CARLITOS E.
SILVA, petitioner “We find it more wholesome morally and emotionally for the
v. CA and SUZANNE T. GONZALES, respondents.
G.R. No. 114742. July 17, 1997.
FACTS:
Carlitos E. Silva, a married businessman, and Suzanne T. Gonzales,
an unmarried local actress, cohabited without the benefit of marriage.
They had two children, Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia. Not long after,
a rift in their relationship surfaced. It began when Suzanne decided to
resume her acting career over Carlitos’ vigorous objections. However,
Suzanne stated that she had never stopped working throughout their
relationship. With this, the two eventually parted ways.
In February 1986, Suzanne refused to allow Carlitos to have their
children in his company on weekends. Carlitos led a petition for
custodial rights over the children before the RTC. The petition was
opposed by Suzanne who averred that Carlitos was often engaged in
"gambling and womanizing" which she feared could affect the moral
and social values of the children.
During the course of the case, Suzanne got married to a Dutch national.
The newlyweds emigrated to Holland with Ramon Carlos and Rica
Natalia.
Decisions of the RTC and CA
• RTC granted Carlitos’ petition directing Suzanne to allow
visitorial rights to his children during Saturdays and/or Sundays
with the condition of obtaining first a written consent of Suzanne
that Carlitos can take their children out. Carlitos appeared
somehow satisfied with the judgment because only Suzanne
appealed the RTC's order to the Court of Appeals.
• CA ruled in favor of Suzanne in denying Carlitos his visitorial
rights over his children. Citing Article 8 of P.D. 603 which states
that: In all questions, regarding the care, custody, education and
property of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount
consideration — not the welfare of the parents, the CA firmly
stated:
children if we put a stop to the rotation of custody of said
children. Allowing these children to stay with their mother on
weekdays and then with their father and the latter's live-in
partner on weekends may not be conducive to a normal up-
bringing of children of tender age.
The children concerned are still in their early formative years of
life. The molding of the character of the child starts at home. A
home with only one parent. is more normal than two separate
houses — (house where one parent lives and another house
where the other parent with another woman/man lives). After all,
under Article 176 of the Family Code, illegitimate children are
supposed to use the surname of and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother.”
ISSUE:
Whether a non-custodial parent has the right of access to his or her
children (visitation right)
RULING:
YES. A non-custodial parent should be granted visitorial rights over his
or her children. There is enough recognition on the inherent and natural
right of parents over their children. The Supreme Court laid down
specific provisions:
• Article 150 of the Family Code expresses that "family relations
include those . . . (2) between parents and children; . . .”
• Article 209, in relation to Article 220, of the Code states that it is
the natural right and duty of parents and those exercising
parental authority to, among other things, keep children in their
company and to give them love and affection, advice and
counsel, companionship and understanding.
• The Constitution itself speaks in terms of the " natural and
primary rights" of parents in the rearing of the youth.
• Then, too, and most importantly, in the declaration of nullity of
marriages, a situation that presupposes a void or in existent
marriage, Article 49 of the Family Code provides for appropriate
visitation rights to parents who are not given custody of their
children.

There is nothing conclusive to indicate that these provisions are meant
to solely address themselves to legitimate relationships. Indeed,
although in varying degrees, the laws on support and successional
rights, by way of examples, clearly go beyond the legitimate members
of the family and so explicitly encompass illegitimate relationships as
well. There is no doubt that in all cases involving a child, his interest
and welfare is always the paramount consideration.
The Court appreciates the apprehensions of Suzanne and her well-
meant concern for their children. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that
Carlitos would have ulterior motives or undue designs more than a
parent's natural desire to be able to call on, even if it were only on brief
visits, his own children. The trial court, in any case, has seen it to
understandably provide this precautionary measure, i.e., "in no case
(can petitioner) take out the children without the written consent of the
mother."
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the RTC was reinstated.
ANTONIO A. S. VALDES, petitioner v. RTC and CONSUELO M.
GOMEZ-VALDES, respondents.
G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996.
FACTS:
Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on January 5,
1971. They had five children. Antonio sought the declaration of nullity
of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. After hearing
the parties following the joinder of issues, the trial court granted the
petition stating that
• Antonio and Consuelo’s marriage was declared null and void
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
• The three older children, Carlos Enrique III, Antonio Quintin and
Angela Rosario shall choose which parent they would want to
stay with.
• Stella Eloisa and Joaquin Pedro shall be placed in the custody
of Consuelo Gomez.
• Antonio and Consuelo shall have visitation rights over the
children who are in the custody of the other.
• Antonio and Consuelo are directed to start proceedings of their
common properties as defined in Article 147 of the Family Code
and to comply with the provisions of Articles 50, 51, and 52 of
the Family Code.
Consuelo sought a clarification of the decision directing compliance
with Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the Family Code. She asserted that the
Family Code contained no provisions on the procedure for the
liquidation of common property in "unions without marriage."
