RESIDENT MAMMALS VS.

REYES

FACTS:

A novel case was recently decided by the Supreme Court where a suit was filed by resident marine mammals, like whales, dolphins, etc.
in order to prevent the exploration, development and exploitation of petroleum resources within Tanon Strait, a narrow passage of water
situated between the islands of Negros and Cebu. One of the basic questions is whether they have the capacity to sue or otherwise
known in constitutional law as locus standi.

This case arose when DOE and Japan Petroleum Exploration Co. Ltd. (JAPEX) entered into an agreement for the exploration,
development and production of petroleum resources at the offshore of Tanon Strait.

The Resident Marine Mammals, through the Stewards, “claimed” that they have the legal standing to file this action since they stand to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in this suit. Citing Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., they also asserted their right to sue for the faithful
performance of international and municipal environmental laws created in their favor and for their benefit. In this regard, they propounded
that they have the right to demand that they be accorded the benefits granted to them in multilateral international instruments that the
Philippine Government had signed, under the concept of stipulation pour autrui.

The Stewards contended that there should be no question of their right to represent the Resident Marine Mammals as they have stakes
in the case as forerunners of a campaign to build awareness among the affected residents of Tañon Strait and as stewards of the
environment since the primary steward, the Government, had failed in its duty to protect the environment pursuant to the public trust
doctrine. (See: Oposa case).

They also contended that the Court may lower the benchmark in locus standi as an exercise of epistolary jurisdiction. (See: Oposa case).

Public respondents argued that the Resident Marine Mammals have no standing because Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires
parties to an action to be either natural or juridical persons.

They also contested the applicability of Oposa, pointing out that the petitioners therein were all natural persons, albeit some of them were
still unborn.

As regards the Stewards, the public respondents likewise challenged their claim of legal standing on the ground that they are representing
animals, which cannot be parties to an action. Moreover, the public respondents argued that the Stewards are not the real parties-in-
interest for their failure to show how they stand to be benefited or injured by the decision in this case.

Since the petition was not brought in the name of a real party-in-interest, it should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the resident mammals have legal standing to sue in this case.

RULING:

YES! Inanimate objects are sometimes parties in litigation. A ship has a legal personality, a fiction found useful for maritime purposes.
The corporation sole - a creature of ecclesiastical law - is an acceptable adversary and large fortunes ride on its cases. The ordinary
corporation is a “person” for purposes of the adjudicatory processes, whether it represents proprietary, spiritual, aesthetic, or charitable
causes.

So it should be as respects valleys, alpine meadows, rivers, lakes, estuaries, beaches, ridges, groves of trees, swampland, or even air
that feels the destructive pressures of modern technology and modem life. The river, for example, is the living symbol of all the life it
sustains or nourishes—fish, aquatic insects, water ouzels, otter, fisher, deer, elk, bear, and all other animals, including man, who are
dependent on it or who enjoy it for its sight, its sound, or its life. The river as plaintiff speaks for the ecological unit of life that is part of it.
Those people who have a meaningful relation to that body of water—whether it be a fisherman, a canoeist, a zoologist, or a logger—must
be able to speak for the values which the river represents and which are threatened with destruction.

The primary reason animal rights advocates and environmentalists seek to give animals and inanimate objects standing is due to the
need to comply with the strict requirements in bringing a suit to court. Our own 1997 Rules of Court demand that parties to a suit be either
natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law. It further necessitates the action to be brought in the name of the real party-in-
interest, even if filed by a representative, viz.:

Although this petition was filed in 2007, years before the effectivity of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, it has been
consistently held that rules of procedure “may be retroactively applied to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage
and will not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there is no vested rights in rules of
procedure.”

Elucidating on this doctrine, the Court, in Systems Factors Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission (399 Phil. 721 (2000)
held that:
Remedial statutes or statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only
operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing, do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive
law, or the general rule against retroactive operation of statutes. Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as
applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that
extent, x x x.

