POWER TO PARDON, GRANT REPRIEVE AND COMMUNICATION

LORETA BARRIOQUINTO & NOBERTO JIMENIZ V. ENRIQUE A. FERNANDEZ 1949

Facts:

Petitioners Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged with the crime of murder. Jimenez was sentenced to life imprisonment while Barrioquinto
remained at large. Before the period for appeal had expired, Jimenez became aware of the Proclamation No. 8, which grants amnesty in favor of all
persons who may be charged with an act penalized under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons
aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and committed during the period from December 8, 1941, to the date when particular area of the
Philippines where the offense was actually committed was liberated from enemy control and occupation. Jimenez decided to apply for amnesty.
Barrioquinto, who had then been already apprehended, did the same. The Amnesty Commission returned the cases of the petitioners to the Court
of First Instance of Zamboanga, without deciding on the case saying that since the Barrioquinto and Jimenez deny having committed the crime,
they cannot invoke the benefits of amnesty.

Issue:

Is admission of guilt necessary in amnesty?

Held:

The theory of the respondents, supported by the dissenting opinion, is predicated on a wrong conception of the nature or character of an amnesty.
Amnesty must be distinguished from pardon.

Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the
courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of
which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or
communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after
conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it
abolished or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does "nor work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of
suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon," and it "in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil
indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence"; while amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so
overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he
had committed no offense.

In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation of September 7, 1946, it is not necessary that he should, as a condition
precedent or sine qua non, admit having committed the criminal act or offense with which he is charged and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is
sufficient that the evidence either of the complainant or the accused, shows that the offense committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty
Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say that "invocation of the benefits of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance."
Although the accused does not confess the imputation against him, he may be declared by the courts or the Amnesty Commissions entitled to the
benefits. For, whether or not he admits or confesses having committed the offense with which he is charged, the Commissions should, if necessary
or requested by the interested party, conduct summary hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants and the accused, on whether he has
committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and decide
whether he is entitled to the benefits of amnesty and to be "regarded as a patriot or hero who have rendered invaluable services to the nation,," or
not, in accordance with the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation. Since the Amnesty Proclamation is a public act, the courts as well as the Amnesty
Commissions created thereby should take notice of the terms of said Proclamation and apply the benefits granted therein to cases coming within
their province or jurisdiction, whether pleaded or claimed by the person charged with such offenses or not, if the evidence presented show that
the accused is entitled to said benefits. (Barrioquinto vs. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-1278, January 21, 1949)

RODOLFO D LLAMAS V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OSCAR ORBOS & MARIANO OCAMPO

Facts:

Vice-Governor Llamas together with some other complainants filed an administrative case against Governor Ocampo III of Tarlac for alleged acts
constituting graft and corruption. After trial, the Secretary of the then Department of Local Government found Ocampo guilty of serious neglect of
duty and/or abuse of authority for entering into a loan contract grossly/manifestly disadvantageous to Tarlac Province and meted a penalty of
suspension for 90 days. Llamas, assumed office. In not less than 30 days, however, Executive Secretary Orbos, by authority of the President, issued
a Resolution granting executive clemency to Ocampo (after finding the relative success of Ocampo's livelihood loan program) in the sense that the
latter's 90-day suspension is reduced to the period already served. Ocampo reassumed the governorship of the province, allegedly without any
notification made to Llamas. Llamas questioned the Resolution before the SC.

Petitioner's main argument is that the President may grant executive clemency only in criminal cases, based on Article VII, Section 19 of the
Constitution which reads:
Sec. 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and

pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress.

Petitioner argued that the qualifying phrase “after conviction by final judgment” applies solely to criminal cases, and no other law allows the grant
of executive clemency or pardon to anyone who has been “convicted in an administrative case.

Respondent Governor avers that since under the Constitution discretionary authority is granted to the President on the exercise of executive
clemency, the same constitutes a political question which is beyond judicial review.

Issues:

1. Is the question on the exercise of executive clemency by the president a political question?

2. May the President grant executive clemency in administrative cases?

3. Was petitioner's right to due process violated when he was not notified of the grant of executive clemency?

Held:

1. While it is true that courts cannot inquire into the manner in which the President's discretionary powers are exercised or into the wisdom for its
exercise, it is also a settled rule that the Court may exercise its power of judicial review when the issue involved concerns the validity of such
discretionary powers or whether said powers are within the limits prescribed by the Constitution. And such review does not constitute a
modification or correction of the act of the President, nor does it constitute interference with the functions of the President. Besides, under the
1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court has been conferred an "expanded jurisdiction" to review the decisions of the other branches and agencies of
the government to determine whether or not they have acted within the bounds of the Constitution.

2. Yes. "Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguire debemos." If the law does not distinguish, so We must not distinguish. The Constitution does not
distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. By the
same token, if executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of
impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Following petitioner's proposed interpretation, cases of
impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses. In the same vein, We do not clearly
see any valid and convincing reason why the President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is Our considered view that if the
President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant
executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.

If those already adjudged guilty criminally in court may be pardoned, those adjudged guilty administratively should likewise be extended the same
benefit. In criminal cases, the quantum of evidence required to convict an individual is proof beyond reasonable doubt, but the Constitution grants
to the President the power to pardon the act done by the proved criminal and in the process exempts him from punishment therefor. On the other
hand, in administrative cases, the quantum of evidence required is mere substantial evidence to support a decision, not to mention that as to the
admissibility of evidence, administrative bodies are not bound by the technical and rigid rules of admissibility prescribed in criminal cases. It will
therefore be unjust and unfair for those found guilty administratively of some charge if the same effects of pardon or executive clemency cannot
be extended to them, even in the sense of modifying a decision to subserve the interest of the public.

Moreover, the President, in the exercise of her power of supervision and control over all executive departments, may substitute her decision for
that of her subordinate, most especially where the basis therefor would be to serve the greater public interest. It is clearly within the power of the
President not only to grant "executive clemency" but also to reverse or modify a ruling issued by a subordinate against an erring public official,
where a reconsideration of the facts alleged would support the same. It is in this sense that the alleged executive clemency was granted, after
adducing reasons that subserve the public interest. — "the relative success of . . . livelihood loan program.

However, that when we say the President can grant executive clemency in administrative cases, we refer only to all administrative cases in the
Executive branch, not in the Judicial or Legislative branches of the government.

3. Petitioner's argument that his constitutional rights to due process were violated is uruneritorious. Pardon has been defined as "the private,
though official, act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended and not communicated officially to the
court. ..." Thus, assuming that petitioner was not notified of the subject pardon, it is only because said notice is unnecessary. (Llamas vs. Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 99031, October 15, 1991)

SALVACION A. MONSANTO V. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN JR.

Facts:

The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) of the crime of estafa through
falsification of public documents. She was sentenced to jail and to indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50.The SC affirmed the decision.
She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was extended by then President Marcos absolute pardon which
she accepted (at that time, the rule was that clemency could be given even before conviction). By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the
Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant. Her letter was
referred to the Minister of Finance who ruled that she may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new appointment not earlier
than the date she was extended the absolute pardon.

Petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which implies that her service in the
government has never been interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her preventive suspension;
that she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the proportionate share of the
amount of P4,892.50

The Ministry referred the issue to the Office of the President. Deputy Executive Secretary Factoran denied Monsanto’s request averring that
Monsanto must first seek appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate her former position.

Issues:

1. Is Monsanto entitled to backpay?

2. Is a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, entitled to reinstatement to her former position without
need of a new appointment?

3. May petitioner be exempt from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon her by the sentence?

Held:

1. Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on
whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive
magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the Court.

While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as though
he never committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon
implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral stain. It involves
forgiveness and not forgetfulness.

A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the
offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. “Since the offense has been
established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and
justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required.” This would explain why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive
backpay for lost earnings and benefits.

2. The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To
regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.

3. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the
sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioner's civil liability may only be extinguished by the same causes
recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor,
compensation and novation. (Monsanto vs. Factoran, G.R. No. 78239, February 9, 1989)

VALENTINO L. LEGASPI V. THE HONORABLE MINSTER OF FINANCE

Facts:

Petition filed by the Honorable Valentino L. Legaspi, incumbent member of the interim Batasang Pambansa, praying that this Court declare
Presidential Decree 1840 "granting tax amnesty and filing of statement of assets and liabilities and some other purposes"... unconstitutional.

5. That said decree was issued by the President under supposed legislative powers granted him under Amendment No. 6 of the Constitution

That said decree was promulgated despite the fact that under the Constitution '(T)he Legislative power shall be vested in a Batasang Pambansa'
(Sec. 1, Article VIII) and the President may grant amnesty only 'with concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa (Sec. 11, Art.
VII);

7. That Amendment No. 6 is not one of the powers granted the President by the Constitution

Issues:

Whether the 1973 Constitution as amended by Plebiscite-Referendum of 1976, retained the same amendments, more particularly Amendment No.
6, after it was again amended in the Plebiscite held on April 7,... 1981?

Ruling:

"Amendment No. 6 as originally submitted to the people for ratification under Pres. Dec. No. 1033, and thereafter approved reads as follows:

'Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the
Interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in... his
judgment requires immediate action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instruction, which
shall form part of the law of the land.'

After mature study and deliberation and considering the peculiar circumstances that dictated the formulation of Amendment No. 6, the Court's
conclusion is that Assemblyman-Petitioner's posture lacks, to say the least, sufficient merit.

It is, therefore, evident that the reference to Amendment No. 2 in the amendments of 1981 was not intended at all to convert or upgrade the
present existing assembly into the regular Batasang Pambansa. To repeat, what we have now is still the interim Batasang Pambansa created... in
1976.

Having arrived at the ineludible conclusion that the present Batasan is still interim, it also ineluctably follows that its legislative authority cannot be
more exclusive now after 1981 amendments than when it was originally created in 1976. Thus even as the interim Batasan... which came into being
"in lieu of the Interim National Assembly" by virtue of Amendment No. 2 consequently acquired "the same powers and its Members - - - the same
functions, responsibilities, rights and privileges, and disqualifications as the regular National Assembly and the

Members thereof", there can be no question that coeval with the creation of the interim Batasan, Amendment No. 6 came into force and effect.
And Amendment No. 6 mandates in unequivocal and unambiguous terms the grant of concurrent legislative authority to an official (the

President [Prime Minister]) who is not in the Batasan itself.

Actually, the insistence of petitioner that Amendment No. 6 has been repealed by the 1981 amendments springs from another point of view. It is
fundamentally based on analysis and ratiocination related to the language and tenor thereof. Petitioner maintains that said... amendments vested
extraordinary legislative powers on "the President (Prime Minister)" and on nobody else, and since there is no one who is President (Prime
Minister) under our present governmental set-up pursuant to 1981 amendments, no one in the existing government can... exercise said powers.

At this juncture, it must be emphatically made clear that explicitly, the power that Amendment No. 6 vests upon the "President (Prime Minister)"
are to be exercised only on two specified occasions, namely, (1) "when in (his judgment) a grave emergency exists or there is a... threat or
imminence thereof" and (2) "whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly (now regular Batasang Pambansa) fails or
is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action." The power is to "issue... necessary
decrees, orders, or letters of instruction which shall form part of the law of the land." As the tenor of the amendment readily imparts, such power
may be exercised even when the Batasan is in session. Obviously, therefore, it is a power that is in the nature of the... other powers which the
Constitution directly confers upon the President or allows to be delegated to him by the Batasan in times of crises and emergencies.

It appears, therefore, that within the four corners of the Constitution itself, whether that of 1935 or that of 1973, there were four constitutionally
designed ways of coping with abnormal situations in the country, namely: (1) the so-called emergency powers delegated by the... assembly to the
President; (2) the calling of the armed forces; (3) the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and (4) the placing of the country or
any part thereof under martial law. Understandably, it is to be supposed that these measures are to be resorted... to one after the other according
to the degree of gravity of the situation.

Why does the country have to have a one-man legislating authority concurrent with the Batasang Pambansa?

Are the above-discussed safeguards not enough?

At this point, it must be noted that Amendment No. 6 does not refer only to the interim Batasang Pambansa but also to the regular "National
Assembly" (now Batasang Pambansa)

We have said earlier that the Constitution has four built-in measures to cope with crises and emergencies. To reiterate, they are: (a) emergency
powers expressly delegated by the Batasan; (b) call of the armed forces, who otherwise are supposed to be in the barracks; (c)... suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (d) martial law. Of these four, the people dislike martial law most and would, if possible, do away with it
in the Constitution. And the President who first conceived of what is now Amendment No. 6 knew this. Thus,... Our understanding of the
development of events and attitudes that led to the adoption of Amendment No. 6 is that in addition to the four measures authorized in the body
of the charter, this amendment is supposed to be a fifth one purportedly designed to make it practically... unnecessary to proclaim martial law,
except in instances of actual surface warfare or rebellious activities or very sophisticated subversive actions that cannot be adequately met without
martial law itself. Very evidently, the purpose of Amendment No. 6 is that the Philippines... be henceforth spared of martial law unless manifest
extreme situations should ever demand it.

Anent petitioner's claim that the President may not constitutionally grant the amnesty provided for in P.D. 1840, to Our mind, the following well
taken brief answer of the Solicitor General, with whom We fully agree, is more than sufficient to dispose of the same adversely to... petitioner's
stance:

"Petitioner argues that Presidential Decree 1840 is likewise invalid for it did not enjoy the concurrence of the Batasan. He relies on Article VII,
section 11 of the Constitution which provides that

'The President may, except in cases of impeachment, grant reprieves commutations and pardons, remit fines and forfeitures and with the
concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa, grant amnesty.'

"Again, we beg to disagree. Article VII, sec. 11, applies only when the President is exercising his power of executive clemency. In the case at bar,
Presidential Decree 1840 was issued pursuant to his power to legislate under Amendment No. 6. It ought to be indubitable that... when the
President acts as legislator as in the case at bar, he does not need the concurrence of the Batasan. Rather, he exercises concurrent authority vested
by the Constitution."

Nowhere else in the world but in the Philippines are martial law decrees and acts subject to the judicial scrutiny of the Supreme Court. Amendment

No. 6 is of the same strain. It is our native and indigenous way of coping with crucial situations.

All the above premises taken into account, Our considered conclusion and judgment is that Amendment No. 6 of October 1976 of the Constitution
of 1973 has not been in anyway altered or modified, much less repealed by the constitutional amendments of 1981.

President is both head of state and head of government while the Prime Minister,... despite his lofty title, is but an alter ego of the President.

ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL ET AL. V. COMELEC & JOSEPH E. ESTRADA

FACTS:

 September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada, a former President of the Republic of the Philippines, for
the crime of plunder.
 October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (former President Arroyo) extended executive clemency, by way
of pardon, to former President Estrada.
 October 2, 2012, former President Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of Candidacy, this time
vying for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of Manila.
 January 24, 2013, Risos-Vidal, the petitioner in this case, filed a Petition for Disqualification against former President Estrada before the
COMELEC. Risos Vidal anchored her petition on the theory that "Former President Estrada is Disqualified to Run for Public Office because of his
Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan Sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with Perpetual Absolute Disqualification."

ISSUE:

 Whether or not former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as a result of the pardon granted to him by
former President Arroyo.

HELD:

 Yes, former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as a result of the pardon granted to him by former
President Arroyo. It is well-entrenched that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. Verba legis non est recedendum. From the words of a statute there should be no
departure. It is this Court’s firm view that the phrase in the presidential pardon at issue which declares that former President Estrada "is hereby
restored to his civil and political rights" substantially complies with the requirement of express restoration.

POWER TO VETO, IN GENERAL

POWER OVER THE NATIONAL BUDGET AND GENERAL APPROPRIATION

TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA JR & AQUILINO Q PIMENTEL, JR V. HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE ET AL.

FACTS:

The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under
 RA 6831, otherwise known as the General Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the DECS amount to
P27,017,813,000.00.

The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18, entitled “ Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered
Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), “by PD No. 1177, entitled “Revising the Budget Process in Order to
Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society,” and by PD No.1967, entitled “An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment
Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For
The Purpose.”

The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service, it being higher than the budget
for education, therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution which mandates to “assign the highest budgetary priority
to education.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional; it being higher than the budget for education.

HELD:

No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to “assign the highest budgetary priority
to education,” it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives
of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives.

Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our
enormous debt…It is not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our
economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the share allocated to education, the
Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutiona.

GRECO BELGICA ET AL. V. HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR., ET AL

NATURE:
These are consolidated petitions taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System.

FACTS:
The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had
swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints were filed before the Office of
the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers’ chiefs -of-staff or representatives,
the heads and other officials of three (3) implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.
Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for
agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO. Several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel
System" be declared unconstitutional

G.R. No. 208493 – SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition
be issued permanently
G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the
GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that
the Court issue a TRO against respondents

UDK-14951 – A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order be issued restraining President
Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to Members of Congress

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they
violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d)
accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.
2. Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD
1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power.

HELD:
1. Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund
realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly
belong to the sphere of budget execution. This violates the principle of separation of powers. Congress‘role must be confined to mere oversight
that must be confined to: (1) scrutiny and (2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws. Any action or step beyond that will
undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the constitution.

Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-
enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of
powers principle and thus unconstitutional.

2. Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President”‖ constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority with respect
to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. It gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other
purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.”

Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993- the phrases:

(b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” was declared constitutional. IT INDICATED PURPOSE ADEQUATELY CURTAILS THE
AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO SPEND THE PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND ONLY FOR RESTORATION PURPOSES WHICH ARISE FROM CALAMITIES.

(b)” and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the
President of the Philippines” was declared unconstitutional.IT GIVES THE PRESIDENT CARTE BLANCHE AUTHORITY TO USE THE SAME FUND FOR
ANY INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT HE MAY SO DETERMINE AS A ―PRIORITY‖. VERILY, THE LAW DOES NOT SUPPLY A DEFINITION OF ―PRIORITY
INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS‖ AND HENCE, LEAVES THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ANY GUIDELINE TO CONSTRUE THE SAME.

POWER TO ENTER INTO TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS & THE COLLECTORS OF CUSTOMS V. EASTERN SEA TRADING

FACTS: EST was a shipping company charged in the importation from Japan of onion and garlic into the Philippines. In 1956, the Commissioner of
Customs ordered the seizure and forfeiture of the import goods because EST was not able to comply with Central Bank Circulars 44 and 45. The
said circulars were pursuant to EO 328 w/c sought to regulate the importation of such non-dollar goods from Japan (as there was a Trade and
Financial Agreement b/n the Philippines and Japan then). EST questioned the validity of the said EO averring that the said EO was never concurred
upon by the Senate. The issue was elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals and the latter ruled in favor of EST. The Commissioner appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the EO is subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the Senate.

HELD: No, executive Agreements are not like treaties which are subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the members of the Senate.
Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties are commonly referred to as executive agreements and are no less common in
our scheme of government than are the more formal instruments — treaties and conventions. They sometimes take the form of exchanges of
notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated ‘agreements’ or ‘protocols’. The point where ordinary correspondence
between this and other governments ends and agreements — whether denominated executive agreements or exchanges of notes or otherwise —
begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It would be useless to undertake to discuss here the large variety of executive
agreements as such, concluded from time to time. Hundreds of executive agreements, other than those entered into under the trade- agreements
act, have been negotiated with foreign governments. . . . It would seem to be sufficient, in order to show that the trade agreements under the act
of 1934 are not anomalous in character, that they are not treaties, and that they have abundant precedent in our history, to refer to certain classes
of agreements heretofore entered into by the Executive without the approval of the Senate. They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels,
navigation dues, income tax on shipping profits, the admission of civil aircraft, customs matters, and commercial relations generally, international
claims, postal matters, the registration of trade-marks and copyrights, etc. Some of them were concluded not by specific congressional
authorization but in conformity with policies declared in acts of Congress with respect to the general subject matter, such as tariff acts; while still
others, particularly those with respect to the settlement of claims against foreign governments, were concluded independently of any legislation.

WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (WHO) & DR. LEONCE VERSTUFT V. HON. BENJAMIN H. AQUINO ET AL.

Facts:

Petitioner, Dr. Leonce Verstuyft, was assigned on December 6, 1971 by the WHO to the Regional Office in Manila as Acting Assistant Director of
Health Services. He is entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the Host Agreement executed on July 22, 1951 between the Philippine
Government and the World Health Organization.
When petitioner Verstuyft’s personal effects contained in twelve (12) crates entered the Philippines as unaccompanied baggage on January 10,
1972, they were accordingly allowed free entry from duties and taxes.

The crates were directly stored at the Eternit Corporation’s warehouse at Mandaluyong, Rizal, “pending his relocation into permanent quarters.”

Nevertheless, as above stated, respondent judge, Hon. Benjamin H. Aquino, issued on March 3, 1972 upon application on the same date of
respondents Constabulary Offshore Action Center (COSAC) officers search warrant for alleged violation of RA No. 4712 directing the search and
seizure of the dutiable items in said crates.

Upon protest of March 6, 1972 of Dr. Francisco Dy, WHO Regional Director for the Western Pacific stationed in Manila, Secretary of Foreign
Affairs Carlos P. Romulo, personally wired on the same date respondent judge advising that Dr. Verstuyft is entitled to immunity from search.

The Office of the Solicitor General filed an extended comment stating the official position of the executive branch of the Philippine Government
that petitioner Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic immunity. The Solicitor General accordingly joined petitioner Verstuyft’s prayer for the quashal of
the search warrant. Respondent judge nevertheless summarily denied quashal of the search warrant.

Hence, the petition at bar.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner Verstuyft is entitled “to all privileges and immunities, exemptions and facilities accorded to diplomatic envoys in
accordance with international law” under section 24 of the Host Agreement.

Ruling:

Yes. It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is essentially a
political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of
diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to
accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law officer of the government, the Solicitor General in this case, or
other officer acting under his direction.

