusal Room: A separate refusal room for the purpose shall be earmarked by the Airport
Operator in consultation with the immigration authorities at each international airport.
Whenever there is a passenger in the guard room it will be guarded by CISF to ensure that the
passenger does not escape from custody and is deported out of India.
The following instruction shall be implemented by all concerned:-

1. The entire infrastructure for the refusal room will be provided by the Airport Operator. The
design of the Refusal Room will be sent to BCAS by Airport Operator for security vetting.
2. Necessary facilities in the Refusal Room will be provided by the concerned Airport Operator.
3. Guarding of the Refusal Room is the responsibility of CISF for which a guard of one Head
Constable and 04 Constables will be provided.
4. Food and other facilities to the INAD will be provided by the concerned airlines.
Handout RESTRICTED
Page 201 of 252
5. No charges will be levied for the Refusal Room on the Bureau of Immigration.
Inadmissible persons (sometimes referred to as “refusals’’).
A passenger who is refused admission to a State by the authorities of that State, or who is
refused onward carriage by a State authority at a point of transfer (e.g. due to lack of visa,
expired passport etc).
Typical consignments requiring security escort
 Valuable cargo and mail

 Diplomatic Bags / Mail
 Dangerous goods
 Vulnerable cargo during high threat situations
 Registered baggage
 Catering.
PRIMARY responsibility for movement of consignment will be that of the airline or agency
involved. SECURITY is responsible to assist airline/police/other agency for the safe movement
of the consignment.
Procedure for Escorting Consignment:-
Responsible agency for escorting of consignment should ensure that:

• The movement is planned in advance
• The consignment and escort proceed along a pre-determined route

• The route is varied from consignment to consignment
Register Baggage / Accompanied Baggage

Personal Property of passengers or crew for which the sole custody is taken by the aircraft
operator & claim tagged is issued.
Categories of baggage required escort
 Bags Containing Arms / Ammunition

 Bags Containing High value items
 Baggage of VVIP ’s
Any baggage which has weapon in it will be escorted in restricted area.

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 202 of 252
Module-17 Protecting Aircraft Catering Uplift
Module Objective
 Describe the need for security checks of catering uplift
 Explain typical methods for protection of catering facilities equipment and uplift
 Describe a system for sealing catering containers
 Inspection of HLV before entering operational area.
Teaching Methods
 Demonstrations
 Progress Tests
Annex – 17
Standard 4.6.5 Each Contracting State shall ensure that catering, stores and
supplies intended for carriage on passenger commercial
flights are subjected to appropriate security controls and
thereafter protected until loaded onto the aircraft.
Standard 4.6.6 Each Contracting State shall ensure that merchandise and supplies
introduced into security restricted areas are subject to
appropriate security controls, which may include screening.

Part VII – Catering Supplies & Stores
Rule 43 Catering Supplies
Rule 44 Supply of other stores
NCASP
4.13 Catering Establishments

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 203 of 252
Order 07/2004 Catering Security

Order 13 /2011 Security Programme of Catering Companies
Circular 25/2006 Security controls for catering supplies.
Security Controls by the Caterer
 Officer to supervise Security Controls

 Premises secured
 Access control
 Personnel employed for preparation and delivery of catering supplies – regular employee and
should have undergone Security Awareness Training
 Deliveries of Raw material and equipment to be X-rayed or physically checked
 Chilling rooms and refrigerators under strict control
 Catering carts should have proper locking systems
 Security certificate for each consignment to be loaded in aircraft
 HLV’s should be securable
No airline operator shall accept any catering items for loading in the aircraft unless a written
contract is signed between both the agencies (Air operator & the caterer)
Stages of Catering Security

1. Preparation
2. Pre-Setting
3. Hi-lift/ Transportation
1. Preparation Stage 2. Pre-Setting

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 204 of 252
3. Hi-lift/ Transportation
 The airline security personnel will be present at the catering facility to closely supervise
the preparation, packing, pre-setting of the catering uplift and while placing them into
the meal carts / containers.
 They will ensure that no unauthorized personnel have access to the catering uplift.
 All security checked / cleared catering uplift will be sealed prior to loading into the hi-lift
van/ vehicle.
 Hi-lift van / vehicle will be checked for any prohibited and dangerous item prior to
loading of the security cleared catering uplift
 The HLV should be properly maintained and the rolling shutters on both sides should have
provision for locking arrangements and during an operation the shutters should be locked
and sealed.
 The transportation of the catering uplift from the catering facility to the airport /aircraft
shall be done under escort and strict supervision by the airline security officials/ catering
officials.
 While transferring the catering uplift from the HLV to the aircraft, airline security official
shall check the seals affixed at catering facility for any traces of tampering and then
handover the same to the cabin crew.
 All security stickers/ seals will be kept under safe custody at all times and a proper
record of the security seals used for sealing the catering uplift and HLV will be maintained.
Record to be maintained for a minimum of 07 Days.
Systematic Search of a Food Trolley
 Search under the food trolley and check locks.

 Open both ends of the trolleys and look for anything unusual inside the trolley.
 Check the trays for unusual weight.
 Search the top part of the trolley namely the ice tray.
 Seal the trolley once it has been security cleared.

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 205 of 252
Security Controls for Newspapers and Cleaning supplies etc
Newspapers, magazines, cleaning stores and supplies or any other item for loading in the aircraft
has to be subjected to the following security controls:-
 The stores and supplies have been obtained from an establishment with whom the air
operator has a written contract for the purpose;
 The stores and supplies have been searched by hand or X-ray screened to prevent the
introduction of any prohibited article;
 Before allowing access to the aircraft, the cleaning staff shall be frisked and all the articles
carried by them checked properly by the airline operator; and
 Any other security controls prescribed by the DG, BCAS
Response to Tampering Of Security Seals/ Stickers

 Inform the supervisor immediately
 Carry out a thorough check of the HLV, catering uplift for any suspicious items
 Record the incident.

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 206 of 252
Module-18 Protecting Cargo, Mail and Courier
Module Objective
 Define airline responsibility for acceptance of cargo and mail consignments.

 Describe typical airline security procedures for protecting cargo and mail
consignments after acceptance.
 Explain the physical security measures and access control for cargo and mail facilities.
 Conduct a physical search of a sterile cargo area for prohibited items and deal with suspect
items as per SOP.
 Maintain sterility of cargo SHA.
Teaching Methods
 Demonstrations
 Progress Tests
Annex 17
4.6 Measures relating to cargo, mail and other goods
Rule 35 Carriage of cargo, mail, catering items and other stores
Part –VI Cargo, courier bags, mail and regulated agent
Rule 37 Security control for cargo & courier bag
Rule 38 Registration of Courier agency
Rule 39 Identification or reconciliation of the accompanied courier bags
Rule 40 Prohibition on carriage of certain goods

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 207 of 252
NCASP 2018
Chapter 7.8 Air Cargo & Mail
Order 01/2010 & Security of Cargo Complex at airports in the country

05/2010
Order 01/2006 Security measures for Air Cargo
Order 06/2005 Consignment Security Declaration
Circular 20/2004 Security of Courier bags & unaccompanied consignments by

courier companies
Circular 08/2008 Comprehensive security procedures in respect of
cargo, express cargo, mail and courier bags
Corrigendum dated Security of Courier bags/ unaccompanied consignment
23.6.17 forwarded by courier companies
Corrigendum dated Security screening of mail

02.7.11
Order 11/2015 Security Measures for Regulated Agents
Order 10/2011 Security measures for Company Mail (COMAIL) and Company
Material (COMAT)
Definition:
“Any property carried on board an aircraft other than mail, stores and accompanied or
mishandled baggage.” Is termed as Air Cargo
Types of Cargo
 General Cargo
 Perishable Cargo (PER)
 Valuable Cargo (VAL)
 Live animals (AVI)
 Diplomatic mail (DIP)
 Company Stores ( Comail / Comat)
 Human Remains (HUM)
 Transshipment Cargo
 Express cargo / parcel
 Consolidated Cargo

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 208 of 252
Transportation of Air Cargo
Air cargo may be transported by air, both on passenger and cargo-only aircraft. Many
large airlines have very few cargo-only aircraft in comparison to the size of their fleet. Air
cargo may also be transport by truck/haulier on a pre or post flight sector, depending on
regional or national legislation.
Transportation of Air Cargo involves operations at three levels:

 Consignors (individual or companies) who send items of cargo by air,
 Agents who provide a link between consigners and airlines;
 Airlines, which carry the Cargo.
How cargo moves
Why is cargo vulnerable / attractive target for terrorist attacks?

 Volume carried increasing – Aircraft is seen as fastest mode of transportation
 Cargo system well known
 Able to target specific flights
 Difficult to screen – Nature and size of cargo
 Low risk to terrorist – cannot be identified after the attacks.
Need For Cargo Security:
Security standards throughout the civil aviation industry have improved over the years and that
the potential terrorist has had to adjust accordingly, choosing a softer (more vulnerable) point of
attack.
Regulated Agent
An agent, freight forwarder or any other entity who conducts business with an operator and provides
security controls that are accepted or required by the appropriate authority in respect of cargo or
mail.