The trial court made the following clarification:
"Consequently, considering that Article 147 of the Family Code
explicitly provides that the property acquired by both parties
during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are
presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the
parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and
defendant will own their “family home” and all their other
properties for that matter in equal shares. In the liquidation and
partition of the properties owned in common by the plaintiff and
defendant, the provisions on co-ownership found in the Civil
Code shall apply.”
In addressing, specifically, the issue regarding the disposition of the
family dwelling, the trial court said:
"Considering that this Court has already declared the marriage
between petitioner and respondent as null and void ab initio,
pursuant to Art. 147, the property regime of petitioner and
respondent shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
The provisions of Articles 102 and 129 of the Family Code finds
no application since Article 102 refers to the procedure for the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership property and Article 129
refers to the procedure for the liquidation of the absolute
community property.”
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the order, but the trial court
denied the motion.
ISSUE:
What property regime will govern void marriages?
RULING:
The rule of co-ownership shall govern void marriages. In a void
marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the
parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions
of Article 147 or Article 148, as the case may be, of the Family Code.
The first paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code, applying
paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43, relates only, by its explicit
terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages
under Article 40 of the Code, i.e. the declaration of nullity of a
subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage
before the latter is judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule
that somehow recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void
marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and no judicial decree
is necessary to establish their nullity.
Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted
and so applied in previous cases. This peculiar kind of co-ownership
applies when a man and a woman, suffering no legal impediment to
marry each other, so exclusively live together as husband and wife
under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. The term
"capacitated" in the first paragraph of Art. 147 refers to the legal
capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e. any "male or female of the
age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments
mentioned in Articles 37 and 38" of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through
their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-
ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie
presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who
did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be
considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family household." Unlike
the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's separate
property are not included in the co-ownership.
WHEREFORE, the Supreme Court AFFIRMED the trial court’s ruling.
ENRICO L. PACETE, CLARITA DE LA CONCEPCION, et. al,
petitioners v. HON. GLICERIO V. CARRIAGA, JR. and
CONCEPCION (CONCHITA) ALANIS PACETE, respondents.
G.R. No. 53880. March 17, 1994.
FACTS:
On October 29, 1979, Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint for the
declaration of nullity of the marriage between her erstwhile husband
Enrico L. Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well as for legal
separation (between Alanis and Pacete), accounting and separation of
property.
In her complaint, she averred the following:
• She was married to Enrico Pacete on April 30, 1938 in Cotabato
and had a child named Consuelo.
• In 1948, Enrico subsequently contracted a second marriage
with Clarita de la Concepcion, which she only learned of only on
August 1, 1979.
• During her marriage to Enrico, the latter acquired vast property
consisting of large tracts of land, fishponds and several motor
vehicles and he fraudulently placed the several pieces of
property either in his name and Clarita or in the names of his
children with Clarita and other "dummies”.
• Enrico ignored overtures for an amicable settlement and that
reconciliation between her and Enrico was impossible since he
evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita.
Enrico and the others were each served with summons on November
15, 1979. They filed a motion for an extension of twenty (20) days from
30 November 1979 within which to file an answer. The court granted
the motion.
On December 18, 1979, appearing through a new counsel, Enrico and
the others filed a second motion for an extension of another thirty (30)
days from December 20, 1979.
On January 7, 1980, the lower court granted the motion but only for
twenty (20) days to be counted from December 20, 1979 or until
January 9, 1980. The Order of the court was mailed to Enrico's counsel
on January 11, 1980.
Likely still unaware of the court order, Enrico and the others on
February 5, 1980, again filed another motion (dated 18 January 1980)
for an extension of fifteen days counted from the expiration of the 30-
day period previously sought within which to file an answer. The
following day, or on February 6, 1980, the court denied this last motion
on the ground that it was "filed after the original period given as first
extension had expired."
Conchita, thereupon, filed a motion to declare Enrico and the others in
default, which the court granted. The trial court, ruling in favor of
Conchita, ordered that a Decree of Legal Separation be issued and
declared the disposal of their properties. Hence, Enrico and the others
filed a petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioners'
motion for extension of time to file their answer, in declaring petitioners
in default, and in rendering its decision which, among other things,
decreed the legal separation of petitioner Enrico L. Pacete and private
respondent Concepcion Alanis and held to be null and void ab initio the
marriage of Enrico L. Pacete to Clarita de la Concepcion
RULING:
Yes. The default order, unquestionably, is not legally sanctioned. The
Civil Code provides:
"Art. 101. No decree of legal separation shall be promulgated
upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In
case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall order
the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not a collusion
between the parties exists. If there is no collusion, the
prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to
take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated."
The provision has been taken from Article 30 of the California Civil
Code, and it is, in substance, reproduced in Article 60 of the Family
Code. Article 101 reflects the public policy on marriages, and it should
easily explain the mandatory tenor of the law.