Hence, even assuming arguendo as against the categorical assurance of the executive branch of government that respondent judge had some
ground to prefer respondents COSAC officers’ suspicion that there had been an abuse of diplomatic immunity, the continuation of the search
warrant proceedings before him was not the proper remedy. He should, nevertheless, in deference to the exclusive competence and jurisdiction of
the executive branch of government to act on the matter, have acceded to the quashal of the search warrant, and forwarded his findings or
grounds to believe that there had been such abuse of diplomatic immunity to the Department of Foreign Affairs for it to deal with, in accordance
with the aforementioned Convention, if so warranted.

BAYAN (BAGONG ALYANSA MAKABAYAN) ET AL., V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RONALDO ZAMORA, ET AL.

BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan), a Junk VFA Movement, Bishop Tomas Millamena (Iglesia Filipina Independiente), Bishop Elmer Bolocan
(United Church of Christ of the Phil.), Dr. Reynaldo Legasca, Md, Kilusang Mambubukid Ng Pilipinas, Kilusang Mayo Uno, Gabriela, Prolabor, and
The Public Interest Law Center, petitioners, vs. Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, Foreign Affairs Secretary Domingo Siazon, Defense Secretary
Orlando Mercado, Brig. Gen. Alexander Aguirre, Senate President Marcelo Fernan, Senator Franklin Drilon, Senator Blas Ople, Senator Rodolfo
Biazon, And Senator Francisco Tatad, respondents.

Facts: On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged a Military Bases Agreement which formalized, among others,
the use of installations in the Philippine territory by United States military personnel. In view of the impending expiration of the RP-US Military
Bases Agreement in 1991, the Philippines and the United States negotiated for a possible extension of the military bases agreement. On September
16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, in effect, would have extended
the presence of US military bases in the Philippines. On July 18, 1997, the United States panel, headed by US Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Asia Pacific Kurt Campbell, met with the Philippine panel, headed by Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Rodolfo Severino Jr., to exchange notes on
“the complementing strategic interests of the United States and the Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region.” Both sides discussed, among other
things, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA for brevity). Thereafter, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA,
which was respectively signed by public respondent Secretary Siazon and Unites States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard. On October 5, 1998,
President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA. On October 6, 1998, the President, acting through
respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, officially transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines, the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of
the President and the VFA, for concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution

Issues (justiciable controversy): (1) Whether or not petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to question the
constitutionality of the VFA; (2) whether the VFA is governed by the provisions of Section 21, Article VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the
Constitution; (3) and whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction.

Ruling: (1) No. Petitioners failed to show that they have sustained, or are in danger of sustaining any direct injury as a result of the enforcement of
the VFA. As taxpayers, petitioners have not established that the VFA involves the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers. On this
point, it bears stressing that a taxpayer’s suit refers to a case where the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds
derived from taxation.

(2) Yes.The fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under Section 21, Article VII, and that the Senate extended its concurrence under
the same provision, is immaterial. For in either case, whether under Section 21, Article VII or Section 25, Article XVIII, the fundamental law is
crystalline that the concurrence of the Senate is mandatory to comply with the strict constitutional requirements.

(3) No. In fine, absent any clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondents, the Court as the final arbiter of legal controversies
and staunch sentinel of the rights of the people is then without power to conduct an incursion and meddle with such affairs purely executive and
legislative in character and nature. For the Constitution no less, maps out the distinct boundaries and limits the metes and bounds within which
each of the three political branches of government may exercise the powers exclusively and essentially conferred to it by law.

SENATOR AQUILINO PIMENTEL JR., ET AL V. OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARYH HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, ET AL

Facts:

1. The petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit
the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippinesfor its concurrence pursuant to Sec. 21, Art
VII of the 1987 Constitution.

2. The Rome Statute established the Int'l Criminal Court which will have jurisdiction over the most serious crimes as genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression as defined by the Statute. The Philippines through the Chargie du Affairs in UN. The provisions of
the Statute however require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory state.

3. Petitioners contend that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic and international law, is a function of the Senate, hence it is the duty of the
Executive Department to transmit the signed copy to the senate to allow it to exercise its discretion.

Issue: Whether or not the Exec. Secretary and the DFA have the ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed
by a member of the Philippine mission to the U.N. even without the signature of the President.

The Supreme Court held NO.

1. The President as the head of state is the sole organ and authorized in the external relations and he is also the country's sole representative with
foreign nations, He is the mouthpiece with respect to the country's foreign affairs.

2. In treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states and enter into treaties but this power is limited by the
Constitution with the 2/3 required vote of all the members of the Senate for the treaty to be valid. (Sec. 21, Art VII).

3. The legislative branch part is essential to provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign relations, to ensure the nation's pursuit of
political maturity and growth.

R.A.V. SAGUISAG ET AL V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO OCHOA JR. ET AL

FACTS:

This is a Resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration seeking to reverse the Decision of this Court in Saguisag et. al., v. Executive Secretary dated
12 January 2016.

Petitioners claim this Court erred when it ruled that the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the Philippines and the US was
not a treaty. In connection to this, petitioners move that EDCA must be in the form of a treaty in order to comply with the constitutional restriction
under Section 25, Article· XVIII of the 1987 Constitution on foreign military bases, troops, and facilities. Additionally, they reiterate their arguments
on the issues of telecommunications, taxation, and nuclear weapons.

The principal reason for the Motion for Reconsideration is evidently petitioners’ disagreement with the Decision that EDCA implements the VFA
and Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT).

Petitioners argue that EDCA’s provisions fall outside the allegedly limited scope of the VFA and MDT because it provides a wider arrangement than
the VFA for military bases, troops, and facilities, and it allows the establishment of U.S. military bases.

ISSUE:

Whether or not EDCA is a treaty.

RULING:

Petitioners detail their objections to EDCA in a similar way to their original petition, claiming that the VFA and MDT did not allow EDCA to contain
the following provisions:

1. Agreed Locations

2. Rotational presence of personnel

3. U.S. contractors

4. Activities of U.S. contractors

We ruled in Saguisag, et. al. that the EDCA is not a treaty despite the presence of these provisions. The very nature of EDCA, its provisions and
subject matter, indubitably categorize it as an executive agreement – a class of agreement that is not covered by the Article XVIII Section 25
restriction – in painstaking detail. To partially quote the Decision:

Executive agreements may dispense with the requirement of Senate concurrence because of the legal mandate with which they are concluded.

As culled from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, past Supreme Court Decisions, and works of noted scholars, executive
agreements merely involve arrangements on the implementation of existing policies, rules, laws, or agreements.

They are concluded

(1) to adjust the details of a treaty;

(2) pursuant to or upon confirmation by an act of the Legislature; or

(3) in the exercise of the President’s independent powers under the Constitution.

The raison d’etre of executive agreements hinges on prior constitutional or legislative authorizations.

The special nature of an executive agreement is not just a domestic variation in international agreements.

International practice has accepted the use of various forms and designations of international agreements, ranging from the traditional notion of a
treaty – which connotes a formal, solemn instrument – to engagements concluded in modern, simplified forms that no longer necessitate
ratification.
An international agreement may take different forms: treaty, act, protocol, agreement, concordat, compromis d’arbitrage, convention, covenant,
declaration, exchange of notes, statute, pact, charter, agreed minute, memorandum of agreement, modus vivendi, or some other form.

Consequently, under international law, the distinction between a treaty and an international agreement or even an executive agreement is
irrelevant for purposes of determining international rights and obligations.

However, this principle does not mean that the domestic law distinguishing treaties, international agreements, and executive agreements is
relegated to a mere variation in form, or that the constitutional requirement of Senate concurrence is demoted to an optional constitutional
directive. There remain two very important features that distinguish treaties from executive agreements and translate them into terms of art in the
domestic setting.

First, executive agreements must remain traceable to an express or implied authorization under the Constitution, statutes, or treaties. The absence
of these precedents puts the validity and effectivity of executive agreements under serious question for the main function of the Executive is to
enforce the Constitution and the laws enacted by the Legislature, not to defeat or interfere in the performance of these rules. In turn, executive
agreements cannot create new international obligations that are not expressly allowed or reasonably implied in the law they purport to implement.

Second, treaties are, by their very nature, considered superior to executive agreements. Treaties are products of the acts of the Executive and the
Senate unlike executive agreements, which are solely executive actions. Because of legislative participation through the Senate, a treaty is regarded
as being on the same level as a statute. If there is an irreconcilable conflict, a later law or treaty takes precedence over one that is prior. An
executive agreement is treated differently. Executive agreements that are inconsistent with either a law or a treaty are considered ineffective. Both
types of international agreement are nevertheless subject to the supremacy of the Constitution.

Subsequently, the Decision goes to great lengths to illustrate the source of EDCA’s validity, in that as an executive agreement it fell within the
parameters of the VFA and MDT, and seamlessly merged with the whole web of Philippine law. We need not restate the arguments here. It suffices
to state that this Court remains unconvinced that EDCA deserves treaty status under the law.

We find no reason for EDCA to be declared unconstitutional. It fully conforms to the Philippines’ legal regime through the MDT and VFA. It also fully
conforms to the government’s continued policy to enhance our military capability in the face of various military and humanitarian issues that may
arise.

POWER TO CONTRACT OR GUARANTEE FOREIGN LOANS

SPOUSES CONSTANTINO V. CUISA

During the Aquino regime, her administration came up w/ a scheme to reduce the country’s external debt. The solution resorted to was to incur
foreign debts. Three restructuring programs were sought to initiate the program for foreign debts – they are basically buyback programs & bond-
conversion programs). Constantino as a taxpayer and in behalf of his minor children who are Filipino citizens, together w/ FFDC averred that the
buyback and bond-conversion schemes are onerous and they do not constitute the loan “contract” or “guarantee” contemplated in Sec. 20, Art. 7
of the Constitution. And assuming that the President has such power unlike other powers which may be validly delegated by the President, the
power to incur foreign debts is expressly reserved by the Constitution in the person of the President. They argue that the gravity by which the
exercise of the power will affect the Filipino nation requires that the President alone must exercise this power. They argue that the requirement of
prior concurrence of an entity specifically named by the Constitution–the Monetary Board–reinforces the submission that not respondents but the
President “alone and personally” can validly bind the country. Hence, they would like Cuisia et al to stop acting pursuant to the scheme.

ISSUE: Whether or not the president can validly delegate her debt power to the respondents.

HELD: There is no question that the president has borrowing powers and that the president may contract or guarantee foreign loans in behalf of
this country w/ prior concurrence of the Monetary Board. It makes no distinction whatsoever and the fact that a debt or a loan may be onerous is
irrelevant. On the other hand, the president can delegate this power to her direct subordinates. The evident exigency of having the Secretary of
Finance implement the decision of the President to execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the fact that the process of establishing
and executing a strategy for managing the government’s debt is deep within the realm of the expertise of the Department of Finance, primed as it
is to raise the required amount of funding, achieve its risk and cost objectives, and meet any other sovereign debt management goals. If the
President were to personally exercise every aspect of the foreign borrowing power, he/she would have to pause from running the country long
enough to focus on a welter of time-consuming detailed activities–the propriety of incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and choosing among the
many methods that may be taken toward this end, meeting countless times with creditor representatives to negotiate, obtaining the concurrence
of the Monetary Board, explaining and defending the negotiated deal to the public, and more often than not, flying to the agreed place of
execution to sign the documents. This sort of constitutional interpretation would negate the very existence of cabinet positions and the respective
expertise which the holders thereof are accorded and would unduly hamper the President’s effectivity in running the government. The act of the
respondents are not unconstitutional.
Exception
There are certain acts which, by their very nature, cannot be validated by subsequent approval or ratification by the President. There are certain
constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and no amount of approval
or ratification will validate the exercise of any of those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, in his power to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus and proclaim martial law and the exercise by him of the benign prerogative of pardon (mercy).
There are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental
freedoms, or at least call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of government. The declaration
of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power notwithstanding the judicial determination of
guilt of the accused, all fall within this special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested power. The
list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a showing that the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import.

SPOWER TO IMPOSE TARIFF AND TAXES

THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO ET AL. V. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PH, PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP)
ET. AL

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in line with the government‘s policy of pursuing peace negotiations with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF), asked Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad to convince the MILF to continue negotiating with the government. MILF, thereafter, convened
its Central Committee and decided to meet with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP). Formal peace talks were held in Libya
which resulted to the crafting of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) which consists of three (3) aspects: a.) security
aspect; b.) rehabilitation aspect; and c.) ancestral domain aspect. Various negotiations were held which led to the finalization of the Memorandum
of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). The said memorandum was set to be signed last August 5, 2008. In its body, it grants ―the
authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro to the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE). The latter,
in addition, has the freedom to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relation with foreign countries. ―The sharing between the Central
Government and the BJE of total production pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE. The MOA-AD further provides for the
extent of the territory of the Bangsamoro. It describes it as ―the land mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains,
including the aerial domain and the atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region. With regard to
governance, on the other hand, a shared responsibility and authority between the Central Government and BJE was provided. The relationship was
described as ―associative. With the formulation of the MOA-AD, petitioners aver that the negotiation and finalization of the MOA-AD violates
constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation, as mandated by Executive Order No. 3, and right to information. They further
contend that it violates the Constitution and laws. Hence, the filing of the petition.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not the MOA-AD violates constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and right to information 2) Whether or not
the MOA-AD violates the Constitution and the laws.

HELD:

The MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which
directly affects the lives of the public at large. Intended as a ―splendid symmetry to the right to information under the Bill of Rights is the policy of
public disclosure under Section 28, Article II of the Constitution which provides that subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State
adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. Moreover, the policy of full public disclosure
enunciated in above-quoted Section 28 complements the right of access to information on matters of public concern found in the Bill of Rights. The
right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give
information even if nobody demands. The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the conduct of public affairs in a
genuinely open democracy, with the people‘s right to know as the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be accountable by following such
policy. These provisions are vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to hold public officials at all times accountable to the
people. Indubitably, the effectivity of the policy of public disclosure need not await the passing of a statute. As Congress cannot revoke this
principle, it is merely directed to provide for ―reasonable safeguards.‖ The complete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates
that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature. Since both provisions go hand-in-hand, it is absurd to
say that the broader right to information on matters of public concern is already enforceable while the correlative duty of the State to disclose its
transactions involving public interest is not enforceable until there is an enabling law. Respondents cannot thus point to the absence of an
implementing legislation as an excuse in not effecting such policy. An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or
process of communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion
be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people‘s will. Envisioned to be corollary to the twin rights to
information and disclosure is the design for feedback mechanisms. The imperative of a public consultation, as a species of the right to information,
is evident in the ―marching orders‖ to respondents. The mechanics for the duty to disclose information and to conduct public consultation
regarding the peace agenda and process is manifestly provided by E.O. No. 3. The preambulatory clause of E.O. No. 3 declares that there is a need
to further enhance the contribution of civil society to the comprehensive peace process by institutionalizing the people‘s participation. One of the
three underlying principles of the comprehensive peace process is that it ―should be community-based, reflecting the sentiments, values and
principles important to all Filipinos and ―shall be defined not by the government alone, nor by the different contending groups only, but by all
Filipinos as one community. Included as a component of the comprehensive peace process is consensus-building and empowerment for peace,
which includes ―continuing consultations on both national and local levels to build consensus for a peace agenda and process, and the
mobilization and facilitation of people‘s participation in the peace process.Clearly, E.O. No. 3 contemplates not just the conduct of a plebiscite to
effectuate “continuing” consultations, contrary to respondents’ position that plebiscite is “more than sufficient consultation.Further, E.O. No. 3
enumerates the functions and responsibilities of the PAPP, one of which is to ―conduct regular dialogues with the National Peace Forum (NPF) and
other peace partners to seek relevant information, comments, recommendations as well as to render appropriate and timely reports on the
progress of the comprehensive peace process. E.O. No. 3 mandates the establishment of the NPF to be ―the principal forum for the Presidential
Adviser on Peace Progress (PAPP) to consult with and seek advi[c]e from the peace advocates, peace partners and concerned sectors of society on
both national and local levels, on the implementation of the comprehensive peace process, as well as for government[-]civil society dialogue and
consensus-building on peace agenda and initiatives. In fine, E.O. No. 3 establishes petitioners’ right to be consulted on the peace agenda, as a
corollary to the constitutional right to information and disclosure. In general, the objections against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the
powers conceded therein to the BJE. Petitioners assert that the powers granted to the BJE exceed those granted to any local government under
present laws, and even go beyond those of the present ARMM. Before assessing some of the specific powers that would have been vested in the
BJE, however, it would be useful to turn first to a general idea that serves as a unifying link to the different provisions of the MOA-AD, namely, the
international law concept of association. Significantly, the MOA-AD explicitly alludes to this concept, indicating that the Parties actually framed its
provisions with it in mind. Association is referred to in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY, paragraph 11 on RESOURCES, and paragraph 4 on GOVERNANCE.
It is in the last mentioned provision, however, that the MOA-AD most clearly uses it to describe the envisioned relationship between the BJE and
the Central Government.

4. The relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro juridical entity shall be associative characterized by shared authority and
responsibility with a structure of governance based on executive, legislative, judicial and administrative institutions with defined powers and
functions in the comprehensive compact. A period of transition shall be established in a comprehensive peace compact specifying the relationship
between the Central Government and the BJE. The nature of the ―associative relationship may have been intended to be defined more precisely
in the still to be forged Comprehensive Compact. Nonetheless, given that there is a concept of ―association in international law, and the MOA-AD
– by its inclusion of international law instruments in its TOR– placed itself in an international legal context, that concept of association may be
brought to bear in understanding the use of the term ―associative in the MOA-AD. The MOA-AD contains many provisions which are consistent
with the international legal concept of association, specifically the following: the BJE‘s capacity to enter into economic and trade relations with
foreign countries, the commitment of the Central Government to ensure the BJE‘s participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the
specialized UN agencies, and the continuing responsibility of the Central Government over external defense. Moreover, the BJE‘s right to
participate in Philippine official missions bearing on negotiation of border agreements, environmental protection, and sharing of revenues
pertaining to the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain, resembles the right of the governments
of FSM and the Marshall Islands to be consulted by the U.S. government on any foreign affairs matter affecting them. These provisions of the MOA
indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely
approximating it. The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution. No province, city, or municipality, not even the
ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an ―associative‖ relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers
that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated
entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it
provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.
Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-AD‘s provisions, therefore, already requires for its validity the amendment of constitutional
provisions, specifically the following provisions of Article X:
SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There
shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and
distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this
Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government being fundamentally different from
that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, a
permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it
is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the M OA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution
and the laws. Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that ―[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by
a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas
voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.
The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term ―autonomous region in the constitutional
provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it. Under paragraph 2(c) on TERRITORY in relation to 2(d) and 2(e), the present
geographic area of the ARMM and, in addition, the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001
plebiscite – Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and Tangkal – are automatically part of the BJE without need of another plebiscite, in
contrast to the areas under Categories A and B mentioned earlier in the overview. That the present components of the ARMM and the above-
mentioned municipalities voted for inclusion therein in 2001, however, does not render another plebiscite unnecessary under the Constitution,
precisely because what these areas voted for then was their inclusion in the ARMM, not the BJE.
Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended if the scheme envisioned in the MOA-AD is to be effected. That constitutional
provision states: ―The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and
development. An associative arrangement does not uphold national unity. While there may be a semblance of unity because of the associative ties
between the BJE and the national government, the act of placing a portion of Philippine territory in a status which, in international practice, has
generally been a preparation for independence, is certainly not conducive to national unity.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them,
namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the
associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.
While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until
that framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship
between the BJE and the Central Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions from the President dated March 1, 2001,
addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the necessary amendments to the
Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a
guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional
Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the
amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with that process.

ESTRADA V. DESIERTO

FACTS:

 Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President.
 Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his family and
friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.
 House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the members of the
House of Representatives to the Senate. This caused political convulsions in both houses of Congress. Senator Drilon was replaced by Senator
Pimentel as Senate President. Speaker Villar was unseated by Representative Fuentebella.
 Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. 21 senators took their oath as judges with Supreme Court Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding.
 When by a vote of 11-10 the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the 2nd envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing
that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name "Jose Velarde." The public and private prosecutors walked out in protest
of the ruling. In disgust, Senator Pimentel resigned as Senate President. By midnight, thousands had assembled at the EDSA Shrine and speeches
full of sulphur were delivered against the petitioner and the 11 senators.
 January 18, 2001 saw the high velocity intensification of the call for petitioner's resignation. A 10-km line of people holding lighted
candles formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino Monument on Ayala Avenue in Makati City to the EDSA Shrine to symbolize the people's
solidarity in demanding petitioner's resignation.
 January 19, 2001, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. Petitioner agreed to the holding of a snap election for
President where he would not be a candidate. Secretary of National Defense Orlando Mercado and General Reyes, together with the chiefs of all
the armed services went to the EDSA Shrine. General Angelo Reyes declared that "on behalf of Your Armed Forces, the 130,000 strong members of
the Armed Forces, we wish to announce that we are withdrawing our support to this government.” A little later, PNP Chief, Director General Panfilo
Lacson and the major service commanders gave a similar stunning announcement.
 January 20, 2001 Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. Petitioner and his
family hurriedly left Malacañang Palace.
 January 22, 2001, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the powers the duties of the Presidency.
 February 5, 2001, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to
enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from "conducting any further proceedings in any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until
after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted."
 February 6, 2001, Thru another counsel, petitioner filed for Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment "confirming petitioner to be the
lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent
to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution."

ISSUES:
 Whether or not the petitioner resigned as president.
 Whether or not petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.

HELD:
 Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to
resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not government by any formal requirement as to
form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
 In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he evacuated Malacañang Palace in
the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be
determined from his act and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts
and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
 Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.

 An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:

 Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written
declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary,
such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President xxx.
 What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President.
Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected
petitioner's claim of inability.
 In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the
ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the
de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

ORGANIZATION

LEO ECHEGARAY V. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL.

FACTS:
On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The public respondent
Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment but also
encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on the execution of Echegaray despite the
fact that the finality of judgment has already been rendered… that by granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is
an executive function.

