G.R. No. 181435
"23 Hence, the LRA recommended that the CENRO of
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROSARIO L. NICOLAS
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed by the Republic
of the Philippines to assail the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision2 and Resolution3 in CA-GR. CV No. 81678. The CA
affirmed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision,4 which granted
the Petition5 filed by respondent Rosario L. Nicolas for the
registration of title to a parcel of land located in Barangay
(Brgy.) San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal.6 The appellate court agreed
with the conclusion of the RTC that respondent had convincingly
established her ownership of the land and was therefore
entitled to judicial confirmation and registration of title. 7
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
On 22 March 1996, respondent filed a Petition before the RTC of
San Mateo, Rizal,8 seeking to register her title over Lot 2 of
Survey Plan Psu-213331, a parcel of land located in Brgy. San
Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal, with an area of 118,448 square
meters.9 She asserted that she was entitled to confirmation and
registration of title, as she had been in "natural, open, public,
adverse, continuous, uninterrupted" possession of the land in
the concept of an owner since October 1964.10
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed an Opposition 11 to the
Petition. It contended that (a) neither respondent nor her
predecessors-ininterest had been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession of the land since 12 June 1945;12 (b)
the Tax Declarations attached to the Petition did not constitute
sufficient evidence of the acquisition or possession of the
property;13 (c) respondent failed to apply for registration of title
within six months from 16 February 1976 as required by
Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 892;14 and (d) the land in question
was part of the public domain and not subject to private
appropriation.15
After the conduct of proceedings to confirm compliance with
jurisdictional requisites,16 the RTC directed respondent to submit
documents to establish that (a) the property that was the
subject of the application for registration of title was not
covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program of the
Government; (b) there were no tenants on the property; and (c)
the land was not subject to any homestead, free patent, or grant
of title from the Land Registration Authority (LRA), the Bureau of
Lands, or the Department of Agrarian Reform.17 Respondent was
also directed to begin the presentation of her evidence.18
In line with this directive, the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) submitted a Report19 on the
results of its verification of the existing records on the subject
property. The Report stated that the land "appears to be [n]ot
covered by any public land application nor embraced by any
administrative title."20 However, the entry with respect to
whether the land was within the alienable and disposable zone
was left blank with a notation that the area was "not projected
due to [u]navailability of coordinates re[:] Tala Estate Tie-Line."21
The LRA likewise submitted a Report22 stating that it "was not in
a position to verify whether or not the parcel of land subject of
registration is already covered by land patent and is within the
area classified as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.
Antipolo, Rizal, be ordered to submit a report on the status of
the land.24 This proposal was adopted by the RTC in an
Order25 dated 28 December 1998.
During trial, respondent presented three witnesses to prove her
right to register the property: Leonila Alfaro, her daughter and
attorney-in-fact, who testified that respondent had occupied the
land since 1940 and had paid the real estate taxes therefor since
1969;26 Santiago Eulin, who was allegedly hired by respondent to
plant vegetables and fruit trees on the land and who acted as its
caretaker since 1942;27 and Roberto M. Valdez of the LRA, who
identified the original tracing cloth plan for the property.28
The following documents were likewise submitted to the trial
court: Survey Plan PSU-213331,29 a Surveyor's Certificate30 and
technical descriptions of the property,31 which purportedly
proved that the land had been duly surveyed by the Land
Management Sector; various Tax Declarations and
receipts;32 and a Certification issued by the CENRO that the land
applied for was not covered by any public land application.33
Petitioner, on the other hand, decided to have the case
submitted for resolution without any further submission. 34
THE RULING OF THE RTC
In a Decision dated 31 July 2002, the RTC granted the Petition
and ordered the issuance of a Decree of Registration in favor of
respondent.35 It declared that she had acquired ownership of the
land by way of open, continuous, public, adverse, actual
and bona fide possession in the concept of an owner since
1940.36
Petitioner appealed the RTC Decision to the CA. In the
Appellant's Brief,37 the Republic argued that respondent had
failed to clearly and convincingly establish that she had actual,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the property
since 12 June 1945 or earlier as required by Section 14(1) of P.D.
1529 or the Property Registration Decree.38 Petitioner further
asserted that there was no basis for the finding of the RTC that
she had occupied the land since 1940.39
Respondent failed to file an appellee's brief.40 Consequently, the
CA considered the case submitted for resolution.41
THE RULING OF THE CA
On 23 August 2007, the CA dismissed petitioner's
appeal.42 According to the appellate court, the evidence
presented proved that respondent had occupied the land since
1940. Even assuming that her possession of the property started
only when she had it privately surveyed in 1964, she had been
its occupant for more than 30 years.43 As such, she was still
entitled to registration of title under Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529.
The CA further characterized the land as private property:
The fact that the subject land is covered by a private survey
(PSU) (EXH. "J") way back in 1964, which survey was approved
on April 1965 by Director Nicanor Jorge of the then Bureau of
Lands, is a clear indication that it is already private in nature.
Moreover, applicant's evidence consisting of the DENR-CENRO
Certifications (Exhs. "O" and "P") that Lot 2 of PSY 213331 is not
covered by any public land application and that its equivalent is
Lot No, 10549 of the Montalban Cadastre have substantial
probative value which established (sic) that the land is alienable
and disposable and not covered by any land grant from the
government.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Decision.44 The CA,
however, denied the motion in a Resolution45 dated 22 January
2008, prompting petitioner to elevate the case to this Court.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THIS COURT
In its Petition for Review, the Republic argues that (a) the
decision of the CA and the RTC to confirm the title of respondent
to the land based on her possession and occupation thereof was
not supported by evidence; and (b) the testimonial and
documentary evidence she presented did not establish
possession of the property in the manner and period required by
law, that is, her possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or
earlier. Petitioner also emphasizes that the lower courts gave
undue importance to the Tax Declarations and receipts
presented,46 as well as to the testimonies of respondent's
witnesses, notwithstanding the inconsistencies in their
statements.
On 26 September 2008, respondent filed a Manifestation and
Comment47 in which she pointed out that the grounds relied
upon by petitioner all pertain to allegedly erroneous findings of
fact. She argued that these grounds could not be raised in a Rule
45 proceeding; hence, the dismissal of the petition was
warranted.48
Petitioner reiterate its arguments in its RepIy49 and
Memorandum50 filed on 17 March 2009 and 19 February 2010,
respectively.
ISSUES
Based on the submissions of the parties and the Decisions of the
CA and the RTC, two issues are presented for resolution by this
Court:
(1) Whether the CA erroneously allowed the judicial
confirmation of respondent's title to the property under Section
14(1) of P.D. 1529; and
(2) Whether the CA erred in declaring that respondent is likewise
entitled to registration of title based on ownership by acquisitive
prescription under Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529.
OUR RULING
We GRANT the Petition.
Applications for registration of title to land, both public and
private, are governed by Section 14 of P.D. 1529:
SECTION 14. Who May Apply. -The following persons may file in
the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration
of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or
abandoned river beds by right of accession or accretion under
the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other
manner provided for by law.
Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall file
the application jointly.
Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro, the vendor
a retro may file an application for the original registration of the
land, provided, however, that should the period for redemption
expire during the pendency of the registration proceedings and
ownership to the property consolidated in the vendee a retro,
the latter shall be substituted for the applicant and may
continue the proceedings.
A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original
registration of any land held in trust by him, unless prohibited by
the instrument creating the trust.
Each paragraph of Section 14 refers to a distinct type of
application depending on the applicable legal ground. Since each
type is governed by its own set of legal principles, the
framework for analysis to be used in resolving an application
would vary depending on the paragraph invoked.51 Hence, it is
important for the Court to first determine the exact legal ground
used by an applicant for registration.52
In this case, we note that the application filed by respondent
before the RTC did not state the exact legal basis of her request.
