RAMOS VS.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS- Adverse Possession

The general rule is that possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract of land under the claim
of ownership of all is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse
possession of another.

FACTS:

Restituo Romero gained possession of a considerable tract of land located in Nueva Ecija. He
took advantage of the Royal Decree to obtain a possessory information title to the land and was
registered as such.

Parcel No. 1 included within the limits of the possessory information title of Romero was sold to
Cornelio Ramos, herein petitioner.

Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title registered.

Director of Lands opposed on the ground that Ramos had not acquired a good title from the
Spanish government.

Director of Forestry also opposed on the ground that the first parcel of land is forest land.
It has been seen however that the predecessor in interest to the petitioner at least held this
tract of land under color of title.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the actual occupancy of a part of the land described in the instrument giving
color of title sufficient to give title to the entire tract of land?

HELD:

The general rule is that possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract of land under the claim
of ownership of all is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse
possession of another.
The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith and he has open, peaceable, and
notorious possession of a portion of the property, sufficient to apprise the community and the
world that the land was for his enjoyment.

Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every
square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession.
Ramos and his predecessor in interest fulfilled the requirements of the law on supposition that
the premises consisted of agricultural public land.

On the issue of forest land, Forest reserves of public land can be established as provided by law.
When the claim of the citizen and the claim of the government as to a particular piece of
property collide, if the Government desires to demonstrate that the land is in reality a forest,
the Director of Forestry should submit to the court convincing proof that the land is not more
valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes.

In this case, the mere formal opposition on the part of the Attorney-General for the Director of
Forestry, unsupported by satisfactory evidence will not stop the courts from giving title to the
claimant.
Petitioner and appellant has proved a title to the entire tract of land for which he asked for
registration.
Registration in the name of the petitioner is hereby granted.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. CA & HEIRS OF BRUNO CABAUATAN

FACTS:
 This is a land registration case involving 128 hectares of land in Cabagan, Isabela applied for by
Bruno Cabanatan.
 However, the applicant had not produced in evidence any composition title, the basis of their
application. It was allegedly burned during the war.
 Because of this, the following are not known: (1) boundaries of the land allegedly adjudicated to
Bruno Cabanatan granted that he was the same as Bruno Cabautan, (2) what Bario or Sitio is it
located, (3) Why the hectares had been increased from 138 hectares in 1885 to 154 hectares in
1934 and (4) Why the same land was declared for tax purposes under the name of Bruno’s
nephew, and not his heirs.
  The SolGen contended that the land applied for must be identified. The claim of possession is
inutile if the land is not identified.
 On March 1934, Judge Rosauro issued a decree for 25 hectare to the heirs of Bruno. After it was
granted, they produced a survey plan which had an area of 154 hectares than 138 hectares
adjudicated to Bruno.
 The provincial fiscal, in representation of the Director of Lands, alleged in his opposition that the
land claimed by Bruno’s heirs was covered by the approved and subsisting homestead
applications of 6 people (plaintiffs in this case).
 Evidence of Bruno’s heirs: that the land in question was administered by Bruno’s son,
Salvador, and there were 40 tenants during the Spanish regime, and that they have been
cultivating the land.
 Evidence of Director of Lands and Homesteaders: Homestead applications and approvals, and
order for issuance of patent.
 TC: The trial court granted the application for registration of the six lots with an area of 128 hectares,.
According to TC, if Bruno’s heirs had possession of said 25 hectares, they could be deemed to
have “constructive possession” of the remaining part of the land, provided that the same was not
in adverse possession of another person.

ISSUE: WON the application for registration must be granted. - NO.

 Constructive possession does not apply to the case because the major portion of the disputed 128
hectares has been in the adverse possession of homesteaders and their heirs and is still part of
the public domain until the patents are issued.
 The area claimed is in excess of that mentioned in the committed position title. The alleged lost
composition title cannot be given any probative value. Its contents were not proven by secondary
evidence.
 The precise location of the land and the possession thereof were not proven by the applicants.
The alleged possession of Bruno's heirs may refer to the 25 hectares already registered in their
names. Inexplicably, the registration of the 154 hectares was made in two installments.

PLEASANTVILLE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. CA, GR No. 79688, 1996-02-01

Facts:
Edith Robillo purchased from petitioner a parcel of land designated as Lot 9, Phase II and located at
Taculing Road, Pleasantville Subdivision, Bacolod City. In 1975, respondent Eldred Jardinico bought
the rights to the lot from Robillo. At that time, Lot 9 was vacant.
Upon completing all payments, Jardinico secured from the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City on
December 19, 1978 Transfer Certificate of Title No. 106367 in his name. It was then that he
discovered that improvements had been introduced on Lot 9 by respondent Wilson Kee, who had...
taken possession thereof.
It appears that on March 26, 1974, Kee bought on installment Lot 8 of the same subdivision from
C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. (CTTEI), the exclusive real estate agent of petitioner.
After discovering that Lot 9 was occupied by Kee, Jardinico confronted him. The parties tried to
reach an amicable settlement, but failed.
On January 30, 1981, Jardinico's lawyer wrote Kee, demanding that the latter remove all
improvements and vacate Lot 9. When Kee refused to vacate Lot 9, Jardinico filed with the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 3, Bacolod City (MTCC), a complaint for ejectment with...
damages against Kee.
Kee, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against petitioner and CTTEI.
The MTCC held that the erroneous delivery of Lot 9 to Kee was attributable to CTTEI.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 48, Bacolod City (RTC) ruled that petitioner and CTTEI
were not at fault or were not negligent, there being no preponderant evidence to show that they
directly participated in the delivery of Lot 9 to Kee.
The appellate court ruled that Kee was a builder in good faith, as he was unaware of the "mix-up"
when he began construction of the improvements on Lot 8.
Issues:
(1) Was Kee a builder in good faith?
(2) What is the liability, if any, of petitioner and its agent, C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc.? and
(3) Is the award of attorney's fees proper?
Ruling:
On issue no. 1

Petitioner fails to persuade this Court to abandon the findings and conclusions of the Court of
Appeals that Kee was a builder in good faith.
The roots of the controversy can be traced directly to the errors committed by CTTEI, when it
pointed the wrong property to Wilson Kee and his wife. It is highly improbable that a purchaser of a
lot would knowingly and willingly build his residence on a lot owned by... another, deliberately
exposing himself and his family to the risk of being ejected from the land and losing all
improvements thereon, not to mention the social humiliation that would follow.
"Under the circumstances, Kee had acted in the manner of a prudent man in ascertaining the
identity of his property.
Upon Kee's receipt of the map, his wife went to the subdivision site accompanied by CTTEI's
employee, Octaviano, who authoritatively declared that the land she was pointing to was indeed
Lot 8. Having full... faith and confidence in the reputation of CTTEI, and because of the company's
positive identification of the property, Kee saw no reason to suspect that there had been a
misdelivery.
Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and his ignorance
of any defect or flaw in his title.[9] And as good faith is presumed, petitioner has the burden of
proving bad faith on the part of Kee.[10]
At the time he built improvements on Lot 8, Kee believed that said lot was what he bought from
petitioner. He was not aware that the lot delivered to him was not Lot 8. Thus, Kee's good faith.
Petitioner failed to prove otherwise.
On issue no. 2

The rule is that the principal is responsible for the acts of the agent, done within the scope of his
authority, and should bear the damage caused to third persons.[14] On the other hand, the agent
who exceeds his authority is personally liable for the... damage.
CTTEI was acting within its authority as the sole real estate representative of petitioner when it
made the delivery to Kee. In acting within its scope of authority, it was, however, negligent. It is
this negligence that is the basis of petitioner's liability, as principal... of CTTEI, per Articles 1909 and
1910 of the Civil Code.
For such negligence, the petitioner should be held liable for damages. Now, the extent and/or
amount of damages to be awarded is a factual issue which should be determined after evidence is
adduced.
However, there is no showing that such evidence was actually presented in the trial court; hence no
damages could now be awarded.
On issue no. 3