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 209 of 252
The aircraft operator may engage Regulated Agent for carriage of cargo, courier or mail to be carried
by air, who shall function as per the procedure laid down by the Director General, BCAS in writing
from time to time. (Ref. Rule 42 of Aircraft (Security) Rules, 2011).
Known Consignor. A consignor who originates cargo or mail for its own account and whose
procedures meet common security rules and standards sufficient to allow the carriage of cargo or
mail on any aircraft
Known Cargo. A cargo consignment received from a regulated agent or known consignor to which
appropriate security controls have been applied; or a consignment of unknown cargo which has been
subjected to appropriate security controls
Unknown Cargo. A Cargo consignment received from an unknown consignor will be considered
unknown cargo, which must be subjected to appropriate security controls. Known cargo can also
be considered unknown cargo, if security of the consignment was not maintained after security
controls had been applied.
Consolidated cargo. A consignment of multiple packages which has been originated by more than one
person, each of whom has made an agreement for carriage by air with another person other than a
scheduled aircraft operator.
Security Control of Normal / General Cargo (As per Avsec Circular 08/2008)
Cargo can be security cleared by
- X-Ray Screening
- Physical Checking
- 24 hours cooling off in addition to ETD
Apart from the above security measures staff will also ensure following aspects:
- Affixing of prescribed security sticker on the cleared consignments

- Prescribed Security Declaration from Cargo Agent
- Manifest indicating Security control against each consignment
- Protection of security cleared cargo
- Escorting of cargo consignment.
HUM: Security Measures for carriage of Dead bodies/human Cremated Remains
Following security controls will be applied by the aircraft operator for carriage of dead
body/Human Crematal remains.
Station Manager/Station Security Manager of the Aircraft Operator will examine and
validate accompanying documents as below:-

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 210 of 252
In case of movement from a station within India

 Death Certificate from a competent Medical Authority;
 Embalming Certificate by the Hospital/competent Authority;
 Permission by the local Police Authorities for carrying dead body/human remains;
 Any document like Driving license or Passport or any other Photo ID Card issued by a
Govt./semi- Govt. agency to establish identity of the deceased.
In case of transportation from a Foreign Station

 Death Certificate from a competent Medical Authority;
 Embalming Certificate by the Hospital/competent Authority;
 Certificate by the local Police Authority for carriage of dead body/human remains;
 Permission from the Indian Mission for carriage;
 Copies of cancelled passport of the deceased.
1. Identity of the relative/person who accompanies the dead body/human remains shall be
established.
2. In case no relative/person accompanies the dead body/human remains the consignment
will be screened through X-ray, to ensure that it does not contain any prohibited/dangerous
item.
3. In the absence of X-ray machine at a particular station, dead body/human remains shall be
inspected visually by a responsible employee of the aircraft operator to ensure that the
consignment has dead body/human remains only and nothing else which may endanger safety
of the flight.
Security Measures for Mail
Security Controls for Mail bags by Postal Authorities will be

as under:
The acceptance, processing and handling of mail to be
carried by air shall be done by regular and duly trained
staff of the Postal authorities
Letters or parcels weighing less than 200 grams

 These may not be X-ray screened or may not be subjected to cooling off period.
 A Certificate to the effect that the postal bag does not contain any letter or parcel
which weighs more than 200 grams, shall be obtained by the airline operator from the
Postal authorities.

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 211 of 252
 Airline Operator will ensure that the postal bags with suspected sign of tampering en-
route shall be segregated and subjected to additional security controls; and
 If the suspicious bag cannot be checked physically it shall not be accepted for carriage.
Letters or parcels weighing 200 grams and above
Airline duties
(a) The mail is handled by the regular and duly trained staff of the airline operator;
(b) The security staff of the airline operator shall check the condition of the mail bags
and accompanied security certificate(s) as specified in these rules. Postal bags with
suspected sign of tampering en-route shall be segregated and subjected to additional
security controls; and
(c) The airline operator shall x-ray screen all the mail bags.
(d) In case of suspicious on such baggage shall be checked physically in the presence of an
official of the postal authority. If the suspicious bag cannot be checked physically due to
one reason or the other, the same shall not be accepted by Aircraft Operator.
(e) If any prohibited article is detected during screening of mail/ speed post, the aircraft
operator shall withhold such mail initiate legal action.
Diplomatic mail bag (Reference Avsec Order 05/2002)
The following points must be verified while

accepting diplomatic mail bag:
 Visible external marks of their character
 Contain only diplomatic documents or articles
intended for official use.
 Name and address of the consignee as well as
that of the Foreign Diplomatic Mission.
Security Controls for Diplomatic Bag:
1. Diplomatic bags to be transported as cargo / registered baggage

 Screened by X-ray
 In case of serious doubts / suspicion about the contents of these bags, the matter shall be
brought to the notice of the Protocol Division of the Ministry of External Affairs who would
take appropriate action.
 Such suspicious baggage shall not be transported until and unless the doubts are cleared
to the satisfaction of security staff.
2. Diplomatic bags carried as hand baggage

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 212 of 252
 Diplomatic Bags carried as hand baggage is exempted from Security Checks provided that the
Diplomatic Courier (holder of diplomatic passport) produces official document from
foreign diplomatic mission indicating his status and number of diplomatic packages
and a certificate by concerned diplomatic mission stating that the packages constituting the
diplomatic bag do not contain any substance which would be dangerous and harmful to the
aircraft or its passengers.
 Concerned courier / person will be allowed to go till the boarding gate to hand over /
receive the diplomatic bag
 Pre-embarkation security checks shall be carried out on the person accompanying the
diplomatic bags and other bags carried by him unless exempted.
3. Courier/Express Consignments
For acceptance of courier loads by an airline:
 The courier company has been duly registered with the airline operator; and
 It has established and implemented a security programme approved by the Appropriate
Authority.
The airline will ensure that :
 the consignment has been handed over personally by a responsible person of the
organization;
 Consignment is accompanied by a Courier Certificate from the authorized
signatory of such organization.
 The courier bag has been properly marked externally to facilitate identification with the
relevant courier;
Security Measures
- Screening through x-ray
- Each baggage/ bag being viewed from two different angles and
- 15 % Physical check on continuous random basis.
 Unaccompanied courier bags shall be treated as express cargo and shall be subjected
to the same security controls as specified for express cargo.
 If any prohibited article is detected during the course of screening, such consignment
shall not be allowed to be loaded into the aircraft and legal action initiated against the
consignor.
 After application of the prescribed security controls, sterility of the cargo/ express cargo/
courier bags etc, whether inside or outside the aerodrome premises, shall be maintained
until such time that these are placed on board aircraft. The screened items shall not be
left unguarded at any stage until departure of the aircraft.

Handout RESTRICTED
Page 213 of 252
 Tamper-proof security stickers bearing serial number and date shall be affixed on the
screened cargo/ express cargo/ courier bags, indicating clearly the type of security controls
applied to them.
Security Controls for Trans-shipment cargo
Trans-shipment cargo is a consignment of Cargo originating from an airport within or outside

India which arrives at an aircraft operator / Regulated Air Cargo agent’s premises in India, with
a valid flight number for carriage on another flight from any airport in India.
For cargo originating from India for a foreign station:

- Consignment Security Declaration
- All security measures to be followed as originating cargo
- Escorted till aircraft
For bonded cargo transiting at an Indian airport for further transportation to a foreign station:
- Appropriate documentation will be examined and confirmed as accurate.
- Escorted to departure aircraft
For cargo originating from a foreign station:
- Appropriate documentation will be examined and confirmed as accurate.
- In case of any discrepancy in the documentation, this will be resolved and a record
made of the discrepancies.
- In case the discrepancies remain unresolved, the consignment will be treated as
Unknown Cargo and screened accordingly.
- Escorted to departure aircraft
- In case the bonded / transhipment cargo moves through landside, it will be treated as
originating cargo and screened accordingly.
Security Measures for Perishable Cargo:
Articles Which Are Liable To Deteriorate Or Perish Due To

Changes In Climate, Altitude, Temperature Or Any Other Normal
Exposure Inherent To Carriage Of Cargo By Air, Or Length Of
Time Etc.
Security Measures
 Security Declaration by the consignor
 X-ray Screening
 Physical Checks
EDS
Handout RESTRICTED
Page 214 of 252
Security measures for Company mail (Comail) and Company material (Comat)
Comail:
Aircraft operator company mail, shipped within the
company’s network of stations.
Comat:
Aircraft operator company materials, shipped within the
company’s network of stations.
Security Measures
 Security Declaration by concerned department signed by a responsible person
 X-ray Screening or
 Physical Checks
Note: Comail / Comat containing Dangerous Goods to be referred to personnel qualified in
handling Dangerous Goods for carriage.
Security Measures for Live animals (AVI)
Live animals may be carried as Cargo or as registered baggage. Adequate

security measures needs to be carried out for transportation of the same.
 Certificate from Veterinary Doctor – if carried as registered baggage

 Empty cage / box to be screened
 Physical / X-BIS
 Items attached to the body of animal to be security cleared
 Live Animals not to be put through X-BIS
Security of Cargo Complex at airports
 Entry/Exit to Cargo Complex and Sterile Area beyond cargo screening points at the airports
shall be guarded by ASG at all airports.

