Consti Case Digest: ARTICLE 11, SECTION 3(5) – Impeachment

A. IN RE FIRST INDORSEMET FROM HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ DATED 16 MARCH 1988 REQUESTING
HONORABLE JUSTICE MARCELO B. FERNAN TO COMMENT ON AN ANONYMOUS LETTER-COMPLAINT.
A.M. No. 88-4-5433
FACTS: The Court CONSIDERED the 1st Indorsement dated 16 March 1988 from Mr. Raul M. Gonzalez,
"Tanodbayan/Special; Prosecutor" forwarding to Mr. Justice Marcelo B. Fernan a "letter-complaint, dated 14 December
1987 with enclosure of the Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court," together with a telegram of Miguel Cuenco,
for "comment within ten (10) days from receipt hereof." Mr. Justice Fernan had brought this 1st Indorsement to the
attention of the Court en banc in view of the important implications of policy raised by said 1st Indorsement.
Gonzales was the Tanodbayan or Special Prosecutor. He forwarded to Mr. Justice Marcelo B. Fernan a letter-
complaint. The letter was said to be from concerned employees of the SC (an anonymous letter).
The letter was originally addressed to Gonzales referring to the charges for disbarment sought by Mr. Miguel Cuenco
against Justice Fernan, and asking him (Gonzales) to do something about it.
The Court furnished to Mr. Raul M. Gonzales a copy of the per curiam Resolution in which, the Court Resolved to
dismiss the charges made by complaint Cuenco against Mr.Justice Fernan for utter lack of merit. In the same
Resolution, the Court Resolved to require complainant Cuenco to show cause why he should not be administratively
dealt with for making unfounded serious accusations against Mr. Justice Fernan. Upon request of Mr. Cueco, the Court
had granted him an extension of up to 30 March 1988, Mr. Cuenco filed a pleading which appears to be an omnibus
pleading relating to, inter alia, Administrative Case No. 3135. Insofar as Administrative Case No. 3135 is concerned,
the Court treated this pleading as a Motion for Reconsideration. By a per curiam Resolution dated 15 April 1988, the
Court denied with finality Mr Cuenco's Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not a Supreme Court justice can be disbarred during his term of office.
HELD: A public officer (such as Justice Fernan) who under the Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine
Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be
charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer.Further, such public officer, during his
incumbency, cannot be charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan, or any other court, with any offense which carries
with it the penalty of removal from office.
Another reason why the complaint for disbarment should be dismissed is because under the Constitution, members of
the SC may be removed only by impeachment. The above provision proscribes removal from office by any other
method. Otherwise, to allow such public officer who may be removed solely by impeachment to be charged criminally
while holding his office with an office that carries the penalty of removal from office, would be violative of the clear
mandate of the Constitution.
The effect of impeachment is limited to the loss of position and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust or profit
under the Republic. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and
disqualification to hold any office. But the party convicted shall nevertheless be held liable and subject to prosecution,
trial and punishment according to law.
The court is not saying that its Members or other constitutional officers are entitled to immunity from liability for possibly
criminal acts or for alleged violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics or other supposed misbehavior. What the court is
saying is that there is a fundamental procedural requirement that must be observed before such liability may be
determined and enforced. A member of the Supreme Court must first be removed from office, via the constitutional
route of impeachment, and then only may he be held liable either criminally or administratively (that is, disbarment), for
any wrong or misbehavior that may be proven against him in appropriate proceedings.

B. JOSEPH ESTRADA v. ANIANO DESIERTO (D)

G.R. No. 146710, Mar. 2, 2001
FACTS:
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-
President.
Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner,
his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.
House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives, or more than 1/3 of all
the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. This caused political convulsions in both houses of
Congress. Senator Drilon was replaced by Senator Pimentel as Senate President. Speaker Villar was unseated by
Representative Fuentebella.
Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. 21 senators took their oath as judges with Supreme
Court Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding.
When by a vote of 11-10 the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the 2nd envelope which allegedly contained
evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name "Jose Velarde." The public
and private prosecutors walked out in protest of the ruling. In disgust, Senator Pimentel resigned as Senate President.
By midnight, thousands had assembled at the EDSA Shrine and speeches full of sulphur were delivered against the
petitioner and the 11 senators.
January 18, 2001 saw the high velocity intensification of the call for petitioner's resignation. A 10-km line of people
holding lighted candles formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino Monument on Ayala Avenue in Makati City to
the EDSA Shrine to symbolize the people's solidarity in demanding petitioner's resignation.
January 19, 2001, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. Petitioner agreed to the holding of a snap
election for President where he would not be a candidate. Secretary of National Defense Orlando Mercado and General
Reyes, together with the chiefs of all the armed services went to the EDSA Shrine. General Angelo Reyes declared
that "on behalf of Your Armed Forces, the 130,000 strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish to announce that
we are withdrawing our support to this government.” A little later, PNP Chief, Director General Panfilo Lacson and the
major service commanders gave a similar stunning announcement.
January 20, 2001 Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines.
Petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacañang Palace.
January 22, 2001, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the powers the duties
of the Presidency.
February 5, 2001, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.
It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from "conducting any further proceedings in any other criminal
complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally
warranted."
February 6, 2001, Thru another counsel, petitioner filed for Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment "confirming
petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge
the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President,
only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution."
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the petitioner resigned as president.
2. Whether or not petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.
HELD: Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble:
there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation
is not government by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be
implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he evacuated
Malacañang Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently,
whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his act and omissions before, during and after January
20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material
relevance on the issue.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.
An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:
Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his
written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a
written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting
President xxx.
What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo
as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer
temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of inability.
In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President
on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress
and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be
reviewed by this Court.

C. FRANCISCO VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

G.R. NO. 160261. November 10, 2003
FACTS: On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules
of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the
11th Congress.
On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice “to
conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).
On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment complaint)
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for “culpable violation
of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.” The complaint was endorsed by House
Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section
3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,” but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient
in substance.
The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of
the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the
legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint was
accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House
of Representatives.
Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the House of
Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is
unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that “[n]o impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year.”
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid impeachable
offenses under the Constitution.
2. Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress
are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.
3. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
HELD: This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of the judicial power of the Supreme
Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable
offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of
the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the
controversy.
The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is unconstitutional.
Section 3 of Article XI provides that “The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out
the purpose of this section.” Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase “to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section.” Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the
Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides
for other specific limitations on its power to make rules.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had
absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of
the Constitution without need of referendum.
It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and referral to the
House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear.
Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same
official within a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee
on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr.
and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition
against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.

Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by
the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and
Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23,
2003 is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.