HELD:
No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the source of power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons
and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to
control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality.
The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason
that there is no higher right than the right to life.
For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to
violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our government.

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY V. PASAY TRANSPORTATION COMPANY INC.,

Act No. 1446 was passed. Section 11 of the Act provides: "Whenever any franchise or right of way is granted to any other person or corporation,
now or hereafter in existence, over portions of the lines and tracks of the grantee herein, the terms on which said other person or corporation shall
use such right of way, and the compensation to be paid to the grantee herein by such other person or corporation for said use, shall be fixed by the
members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final."

Pursuant to said Act, Meralco filed a petition requesting the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to fix the terms upon
which certain transportation companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the Manila Electric Company and the compensation to be paid
to the Manila Electric Company by such transportation companies.

Copies of the petition were directed to be sent to transportation companies affected by the petition. Opposition was entered to the petition by a
number of public utility operators.

Issue:

Can the members of the Supreme Court sit as arbitrators and fix the terms and compensation as is asked of them in this case?

Held:

The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of power in our government. It is judicial power and judicial
power only which is exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction
usurpations by any other department of the government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by
implication conferred on it. The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust
or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial functions.

Section 11 of Act No. 1446 contravenes the maxims which guide the operation of a democratic government constitutionally established, and that it
would be improper and illegal for the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be
final, to act on the petition of the Manila Electric Company. (Meralco vs. Pasay Transportation Company, G.R. No. L-37878, November 25, 1932)

ANTONIO H. NOBLEJAS AS COMMISIONER OF LAND REGISTRATION V. CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE AS SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

NOBLEJAS v. TEEHANKEE Judicial power does not include the power to discipline officers in others branches of government with equal rank as that
of a judge. This is beyond the judicial sphere.

The facts:

In 1991, Jussi Olavi Leino was taking Maureen Hultman to her home at Campanilla Street, Dasmarinas Village, Makati. Roland John Chapman went
with them. When they entered the village, Maureen asked Leino to stop about a block away from her house, as she wanted to walk the rest of the
way for she did not want her parents to know that she was going home that late. Leino offered to walk with her while Chapman stayed in the car
and listened to the radio.

While Leino and Maureen were walking, a light-colored Mitsubishi box-type Lancer car, driven by accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr., came up from
behind them and stopped on the middle of the road. Accused alighted from his car, approached them, and asked: “Who are you? (Show me your)
I.D.” When Leino handed his I.D., the accused grabbed and pocketed the I.D., without bothering to look at it.

Chapman saw the incident. He stepped down on the sidewalk and asked accused: “Why are you bothering us?” Accused pushed Chapman, dug into
his shirt, pulled out a gun and fired at him. Chapman felt his upper body, staggered for a moment, and asked: “Why did you shoot me?” Chapman
crumpled on the sidewalk. Leino knelt beside Chapman to assist him but accused ordered him to get up and leave Chapman alone. Accused then
turned his ire on Leino. He pointed gun at him and asked: “Do you want a trouble?” Leino said “no” and took a step backward.

The shooting initially shocked Maureen. When she came to her senses, she became hysterical and started screaming for help. She repeatedly
shouted: “Oh, my God, he’s got a gun. He’s gonna kill us. Will somebody help us?” All the while, accused was pointing his gun to and from Leino to
Maureen, warning the latter to shut up. Accused ordered Leino to sit down on the sidewalk. Leino obeyed and made no attempt to move away.
Accused stood 2-3 meters away from him. Maureen continued to be hysterical. She could not stay still. She strayed to the side of accused’s car.
Accused tried but failed to grab her. Maureen circled around accused’s car, trying to put some distance between them. The short chase lasted for a
minute or two. Eventually, accused caught Maureen and repeatedly enjoined her to shut up and sit down beside Leino. Maureen finally sat beside
Leino on the sidewalk.

For a moment, the accused turned his back from the two. He faced them again and shot Leino. Leino was hit on the upper jaw, fell backwards on
the sidewalk, but did not lose consciousness. Leino heard another shot and saw Maureen fall beside him. He lifted his head to see what was
happening and saw accused return to his car and drive away. Leino struggled to his knees and shouted for help. He noticed at least 3 people who
saw the incident.

As a result of the incident, 3 separate criminal cases were filed against accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr. Initially, he was charged with: MURDER for
the killing of ROLAND CHAPMAN, and two (2) FRUSTRATED MURDER for the shooting and wounding of JUSSI LEINO and MAUREEN HULTMAN.
When Hultman subsequently died after 97 days of confinement at the hospital and during the course of the trial, the Information for Frustrated
Murder was amended to MURDER.

The defense:

Accused relied on the defense of denial and alibi. Accused claimed that during the shooting incident, he was not anywhere near the scene of the
crime, but in his house in Pasig. Accused averred that he only came to know the 3 victims in the Dasmarinas shooting when he read the newspaper
reports about it. Accused admitted ownership of a box-type, silver metallic gray Mitsubishi Lancer, with plate number PDW 566. He, however,
claimed that said car ceased to be in good running condition after its involvement in an accident. Until the day of the shooting, his Lancer car had
been parked in the garage of his mother’s house in Dasmarinas Village. He has not used this car since then. Accused conceded that although the car
was not in good running condition, it could still be used.

The ruling:

Eyewitness identification and out-of-court identification.

The accused was convicted on the strength of the testimonies of 3 eyewitnesses who positively identified him as the gunman. However, he
vigorously assails his out-of-court identification by these eyewitnesses.

He starts by trying to discredit the eyeball account of Leino, the lone surviving victim of the crimes at bar. Appellant urges: First, that Leino’s
identification of him outside an unoccupied house in Forbes Park was highly irregular; Second, that Leino saw his pictures on television and the
newspapers before he identified him; Third, that Leino’s interview at the hospital was never put in writing; Fourth, that the sketch of appellant
based on the description given by Leino to the CIS agents was suppressed by the NBI. It is surmised that the sketch must have been among the
evidence turned over to the NBI when the latter assumed jurisdiction over the investigation; and, lastly, that Leino could not have remembered the
face of the accused. The shooting lasted for only five (5) minutes. During that period, his gaze could not have been fixed only on the gunman’s face.
His senses were also dulled by the five (5) bottles of beer he imbibed that night.

It is understandable for the accused to assail his out-of-court identification by the prosecution witnesses in his first assignment of error. Eyewitness
identification constitutes vital evidence and, in most cases, decisive of the success or failure of the prosecution. Yet, while eyewitness identification
is significant, it is not as accurate and authoritative as the scientific forms of identification evidence such as the fingerprint or DNA testing. Some
authors even describe eyewitness evidence as “inherently suspect.” The causes of misidentification are known, thus:

Identification testimony has at least three components. First, witnessing a crime, whether as a victim or a bystander, involves perception of an event
actually occurring. Second, the witness must memorize details of the event. Third, the witness must be able to recall and communicate accurately.
Dangers of unreliability in eyewitness testimony arise at each of these three stages, for whenever people attempt to acquire, retain, and retrieve
information accurately, they are limited by normal human fallibilities and suggestive influences.

Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face with
the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru line-
ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. Since corruption of out-of-court identification
contaminates the integrity of in-court identification during the trial of the case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its
compliance with the requirements of constitutional due process. In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of
suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness’ opportunity to view
the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness;
(4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and, (6)
the suggestiveness of the identification procedure.

Using the totality of circumstances test, the alleged irregularities cited by the accused did not result in his misidentification nor was he denied due
process. There is nothing wrong in Leino’s identification of the accused in an unoccupied house in Forbes Park. The records reveal that this mode
was resorted to by the authorities for security reasons. The need for security even compelled that Leino be fetched and escorted from his house in
Forbes Park by U.S. embassy security officials and brought to the house where he was to make the identification. The Leinos refused to have the
identification at the NBI office as it was cramped with people and with high security risk. Leino’s fear for his safety was not irrational. He and his
companions had been shot in cold blood in one of the exclusive, supposedly safe subdivisions in the metropolis.

There is no hard and fast rule as to the place where suspects are identified by witnesses. Identification may be done in open field. It is often done in
hospitals while the crime and the criminal are still fresh in the mind of the victim.

Accused can’t also gripe that Leino saw his pictures and heard radio and TV accounts of the shooting before he personally identified him. The
records show that while Leino was still in the hospital, he was shown 3 pictures of different men by the investigators. He identified the accused as
the gunman from these pictures. He, however, categorically stated that, before the mug shot identification, he has not seen any picture of accused
or read any report relative to the shooting incident. The burden is on accused to prove that his mug shot identification was unduly suggestive.
Failing proof of impermissible suggestiveness, he cannot complain about the admission of his out-of-court identification by Leino.

There is no reason to doubt the correctness of the accused’s identification by Leino. The scene of the crime was well-lighted by a lamp post. The
accused was merely 2-3 meters away when he shot Leino. The incident happened for a full 5 minutes. Leino had no ill-motive to falsely testify
against the accusedt. His testimony at the trial was straightforward. He was unshaken by the brutal cross-examination of the defense counsels. He
never wavered in his identification of the accused. When asked how sure he was that the accused was responsible for the crime, he confidently
replied: “I’m very sure. It could not have been somebody else.”

The accused cannot likewise capitalize on the failure of the investigators to reduce to a sworn statement the information revealed by Leino during
his hospital interviews. It was sufficiently established that Leino’s extensive injuries, especially the injury to his tongue, limited his mobility. The day
he identified appellant in the line-up, he was still physically unable to speak. He was being fed through a tube inserted in his throat. There is also no
rule of evidence which requires the rejection of the testimony of a witness whose statement has not been priorly reduced to writing.

The SC also rejected the accused’s contention that the NBI suppressed the sketch prepared by the CIS on the basis of the description given by
Leino. There is nothing on the record to show that said sketch was turned over by the CIS to the NBI which could warrant a presumption that the
sketch was suppressed. The suspicion that the sketch did not resemble the accused is not evidence. It is unmitigated guesswork.
The SC was also not impressed with the contention that it was incredible for Leino to have remembered the accused’s face when the incident
happened within a span of 5 minutes. Five minutes is not a short time for Leino to etch in his mind the picture of the accused. Experience shows
that precisely because of the unusual acts of bestiality committed before their eyes, eyewitnesses, especially the victims to a crime, can remember
with a high degree of reliability the identity of criminals. The natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to see the appearance of
their assailants and observe the manner the crime was committed. Most often, the face end body movements of the assailant create an impression
which cannot be easily erased from their memory. In this case, there is absolutely no improper motive for Leino to impute a serious crime to the
accused. The victims and the accused were unknown to each other before their chance encounter. If Leino identified the accused, it must be
because the accused was the real culprit.

The SC also gave credence to the testimony of the other two witnesses. As to the testimony of Cadenas, his initial reluctance to reveal to the
authorities what he witnessed was sufficiently explained during the trial – he feared for his and his family’s safety. The Court has taken judicial
notice of the natural reticence of witnesses to get involved in the solution of crimes considering the risk to their lives and limbs. In light of these all
too real risks, the court has not considered the initial reluctance of fear-gripped witnesses to cooperate with authorities as an authorities as an
indicium of credibility. As to the testimony of Mangubat, the SC found nothing in the records to suspect that Mangubat would perjure himself.

2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt

According to the the accused, the trial court erred in not holding that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. First, he
claims the trial court erred in citing in its Decision his involvement in previous shooting incidents. Second, the NBI failed to conduct an examination
to compare the bullets fired from the gun at the scene of the crime with the bullets recovered from the body of Chapman. Third, the prosecution
eyewitnesses described the gunman’s car as white, but the trial court found it to be silver metalic gray. Fourth, the accused could not have been
the gunman, for Mangubat said that he overheard the victim Hultman plead to the gunman, thus: “Please, don’t shoot me and don’t kill me. I
promise Mommy, Daddy.” The accused also contends that a maid in a house near the scene of the crime told Makati police Alberto Fernandez that
she heard Maureen say: “Daddy don’t shoot. Don’t.” Fifth, the NBI towed accused’s car from Dasmarinas Village to the NBI office which proved that
the same was not in good running condition. Lastly, the result of the paraffin test conducted on appellant showed he was negative of nitrates.

The accused points to other possible suspects, viz:. ANDERS HULTMAN, since one of the eyewitnesses was quoted in the newspapers as having
overheard Maureen plead to the gunman: “Huwag, Daddy.”; and, (b) JOSE MONTAÑO, another resident of Dasmariñas Village, who had a white
Lancer car, also bearing license plate number 566.

The accused, however, cannot hope to exculpate himself simply because the trial judge violated the rule on res inter alios acta when he considered
his involvement in previous shooting incidents. This rule has long been laid to rest. The harmless error rule is also followed in our jurisdiction. In
dealing with evidence improperly admitted in trial, the court examines its damaging quality and its impact to the substantive rights of the litigant. If
the impact is slight and insignificant, the court disregards the error as it will not overcome the weight of the properly admitted evidence against the
prejudiced party.

In the case at bar, the reference by the trial judge to reports about the troublesome character of appellant is a harmless error. The reference is not
the linchpin of the inculpatory evidence appreciated by the trial judge in convicting the accused. As aforestated, the accused was convicted mainly
because of his identification by 3 eyewitnesses with high credibility.

The NBI may have also failed to compare the bullets fired from the fatal gun with the bullets found at the scene of the crime. The omission,
however, cannot exculpate the accused. The omitted comparison cannot nullify the evidentiary value of the positive identification of the accused.

There is also little to the contention of the accused that his Lancer car was not in running condition. Allegedly, this was vicariously proved when the
NBI towed his car from Dasmariñas Village where it was parked to the NBI office. Again, the argument is negated by the records which show that
said car was towed because the NBI could not get its ignition key which was then in the possession of the accused. Clearly, the car was towed not
because it was not in running condition. Even the accused’s evidence show that said car could run. After its repairs, the accused’s son, Claudio
Teehankee III, drove it from the repair shop in Banawe, Quezon City to Dasmarinas Village, in Makati, where it was parked.

Nor was the SC impressed by the alleged discrepancies in the eyewitnesses’ description of the color of the gunman’s car. Leino described the car as
light-colored; Florece said the car was somewhat white (“medyo puti”); Mangubat declared the car was white; and Cadenas testified it was silver
metallic gray. These alleged discrepancies amount to no more than shades of differences and are not meaningful, referring as they do to colors
white, somewhat white and silver metallic gray. Considering the speed and shocking nature of the incident which happened before the break of
dawn, these slight discrepancies in the description of the car do not make the prosecution eyewitnesses unworthy of credence.

The accused’s attempt to pin the crimes at bar on Anders Hultman, the adoptive father of Maureen Hultman, deserves scant consideration. The
accused cites a newspaper item where Maureen was allegedly overheard as saying to the gunman: “Huwag, Daddy. Huwag, Daddy.” The evidence
on record, however, demonstrates that Anders Hultman could not have been the gunman. It was clearly established that Maureen could not have
uttered said statement for two (2) reasons: Maureen did not speak Tagalog, and she addressed Anders Hultman as “Papa,” not “Daddy.” Moreover,
Leino outrightly dismissed this suspicion. While still in the hospital and when informed that the Makati police were looking into this possibility,
Leino flatly stated that Anders Hultman was NOT the gunman. Leino is a reliable witness.
The accused cannot also capitalize on the paraffin test showing he was negative of nitrates. Scientific experts concur in the view that the paraffin
test has “. . . proved extremely unreliable in use. The only thing that it can definitely establish is the presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on
the hand. It cannot be established from this test alone that the source of the nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of a firearm. The person may
have handled one or more of a number of substances which give the same positive reaction for nitrates or nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks,
fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, and leguminous plants such as peas, beans, and alfalfa. A person who uses tobacco may also have nitrate or nitrite
deposits on his hands since these substances are present in the products of combustion of tobacco.” In numerous rulings, we have also recognized
several factors which may bring about the absence of gunpowder nitrates on the hands of a gunman, viz: when the assailant washes his hands after
firing the gun, wears gloves at the time of the shooting, or if the direction of a strong wind is against the gunman at the time of firing. In the case at
bar, NBI Forensic Chemist, Leonora Vallado, testified and confirmed that excessive perspiration or washing of hands with the use of warm water or
vinegar may also remove gunpowder nitrates on the skin. She likewise opined that the conduct of the paraffin test after more than seventy-two
(72) hours from the time of the shooting may not lead to a reliable result for, by such time, the nitrates could have already been removed by
washing or perspiration. In the Report on the paraffin test conducted on appellant, Forensic Chemist Elizabeth Ayonon noted that when the
accused was tested for the presence of nitrates, more than 72 hours has already lapsed from the time of the alleged shooting.

3. The right to an impartial trial.

The the accused blames the press for his conviction as he contends that the publicity given to his case impaired his right to an impartial trial. He
postulates there was pressure on the trial judge for high-ranking government officials avidly followed the developments in the case (as no less than
then Vice-President Estrada and then DOJ Secretary Drilon attended some of the hearings and, President Aquino even visited Hultman while she
was still confined at the hospital). He submits that the trial judge failed to protect him from prejudicial publicity and disruptive influences which
attended the prosecution of the cases.

The SC did not sustain the accused’s claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. It’s true that the print and
broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right
of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accused’s right to a fair trial for, as
well pointed out, “a responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal
field . . . The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting in the police,
prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.”

Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day,
gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it
is impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal cases. The state of the
art of our communication system brings news as they happen straight to our breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of
our everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with
the world. We have not installed the jury system whose members are overly protected from publicity lest they lose their impartiality. Our judges
are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to
publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.

At best, the accused can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the
investigation and trial of the case. The SC had previously rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice
as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not
simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against
appellant as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not
prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of change even by evidence presented
during the trial. The accused has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden. There is no evidence showing that the
trial judge allowed the proceedings to turn into a carnival. Nor did he consent to or condone any manifestation of unruly or improper behavior or
conduct inside the courtroom during the trial of the case at bar.

Parenthetically, the accused should be the last person to complain against the press for prejudicial coverage of his trial. The records reveal he
presented in court no less than 7 newspaper reporters and relied heavily on selected portions of their reports for his defense. The defense’s
documentary evidence consists mostly of newspaper clippings relative to the investigation of the case at bar and which appeared to cast doubt on
his guilt. The press cannot be fair and unfair to appellant at the same time.

Finally, it would not be amiss to stress that the trial judge voluntarily inhibited himself from further hearing the case, but the SC, nothing in the
conduct of the proceedings to stir any suspicion of partiality against the trial judge, directed the trial judge to proceed with the trial to speed up the
administration of justice.

4. The presence of treachery

The accused claims that treachery was not present in the killing of Hultman and Chapman, and the wounding of Leino for it was not shown that the
gunman consciously and deliberately adopted particular means, methods and forms in the execution of the crime. The accused asserts that mere
suddenness of attack does not prove treachery.
The 3 Informations charged the accused with having committed the crimes with treachery and evident premeditation. Evident premeditation was
correctly ruled out by the trial court for, admittedly, the shooting incident was merely a casual encounter or a chance meeting on the street since
the victims were unknown to the accused and vice-versa. It, however, appreciated the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.

On the other hand, the prosecution failed to prove treachery in the killing of Chapman. Prosecution witness Leino established the sequence of
events leading to the shooting. He testified that for no apparent reason, the accused suddenly alighted from his car and accosted him and Maureen
Hultman who were then walking along the sidewalk.

Appellant questioned who they were and demanded for an I.D. After Leino handed him his I.D., Chapman appeared from behind Leino and asked
what was going on. Chapman then stepped down on the sidewalk and inquired from appellant what was wrong. There and then, the accused
pushed Chapman, pulled a gun from inside his shirt, and shot him. The gun attack was unexpected. “Why did you shoot me?” was all Chapman
could utter. Concededly, the shooting of Chapman was carried out swiftly and left him with no chance to defend himself. Even then, there is no
evidence on record to prove that the accused consciously and deliberately adopted his mode of attack to insure the accomplishment of his criminal
design without risk to himself. The accused acted on the spur of the moment. Their meeting was by chance. They were strangers to each other. The
time between the initial encounter and the shooting was short and unbroken. The shooting of Chapman was thus the result of a rash and
impetuous impulse on the part of the accused rather than a deliberate act of will. Mere suddenness of the attack on the victim would not, by itself,
constitute treachery. Hence, absent any qualifying circumstance, the accused should only be held liable for Homicide for the shooting and killing of
Chapman.

As to the wounding of Leino and the killing of Hultman, treachery clearly attended the commission of the crimes. The evidence shows that after
shooting Chapman in cold blood, the accused ordered Leino to sit on the pavement. Maureen became hysterical and wandered to the side of
appellant’s car. When the accused went after her, Maureen moved around his car and tried to put some distance between them. After a minute or
two, the accused got to Maureen and ordered her to sit beside Leino on the pavement. While seated, unarmed and begging for mercy, the two
were gunned down by the accused . Clearly, the accused purposely placed his two victims in a completely defenseless position before shooting
them. There was an appreciable lapse of time between the killing of Chapman and the shooting of Leino and Hultman – a period which the accused
used to prepare for a mode of attack which ensured the execution of the crime without risk to himself.

Penalties:(Note: Mr. Teehankee was pardoned in 2008)

(1) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide for the shooting of Roland John Chapman. He was sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as
maximum, and to pay the heirs of the said deceased the following amounts: P50,000 as indemnity for the victim’s death; and, P1,000,000 as moral
damages.

(2) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, qualified by treachery, for the shooting of Maureen Navarro Hultman. He was
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua, and to pay the heirs of the said deceased the following amounts: P50,000 as indemnity for
her death; P2,350,461.83 as actual damages; P564,042.57 for loss of earning capacity of said deceased; P1,000,000 as moral damages; and
P2,000,000 as exemplary damages.

(3) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder, qualified by treachery, for the shooting of Jussi Olavi Leino, and sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 8 years of prision mayor as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to
pay the said offended party the following amounts: P30,000 as indemnity for his injuries; P118,369.84 and equivalent in Philippine Pesos of
U.S.$55,600.00, both as actual damages; P1,000,000 as moral damages; and, P2,000,000 as exemplary damages.