In Brown v. Yambao, the Court has observed:
"The policy of Article 101 of the new Civil Code, calling for the
intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings
for legal separation (and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88),
is to emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract; that it is a
social institution in which the state is vitally interested, so that its
continuation or interruption cannot be made to depend upon the parties
themselves. It is consonant with this policy that the inquiry by the Fiscal
should be allowed to focus upon any relevant matter that may indicate
whether the proceedings for separation or annulment are fully justified
or not."
Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further
mandates that an action for legal separation must "in no case be tried
before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition,"
obviously in order to provide the parties a "cooling-off" period. In this
interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to
reconcile.
The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further
underscored by the inclusion of the following provision in Rule 18 of the
Rules of Court:
"Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulments of marriage or for
legal separation. — If the defendant in an action for annulment
of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall
order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a
collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no collusion,
to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence
submitted is not fabricated."
The special prescriptions on actions that can put the integrity of
marriage to possible jeopardy are impelled by no less than the State's
interest in the marriage relation and its avowed intention not to leave
the matter within the exclusive domain and the vagaries of the parties
to alone dictate.
WHEREFORE, petition for certiorari was hereby GRANTED. The ruling
of the trial court was SET ASIDE.
 LUCY SOMOSA-RAMOS, petitioner v. THE HONORABLE
CIPRIANO VAMENTA, JR., Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Oriental and CLEMENTE G. RAMOS,
respondents.
G.R. No. L-34132. July 29, 1972.
FACTS:
On June 18, 1971, petitioner Lucy filed a civil case in the sala of
respondent Judge against respondent Clemente for legal separation,
concubinage on the respondent's part and an attempt by him against
her life being alleged. Lucy likewise sought the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction for the return to her of what she
claimed to be her paraphernal and exclusive property, then under the
administration and management of respondent Clemente. Clemente
opposed to the hearing of the motion filed by Lucy based on Article 103
of the Civil Code. It was further manifested by Clemente in a pleading
that if the motion asking for preliminary mandatory injunction were
heard, the prospect of the reconciliation of the spouses would become
even more dim. Respondent Judge ordered the parties to submit their
respective memoranda on the matter. Then, on September 3, 1971,
Lucy received an order of respondent Judge granting the motion of
Clemente to suspend the hearing of the petition for a writ of mandatory
preliminary injunction. Lucy, then, filed a petition for certiorari
questioning the Order of the trial court in the suspension of the hearing
of the motion.
ISSUE:
Whether Article 103 of the Civil Code prohibiting the hearing of an
action for legal separation before the lapse of six months from the filing
of the petition, would likewise preclude the court from acting on a
motion for preliminary mandatory injunction applied for as an ancillary
remedy to such a suit
RULING:
No. Art. 103 of the Civil Code, which prohibits the hearing of an action
for legal separation before the lapse of six months from the filing of the
petition, is not an absolute bar to the hearing of a motion for preliminary
injunction prior to the expiration of the six-month period.
Respondent Judge, however, answered the question in the affirmative
in view of the absolute tenor of Article 103. He therefore ordered the
suspension, upon the plea of Clemente, of the hearing on a motion for
a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction filed by Lucy at the same time
the suit for legal separation was instituted. Lucy Somosa-Ramos, the
wife who brought the action for legal separation would dispute such a
ruling. Hence, this certiorari proceeding. However, there is justification
for such a move on the part of Lucy.
A suit for legal separation must be distinguished from an ordinary suit.
It involves a relationship in which the law for the best of reasons would
attach the quality of permanence. That there are times when domestic
felicity is much less than it ought to be is not of course to be denied.
Grievances, whether fancied or real, may be entertained by one or both
spouses. There may be constant bickering. The loss of affection on the
part of one or both may be discernible. Nonetheless, it will not serve
public interest, much less the welfare of the husband or the wife, to
allow them to go their respective ways. Where there are offspring, the
reason for maintaining the conjugal union is even more imperative. It is
a mark of realism of the law that for certain cases, adultery on the part
of the wife and concubinage on the part of the husband, or an attempt
of one spouse against the life of the other, it recognizes, albeit
reluctantly, that the couple is better off apart. A suit of legal separation
lies. Even then, the hope that the parties may settle their differences is
not all together abandoned. The healing balm of the time may aid in the
process. Hopefully, the guilty parties may mend his or her ways, and
the offended party may in turn exhibit magnanimity. Hence, the
interposition of a six-month period before an action for legal separation
is to be tried.
Article 103 of the Civil Code however remains cognizant of the need in
certain cases for judicial power to assert itself during the six-months'
ban on hearing. The question of management of the spouses'
respective property need not be left unresolved even during such six-
month period. An administrator may even be appointed for the
management of the property of the conjugal partnership. The absolute
limitation from which the court suffers under the preceding article is
hereby eased. The parties may in the meanwhile be heard.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari was GRANTED.