Handout SECRET
Page 215 of 252
Module‐19 Behavior Detection and Security Environment
Module Objective
 Passenger behavior detection

 Courtesy and behavior
 Improving attitude of security staff for pax interface
Teaching Methods
 Demonstrations
 Role‐ playing and practical exercises
 Progress Tests
Annex 17
Recommendation 4.1.3 Each Contracting State should consider

integrating behaviour detection into its
aviation security practices and procedures.
Recommendation 4.1.2 Each Contracting State should promote the

use of random and unpredictable security
measures. Unpredictability could contribute
to the deterrent effect of security measures.
NCASP 2018
7.1.1.2 Each entity responsible for implementation of security

controls relating to pre-embarkation security
checks of passengers and entry of non-passengers
into the security restricted area shall consider
AVSEC BASIC Handout/2019 SECRET

Handout SECRET
Page 216 of 252
integrating behavior detection into its aviation

security practices and procedures
9.4.6 The Director General, BCAS shall ensure training

of Behaviour Detection into aviation security
practices & procedures in accordance with
NCASTP.
7.1.7.2 Procedure for persons with special needs:

(f) All possible and due courtesy shall be extended
to them without compromising on security
7.7.2.6 In the interest of effective security and passenger

facilitation, a manual search of the hold baggage
should be conducted in accordance with the
following basic guidelines:
(a) The searcher should be tactful, courteous and
use caution.
6.4.6.3 All ground handling staff while leaving aerodrome

from any gate (s) / designated gate (s) shall be
subjected to security check (frisking / baggage
search). All other staff, when exiting the security
restricted area of airport shall be frisked on a
random basis,
7.1.8.2 (vi) Random Search: - In addition to suspect bags,
all bags should be subjected to random searches.
On an average one bag in ten should be hand
searched. This number may be changed in cases of
higher risk.
7.1.7 (f) 100% pat down search of a person will be carried
out whenever the screener deems it necessary.
However, at least one out of every five persons
will be subjected to pat down (whole body) search
on a continuous random basis.
Order 24/2011 Random Screening at the entry gate to Terminal
Building

Handout SECRET
Page 217 of 252
Behavior Detection Within an aviation security environment, the application of

techniques involving the recognition of behavioural characteristics, including but not
limited to physiological or gestural signs indicative of anomalous behaviour, to
identify persons who may pose a threat to civil aviation
Unpredictability. The implementation of security measures in order to increase their

deterrent effect and their efficiency, by applying them at irregular frequencies,
different locations and/or with varying means, in accordance with a defined framework.
Behavioural detection techniques are used to identify persons who may pose a threat
to civil aviation. Such persons needs to undergo enhanced security screening.
Based on the threat perception, all passengers are classified as two:-

Handout SECRET
Page 218 of 252
 Threatening
 Non- threatening
Non- Threatening:- Are those passengers who does not pose any threat to the flight.
Threatening:- Are those passengers who have/ possess potential threat to the flight.
These are the passengers we need to keep a vigil on.
It is not only the passenger who possess threat to aviation industry. Even the non-
travelling public are also a concern. Hence, we also need to consider informally
interacting with non-passengers, which involves interactive dialogue (including security
interviews, casual conversation and targeted questioning) between trained staff and
non-passengers to assess the legitimacy of the non-passengers’ presence and their
activity.
Depending on the result of the assessment, such non-passengers may be subjected to

additional screening.
In the framework of a risk-based approach to aviation security, behavioural detection is

used to identify persons who may pose a threat to civil aviation and should be
subjected to additional security measures. This technique involves the recognition of
behavioural characteristics, including but not limited to, physiological or gestural signs
indicative of anomalous behaviour, and can be applied to the general public,
passengers and persons other than passengers (also referred to as non-passengers or
staff).
Behavioural detection programme are based on the premises that people attempting to
evade security measures typically display signs of anomalous behaviour compared to
the behaviours of the legitimate travelling population. Such programme pinpoint
individuals on the sole basis of their behaviour and not on the basis of their nationality,
ethnicity, race, gender or religion.
While baggage screening focuses on finding prohibited items, behavioural detection

should be concerned with identifying a potential intent to commit an act of unlawful
interference. A review of existing behavioural detection programmes shows that
choosing persons for additional security controls on the basis of anomalous behaviour
can be more effective than selecting persons randomly, and is more likely to lead to
further actions such as arrests, seizures and onward referrals to authorities.
Through its focus on the intention of individuals instead of prohibited items carried by
passengers, behavioural detection potentially allows for the detection of unknown
threats not currently addressed by other measures in aviation security like human
trafficking, smuggling etc.
Behavior detection is done to detect the following:

Handout SECRET
Page 219 of 252
 A terrorist with intent to harm the airline

 A terrorist with intent to cause damage to the terminal building, aircraft etc.
 Asylum seekers
 criminals
 Detection of fraudulent travel documents
 Traffickers of drugs, contraband and human being
Behavior detection is carried out on

Passenger
Non-traveling public
Staff
Detection depends on the effectiveness of the “Behavior detection Process” because

of the fact that most individual(s) involved or in the process of doing illegal
activities are unable to speak the truth and may present fraudulent documents in
order to mask their true intentions and identity.
Behaviour detection is a continuous process. A person may display any abnormal sign in
his behavior while:
a) Entering inside the terminal building
b) While waiting at the check-in counter queue
c) While check-in
d) While screening
e) While waiting at the queue at SHA
f) At boarding gate
g) While boarding
h) Inside the aircraft, while on ground.
The flexibility inherent in the deployment of security staff for behavioural detection at
different locations makes it an ideal tool when unpredictable security measures are
intended to be implemented in various locations of an airport.
A) At entry gates:- in case a person shows any abnormal sign, the ASG staff shall resolve
anomalous behaviours through targeted conversation with persons and/or through
additional screening at the x-ray machines so installed near the entry gates for the
purpose.
B) Any other location:- staff shall resolve anomalous behaviours through targeted
conversation with persons and/or through additional screening at the nearest location.
If anomalous behaviours cannot be resolved, refer those persons to appropriate

authorities such as local law enforcement

Handout SECRET
Page 220 of 252
Steps for Behavior detection
Threat assessment
Profile of your passenger
Profile of potential terrorist
Interviewing process
Passenger appearance and behavior – Suspicious signs (as mentioned below). The staff
needs to ensure all the signs displayed by the person is resolved.
A passenger who is a possible threat may be identified by the following suspicious signs:
 Sweating Shaky voice

 Nervousness Stammering
 No eye contact Deep sighs
 Fumbling Grinds teeth
 Curiosity Un‐cooperating
 Gestures Undue interests in security procedures
 Face turns pale or white Contact with other passengers through signals
 Shivering Cannot open his bag
 Biting lips First pax
 Biting nails Last pax
 Restless Inability to answer a question or reluctance
SIGNS OF STRESS
- Late for flight

- Avoid eye contact with Security person
- Yawning
- Excessive fidgeting
- Excessive perspiration
- Face pale from shaving (neck & face different color/ Fresh shaving after long
time
- Facial Flushing (on neck & ear (pink &red)
- Faster eye blink rate (increases at stress point more)
- Increased breathing rate (faster/harder /Deeper & mouth opening)
- Adams Apple jump (audible gulp)
- Protruding Neck arteries
- Repetitive face touching

Handout SECRET
Page 221 of 252
- Strong body odor

- Sweaty palms
- Trembling
- Whistling
SIGNS OF FEAR FACTOR
- Bag appears to be heavier and does not suit the passenger

- Bag heavier and requires more efforts (Lift/Carrying/Hold or move and suggest
or will sag, hang or stress
- Bulges in clothing
- Cold penetrating stare
- Pure hatred in the eyes towards security personals
- Looking at others traveling associates
- Exaggerated emotions (excessive Laughter or chatter/swings/shift to one
another)
- Repetitive grooming
- Hesitation
- Identical dress or Luggage (not traveling together)
- Powerful Grip on bag
- Rigid posture (limited or restricted range of movement or hiding something on
torso)
- It may be mentioned that we need to understand that all signs displayed by the
passenger may not be threating.
- Looking for security or ASG
- Unusual Interest on security
- Display arrogance (shows superior)
- Improper attire (does not match with geographical background)
- Widely opening staring eyes (white in eye very much visible)
Signs of DECEPTION
- Appear to be confused or disoriented