Moreover, even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases became effective, the Court had already taken a permissive
position on the issue of locus standi in environmental cases. In Oposa, the Court allowed the suit to be brought in the name of generations
yet unborn “based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.”
Furthermore, the right to a balanced and healthful ecology, a right that does not even need to be stated in our Constitution as it is assumed
to exist from the inception of humankind, carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.

In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules, which allow
any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is worth noting here that the Stewards are
joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-
Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine
Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the legal standing to file this petition.

OPOSA VS. FACTORAN

FACTS:

The principal petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the
Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia,
engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The petitioners alleged the respondent,
Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), continued
approval of the Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to numerous commercial logging companies to cut and deforest the remaining forests
of the country. Petitioners request the defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:

Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable
demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or
impairment of the natural resource property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations. Plaintiff have
exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant’s office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to
cancel all logging permits in the country. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA’s to the continuing serious
damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of the Court.
Whether or not the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any
relief is provided by law.
Whether or not petitioners’ proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing violates the
requirements of due process.

RULINGS:

In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:

The petitioners have the right to bring action to the judicial power of the Court.

The case at bar is subject to judicial review by the Court. Justice Davide, Jr. precisely identified in his opinion the requisites for a case to
be subjected for the judicial review by the Court. According to him, the subject matter of the complaint is of common interest, making this
civil case a class suit and proving the existence of an actual controversy. He strengthens this conclusion by citing in the decision Section
1, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution.

The petitioners can file a class suit because they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. Their personality to sue
in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature.”
Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition,
utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and
other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as
future generations.

Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful
ecology. Put a little differently, the minors’ assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance
of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
The Court does not agree with the trial court’s conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal
right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on
unverified data.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in
our nation’s constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides: Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature.

This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article: Sec. 15. The State shall protect
and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under
the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right
belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and
fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a
matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind.
The Court are not persuaded by the trial court’s pronouncement.

The respondent Secretary did not invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, Justice Feliciano would
have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license
holders because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions
regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the
petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides that when the
national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other
form of privilege granted herein .

All licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protested by the due
process clause of the Constitution.

Hence, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case
No. 90-777 was set aside. The petitioners amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned
timber license agreements.

SAGUISAG VS. OCHOA

FACTS:

This is a Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration seeking to reverse the Decision of this Court in Saguisag et. al., v. Executive
Secretary dated 12 January 2016.

Petitioners claim this Court erred when it ruled that the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the Philippines and
the US was not a treaty. In connection to this, petitioners move that EDCA must be in the form of a treaty in order to comply with the
constitutional restriction under Section 25, Article· XVIII of the 1987 Constitution on foreign military bases, troops, and facilities.
Additionally, they reiterate their arguments on the issues of telecommunications, taxation, and nuclear weapons.

The principal reason for the Motion for Reconsideration is evidently petitioners’ disagreement with the Decision that EDCA implements
the VFA and Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT).

Petitioners argue that EDCA’s provisions fall outside the allegedly limited scope of the VFA and MDT because it provides a wider
arrangement than the VFA for military bases, troops, and facilities, and it allows the establishment of U.S. military bases.

ISSUE:

Whether or not EDCA is a treaty.

RULING:

NO! We ruled in Saguisag, et. al. that the EDCA is not a treaty despite the presence of these provisions. The very nature of EDCA, its
provisions and subject matter, indubitably categorize it as an executive agreement – a class of agreement that is not covered by the
Article XVIII Section 25 restriction – in painstaking detail. To partially quote the Decision:

Executive agreements may dispense with the requirement of Senate concurrence because of the legal mandate with which they are
concluded.

As culled from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, past Supreme Court Decisions, and works of noted scholars, executive
agreements merely involve arrangements on the implementation of existing policies, rules, laws, or agreements.

They are concluded

(1) to adjust the details of a treaty;
(2) pursuant to or upon confirmation by an act of the Legislature; or
(3) in the exercise of the President’s independent powers under the Constitution.

The raison d’etre of executive agreements hinges on prior constitutional or legislative authorizations.

The special nature of an executive agreement is not just a domestic variation in international agreements.