The MTCC awarded Jardinico attorney's fees and costs in the amount of P3,000.00 and P700.00,
respectively, as prayed for in his complaint. The RTC deleted the award, consistent with its ruling
that petitioner was without fault or negligence. The Court of Appeals, however,... reinstated the
award of attorney's fees after ruling that petitioner was liable for its agent's negligence.
The award of attorney's fees lies within the discretion of the court and depends upon the
circumstances of each case.[19] We shall not interfere with the discretion of the Court of Appeals.
Jardinico was compelled to litigate for the protection of his... interests and for the recovery of
damages sustained as a result of the negligence of petitioner's agent.

Kasilag v. Rodriguez, 69 PHIL 217

FACTS: Marcial Kasilag and Emiliana Ambrosio entered a contract of mortgage of improvements
of land acquired as homestead to secure the payment of the indebtedness of P1,000 plus
interest. The parties stipulated that Emilina Ambrosio was to pay the debt with interest within 4
½ years., and in such case, mortgage would not have any effect. They also agreed that Emiliana
Ambrosio would execute a deed of sale if it would not be paid within 4 ½ years and that she
would pay the tax on the land. One year after the execution of the aforequoted deed, that is, in
1933, it came to pass that Emiliana Ambrosio was unable to pay the stipulated interests as well as the
tax on the land and its improvements. For this reason, she and the petitioner entered into another
verbal contract whereby she conveyed to the latter the possession of the land on condition that the
latter would not collect the interest on the loan, would attend to the payment of the land tax, would
benefit by the fruits of the land, and would introduce improvements thereon. By virtue of this verbal
contract, the petitioner entered upon the possession of the land, gathered the products thereof, did
not collect the interest on the loan, introduced improvements upon the land valued at P5,000,
according to him and on May 22, 1934 the tax declaration was transferred in his name and on March
6, 1936 the assessed value of the land was increased from P1,020 to P2,180.

After an analysis of the conditions of Exhibit "1" the Court of Appeals came to the conclusion and so
held that the contract entered into by and between the parties, set out in the said public deed, was
one of absolute purchase and sale of the land and its improvements. And upon this ruling it held null
and void and without legal effect the entire Exhibit 1 as well as the subsequent verbal contract
entered into between the parties, ordering, however, the respondents to pay to the petitioner, jointly
and severally, the loan of P1,000 with legal interest at 6 per cent per annum from the date of the
decision. In this first assignment of error the petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals violated
the law in holding that Exhibit 1 is an absolute deed of sale of the land and its improvements and that
it is void and without any legal effect. These pacts made by the parties independently were calculated
to alter the mortgage a contract clearly entered into, converting the latter into a contract of
antichresis. (Article 1881 of the Civil Code.) The contract of antichresis, being a real encumbrance
burdening the land, is illegal and void because it is legal and valid.

ISSUE: W/N the petitioner should be deemed the possessor of the land in good faith because he
was unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition by which it is invalidated

RULING:
According to this author, gross and inexcusable ignorance of law may not be the basis of good faith,
but possible, excusable ignorance may be such basis. It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant
with the laws because he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of the improvements he
proceeded on the well-grounded belief that he was not violating the prohibition regarding the
alienation of the land. In taking possession thereof and in consenting to receive its fruits, he did not
know, as clearly as a jurist does, that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of the
contract of antichresis and that the latter, as a lien, was prohibited by section 116. These
considerations again bring us to the conclusion that, as to the petitioner, his ignorance of the
provisions of section 116 is excusable and may, therefore, be the basis of his good faith.