(4) In all three cases, to pay each of the 3 offended parties the sum of P1,000,000, or a total of P3,000,000, for attorney’s fees and expenses of
litigation; and

(5) To pay the costs in all 3 cases.

THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS & THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY V. ANG CHO KIO

Facts:

Ang Cho Kio was convicted of various offenses and was granted conditional pardon in 1959. He was never to return to the Philippines. In violation
of his pardon, he returned in 1966 under the name "Ang Ming Huy". However, he was identified by an inspector of the Immigration Bureau. Thus,
he was arrested. The Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, ordered him recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of the
sentence that were imposed on him, for having violated the conditioned of his pardon.

He filed a petition for habeas corpus which the CFI of Rizal denied. The CA affirmed the decision but made a recommendation that Ang may be
allowed to leave the country on the first available transportation abroad.
The Solicitor General filed a motion for reconsideration praying for the deletion of the recommendation. The Solicitor General maintains that the
recommendation is not a part of the decision and was uncalled for; that it gives the decision a political complexion, because courts are not
empowered to make such a recommendation, nor is it inherent or incidental in the exercise of judicial powers. He also contends that allowing
convicted aliens to leave the country is an act of the state exercises solely in the discretion of the Chief Executive. It is urged that the act of sending
an undesirable alien out of the country is political in character, and the courts should not interfere with, nor attempt to influence, the political acts
of the President.

Issues:

1. Was the CA decision was proper?

2. Can the CA make recommendations?

Held:

1. No. The case before the CA was for habeas corpus. The only question to be resolved by the CA was whether, or not, the CFI of Rizal, had rightly
dismissed the petition of Ang Cho Kio for habeas corpus. The CA was not called upon to review any sentence imposed upon Ang Cho Kio. The
sentence against him had long become final, and, in fact, he was pardoned. The majority opinion should have been limited to the affirmance of the
decision of the lower court, and no more.

2. The recommendatory power of the courts in this jurisdiction are limited to those expressly provided in the law — and such law is the provision of
Section 5 of the Revised Penal Code as follows:

Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper
decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act
should be made the subject of penal legislation.

In the same way the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice such statement as may be deemed proper, without
suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly
excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense.

Certainly, the recommendation in the majority opinion of the special division of the CA, now in question, is not authorized under the aforequoted
provision of Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code. The CA was not called upon to review any sentence that was imposed on Ang Cho Kio. It was
simply called upon to determine whether Ang Cho Kio was illegally confined, or not, in the insular penitentiary under the Director of Prisons.

It was improper for the CA justices to make a recommendation that would suggest a modification or a correction of the act of the Chief Executive.
The matter of whether an alien who violated the laws in this country may remain or be deported is a political question that should be left entirely
to the Chief Executive to decide. Under the principle of separation of powers, it is not within the province of the judiciary to express an opinion, or
express a suggestion, that would reflect on the wisdom or propriety of the action of the Chief Executive on matters purely political in nature.

After all, courts are not concerned with the wisdom or morality of laws, but only in the interpretation and application of the law. We believe that
judges should refrain from expressing irrelevant opinions in their decisions which may only reflect unfavorably upon their competence and the
propriety of their judicial actuations. (Director of Prisons vs. Ang Cho Kio, G.R. No. L-30001, June 23, 1970)

HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH ET AL. V. HON. RENATO C. CORONA ET AL.

DOCTRINE: The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgements/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body must reach a point of
finality set by the law, rules and regulations; a resolution which substantially modifies a decision after it has attained finality is utterly void. When
an administrative agency's decision becomes final and executory and no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said
agency has lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its decision.

FACTS:
On March 29, 1996, the Office of the President (OP) issued a decision converting a large parcel of land from agricultural land to agro-
industrial/institutional area. Because of this, a group of farmer-beneficiaries staged a hunger strike in front of the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) Compound in Quezon City in October 9, 1997. The strike generated a lot of publicity and even a number of Presidential Candidates (for the
upcoming 1998 elections) intervened on behalf of the farmers.

Because of this “blackmail”, the OP re-opened the case and through Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona issued the so-called, “politically
motivated”, “win-win” resolution on November 7, 1997, substantially modifying its 1996 decision after it had become final and executory.
ISSUE: WON the “win-win” resolution, issued after the original decision had become final and executory, had any legal effect.

HELD:
No; When the OP issued the Order dated June 23,1997 declaring the Decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed
a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its Decision. Having lost its
jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR
Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the assailed “Win-Win” Resolution. Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4,
Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court mandate that only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the Decision of March 29,
1996. And even if a second motion for reconsideration was permitted to be filed in “exceptionally meritorious cases,” as provided in the second
paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still the said motion should not have been entertained considering that the first motion for reconsideration was
not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the President in re-
opening the case and substantially modifying its March 29,1996 Decision which had already become final and executory, was in gross disregard of
the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative determinations.

The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body must reach a point of finality set by
the law, rules and regulations. The noble purpose is to write finis to disputes once and for all

SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA V. MARIA LOURDES SERENO

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

Quo warranto as a remedy to oust an ineligible public official may be availed of when the subject act or omission was committed prior to or at the
time of appointment or election relating to an official’s qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment or election invalid. Acts or
omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of integrity being a continuing requirement but nonetheless committed during the incumbency of a
validly appointed and/or validly elected official cannot be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of impeachment if the public official
concerned is impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or to disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if
otherwise.

FACTS:

From 1986 to 2006, Sereno served as a member of the faculty of the University of the Philippines-College of Law. While being employed at the UP
Law, or from October 2003 to 2006, Sereno was concurrently employed as legal counsel of the Republic in two international arbitrations known as
the PIATCO cases, and a Deputy Commissioner of the Commissioner on Human Rights.

The Human Resources Development Office of UP (UP HRDO) certified that there was no record on Sereno’s file of any permission to engage in
limited practice of profession. Moreover, out of her 20 years of employment, only nine (9) Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN)
were on the records of UP HRDO. In a manifestation, she attached a copy of a tenth SALN, which she supposedly sourced from the “filing cabinets”
or “drawers of UP”. The Ombudsman likewise had no record of any SALN filed by Sereno. The JBC has certified to the existence of one SALN. In
sum, for 20 years of service, 11 SALNs were recovered.

On August 2010, Sereno was appointed as Associate Justice. On 2012, the position of Chief Justice was declared vacant, and the JBC directed the
applicants to submit documents, among which are “all previous SALNs up to December 31, 2011” for those in the government and “SALN as of
December 31, 2011” for those from the private sector. The JBC announcement further provided that “applicants with incomplete or out-of-date
documentary requirements will not be interviewed or considered for nomination.” Sereno expressed in a letter to JBC that since she resigned from
UP Law on 2006 and became a private practitioner, she was treated as coming from the private sector and only submitted three (3) SALNs or her
SALNs from the time she became an Associate Justice. Sereno likewise added that “considering that most of her government records in the
academe are more than 15 years old, it is reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all of those files,” and that the clearance issued by UP
HRDO and CSC should be taken in her favor. There was no record that the letter was deliberated upon. Despite this, on a report to the JBC, Sereno
was said to have “complete requirements.” On August 2012, Sereno was appointed Chief Justice.

On August 2017, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon against Sereno, alleging that Sereno failed to make truthful declarations
in her SALNs. The House of Representatives proceeded to hear the case for determination of probable cause, and it was said that Justice Peralta,
the chairman of the JBC then, was not made aware of the incomplete SALNs of Sereno. Other findings were made: such as pieces of jewelry
amounting to P15,000, that were not declared on her 1990 SALN, but was declared in prior years’ and subsequent years’ SALNs, failure of her
husband to sign one SALN, execution of the 1998 SALN only in 2003

On February 2018, Atty. Eligio Mallari wrote to the OSG, requesting that the latter, in representation of the Republic, initiate a quo
warranto proceeding against Sereno. The OSG, invoking the Court’s original jurisdiction under Section 5(1), Article VIII of the Constitution in
relation to the special civil action under Rule 66, the Republic, through the OSG filed the petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo
warranto to declare as void Sereno’s appointment as CJ of the SC and to oust and altogether exclude Sereno therefrom. [yourlawyersays]

Capistrano, Sen. De Lima, Sen. Trillianes, et. al., intervened. Sereno then filed a Motion for Inhibition against AJ Bersamin, Peralta, Jardeleza, Tijam,
and Leonardo-De Castro, imputing actual bias for having testified against her on the impeachment hearing before the House of Representatives.

Contentions:

Office of the Solicitor General (petitioner):

OSG argues that the quo warranto is an available remedy because what is being sought is to question the validity of her appointment, while the
impeachment complaint accuses her of committing culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust while in office, citing Funa v.
Chairman Villar, Estrada v. Desierto and Nacionalista Party v. De Vera. OSG maintains that the phrase “may be removed from office” in Section 2,
Article XI of the Constitution means that Members of the SC may be removed through modes other than impeachment.

OSG contends that it is seasonably filed within the one-year reglementary period under Section 11, Rule 66 since Sereno’s transgressions only came
to light during the impeachment proceedings. Moreover, OSG claims that it has an imprescriptible right to bring a quo warranto petition under the
maxim nullum tempus occurit regi (“no time runs against the king”) or prescription does not operate against the government. The State has a
continuous interest in ensuring that those who partake of its sovereign powers are qualified. Even assuming that the one-year period is applicable
to the OSG, considering that SALNs are not published, the OSG will have no other means by which to know the disqualification.

Moreover, OSG maintains that the SC has jurisdiction, citing A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC which created a permanent Committee on Ethics and Ethical
Standards, tasked to investigate complaints involving graft and corruption and ethical violations against members of the SC and contending that
this is not a political question because such issue may be resolved through the interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution, laws, JBC rules,
and Canons of Judicial Ethics.

OSG seeks to oust Sereno from her position as CJ on the ground that Sereno failed to show that she is a person of proven integrity which is an
indispensable qualification for membership in the Judiciary under Section 7(3), Article VIII of the Constitution. According to the OSG, because OSG
failed to fulfill the JBC requirement of filing the complete SALNs, her integrity remains unproven. The failure to submit her SALN, which is a legal
obligation, should have disqualified Sereno from being a candidate; therefore, she has no right to hold the office. Good faith cannot be considered
as a defense since the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA No. 3019) and Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees (RA No. 6713) are special laws and are thus governed by the concept of malum prohibitum, wherein malice or criminal intent is
completely immaterial.

Sereno (respondent):

Sereno contends that an impeachable officer may only be ousted through impeachment, citing Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution,
and Mayor Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, Cuenca v. Hon. Fernan, In Re: First lndorsement from Hon. Gonzales, and Re: Complaint-Affidavit for
Disbarment Against SAJ Antonio T. Carpio. Sereno contends that the clear intention of the framers of the Constitution was to create an exclusive
category of public officers who can be removed only by impeachment and not otherwise. Impeachment was chosen as the method of removing
certain high-ranking government officers to shield them from harassment suits that will prevent them from performing their functions which are
vital to the continued operations of government. Sereno further argues that the word “may” on Section 2 of Article XI only qualifies the penalty
imposable after the impeachment trial, i.e., removal from office. Sereno contends that the since the mode is wrong, the SC has no jurisdiction.

Sereno likewise argues that the cases cited by OSG is not in all fours with the present case because the President and the Vice President may, in
fact, be removed by means other than impeachment on the basis of Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution vesting in the Court the power to
be the “sole judge” of all contests relating to the qualifications of the President and the Vice-President. There is no such provision for other
impeachable officers. Moreover, on the rest of the cases cited by the OSG, there is no mention that quo warranto may be allowed.

Sereno also argues that since a petition for quo warranto may be filed before the RTC, such would result to a conundrum because a judge of lower
court would have effectively exercised disciplinary power and administrative supervision over an official of the Judiciary much higher in rank and is
contrary to Sections 6 and 11, Article VIII of the Constitution which vests upon the SC disciplinary and administrative power over all courts and the
personnel thereof.

Sereno likewise posits that if a Member of the SC can be ousted through quo warranto initiated by the OSG, the Congress’ “check” on the SC
through impeachment would be rendered inutile.
 Furthermore, Sereno argues that it is already time-barred. Section 11, Rule 66 provides that a petition for quo warranto must be filed within one (1)
year from the “cause of ouster” and not from the “discovery” of the disqualification.

Moreover, Sereno contends that the Court cannot presume that she failed to file her SALNs because as a public officer, she enjoys the presumption
that her appointment to office was regular. OSG failed to overcome the presumption created by the certifications from UP HRDO that she had been
cleared of all administrative responsibilities and charges. Her integrity is a political question which can only be decided by the JBC and the
President.

Regarding her missing SALNs, Sereno contends that the fact that SALNs are missing cannot give rise to the inference that they are not filed. The fact
that 11 SALNs were filed should give an inference to a pattern of filing, not of non-filing.

Intervenors’ arguments:

The intervenors argue that it is not incumbent upon Sereno to prove to the JBC that she possessed the integrity required by the Constitution;
rather, the onus of determining whether or not she qualified for the post fell upon the JBC. Moreover, submission of SALNs is not a constitutional
requirement; what is only required is the imprimatur of the JBC. The intervenors likewise contend that “qualifications” such as citizenship, age, and
experience are enforceable while “characteristics” such as competence, integrity, probity, and independence are mere subjective considerations.

ISSUES:

Preliminary issues:

1. Whether the Court should entertain the motion for intervention

2. Whether the Court should grant the motion for the inhibition of Sereno against five Justices

Main Issues:

3. Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition for quo warranto.
4. Whether Sereno may be the respondent in a quo warranto proceeding notwithstanding the fact that an impeachment complaint has already been
filed with the House of Representatives.
5. Whether Sereno, who is an impeachable officer, can be the respondent in a quo warranto proceeding, i.e., whether the only way to remove an
impeachable officer is impeachment.
6. Whether to take cognizance of the quo warranto proceeding is violative of the principle of separation of powers
7. Whether the petition is outrightly dismissible on the ground of prescription
8. Whether the determination of a candidate’s eligibility for nomination is the sole and exclusive function of the JBC and whether such determination.
partakes of the character of a political question outside the Court’s supervisory and review powers;
9. Whether the filing of SALN is a constitutional and statutory requirement for the position of Chief Justice.
10. If answer to ninth issue is in the affirmative, whether Sereno failed to file her SALNs as mandated by the Constitution and required by the law and
its implementing rules and regulations
11. If answer to ninth issue is in the affirmative, whether Sereno filed SALNs are not filed properly and promptly.
12. Whether Sereno failed to comply with the submission of SALNs as required by the JBC
13. If answer to the twelfth issue is in the affirmative, whether the failure to submit SALNs to the JBC voids the nomination and appointment of Sereno
as Chief Justice;
14. In case of a finding that Sereno is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice, whether the subsequent nomination by the JBC and the
appointment by the President cured such ineligibility.
15. Whether Sereno is a de jure or a de facto officer.

[READ: Justice Leonen’s dissenting opinion: Q&A Format]

HELD:

Anent the first issue: The intervention is improper.

Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein for a certain purpose: to
enable the third party to protect or preserve a right or interest that may be affected by those proceedings. The remedy of intervention is not a
matter of right but rests on the sound discretion of the court upon compliance with the first requirement on legal interest and the second
requirement that no delay and prejudice should result. The justification of one’s “sense of patriotism and their common desire to protect and
uphold the Philippine Constitution”, and that of the Senator De Lima’s and Trillanes’ intervention that their would-be participation in the
impeachment trial as Senators-judges if the articles of impeachment will be filed before the Senate as the impeachment court will be taken away is
not sufficient. The interest contemplated by law must be actual, substantial, material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent or
expectant. Moreover, the petition of quo warranto is brought in the name of the Republic. It is vested in the people, and not in any private
individual or group, because disputes over title to public office are viewed as a public question of governmental legitimacy and not merely a private
quarrel among rival claimants.

Anent the second issue: There is no basis for the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to inhibit in the case.

It is true that a judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its
fairness and as to his integrity. However, the right of a party to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does not appear to be wholly
free, disinterested, impartial and independent in handling the case must be balanced with the latter’s sacred duty to decide cases without fear of
repression. Bias must be proven with clear and convincing evidence. Those justices who were present at the impeachment proceedings were
armed with the requisite imprimatur of the Court En Banc, given that the Members are to testify only on matters within their personal knowledge.
The mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition, especially when the charge is without basis. There must be acts or
conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before it can brand them with the stigma of bias or partiality. Sereno’s call for inhibition has
been based on speculations, or on distortions of the language, context and meaning of the answers the Justices may have given as sworn witnesses
in the proceedings before the House.

Moreover, insinuations that the Justices of the SC are towing the line of President Duterte in entertaining the quo warranto petition must be struck
for being unfounded and for sowing seeds of mistrust and discordance between the Court and the public. The Members of the Court are beholden
to no one, except to the sovereign Filipino people who ordained and promulgated the Constitution. It is thus inappropriate to misrepresent that
the SolGen who has supposedly met consistent litigation success before the SG shall likewise automatically and positively be received in the
present quo warranto action. As a collegial body, the Supreme Court adjudicates without fear or favor. The best person to determine the propriety
of sitting in a case rests with the magistrate sought to be disqualified. [yourlawyersays]

Anent the third issue: A quo warranto petition is allowed against impeachable officials and SC has jurisdiction.

The SC have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and RTC to issue the extraordinary writs, including quo warranto. A direct invocation of the SC’s
original jurisdiction to issue such writs is allowed when there are special and important reasons therefor, and in this case, direct resort to SC is
justified considering that the action is directed against the Chief Justice. Granting that the petition is likewise of transcendental importance and has
far-reaching implications, the Court is empowered to exercise its power of judicial review. To exercise restraint in reviewing an impeachable
officer’s appointment is a clear renunciation of a judicial duty. an outright dismissal of the petition based on speculation that Sereno will eventually
be tried on impeachment is a clear abdication of the Court’s duty to settle actual controversy squarely presented before it. Quo
warranto proceedings are essentially judicial in character – it calls for the exercise of the Supreme Court’s constitutional duty and power to decide
cases and settle actual controversies. This constitutional duty cannot be abdicated or transferred in favor of, or in deference to, any other branch of
the government including the Congress, even as it acts as an impeachment court through the Senate.

To differentiate from impeachment, quo warranto involves a judicial determination of the eligibility or validity of the election or appointment of a
public official based on predetermined rules while impeachment is a political process to vindicate the violation of the public’s trust. In quo
warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by appointment, what is determined is the legality of the appointment. The title to a public office
may not be contested collaterally but only directly, by quo warranto proceedings. usurpation of a public office is treated as a public wrong and
carries with it public interest, and as such, it shall be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines
through the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor. The SolGen is given permissible latitude within his legal authority in actions for quo warranto,
circumscribed only by the national interest and the government policy on the matter at hand.

Anent the fourth issue: Simultaneous quo warranto proceeding and impeachment proceeding is not forum shopping and is allowed.

Quo warranto and impeachment may proceed independently of each other as these remedies are distinct as to (1) jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3)
applicable rules pertaining to initiation, filing and dismissal, and (4) limitations. Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of
several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same
essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues, either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court,
to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in another. The test for determining forum shopping is whether in
the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought. The crux of the controversy in this quo
warranto proceedings is the determination of whether or not Sereno legally holds the Chief Justice position to be considered as an impeachable
officer in the first place. On the other hand, impeachment is for respondent’s prosecution for certain impeachable offenses. Simply put, while
Sereno’s title to hold a public office is the issue in quo warranto proceedings, impeachment necessarily presupposes that Sereno legally holds the
public office and thus, is an impeachable officer, the only issue being whether or not she committed impeachable offenses to warrant her removal
from office.
Moreover, the reliefs sought are different. respondent in a quo warranto proceeding shall be adjudged to cease from holding a public office, which
he/she is ineligible to hold. Moreover, impeachment, a conviction for the charges of impeachable offenses shall result to the removal of the
respondent from the public office that he/she is legally holding. It is not legally possible to impeach or remove a person from an office that he/she,
in the first place, does not and cannot legally hold or occupy.

Lastly, there can be no forum shopping because the impeachment proceedings before the House is not the impeachment case proper, since it is
only a determination of probable cause. The impeachment case is yet to be initiated by the filing of the Articles of Impeachment before the Senate.
Thus, at the moment, there is no pending impeachment case against Sereno. The process before the House is merely inquisitorial and is merely a
means of discovering if a person may be reasonably charged with a crime.

Anent the fifth issue: Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed or invalidly elected impeachable official may be
removed from office.

The language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not foreclose a quo warranto action against impeachable officers: “Section 2. The
President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be
removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other
high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.” The provision uses the permissive term “may” which denote discretion and cannot be construed as having
a mandatory effect, indicative of a mere possibility, an opportunity, or an option. In American jurisprudence, it has been held that “the express
provision for removal by impeachment ought not to be taken as a tacit prohibition of removal by other methods when there are other adequate
reasons to account for this express provision.”

The principle in case law is that during their incumbency, impeachable officers cannot be criminally prosecuted for an offense that carries with it
the penalty of removal, and if they are required to be members of the Philippine Bar to qualify for their positions, they cannot be charged with
disbarment. The proscription does not extend to actions assailing the public officer’s title or right to the office he or she occupies. Even the PET
Rules expressly provide for the remedy of either an election protest or a petition for quo warranto to question the eligibility of the President and
the Vice-President, both of whom are impeachable officers.

Further, that the enumeration of “impeachable offenses” is made absolute, that is, only those enumerated offenses are treated as grounds for
impeachment, is not equivalent to saying that the enumeration likewise purport to be a complete statement of the causes of removal from office.
If other causes of removal are available, then other modes of ouster can likewise be availed. To subscribe to the view that appointments or election
of impeachable officers are outside judicial review is to cleanse their appointments or election of any possible defect pertaining to the
Constitutionally-prescribed qualifications which cannot otherwise be raised in an impeachment proceeding. To hold otherwise is to allow an absurd
situation where the appointment of an impeachable officer cannot be questioned even when, for instance, he or she has been determined to be of
foreign nationality or, in offices where Bar membership is a qualification, when he or she fraudulently represented to be a member of the Bar.