International practice has accepted the use of various forms and designations of international agreements, ranging from the traditional
notion of a treaty – which connotes a formal, solemn instrument – to engagements concluded in modern, simplified forms that no longer
necessitate ratification.

An international agreement may take different forms: treaty, act, protocol, agreement, concordat, compromis d’arbitrage, convention,
covenant, declaration, exchange of notes, statute, pact, charter, agreed minute, memorandum of agreement, modus vivendi, or some
other form.

Consequently, under international law, the distinction between a treaty and an international agreement or even an executive agreement
is irrelevant for purposes of determining international rights and obligations.

However, this principle does not mean that the domestic law distinguishing treaties, international agreements, and executive agreements
is relegated to a mere variation in form, or that the constitutional requirement of Senate concurrence is demoted to an optional
constitutional directive. There remain two very important features that distinguish treaties from executive agreements and translate them
into terms of art in the domestic setting.

First, executive agreements must remain traceable to an express or implied authorization under the Constitution, statutes, or treaties.
The absence of these precedents puts the validity and effectivity of executive agreements under serious question for the main function
of the Executive is to enforce the Constitution and the laws enacted by the Legislature, not to defeat or interfere in the performance of
these rules. In turn, executive agreements cannot create new international obligations that are not expressly allowed or reasonably implied
in the law they purport to implement.

Second, treaties are, by their very nature, considered superior to executive agreements. Treaties are products of the acts of the Executive
and the Senate unlike executive agreements, which are solely executive actions. Because of legislative participation through the Senate,
a treaty is regarded as being on the same level as a statute. If there is an irreconcilable conflict, a later law or treaty takes precedence
over one that is prior. An executive agreement is treated differently. Executive agreements that are inconsistent with either a law or a
treaty are considered ineffective. Both types of international agreement are nevertheless subject to the supremacy of the Constitution.

Treaties that the President enters into should have the required Senate concurrence for its validity and effectivity. Even the
President's executive agreements that are within the President's authority to enter into without Senate concurrence, effectively
reflect a shared function as they implement laws passed by Congress or treaties that the Senate has previously concurred in.
The judicial branch of government, on the other hand, passively participates in international agreements through the exercise
of judicial power; courts have the duty to ensure that the Executive and the Legislature stay within their spheres of competence,
and that the constitutional standards and limitations set by the Const itution are not violated.

Under these norms, an executive agreement that creates new obligations or amends existing ones should properly be classified
and entered into as a treaty. When implemented as an executive agreement that does not have the benefit of the treaty-making
process and its Senate concurrence, such executive agreement is invalid and ineffective, and can judicially be so declared
through judicial review.

Subsequently, the Decision goes to great lengths to illustrate the source of EDCA’s validity, in that as an executive agreement it fell within
the parameters of the VFA and MDT, and seamlessly merged with the whole web of Philippine law. We need not restate the arguments
here. It suffices to state that this Court remains unconvinced that EDCA deserves treaty status under the law.

We find no reason for EDCA to be declared unconstitutional. It fully conforms to the Philippines’ legal regime through the MDT and VFA.
It also fully conforms to the government’s continued policy to enhance our military capability in the face of various military and humanitarian
issues that may arise.

DOMINGO VS. REVILLA

FACTS:

This disbarment complaint arose from when the complainant engaged in the services of the respondent in 2 cases that the former wanted
to institute. The first is that he sought the annulment of the adoption decree of his adopted sibling Melchor Arruiza. The second is the
settlement of the estate of his late mother Judith Arruiza in order to transfer the properties in the name of the complainant and his children.
Since the complainant resided in the USA, he maintained communication with the respondent through e-mail and fax. During the course
of the case, the respondent made these misrepresentations:

That he had already filed the annulment of adoption.

