PLDT vs.

Alvarez
GR No 179408
March 5, 2014

ISSUE:
 Whether or not PLDT’s business of providing telecommunication services and
these services are personal properties contemplated under the crime of theft

RULES:
 Laurel vs. Abrogar (GR No 155076; January 13, 2009) - concept of personal
property in relation to crime of theft
 Article 335 of the Civil Code of Spain - meaning of personal property
 Article 308, RPC - theft

ANALYSIS OF FACTS:
PLDT offers telecommunications services in and between the Philippines and
other countries. It its regular investigations to prevent or stop network fraud, a test call
was conducted by PLDT which thereafter lead to the discovery that several lines are
installed in the address to which herein respondents were subscribed, allowing them to
place a call without having to pass PLDT’s system. A search warrant was issued for the
crimes of theft and violation of PD 401 and thereafter a complaint was filed against the
respondents.

ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENTS:

Petitioner: Philippine Long Respondent/s: Abigail Razon Alvarez; Vernon

Distance Telephone Company Razon
(PLDT)

 Respondents are engaged  No probable cause for the crime of theft

in a form of network fraud
which amounts to theft
under the RPC
 CA relying on Laurel case, PLDT’s
telephone services are not personal
properties which have physical or
material existence and susceptible for
occupation by another

CONCLUSION:
PLDT’s telephone services are personal properties contemplated under the crime
of theft because the Court En Banc reversed the CA’s decision. The Court ruled that
even prior to the passage of the RPC, it is well- settled that “any personal property,
tangible or intangible, corporeal or incorporeal, capable of appropriation can be the
object of theft.” Moreover, the Civil Code of Spain defined personal property as
“anything susceptible of appropriation and not included in the foregoing chapter (not real
property).” It is the use of PLDT’s facilities without its consent that constitutes the crime
of theft.

Aranda vs. Republic

GR No. 172331
August 24, 2011

Case principles:
1. Land Registration Requisites - The Property Registration Decree (PD 1529)
provides for original registration of land in an ordinary registration proceeding.
Under Section 14(1) thereof, a petition may be granted upon compliance with the
ff requisites: (a) That the property in question is alienable and disposable land of
public domain; (b) That the applicants by themselves or through their
predecessors- in- interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation; (c)That such possession is under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
 2. Regalian Doctrine - Under the Regalian Doctrine which is embodied in Section
2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, “All lands of public domain belong to the
State, which is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. All lands not
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a
private person by the State, it remains part of inalienable public domain.”
3. Tax Declarations - While, as a rule, tax declarations or realty tax payments of
property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless they are good
indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for no one in his right mind would
be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive possession-
they constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.

Issue: Whether or not Aranda was able to prove his ownership over the subject
property

Sub-issue: Whether or not subject land is alienable and disposable

Rules of Law:
 Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by R.A. No 6940
o Public Land Act - “continuous possession in the concept of owner,
publicly, openly and adversely for more than 30 years”
 Property Registration Decree (P.D. No. 1529)
o Original registration of land in an ordinary registration proceeding
o Land Registration requisites (Section 14, paragraph 1)
1. That the property in question is alienable and disposable
land of public domain
2. That the applicants by themselves or through their
predecessors- in- interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation;
3. That such possession is under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
 Section 2, Article XII, 1987 Constitution
o Regalian Doctrine- “All lands of public domain belong to the State, which
is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. All lands not
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong
to the State. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or
alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of inalienable
public domain.”

Analysis of Facts:
ICTSI Warehousing, Inc. filed a petition for original registration for a parcel of
land located in San Andres, Malvar, Batangas. However, the Solicitor General opposed.
The RTC admitted the amended application filed in the name of Ramon Aranda, to
whom ICTSI - WI bought the land, the latter invoking Section 48 of C.A. 141. Aranda
presented documents and witnesses to prove that the land was donated to him and
prior to such, his father bought the land and that they tilled and planted some rice and
corn therein. The RTC granted the application and ordered the issuance of a decree of
registration in favor of Ramon Aranda. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court.

Analysis of Arguments:
Ramon Aranda
 Deeds of confirmation of 1946 sale in favor of Anatalio Aranda and 1965
donation ro Ramon Aranda are competent proof of transfer of ownership
 Testimonies of Merlita Aranda-Enriquez and Luis Olan on the loss and
destruction of copies of the deeds constitute secondary evidence
 The CA has no legal basis to doubt the veracity of the donation and sale
of the subject property and to conclude that the confirmation deeds can be
treated as compromise agreement

Republic
 The land applied for is part of public domain and applicant ICTSI has not
acquired a registrable title thereto under CA 141, as amended
 Ramon Aranda’s evidence does not satisfactorily establish the character
and duration of possession required by law
 The CA did not give evidentiary weight to the documents prepared only
when the application was files as factual proof of ownership by the parties
to the compromise agreement

Conclusion
Sub-issue:
The status of the land applied for as alienable and disposable was not clearly
established because Ramon Andanar did not explain the discrepancies in the dates of
classification in the government certifications he presented in court. On the 1936
certificate, the land is alienable and disposable. However, in the 2000 certificate, the
land is alienable and disposable except for 20 meters of the land along the creek.

Main issue:
The CA did not err in dismissing Ramon Aranda’s application for judicial
confirmation of title because Ramon Aranda’s evidence failed to show that he
possessed the property in the manner and for the duration required by law and he
himself failed to prove the alleged possession of his predecessors-in-interest.

In this case, it was found that Ramon Aranda paid taxes for the said land only
three years before the filing of the application for original registration. While, as a rule,
tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner as they
constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property since no
one on his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or
constructive possession. Likewise, Ramon Aranda failed to prove the alleged
possession of his predecessors-in-interest because mere casual cultivation of the land
does not amount to exclusive and notorious possession that would give rise to
ownership.