Anent the sixth issue: The Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition is not violative of the doctrine of separation of
powers.

The Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto involving a person who would otherwise be an impeachable official had it
not been for a disqualification, is not violative of the core constitutional provision that impeachment cases shall be exclusively tried and decided by
the Senate. Again, the difference between quo warranto and impeachment must be emphasized. An action for quo warranto does not try a
person’s culpability of an impeachment offense, neither does a writ of quo warranto conclusively pronounce such culpability. The Court’s exercise
of its jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings does not preclude Congress from enforcing its own prerogative of determining probable cause for
impeachment, to craft and transmit the Articles of Impeachment, nor will it preclude Senate from exercising its constitutionally committed power
of impeachment.

However, logic, common sense, reason, practicality and even principles of plain arithmetic bear out the conclusion that an unqualified public
official should be removed from the position immediately if indeed Constitutional and legal requirements were not met or breached. To abdicate
from resolving a legal controversy simply because of perceived availability of another remedy, in this case impeachment, would be to sanction the
initiation of a process specifically intended to be long and arduous and compel the entire membership of the Legislative branch to momentarily
abandon their legislative duties to focus on impeachment proceedings for the possible removal of a public official, who at the outset, may clearly
be unqualified under existing laws and case law.

For guidance, the Court demarcates that an act or omission committed prior to or at the time of appointment or election relating to an official’s
qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment or election invalid is properly the subject of a quo warranto petition, provided that the
requisites for the commencement thereof are present. Contrariwise, acts or omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of integrity, being a
continuing requirement but nonetheless committed during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected official, cannot be the
subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of something else, which may either be impeachment if the public official concerned is impeachable and
the act or omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.
Anent the seventh issue: Prescription does not lie against the State.

The rules on quo warranto provides that “nothing contained in this Rule shall be construed to authorize an action against a public officer or
employee for his ouster from office unless the same be commenced within one (1) year after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the petitioner
to hold such office or position, arose”. Previously, the one-year prescriptive period has been applied in cases where private individuals asserting
their right of office, unlike the instant case where no private individual claims title to the Office of the Chief Justice. Instead, it is the government
itself which commenced the present petition for quo warranto and puts in issue the qualification of the person holding the highest position in the
Judiciary.

Section 2 of Rule 66 provides that “the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, when directed by the President of the Philippines, or when upon
complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case specified in the preceding section can be established by proof must commence
such action.” It may be stated that ordinary statutes of limitation, civil or penal, have no application to quo warranto proceeding brought to
enforce a public right. There is no limitation or prescription of action in an action for quo warranto, neither could there be, for the reason that it
was an action by the Government and prescription could not be plead as a defense to an action by the Government.

That prescription does not lie in this case can also be deduced from the very purpose of an action for quo warranto. Because quo warranto serves
to end a continuous usurpation, no statute of limitations applies to the action. Needless to say, no prudent and just court would allow an
unqualified person to hold public office, much more the highest position in the Judiciary. Moreover, the Republic cannot be faulted for questioning
Sereno’s qualification· for office only upon discovery of the cause of ouster because even up to the present, Sereno has not been candid on
whether she filed the required SALNs or not. The defect on Sereno’s appointment was therefore not discernible, but was, on the contrary,
deliberately rendered obscure.

Anent the eighth issue: The Court has supervisory authority over the JBC includes ensuring that the JBC complies with its own rules.

Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution provides that “A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme
Court.” The power of supervision means “overseeing or the authority of an officer to see to it that the subordinate officers perform their duties.”
JBC’s absolute autonomy from the Court as to place its non-action or improper· actions beyond the latter’s reach is therefore not what the
Constitution contemplates. What is more, the JBC’s duty to recommend or nominate, although calling for the exercise of discretion, is neither
absolute nor unlimited, and is not automatically equivalent to an exercise of policy decision as to place, in wholesale, the JBC process beyond the
scope of the Court’s supervisory and corrective powers. While a certain leeway must be given to the JBC in screening aspiring magistrates, the
same does not give it an unbridled discretion to ignore Constitutional and legal requirements. Thus, the nomination by the JBC is not accurately an
exercise of policy or wisdom as to place the JBC’s actions in the same category as political questions that the Court is barred from
resolving. [yourlawyersays]

[READ: Justice Leonen’s dissenting opinion: Q&A Format]

With this, it must be emphasized that qualifications under the Constitution cannot be waived or bargained by the JBC, and one of which is that “a
Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence. “Integrity” is closely related to, or if not,
approximately equated to an applicant’s good reputation for honesty, incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and
ethical standards.” Integrity is likewise imposed by the New Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Court has
always viewed integrity with a goal of preserving the confidence of the litigants in the Judiciary. Hence, the JBC was created in order to ensure that
a member of the Supreme Court must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence.

Anent the ninth issue: The filing of SALN is a constitutional and statutory requirement.

Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution states that “A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may
be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth.” This has likewise been required by RA 3019 and RA
6713. “Failure to comply” with the law is a violation of law, a “prima facie evidence of unexplained wealth, which may result in the dismissal from
service of the public officer.” It is a clear breach of the ethical standards set for public officials and employees. The filing of the SALN is so important
for purposes of transparency and accountability that failure to comply with such requirement may result not only in dismissal from the public
service but also in criminal liability. Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713 even provides that non-compliance with this requirement is not only punishable by
imprisonment and/or a fine, it may also result in disqualification to hold public office.

Because the Chief Justice is a public officer, she is constitutionally and statutorily mandated to perform a positive duty to disclose all of his assets
and liabilities. According to Sereno herself in her dissenting opinion in one case, those who accept a public office do so cum onere, or with a
burden, and are considered as accepting its burdens and obligations, together with its benefits. They thereby subject themselves to all
constitutional and legislative provisions relating thereto, and undertake to perform all the duties of their office. The public has the right to demand
the performance of those duties. More importantly, while every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater
demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the Judiciary.

Noncompliance with the SALN requirement indubitably·reflects on a person’s integrity. It is not merely a trivial or a formal requirement. The
contention that the mere non-filing does not affect Sereno’s integrity does not persuade considering that RA 6713 and RA 3019 are malum
prohibitum and not malum in se. Thus, it is the omission or commission of that act as defined by the law, and not the character or effect thereof,
that determines whether or not the provision has been violated. Malice or criminal intent is completely immaterial.

Anent the tenth issue: Sereno chronically failed to file her SALNs and thus violated the Constitution, the law, and the Code of Judicial Conduct.

In Sereno’s 20 years of government service in UP Law, only 11 SALNs have been filed. Sereno could have easily dispelled doubts as to the filing or
nonfiling of the unaccounted SALNs by presenting them before the Court. Yet, Sereno opted to withhold such information or such evidence, if at
all, for no clear reason. The Doblada case, invoked by Sereno, cannot be applied, because in the Doblada case, there was a letter of the head of the
personnel of the branch of the court that the missing SALN exists and was duly transmitted and received by the OCA as the repository agency. In
Sereno’s case, the missing SALNs are neither proven to be in the records of nor was proven to have been sent to and duly received by the
Ombudsman as the repository agency. The existence of these SALNs and the fact of filing thereof were neither established by direct proof
constituting substantial evidence nor by mere inference. Moreover, the statement of the Ombudsman is categorical: “based on records on
file, there is no SALN filed by [Sereno] for calendar years 1999 to 2009 except SALN ending December 1998.” This leads the Court to conclude that
Sereno did not indeed file her SALN.

For this reason, the Republic was able to discharge its burden of proof with the certification from UP HRDO and Ombudsman, and thus it becomes
incumbent upon Sereno to discharge her burden of evidence. Further, the burden of proof in a quo warranto proceeding is different when it is filed
by the State in that the burden rests upon the respondent.

In addition, contrary to what Sereno contends, being on leave does not exempt her from filing her SALN because it is not tantamount to separation
from government service. The fact that Sereno did not receive any pay for the periods she was on leave does not make her a government worker
“serving in an honorary capacity” to be exempted from the SALN laws on RA 6713. [yourlawyersays]

Neither can the clearance and certification of UP HRDO be taken in favor of Sereno. During the period when Sereno was a professor in UP,
concerned authorized official/s of the Office of the President or the Ombudsman had not yet established compliance procedures for the review of
SALNs filed by officials and employees of State Colleges and Universities, like U.P. The ministerial duty of the head of office to issue compliance
order came about only on 2006 from the CSC. As such, the U.P. HRDO could not have been expected to perform its ministerial duty of issuing
compliance orders to Sereno when such rule was not yet in existence at that time. Moreover, the clearance are not substitutes for SALNs. The
import of said clearance is limited only to clearing Sereno of her academic and administrative responsibilities, money and property accountabilities
and from administrative charges as of the date of her resignation.

Neither can Sereno’s inclusion in the matrix of candidates with complete requirements and in the shortlist nominated by the JBC confirm or ratify
her compliance with the SALN requirement. Her inclusion in the shortlist of candidates for the position of Chief Justice does not negate, nor supply
her with the requisite proof of integrity. She should have been disqualified at the outset. Moreover, the JBC En Banc cannot be deemed to have
considered Sereno eligible because it does not appear that Sereno’s failure to submit her SALNs was squarely addressed by the body. Her inclusion
in the shortlist of nominees and subsequent appointment to the position do not estop the Republic or this Court from looking into her
qualifications. Verily, no estoppel arises where the representation or conduct of the party sought to be estopped is due to ignorance founded upon
an innocent mistake

Anent the eleventh issue: Sereno failed to properly and promptly file her SALNs, again in violation of the Constitutional and statutory
requirements .

Failure to file a truthful, complete and accurate SALN would likewise amount to dishonesty if the same is attended by malicious intent to conceal
the truth or to make false statements. The suspicious circumstances include: 1996 SALN being accomplished only in 1998; 1998 SALN only filed in
2003; 1997 SALN only notarized in 1993; 2004-2006 SALNs were not filed which were the years when she received the bulk of her fees from PIATCO
cases, 2006 SALN was later on intended to be for 2010, gross amount from PIATCO cases were not reflected, suspicious increase of P2,700,000 in
personal properties were seen in her first five months as Associate Justice. It is therefore clear as day that Sereno failed not only in complying with
the physical act of filing, but also committed dishonesty betraying her lack of integrity, honesty and probity. The Court does not hesitate to impose
the supreme penalty of dismissal against public officials whose SALNs were found to have contained discrepancies, inconsistencies and non-
disclosures.

Anent the twelfth issue: Sereno failed to submit the required SALNs as to qualify for nomination pursuant to the JBC rules.
The JBC required the submission of at least ten SALNs from those applicants who are incumbent Associate Justices, absent which, the applicant
ought not to have been interviewed, much less been considered for nomination. From the minutes of the meeting of the JBC, it appeared that
Sereno was singled out from the rest of the applicants for having failed to submit a single piece of SALN for her years of service in UP Law. It is clear
that JBC did not do away with the SALN requirement, but still required substantial compliance. Subsequently, it appeared that it was only Sereno
who was not able to substantially comply with the SALN requirement, and instead of complying, Sereno wrote a letter containing justifications why
she should no longer be required to file the SALNs: that she resigned from U.P. in 2006 and then resumed government service only in 2009, thus
her government service is not continuous; that her government records are more than 15 years old and thus infeasible to retrieve; and that U.P.
cleared her of all academic and administrative responsibilities and charges.

These justifications, however, did not obliterate the simple fact that Sereno submitted only 3 SALNs to the JBC in her 20-year service in U.P., and
that there was nary an attempt on Sereno’s part to comply. Moreover, Sereno curiously failed to mention that she did not file several SALNs during
the course of her employment in U.P. Such failure to disclose a material fact and the concealment thereof from the JBC betrays any claim of
integrity especially from a Member of the Supreme Court. [yourlawyersays]

Indubitably, Sereno not only failed to substantially comply with the submission of the SALNs but there was no compliance at all. Dishonesty is
classified as a grave offense the penalty of which is dismissal from the service at the first infraction. A person aspiring to public office must observe
honesty, candor and faithful compliance with the law. Nothing less is expected. Dishonesty is a malevolent act that puts serious doubt upon one’s
ability to perform his duties with the integrity and uprightness demanded of a public officer or employee. For these reasons, the JBC should no
longer have considered Sereno for interview.

Moreover, the fact that Sereno had no permit to engage in private practice while in UP, her false representations that she was in private practice
after resigning from UP when in fact she was counsel for the government, her false claims that the clearance from UP HRDO is proof of her
compliance with SALNs requirement, her commission of tax fraud for failure to truthfully declare her income in her ITRs for the years 2007-2009,
procured a brand new Toyota Land Cruiser worth at least P5,000,000, caused the hiring of Ms. Macasaet without requisite public bidding, misused
P3,000,000 of government funds for hotel accommodation at Shangri-La Boracay as the venue of the 3rd ASEAN Chief Justices meeting, issued a
TRO in Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines v. COMELEC contrary to the Supreme Court’s internal rules, manipulated the
disposition of the DOJ request to transfer the venue of the Maute cases outside of Mindanao, ignored rulings of the Supreme Court with respect to
the grant of survivorship benefits which caused undue delay to the release of survivorship benefits to spouses of deceased judges and Justices,
manipulated the processes of the JBC to exclude then SolGen, now AJ Francis Jardeleza, by using highly confidential document involving national
security against the latter among others, all belie the fact that Sereno has integrity.

Anent the thirteenth issue: Sereno’s failure to submit to the JBC her SALNs for several years means that her integrity was not established at the
time of her application

The requirement to submit SALNs is made more emphatic when the applicant is eyeing the position of Chief Justice. On the June 4, 2012, JBC En
Banc meeting, Senator Escudero proposed the addition of the requirement of SALN in order for the next Chief Justice to avoid what CJ Corona had
gone through. Further, the failure to submit the required SALNs means that the JBC and the public are divested of the opportunity to consider the
applicant’s fitness or propensity to commit corruption or dishonesty. In Sereno’s case, for example, the waiver of the confidentiality of bank
deposits would be practically useless for the years that she failed to submit her SALN since the JBC cannot verify whether the same matches the
entries indicated in the SALN.

Anent the fourteenth issue: Sereno’s ineligibility for lack of proven integrity cannot be cured by her nomination and subsequent appointment as
Chief Justice.

Well-settled is the rule that qualifications for public office must be possessed at the time of appointment and assumption of office and also during
the officer’s entire tenure as a continuing requirement. The voidance of the JBC nomination as a necessary consequence of the Court’s finding that
Sereno is ineligible, in the first place, to be a candidate for the position of Chief Justice and to be nominated for said position follows as a matter of
course. The Court has ample jurisdiction to do so without the necessity of impleading the JBC as the Court can take judicial notice of the
explanations from the JBC members and the OEO. he Court, in a quo warranto proceeding, maintains the power to issue such further judgment
determining the respective rights in and to the public office, position or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires.

Neither will the President’s act of appointment cause to qualify Sereno. Although the JBC is an office constitutionally created, the participation of
the President in the selection and nomination process is evident from the composition of the JBC itself.

An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee should
possess the qualifications required by law. While the Court surrenders discretionary appointing power to the President, the exercise of such
discretion is subject to the non-negotiable requirements that the appointee is qualified and all other legal requirements are satisfied, in the
absence of which, the appointment is susceptible to attack.
 Anent the fifteenth issue: Sereno is a de facto officer removable through quo warranto

The effect of a finding that a person appointed to an office is ineligible therefor is that his presumably valid appointment will give him color of title
that confers on him the status of a de facto officer. For lack of a Constitutional qualification, Sereno is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice
and is merely holding a colorable right or title thereto. As such, Sereno has never attained the status of an impeachable official and her removal
from the office, other than by impeachment, is justified. The remedy, therefore, of a quo warranto at the instance of the State is proper to oust
Sereno from the appointive position of Chief Justice. [yourlawyersays]

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Quo Warranto is GRANTED.

Sereno is found DISQUALIFIED from and is hereby adjudged GUILTY of UNLAWFULLY HOLDING and EXERCISING the OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE.
Accordingly, Sereno is OUSTED and EXCLUDED therefrom.

The position of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is declared vacant and the Judicial and Bar Council is directed to commence the application
and nomination process.

This Decision is immediately executory without need of further action from the Court.

Sereno is ordered to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from receipt hereof why she should not be sanctioned for violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Code of Judicial Conduct for transgressing the sub judice rule and for casting aspersions and ill motives to the Members of
the Supreme Court.

THE OTHER COURTS

JURISDICTION

FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS, INC. V. THE COUR OF APPEALS ET AL,

Facts:

1. Petitioner assailed the conflicting provisions of B.P. 129, EO 226 (Art. 82) and a circular, 1-91 issued by the Supreme Court which deals with the
jurisdiction of courts for appeal of cases decided by quasi-judicial agencies such as the Board of Investments (BOI).

2. BOI granted petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s application to amend its BOI certificate of registration by changing the scope of its registered
product from "glazed floor tiles" to "ceramic tiles." Oppositor Mariwasa filed a motion for reconsideration of the said BOI decision while oppositor
Fil-Hispano Ceramics, Inc. did not move to reconsider the same nor appeal therefrom. Soon rebuffed in its bid for reconsideration, Mariwasa filed a
petition for review with CA.

4. CA temporarily restrained the BOI from implementing its decision. The TRO lapsed by its own terms twenty (20) days after its issuance, without
respondent court issuing any preliminary injunction.

5. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and to lift the restraining order contending that CA does not have jurisdiction over the BOI case, since the same
is exclusively vested with the Supreme Court pursuant to Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987.

6. Petitioner argued that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 or B.P. 129 and Circular 1-91, "Prescribing the Rules Governing Appeals to the Court
of Appeals from a Final Order or Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies" cannot be the basis of Mariwasa's appeal to
respondent court because the procedure for appeal laid down therein runs contrary to Article 82 of E.O. 226, which provides that appeals from
decisions or orders of the BOI shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court.

7. While Mariwasa maintains that whatever inconsistency there may have been between B.P. 129 and Article 82 of E.O. 226 on the question of venue
for appeal, has already been resolved by Circular 1-91 of the Supreme Court, which was promulgated on February 27, 1991 or four (4) years after
E.O. 226 was enacted.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the case

YES. Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal from
decisions of the BOI are concerned. Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute was previously allowed to be filed directly with the
Supreme Court, should now be brought to the Court of Appeals.

TERESITA G. FABIAN V. HON. ANIANO A DESIERTO ET AL.

Facts:

Fabian filed an administrative charge for grave misconduct against Agustin committed by him as then DPWH Assistant Regional Director of Region
IV-A. The Ombudsman found Agustin guilty but upon reconsideration, he was exonerated.

Fabian elevated the case to the SC, arguing that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) provides that all administrative
disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for
certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issue:

May administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman be appealed to the Supreme Court without its
advise and concurrence?

Held:

No. Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases. It violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases
the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. The constitutional prohibition was intended to give this Court a measure of control over cases placed under
its appellate Jurisdiction.Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the
Court.

Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 was declared INVALID. (Fabian vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 129742. September 16, 1998)

REPUBLIC OF THE PH, ET AL V. HON. HENRICK F. GINGOYON

Republic vs Gingoyon
481 SCRA 457 [GR No. 166429 December 19, 2005]

Facts: The Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III (NAIA 3) was conceived, designed and constructed to serve as the country’s
show window to the world. Regrettably, it has spawned controversies. Regrettably too, despite the apparent completion of the terminal complex
way back it has not yet been operated. This has caused immeasurable economic damage to the country, not to mention its deplorable discredit in
the international community. In the first case that reached this Court, Agan v. PIATCO,the contracts which the Government had with the contractor
were voided for being contrary to law and public policy. The second case now before the Court involves the matter of just compensation due the
contractor for the terminal complex it built. We decide the case on the basis of fairness, the same norm that pervades both the Court’s 2004
Resolution in the first case and the latest expropriation law. The present controversy has its roots with the promulgation of the Court’s decision in
Agan v. PIATCO,promulgated in 2003 (2003 Decision). This decision nullified the “Concession Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-Transfer
Arrangement of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III” entered into between the Philippine Government (Government)
and the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO), as well as the amendments and supplements thereto. The agreement had
authorized PIATCO to build a new international airport terminal (NAIA 3), as well as a franchise to operate and maintain the said terminal during
the concession period of 25 years. The contracts were nullified, among others, that Paircargo Consortium, predecessor of PIATCO, did not possess
the requisite financial capacity when it was awarded the NAIA 3 contract and that the agreement was contrary to public policy. At the time of the
promulgation of the 2003 Decision, the NAIA 3 facilities had already been built by PIATCO and were nearing completion. However, the ponencia
was silent as to the legal status of the NAIA 3 facilities following the nullification of the contracts, as well as whatever rights of PIATCO for
reimbursement for its expenses in the construction of the facilities. PIATCO and several respondents-intervenors filed their respective motions for
the reconsideration of the 2003 Decision. These motions were denied by the Court in its Resolution dated 21 January 2004 (2004 Resolution).
However, the Court this time squarely addressed the issue of the rights of PIATCO to refund, compensation or reimbursement for its expenses in
the construction of the NAIA 3 facilities. After the promulgation of the rulings in Agan, the NAIA 3 facilities have remained in the possession of
PIATCO, despite the avowed intent of the Government to put the airport terminal into immediate operation. The Government and PIATCO
conducted several rounds of negotiation regarding the NAIA 3 facilities. It also appears that arbitral proceedings were commenced before the
International Chamber of Commerce International Court of Arbitration and the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes,
although the Government has raised jurisdictional questions before those two bodies. Then, on 21 December 2004, the Government11 filed a
Complaint for expropriation with the Pasay City Regional Trial Court (RTC), together with an Application for Special Raffle seeking the immediate
holding of a special raffle. The Government sought upon the filing of the complaint the issuance of a writ of possession authorizing it to take
immediate possession and control over the NAIA 3 facilities. The Government also declared that it had deposited the amount of
P3,002,125,000.0012 (3 Billion) in Cash with the Land Bank of the Philippines, representing the NAIA 3 terminal’s assessed value for taxation
purposes. The case was raffled to Branch 117 of the Pasay City RTC, presided by respondent judge Hon. Henrick F. Gingoyon (Hon. Gingoyon). On
the same day that the Complaint was filed, the RTC issued an Order directing the issuance of a writ of possession to the Government, authorizing it
to “take or enter upon the possession” of the NAIA 3 facilities. Citing the case of City of Manila v. Serrano, the RTC noted that it had the ministerial
duty to issue the writ of possession upon the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance, and upon deposit made by the
government of the amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property subject to expropriation. The RTC found these requisites present,
particularly noting that “[t]he case record shows that [the Government has] deposited the assessed value of the [NAIA 3 facilities] in the Land Bank
of the Philippines, an authorized depositary, as shown by the certification attached to their complaint.” Also on the same day, the RTC issued a Writ
of Possession. According to PIATCO, the Government was able to take possession over the NAIA 3 facilities immediately after the Writ of Possession
was issued. However, on 4 January 2005, the RTC issued another Order designed to supplement its 21 December 2004 Order and the Writ of
Possession. In the 4 January 2005 Order, now assailed in the present petition, the RTC noted that its earlier issuance of its writ of possession was
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. However, it was observed that Republic Act No. 8974 (Rep. Act No. 8974),
otherwise known as “An Act to Facilitate the Acquisition of Right-of-Way, Site or Location for National Government Infrastructure Projects and For
Other Purposes” and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules) had amended Rule 67 in many respects.