At best, the pleading implied that her claim was one for
registration and confirmation of title based on
her possession and occupation of the property:
COMES NOW Petitioner Rosario L. Nicolas, of legal age, widow,
Pilipino [sic] with address at Brgy. San Isidro, Rodriguez (formerly
Montalban), Rizal Province, Philippines, by her undersigned
counsel and to this Honorable Court respectfully petitions to
have the land hereinafter described below brought under the
operation of the Land Registration Act and to have said land
titled, registered and confirmed in her name and further
declares that:
xxxx
6. Petitioner acquired the subject parcel of land by way of
occupation and has been in natural, open, public, adverse,
contin[u]ous, uninterrupted and in the concept of an
owner/possessor thereof since October 1964 up to the
present.53 (Emphases supplied)
From the foregoing allegations, it appears that the claim of
respondent is anchored on either of the first two paragraphs of
Section 14. However, it is unclear whether she sought judicial
confirmation and registration of her title pursuant to Section
14(1) of P.D. 1529, or of the registration of her title on the
ground of acquisitive prescription under Section 14(2) of the
same law.
Similarly, no specific provision in P.D. 1529 was identified by the
RTC when it granted the Petition.54 Its mention of the Civil Code,
however, seems to indicate an application of the principle of
acquisitive prescription. The CA, for its part, delineated the
differences between the first two paragraphs of Section 14, but
decided to apply both clauses. In its Decision, it ruled that
respondent is entitled to register her title under either
paragraph:
From the evidence adduced, applicant-appellee has convincingly
established her registrable title to the subject land, which is
entitled to confirmation and registration by the trial court. As
testified by the daughter of applicant, her mother commenced
occupying the subject land since 1940 and up to the present
which (sic) has been planted with fruit-bearing trees and
vegetables by their caretaker. Her testimony was corroborated
by Santiago Eulin, their caretaker since 1942 who took over after
his father, the original caretaker. These witnesses declared that
they even stayed on the land in question where the applicant
has a hut. It was also established that the applicant had the
property surveyed in 1964 resulting in the approval of Plan PS U
213 31 by the Bureau of Lands. This qualifies applicant under
Section 14, par. 1 of the Property Registration Decree.
Even assuming that applicant's occupation and possession of the
subject land did not start on July 12, 1945 or earlier but only in
1964 when she had it surveyed, still she can apply for
registration of title under Sec. 14, par. 2 of the Property
Registration Decree as she has been occupying the land
continuously for more than thirty (30) years from the time the
application was filed in 1996.55 (Emphases supplied)
Given these findings, the Court has examined the application for
registration in this case under the legal framework
of both Section 14(1) and (2) of P.D. 1529. We find that
respondent has failed to sufficiently establish the requisites of
both paragraphs; in particular, with respect to the classification
and the character of the land in question. Hence, we are
constrained to reverse the CA and the RTC Decisions allowing
the registration of her title to the property.
Respondent has failed to prove that the property is alienable and
disposable agricultural land that may be registered under Section
14(1) of P.D. 1529.
Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529 governs applications for registration
of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. This
paragraph operationalizes Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act
No. 141 as amended.56 This provision grants occupants of public
land the right to judicial confirmation of their title. Based on
these two provisions and other related sections of C.A. 141,
registration is allowed provided the following requisites have
been complied with:
1. The applicant is a Filipino citizen.57
2. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-in-
interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the property since 12 June 1945.58
3. The prope1ty has been declared alienable and disposable as
of the filing of the application.59
4. If the area applied for does not exceed 12 hectares, the
application should be filed by 31 December 2020. 60
As earlier stated, respondent failed to establish the third
requisite, i.e., that the property subject of the application is
alienable and disposable agricultural land.
The Court has emphasized in a long line of cases61 that an
applicant for registration under Section 14(1) must prove that
the subject property has been classified as alienable and
disposable agricultural land by virtue of a positive act of the
Executive Department. In Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic, 62 we
declared:
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two
categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those
classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the
Civil Code, without limitation; and (b) lands of the public
domain, or the public lands as provided by the Constitution, but
with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural.
Consequently, lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or
national parks are not susceptible of alienation or disposition
unless they are reclassified as agricultural. A positive act of the
Government is necessary to enable such reclassification, and the
exclusive prerogative to classify public lands under existing laws
is vested in the Executive Department, not in the courts. xxx
Thus, until the Executive Department exercises its prerogative to
classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or the President
declares that the State no longer intends the land to be used for
public service or for the development of national wealth, the
Regalian Doctrine is applicable.
In this case, we note that both the RTC and the CA glossed over
this requirement. The RTC, for instance, only made a general
conclusion as to the classification and alienability of the
property, but without any discussion of the evidence presented:
From the evidence adduced, applicant-appellee has convincingly
established her registrable title to the subject land which is
entitled to confirmation and registration by the trial court. x x x
It was also established that the applicant had the property
surveyed in 1964 resulting in the approval of Plan PSU-213331
by the Bureau of Lands. This qualifies applicant under Sec. 14,
par. 1 of the Property Registration Decree.63
The CA, on the other hand, simply relied on the fact that the
property had been the subject of a private survey in 1964:
From the evidence adduced, the following facts have been duly
proved:
xxxx
That the land applied for is neither subject to any water, oil/nor
(sic) mineral rights, not within any government reservation,
naval or military, or mineral rights, within the forest zone, and
neither is it part of the inalienable or undisposable land of the
public domain nor covered by the Code on Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform or subject to any subsisting Public Patent
application;
 xxxx
That the said parcel of land applied for is duly surveyed for
registration (Exh. "J"), classified as agricultural; that they planted
mangoes, buko, sometimes corn in the area through their
caretaker x x x.64
While a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is
generally limited to a review of errors of law, the Court may
conduct its own review of the evidence if the findings of the
lower courts are bereft of legal and factual bases.65 In this case,
the conclusions of the RTC and the CA are not only contradicted
by the evidence on record; they are likewise contrary to law and
jurisprudence. As a result, the Court is constrained to set aside
these pronouncements.
To prove that the property subject of an application for original
registration is part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, applicants must "identify a positive act of the
government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying
inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or
other purposes."66 To sufficiently establish this positive act, they
must submit (1) a certification from the CENRO or the Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO); and (2) a
copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of
the official records.67
Here, respondent presented the following pieces of evidence to
establish her claim that the land had been classified as
agricultural and considered alienable and disposable:
(1) A CENRO Report68 stating that the land was not covered by
any public land application or embraced by any administrative
title, but with a notation that that the alienability of the land
was "[n]ot projected due to [u]navailability of coordinates re:
Tala Estate Tieline'';
(2) A CENRO Certification69 that the lot "is not covered by any
kind of public land application";
(3) A Report70 from the Land Registration Authority (LRA)
declaring that it was "not in a position to verify whether or not
the parcel of land subject of registration is already covered by
land patent and is within the area classified as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain"; and
(4) The testimonies of Leonila Alfaro,71 her daughter, and
Santiago Eulin72 (the caretaker of the land) confirming that the
property is agricultural in nature.
It is evident from the foregoing enumeration that respondent
not only neglected to submit the required CENRO/PENRO
certification and DENR classification, but also presented
evidence that completely failed to prove her assertion.
First, the testimonies of Leonila and Santiago on the
classification of the land have very little evidentiary value. That
they consider the property agricultural in nature is irrelevant, as
their statements are mere opinions bereft of any legal
significance.
Second, none of the documents submitted by respondent to the
trial court indicated that the subject property was agricultural or
part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
At most, the CENRO Report and Certification stated that the land
was not covered by any kind of public land application. This was
far from an adequate proof of the classification of the land. In
fact, in Republic v Lualhati, 73 the Court rejected an attempt to
prove the alienability of public land using similar evidence:
Here, respondent failed to establish, by the required evidence,
that the land sought to be registered has been classified as
alienable or disposable land of the public domain. The records of
this case merely bear certifications from the DENR-CENRO,
Region IV, Antipolo City, stating that no public land application
or land patent covering the subject lots is pending nor are the
lots embraced by any administrative title. Said CENRO
certifications, however, do not even make any pronouncement
as to the alienable character of the lands in question for they
merely recognize the absence of any pending land patent
application, administrative title, or government project being
conducted thereon. But even granting that they expressly
declare that the subject lands form part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, these certifications
remain insufficient for purposes of granting respondent's
application for registration. As constantly held by this Court, it is
not enough for the CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and
disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that
the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and
released the land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable, and that the land subject of the application for
registration falls within the approved area per verification
through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. Unfortunately for
respondent, the evidence submitted clearly falls short of the
requirements for original registration in order to show the
alienable character of the lands subject herein.
