1 K. B. KING'S BENCH DIVISION.

59

BASTABLE, Appellant v. LITTLE, Respondent. 1906

Constable—Obstructing Police in Execution of Duty—Giving Warning of ^ov- *
"Police Trap" —Prevention of Crime) Amendment Act, 1885 (48 & 49
Vict. c. 75), ». 2.
Two constables, having measurel certain distances on a road much
frequented by motor cars, were watching in order to ascertain the pace
at which each car passed over the measured distance, with a view to
di»covering whether it was proceeding at an illegal rate of speed. The
respondent gave warning of this fact to approaching cars, which then
Blackened speed. There was no evidence that the respondent was acting
in concert with any of the drivers of the cars, or that any car when the
■warning was given was going at an illegal pace :—
Held, that the respondent was not guilty of the offence of obstructing
the constables when in the execution of their duty within the meaning
of s. 2 of the Prevention of Crimes Amendment Act, 1885.

Case stated by justices.

The information was laid by the appellant against the respon
dent for that he (the respondent) did on March 4, 1906, in the
London Road in the borough of Croydon, wilfully obstruct certain
police constables in the execution of their duty as such constables,
contrary to the Prevention of Crimes Act, 1871 (84 & 85 Vict,
c. 112), s. 12, and the Prevention of Crimes Amendment Act,
1885 (48 & 49 Vict. c. 75), s. 2.
The case stated that " on March 4, 1906, Henry Harris and
Percival Suter, two constables of the Metropolitan Police Force,
were engaged under and pursuant to the orders of the Commis
sioner of the Police of the Metropolis on special duty in the
London Road, Croydon, within the Metropolitan Police District,
which road is much used by all kinds of traffic, vehicular and
pedestrian, between the hours of 11 a.m. and 12 noon, observing
and timing the speed of motor cars driven along the said road,
for the purpose of securing that such cars should not be driven
at an unlawful rate of speed or otherwise in contravention of the
Motor Car Acts, 1896 and 1908.
" Prior to the acts of the respondent hereinafter mentioned the
metropolitan police authorities had caused three several distances
of one furlong each (with intervals between them respectively)
to be measured off upon the said road, so that, by timing cars as
60 KING'S BENCH DIVISION. [1907]

1906 they passed over the measured distances, the rates of speed at
Bastable which such motor cars were being driven would be accurately
Little ascertained. At the time of the acts of the respondent com
plained of in the information the said police constables were
waiting to observe the speed of any motor cars that might pass
over the aforesaid measured distances. The constables were at
the times in question employed in the above manner under the
directions of the Commissioner of Police and in the performance
of their duty as metropolitan police constables within the
Metropolitan Police District.
" The respondent, while the said police constables were so
engaged in the discharge of their duty, by means of signals
made with his hand and with a sheet of newspaper, and in one
instance by calling out the words ' Police trap,' warned the
drivers of motor cars which he saw approaching the said
measured distances that the police were on the watch as afore
said. By such means the said drivers may have been enabled to
avoid travelling at an illegal speed over the said measured
distances, the cars in every case slackening speed on the drivers
being warned.
" The respondent at the time when he gave the warning above
mentioned was fully aware that the said police constables were
then engaged upon the above duty.
" The warnings of the respondent above mentioned were
repeated by him upon upwards of a dozen occasions during a
period of forty minutes while the said police constables were
engaged upon the aforesaid duty.
" The respondent at the time aforesaid was not acting in concert
with the said drivers of motor cars, nor was he in any way con
nected with any person or body of persons interested in the
driving of motor cars."
The magistrates were of opinion that the acts of the respon
dent did not in law constitute an obstruction of the police con
stables in the execution of their duty within the meaning of the
sections, and dismissed the information, but stated this case for
the opinion of the Court. (1)
(1) By the PreTention of Crimes s. 12, "Where any person is con-
Act, 1871 (34 & 35 Vict. c. 112), victed of an assault on any con-
1 K. B. KING'S BENCH DIVISION. 61
Dancknerts, K.C. (Bodkin with him), for the appellant. The 1906
respondent was guilty of an offence under the section. He was bastable
preventing the police from obtaining evidence of the pace at LlT^LE
which the motor cars were travelling, and so was obstructing them
in the execution of their duty. The fact that the speed of all
the cars was slackened when the warning was given shews
that the drivers knew they were proceeding at an excessive
rate, and were therefore committing an offence against the
Motor Car Acts. Where a man is committing or has com
mitted a crime, and another person prevents the police from
obtaining evidence of the commission of the crime, he is
obstructing the police in the execution of their duty, even
although he does not physically obstruct them.
Avory, K.C. (Hemmerde with him), for the respondent. The
magistrates were right. There was no evidence that any offence
was being committed or had been committed by the drivers of
any of the motor cars, and it would be absurd to say that
everyone who warns another not to commit an offence, lest he
should be detected, is obstructing the police in the execution of
their duty. The fact that the drivers slackened speed on
receiving the warning is no evidence that they knew that they
were going too fast and breaking the law.
The section only applies to actual physical obstruction of the
constable-
Dancknerts, K.C, replied.