- Pax. continued distracted
- Appear to be in disguise
- Pax. has taken observable steps to alter his/her appearance
- Ask security related questions
- Does not responds to authoritative commands
- Maintain covert ties with others
- Pax. Pats upper body with hand
A passenger may be displaying a sign of nervousness as he might be a first time traveler

or may not be feeling well etc. Hence the staff needs to know that all signs displayed by

Handout SECRET
Page 222 of 252
a person may have a threatening as well as a non-threatening reason.
Sign/ behavior Threatening reason Non-Threatening reason

Passenger or those The terrorist or drug smuggler Fear of flying. Passenger
accompanying passenger or their accomplices may may be intoxicated or
display unusual nervousness display this Sign as they know under the influence of
or fear. that they are doing something drugs.
illegal and do not want to get
caught.
Passenger unable to speak A terrorist/drug smuggler may Some countries recognize
language of country of have been given a stolen several different national
passport. foreign passport in order to languages and it is possible
hide their true identity but does that the passenger is from
not know how to speak the a region in the country that
national language associated speaks a dialect different
with the document. to the principal one.
Passenger refuses to The terrorist/smuggler is trying Passenger considers the
cooperate with security staff. to pressure or intimidate the screening process to be an
security agent into bypassing invasion of their privacy.
security procedures that might
reveal their true identity and
purpose.
Passenger maintains covert Large groups generate Secret love affair.
ties (secret contact) with attention therefore
others. terrorists/drug smugglers may
split up in order to draw less
attention to them. If one of the
groups is caught during the
security check the other
members may still be able to
continue with the operation.
Coded signals, such as nodding,
may be used in order to signal
the progress of the mission.
Passenger rushes security The terrorist/drug smuggler is Passenger is late for the
staff to complete procedures. trying to pressure the security flight. Passenger may also
agent into overlooking details want to make business
that may lead to their capture. calls or shop for duty free
items before the flight.
Passenger displays In preparation for an attack or First time fliers who are
exceptional interest in movement of narcotics, the unfamiliar with airline
security. terrorist/drug smuggler will security, or possibly
send members of the passengers that are in the
organizations to check out the security business

Handout SECRET
Page 223 of 252
security operation of an airline. themselves.

This is designed to ensure the
success of an operation.
Passenger arrives unusually The terrorist/drug smuggler is Passenger is genuinely late
late for flight. trying to put pressure on the for the flight, or is hoping
security agent to overlook for a last minute upgrade.
details that may lead to their
capture.
Passenger insists on boarding The terrorist has targeted a Passenger is travelling with
a specific flight for no valid specific flight or needs to meet others or has an important
reason. with other members of the business meeting that they
operation at a specific time and can’t miss.
place.
Baggage and/or contents of Baggage being carried by a The passenger may have
baggage inconsistent with terrorist/drug smuggler is not borrowed the baggage.
passenger’s appearance, always packed by the same
profession, ticket class or person completing the mission.
description of contents. It is therefore possible that the
person carrying the bag is not
familiar with its contents or
dressed in a manner consistent
with the cost of the actual
baggage.
Passenger claims not to have It is not his baggage, may be Might have forgotten the
baggage keys or does not belonging to terrorist or is code number or left the
know how to open baggage. carrying an IED. keys at home.
Name on Baggage does not Baggage belongs to third party May have borrowed a
match name on ticket or i.e. Terrorist baggage from someone.
passport. Maybe the bag belongs to
some family member.
Amount of baggage unusual This sign indicates the May be transferred or on
to ticketed Itinerary. possibility that the passenger is immigration visa.
not carrying his own baggage,
or is carrying no baggage at all.
His true intentions and the
purpose of journey is to hijack.
Appearance and behavior not Past experience has shown that Company sponsored ticket.
consistent with price of when planning an attack the
ticket. ideal place for the terrorist to
be is in the front of the plane,
as near the cockpit as possible.
Due to high price, assures the
passenger a definite seat in
case of overbooking.

Handout SECRET
Page 224 of 252
Passenger appears to be lying Maybe partly naïve passenger, Asylum seeker.

or withholding information. framed or a terrorist. Will
accompany with 1 or more
signs.
Passenger possesses A terrorist. Definite Hijacker. Bonafides passenger with
prohibited items such as valid license
weapons, ammunition,
explosives etc.
Passenger wearing loose Terrorist planning a hijack. Maybe not feeling well.
clothing or clothing Hiding weapons. May be travelling to a
that can conceal weapons colder place or may
strapped up to body. be carrying excess
baggage.
Action to be taken in case a suspicious passenger is detected
 Keep surveillance on the passenger (preferable electronic)

 Inform Supervisor
 Check baggage thoroughly
 Ask questions
 Verify documents
 Inform ASG
 Frisk thoroughly

Handout SECRET
Page 225 of 252
Module-20 Insider Threat
Annex 17
Recommendation 4.1.2 Each Contracting State should promote the use
of random and unpredictable security measures.
Unpredictability could contribute to the deterrent
effect of security measures.
Standard 4.2.3 Each Contracting State shall ensure that

identification systems are established in respect of
persons and vehicles in order to prevent
unauthorized access to airside areas and security
restricted areas. Identity shall be verified at
designated checkpoints before access is allowed to
airside areas and security restricted areas.
Standard 4.2.4 Each Contracting State shall ensure that background

checks are conducted on persons other than
passengers granted unescorted access to security
restricted areas of the airport prior to granting
access to security restricted areas.
Standard 4.2.5 Each Contracting State shall ensure that the

movement of persons and vehicles to and from the
aircraft is supervised in security restricted areas in
order to prevent unauthorized access to aircraft.
Standard 4.2.6 Each Contracting State shall ensure that persons

other than passengers, together with items carried,
prior to entry into airport security restricted areas

Handout SECRET
Page 226 of 252
serving international civil aviation operations, are

subject to screening and security controls.
Recommendation 4.2.8 Each Contracting State should ensure that identity

documents issued to aircraft crew members provide a
harmonized and reliable international basis for
recognition and validation of documentation to permit
authorized access to airside and security restricted areas
by conforming to the relevant specifications set forth in
Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents.
Rule 18 Entry into aerodrome
Rule 19 Entry into security restricted area
Rule 20 Prohibition to carry weapons or explosive
Rule 26 Deployment of staff
Rule 28 Access control to aircraft
INSIDER THREAT
A decade and a half after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks that involved four hijacked
aircraft crashing into and destroying the World Trade Center Twin Towers and severely
damaging the Pentagon, aviation remains a staple target for terrorists. Although fatal
hijackings and attacks on aircraft occurred well before these attacks, 9/11 sparked the
international community into launching new aviation security, procedures, regulations, and
operations. There are political, economic, and social implications that act as motives of
terrorism. Some terrorists claim that acts of violence are the better alternative to other
forms of political protesting and promotion. Some join terrorist groups for financial reasons,
such as providing for their families. Other people join terrorist groups because they are
otherwise outcasts and lack a place in society
The insider is rising as one of the key threats to the aviation industry in relation to terrorism.
Motives for malicious and intentional insider activity can be political, economic, social,
cultural, and personal. Malicious insiders seeking revenge, sabotage, or espionage, and
intentional insiders seeking a self-benefiting profit are aware that their access to materials,
systems, networks, and infrastructure is valuable to terrorists. They can provide terrorists
with access to information about a company or significant building that would aid in an
attack, such as the layout of an airport. Terrorists can also recruit insiders to act on their
behalf or attempt to become the insider to carry out an attack by gaining authorized access
to facilities, systems, and data.
In this Module, we will emphasis on the following points
• Describe Insider Threat

Handout SECRET
Page 227 of 252
• Categories of people who can be a potential insider threat, motivating factors of insider
threat
• Past incidents of Insider threat
• Factors that make an insider threat a challenge in Civil Aviation
• Risk Mitigation against Insider threat
To define the insider threat more clearly, we first need to understand what constitutes an
‘insider’ within an aviation context. Essentially in an airport environment, an insider is an
individual who exploits their knowledge or access to their airport, airline, or organisation’s
assets, for unauthorised purposes. So, the insider could be virtually anyone, including an
employee, contractor, consultant or anyone else who has legitimate access to their
organisation’s information or assets. This problem is especially difficult to manage when you
consider the interdependencies and wealth of information that moves around an airport.
Insider threat is the risk posed by workers with inside access and knowledge to exploit
vulnerabilities in the Civil aviation systems.
Why are insiders so dangerous?
The danger presented by an aviation insider is that they already understand the external
security of airports and aviation assets and will be able to exploit their knowledge of these
security measures. Many aviation insiders potentially also have access to the most critical
and sensitive parts of an airport. They are already in a position of trust and might hold an
access badge to an airport’s airside, for example. Given this enhanced level of access, they
are more likely to be able to identify vulnerabilities and target the weakest areas within their
airport.
Insiders pose a great risk to security and safety of the aviation industry by challenging
security countermeasures, exploiting potential vulnerabilities and increasing their knowledge
of security procedures for nefarious purposes.
Potential Insider Threats within the Aviation Industry include a wide variety of individuals
involved with the aircraft and passengers, including, but not limited to, the following
categories:
 Airline employees
 Concession and restaurant employees
 Cleaning and catering crews
 Construction and maintenance crews
 Law enforcement, military and/or security personnel
 Taxi cab, shuttle bus and/or other transportation specialists
 Current and/or former employees

Handout SECRET
Page 228 of 252
 Current and/or former contract government employees

 Air Traffic Controllers
What are the Types of Intent Behind an Insiders act?

