THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
PACIANO NIERRA alias Pacing, The contention that there was no proof of conspiracy among the accused is belied by
GAUDENCIA NIERRA, FELICISIMO DOBLEN alias Simoy and VICENTE ROJAS, accused-
appellants; GASPAR MISA, accused whose death sentence is under automatic review
96 SCRA 1, February 12, 1980
FACTS:
 Juliana Gadugdug-Nierra, 52, and Paciano Nierra, 39, her brother-in-law, were
competitors in the businesses of launch transportation and the sale of soft
drinks in Barrio Tinago, General Santos City. Juliana sold coca-cola while Paciano
sold pepsi-cola. Juliana was the owner of two motor launches, Elsa I and II, while
Paciano was the owner of two launches, Sylvania I and II.
 Paciano Nierra conceived the idea of liquidating his competitor, Juliana.
Felicisimo Doblen, a cousin-in-law of Paciano, accompanied to Paciano’s house
in the afternoon of July 4, 1969 Gaspar Misa, 29, a convicted murderer who in
1965 had escaped from the Davao Penal Colony. Misa, in the presence of
Gaudencia Garrido-Nierra, the wife of Paciano, agreed to kill Juliana in
consideration of three thousand pesos. Paciano promised that in the morning
after the killing he would pay Misa four hundred pesos.
 In the evening of July 6, 1969, Rojas posted himself at the Bernadette store near
the creek or canal about twenty-seven steps from the scene of the crime.
Gaudencia was stationed near the house of Maning Desinorio about eighteen
steps from the scene of the crime. Paciano was near the house of Juanito
Desinorio about twenty-seven steps from the scene of the crime.
 Misa secluded himself near a warehouse about five steps from the scene of the
crime in close proximity to the back of Juliana’s house where, as he had
previously observed some nights before, she used to answer the call of nature.
Between seven and eight o’clock that night, the unwary Juliana went to the
beach where she was accustomed to void and when she squatted, Misa
unexpectedly appeared behind her, held her hair, thus tilting her face, and while
in that posture, he inserted into her mouth the muzzle of the pistol and fired it.
 Misa was arrested and confessed the crime pointing the Nierra spouses, Doblen,
and Rojas as co-conspirators of killing the victim. They were charged as co-
conspirators of the crime of murder.
ISSUE: W/N Doblen and Rojas are accomplices in the commission of the crime of
murder.
RULIING: (YES)
the facts shown in the record. Misa had no personal motive for killing Juliana Nierra.
He was induced to do so because of the monetary consideration promised by the
Niera spouses. Doblen (Simoy), married to Paciano’s cousin, introduced Misa to the
Nierra spouses.
Doblen’s role was that of having introduced Misa to the Nierra spouses and
delivering the murder weapon to Misa. He was not present at the scene of the
crime. On the other hand, Rojas acted as lookout and received fifty pesos for his
work. After a conscientious reflection on the complicity of Doblen and Rojas, we
have reached the conclusion that they should be held guilty as accomplices. It is true,
strictly speaking, that as co-conspirators they should be punished as co-principals.
However, since their participation was not absolutely indispensable to the
consummation of the murder, the rule that the court should favor the milder form of
liability may be applied to them (People vs. Tamayo, 44 Phil. 38 and other cases).
Other: The fact that the Nierra spouses did not comply with their contractual
commitment to pay Misa the balance of two thousand six hundred pesos must have
impelled him to unmask them and to reveal the truth even if such a revelation
speeled his own destruction.
No. L-30028. May 31, 1982.*
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CRESENCIO DOBLE., ET AL.,
defendants, CRESENCIO DOBLE, SIMEON DOBLE and ANTONIO ROMAQUIN,
defendants-appellants.
FACTS:
 On the night of June 13, 1966, 10 heavily armed men proceeded to Navotas,
Rizal thru a banca and robbed Navotas Branch of the Prudential Bank and Trust
Company. 8 men proceeded to the branch, 2 of them entered the bank asking a
change of their money but the banker declined because they have no small
denominations then 3 men barged in and fired at the ceiling and walls of the
bank. They ordered the employees to lie down, face downward and then
demanded the key to the vault. Since there was no key, they fired at the vault
but were not able to get anything from it.