Applying these standards to the instant case, we declare that the
RTC did not have sufficient basis for its finding that the property
in question was alienable and disposable.
The Court also finds that the ruling of the CA on the evidentiary
value of the private survey is untenable. The fact that the land
has been privately surveyed is not sufficient to prove its
classification or alienable character. While the conduct of a
survey and the submission of the original tracing cloth plan are
mandatory requirements for applications for original registration
of land under P.D. 1529, they only serve to establish the true
identity of the land and to ensure that the property does not
overlap with another one covered by a previous
registration.74 These documents do not, by themselves, prove
a1ienability and disposability of the property. In fact, in several
cases,75 the Court has declared that even a survey plan with a
notation that the property is alienable cannot be considered as
sufficient evidence of alienability. Here, the survey plan and
original tracing cloth plan submitted by respondent does not
even bear that notation. Consequently, it was grave error for the
CA to consider the mere conduct of a private survey as proof of
the classification and the alienability of the land.
Respondent has failed to prove that the land subject of the
application is part of the patrimonial property of the State that
may be acquired by prescription under Section 14(2) of P.D.
1529.
As previously noted, the CA also allowed the registration of the
property under Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529 based on the
following findings: (1) the property is "private in nature" as
shown by the fact that it is "covered by a private survey";76 (2)
respondent had occupied the land continuously for more than
30 years from the time of the filing of the application in
1996;77 and (3) the land is not covered by any public land
application based on the DENR-CENRO Certifications submitted
by respondent.78
We do not agree. The Court fields no sufficient basis to allow the
registration of the property under Section 14(2).
By express provision of the law, only private lands that have
been acquired by prescription under existing laws may be the
subject of applications for registration under Section 14(2). The
starting point of the Court's evaluation must, therefore, be
whether the property involved falls within the scope of the
paragraph.
Under the Civil Code, all things within human commerce are
generally susceptible of prescription.79 Properties of the public
dominion, or those owned by the State, are expressly excluded
by law from this general rule,80 unless they are proven to
be patrimonial in character. As the Court explained in Republic
of the Philippines v. Tan:
Only private property can be acquired by prescription. Property
of public dominion is outside the commerce of man.1âwphi1 It
cannot be the object of prescription because prescription does
not run against the State in its sovereign capac.ty. However,
when property of public dominion is no longer intended for
public use or for public service, it becomes part of the
patrimonial property of the State. When this happens, the
property is withdrawn from public dominion and becomes
property of private ownership, albeit still owned by the State.
The property is now brought within the commerce of man and
becomes susceptible to the concepts of legal possession and
prescription.81 (Emphasis supplied)
To establish that the land subject of the application has been
converted into patrimonial property of the State, an applicant
must prove the following:
l. The subject property has been classified as agricultural land.82
2. The property has been declared alienable and disposable.83
3. There is an express government manifestation that the
property is already patrimonial, or is no longer retained for
public service or the development of national wealth.84
It must be emphasized that without the concurrence of these
three conditions, the land remains part of public dominion and
thus incapable of acquisition by prescription.85
Here, the records show that respondent has failed to allege or
prove that the subject land belongs to the patrimonial property
of the State.1âwphi1 As earlier discussed, the evidence she has
presented does not even show that the property is alienable and
disposable agricultural land. She has also failed to cite any
government act or declaration converting the land into
patrimonial property of the State.
Contrary to the ruling of the CA, the DENR-CENRO Certifications
submitted by respondent are not enough; they cannot
substitute for the three conditions required by law as proof that
the land may be the subject of prescription under the Civil Code.
For the same reason, the mere conduct of a private survey of a
property - even with the approval of the Bureau of Lands - does
not convert the lot into private land or patrimonial property of
the State. Clearly, the appellate court erred when it relied on the
survey to justify its conclusion that the land is private in nature.
Considering the absence of sufficient evidence that the subject
land is a patrimonial property of the State, we must consider it
part of public dominion and thus immune from acquisitive
prescription.
As a final note, the Court must point out that proof of the
classification, alienability and disposability of the subject
property is of particular significance in applications for the
registration of land. Given the general rule that public lands may
not be alienated,86 it is the burden of applicants to prove that
the land they seek to register falls within the classifications
enumerated in Section 14 of P.D. 1529; in particular, the specific
paragraph they invoke as basis for registration.87 Absent that
proot: no length of possession or occupation would vest any
right of ownership over the property,88 and registration under
P.D. 1529 cannot be sanctioned by this Court.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of
Appeals Decision dated 23 August 2007 and Resolution dated 22
January 2008 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent's
application for land registration is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
56-58
Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 1073, states: SEC. 48. The following
described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Regional Trial Court of the province or city
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and
the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Property
Registration Decree, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious ro;;session and occupation of
alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, since June 12, 1945, except when prevented
by \\>ar orforce majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed ail rhe conditions essential
to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
60
C.A. 141, Section 47.
79-80
CIVIL CODE, Article 1113.
82
CONSTITUTION, Art. XII, Secs. 2 and 3.
83
C.A. 141, Section 6.
84-85
CIVIL CODE, Art. 422. Also see Heirs of Malabanan v
Republic, supra note 51.

G.R. No. 200894 November 10, 2014
LUZVIMINDA APRAN CANLAS vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
This resolves the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, assailing the decision 1 dated November 10,
2011 and resolution2 dated February 23, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision
dated January 30, 2008 in LRC Case No. N-06-0033 and dismissed
petitioner's application for registration of title:
We restate the pertinent facts in this case.
On August 22, 2006, petitioner Luzviminda A. Canlas (Canlas)
applied for the original registration of title, under Presidential
Decree No. 1529,4 of the 9,751-square-meter parcel of land
located in Barrio Macamot, Municipality of Binangonan,
Province of Rizal, and technically described as Cadastral Lot No.
11566, Psu-04-006561.5
There was no opposition to Canlas’ application. Respondent
Republic of the Philippines (Republic) did not submit its
comment or opposition despite the opportunity given by the
trial court.6 The case was then submitted for decision.7
The Regional Trial Court granted Canlas’ application8 and held
that:
We GRANT the application. We ORDER the Register of Deeds of
Rizal (Binangonan) to cause the registration of the property,
described in Cadastral Lot No. 11566 of the subdivision plan,
Psu-04-006561, in the name of the applicant Luzviminda A.
Canlas with the reservation that it shall be subject of easement
to public use. Once this judgment becomes final and executory,
we shall issue a decree of registration and then order the
issuance of an original certificate of title in her name. 9 (Emphasis
and underscoring in the original)
According to the trial court, Canlas complied with the procedural
requirements and substantiated her application.10 She
sufficiently proved that, through her predecessors-in-interest,
she has been in "open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of an alienable and disposable parcel of land of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership for more
than 30 years."11
The Republic of the Philippines, however, filed a notice of appeal
on February 29, 2008.12 Acting on the Republic’s appeal, the
Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the trial
court. The Court of Appeals held that Canlas was not able to
prove open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the property.13 According to the Court of Appeals,
Canlas failed to discharge the burden of proof placed on
applicants for land registration.14
The Court of Appeals also found that Canlas admitted during
cross examination that she has not resided on the property since
she got married in 1966 and left for San Francisco Del Monte,
Quezon City.15 During the same cross-examination, Canlas
contradicted her allegations in the application as to knowledge
of any mortgage, encumbrance, or interest of other persons in
the property in question.16 Moreover, she did not show "any
acts of occupation, development, cultivation or maintenance
over the property."17
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated
January 30, 2008 in LRC Case No. N-06-003 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, the Application of Registration of Title of
Luzviminda A. Canlas is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.18 (Emphasis in the original)
The Court of Appeals denied on February 23, 2012 Canlas’
December 7, 2011 motion for reconsideration.19
Canlas comes before this court, arguing that she has duly
overcome the burden of proof by showing open, continuous,
exclusive, adverse, and notorious possession and occupation of
the property. This is allegedly shown in the following acts of
Canlas and her predecessors-in-interest since the 1900’s:
declaring the property in their names, paying taxes due on the
property, having the property surveyed, and allowing the
excavation in the property for the retrieval and hauling of
"pulang lupa" for the making of clay pots.20
Canlas argued further that "residence" is not synonymous with
"possession and occupation" as implied by the Court of
Appeals.21 Presidential Decree No. 1529 does not require the
applicant to reside on the land being registered. 22 The law also
does not require that a relative of the applicant be present to
oversee the property.23
On March 4, 2013, this court resolved, among others, to require
the Republic to submit its comment, without necessarily giving
due course, within 10 days from notice.24
In its comment, the Republic argued that "[Canlas] failed to
present sufficient and convincing evidence to support her
application for registration of the subject parcel of
land."25 Canlas must offer more than a bare assertion of
possession and occupation.26
In addition, the property had been sporadically and irregularly
declared for tax purposes under the name of Honorio Apran
from 1949 until 1999.27 Realty taxes on the property were paid
only in 2003.28 The Republic observed that the tax declarations
presented by Canlas had been made a few months before the
application for registration was made and served only to
establish a weak claim for a registrable title for her. 29
On October 23, 2013, this court resolved to require Canlas to file
her reply.30 In her reply31 dated December 13, 2013, she claimed
that she "suddenly realized that she has a significant document
that she believes would . . . change the complexion of the instant
case."32 This document is the Land Registration Authority’s
report and motion dated May 12, 2009 and was allegedly
prepared after the Land Registration Authority’s receipt of the
trial court decision dated January 30, 2008.33
The Land Registration Authority, through its Director for
Registration,34 stated that the land described as Psu-04-006561
located in Barrio Macamot,35 Municipality of Bingangonan,
Province of Rizal, is found entirely within the land denominated
as Lot 16 of the subdivision plan Psd-240150 covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. M-00861 and is under the name of
the "Heirs of Francisco Guido and Hermogenes Guido."36
TCT No. M-00861 was derived from a mother title, TCT No.