Historically, the insider threat is considered to be a malicious insider or group who seeks to
do harm; however, it is important to remember that the insider threat can be unintentional
as well. Personality, behavioral, and lifestyle indicators may alert us to the malicious insider;
however, the unwitting or complacent insider could go undetected by peers and supervisors.
a. Malicious: Insider seeks to aid or conduct an act that is malicious and intentional in nature
to cause damage
b. Complacent : Insider takes a lax approach to policies, procedures, and potential
security risks
c. Unwitting : Insider is not aware of security policies, procedures and protocols which
expose the organizations/agency to external risks.
Types of Insider Threats
The insider threat to the aviation sector spans across all realms of the threat vector to
include cyber, criminal, and terrorism. Some of the more notable examples of aviation insider
threat across the globe include terrorism/sabotage, security compromise, and physical
property theft.
Terrorism Use of insider access to facilitate an act of violence as a means

of disruption or coercion for political purposes.
Espionage Use of insider access to obtain sensitive information for

exploitation.
Security Compromise Use of insider access to facilitate and circumvent security
controls.
Sabotage Use of insider access to destroy equipment or materials.
Physical Property Theft Use of insider access to steal material items.

Information/Intellectual Property Use of insider access to steal information or intellectual
Theft property.
Workplace Violence Use insider access to conduct violence in the workplace.
What motivates an insider?
The motives of an insider can be varied and can include gaining financial advantage through
low-level or organised crime activities. They can be issue-driven (e.g. environmentalist
groups), terrorism focused, or an individual may become an insider simply because they are
disgruntled or unhappy with the way they have been treated by their organisation. However,
the motivation may also be due to a combination of the above factors. Motivation is a

Handout SECRET
Page 229 of 252
complex issue, as two employees may be faced with an identical situation, while only one
may decide to act against the interests of their organisation. Insider threat motivators are:-
• Radicalization- The process by which people come to support terrorism and violent
extremism and, in some cases, then join terrorist groups.”
• Financial Gain- Some insider threat activity has been motivated by greed or financial need.
• Anger/Revenge- Insider threat activity has been conducted by employees who were
disgruntled to the point of wanting to retaliate against the organization
• Problems at work- Some insider threats have been individuals who felt a lack of
recognition at work, has disagreements with co-workers or managers and were dissatisfied
with the job, or upset by a pending layoff.
• Divided loyality- Insider threat activity has also been conducted by individuals who have
pledged allegiance to another person or company or to a country besides India.
• Adventure/Thrill Seeker- A person who wants more excitement in life and who in intrigued
by covert or sneaky activity is probably motivated by fame. He or she generally has an
inflated ego
• Blackmail/Extrotion- Blackmail is when a person is easily manipulated due to fear of
sensitive information getting out such as gambling, fraud, or illicit relationships.
• Extortion is when a person is coerced through force or threat.
• Destructive Behaviour- On occasions individual threat activity was related to an
individual’s problems with substance abuse.
• Family Problems- In the past, there also have been incidents when a person who was
experiencing the stress of family or marital conflicts, or separation from loved ones became
involved in insider threat activity.
Past Incidents of Insider Threat
OCTOBER 2010
Two packages containing plastic/non-metallic explosives and a detonating mechanism, were
found on separate cargo planes travelling from Yemen to the United States. One week later,
al-Qaeda took responsibility for the plot.
MARCH 2011
A London based British Airways IT engineer plotted with AQAP’s leader Anwar Al-Awlaki to
blow up an aircraft.
The investigation uncovered hundreds of encoded messages between the British Airways
employee and his AQAP handlers.
Messages expressed interest in getting a bomb onboard an aircraft, crashing British Airways
computer system to cause international disruption and circumventing security measures.
DECEMBER 2013
At an airport in Wichita, KS a 58 year-old contract avionics worker was arrested for
attempting to explode a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device at the airport.
He stated he was inspired by the teachings of Al-Qaeda’s Osama bin Laden and Anwar Al-

Handout SECRET
Page 230 of 252
Awlaki. The worker was arrested while circumventing security measures
DECEMBER 2014
At the Atlanta airport, two airline workers, one of them a former employee, were arrested
for trafficking over 100 firearms onboard multiple aircraft from Atlanta to New York involving
circumventing security measures
AUGUST 2015
At the airport in New York, four contact cargo handlers were arrested for stealing $250,000
om currency (yen) from international mail of Japan Airlines flights.
OCTOBER 2015
Metrojet Flight 9268, a Russian charter flight from Egypt crashed killing all 224 people
onboard. ISIS claims they circumvented airport security and published a photo online of the
alleged improvised explosive device (can of soda). Other theories state the bomb was placed
in the cargo hold near the fuel lines. An Egypt Air mechanic, two police officers, and a
baggage handler were arrested.
FEBRUARY 2016
An explosion blew a hole through the fuselage of (Somali) Daallo Airlines inflight on #3159,
from Mogadishu to Djibouti.
Somali authorities arrested 20 suspects, including two airport workers, seen on CCTV footage
passing a laptop to the suspected suicide bomber
March 2016
Three suicide bombings ripped through the Zaventem Airport and the Maelbeek Metro
station in Brussels, Belgium. The blasts left 31 dead and 270 injured.
ISIS has claimed responsibility for the attacks. A known ISIS explosives expert, recorded by an
airport surveillance camera, is alleged to have built the bombs used in the attacks and to be
one of the suicide bombers that died at the airport.
MITIGATING INSIDERS’ THREAT: Proposed Solution
The advantage of someone working at an airport possessing sufficient knowledge of routine

security systems may be significantly reduced if unpredictable measures are in place like
random screening of staff, Surprise check of AEP.
Security measures also contribute towards mitigating the risk associated with the insider
threat, and include background checks, selection procedures, security awareness training for
airport identification holders and training of staff implementing other security controls, as
well as perimeter security, access controls, surveillance, aircraft security and quality control
In all cases, screening and other security controls carried out in a random and unpredictable
manner should achieve outcomes to combat the insider threat.

Handout SECRET
Page 231 of 252
o Proactive approach to reporting suspicious activities

o Pre‐employment background checks: Comprehensive background check of all
personnel selected for hiring/ employment at the airport should be carried out by
the relevant State’s security agencies base on the risk assessment.
o The policy should focus on preventing the recruitment of a person who is not able
to provide a background check which is compliant with the operator’s
requirements.
o Criminal records, detailed review of employment history, travel history, correct
identification etc. can provide a reasonable picture of a potential employee.
Operators should have a process to ensure that all new entrant staff complete the
requirements of the vetting process prior to employment. These measures may be
varied depending on the level of risk that is posed by the person’s role and the access
to the operator’s sensitive areas.
o In addition, re‐vetting of airport workers such as the cleaners, duty free shop
personnel, catering staff and concessionaire need to be carried out frequently to
mitigate collusion to commit acts of unlawful interference.
o Practical vetting techniques
o Spot and Stop measures: Operators should consider what measures exist to identify an
insider at the earliest stage and to stop or deter him.
SPOT measures: measures aim to identify behaviors or activities of concern, and to identify
any changing or suspicious behavior patterns that might help to detect a potential insider.
STOP measures: should aim to prevent or deter an insider from exploiting, or intending to
exploit their role for unauthorized purposes.
Due to changing circumstances in their lives, every person may potentially become vulnerable
to being an insider, and if so, their attitudes or behaviors are significantly affected.
Such circumstances range from stressful personal crises to deliberate targeting and
recruitment by malicious third parties. Circumstances leading to vulnerability might be
subtle and difficult to recognize.
However the reality would suggest that most such circumstances are caused by financial
difficulty, undue pressure from peers and family, perceptions of unfairness at work, or, other
inducement or coercion from third parties.
Governance: Within the insider threat policy the operator should consider identifying a
summary of the roles and responsibilities of relevant departments.