Issue: Whether or not RA 8794 should be applied in the instant expropriation case and not Rule 67.

Held: Yes. At the very least, Rule 67 cannot apply in this case without violating the 2004 Resolution. Even assuming that Rep. Act No. 8974 does not
govern in this case, it does not necessarily follow that Rule 67 should then apply. After all, adherence to the letter of Section 2, Rule 67 would in
turn violate the Court’s requirement in the 2004 Resolution that there must first be payment of just compensation to PIATCO before the
Government may take over the property.

It is the plain intent of Rep. Act No. 8974 to supersede the system of deposit under Rule 67 with the scheme of “immediate payment” in cases
involving national government infrastructure projects.

As acknowledged in the 2003 Decision, the development of NAIA 3 was made pursuant to a build-operate-and-transfer arrangement pursuant to
Republic Act No. 6957, as amended,which pertains to infrastructure or development projects normally financed by the public sector but which are
now wholly or partly implemented by the private sector. Under the build-operate-and-transfer scheme, it is the project proponent which
undertakes the construction, including the financing, of a given infrastructure facility.

There can be no doubt that PIATCO has ownership rights over the facilities which it had financed and constructed. The 2004 Resolution squarely
recognized that right when it mandated the payment of just compensation to PIATCO prior to the takeover by the Government of NAIA 3. The fact
that the Government resorted to eminent domain proceedings in the first place is a concession on its part of PIATCO’s ownership. Indeed, if no
such right is recognized, then there should be no impediment for the Government to seize control of NAIA 3 through ordinary ejectment
proceedings.

Since the rights of PIATCO over the NAIA 3 facilities are established, the nature of these facilities should now be determined.

The law classifies the NAIA 3 facilities as real properties just like the soil to which they are adhered. Any sub-classifications of real property and
divergent treatment based thereupon for purposes of expropriation must be based on substantial distinctions, otherwise the equal protection
clause of the Constitution is violated. There may be perhaps a molecular distinction between soil and the inorganic improvements adhered thereto,
yet there are no purposive distinctions that would justify a variant treatment for purposes of expropriation. Both the land itself and the
improvements thereupon are susceptible to private ownership independent of each other, capable of pecuniary estimation, and if taken from the
owner, considered as a deprivation of property. The owner of improvements seized through expropriation suffers the same degree of loss as the
owner of land seized through similar means. Equal protection demands that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as
to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. For purposes of expropriation, parcels of land are similarly situated as the buildings or
improvements constructed thereon, and a disparate treatment between those two classes of real property infringes the equal protection clause.

Even as the provisions of Rep. Act No. 8974 call for that law’s application in this case, the threshold test must still be met whether its
implementation would conform to the dictates of the Court in the 2004 Resolution. Unlike in the case of Rule 67, the application of Rep. Act No.
8974 will not contravene the 2004 Resolution, which requires the payment of just compensation before any takeover of the NAIA 3 facilities by the
Government. The 2004 Resolution does not particularize the extent such payment must be effected before the takeover, but it unquestionably
requires at least some degree of payment to the private property owner before a writ of possession may issue. The utilization of Rep. Act No. 8974
guarantees compliance with this bare minimum requirement, as it assures the private property owner the payment of, at the very least, the
proffered value of the property to be seized. Such payment of the proffered value to the owner, followed by the issuance of the writ of possession
in favor of the Government, is precisely the schematic under Rep. Act No. 8974, one which facially complies with the prescription laid down in the
2004 Resolution.

Clearly then, we see no error on the part of the RTC when it ruled that Rep. Act No. 8974 governs the instant expropriation proceedings.
BAGUIO MARKET VENDORS MULTI-PURPOSE COOP (BAMARVEMPCO) V. HON. ILUMINADA CABATO-CORTES, RTC, BAGUIO CITY

FACTS:

Petitioner Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative is a credit cooperative organized under RA 6938, or the Cooperative Code of the
Philippines.

Article 62(6) of RA 6938 exempts cooperatives:

from the payment of all court and sheriff’s fees payable to the Philippine Government for and in connection with all actions brought under this
Code, or where such action is brought by the Cooperative Development Authority before the court, to enforce the payment of obligations
contracted in favor of the cooperative.

Petitioner, as mortgagee, filed with the RTC of Baguio City a petition to extrajudicially foreclose a mortgage. Invoking Article 62 (6) of RA 6938,
petitioner sought exemption from payment of the fees.

Judge Iluminada Cabato-Cortes (respondent), denied the request for exemption ruling that under Section 7(c) of Rule 141, as amended, petitions
for extrajudicial foreclosure are subject to legal fees based on the value of the mortgagee’s claim.

Petitioner’s MR was denied.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner’s application for extrajudicial foreclosure is exempt from legal fees under Article 62(6) of RA 6938.

RULING:

We hold that Article 62(6) of RA 6938 does not apply to petitioner’s foreclosure proceeding.

Petitions for Extrajudicial Foreclosure Outside of the Ambit of Article 62(6) of RA 6938

The scope of the legal fees exemption Article 62(6) of RA 6938 grants to cooperatives is limited to two types of actions, namely:

(1) actions brought under RA 6938; and (2) actions brought by the Cooperative Development Authority to enforce the payment of obligations
contracted in favor of cooperatives.

It is apparent that Article 62(6) of RA 6938 is no authority for petitioner to claim exemption from the payment of legal fees in this proceeding
because first, the fees imposable on petitioner do not pertain to an action brought under RA 6938 but to a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgage under Act 3135.

Second, petitioner is not the Cooperative Development Authority which can claim exemption only in actions to enforce payments of obligations on
behalf of cooperatives.

JANG LIM ET AL., V. THE COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:
Respondent Cotabato Timberland Company Inc is a company engaged in the production and manufacture of plywood and veneer. Respondent

tapped and hired Teddy Arabi whose main task is simply to recruit herein petitioners to perform milling and pilling works. Being exploited and

underpaid, a group of disgruntled workers filed a complaint for unpaid labor standards benefits against CTCI. The parties settled but CTCI made it

appear that Arabi was petitioners’ employer and the one who paid their claims. Subsequently, after being warned that management was

dissatisfied with their work performance, CTCI terminated petitioners without due process. Thus, petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal

and payment of monetary claims against CTCI. The Labor Arbiter found in favor of petitioners. NLRC tribunal reversed the decision stating that no

employer-employee relationship existed between petitioners and CTCI, and that Teddy Arabi being an independent contractor was the real

employer of petitioners.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not petitioners are employees of CTCI.

(2) Whether or not Teddy Arabi is an independent contractor.

Ruling:

(1) YES. CTCI exercised the power of control over the employees. The work activities and schedules of petitioners were set by CTCI. Evidence of

CTCI’s absolute control and supervision over the manner and conduct of work of the petitioners can be established from the following: (1) the

manning/shifting schedules of the petitioners were entirely prepared and approved by CTCI; and (2) photocopies of the company identification

cards bearing the name of the CTCI and likewise countersigned by CTCI’s Personnel Officer. Also, the fact that petitioners herein were advised that

“the management of CTCI has been dissatisfied with their work performance and production output results” undoubtedly indicate CTCI’s power to

regulate and direct the means and methods to be utilized in petitioners’ work. We find that the petitioners performed usual, regular and necessary

services for petitioner’s production of goods. In Zanotte Shoes v. NLRC, it was held that there is an employer-employee relationship where the work

performed is clearly related to, and in the pursuit of, the principal business activity of the employer.

(2) NO. The allegations that Arabi has sufficient capitalization or that he has investments in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, and work

premises, are entirely unsubstantiated. In our view what clearly appears here is that Arabi is a mere agent of CTCI. His only job is to recruit and hire

manpower as needed. Arabi is definitely not an independent contractor. Therefore, it is not Arabi but CTCI which is responsible to petitioners who

must be deemed employed not by Arabi but by the company.

FISCAL AUTONOMY, SECTION

JUDGE RENATO FUENTES V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN-MINDANAO
Constitutional Law 1 - Case Digests

On the Supreme Court's Supervision over Lower Courts

JUDGE RENATO A. FUENTES, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN-MINDANAO, GRAFT INVESTIGATION OFFICER II, MARIVIC A. TRABAJO-DARAY,
ANTONIO E. VALENZUELA in his capacity as the Director for Fact Finding and Intelligence of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao,
and MARGARITO P. GERVACIO, JR., in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao

Facts: Pursuant to the government’s plan to construct its first fly-over in Davao City, the Republic of the Philippines filed an expropriation case
against the owners of the properties affected by the project. The expropriation case was presided by Judge Renato A. Fuentes. The government
won the expropriation case. DPWH still owed the defendants-lot owners. The lower court granted Tessie Amadeo’s motion for the issuance of a
writ of execution against the DPWH to satisfy her unpaid claim. On May 3, 1994, respondent Sheriff Paralisan issued a Notice of Levy, addressed to
the Regional Director of the DPWH, Davao City, describing the properties subject of the levy as ‘All scrap iron/junks found in the premises of the
Department of Public Works and Highways depot at Panacan, Davao City. The auction sale pushed through and Alex Bacquial emerged as the
highest bidder. Meanwhile, Alex Bacquial, together with respondent Sheriff Paralisan, attempted to withdraw the auctioned properties on May 19,
1994. They were, however, prevented from doing so by the custodian of the subject DPWH properties, a certain Engr. Ramon Alejo, who claimed
that his office was totally unaware of the auction sale, and informed the sheriff that many of the properties within the holding area of the depot
were still serviceable and were due for repair and rehabilitation.

On the basis of letters from Congressman Manuel M. Garcia of the Second District of Davao City and Engineer Ramon A. Alejo, the Court
Administrator, Supreme Court directed Judge Renato A. Fuentes and Sheriff Norberto Paralisan to comment on the report recommending the filing
of an administrative case against the sheriff and other persons responsible for the anomalous implementation of the writ of execution. The
Department of Public Works and Highways, through the Solicitor General, filed an administrative complaint against Sheriff Norberto Paralisan for
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao recommended that Judge Renato A. Fuentes be charged before the Sandiganbayan with violation of
Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3 (e) and likewise be administratively charged before the Supreme Court with acts unbecoming of a judge.

Director Valenzuela filed with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao a criminal complaint charging Judge Rentao A. Fuentes with
violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3 (e).

Fuentes filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao a motion to dismiss complaint and/or manifestation to forward all records to the
Supreme Court.

Petitioner alleged that the respondent Ombudsman-Mindanao committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when he initiated a criminal complaint against petitioner for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Section 3 [e]. And he conducted an investigation of said
complaint against petitioner. Thus, he encroached on the power of the Supreme Court of administrative supervision over all courts and its
personnel.

The Solicitor General submitted that the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation because the Supreme Court is not in possession of any record
which would verify the propriety of the issuance of the questioned order and writ. Moreover, the Court Administrator has not filed any
administrative case against petitioner judge that would pose similar issues on the present inquiry of the Ombudsman-Mindanao.

Issue: Whether the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation of acts of a judge in the exercise of his official functions alleged to be in violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in the absence of an administrative charge for the same acts before the Supreme Court.

Held: No.
Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides:

“Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties: (1) Investigate and
prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the
exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases.”

Thus, the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative complaint before his office against petitioner judge, pursuant to
his power to investigate public officers. The Ombudsman must indorse the case to the Supreme Court, for appropriate action.

Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from
the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals to the lowest municipal trial court clerk.

Hence, it is the Supreme Court that is tasked to oversee the judges and court personnel and take the proper administrative action against them if
they commit any violation of the laws of the land. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the
independence of the judiciary and the doctrine of separation of powers.

Petitioner’s questioned order directing the attachment of government property and issuing a writ of execution were done in relation to his office,
well within his official functions. The order may be erroneous or void for lack or excess of jurisdiction. However, whether or not such order of
execution was valid under the given circumstances, must be inquired into in the course of the judicial action only by the Supreme Court that is
tasked to supervise the courts. “No other entity or official of the Government, not the prosecution or investigation service of any other branch, not
any functionary thereof, has competence to review a judicial order or decision--whether final and executory or not--and pronounce it erroneous so
as to lay the basis for a criminal or administrative complaint for rendering an unjust judgment or order.
 RE. ALLEGATIONS MADE UNDER OATH AT THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE HEARING HELP ON SEPT. 26 AGAINST JUSTICE GREGORY S.
ONG, SANDIGAN BAYAN

SEE FULL TEXT.

ESTIVONA V. HON. FRANK LOBRIGO AND PEOPLE

FACTS:

Petitioner Estipona, Jr. was charged with violation of Section 11 of RA 9165.

On June 15, 2016, Estipona filed a Motion to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty plea
and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12 (NOTE: should have been Section 15?) of the same law, with a penalty of
rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender and the minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession.

Petitioner argues that Section 23 of RA 9165 which prohibits plea bargaining in all violations of said law violates:

1. The intent of the law expressed in paragraph 3, Section 2 thereof;

2. The rule-making authority of the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution; and
3. The principle of separation of powers among the three equal branches of the government.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional as it encroached upon the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure.
2. Whether or not Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional for being violative of the Constitutional right to equal protection of the law.

HELD:

FIRST ISSUE: YES

The Supreme Court held that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now Their exclusive domain and no longer
shared with the Executive and Legislative departments.

The Court further held that the separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government has erected an impregnable wall that
keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure within the sole province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon
this prerogative if they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules promulgated by the Court.

Viewed from this perspective, the Court had rejected previous attempts on the part of the Congress, in the exercise of its legislative power, to
amend the Rules of Court (Rules), to wit:

1. Fabian v. Desierto -Appeal from the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in an administrative disciplinary case should be taken to the Court of
Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules instead of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 as provided in Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770.
2. Cathay Metal Corporation v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. – The Cooperative Code provisions on notices cannot replace the rules
on summons under Rule 14 of the Rules.
3. RE: Petition for Recognition of the Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal Fees; Baguio Market Vendors MultiPurpose Cooperative
(BAMARVEMPCO) v. Hon. Judge Cabato-Cortes; In Re: Exemption of the National Power Corporation from Payment of Filing/Docket Fees; and
Rep. of the Phils. v. Hon. Mangotara, et al. – Despite statutory provisions, the GSIS, BAMARVEMPCO, and NPC are not exempt from the payment
of legal fees imposed by Rule 141 of the Rules.
4. Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division) – The first paragraph of Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770, which prohibits courts except the Supreme
Court from issuing temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, is
unconstitutional as it contravenes Rule 58 of the Rules.

Considering that the aforesaid laws effectively modified the Rules, this Court asserted its discretion to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of
procedure, to the exclusion of the legislative and executive branches of government. To reiterate, the Court’s authority to promulgate rules on
pleading, practice, and procedure is exclusive and one of the safeguards of Our institutional independence.

SECOND ISSUE: UNRESOLVED

The Supreme Court did not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is contrary to the constitutional right to equal protection of the
law in order not to preempt any future discussion by the Court on the policy considerations behind Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165.

Pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the statutory provision in toto or a qualified version thereof, the Court deemed it proper to
declare as invalid the prohibition against plea bargaining on drug cases until and unless it is made part of the rules of procedure through an
administrative circular duly issued for the purpose.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSIONS ABOUT PLEA BARGAINING:

Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure

Fabian v. Hon. Desierto laid down the test for determining whether a rule is substantive or procedural in nature.

In determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies
any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized
by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is
not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of
implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.

In several occasions, We dismissed the argument that a procedural rule violates substantive rights. By the same token, it is towards the provision of
a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases in all courts that the rules on plea bargaining was introduced. As a way
of disposing criminal charges by agreement of the parties, plea bargaining is considered to be an “important,” “essential,” “highly desirable,” and
“legitimate” component of the administration of justice.

In this jurisdiction, plea bargaining has been defined as “a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory
disposition of the case subject to court approval.” There is give-and-take negotiation common in plea bargaining. The essence of the agreement is
that both the prosecution and the defense make concessions to avoid potential losses. Properly administered, plea bargaining is to be encouraged
because the chief virtues of the system – speed, economy, and finality – can benefit the accused, the offended party, the prosecution, and the
court.

Considering the presence of mutuality of advantage, the rules on plea bargaining neither create a right nor take away a vested right. Instead, it
operates as a means to implement an existing right by regulating the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law
and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them.

No constitutional right to plea bargain

Yet a defendant has no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic rights are infringed by trying him rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the
prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to trial. Under the present Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right
but depends on the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense
that is necessarily included in the offense charged. The reason for this is that the prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions;
his duty is to always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, based on what the evidence on hand can sustain.

Plea bargaining, when allowed

Plea bargaining is allowed during the arraignment, the pre-trial, or even up to the point when the prosecution already rested its case.

As regards plea bargaining during the pre-trial stage, the trial court’s exercise of discretion should not amount to a grave abuse thereof.

If the accused moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense subsequent to a bail hearing or after the prosecution rested its case, the rules allow such a
plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged. The only basis on which the
prosecutor and the court could rightfully act in allowing change in the former plea of not guilty could be nothing more and nothing less than the
evidence on record. The ruling on the motion must disclose the strength or weakness of the prosecution’s evidence. Absent any finding on the
weight of the evidence on hand, the judge’s acceptance of the defendant’s change of plea is improper and irregular.

DISCIPLINARY, SECTION 11
VENANCIO INONOG V. JUDGE FRANCISCO B. IBAY

Facts:

According to complainant, at around 1:00 a.m. of March 18, 2005, he parked the vehicle that he drives for his boss in a vacant parking space at the
basement of the
Makati City Hall because the slot where he usually parked was already occupied. At the time, the parking slots at the basement of the Makati City
Hall were indicated only by numbers and not by names of officials to whom they were assigned. Thereafter, complainant notified his... superior
that he will not be reporting for work for the rest of that day, March 18, 2005, because he was not feeling well. Thus, he left the vehicle in the said
basement parking area and went home to Tanay, Rizal.

Later that morning, complainant received a call from his brother, also an employee of the City Government of Makati, informing him that he should
appear before the sala of respondent judge at 10:30 a.m. to explain/show cause why he should not be cited for contempt of court for... parking his
vehicle at the space reserved for respondent judge.

He was informed that the respondent judge blamed the usurpation of the said parking space for the delay in the promulgation of the decision in
Criminal Case Nos. 02-1320, 02-3046, 02-3168-69, and 03-392-393... scheduled at 8:00 a.m. of March 18, 2005 because the latter had a hard time
looking for another parking space. Complainant was also informed that if he failed to appear at the hearing, a warrant for his arrest will be issued.

Aggrieved by the said orders of respondent judge, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint.

respondent judge explained that on March 18, 2005, he proceeded to the court at around 7:00 a.m. to finalize the decision in Criminal Case Nos.
02-1320, 02-3046, 02-3168-69 and 03-392-393, all entitled People v. Glenn Fernandez, et al.,... which were to be promulgated on the first hour of
the same day. Upon reaching his parking slot, he found complainant's vehicle parked there. As a result, he had a hard time looking for his own
parking space. Hence, the promulgation of the decision was delayed.

Respondent judge added that he ordered the complainant to appear before him for the hearing at 10:30 a.m. of March 18, 2005, but, complainant
refused, thus, he declared him in contempt of court.

the OCA made the following evaluation and recommendation:

In the instant case, there was no defiance of authority on the part of the complainant when he parked his vehicle at the spot reserved for the
respondent judge. The incident is too flimsy to be a basis of a contempt proceedings. At most, the act resulted to a minor inconvenience... on the
part of the respondent but it was unlikely that it delayed the administration of justice. Besides, it was not shown that complainant parked his
vehicle at the spot intentionally to show disrespect to Judge Ibay. Respondent Judge Ibay acted precipitously in citing... complainant in contempt of
court in a manner which obviously smacks of retaliation rather than upholding of the court's honor.

Records failed to show that complainant was properly notified of Judge Ibay's order directing the former to appear and explain why he should not
be cited in contempt of court. The hearing was set at 10:30 A.M. or only about two and a half hours after respondent judge found that... his parking
space was occupied. The lack of notice accounts for the complainant's failure to appear at the hearing. Verily, complainant was not given a
reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit evidence in support of his defense.

Issues:

with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Ruling:

The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA but deems it proper to impose a penalty different from the OCA's recommendation.