That he was processing the transfer of titles of the properties in the names of complainant and his children.
That he was processing the cancellation of the claim of Melchor in the properties.
That he was processing the payment of the taxes and other fees for the properties to be transferred.
That he was negotiating with the BIR to reduce the tax.
That the new titles were ready.
That Melchor opposed the cancellation of adoption; he boasted that he knew many big time politicians in Abra who could help in the case.
That the judge in the case would rule in favor of the complainant if he would give the judge 10% of the value of the property.
That they would need ₱200,000 for the judge but he needed an additional ₱50,000 for the “boys” in the CA and the SC.
That the judge had already written the decision but, for his protection, insisted on a kaliwaan of the copy of the decision and the payment.
That the decision was appealed in the CA and eventually in the SC, and that the respondent would be working doubly hard to in fluence
a favorable outcome.
That in total, all the expenses would amount to ₱433,002.61 (legal fees, payment to the judge, BIR, other agencies).

The complainant gave the respondent the amount and later on asked for the delivery of the decisions. However, the respondent refused
to deliver any of the documents. Eventually, the respondent cut off communications with the complainant. The complainant contacted the
law firm of the respondent and he found out that the law firm never took on any of the cases of the complainant. The decree for annulment
of adoption was never instituted and the settlement of the estate never took place.

Respondent denied all the charges. He claimed that he had properly apprised the complainant on the difficulty of winning the annulment
of adoption case considering that the adoption was decreed in 1979 and that the complainant was in the USA, unable to personally testify
in court. He went on to say that the complainant pleaded with the respondent to pursue the case.

IBP Finding: The respondent acted negligently and deserves to be reprimanded with a stern warning that a repetition of the offense would
warrant a more severe penalty. It further recommended that respondent return the money to complainant. Board of Governors confirmed
findings.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent should be disciplined.

RULING:

YES! The SC found respondent guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Rules 15.06 and 15.07 of Canon 15, and Rule 18.03 of Canon
18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, but, in view of his continuing disbarment, hereby METES the penalty of FINE of ₱l00,000.00.

In their conversations, the respondent told the complainant that the judge handling the case would rule in their favor only if he would be
given 10% of the value of the property at Better Living Subdivision, Parañaque, and that the handling judge consequently agreed on the
fee of ₱200,000.00 but needed an additional ₱50,000.00 "for the boys" in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. In doing so, the
respondent committed calumny, and thereby violated Rules 15.06 and 15.07 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Members of the Bench are tasked with ensuring that the ends of justice are served. Such negative imputations against them and the
collegial bodies of the Judiciary on the part of the respondent tended to erode the trust and confidence of the people in our judicial system.
The Court should not take such conduct of the respondent lightly considering that the image of the Judiciary was thereby diminished in
the eyes of the public; hence, the Court must severely reprove the respondent.
Why Respondent was not disbarred

First, the respondent had properly explained to the complainant that the filing of the annulment of adoption case would be di fficult since
the adoption was decreed in 1979. He also properly explained that the case would be difficult since the complainant would not be
physically present during the court hearings, where he was required.

Second, the respondent already returned the amount of ₱650,000 to the complainant. He also executed a Most Respectful Motion to
Dismiss to the effect that he had amicably settled the issues with the complainant.

Finally, the respondent has pleaded judicial clemency in order to reinstate him in the bar. He is also suffering from a chronic kidney
disease. The court considered this as remorse and repentance, warranting mitigation.

LAW:
Rule 15.06 - A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body.
Rule 15.07 - A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and principles of fairness.

TROVELA VS. ROBLES

FACTS:

The complainant initiated this disbarment complaint against Pasig City Assistant Prosecutor Michael B. Robles recommending the
dismissal of his complaint for estafa against Carlo L. Katigbak, Carlos Pedro C. Salonga and Barbara B. Reyes for insufficiency of
evidence; and against Pasig City Prosecs. Emmanuel L. Obuñgen and Jacinto G. Ang, for approving the recommendation of dismissal.