Handout SECRET
Page 232 of 252
Module 21 Cyber Threat
Annex 17
4.9.1 Each Contracting State shall ensure that operators or

entities as defined in the national civil aviation security
programme or other relevant national documentation
identify their critical information and communications
technology systems and data used for civil aviation
purposes and, in accordance with a risk assessment,
develop and implement, as appropriate, measures to
protect them from unlawful interference.
Recommendation. 4.9.2 Each Contracting State should ensure that the measures
implemented protect, as appropriate, the confidentiality,
integrity and availability of the identified critical systems
and/or data. The measures should include, interalia,
security by design, supply chain security, network
separation, and the protection and/or limitation of any
remote access capabilities, as appropriate and in
accordance with the risk assessment carried out by its
relevant national authorities.
NCASP
6.12 Measures relating to cyber threats
AVSEC Order
03/2011 Procedure for protection and handling of security
information
What is CYBER THREAT?
Cyber Threat can be defined as the possibility of a malicious attempt to damage or disrupt a
computer network or system.
In Aviation Industry it has been categorized as new and emerging threat.
What is Cyber Security?
Cyber security is the practice of protecting systems, networks and programs from

Handout SECRET
Page 233 of 252
digital attacks. These attacks are usually aimed at accessing, changing or destroying
sensitive information; extorting money from users or interrupting normal busine ss
process
Why Aviation Information & Communication Technology System needs to be protected
1) Rapid growth of civil aviation and significant use of data and use of new technologies.
2) Manual processes are shifting to more efficient automated processes.
3) Paperless and environment friendly approach
4) Huge number of stakeholders
5) Cyber-attack can endanger the safety of an aircraft.
6) Hackers, cyber criminals, “hacktivists” and terrorists are focused on malicious intent, theft
of information, profit and disruption.
Governance and responsibilities:
States, governments, Airport Operator, and relevant entities should work collaboratively
towards the development of an effective and coordinated framework for civil aviation
stakeholders working at the airport to address the challenges of cyber threats, and increase
the resilience of the global aviation system to cyber threats that may jeopardize the safety
of civil aviation operation at the airport.
The confidentiality, integrity and availability of all Information and Technology systems of
the airport shall be maintained.
Each entity involved in Civil Aviation
Access control and alarm monitoring system

Departure control systems
Passenger and baggage reconciliation system
Screening system and/or explosive detection system
Regulated agent and/or known consignor
Air Traffic Managemnet systems
Reservation and passenger check-in system
CCTV surveillance systems
Security Command, control and dispatch system
Identification
DG, BCAS shall define criteria for identification of critical information systems. An information
system is considered to be critical when it contains or uses sensitive or privacy data and/or
assets; or its operation is indispensable for the safe and secure operation and availability
of aviation activities. The identification of critical systems should be conducted through

Handout SECRET
Page 234 of 252
classification of all data and/or assets according to a predefined data policy or classification,
and the development of a business impact analysis on the criticality for each of the individual
system.
Airport Operator, ATS, aircraft operators, communications service providers, ground

handling agents, maintenance, repair and overhaul service providers, and Security service
providers should identify additional critical data and information systems software and
hardware used in their operation, which may include, but are not limited to:
a) Systems and data identified as critical from an aviation safety perspective, such as:
i) Air traffic management systems;
ii) Departure control systems;
iii) Communication, navigation and other safety-critical systems of an aircraft;
iv) Aircraft command, control and dispatch systems;
b) Systems and data identified as critical from an aviation security perspective, such as:
i) Regulated agent and/or known consignor databases;
ii) Access control and alarm monitoring systems;
iii) Closed-circuit television surveillance systems;
iv) Passenger and baggage reconciliation systems; and
v) Screening systems and/or explosive detection systems, whether networked
or operating in a stand-alone configuration;
c) Systems and data identified as critical from an aviation facilitation perspective, such as:
i) Aircraft operator reservation and passenger check-in systems;
ii) Flight information display systems;
iii) Baggage handling and monitoring systems; and
iv) Border crossing and customs systems.
Each stakeholder working in aviation industry needs to identify critical information vital to
their operations and the consequences of its being misused.
Risk Assessment
When applying security considerations in airport design, it will be necessary to conduct an

airport threat and risk assessment. The Airport Operator shall be responsible to ensure
threat and risk assessments of a particular airport and shall approach the Director General,
BCAS well in time.
Factors to be considered:-
Threat assessment and risk management
Extent of Airport Operation
Frequency and volume of aircraft operations
Volume of cargo and mail or catering operations
Likelihood of an act of unlawful interference
Outcome of previous monitoring activities

Handout SECRET
Page 235 of 252
Finding of internal quality control measures

New and emerging needs
Impact Assessment
Impact assessment shall be carried out for the appraisal of the positive and negative effects
of the introduction of new and/or modified mitigation measures on the existing aviation
security systems and on all relevant stakeholders taking an active part in those systems
keeping in view aircraft and airport operation and the security, safety and facilitation of
passengers and goods.
Following areas to be covered while assessing the impact:-

a) Effectiveness
b) International and communication considerations
c) Wider economic considerations
d) Operations
e) Facilitation
f) Aviation Security System in place
g) Technology
h) Health and safety
i) Environment
j) Costs
Detection
The Service provider shall ensure the following for detection, protection and maintaining
electronic records:
a) IT Data Center: Firewall to cover risky user activity by identifying anomalous behavior.
b) Investigate suspicious user activity
c) Reduce risk and real-time user notifications and blocking
d) Anonymize user data to protect employee and outsourced privacy and meet regulations.
e) IT Policy for external drive.
f) Networks used for critical aviation information and communication technology systems
and data are physically and/or logically separated into zones based on function, use and
security levels. Where these critical aviation information systems require connectivity to
other operational systems, these connections should be minimized to the extent practicable. If
separation is not possible, connection and access should be monitored at all times.
Appropriate policies and practices should be in place to reduce the number of connections to
the minimum required.
Protection
There should be appropriate provisions for the protection of critical information and
communication technology systems (including their hardware and software) and data,

Handout SECRET
Page 236 of 252
against cyber-attacks and interference, in relevant national programmes. The programme

shall envisage measure to:
a) Protect the systems and data against unauthorized access, modification and use;
b) Prevent lack of availability and integrity due to flaws in software compilation and/or
misuse of configurations; and
c) Prevent tampering with the systems and their data.
Response: Planning and Readiness
Risk response includes the development of a comprehensive approach to reducing or

eliminating the vulnerabilities identified, as well as the techniques of risk avoidance,
mitigation, transfer and acceptance. Continual review of risk mitigation efforts is an essential
element in a cyber-security risk management programme and shall include, to a minimum
the following:-
a) Hacking: an illegal intrusion into a computer system and/or network

b) Denial of service attack:
i. Act of criminal who floods the bandwidth of the victims network
ii. Spam mail in the mail box depriving access of the services
c) Virus dissemination which includes malicious software that attaches itself to other software
(virus, worms, Trojan horse, web jacking, e-mail bombing etc.)
d) Computer vandalism by damaging or destroying data rather than stealing and/or
transmitting virus
e) Cyber terrorism: Use of internet based attacks in terrorism activities. Technology savvy
terrorists are using 512-bit encryption which is impossible to decrypt
f) Software piracy: Theft of software through the illegal copying of genuine programme.
Distribution of products intended to pass for the original.
Reporting
Any act or breach in the protection of the confidentiality, integrity and availability of
critical information and communications technology systems and data used for civil
aviation purposes from interference that may jeopardize the safety of civil aviation shall be
immediately reported to the DG, BCAS by the concerned entity.
Analysis
As and when any act of cyber threat is noticed, it should be immediately reported and
analyzed. It may have resulted maliciously or inadvertently.
a) Malicious threat has Common Goals and includes Sabotage, Intellectual property theft,
Espionage and Fraud.

Handout SECRET
Page 237 of 252
b) Inadvertent threat results due to situations caused by Human error, Bad judgment,
Phishing, Malware, Unintentional aiding and abetting, Stolen credentials Convenience
During any quality control activities, including audits, inspections and tests conducted by
BCAS, the following shall be monitored:
a) Hardware and software supply chain security;

b) Disaster, emergency and contingency plans;
c) Security reviews and audits;
d) Interdependencies with critical services supply chain; and
e) Systems configuration control and management.

Handout SECRET
Page 238 of 252
Module 22 Passenger Profiling and Security Environment
Module Objective
Passenger behavior detection, Baggage & documents profiling

Safety regulation for person and vehicle movement in the operational area
Improving attitude of security staff for pax interface
VVIP security – laid down procedure
Teaching Methods
Teaching Methods
 Demonstrations
 Role‐ playing and practical exercises
 Progress Tests
Annex 17
Recommendation 4.1.3 Each Contracting State should consider integrating

behaviour detection into its aviation security
practices and procedures.
Recommendation 4.1.2 Each Contracting State should promote the use of

random and unpredictable security measures.
Unpredictability could contribute to the deterrent
effect of security measures.
Recommendation 2.3 Security and facilitation Each Contracting State

should whenever possible arrange for the security
controls and procedures to cause a minimum of
interference with, or delay to the activities of, civil

Handout SECRET
Page 239 of 252
aviation provided the effectiveness of these controls

and procedures is not compromised
NCASP 20118
7.1.1.2 Each entity responsible for implementation of

security controls relating to pre-embarkation
security checks of passengers and entry of non-
passengers into the security restricted area shall
consider integrating behavior detection into its
aviation security practices and procedures
9.4.6 The Director General, BCAS shall ensure training

of Behaviour Detection into aviation security
practices & procedures in accordance with
NCASTP.
7.1.7.2 Procedure for persons with special needs:

(f) All possible and due courtesy shall be extended
to them without compromising on security
7.7.2.6 In the interest of effective security and passenger

facilitation, a manual search of the hold baggage
should be conducted in accordance with the
following basic guidelines:
(b) The searcher should be tactful, courteous
and use caution.
6.4.6.3 All ground handling staff while leaving aerodrome

from any gate (s) / designated gate (s) shall be
subjected to security check (frisking / baggage
search). All other staff, when exiting the security
restricted area of airport shall be frisked on a
random basis,
7.1.8.2 (vi) Random Search: - In addition to suspect bags,
all bags should be subjected to random searches.
On an average one bag in ten should be hand

Handout SECRET
Page 240 of 252
searched. This number may be changed in cases of

higher risk.
7.1.7 (f) 100% pat down search of a person will be
carried out whenever the screener deems it
necessary. However, at least one out of every five
persons will be subjected to pat down (whole
body) search on a continuous random basis.
Order 06/2009 Exemption from Pre‐embarkation security checks at civil
airports
Order 24/2011 Random Screening at the entry gate to Terminal Building
Circular 23/2005 procedure for passenger and carryon baggage screening.
Profiling is described as a systematic observation to categorize each passenger by creating a

short biographical character sketch to study certain characteristic personal manner or attitude,
in order to decide whether the passenger is a threat to the airline or not.
Profiling is done to detect the following:
 A terrorist with intent to harm the airline

 A terrorist with intent to cause damage to the terminal building, aircraft etc.
 Asylum seekers
 criminals
 Detection of fraudulent travel documents
 Traffickers of drugs, contraband and Human Trafficking
Characteristics of Profiler
 Alertness
 Awareness
 Experience
 Endurance
 Sufficient knowledge
 Flexible
 Good Interpersonal Skills
 Good Team Member and
 Quick decision maker.

Handout SECRET
Page 241 of 252
Profiling is carried out on

 Passenger
- Business travelers
- Couples
- Traveling alone
- Traveling with Family
- Traveling with group
- Tourists
- Students
- Officials and VIPS
- Unaccompanied
- Pilgrimage
- Mourners
- Sick
- Prisoners
- Immigration deportees
 Baggage
- Carry On Baggage
- Hold Baggage
- Other items.
 Travel documents
- Passport (expired; forged; alterations; etc.)
- Visa;
- Ticket (last minute purchase; one way ticket; uneconomical routing; etc)
Equipment or tools used for Profiling:
 X-BIS
 Explosive detectors
 Metal detectors
 Machine to check passport
 Ultra violet light
 Biometrics ( Iris Scan; facial recognition; voice recognition; hand geometry; finger print)
Five Steps for Profiling
 The Interviewing process.

 Threat assessment.
 Visual profile of potential terrorist.
Handout SECRET
Page 242 of 252
 Knowledge of the information in the accompanying documents of the traveler.

 Knowledge of the average traveler.
Tools essential to the successful performance
a. Deviations from the norm. Any abnormality displayed either by the passenger, his
travel documents and/or his baggage.
b. Lessons from the Past. It is a known fact that terrorist use forged, altered or stolen
passports and tickets to hide their identity. The tickets are mostly purchased in the
last minute and in cash.
c. Suspicious Signs. Any deviation from the norm along with lessons of the past is
good enough to rise a suspicion. These deviations may either be in passenger’s
appearance and behavior, documentation and/or baggage. At times in case we see
a person in possession on a weapon, it can be for a specific reason for acts of
unlawful interference with civil aviation, then it is termed as critical sign and calls
for the passenger to be handed over to the law enforcement.
d. Questioning Guidelines. Is used to confirm or resolve any suspicious sign observed
during the profiling process.
e. Positive Signs.
1. Diplomats have been through a strict security clearance process and are
well known to the Government, therefore, they are unlikely to carry out a
terrorist act.
2. Designated VIPs or guests of the airline. These are people who are well
known to the airline and the public. They may be famous artists, CEO’s,
politicians, etc. There is little risk of these people being involved in a
terrorist organization.
3. Direct employees of the Airlines who present a valid employee ID card and a
valid ticket. All the airline employees go through background checks to
verify the possibility of being involved with a terrorist organization prior to
begin hired.
4. Military personnel and their families usually live in secure military
compounds. They are more security conscious and it would be more
difficult for terrorists groups to have contact with them.
5. Frequent flyers are exposed to the airline security personnel, Immigration
and Customs officials very often. The Company has a lot of information
about these people such as addresses, phone numbers, etc.
6. A child under 12 years is unlikely to be involved with or used by a terrorist
organization to carry out an attack due to their maturity level and lack of
experience.
7. Group traveling together. It would be difficult for a terrorist to infiltrate a
group without raising suspicion as they all have a common background,
known to each other, ticket issued from the same agent etc. Terrorists
would not want to be part of a group because of the advance reservations
Handout SECRET
Page 243 of 252
and information they would have to supply.

f. The Mandatory Baggage Control Questions (MBCQ).
1. Is it your baggage?
2. Did you pack it yourself?
3. Do you know the contents?
4. Was the bag in your custody throughout?
5. Are you carrying any electronic / electrical goods?
- If yes, since how long have you owned it?
- Did you lend it to someone in the recent past?
- Has it ever been repaired?
6. Did you accept any gift / packets etc from any other person to be
carried on their behalf?
Note: From now till the time you board the aircraft, do not leave your hand baggage unattended or
accept any parcel from anyone.
Detection depends on the effectiveness of the Profiling Process because of the fact that most
individual(s) involved or in the process of doing illegal activities are unable to speak the truth
and may present fraudulent documents in order to mask their true intentions and identity.
Passenger Classification
Correct classification of passenger is the key element in security system. All passengers can be
classified as non-threatening and Threatening based on the suspicious sign in appearance and
behavior displayed by them
Non- Threatening :- Are those passengers who does not pose any threat to the flight.
Threatening :- Are those passengers who have/ possess potential threat to the flight. These are the
passengers we need to keep a vigil on.
Threatening passengers are again of two types. The first type is that who does not know that they
pose a threat to the flight. While the other type of passenger are aware of this.
- UNAWARE
- AWARE
Unaware passenger:
- Naïve :- Who is unaware that his/ her baggage is in- filtered with explosives.
- Partly Naïve :- Who does not have any link with the terrorist organization, but is not
aware that he is carrying explosives. Example, a passenger carrying an item on behalf of
someone without checking the contents. He knows that the package is not his but is
totally unaware that the package given to him is actually an IED.
- Framed terrorist :- Is one who has connection with a terrorist organization, is carrying
materials for them, but is not aware what will be the consequences of carrying the

Handout SECRET
Page 244 of 252
same. He is being used by his own organization.

Aware passenger
- Terrorist/ Hijacker :- is one who will harm by creating unlawful interference and escapes
from the target to save his/ her own life. Example bombing of Kanishka, Pan Am etc
- Suicidal Terrorist :- is one who is ready to sacrifice his own life while creating unlawful
interference. Example Suicide incident in Moscow airport.

Handout SECRET
Page 245 of 252
All Passenger
Threatening Non-threatening
unaware aware safe to travel
Unaware
Naive Partly Naive Framed Terrorist
Aware
Terrorist/ Hijacker
Suicidal Terrorist
Purpose of Questioning
A person can be an innocent non- threatening passenger if has a logical reason for the sign. To
eliminate this we need to question. Asking questions will identify signs that are truly suspicious. It is a
process of asking a passenger, questions to determine whether he potentially possess a threat to
flight.
RESOLVE To find a logical, legitimate reason behind a suspicious sign which you can believe,
therefore the sign is no longer considered suspicious. The passenger is then classified as regular/
non-threatening passenger.
CONFIRM Unable to find a logical, legitimate reason behind a suspicious sign, therefore the sign is
considered truly suspicious. The passenger is then classified as selectee or threatening passenger and
will be subjected to enhanced security procedure.
Baggage (Check-in / Hand baggage) – Suspicious signs
The baggage of a passenger who is a possible threat may also

Handout SECRET
Page 246 of 252
provide signs for suspicion. These may be:
 Profile of passenger does not matching to the type of baggage

 Baggage not matching with profession as declared
 Baggage not matching with class of travel or duration of trip.
 Baggage contents are confusing – not matching travel requirements.
 Passenger not having the baggage keys or does not know how to open the baggage
 Name on the baggage does not match with the name on the ticket
 Passenger carrying weapons, explosives , prohibited articles & Dangerous goods
Documents - Suspicious Signs
The travel documents of a passenger may also provide signs for

suspicion. The signs may be:
 Last minute purchase of ticket

 One way ticket
 Unusual / uneconomical routing of the ticketed
 Ticket appears to be corrected forged or stolen
 Passport appears to be forged, altered or otherwise invalid
 Name on the passport does not match with the name on ticket
 Personal identification information does not match with that on Passport
 Passenger not familiar with the details in travel documents
 Passenger originating from a suspicious country
 Passenger’s nationality does not matches with his / her profile
Action to be taken in case a suspicious passenger is detected
 Keep surveillance on the passenger (preferable electronic)

 Inform Supervisor
 Check baggage thoroughly
 Ask questions
 Verify documents

Handout SECRET
Page 247 of 252
 Inform ASG
 Frisk thoroughly
COURTESY AND BEHAVIOUR
Courtesy and Behaviour at the airport:
 Image of the organization

 Satisfied customer is the best goodwill promoter
 High Profile personnel travel through airport
 Larger Media publicity
Personal Presentation:
 Good Appearance
 Posture / gesture while dealing with the passenger.
 Clothing – pressed, neat and clean (good turnout)
 Facial expression / body language
 Good and effective communication skills.
 Conversation with passenger- Fresh breath, voice tone /voice modulation
 Right staff at right place at the right time.
Passenger Profile:
 VVIPs/ VIPs / CIPs

 Diplomats
 Business Traveler
 Celebrities
 Tourists
 Group travelers
 Airline / airport employees
 Families
 Emergency Traveler
 Students

Handout SECRET
Page 248 of 252
 Unaccompanied Minors
Why does a passenger get upset?
A passenger may get upset for a wide range of reasons from personal too impersonal.
Sometimes their anger is justified, sometimes not. Some of the reasons are as under:
 Already upset at someone / something/ somewhere
 Tired, stressed, frustrated.

 Travel expectations have not been met. e.g Seat allocation; meal request;
 Feels nothing is right for him
 Feels unpleasant attitude
Effects of courtesy and behaviour:
 Professional competency / survival

 Recommendation of high level
 Good reputation of security staff
 Confidence of passenger on security staff
 Image of airlines in comparison to other
DOS AND DONTS:
D O’s
 Positive Attitude
 Well conversation
 Smiling face
 Honesty
 Cooperation with the passenger
DONT’s
 Don’t chew, eat during dealing with passenger

 Don’t give wrong information
 Don’t relax during duty
 Don’t irritate on the behavior of pax.

Handout SECRET
Page 249 of 252
 Don’t lose temper

Never ignore a bad security impression.

Handout SECRET
Page 250 of 252
VVIP / VIP SECURITY PROCEDURES
Certain categories of VVIP/VIPs while travelling by air through the civilian airports in the
country are exempted from security checks as per the directions issued by the
regulatory authorities from time to time.
Exemption from pre‐embarkation security checks at civil airports.
The Bureau of Civil aviation security vide their circular has exempted the following VVIPs
/ VIPs from pre embarkation security checks all civil airports in the country.
The pre embarkation checks involve screening of passengers and their carryon
/hand baggage at the security hold area by the ASG and the secondary ladder point
checks carried out by the aircraft operator prior to boarding.
As per BCAS AVSEC Order 06/2015, following are the categories of personnel and their
accompanying spouse are exempted from pre‐embarkation security checks:-
1. President
2. Vice President
3. Prime Minister
4. Former president
5. Governors of States
6. Former Vice president
7. Chief Justice of India
8. Speaker of Lok sabha
9 . Union Ministers of Cabinet rank
10. Chief Ministers of States
11. Dy Chief Minister of states
12. Dy Chairman Niti Aayog
13. Leader of opposition in Lok Sabha & Rajya Sabha
14. Holders of Bharat Ratan Decoration
15. Ambassadors of foreign countries, Charge D’ Affairs and High Commissioners and
spouses
16. Judges of Supreme Court
17. Chief Election Commissioner
18. Comptroller/auditor General of India
19. Deputy Chairman Rajya Sabha & Deputy Speaker of Lok Sabha
20. Minister of State of the Union Council of Ministers
21. Attorney General of India
22. Cabinet Secretary
23. Lt. Governors of Union Territories
24. Chiefs of staffs holding the rank of full General or equivalent rank
25. Chief Justices of High courts
Handout SECRET
Page 251 of 252
26. Chief Ministers of Union Territories

27. Deputy Chief Ministers of Union Territories
28. Visiting Foreign dignitaries of the same status as at Sl. Nos. 1 to 4,7,8,9 above
29. His Holiness the Dalai Lama
30. SPG Protectees
31. Former Prime Minister of India are also exempted from pre‐embarkation checks at all
civilian airports in the country
Note: Spouse of the president of India is exempted from pre‐embarkation security checks
at all civil airports even when he/she is not accompanying the president.
It is reiterated that except the categories specified above, all other categories of
passengers, travelling by air through the civil airports in the country, are to be subjected
to pre-embarkation security checks without making any exception in any particular case.

Handout SECRET
Page 252 of 252

Avsec Basic

Încărcat de

Informații document

Descriere originală:

Drepturi de autor

Formate disponibile

Partajați acest document

Partajați sau inserați document

Opțiuni de partajare

Vi se pare util acest document?

Este necorespunzător acest conținut?

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

Avsec Basic

Încărcat de

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

Aviation Security Basic

Trainee Reference Book

Aviation Security Basic (AVSEC Basic)

For Restricted Circulation

Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS)

Issue Date: 21 February 2019

AVSEC BASIC Handout/2019 Restricted

AVSEC BASIC Handout/2019 Restricted

AVIATION SECURITY TRAINING PROGRAMME

Aviation Security Order / Circular

Order 1 / 2018 The objective of the National Civil Aviation Security

Order 2/2018 In exercise of powers conferred by Section SA of the Aircraft

AVSEC BASIC Handout/2019 Restricted

reviewed and updated to comply with Standards of Annex-17

Aviation Security Training Package (ASTP)

AVSEC BASIC Handout/2019 Restricted

AVIATION SECURITY BASIC TRAINING PROGRAM

AVSEC BASIC Handout/2019 Restricted

Module-1 Introduction to the Course

 To understand the course objective, structure and methodology

After completion of this course, the trainees will be able to:

AVSEC BASIC Handout/2019 Restricted

 Respond to security incidents or airport emergencies.

Terminologies Related To AVSEC and Vital Installations at Airport

Terms that are defined in the I C A O A v i a t i o n S e c u r i t y M a n u a l (Doc

• forcible intrusion on board an aircraft, at an airport or on the premises of an aeronautical

Aerodrome Operator: A person, organization or enterprise responsible for operation and

AVSEC BASIC Handout/2019 Restricted

AVSEC BASIC Handout/2019 Restricted

Behavior Detection Within an aviation security environment, the application of techniques

Bomb alert: A status of alert put in place by competent authorities to activate an

Bomb threat: A communicated threat, anonymous or otherwise, which suggests, or infers,

Cabin baggage: Baggage intended for carriage in the cabin of an aircraft.

AVSEC BASIC Handout/2019 Restricted

aircraft. Note: Stores (Supplies).

Certification. A formal evaluation and confirmation by or on behalf of the appropriate

Crisis management: Contingency measures implemented in response to increased threat levels

AVSEC BASIC Handout/2019 Restricted

Explosive Detection System (EDS). A technology system or combination of different

Explosive Device Detection System (EDDS). A technology system or combination of different

Freight. See Cargo.

AVSEC BASIC Handout/2019 Restricted

Identification cards: See Permits.

Integrated/consolidated cargo. A consignment of multiple packages which has been originated

Mishandled baggage: Baggage involuntarily, or inadvertently, separated from passengers or

Off-airport processing facilities. A passenger or cargo transport link terminal at an urban

Sabotage: An act or omission, intended to cause malicious or wanton destruction of property,

areas or to conduct business after completion of a background check.

Security equipment: Devices of a specialized nature for use, individually or as part of a

Security inspection. An examination of the implementation of relevant National Civil Aviation

Security programme. Written measures adopted to safeguard international civil aviation

Security survey. An evaluation of security needs including the identification of vulnerabilities

AVSEC BASIC Handout/2019 Restricted

Sensitive Aviation Security Information. Information that, if accessed by or disclosed to

Small arms. A general description applied to all hand-held firearms.

Trace detection equipment. A technology system or combination of different technologies

Transfer passengers/baggage: Passengers/baggage making direct connections between two

Transit passengers/Baggage: Passengers/Baggage departing from an airport on the same flight as

Travel document: A passport or other official document of identity issued by a State or

Unidentified/Unattended baggage. Baggage at an airport, with or without a baggage tag,

Unpredictability. The implementation of security measures in order to increase their deterrent

AVSEC BASIC Handout/2019 Restricted

Vital installation. Any facility on or connected with an aerodrome, which, if damaged or