Lord Alverstone C.J. In my opinion this case is not free

from difficulty, and I am, for my own part, by no means satisfied
that no offence was committed by the respondent. If the case
had contained allegations that a breach of the law had been
committed by any of these motor cars, and that there was a
proximity of detection, the case would be different, but I think

stable when in the execution of his recited Act " (the Prevention of
duty such person shall be guilty of Crimes Act, 1871) "shall apply to
an offence against this Act " all cases of resisting or wilfully
By the Prevention of Crimes obstructing any constable or peace
Amendment Act, 1885 (48 & 49 officer when in the execution of his
Vict c. 75), b. 2, "The provisions duty."
of the twelfth, section of the said
62 KING'S BENCH DIVISION. [1907]

1906 that the magistrates were right in holding that on the facts
Bartable before them no offence was disclosed against s. 2 of the Preven-
Little. tion of Crimes Amendment Act, 1885. That section provides
i oni AWerstoue ^a^ *ne provisions of s. 12 of the Prevention of Crimes Act,
CJ- 1871, which deals with assaults on constables when in the
execution of their duty, shall apply to all cases of resisting or
wilfully obstructing any constable when in the execution of his
duty. I think that the section points to something done in
regard to the duty which the constable is performing, and does
not apply to what is done or said to third parties. To take an
instance which was put during the argument : suppose a party
of men are engaged in the offence of night poaching, and a person
passing near warns them that the police are coming, I think
it is clear that that could not be held to be an offence within
this section.
We must not allow ourselves to be warped by any prejudice
against motor cars, and so to strain the law against them.
We are asked to infer from the fact that all the motor cars, on
receiving the warning, slackened their speed, that all or most of
them were then exceeding the speed limit and breaking the law.
I do not think that we can draw any such inference. The
magistrates only say that in consequence of the warning the
drivers may have been enabled to avoid travelling at an illegal
speed past the policemen. They do not say that as a fact they
were at the time they received the warning travelling at an illegal
rate of speed. I cannot draw the inference that the cars were
breaking the law when they received the warning. I also attach
importance to the fact that there was a complete absence of any
evidence of conspiracy or agency on the part of the respondent
and the drivers of the cars. Under the circumstances, there
fore, I think that the magistrates came to a right conclusion,
and that this appeal must be dismissed.

Ridley J. I am of the same opinion. I think that in order

to constitute an offence under the section there must be
some interference with the constable himself by physical force
or threats. He must be either physically obstructed in doing his
duty or at least threats must be used to prevent him from doing it.
1 K. B. KING'S BENCH DIVISION. 63

Darling J. I do not differ from the judgments that have 1906

been pronounced, but I do not feel inclined to say much more bastable
than that. If the case had stated definitely that any of these cars little
when approaching the measured mile was going at an illegal rate
of speed, and that the warning prevented the police constables
from taking the real pace of the car as it passed, and so
securing the conviction of the driver, I should desire to reserve
my opinion whether the respondent had committed an offence
under the section, although no physical obstruction of the police
constables in the execution of their duty had taken place. In
my opinion it is quite easy to distinguish the cases where a
warning is given with the object of preventing the commission
of a crime from the cases in which the crime is being committed
and the warning is given in order that the commission of the
crime may be suspended while there is danger of detection, with
the intention that the commission of the crime should be re-com
menced as soon as the danger of detection is past.
I do not wish to be understood to say that in order that there
should be an offence under this section there must be some
physical obstruction of the constable. In my opinion a police
man who in seeking information which might lead to the con
viction of the perpetrators of a crime was wilfully misled by false
information would be obstructed in the execution of his duty, and
I should not like to say that the person who so wilfully misled
him was not committing an offence within the meaning of this
section.

Lord Alverstone C.J. I also would wish to guard myself

from saying that the only obstruction contemplated by this
section is a physical obstruction.
Appeal dismissed.

Solicitors for appellant : Wontner & Son.

Solicitors for respondent : Campbell, Hooper & Todd.
A. P. P. K