 They took whatever they can amounting to P10,439.95
 Officers (7) were on duty that night in the police outpost beside the bank when
they heard the shots and went outside in the middle of the road. They were
fired by shots. 3 were dead while the rest were wounded.
 Three appellants had no participation. OSG recommended acquittal of Simeon.
ISSUE: W/N the three appellants are guilty as principals to the crime of robbery.
RULING:
SIMEON – NO, he was acquitted. The only link between Simeon and the crime is his
house having been used as the meeting place of the malefactors for their final
conference before proceeding to Navotas to rob the Prudential Bank branch thereat.
He did not join them because of a 5-year old foot injury which would make him only
a liability, not one who can help in the devilish venture. To the malefactors he was
most unwanted to join them. If they met at his house it was only because it was near
the landing place of the banca, and so he invited them to his house while waiting for
the banca to arrive. His mere presence in his house where the conspirators met, and
for merely telling them that he could not join them because of his foot injury, and
will just wait for them, evidently as a mere gesture of politeness in not being able to
join them in their criminal purpose, for he could not be of any help in the attainment
thereof, and also to avoid being suspected that he was against their vicious plan for
which they may harm him, Simeon is by no means a co-conspirator, not having even
taken active part in the talks among the malefactors in his house.
We, therefore, find no culpable participation of Simeon Doble in the commission of
the crime, for, indeed, by his physical condition alone, he could not in any way be of
help to the malefactors in the pursuit of their criminal design, nor could he have
been desired by the latter to be one of them.
CRESENCIO and ROMAQUIN – NO, they are accomplices
The circumstances pointed out would not make appellants liable as co-principals in
the crime charged. At the most, their liability would be that of mere accomplices.
They joined in the criminal design when Cresencio consented to look for a banca and
Romaquin provided it when asked by the gang leader Joe Intsik, and then brought
the malefactors to the scene of the robbery, despite knowledge of the evil purpose
for which the banca was to be used. It was the banca that brought the malefactors to
the bank to be robbed and carried them away from the scene after the robbery to
prevent their apprehension. Appellants thus cooperated but not in an indispensable
manner. Even without appellants providing the banca, the robbery could have been
committed, especially with the boldness and determination shown by the robbers in
committing the crime.
As to Romaquin, while he testified that the malefactors gave a gun to Cresencio with
which the latter would prevent Romaquin from fleeing away from the scene,
evidently to show that he never joined in the criminal purpose, and that all his acts
were in fear of bodily harm and therefore, not voluntary, the measure taken by the
malefactors to prevent his escape, could have been just an extra precaution, lest he
would be stricken with fear in the course of the commission of the crime specially if
attended by shootings as it was really so. If it is true that he never voluntarily made
the trip with knowledge of the planned robbery, and with Cresencio saying that he
returned the gun given him with which to prevent Romaquin from speeding away,
Romaquin could have tried a getaway, as should have been his natural impulse had
he not joined in the criminal design. His act of hiding the money he received from
the malefactors, and repainting his boat, all attest to his guilty conscience arising
from the act of cooperation he knowingly extended to the principal culprits to
achieve their criminal purpose.
It is however, not established by the evidence that in the meeting held in the house
of Simeon Doble, the malefactors had agreed to kill, if necessary to carry out
successfully the plan to rob. What appellants may be said to have joined is the
criminal design to rob, which makes them accomplices. Their complicity must,
accordingly, be limited to the robbery, not with the killing. Having been left in the
banca, they could not have tried to prevent the killing, as is required of one seeking
relief from liability for assaults committed during the robbery (Art. 296, Revised
Penal Code).2
The finding that appellants are liable as mere accomplices may appear too lenient
considering the gravity and viciousness of the offense with which they were charged.
The evidence, however, fails to establish their complicity by a previous conspiracy
with the real malefactors who actually robbed the bank and killed and injured
several persons, including peace officers. The failure to bring to justice the real and
actual culprits of so heinous a crime should not bring the wrath of the victims nor of
the outraged public, upon the heads of appellants whose participation has not been
shown to be as abominable as those who had gone into hiding. The desire to bring
extreme punishment to the real culprits should not blind Us in meting out a penalty
to appellants more than what they justly deserve, and as the evidence warrants.