23377,37 which was the subject of Republic v. Court of Appeals
and Guido, et al.38 The case stemmed from a complaint, filed by
the Republic of the Philippines, for declaration of nullity of
Decree No. 6145, the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 23377,
and all titles derived from the decree.39 The Republic also prayed
that the land covered by the decree be declared in its name,
except those parcels of land validly acquired by third persons.
According to the Republic, Decree No. 6145 was spurious and
false and, in turn, the reconstituted TCT No. 23377, aswell as the
derivative titles, was invalid.40 Both the trial court and the Court
of Appeals found that Decree No. 6145 and TCT No. 23377 were
genuine and authentic.41
This court in Republicupheld the authenticity and validity of
Decree No. 6145 and TCT No. 23377. However, in affirming
respondent heirs’ title, this court recognized the waiver of
certain parts of the land covered by TCT No. 23377 in favor of
bona fide occupants. The court held that: Moreover, conscious
of the resulting "large scale dispossession and social
displacement of several hundreds of bona fide occupants and
their families" which the Solicitor General pointed out, the
private respondent agreed unanimously to accept the
alternative prayer of the petitioner in their joint memorandum
(pp. 624–636, Rollo). This agreement by private respondents
takes the form of a waiver. Though a valid and clear right over
the property exists in their favors, they seemingly have
voluntarily abandoned the same in favor of: 1) those who
possessed and actually occupied specific portions and obtained
torrens certificates of titles, and 2) those who possessed certain
specific portions for such lengths of time as to amount to full
ownership. The waiver, not being contrary to law, morals, good
customs and good policy, isvalid and binding on the private
respondents.
However, with respect to the second set of possessors, whose
alleged bona fide occupancy of specific portions of the property
is not evidenced by Torrens Titles, it is imperative that their
claims/occupancy be duly proven in an appropriate proceeding.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
No. 12933 is AFFIRMED subject to the herein declared superior
rights of bona fide occupants with registered titles within the
area covered by the questioned decree and bona fide occupants
therein with length of possession which had ripened to
ownership, the latter to be determined in an appropriate
proceeding.
SO ORDERED.42 (Emphasis supplied)
Citing the case above, the Land Registration Authority prayed
the following before the trial court in its report and motion:
WHEREFORE,it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to
issue an order (1) directing the Register of Deeds of Rizal,
Binangonan, Rizal to annotate on TCT No. M-2106the following
memorandum:
By virtue of the decision of the Court dated January 30, 2008 in
Land Reg. Case No. 06-003, LRC Record No. N-78156,
LUZVIMINDA A. CANLAS, applicant, Psu-04-006561, has been
adjudicated in favor of the applicant and pursuant to the
decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 84966, promulgated
on November 21, 1991, entitled Republic of the Philippines vs.
Court of Appeals and Antonina Guido, et al., (204 SCRA160),
afore-said [sic] lot is deemed excluded from this certificate of
title.
and (2) Authorizing this Authority to issue the corresponding
decree of registration for the land embraced in plan Psu-04-
006561, in accordance with the adjudication of the Honorable
Court in its decision January 30, 2008.43 (Emphasis and italics in
the original)
According to Canlas, she falls under the second set of possessors
described in Republic — bona fide occupants whose possession
of specific portions for such lengths of time amounted to full
ownership but whose occupancy must be duly provedin
appropriate proceedings.44
In sum, Canlas changed the theory of her case from an
application for original registration of land, to a declaration of a
right to an indefeasible registrable title of the land described in
plan Psu-04-006561 and covered by TCT No. 23377.
Despite the change in Canlas’ theory, the main issues to be
resolved are: 1) whether petitioner Luzviminda A. Canlas has
proven open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of the land described in plan Psu-04-006561; and
2) whether Psu-04-006561 is covered by TCT No. 23377 wherein
she is one of the bona fide occupants whose possession and
occupation ripened into an indefeasible right to title as
pronounced in Republic.
After considering the parties’ arguments and the records of this
case, this court resolves to grant the petition. The assailed
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals are reversed and
set aside. The case is remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings with regard to the determination of whether Psu-
04-006561 is covered by TCT No. 23377.
At the outset, the issue on sufficiency of evidence is factual in
nature and is generally outside the province of this court’s
review of petitions under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.45 However, exceptions are allowed when the findings of
the trial court and Court of Appeals are conflicting with each
other46 or when the assailed judgment isbased on a
misapprehension of facts,47 such as the case at bar.
Section 14 of Presidential Decree No. 152948 or the Property
Registration Decree governs the applications for registration of
title to land:
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in
the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration
of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
 1945, or earlier. (2) Those who have acquired
ownership of private lands by prescription under the
provision of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands
or abandoned river beds by right of accession or
accretion under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any
other manner provided for by law. Where the land is
owned in common, all the co-owners shall file the
application jointly.
Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 proceeds from
Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 or The Public Land
Act, as amended, which provides for the grant of the substantive
right of title to land to qualified persons:
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
of the province where the land is located for confirmation of
their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
....
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-
ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and, occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, since June 12, 1945, immediately preceding the filing
of the application for confirmation of title, except when
prevented by war or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter. (As amended by P.D. 1073.)
In land registration cases, the applicants’ legal basis is important
in determining the required number of years or the reference
point for possession or prescription. This court has delineated
the differences in the modes of acquiring imperfect titles under
Section 14 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. Heirs of Mario
Malabanan v. Republic49 extensively discussed the distinction
between Section 14(1) and Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree
No. 1529. Thus, this court laid down rules to guide the public:
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act recognizes and confirms that "those who by
themselves or through their predecessors in interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12,
1945" have acquired ownership of, and registrable title
to, such lands based on the length and quality of their
possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires
possession since 12 June 1945 and does not
require that the lands should have been
alienable and disposable during the entire
period of possession, the possessor is entitled
to secure judicial confirmation of his title
thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and
disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed
by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.
(b) The right to register granted under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act is further
confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code,
prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring
ownership of patrimonial property. However, public
domain lands become only patrimonial property not
only with a declaration that these are alienable or
disposable. There must also be an express government
manifestation that the property isalready patrimonial
or no longer retained for public service or the
development of national wealth, under Article 422 of
the Civil Code. And only when the property has become
patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the
acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to
run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of
the government. The person [who] acquires
ownership of patrimonial property by
prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to
secure registration thereof under Section 14(2)
of the Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by
which patrimonial property may be acquired,
one ordinary and [the] other extraordinary.
Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a
person acquires ownership of a patrimonial
property through possession for at least ten
(10) years, in good faith and with just title.
Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a
person’s uninterrupted adverse possession of
patrimonial property for at least thirty (30)
years, regardless of good faith or just title,
ripens into ownership.50
In Republic v. Gielczyk,51 this court summarized and affirmed the
differences between Section 14(1) and Section 14(2) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529 as discussed in Heirs of
Malabanan:
In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, the Court further
clarified the difference between Section 14(1) and Section 14(2)
of P.D. No. 1529. The former refers to registration of title on the
basis of possession, while the latter entitles the applicant to the
registration of his property on the basis of prescription.
Registration under the first mode is extended under the aegis of
the P.D. No. 1529 and the Public Land Act (PLA) while under the
second mode is made available both by P.D. No. 1529 and the
Civil Code. Moreover, under Section 48(b) of the PLA, as
amended by Republic Act No. 1472, the 30-year period is in
relation to possession without regard to the Civil Code, while
under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, the 30-year period involves
extraordinary prescription under the Civil Code, particularly
Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137.52
In this case, neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals
clarified under which paragraph of Section 14 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529 the land was being registered. However,
petitioner’s allegations in the application filed on August 22,
2006 established Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529
as her legal basis.53
An applicant for land registration or judicial confirmation of
incomplete or imperfect title under Section 14(1) of Presidential
Decree No. 1529 must prove the following requisites:"(1) that
the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands
of the public domain, and (2) that [the applicant has] been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier."54 Concomitantly, the burden to
prove these requisites rests on the applicant.55 With regard to
the first requisite, it is undisputed that the land subject of
registration is part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain. The trial court found the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources’ report sufficient to prove
the existence of the first requisite.56 The Court of Appeals’
decision was silent on this matter. Respondent failed to make
objections on the issue as well. Thus, we do not see any reason
to deviate from the findings of the lower courts.
As to the second requisite, petitioner claims that she "by herself,
and through [her] predecessors-in-interest, had since June 12,
1945 or earlier[,] been in open[,] continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the . . . parcel of land."57 However, the
Court of Appeals found that petitioner failed to prove with
sufficient evidence her open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the land. Likewise,
respondent argued that petitioner’s allegations ofpossession
and occupation were mere conclusions and unsubstantiated.
Petitioner has sufficiently overcome the burden of proof
required in a judicial confirmation of incomplete or imperfect
title to land.
Contrary to respondent’s arguments, the trial court specifically
found that petitioner’s possession and occupation, through her
predecessors-ininterest, started earlier than June12, 1945. The
trial court found:
Applicant’s evidence shows that she complied with the notice
requirements (Exhibits "A" to ["]M,"inclusive of submarkings)
and she was able to substantiate the allegations in her
application (Exhibits "N" to "II," inclusive of submarkings). In a
nutshell, applicant acquired the property by inheritance from
Honorio and Gregorio S. Apran and she and her predecessors-in-
interest have been in its continuous possession since
1900(Exhibits "Q" to "HH," inclusive of submarkings). . . . The
testimonies of the applicant and her witnesses proved that the
applicant through her predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of an
alienable and disposable parcel of land of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership for more than 30
years.After considering the report and the evidence, we find that
the applicant has sufficient title proper for registration, and we
render judgment confirming it.58 (Emphasis and italics supplied)
Possession involves committing acts of dominion over a parcel of
land in such a way that an owner would perform over his or her
property.59 In explaining the nature of the terms "possession and
occupation" provided in law, this court has held that:
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words
are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the
law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is
broader than occupation because it includes constructive
possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation,
it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive
possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight
the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not
be a mere fiction. Actual possession ofa land consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a
party would naturally exercise over his own property.60 (Italics in
the original)
Moreover, to qualify as open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation, the possession must be of
the following character:
Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious
and not clandestine. It is continuous when uninterrupted,
unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive when the
adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land
and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and
notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known
and talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood. 61
In reversing the trial court’s decision, the Court of Appeals found
that petitioner "failed to address the issue of whether she had . .
. an open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject property. . . . [Petitioner] could have
advanced proofs or arguments to the contrary."62 Thus, she "had
not shown ‘any acts of occupation, development, cultivation or
maintenance over the property.’"63
This court puts more premium on the findings of the trial court
that petitioner has sufficiently shown acts of dominion before
1945 and throughout the years. It is settled that the trial court’s
appreciation of the evidence presented is entitled to great
respect since it is in a better position to evaluate the testimonies
of witnesses.64
Petitioner has sufficiently shown that she, through her
predecessors in-interest, have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
9,751-square-meter parcel of land located in Barrio Macamot,
Municipality of Binangonan, Province of Rizal, since June 12,
1945 or earlier.65 Documentary evidence to prove possession
was presented and substantiated by the witnesses’
testimonies.66 There were sufficient pieces of evidence to show
that petitioner and her predecessors-ininterest exercised
specific acts of ownership such as: farming activities; allowing
the excavation of land for "pulang lupa" to make clay pots;
paying realty taxes; declaring the property for tax purposes;
employing a caretaker; causing corrections in entries in public
documents with regard to the land; and demanding unlawful
occupants to vacate the premises.67
The fact of actual possession and occupation can also be gleaned
from petitioner’s judicial affidavit:
Q : When you inherited the property, who was in
possession and cultivation thereof?
A : My father? [sic]
Q : When did he possess the property?
A : When he was born thereat and lived there, and
when he grew up he cultivated it.
Q : When was he born?
A : May 16, 1918, Sir.
Q : Before your father, who?
A : My grandfather, Honorio Apran.
Q : Since when?
A : Approximately 1900’s, Sir.
Q : What was done by your grandfather on the
property?
A : He tilled the land by growing palay on rainy days,
and kamatis, and sometimes watermelon on summer
days.
Q : What happened to those farming activities when
your grandfather Honorio died?
A : My father continued the farming activities and so
did I until I transferred to Quezon City sometime year
2000.
Q : How young were you then in the 1900’s?
A : I was not yet even born, Sir.
Q : When were you born?
A : February 26, 1944, Sir.
....
Q : After your father, who possessed and cultivated the
property?
A : I, Sir.68
In its assailed decision, the Court of Appeals found that
petitioner was not in possession of the propertyto the exclusion
of others.69 It relied on petitioner’s statements during cross-
examination before the trial court on the following matters: that
a conditional sale was made between petitioner and Maura F.
Reyes and Lorenza F. Reyes in 197670 and that the property had
other occupants.71 The Court of Appeals alsostated that it
"received an Appeal in Intervention filed by the heirs of Lorenza
F. Reyes and the [h]eirs of Maura F. Reyes."72
The totality of petitioner’s evidence trumps any doubt as to the
exclusivity and continuity of petitioner’s possession with regard
to other occupants and an alleged failed conditional sale
executed in 1976 between petitioner and third parties, Lorenza
F. Reyes and Maura F. Reyes. We observe that no oppositors
appeared during the initial hearing on petitioner’s
application.73 Aside from petitioner’s statement during cross-
examination that the sale did not push through due to non-
payment of the full purchase price, the Court of Appeals did not
refer to other evidence to establish the conditional sale.
In addition, the Court of Appeals did not allow the intervention
of the heirs of Lorenza F. Reyes and Maura F. Reyes. 74 No third
parties intervened in the present case. 75
Respondent’s claim that the tax declarations presented by
petitioner were sporadic and irregular deserves scant
consideration. The Court of Appeals observed that:
The OSG likewise claims that [petitioner] failed to show her
ownership and possession of the property in question, since the
subject property was declared for tax purposes only in 1949,
1966, 1974, 1980, 1985, 1994–1999 under the name of Honorio
Apan and in 2004 under the name of [petitioner]. . . .
We do not see the point of the OSG in attacking the tax
declarations. We do not understand why it harps on the fact that
the property was declared for taxation purposes only in 1948.
We do not see any irregularity here. It would have helped Usa
lot had the OSG been more specific and did not leave Us ina
guessing and explorative game. To Our mind, what matters here
is that the tax declarations from 1948 up to the latest are in the
correct series — one tax declaration cancels the immediately
previously issued tax declaration which in effect also cancels all
the previously issued tax declarations.
Further, We find it misleading for OSG to claim that the realty
taxes were only paid a few months before the filing of the
application. Per records of this case, the recent payment was on
October 22, 2003 while the application for registration was filed
on August 22, 2006 or almost three years after.76 (Italics
supplied)
It is settled that tax declarationsare not conclusive evidence of
ownership.77 Other evidence may be appreciated to determine
actual possession and occupation. Documentary evidence, such
as tax declarations, when coupled with positive and clear
testimonies of the applicant and his or her witnesses,may be
weighed in favor of the applicant.78
The fact that a parcel of land is not declared for tax purposes
regularly, or that realty taxes are not paid on a regular basis,
does not automaticallycontradict the claim of possession. Tax
declarations serve as additional indicia of ownership. It is not
conclusive as to the fact of possession, occupation, or
ownership.
Likewise, to solely rely on tax declarations and payment of realty
taxes would mean that petitioner’s possession of the land
should be reckoned from 1949 or the year the earliest tax
declaration was made. Such interpretation is untenable and goes
beyond the text of Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No.
1529. Moreover, as shown in the records, petitioner, through
her predecessors-in-interest, has been in possession of the land
since the early 1900s.
We remand the issue of the inclusion of plan Psu-04-006561 in
TCT No. 23377, as allegedly certified by the Land Registration
Authority, to the trial court of origin.
Generally, the remand of a case will not be permitted if "in the
interest of justice, the Supreme Court itself can resolve the
dispute based on the records before it." 79 Thus, remand may not
be allowed in the following instances: "(a) where the ends of

justice would not be subserved by a remand; or (b) where public
interest demands an early disposition of the case; or (c) where
the trial court had already received all the evidence presented
by both parties, and the Supreme Court is in a position, based
upon said evidence, to decidethe case on its merits."80 None of
these are present in this case.
The trial court is in the best position to ascertain the validity and
authenticity of the alleged Land Registration Authority report
and motion, as well as the truth and probative weight of the
statements contained in the document. A reading of Republic v.
Court of Appeals and Guido, et al., invoked by petitioner, does
not revealthe precise metes and bounds of the property under
TCT No. 23377 and whether plan Psu-04-006561 is covered by
the title.
It does not escape this court’s attention — considering the
length of time the document was in petitioner’s possession —
that the document was presented by petitioner at this latestage
in the Court of Appeals proceedings. Records show that
petitioner was aware of this development as early as 2009 or
even before the appeal to the Court of Appeals.81 There has
been no mention of this document before the Court of Appeals
or in the present petition.
The concealment of a document that changes a party’s theory of
the case is highly improper, if not misleading, and should not be
tolerated. In Multi-Realty Development Corporation v. The
Makati Tuscany Condominium Corporation,82 this court said
that:
[s]ettled is the rule that no questions will be entertained on
appeal unless they have been raised below. Points of law,
theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought to the
attention of the lower court need not be considered by the
reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal. Basic considerations of due process impel this rule. 83
However, the ends of substantial justice would be better served
when the threshing of the issue before the trial court is allowed,
to give all parties due process and avoid multiplicity of suits in
the future.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision
dated November 10, 2011 and resolution. dated February 23,
2012 of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
case is, however, REMANDED to the trial court for presentation
of evidence to determine whether the 9,751-square-meter
parcel of land located in Barrio Macamot, Municipality of
Binangonan, Province of Rizal, technically described as Cadastral
Lot No. 11566, Psu-04-006561, is included in TCT No. 23377, and
to proceed accordingly with this court's ruling in Republic v.
Court of Appeals and Guido, et al.84 SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
56
Rollo, p. 42. InRepublic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., 578 Phil. 441,
452–453 (2008) [Per J. Carpio, First Division], this court held that
it is not enough for the Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Offices (PENRO) or Community Environment and
Natural Resources Offices (CENRO) to certify that a land is
alienable and disposable. However, the facts and issues of that
case are not on all fours with the present case.
65
The present case must be differentiated from Tan v.
Republic,G.R. No. 193443, April 16, 2012, 669 SCRA 499, 510
[Per J. Reyes, Second Division Resolution], in that petitioner
Canlas showed that she and her predecessors-in-interest have
exercised specific acts of ownership over the land subject of the
application for registration. This court in Tan found that "[w]hile
there was an attempt to supplement the tax declaration by
testimonial evidence, the same is futile and frivolous. The
testimonies . . . do not merit consideration and do not make up
for the inherent inadequacy of the eleven (11) tax declarations
submitted by the petitioners. Such witnesses did not state what
specific acts of ownership or dominion were performed by the
petitioners and predecessors-in-interest and simply made that
general assertion that the latter possessed and occupied the
subject property for more than thirty (30) years, which, by all
means, is a mere conclusion of law. The RTC should have tackled
evidence of such nature with a disposition to incredulity, if not
with an outright rejection."
73
Id. at 42. Jurisprudence is clear that the absence of oppositors
in a land registration case does not automatically mean a
meritorious case absent clear and convincing evidence of actual
possession and occupation. However, petitioner has sufficiently
overcome the burden of proof required in land registration
cases, as discussed earlier.
78
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 489 Phil. 405, 419 (2005) [Per
J. Tinga, Second Division], this court ruled that "possession since
1945 was established through proof of the existence of 50 to 60-
year old treesat the time . . . the property [was purchased] as
well as tax declarations executed . . . in 1945." (Emphasis
supplied) In Arbias v. Republic, 587 Phil. 361, 374 (2008) [Per J.
Chico-Nazario, Third Division], this court declared that"[w]ell-
settled is the rule that tax declarations and receipts are not
conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to possess land
when not supported by any other evidence." (Emphasis
supplied); See also Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v.
Ramos, G.R. No. 179181, November 18, 2013, 709 SCRA 576, 594
[PerJ. Brion, Second Division]. These cases show that different
kinds of evidence may be considered in determining actual
possession and occupation.
G.R. No. 137582 August 29, 2012
JOSE I. MEDINA vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF THE
LATE ABUNDIO CASTAÑARES, Represented by ANDRES
CASTAÑARES
Subject of this petition for review on certiorari are the
Decision1 and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 42634, reversing the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Masbate, Masbate,. Branch 46 in Civil Case No. 4080.
The instant case stemmed from a Complaint for Damages with
prayer for Preliminary Attachment and docketed as Civil Case
No. 3561. In a Decision dated 27 December 1985, the RTC
ordered Arles Castañares (Arles), now deceased and represented
by his heirs, to pay damages for running over and causing
injuries to four-year old Wenceslao Mahilum, Jr. The four-year
old victim was left in the custody of petitioner Jose I. Medina,
who also represented the victim’s father, Wenceslao Mahilum,
Sr. in the aforesaid case.
The Decision in Civil Case No. 3561 became final and executory
on 3 June 1987. The motion for issuance of a writ of
execution3 filed by petitioner was granted on 29 September
1987 and the corresponding Writ of Execution4 was issued on 1
October 1987. The Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff of the RTC served
a Notice of Levy and Seizure on Arles’ two (2) parcels of lands
located at Goldbag, Syndicate, Aroroy, Masbate described as
follows:
PARCEL-I
A parcel of coconut land located at Goldbag, Syndicate, Aroroy,
Masbate, registered in the name of deceased Arles Castañares
under Tax Dec. No. 1107, bounded on the North, by Abundio
Castañares; East, by public land; South, by Provincial Road and
on the West, by Abundio Castañares with an area of 5.0000
hectares and assessed at ₱ 6,810.00.
PARCEL-II
A parcel of coconut, rice, unirrigated & cogon located at
Goldbag, Syndicate, Aroroy, Masbate, registered in the name of
Abundio Castañares, under Tax Dec. No. 1106, bounded on the
North, by Masbate Goldfield Min. C.; East, by Timberland; South,
by National Road and on the West, by National Road with an
area of 18.8569 hectares and assessed at ₱ 15,660.00.5
When the heirs of Arles failed to settle their account with
petitioner, Parcel-I under Tax Declaration No. 11076 was sold at a
public auction. Only petitioner participated in the bidding, thus
the subject lot was awarded to him and a Certificate of Sale was
issued on 24 December 1987.7 In the Sheriff’s Final Deed of Sale,
Parcel-I was transferred to Wenceslao Mahilum, Sr., represented
by Jose I. Medina.8 A survey was conducted on the property. On
23 January 1989, the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession
was granted by the trial court commanding the sheriff to
physically oust the heirs of Arles and to deliver the subject lot to
petitioner.
On 26 April 1991, petitioner applied for the registration of the
lot covered by Tax Declaration No. 1107, docketed as LRC Case
No. N-374. Petitioner alleged that he is the owner in fee simple
of such parcel of land by virtue of a Waiver of Rights and
Interests9 executed by Wenceslao Mahilum, Sr. in his favor.
Attached to the application is the Survey Plan which particularly
described the land as follows:
A parcel of coconut land containing an area of 5.0000 (sic)
hectares located at Goldbag-Syndicate, Aroroy, Masbate,
declared for taxation purposes in the name of Wenceslao
Mahilum, Sr. (rep. by Jose I. Medina) under Tax Dec. No. 7372,
and bounded on the North, by Abundio Castañares, South, by
Atlas Mining & Development Corporation and Provincial Road,
East, by Public Land and on the West, by Provincial Road with
the latest assessment at ₱ 6,810.00.10
Andres Castañares (Andres), brother of Arles and representing
the heirs of the late Abundio Castañares (Abundio), filed an
Opposition claiming that after the death of his father Abundio,
the tax declaration of the property was cancelled and in its
place, a tax declaration was issued in his favor; that during the
lifetime of his father and up to his death, Andres had been in
peaceful, open, notorious, public and adverse possession of the
lot; that sometime in 1988, petitioner, through stealth and
strategy, encroached and occupied practically the entirety of the
property in question by encircling it with barbed wires,
destroying in the process scores of fruit-bearing coconut trees;
and that there is a pending case, Civil Case No. 4051, for
recovery of ownership and possession of real estate.11
The pending case mentioned by Andres was later dismissed by
the trial court without prejudice to refiling the same. 12 Thus, on
28 April 1992, Andres filed another Complaint for Recovery of
Possession and Ownership with Damages and with Prayer for
Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction docketed as Civil Case
No. 4080.13
The action for recovery of possession and ownership in Civil Case
No. 4080 and the land registration case in LRC No. N-374 were
jointly tried.
Andres testified that upon Abundio’s death, the latter left his
children a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 18
hectares,14 declared for taxation in Abundio’s name under Tax
Declaration No. 1106, bounded as follows:
North – by Sta. Clara Goldfield (Masbate Goldfield)
East – by Timberland
South – National Road
West – National Road15
Andres presented a sketch plan on 26 May 1983 of Lots 224 and
2187, Pls-7716 and pointed out that the alleged lot of Arles
covered by Tax Declaration No. 1107 is outside Lot 224 and lies
to the south of Abundio’s lot.17 He averred that petitioner
encroached on and fenced a portion of said lot, occupying an
area of about five (5) hectares. Based on the sketch plan,
petitioner fenced Line 2 to Line 8.18
Petitioner presented Tax Declaration No. 1107 under the name
of Arles showing the boundaries of his lot as follow:
North – Abundio Castañares
South – Provincial Road
East – Public Land
West – Abundio Castañares19
Petitioner insisted that the lots contained in Tax Declaration
Nos. 1107 and 1106 are not separate and distinct, but refers to
only one parcel of land, Lot 224. The lot in Tax Declaration No.
1107 is denominated as Lot 224-A and is derived from Tax
Declaration No. 1106, as certified by the wife of Arles, Patricia
Castañares (Patricia).20 Petitioner likewise submitted a sketch
plan prepared on 12 March 1992 to show the real location of the
lot described in Tax Declaration No. 1107.
On 10 May 1993, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of
petitioner. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, decision is hereby rendered
in favor of the defendant-applicant, to wit:
1. Ordering the dismissal of the complaint in Civil Case No. 4080
with costs against the plaintiff-oppositors;
2. Declaring the defendant-applicant, Jose I. Medina, the
absolute owner of the land subject of his application in L.R.C.
Case No. 374;
3. Declaring the title of the applicant over the property
designated in Plan Csd-05-009053 together with all the
improvements thereon, CONFIRMED and REGISTERED pursuant
to the provision of P.D. No. 1529; and
4. Ordering the plaintiff-oppositors to pay the defendant-
applicant the amount of ₱ 5,000.00 as attorney’s fees and ₱
5,000.00 as litigation expenses.
Once this decision becomes final and executory, let the
corresponding decree of registration issue. 21
The trial court found that petitioner lawfully acquired the land
through a Deed of Waiver of Rights and Interest executed by
Wenceslao Mahilum, Sr., the winning party in the damages suit.
The trial court gave credence to a Certification22 issued by the
Provincial Sheriff and even signed by Patricia, the wife of Arles,
certifying that the sketch plan of Lot 224-A reflects the true
location and area of the property subject of the writ of
possession and execution.
On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals reversed the findings
of the trial court as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and a new one is entered, to wit:
1. Ordering the dismissal of the Application of Jose I. Medina in
Land Registration Case No. N-374;
2. Declaring the heirs of the late Abundio Castañares
represented by Andres Castañares the absolute owner of the
land subject of application in L.R.C. Case No. N-374;
3. Ordering the Applicant Jose I. Medina to pay plaintiffs-
oppositors Heirs of Abundio Castañares the following sum:
a. ₱ 20,000.00 as moral damages;
b. ₱ 1,000.00 rental per month from February 24, 1989
until fully paid;
c. ₱ 1,000.00 refund of the yield of the crops of the land
from February 24, 1989 until fully paid, and
d. Costs of suit.23
The Court of Appeals stated that the lot under Tax Declaration
No. 1107 in the name of Arles is separate and distinct from Lots
224 and 2187 declared under Tax Declaration No. 1106. The
appellate court took into consideration the separate and distinct
location of the lots, as well as the difference in their boundaries.
It also noted that since there has been no settlement yet of the
estate of Abundio, it was premature for Arles to have allocated
unto himself a distinct portion of Lots 224 and 2187 as his share
in the estate. And even if there was partition among the heirs of
Abundio, the appellate court concluded that the share of Arles is
only limited to 3.1432 hectares. The Court of Appeals further
observed that the boundary on the west of the property sought
to be registered by petitioner in the land registration case was
changed from "Abundio Castanares" to "Provincial Road," in
conflict with the boundary of the property as stated in Tax
Declaration No. 1107. The appellate court concluded that the
changes in the boundary on the west were purposely made to
justify the illegal occupancy and fencing of the southern portion
of Lot 224.
Petitioner elevated the case before this Court via petition for
review on certiorari and assigned the following alleged errors
committed by the Court of Appeals, to wit:
1. THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN REVERSING
THE FINDINGS OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 46 OF
MASBATE.
2. THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THE BOUNDARIES IN THE TAX DECLARATION WERE
CHANGED TO SUIT THE PURPOSE OF JOSE I. MEDINA.
3. THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT
REFERRING PROPERLY TO THE SKETCH PLAN OF THE LAND IN
ARRIVING AT THE CONCLUSION.
4. THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN STATING
THAT THE LAND SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE AT BAR STILL
FORMS PART OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE ABUNDIO
CASTAÑARES.
5. THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN AWARDING
DAMAGES AS AGAINST PETITIONER-DEFENDANT-APPLICANT
JOSE I. MEDINA, WHO RECEIVED THE PROPERTY IN GOOD FAITH
FROM THE OFFICER OF THE COURT.24
Petitioner contends that a comparison of the respective
boundaries of the lots covered by Tax Declaration No. 1107 and
Tax Declaration No. 1106 readily shows that Lot 224-A in Tax
Declaration No. 1107 is well within the boundaries of Lot 224 in
Tax Declaration No. 1106. Petitioner dismisses the observation
of the appellate court regarding the purported "change in
boundaries" as a mere typographical error. Petitioner scores the
appellate court for relying on a homestead application of
Abundio to establish the latter’s ownership on the subject land.
Petitioner harps on the inconsistencies of respondent ─ first, in
Civil Case No. 4051 (which was dismissed prior to the filing of
Civil Case No. 4080), respondent claimed that the land of
Abundio was transferred to him when his father died but he
later changed his stand and made it appear that the land is still
owned by the heirs of Abundio; second, respondent testified
that the share of Arles in the lot was sold to Ildefonso and Juan
Castañares; and third, respondent’s son, Adrian, had filed a third
party claim during the public auction sale, alleging that the land
is already owned by him by virtue of a sale by the heirs of
Abundio. Petitioner insists that the land is already segregated
from the land of Abundio as evidenced by the mortgage
executed by Arles in 1966 with Masbate Rural Bank, as shown in
Tax Declaration No. 876.
In its Comment, respondent points out that the issues raised by
petitioner are factual questions which cannot be reviewed in a
petition for review on certiorari.
As correctly pointed out by respondent, the assigned errors are
factual in character. It is axiomatic that a question of fact is not
appropriate for a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
This rule provides that the parties may raise only questions of
law, because the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Generally,
we are not duty-bound to analyze again and weigh the evidence
introduced in and considered by the tribunals below. When
supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the parties and
are not reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls under any
of the following recognized exceptions: (1) When the conclusion
is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and
conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse
of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings,
went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to
the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) When the
findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set forth
in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs
are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) When the findings
of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record.25
We find no cogent reason to apply the exceptions. While we
slightly deviate from one of the findings of the appellate court,
we nonetheless affirm its conclusion. We explain.
The boundaries of the subject lot were clearly delineated and
were, as a matter of fact, undisputed. Lot 224, as stated in Tax
Declaration No. 1106, is bounded by Sta. Clara Goldfield
(Masbate Goldfield) in the North, by Timberland in the East, by
National Road in the South, and National Road in the West. On
the other hand, Lot 224-A is bounded on the North by the land
owned by Abundio, on the South by the Provincial Road, on the
East by Public Land, and on the West by Abundio.
As per the Sketch Plans26 submitted by the parties, Lot 224 and
Lot 224-A are illustrated below:
Comparing the two sketches, it is unmistakable that Lot 224-A
forms part and parcel of Lot 224. Moreover, the boundaries, as
admitted by both parties, more or less established the location
of Lot 224-A, which location is inside and forms part of Lot 224.
While it appears that Lot 224-A was a subdivision of Lot 224, it
does not necessarily establish petitioner’s ownership over Lot
224-A.
Quite obviously, the two sketches are purportedly referring to
only one lot. Hence, the pith and core of the controversy is the
ownership of the disputed property.
The appellate court is correct in stating that there was no
settlement of the estate of Abundio. There is no showing that
Lot 224 has already been partitioned despite the demise of
Abundio. It has been held that an heir’s right of ownership over
the properties of the decedent is merely inchoate as long as the
estate has not been fully settled and partitioned. This means
that the impending heir has yet no absolute dominion over any
specific property in the decedent’s estate that could be
specifically levied upon and sold at public auction. Any
encumbrance of attachment over the heir’s interests in the
estate, therefore, remains a mere probability, and cannot
summarily be satisfied without the final distribution of the
properties in the estate.27 Therefore, the public auction sale of
the property covered by Tax Declaration No. 1107 is void
because the subject property is still covered by the Estate of
Abundio, which up to now, remains unpartitioned. Arles was not
proven to be the owner of the lot under Tax Declaration No.
1107. It may not be amiss to state that a tax declaration by itself
is not sufficient to prove ownership.28
Against a mere tax declaration, respondents were able to
present a more credible proof of ownership over Lot
224.1âwphi1 The Court of Appeals relied on the Certification
issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO) Officer of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) which certifies that Abundio, and now
the heirs, is the holder of a homestead application and an order
for the issuance of patent had already been issued as early as 7
July 1952.29
Pertinent portions of the Certification are reproduced
hereunder:
This is to certify that per records of this office, Abundio
Castañares (deceased) now the heirs represented by Juan
Castañares is the holder of Homestead Application No. 178912
(E-96030) which was issued an order: Issuance of Patent on July
7, 1952.
It is also shown that in BL Conflict No. 220 (N), DLO Conflict No.
274, entitled F.P.A. No. 11-1-1823 of Exequiela Jaca-Claimant-
Protestant versus H.A. No. 178912 (E-96030) of Abundio
Castañares (deceased), now the heirs rep. by Juan Castañares,
B.L. Claim No. 220 (N), R.L.O. Claim No. 473, D.L.O. Claim No.
274, a decision was rendered on May 19, 1976 the dispositive
portion reads:
"WHEREFORE, it is ordered that the Homestead Application No.
178912 (E-96030) of the Heirs of Abundio Castañares,
represented by Juan Castañares shall cover only Lots No. 224
and 2187 in Pls-77, Aroroy, Masbate and as thus amended, shall
continue to be given further due course. Likewise, the Free
Patent Application No. 11-1-1823 of Exequiela Jaca for Lot No.
19, in the same subdivision, shall be given further due course."30
The Land Management Bureau of the DENR outlines the steps
leading to the issuance of a homestead patent:
1. Filing of application;
2. Preliminary Investigation;
3. Approval of application;
4. Filing of final proof which consists of two (2) parts;
a. Notice of intention to make Final Proof which is
posted for 30 days.
b. Testimony of the homesteader corroborated by two
(2) witnesses mentioned in the notice.
The Final Proof is filed not earlier than 1 year after the approval
of the application but within 5 years from the said date.
5. Confirmatory Final Investigation;
6. Order of Issuance of Patent;
7. Preparation of patent using Judicial Form No. 67 and 67-D and WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED and
the technical description duly inscribed at the back thereof; the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated 11
September 1998 in CA-G.R. CV No. 42634 is hereby AFFIRMED.
8. Transmittal of the Homestead patent to the Register of Deeds
concerned.31 (Emphasis supplied.) SO ORDERED.
32
In Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, citing the early case of
Balboa v. Farrales33 we ruled that when a homesteader has
complied with all the terms and conditions which entitle him to
a patent for a particular tract of public land, he acquires a vested
interest therein, enough to be regarded as the equitable owner
thereof. Where the right to a patent to land has once become
vested in a purchaser of public lands, it is equivalent to a patent
actually issued. The execution and delivery of patent, after the
right to a particular parcel of land has become complete, are the
mere ministerial acts of the officer charged with that duty. Even
without a patent, a perfected homestead is a property right in
the fullest sense, unaffected by the fact that the paramount title
to the land is still in the government. Such land may be
conveyed or inherited.1âwphi1
Also, in Nieto v. Quines and Pio34 involving ownership over a
contested lot, it was held that:
x x x As a homestead applicant, Quines had religiously complied
with all the requirements of the Public Land Act and, on August
29, 1930, a homestead patent was issued in his favor.
Considering the requirement that the final proof must be
presented within 5 years from the approval of the homestead
application x x x, it is safe to assume that Bartolome Quines
submitted his final proof way back yet in 1923 and that the
Director of Lands approved the same not long thereafter or
before the land became the subject of the cadastral proceedings
in 1927. Unfortunately, there was some delay in the ministerial
act of issuing the patent and the same was actually issued only
after the cadastral court had adjudicated the land to Maria
Florentino. Nevertheless, having complied with all the terms and
conditions which would entitle him to a patent, Bartolome
Quines, even without a patent actually issued, has
unquestionably acquired a vested right on the land and is to be
regarded as the equitable owner thereof (citation omitted).
Under these circumstances and applying by analogy the
principles governing sales of immovable property to two
different persons by the same vendor, Bartolome Quines’ title
must prevail over that of Maria Florentino not only because he
had always been in possession of the land but also because he
obtained title to the land prior to that of Maria Florentino.
In the instant case, it was clear that there has been an issuance
of patent way back in 7 July 1952. The only two acts left for the
CENRO to do are to prepare the patent and to transmit it to the
Register of Deeds. As to whether these acts have already been
complied with is not borne in the records, but the fact remains
that these acts are merely ministerial. Respondents have already
acquired vested rights to a patent which is equivalent to actual
issuance of patent. They have become owners of the land.
As evidence of ownership of land, a homestead patent prevails
over a land tax declaration.