The complainant also seeks the disbarment of former Prosecutor General Arellano and former Secretary of DOJ De Lima for allegedly
incurring inordinate delay in issuing their resolutions resolving his petition for review and motion for reconsideration before the DOJ.
On May 25, 2011, the complainant criminally charged Katigbak, Salonga and Reyes with estafa, alleging that he became the Employee
Relation Director of Sky Cable on November 1, 2004; that he later on received a termination letter dated July 6, 2006 signed by Salonga
informing him of his relief from work and of his compensation being paid until the effective date of his termination; that his payslips for the
periods from July 16, 2006 to July 31, 2006 and from August 1, 2006 to August 15, 2006 still reflected deductions of his savings
contributions to the Meralco Employees Savings and Loan Association (MESALA) amounting to P2,520.00 per payday period; that
withholding taxes of P4,509.45 and P4,235.70, respectively, were also deducted from his compensation; that he discovered that such
deductions were not remitted to MESALA when he closed his account on September 6, 2006; and that Sky Cable did not reimburse the
amounts of his unremitted deductions despite demand.

In his resolution dated September 29, 2011, Robles recommended the dismissal of the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. Obuñgen
and Ang approved the recommendation of dismissal on October 11, 2011.

The complainant filed his petition for review dated November 3, 2011 to appeal the dismissal of his complaint.3

On February 12, 2013, Arellano issued his resolution finding no reversible error in the September 29, 2011 resolution of Robles, hence,
affirming the dismissal of the complaint. The complainant moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by Secretary De Lima.

Consequently, the complainant initiated disbarment proceedings against the respondents, insisting thusly:

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondents should be administratively disciplined based on the allegations of the complainant.

RULING:

NO! The acts complained of undoubtedly arose from the respondents' performance or discharge of official duties as prosecutors of the
Department of Justice. Hence, the authority to discipline respondents Robles, Obuñgen, Ang and Arellano exclusively pertained to their
superior, the Secretary of Justice. In the case of Secretary De Lima, the authority to discipline pertained to the President.

In either case, the authority may also pertain to the Office of the Ombudsman, which similarly exercises disciplinary jurisdiction over them
as public officials pursuant to Section 15, paragraph 1, of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989). Indeed, the accountability
of respondents as officials performing or discharging their official duties as lawyers of the Government is always to be differentiated from
their accountability as members of the Philippine Bar. The IBP has no jurisdiction to investigate them as such lawyers.

Section 15, paragraph 1 of R.A. No. 6770, The Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides

Section 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. — The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or
agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of his primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of
Government, the investigation of such cases.

The 1987 Constitution clothes the Office of the Ombudsman with the administrative disciplinary authority to investigate and prosecute
any act or omission of any government official when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. The Office
of the Ombudsman is the government agency responsible for enforcing administrative, civil, and criminal liability of government officials
"in every case where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient service by the Government to the people." In Samson v.
Restrivera, the Court ruled that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-
feasance committed by any public officer or employee during his or her tenure. Consequently, acts or omissions of public officials relating
to the performance of their functions as government officials are within the administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of the Office of the
Ombudsman.

In Spouses Buffe v. Secretary Gonzales, the Court held that the IBP has no jurisdiction over government lawyers who are charged with
administrative offenses involving their official duties. In the present case, the allegations in Alicias' complaint against Atty. Macatangay,
Atty. Zema, Atty. Ronquillo, and Atty. Buenaflor, which include their (1) failure to evaluate CSC records; (2) failure to evaluate documentary
evidence presented to the CSC; and (3) non-service of CSC Orders and Resolutions, all relate to their misconduct in the discharge of
their official duties as government lawyers working in the CSC. Hence, the IBP has no jurisdiction over Alicias' complaint. These are acts
or omissions connected with their duties as government lawyers exercising official functions in the CSC and within the administrative
disciplinary jurisdiction of their superior or the Office of the Ombudsman.

PEOPLE VS. TENG MONER

FACTS:

Moner was convicted in with the crime of illegal sale of Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, for which he pleaded not guilty.
The prosecution's evidence tends to establish the following facts:

On April 23, 2005, the police operatives of Las Piñas Police Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation Task Force (SAIDSOTF) had
arrested a certain Joel Taudil for possession of illegal drugs.

As per this information, Police Chief Inspector Jonathan Cabal formed a team that would conduct a buy-bust operation for the
apprehension of accused-appellant.