Rule 71 of the Rules of Court prescribes the rules and procedure for indirect contempt. Sections 3 and 4 of the said rule read as follows:

SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing.--After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the
respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a... person guilty of any of
the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions;

(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being
dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or... induces
another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the
possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;

(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this
Rule;

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;

(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;

(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him. xxx
xxx xxx
SEC. 4. How proceedings commenced.--Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt
was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for... contempt. xxx
xxx xxx

The phrase "improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice" is so broad and general
that it encompasses wide spectrum of acts that could constitute indirect contempt. However, the act of complainant in parking his... car in a slot
allegedly reserved for respondent judge does not fall under this category. There was no showing that he acted with malice and/or bad faith or that
he was improperly motivated to delay the proceedings of the court by making use of the parking slot supposedly... reserved for respondent judge.
We cannot also say that the said act of complainant constitutes disrespect to the dignity of the court. In sum, the incident is too flimsy and
inconsequential to be the basis of an indirect contempt proceeding.

In Lu Ym v. Mahinay,[3] we held that an act, to be considered contemptuous, must be clearly contrary or prohibited by the order of the Court. A
person cannot, for disobedience, be punished for contempt unless the act which is forbidden or required to... be done is clearly and exactly
defined, so that there can be no reasonable doubt or uncertainty as to what specific act or thing is forbidden or required. Here, the act of
complainant is not contrary or clearly prohibited by an order of the court.

The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts so as to preserve order in judicial proceedings as well as to uphold the administration of
justice. The courts must exercise the power of contempt for purposes that are impersonal because that power is intended as a... safeguard not for
the judges but for the functions they exercise. Thus, judges have, time and again, been enjoined to exercise their contempt power judiciously,
sparingly, with utmost restraint and with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the... dignity of the court, not for
retaliation or vindication.[4] Respondent judge's act of unceremoniously citing complainant in contempt is a clear evidence of his unjustified use of
the authority vested upon him by law.

INTERVENTION OF OTHER DEPARTMENTS

FRANCISCO CHAVEZ V. JBC AND GLORA MACAPAGAL ARROYO,
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIALAND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR.,Respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:

NATURE:
The case is a motion for reconsideration filed by the JBC in a prior decision rendered July 17, 2012 that JBC’s action of allowing more than one
member of the congress to represent the JBC to be unconstitutional

FACTS:
In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the
JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in
separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote
each. Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the
legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. it should mean one representative each from both Houses which
comprise the entire Congress. Respondent contends that the phrase “ a representative of congress” refers that both houses of congress should
have one representative each, and that these two houses are permanent and mandatory components of “congress” as part of the bicameral
system of legislature. Both houses have their respective powers in performance of their duties. Art VIII Sec 8 of the constitution provides for the
component of the JBC to be 7 members only with only one representative from congress.

ISSUE:
Whether the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the House of Representatives making 8 instead of 7 sitting members to be
unconstitutional as provided in Art VIII Sec 8 of the constitution.

HELD: Yes. The practice is unconstitutional; the court held that the phrase “a representative of congress” should be construed as to having only one
representative that would come from either house, not both. That the framers of the constitution only intended for one seat of the JBC to be
allotted for the legislative.
It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in government – to legislate. In the passage of laws,
the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers. An
inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount.
This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC.
Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department. The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of
seven (7) members only.

FALLO: The motion was denied.

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA V. CHIEF JUSTICE MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

FACTS: Associate Justice Roberto Abad was about to retire and the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) announce an opening for application and
recommendation for the said vacancy. Francis H. Jardeleza (Jardeleza), incumbent Solicitor General of the Republic was included in the list of
candidates. Hence, he was interviewed.
However, he received calls from some Justices that the Chief Justice herself – CJ Sereno, will be invoking unanimity rule against him. It is invoked
because Jardeleza’s integrity is in question.

During the meeting, Justice Carpio disclosed a confidential information which characterized Jardeleza’s integrity as dubious. Jardeleza answered
that he would defend himself provided that due process would be observed. His request was denied and he was not included in the shortlist.

Hence, Jardeleza filed for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for TRO to compel the JBC to include him in the list on the grounds that the JBC and
CJ Sereno acted with grave abuse of discretion in excluding him, despite having garnered a sufficient number of votes to qualify for the position.

ISSUE: Whether or not the right to due process is available in the course of JBC proceedings in cases where an objection or opposition to an
application is raised.

RULING: Yes. While it is true that the JBC proceedings are sui generis, it does not automatically denigrate an applicant’s entitlement to due
process.

The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC proceedings. Notwithstanding being “a class of its own,” the right to be heard
and to explain one’s self is availing.
In cases where an objection to an applicant’s qualifications is raised, the observance of due process neither contradicts the fulfillment of the JBC’s
duty to recommend. This holding is not an encroachment on its discretion in the nomination process. Actually, its adherence to the precepts of due
process supports and enriches the exercise of its discretion. When an applicant, who vehemently denies the truth of the objections, is afforded the
chance to protest, the JBC is presented with a clearer understanding of the situation it faces, thereby guarding the body from making an unsound
and capricious assessment of information brought before it. The JBC is not expected to strictly apply the rules of evidence in its assessment of an
objection against an applicant. Just the same, to hear the side of the person challenged complies with the dictates of fairness because the only test
that an exercise of discretion must surmount is that of soundness.

Consequently, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been included in the shortlist submitted to the President for the vacated
position of Associate Justice Abad. This consequence arose from the violation by the JBC of its own rules of procedure and the basic tenets of due
process.

True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a nomination, but this does not prescind from the fact that the JBC failed to observe the minimum
requirements of due process.

CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATIONS
ANGARA V. ELECTORAL COMMISSION
I. THE FACTS

Petitioner Jose Angara was proclaimed winner and took his oath of office as member of the National Assembly of the Commonwealth
Government. On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed a resolution confirming the election of those who have not been subject of an
election protest prior to the adoption of the said resolution.

On December 8, 1935, however, private respondent Pedro Ynsua filed an election protest against the petitioner before the Electoral
Commission of the National Assembly. The following day, December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted its own resolution providing that it
will not consider any election protest that was not submitted on or before December 9, 1935.

Citing among others the earlier resolution of the National Assembly, the petitioner sought the dismissal of respondent’s protest. The
Electoral Commission however denied his motion.

II. THE ISSUE

Did the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the
petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?

III. THE RULING

[The Court DENIED the petition.]

NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest filed against the
election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly.

The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the
protest filed by the respondent Ynsua against the election of the petitioner Angara, and that the earlier resolution of the National Assembly cannot
in any manner toll the time for filing election protests against members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such
time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.
 The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that
power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. xxx.

[T]he creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time with which
protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. [W]here a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for
the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred. In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the
procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for
the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

JOSE C. MIRANDA V. HON. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE

FACTS:
1994, RA No. 7720 effected the conversion of the municipality of Santiago, Isabela, into an independent component city. July 4th, RA No. 7720 was
approved by the people of Santiago in a plebiscite. 1998, RA No. 8528 was enacted and it amended RA No. 7720 that practically downgraded the
City of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 for the lack of
provision to submit the law for the approval of the people of Santiago in a proper plebiscite.

Respondents defended the constitutionality of RA No. 8528 saying that the said act merely reclassified the City of Santiago from an independent
component city into a component city. It allegedly did not involve any “creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries
of local government units,” therefore, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is unnecessary. They also questioned the standing of petitioners to file
the petition and argued that the petition raises a political question over which the Court lacks jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition at bar.

RULING:
Yes. RA No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional. That Supreme Court has the jurisdiction over said petition because it involves not a political question
but a justiciable issue, and of which only the court could decide whether or not a law passed by the Congress is unconstitutional.

That when an amendment of the law involves creation, merger, division, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units,
a plebiscite in the political units directly affected is mandatory.
Petitioners are directly affected in the imple-mentation of RA No. 8528. Miranda was the mayor of Santiago City, Afiado was the President of the
Sangguniang Liga, together with 3 other petitioners were all residents and voters in the City of Santiago. It is their right to be heard in the
conversion of their city through a plebiscite to be conducted by the COMELEC. Thus, denial of their right in RA No. 8528 gives them proper standing
to strike down the law as unconstitutional.

Sec. 1 of Art. VIII of the Constitution states that: the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instru-mentality of the Government.

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR. VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Facts:

1. On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress.
2. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice “to conduct an investigation, in
aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development
Fund (JDF).
3. On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for “culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust
and other high crimes.” The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5
August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that
the first impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,” but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in
substance.
4. The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by House
Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-
 mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed
by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives.
5. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the House of Representatives, et. al.,
most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section
5 of Article XI of the Constitution that “[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a
period of one year.”

Issues:

1. Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses under the Constitution.
2. Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the
provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.
3. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.

Rulings:

1. This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of the judicial power of the Supreme Court under Section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution.
1. Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a
determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is
clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
2. Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
2. The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is unconstitutional.
1. Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this
section.” Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase “to effectively carry out the purpose of this
section.” Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry
out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules.
2. It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule
making power, then it would by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of
referendum.
3. It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee
on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has
been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI,
Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
2. Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along
with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the
second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice
on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same
impeachable officer within a one-year period.
Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives
on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which
was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

LA BUGAL B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC. ET AL., V. VICTOR RAMOS

The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAA is a exception to the rule that participation in the nation’s natural resources
is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Provision must be construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos.
RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9, 1995. Before the effectivity of RA 7942, or on March 30, 1995, the President signed a
Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with WMCP, a corporation organized under Philippine laws, covering close to 100,000
hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, the Environment Secretary Victor
Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order 95-23, which was later repealed by DENR Administrative Order 96-40, adopted on December 20, 1996.
Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its implementing rules, and the FTAA between the government and WMCP be declared unconstitutional on
ground that they allow fully foreign owned corporations like WMCP to exploit, explore and develop Philippine mineral resources in contravention
of Article XII Section 2 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Charter.
In January 2001, WMC – a publicly listed Australian mining and exploration company – sold its whole stake in WMCP to Sagittarius Mines, 60% of
which is owned by Filipinos while 40% of which is owned by Indophil Resources, an Australian company. DENR approved the transfer
and registration of the FTAA in Sagittarius‘ name but Lepanto Consolidated assailed the same. The latter case is still pending before the Court of
Appeals.
EO 279, issued by former President Aquino on July 25, 1987, authorizes the DENR to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign owned
corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving wither technical or financial assistance for large scale
exploration, development and utilization of minerals which upon appropriate recommendation of the (DENR) Secretary, the President may execute
with the foreign proponent. WMCP likewise contended that the annulment of the FTAA would violate a treaty between the Philippines and
Australia which provides for the protection of Australian investments.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing fully foreign-owned corporations to exploit the Philippine mineral
resources. 2. Whether or not the FTAA between the government and WMCP is a ―service contract that permits fully foreign owned companies to
exploit the Philippine mineral resources.

HELD:

First Issue: RA 7942 is Unconstitutional

RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for permitting fully foreign owned corporations to exploit the Philippine natural
resources.
Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian Doctrine which states that ―All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife,
flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. The same section also states that, ―the exploration and development and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.
Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973 Constitution authorizing the State to grant licenses, concessions, or leases
for the exploration, exploitation, development, or utilization of natural resources. By such omission, the utilization of inalienable lands of the public
domain through license, concession or lease is no longer allowed under the 1987 Constitution.
Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equity investment for the purpose of exploiting a particular natural resource
within a given area. The concession amounts to complete control by the concessionaire over the country‘s natural resource, for it is given exclusive
and plenary rights to exploit a particular resource at the point of extraction.
The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase ―management or other forms of assistance in the 1973 Charter. The present
Constitution now allows only ―technical and financial assistance. The management and the operation of the mining activities by foreign
contractors, the primary feature of the service contracts was precisely the evil the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to avoid.
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is an exception to the rule that participation in the nation‘s natural
resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly, such provision must be construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos.
Therefore, RA 7942 is invalid insofar as the said act authorizes service contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase ―financial and
technical agreements in accordance with the 1987 Constitution, its pertinent provisions actually treat these agreements as service contracts that
grant beneficial ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law.
The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the foreign contractor manages the mineral resources just like the foreign contractor
in a service contract. By allowing foreign contractors to manage or operate all the aspects of the mining operation, RA 7942 has, in effect, conveyed
beneficial ownership over the nation‘s mineral resources to these contractors, leaving the State with nothing but bare title thereto.
The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a circumvention of the constitutionally ordained 60-40% capitalization
requirement for corporations or associations engaged in the exploitation, development and utilization of Philippine natural resources.
When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions, considerations, inducements or compensations for each other as
to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, then if some parts are unconstitutional, all provisions that are thus dependent,
conditional or connected, must fail with them.
Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned corporations are limited only to merely technical or financial assistance to the State
for large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils.
Second Issue: RP Government-WMCP FTAA is a Service Contract
The FTAA between he WMCP and the Philippine government is likewise unconstitutional since the agreement itself is a service contract.
Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP a fully foreign owned corporation, the exclusive right to explore, exploit, utilize and dispose of all minerals
and by-products that may be produced from the contract area. Section 1.2 of the same agreement provides that EMCP shall provide all financing,
technology, management, and personnel necessary for the Mining Operations.
These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA taken together, grant WMCP beneficial ownership over natural resources that
properly belong to the State and are intended for the benefit of its citizens. These stipulations are abhorrent to the 1987 Constitution. They are
precisely the vices that the fundamental law seeks to avoid, the evils that it aims to suppress. Consequently, the contract from which they spring
must be struck down.

PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER INC. ET AL V. MAGDANGAL B. ELMA, & RONALDO ZAMORA

Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constituti
other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any
financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumental
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not during his tenure be appointed as members o
Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including gove
or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. (Art. VII, 1987 Constitution)

Sec. 7. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.

Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Gover
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. (Art. IX-B, 1987 Constitution

Facts:

Elma was appointed as Chairman of the PCGG on 30 October 1998. Thereafter, during his tenure as PCGG Chairman, he was appointed as Chief
Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC). He accepted the second appointment, but waived any renumeration that he may receive as CPLC.

Petitioner questions Elma's concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC. They contend that the appointments contravene Section 13,
Article VII and Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners also maintained that respondent Elma was holding incompatible
offices.

Elma alleged that the strict prohibition against holding multiple positions provided under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution applies only to heads of executive departments, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries; it does not cover other public officials
given the rank of Secretary, Undersecretary, or Assistant Secretary.

He also claimed that it is Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution that should be applied in his case. This provision, according to him,
would allow a public officer to hold multiple positions if (1) the law allows the concurrent appointment of the said official; and (2) the primary
functions of either position allows such concurrent appointment. Since there exists a close relation between the two positions and there is no
incompatibility between them, the primary functions of either position would allow respondent Elma's concurrent appointments to both positions.
He further add that the appointment of the CPLC among incumbent public officials is an accepted practice.

Issues:

1. Can the PCGG Chairman concurrently hold the position of CPLC?

2. Is the strict prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution applicable to the PCGG Chairman or to the CPLC?

3. Does the ruling that the concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC are unconstitutional, for being incompatible offices, render both
appointments void?

4. Is there a need to refer the case to the Court en banc?

Held:
1. No. The concurrent appointment to these offices is in violation of Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, since these
are incompatible offices. An incompatibility exists between the positions of the PCGG Chairman and the CPLC. The duties of the CPLC include giving
independent and impartial legal advice on the actions of the heads of various executive departments and agencies and to review investigations
involving heads of executive departments and agencies, as well as other Presidential appointees. The PCGG is, without question, an agency under
the Executive Department. Thus, the actions of the PCGG Chairman are subject to the review of the CPLC. As CPLC, respondent Elma will be
required to give his legal opinion on his own actions as PCGG Chairman and review any investigation conducted by the Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission, which may involve himself as PCGG Chairman. In such cases, questions on his impartiality will inevitably be raised. This is the situation
that the law seeks to avoid in imposing the prohibition against holding incompatible offices.

2. The strict prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is not applicable to the PCGG Chairman nor to the CPLC, as neither of
them is a secretary, undersecretary, nor an assistant secretary, even if the former may have the same rank as the latter positions.

Granting that the prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is applicable to the present case, the defect in respondent
Elma's concurrent appointments to the incompatible offices of the PCGG Chairman and the CPLC would even be magnified when seen through the
more stringent requirements imposed by the said constitutional provision. The said section allows the concurrent holding of positions only when:
(1) provided for under the Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII, authorizing the Vice-President to become a member of the Cabinet; or (2) the
second post is required by the primary functions of the first appointment and is exercised in an ex-officio capacity [which denotes an act done in an
official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other appointment or authority than that conferred by the
office]. Although respondent Elma waived receiving renumeration for the second appointment, the primary functions of the PCGG Chairman do not
require his appointment as CPLC.

Appointment to the position of PCGG Chairman is not required by the primary functions of the CPLC, and vice versa. The primary functions of the
PCGG Chairman involve the recovery of ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family and associates, the
investigation of graft and corruption cases assigned to him by the President, and the adoption of measures to prevent the occurrence of
corruption. On the other hand, the primary functions of the CPLC encompass a different matter, that is, the review and/or drafting of legal orders
referred to him by the President. And while respondent Elma did not receive additional compensation in connection with his position as CPLC, he
did not act as either CPLC or PGCC Chairman in an ex-officio capacity. The fact that a separate appointment had to be made for respondent Elma to
qualify as CPLC negates the premise that he is acting in an ex-officio capacity.

In sum, the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not apply to respondent Elma since neither the PCGG Chairman nor
the CPLC is a Cabinet secretary, undersecretary, or assistant secretary. Even if this Court assumes, arguendo, that Section 13, Article VII is
applicable to respondent Elma, he still could not be appointed concurrently to the offices of the PCGG appointments in question are not covered by
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, said appointments are still prohibited under Section 7, Article IX-B, which covers all appointive and
elective officials, due to the incompatibility between the primary functions of the offices of the PCGG Chairman and the CPLC. (Public Interest
Center vs. Elma, G. R. No. 138965, June 30, 2006)

3. The ruling that the concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC are unconstitutional, for being incompatible offices, does not render
both appointments void. Following the common-law rule on incompatibility of offices, respondent Elma had, in effect, vacated his first office as
PCGG Chairman when he accepted the second office as CPLC.

4. There also is no merit in the respondents’ motion to refer the case to the Court en banc. What is in question in the present case is the
constitutionality of respondent Elma’s concurrent appointments, and not the constitutionality of any treaty, law or agreement. The mere
application of constitutional provisions does not require the case to be heard and decided en banc. (Public Interest Center vs. Elma, G.R. No.
138965, March 5, 2007)

GMA NETWORK V. COMELEC

FACTS:

The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 limiting
the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and political parties for national election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred
twenty (120) minutes and one hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively. They contend that such restrictive regulation on allowable broadcast
time violates freedom of the press, impairs the people’s right to suffrage as well as their right to information relative to the exercise of their right to
choose who to elect during the forth coming elections

Section 9 (a) provides for an “aggregate total” airtime instead of the previous “per station” airtime for political campaigns or
advertisements, and also required prior COMELEC approval for candidates’ television and radio guestings and appearances.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on airtime limits violates freedom of expression, of speech and of the press.
HELD:

YES. The Court held that the assailed rule on “aggregate-based” airtime limits is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and
constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and communicate with the people. Here, the adverted reason for imposing the
“aggregate-based” airtime limits – leveling the playing field – does not constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial
restriction on the freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs of government.
And, this is specially so in the absence of a clear-cut basis for the imposition of such a prohibitive measure.

It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the aggregate-based time limits on broadcast time when we consider that the
Philippines is not only composed of so many islands. There are also a lot of languages and dialects spoken among the citizens across the country.
Accordingly, for a national candidate to really reach out to as many of the electorates as possible, then it might also be necessary that he conveys
his message through his advertisements in languages and dialects that the people may more readily understand and relate to. To add all of these
airtimes in different dialects would greatly hamper the ability of such candidate to express himself – a form of suppression of his political speech.

JUAN ANTONIO OPASA ET AL. V. HON FULGENCIO FACTORAN, JR.

FACTS:
A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their generation and generations yet unborn, and represented
by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to
a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act
of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural
resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of the government.

ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?”

HELD:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for
themselves, for others of their generation, and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding
generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a
right considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management,
renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end
that their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as the future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and
healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the same time, the performance
of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

DEAN JOSE JOYA ET AL., V. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION AND GOOD GOVERNMENT

FACTS: Mateo A.T. Caparas, then Chairman of PCGG, requested then President Corazon C. Aquino, for authority to sign the proposed Consignment
Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines through PCGG and Christie, Manson and Woods International, Inc. (Christie’s of New York, or
CHRISTIE’S) concerning the scheduled sale of eighty-two (82) Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware seized from Malacañang and the
Metropolitan Museum of Manila alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late President Marcos, his relatives and cronies. Petitioners Dean
Jose Joya, et al., question the possible alienation of “cultural treasure of the nation” which is under the protection of the state pursuant to the 1987
Constitution and/or “cultural properties” contemplated under R.A. 4846, otherwise known as “The Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection
Act”. Petitioners claim that as Filipino citizens, taxpayers and artists deeply concerned with the preservation and protection of the country’s artistic
wealth, they have the legal personality to restrain respondents Executive Secretary and PCGG from acting contrary to their public duty to conserve
the artistic creations as mandated by the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE: Did the petitioners comply with the requisite legal standing, particularly the personality to sue, for the Supreme Court to exercise its power
of judicial review?
HELD: NO.
The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the court
unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: that the question must be raised by the proper party; that there
must be an actual case or controversy; that the question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and, that the decision on the
constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.

On the first requisite, we have held that one having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in an
action. This is premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which provides that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of
the real party-in-interest, and that all persons having interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as
plaintiffs. The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the
constitutional or legal question. “Legal standing” means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term “interest” is material interest, an interest in issue and to
be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Moreover, the interest of the
party plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and related party.

KILOSBAYAN, INC. ET AL., V. TEOFISTO GUINGONA JR.

FACTS:

The PCSO decided to establish an online lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of
funds. Sometime before March 1993, after learning that the PCSO was interested in operating on an online lottery system, the Berjaya Group
Berhad, with its affiliate, the International Totalizator Systems, Inc. became interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO. Considering the
citizenship requirement, the PGMC claims that Berjaya Group undertook to reduce its equity stakes in PGMC to 40% by selling 35% out of the
original 75% foreign stockholdings to local investors. An open letter was sent to President Ramos strongly opposing the setting up of an online
lottery system due to ethical and moral concerns, however the project pushed through.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the petitioners have locus standi (legal standing); and

2. Whether the Contract of Lease is legal and valid in light of Sec. 1 of R.A. 1169 as amended by B.P. Blg. 42.
RULING:

1. The petitioners have locus standi due to the transcendental importance to the public that the case demands. The ramifications
of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic and moral well-being of the people. The legal standing then of the petitioners
deserves recognition, and in the exercise of its sound discretion, the Court brushes aside the procedural barrier.
2. Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries “in collaboration,
association or joint venture with any person, association, company, or entity, whether domestic or foreign.” The language of the section
is clear that with respect to its franchise or privilege “to hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar
activities,” the PCSO cannot exercise it “in collaboration, association or joint venture” with any other party. This is the unequivocal
meaning and import of the phrase. By the exception explicitly made, the PCSO cannot share its franchise with another by way of the
methods mentioned, nor can it transfer, assign or lease such franchise.

KILOSBAYAN, INC ET AL., V. MANUEL L. MORATO

FACTS:
In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC leased online lottery equipment and accessories to
PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the gross amount of ticket or at least P35,000 per terminal annually). 30% of the net receipts is allotted to charity. Term of
lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon the expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the
equipment for P25 million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was filed to declare ELA invalid because it is the same as the Contract of Lease Petitioner's
Contention: ELA was same to the Contract of Lease.. It is still violative of PCSO's charter. It is violative of the law regarding public bidding. It violates
Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitution. Standing can no longer be questioned because it has become the law of the case Respondent's reply:
ELA is different from the Contract of Lease. There is no bidding required. The power to determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of
Directors of PCSO. PCSO does not have funds. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because they
were not parties to the contract

ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioners have standing?
HELD:
NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the petitioners is a departure from the settled rulings on real
parties in interest because no constitutional issues were actually involved. LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply. Since the present case is not the
same one litigated by theparties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be regarded as the law of this case. The
parties are the same but the cases are not. RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still apply. An issue actually and directly passed upon and determine
in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between the same parties involving a different cause of action. But the rule
does not apply to issues of law at least when substantially unrelated claims are involved. When the second proceeding involves an instrument or
transaction identical with, but in a form separable from the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in the second proceeding to
make an independent examination of the legal matters at issue. Since ELA is a different contract, the previous decision does not preclude
determination of the petitioner's standing. STANDING is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually involved.
The more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are REAL PARTIES in INTEREST.

JUANITO MARIANO JR. ET AL., V. COMELEC

FACTS:
This is a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos,
Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only
Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail sections 2, 51,
and 52 of Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy to challenge the constitutionality of one of the questioned sections of R.A. No. 7854.

HELD:
The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or
controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.

Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that
Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for
the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue
which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper partiesto
raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.

PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO V. GOVERNMENT OF REPUBLIC OF THE PH AND COMPANION CASES

Facts:

Subject of this case is the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) which is scheduled to be signed by the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines and the MILF in August 05, 2008. Five cases bearing the same subject matter were consolidated by this court
namely:-

 GR 183591 by the Province of Cotabato and Vice Governor Pinol on its prayer to declare unconstitutional and to have the MOA-AD
disclosed to the public and be open for public consultation.
 GR 183752 by the City of Zamboanga et al on its prayer to declare null and void said MOA-AD and to exclude the city to the BJE.
 GR 183893 by the City of Iligan enjoining the respondents from signing the MOA-AD and additionally impleading Exec. Sec. Ermita.
 GR 183951 by the Province of Zamboanga del Norte et al, praying to declare null and void the MOA-AD and without operative effect and
those respondents enjoined from executing the MOA-AD.
 GR 183692 by Maceda, Binay and Pimentel III, praying for a judgment prohibiting and permanently enjoining respondents from formally
signing and executing the MOA-AD and or any other agreement derived therefrom or similar thereto, and nullifying the MOA-AD for
being unconstitutional and illegal and impleading Iqbal.

The MOA-AD is a result of various agreements entered into by and between the government and the MILF starting in 1996; then in 1997,
they signed the Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities; and the following year, they signed the General Framework of Agreement of Intent
on August 27, 1998. However, in 1999 and in the early of 2000, the MILF attacked a number of municipalities in Central Mindanao. In March 2000,
they took the hall of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte; hence, then Pres. Estrada declared an all-out war-which tolled the peace negotiation. It was
when then Pres. Arroyo assumed office, when the negotiation regarding peace in Mindanao continued. MILF was hesitant; however, this
negotiation proceeded when the government of Malaysia interceded. Formal peace talks resumed and MILF suspended all its military actions. The
Tripoli Agreement in 2001 lead to the ceasefire between the parties. After the death of MILF Chairman Hashim and Iqbal took over his position, the
crafting of MOA-AD in its final form was born.
  MOA-AD Overview

This is an agreement to be signed by the GRP and the MILF. Used as reference in the birth of this MOA-AD are the Tripoli Agreement, organic act of
ARMM, IPRA Law, international laws such as ILO Convention 169, the UN Charter etc., and the principle of Islam i.e compact right entrenchment
(law of compact, treaty and order). The body is divided into concepts and principles, territory, resources, and governance.

Embodied in concepts and principles, is the definition of Bangsamoro as all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. These people
have the right to self- governance of their Bangsamoro homeland to which they have exclusive ownership by virtue of their prior rights of
occupation in the land. The MOA-AD goes on to describe the Bangsamoro people as "the ‘First Nation' with defined territory and with a system of
government having entered into treaties of amity and commerce with foreign nations." It then mentions for the first time the "Bangsamoro
Juridical Entity" (BJE) to which it grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro.

As defined in the territory of the MOA-AD, the BJE shall embrace the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region, involving the present ARMM,
parts of which are those which voted in the inclusion to ARMM in a plebiscite. The territory is divided into two categories, “A” which will be subject
to plebiscite not later than 12 mos. after the signing and “B” which will be subject to plebiscite 25 years from the signing of another separate
agreement. Embodied in the MOA-AD that the BJE shall have jurisdiction over the internal waters-15kms from the coastline of the BJE territory;
they shall also have "territorial waters," which shall stretch beyond the BJE internal waters up to the baselines of the Republic of the Philippines
(RP) south east and south west of mainland Mindanao; and that within these territorial waters, the BJE and the government shall exercise joint
jurisdiction, authority and management over all natural resources. There will also be sharing of minerals in the territorial waters; but no provision
on the internal waters.

Included in the resources is the stipulation that the BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries
and shall have the option to establish trade missions in those countries, as well as environmental cooperation agreements, but not to include
aggression in the GRP. The external defense of the BJE is to remain the duty and obligation of the government. The BJE shall have participation in
international meetings and events" like those of the ASEAN and the specialized agencies of the UN. They are to be entitled to participate in
Philippine official missions and delegations for the negotiation of border agreements or protocols for environmental protection and equitable
sharing of incomes and revenues involving the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain. The BJE
shall also have the right to explore its resources and that the sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total production pertaining
to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor of the BJE. And they shall have the right to cancel or modify concessions and TLAs.

And lastly in the governance, the MOA-AD claims that the relationship between the GRP and MILF is associative i.e. characterized by shared
authority and responsibility. This structure of governance shall be further discussed in the Comprehensive Compact, a stipulation which was highly
contested before the court. The BJE shall also be given the right to build, develop and maintain its own institutions, the details of which shall be
discussed in the comprehensive compact as well.

Issues:

1. WON the petitions have complied with the procedural requirements for the exercise of judicial review

2. WON respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and
later initialed the MOA-AD; and

3. WON the contents of the MOA-AD violated the Constitution and the laws

Ruling:

The SC declared the MOA-AD contrary to law and the Constitution.

 On the Procedural Issue

1st issue: As regards the procedural issue, SC upheld that there is indeed a need for the exercise of judicial review.

The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversy, that is the court will decline on issues that are hypothetical, feigned problems
or mere academic questions. Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. The contention of the
SolGen is that there is no issue ripe for adjudication since the MOA-AD is only a proposal and does not automatically create legally demandable
rights and obligations. Such was denied.

The SC emphasized that the petitions are alleging acts made in violation of their duty or in grave abuse of discretion. Well-settled jurisprudence
states that acts made by authority which exceed their authority, by violating their duties under E.O. No. 3 and the provisions of the Constitution
and statutes, the petitions make a prima facie case for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, and an actual case or controversy ripe for
adjudication exists. When an act of a branch of government is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but
in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. This is aside from the fact that concrete acts made under the MOA-AD are not necessary to
render the present controversy ripe and that the law or act in question as not yet effective does not negate ripeness.

With regards to the locus standi, the court upheld the personalities of the Province of Cotabato, Province of Zamboanga del norte, City of Iligan,
City of Zamboanga, petitioners in intervention Province of Sultan Kudarat, City of Isabela and Municipality of Linnamon to have locus standi since it
is their LGUs which will be affected in whole or in part if include within the BJE. Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel Tamano, in alleging their
standing as taxpayers, assert that government funds would be expended for the conduct of an illegal and unconstitutional plebiscite to delineate
the BJE territory. On that score alone, they can be given legal standing. Senator Mar Roxas is also given a standing as an intervenor. And lastly, the
Intervening respondents Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development, an advocacy group for justice and the attainment of peace
and prosperity in Muslim Mindanao; and Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation Inc., a non-government organization of Muslim lawyers since they
stand to be benefited or prejudiced in the resolution of the petitions regarding the MOA-AD.

On the contention of mootness of the issue considering the signing of the MOA-AD has already been suspended and that the President has already
disbanded the GRP, the SC disagrees. The court reiterates that the moot and academic principle is a general rule only, the exceptions, provided in
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, that it will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if it finds that (a) there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
(b) the situation is of exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved; (c) the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the case is capable of repetition yet evading review; and that where there
is a voluntary cessation of the activity complained of by the defendant or doer, it does not divest the court the power to hear and try the case
especially when the plaintiff is seeking for damages or injunctive relief.

Clearly, the suspension of the signing of the MOA-AD and the disbandment of the GRP did not render the petitions moot and academic. The MOA-
AD is subject to further legal enactments including possible Constitutional amendments more than ever provides impetus for the Court to
formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public and, in this case, the government and its negotiating entity.

At all events, the Court has jurisdiction over most if not the rest of the petitions. There is a reasonable expectation that petitioners will again be
subjected to the same problem in the future as respondents' actions are capable of repetition, in another or any form. But with respect to the
prayer of Mandamus to the signing of the MOA-AD, such has become moot and academic considering that parties have already complied thereat.

 On the Substantive Issue

2nd Issue: The SC ruled that the MOA-AD is a matter of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State,
which directly affects the lives of the public at large.

As enshrined in the Constitution, the right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, and integrated therein is the
recognition of the duty of the officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical
principle for the conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open democracy, with the people's right to know as the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the
State to be accountable by following such policy. These provisions are vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to hold public
officials at all times accountable to the people.

Also, it was held that such stipulation in the Constitution is self-executory with reasonable safeguards —the effectivity of which need not await the
passing of a statute. Hence, it is essential to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the
people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive
and be responsive to the people's will.

The idea of a feedback mechanism was also sought for since it is corollary to the twin rights to information and disclosure. And feedback means not
only the conduct of the plebiscite as per the contention of the respondents. Clearly, what the law states is the right of the petitioners to be
consulted in the peace agenda as corollary to the constitutional right to information and disclosure. As such, respondent Esperon committed grave
abuse of discretion for failing to carry out the furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the
legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereto. Moreover, he cannot invoke of
executive privilege because he already waived it when he complied with the Court’s order to the unqualified disclosure of the official copies of the
final draft of the MOA-AD.

In addition, the LGU petitioners has the right to be involved in matters related to such peace talks as enshrined in the State policy. The MOA-AD is
one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively
and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.
With respect to the ICC/IPPs they also have the right to participate fully at all levels on decisions that would clearly affect their lives, rights and
destinies. The MOA-AD is an instrument recognizing ancestral domain, hence it should have observed the free and prior informed consent to the
ICC/IPPs; but it failed to do so. More specially noted by the court is the excess in authority exercised by the respondent—since they allowed
delineation and recognition of ancestral domain claim by mere agreement and compromise; such power cannot be found in IPRA or in any law to
the effect.

3rd issue: With regard to the provisions of the MOA-AD, there can be no question that they cannot be all accommodated under the present
Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them:

 On matters of the Constitution.

Association as the type of relationship governing between the parties. The parties manifested that in crafting the MOA-AD, the term association
was adapted from the international law. In international law, association happens when two states of equal power voluntarily establish durable
links i.e. the one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, principal, while maintaining its international status as state;
free association is a middle ground between integration and independence. The MOA-AD contains many provisions that are consistent with the
international definition of association which fairly would deduced that the agreement vest into the BJE a status of an associated state, or at any
rate, a status closely approximating it. The court vehemently objects because the principle of association is not recognized under the present
Constitution.

 On the recognition of the BJE entity as a state. The concept implies power beyond what the Constitution can grant to a local government;
even the ARMM do not have such recognition; and the fact is such concept implies recognition of the associated entity as a state. There is
nothing in the law that contemplate any state within the jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a
transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence. The court disagrees with the respondent that the
MOA-AD merely expands the ARMM. BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo
Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.
As such the MOA-AD clearly runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.

 On the expansion of the territory of the BJE. The territory included in the BJE includes those areas who voted in the plebiscite for them to
become part of the ARMM. The stipulation of the respondents in the MOA-AD that these areas need not participate in the plebiscite is in
contrary to the express provision of the Constitution. The law states that that "[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be effective
when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only
provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region." Clearly, assuming
that the BJE is just an expansion of the ARMM, it would still run afoul the wordings of the law since those included in its territory are
areas which voted in its inclusion to the ARMM and not to the BJE.

 On the powers vested in the BJE as an entity. The respondents contend that the powers vested to the BJE in the MOA-AD shall be within
sub-paragraph 9 of sec 20, art. 10 of the constitution and that a mere passage of a law is necessary in order to vest in the BJE powers
included in the agreement. The Court was not persuaded. SC ruled that such conferment calls for amendment of the Constitution;
otherwise new legislation will not concur with the Constitution. Take for instance the treaty making power vested to the BJE in the MOA-
AD. The Constitution is clear that only the President has the sole organ and is the country’s sole representative with foreign nation.
Should the BJE be granted with the authority to negotiate with other states, the former provision must be amended
consequently. Section 22 must also be amended—the provision of the law that promotes national unity and development. Because
clearly, associative arrangement of the MOA-AD does not epitomize national unity but rather, of semblance of unity. The associative ties
between the BJE and the national government, the act of placing a portion of Philippine territory in a status which, in international
practice, has generally been a preparation for independence, is certainly not conducive to national unity.
  On matters of domestic statutes.

o Provisions contrary to the organic act of ARMM. RA 9054 is a bar to the adoption of the definition of Bangsamoro people used in the MOA-AD.
Said law specifically distinguishes between the Bangsamoro people and the Tribal peoples that is contrary with the definition of the MOA-AD which
includes all indigenous people of Mindanao.

o Provisions contrary to the IPRA law. Also, the delineation and recognition of the ancestral domain is a clear departure from the procedure
embodied in the IPRA law which ironically is the term of reference of the MOA-AD.

 On matters of international law.

The Philippines adopts the generally accepted principle of international law as part of the law of the land. In international law, the right to self-
determination has long been recognized which states that people can freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic,
social, and cultural development. There are the internal and external self-determination—internal, meaning the self-pursuit of man and the
external which takes the form of the assertion of the right to unilateral secession. This principle of self-determination is viewed with respect
accorded to the territorial integrity of existing states. External self-determination is only afforded in exceptional cases when there is an actual block
in the meaningful exercise of the right to internal self-determination. International law, as a general rule, subject only to limited and exceptional
cases, recognizes that the right of disposing national territory is essentially an attribute of the sovereignty of every state.

On matters relative to indigenous people, international law states that indigenous peoples situated within states do not have a general right to
independence or secession from those states under international law, but they do have rights amounting to what was discussed above as the right
to internal self-determination; have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways
and means for financing their autonomous functions; have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned,
occupied or otherwise used or acquired.

Clearly, there is nothing in the law that required the State to guarantee the indigenous people their own police and security force; but rather, it
shall be the State, through police officers, that will provide for the protection of the people. With regards to the autonomy of the indigenous
people, the law does not obligate States to grant indigenous peoples the near-independent status of a state; since it would impair the territorial
integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states.

 On the basis of the suspensive clause.

o It was contented by the respondents that grave abuse of discretion cannot be had, since the provisions assailed as unconstitutional shall not
take effect until the necessary changes to the legal framework are effected.

The Court is not persuaded. This suspensive clause runs contrary to Memorandum of Instructions from the President stating that negotiations shall
be conducted in accordance to the territorial integrity of the country—such was negated by the provision on association incorporated in the MOA-
AD. Apart from this, the suspensive clause was also held invalid because of the delegated power to the GRP Peace panel to advance peace talks
even if it will require new legislation or even constitutional amendments. The legality of the suspensive clause hence hinges on the query whether
the President can exercise such power as delegated by EO No.3 to the GRP Peace Panel. Well settled is the rule that the President cannot delegate
a power that she herself does not possess. The power of the President to conduct peace negotiations is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution
but is rather implied from her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-chief. As Chief Executive, the President has the general responsibility
to promote public peace, and as Commander-in-Chief, she has the more specific duty to prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless violence.

As such, the President is given the leeway to explore, in the course of peace negotiations, solutions that may require changes to the Constitution
for their implementation. At all event, the president may not, of course, unilaterally implement the solutions that she considers viable; but she may
not be prevented from submitting them as recommendations to Congress, which could then, if it is minded, act upon them pursuant to the legal
procedures for constitutional amendment and revision.

While the President does not possess constituent powers - as those powers may be exercised only by Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the
people through initiative and referendum - she may submit proposals for constitutional change to Congress in a manner that does not involve the
arrogation of constituent powers. Clearly, the principle may be inferred that the President - in the course of conducting peace negotiations - may
validly consider implementing even those policies that require changes to the Constitution, but she may not unilaterally implement them without
the intervention of Congress, or act in any way as if the assent of that body were assumed as a certainty. The President’s power is limited only to
the preservation and defense of the Constitution but not changing the same but simply recommending proposed amendments or revisions.
o The Court ruled that the suspensive clause is not a suspensive condition but is a term because it is not a question of whether the necessary
changes to the legal framework will take effect; but, when. Hence, the stipulation is mandatory for the GRP to effect the changes to the legal
framework –which changes would include constitutional amendments. Simply put, the suspensive clause is inconsistent with the limits of the
President's authority to propose constitutional amendments, it being a virtual guarantee that the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of the
Philippines will certainly be adjusted to conform to all the "consensus points" found in the MOA-AD. Hence, it must be struck down as
unconstitutional.

 On the concept underlying the MOA-AD.

While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or unilateral declaration binding on the Philippines under international law,
respondents' act of guaranteeing amendments is, by itself, already a constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally defective. The MOA-
AD not being a document that can bind the Philippines under international law notwithstanding, respondents' almost consummated act of
guaranteeing amendments to the legal framework is, by itself, sufficient to constitute grave abuse of discretion. The grave abuse lies not in the fact
that they considered, as a solution to the Moro Problem, the creation of a state within a state, but in their brazen willingness to guarantee that
Congress and the sovereign Filipino people would give their imprimatur to their solution. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a
usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of
initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference
with that process.

ALYANSA PARA SA BAGONG PILIPINAS, INC. VS. ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

Facts:

On June 11, 2015, the Department of Energy (DOE) issued 2015 DOE Circular requiring all Distribution Utilities (DUs) to procure Power Supply
Agreements (PSAs) only through Competitive Selection Process (CSP) conducted through a Third Party duly recognized by the ERC and the DOE,
which took effect on June 30, 2015. On October 20, 2015, the DOE and Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) issued a Joint Resolution to adopt a
regime of transparent process in securing PSAs where ERC is given the power to issue the appropriate regulations to implement it. On the same
day, ERC issued CSP Guidelines which postponed the effectivity of the 2015 DOE Circular (i.e., from June 30, 2015 to November 7, 2015). On March
15, 2016, the ERC again postponed the effectivity of the 2015 DOE Circular (i.e., from November 7, 2015 to April 30, 2016). During the period of
postponement, the ERC has allowed DUs to enter into 90 contracts without the mandatory CSP (some of the contracts lasted for 20 to 21 years).
Alyansa Para sa Bagong Pilipinas, Inc. (APBPI) filed a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition directly to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

1. Is APBPI justified in filing a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition directly to the Supreme Court?

2. Does ERC have the statutory authority to postpone the date of effectivity of CSP, thereby amending the 2015 DOE Circular which required CSP to
take effect on 30 June 2015?

Ruling:

1. Yes, a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition directly to the Supreme Court is a proper remedy.

Although the ERC, in postponing the effectivity date, did not act as tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions, the propriety of filing a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition finds basis in Sec. 1(2), Article VIII of the Constitution to set
right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.

2. No, the ERC does not have the authority to postpone the date of effectivity of CSP. ERC’s power is limited to implementing or executing the CSP

Under the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA), DOE has the power to issue rules and regulations while ERC has the responsibility to
enforce the implementing rules and regulations of the EPIRA as formulated and adopted by DOE. Nothing whatsoever grants the ERC rule-making
power to supplant or change policies, rules, regulations, or circulars prescribed by the DOE.

Since the 2015 DOE Circular was issued solely by the DOE, it is solely the DOE that can amend, postpone, or revoke the 2015 DOE Circular unless a
higher authority, like the Congress or the President, amends or revokes it. Certainly, the ERC has no authority to amend, postpone, or revoke the
2015 DOE Circular, including its date of effectivity. In this case, ERC unilaterally postponed the effectivity of the mandatory CSP twice. By approving
20-year contracts entered into by the DUs during the period of suspension (i.e., before April 30, 2016), the ERC imposed an effective 20-year freeze
to the mandatory CSP.