G.R. No. 34386. February 7, 1991.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LUDOVICO C. DOCTOLERO alias
“ECOY,” CONRADO C. DOCTOLERO alias “CONDRING,” and VIRGILIO C. DOCTOLERO
alias “VERGEL,” accused-appellants.
FACTS:
 On the night of Nov. 8, 1970, the three accused were throwing stones at the
house of Marcial Sagun, went up to the house where Epifania Escosiom, Lolita
de Guzman and her son Jonathan was there. Ludovico brutally hacking Epifania
and Lolita died while Jonathan had physical injuries.
 While spouses Marcial and Maria Sagun were on their way home, they met the
three accused. Doctolero held the left shoulder of Marcial Sagun with his left
hand and struck Marcial Sagun with a bolo but was able to evade and wrestled
with the bolo. Maria run away because of fear.
 Marcelo Doctolero was going towards the house and when he met the three
accused he was strucked by bolo several times which caused his death by
Ludovico.
ISSUE: W/N Conrado and Virgilio are guilty as an accomplices to the crime
committed. YES
RULING:
It is impossible that both appellants Virgilio Doctolero and Conrado Doctolero did not
know or were not aware when their brother Ludovico was brutally killing the two
women Lolita de Guzman-Oviedo and Epifania Escosio and wounding the child
Jonathan said Oviedo inside the room of house. Furthermore, from the nature,
number, and locations of the many wounds sustained by the two women and child
(Exhs. A, C, D, and D-l), it could not have been possible for Ludovico’s two brothers
Virgilio and Conrado (assuming that they did not go inside the house) not to hear
either the screams of pain of their brother’s victims or the contact between the
blade of his bolo and their bodies when their brother Ludovico was ruthlessly
hacking them several times, x x x Under these circumstances, it is obvious that
appellants Conrado Doctolero and Virgilio themselves knew what was going on
inside the room of the house at the time, but they just stood by and did nothing to
stop their brother Ludovico Doctolero from brutally hacking his women victims to
death. It is, therefore, reasonable to believe that the two appellants, Conrado and
Virgilio, merely stood by as their brother Ludovico Doctolero was murdering the two
deceased women, ready to lend assistance. Indeed, there is no question that the
presence of these two appellants upstairs in the house of Marcial Sagun gave their
brother Ludovico Doctolero the encouragement and reliance to proceed as he did
proceed, in committing the heinous crimes against two defenseless women and a
child.”
We have held that where one goes with the principals, and in staying outside of the
house while the others went inside to rob and kill the victim, the former effectively
supplied the criminals with material and moral aid, making him guilty as an
accomplice.
No. L-32126. July 6, 1978.*
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NEMESIO TALINGDAN,
MAGELLAN TOBIAS, AUGUSTO BERRAS. PEDRO BIDES and TERESA DOMOGMA,
accused-appellants.
FACTS:
 Bernardo and Teresa were spouses with Corazon as their daughter. Their
relationship was already strained and she has deserted her family several times.
Teresa and Talingdan were in an illicit relationship.
 2 days before the crime, Bernardo and Teresa had a quarrel of which he slapped
her several times. She went to the police to sought help but Bernardo ignored
Talingdan because he was armed. The next day Corazon saw her mother and the
accused in a small hut that seems to have been planning the killing of her father.
 On June 24, 1967, after Corazon had dinner she called for her parents to eat
supper. That night she already noticed the people but her father ignored such
and continued plowing. When Bernardo proceeded to the kitchen and when he
sat on the floor he was fired from below the stairs of the batalan. The four
accused went upstairs and shot Bernardo upon seeing that he was still alive.
 Corazon was threatened by the accused and her mother not to talk about that
she saw the people who shot her father.
ISSUE: W/N Teresa is guilty as an accessory to the crime committed by the accused.
RULING: YES
Where there is no sufficient proof of conspiracy as to one accused, she cannot be
held to the same liability as her co-appellants.—True it is that the proof of her direct
participation in the conspiracy is not beyond reasonable doubt, for which reason,
she cannot have the same liability as her co-appellants. Indeed, she had no hand at
all in the actual shooting of her husband. Neither is it clear that she helped directly in
the planning and preparation thereof, albeit We are convinced that she knew it was
going to bo done and did not object. (U.S. vs. Romulo, 15 Phil. 408, 411-414.) It is not
definitely shown that she masterminded it either by herself alone or together with
her co-appellant Talingdan. At best, such conclusion could be plain surmise,
suspicion and conjecture, not really ineludible.