After accused-appellant and his co-accused were arrested, the team proceeded to the Las Piñas City Police Station. The items
confiscated from them were turned over by PO2 Panopio to PO3 Dalagdagan who marked them in the presence of the police operatives,
accused-appellant and his co-accused. PO3 Dalagdagan prepared the corresponding inventory of the confiscated items. The specimens
were then brought to the police crime laboratory for testing. The specimens yielded positive to the test for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu.

Consequently, a case for Violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 was filed against accused-appellant and another for Violation of
Section 11, Article II of R.A. 9165 against him and his co-accused.

It is the contention of the defense that on April 23, 2005, accused-appellant and his co-accused in Criminal Case No. Q-05-133983 were
at the house located along No. 26 Varsity Lane, Philam, Tan.dang Sora, Quezon City to prepare for the wedding of Fatima Macabangen
and Abubakar Usman to be held the following day. While they were inside the house, several armed persons wearing civilian clothes
entered and announced that they were police officers. They searched the whole house and gathered all of them in the living room.

The police officer who was positioned behind accused-appellant and Abubakar dropped a plastic sachet. The former asked accused-
appellant and Abubakar who owns the plastic sachet. When accused-appellant .denied its ownership, the police officer slapped him and
accused him of being a liar. Thereafter, they were all frisked and handcuffed and were brought outside the house. Their personal effects
and belongings were confiscated by the police officers. Then they boarded a jeepney and were brought to [the] Las Piñas Police Station.

Upon their arrival, they were investigated. A police officer asked them to call up anybody who can help them because they only needed
money for their release. Judie Dorado called up [his] mother. They saw the other items allegedly confiscated from them only at the police
station. At around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, they were brought to Camp Crame, Quezon City. From there, they went to Makati for drug
testing and were returned to Las Piñas Police Station.

ISSUE:

Whether or not. the failure of the arresting officers to comply with the statutorily mandated procedure for the handling and custody of the
dangerous drugs allegedly seized from him warrants the dismissal of the case against him.

RULING:

NO! For a successful prosecution of an offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following essential elements must be proven: (1)
that the transaction or ·sale took place; (2) that the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as evidence; and (3) that the buyer and
seller were identified. the aforementioned elements were established by the prosecution..

"Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources
of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and
signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in
the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition[.]

In relation to this, Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 pertinently provides the following:

SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge
and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following
manner:

We have consistently ruled that noncompliance with the requirements of Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 will not necessarily render
the illegal drugs seized or confiscated in a buy-bust operation inadmissible. Strict compliance with the letter of Section 21 is not required
if there is a clear showing that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized illegal drugs have been preserved, i.e., the illegal drugs
being offered in court as evidence is, without a specter of doubt, the very same item recovered in the buy-bust operation.13

Under Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law
or these rules. For evidence to be inadmissible, there should be a law or rule which forbids its reception. If there is no such law or rule,
the evidence must be admitted subject only to the evidentiary weight that will accorded it by the court x x x.

We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule that will bring about the non-admissibility of the confiscated and/or
seized drugs due to noncompliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. The issue therefore, if there is noncompliance with said
section, is not of admissibility, but of weight - evidentiary merit or probative value - to be given the evidence. The weight to be given by
the courts on said evidence depends on the circumstances obtaining in each case.

Stated differently, if the evidence of illegal drugs was not handled precisely in the manner prescribed by the chain of custody rule, the
consequence relates not to inadmissibility that would automatically destroy the prosecution's case but rather to the weight of evidence
presented for each particular case. In the case at bar, the trial court judge convicted Moner on the strength of the credibility of the
prosecution's witnesses despite an imperfect chain of custody concerning the corpus delicti.

The above-quoted provision recognizes that the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses and the admissibility of other evidence are well
within the power of trial court judges to decide. Paragraph (5), Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution vests upon the Supreme
Court the following power, among others:

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified
and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.

Jurisprudence explains the above-quoted constitutional provision m the following manner:

Until the 1987 Constitution took effect, our two previous constitutions textualized a power sharing scheme between the legislature and
this Court in the enactment of judicial rules. Thus, both the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions vested on the Supreme Court the "power to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law." However, these
constitutions also granted to the legislature the concurrent power to "repeal, alter or supplement" such rules.

The 1987 Constitution textually altered the power-sharing scheme under the previous charters by deleting in Section 5(5) of Article VIII
Congress' subsidiary and corrective power. This glaring and fundamental omission led the Court to observe in Echegaray v. Secretary of
Justice that this Court's power to promulgate judicial rules "is no longer shared by this Court with Congress."28

The power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts is a traditional power of this Court.29 This
includes the power to promulgate the rules of evidence.

On the other hand, the Rules of Evidence are provided in the Rules of Court issued by the Supreme Court. However, the chain of custody
rule is not found in the Rules of Court. Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 was passed by the legislative department and its implementing
rules were promulgated by PDEA, in consultation with the Department of Justice (DOJ) and other agencies under and within the executive
department.

SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE VS ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL

FACTS

The case consists of 6 petitions challenging the constitutionality of RA 9372, “An Act to Secure the State and Protect our People from
Terrorism,” aka Human Security Act of 2007. Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being suspected “communist
fronts” by the government, whereas individual petitioners invoke the “transcendental importance” doctrine and their status as citizens and
taxpayers.

Petitioners claim that RA 9372 is vague and broad, in that terms like “widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace”
and “coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand” are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to
measure the prohibited acts.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Human Security Act of 2007 can be facially challenged on the grounds of vagueness and overbreadh doctrines

RULING:

NO! A limited vagueness analysis of the definition of “terrorism” in RA 9372 is legally impossible absent an actual or imminent charge
against them.

A statute or acts suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lack comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.

A “facial” challenge is likewise different from an “as applied” challenge. “Facial” challenge is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing
its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very
existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities. Under no case may ordinary
penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. If facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be
hampered. No prosecution would be possible.
A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein certain rules of constitutional litigation are rightly excepted.

In Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan it was held that:

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible”chilling effect” upon
protected speech. The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility
that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly
broad statutes.

This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and,
if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct.
In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.

ESTRADA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:

Former President Estrada and co-accused were charged for Plunder under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of
Plunder), as amended by RA 7659.

On the information, it was alleged that Estrada have received billions of pesos through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal
acts, or similar schemes or means thereby unjustly enriching himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage of the Filipino
people and the Republic of the Philippines.

Estrada questions the constitutionality of the Plunder Law since for him:
1. it suffers from the vice of vagueness
2. it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions
3. it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code.

Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 8 separate Informations against petitioner. Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion
on the grounds of lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses and opportunity to prove lack of probable
cause but was denied.

Later on, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that a probable cause for the offense of plunder exists
to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused.

Estrada moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 26558 on the ground that the facts alleged therein did NOT constitute an
indictable offense since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness and that the Amended Information for Plunder
charged more than one offense. Same was denied.

The questioned provisions of the petitioners are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 of the Plunder Law which states that:

Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business, enterprise or material possession of any person within the
purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or
business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:

(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any
person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public office
concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions,
agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation
including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders
intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or
(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the
expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten
wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total
value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua
to death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder
shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating
and extenuating circumstances as provided by the Revised Penal Code shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and
all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit
or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State (underscoring supplied).
Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal
act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient
to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy
(underscoring supplied).

ISSUE:

Whether or not the crime of plunder is unconstitutional for being vague?

RULING:

NO! As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would
render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. The amended information itself closely tracks the language of the law,
indicating w/ reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense w/c the petitioner is alleged to have committed.

We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense.

Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms “combination” and “series” in the key
phrase “a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. These omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law
unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, hence violative of his fundamental right to due process.

A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used herein, or because of the employment of terms
without defining them.

A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence most necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects – it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves
law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible “chilling effect” upon
protected speech. The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility
that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly
broad statutes. But in criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.