One who conceals or assists in the escape of the principal in the crime, as where she
says to police investigators that she does not have anybody in mind as who killed her
husband although she knew the assailants, can be held guilty as an accessory.—But
this is not saying that she is entirely free from criminal liability. There is in the record
morally convincing proof that she is at the very least an accessory to the offense
committed by her co-accused. She was inside the room when her husband was shot.
As she came out after the shooting, she inquired from Corazon if she was able to
recognize the assailants of her father. When Corazon identified appellants Talingdan,
Tobias, Berras and Bides as the culprits, Teresa did not only enjoin her daughter not
to reveal what she knew to anyone, she went to the extent of warning her, “Don’t
tell it to anyone. I will kill you if you tell this to somebody.” Later, when the peace
officers who repaired to their house to investigate what happened, instead of
helping them with the information given to her by Corazon, she claimed she had no
suspects in mind. In other words, whereas before the actual shooting of her
husband, she was more or less passive in her attitude regarding her co-appellants’
conspiracy, known to her, to do away with him, after Bernardo was killed, she
became active in her cooperation with them. These subsequent acts of her
constitute “concealing or assisting in the escape of the principal in the crime” which
makes her liable as an accessory after the fact under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the
Revised Penal Code.
G.R. No. 84163. October 19, 1989. *
LITO VINO, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS:
 On March 21, 1985, 7PM, Roberto Tejada on his way to watch tv in house of
Isidro Baltazar. At 11PM, Roberto cried out that he had been shot. Ernersto
(father) turned on the light and went to his son calling for his neighbors for help.
Lito Vino and Jessie Salazar were seen riding a bicycle, the former driving and
the latter carrying the armalite. Salazar pointed the armalite to Ernesto and his
companions then the accused left.
ISSUE: W/N Lito Vino is guilty as an accessory to the crime committed.
RULING:
In this case, the correct offense of murder was charged in the information. The
commission of the said crime was established by the evidence. There is no variance
as to the offense committed. The variance is in the participation or complicity of the
petitioner. While the petitioner was being held responsible as a principal in the
information, the evidence adduced, however, showed that his participation is merely
that of an accessory. The greater responsibility necessarily includes the lesser. An
accused can be validly convicted as an accomplice or accessory under an information
charging him as a principal.
The next issue that must be resolved is whether or not the trial of an accessory can
proceed without awaiting the result of the separate charge against the principal. The
answer is also in the affirmative. The corresponding responsibilities of the principal,
accomplice and accessory are distinct from each other. As long as the commission of
the offense can be duly established in evidence the determination of the liability of
the accomplice or accessory can proceed independently of that of the principal.
In the present case, the commission of the crime of murder and the responsibility of
the petitioner as an accessory was established. By the same token there is no doubt
that the commission of the same offense had been proven in the separate case
against Salazar who was charged as principal. However, he was acquitted on the
ground of reasonable doubt by the same judge who convicted Vino as an accessory.
The trial court held that the identity of the assailant was not clearly established. It
observed that only Julius Tejada identified Salazar carrying a rifle while riding on the
bicycle driven by Vino, which testimony is uncorroborated, and that two other
witnesses, Ernesto Tejada and Renato Parvian, who were listed in the information,
who can corroborate the testimony of Julius Tejada, were not presented by the
prosecution.
Although in this case involving Vino the evidence tended to show that the assailant
was Salazar, as two witnesses saw him with a rifle aboard the bicycle driven by Vino,
in the separate trial of the case of Salazar, as above discussed, he was acquitted as
the trial court was not persuaded that he was positively identified to be the man
with the gun riding on the bicycle driven by Vino. In the trial of the case against Vino,
wherein he did not even adduce evidence in his defense, his liability as such an
accessory was established beyond reasonable doubt in that he assisted in the escape
of the assailant from the scene of the crime. The identity of the assailant is of no
material significance for the purpose of the prosecution of the accessory. Even if the
assailant cannot be identified the responsibility of Vino as an accessory is
indubitable.

G.R. No. 124736. September 29, 1999.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMEO GALLO y IGLOSO, accused-
appellant.

FACTS:
