SUAZO v.

SUAZO

G.R. No. 164493 March 10, 2010

FACTS:
Angelito Suazo and Jocelyn Suazo were married when they were 16 years old only. Without
any means to support themselves, they lived with Angelito’s parents while Jocelyn took odd
jobs and Angelito refused to work and was most of the time drunk. Petitioner urged him to
find work but this often resulted to violent quarrels. A year after their marriage, Jocelyn left
Angelito. Angelito thereafter found another woman with whom he has since lived. 10 years
later, she filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Art. 36 Psychological
incapacity. Jocelyn testified on the alleged physical beating she received. The expert
witness corroborated parts of Jocelyn’s testimony. Both her psychological report and
testimony concluded that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated. However, B was not
personally examined by the expert witness. The RTC annulled the marriage on the ground
that Angelito is unfit to comply with his marital obligation, such as “immaturity, i.e., lack
of an effective sense of rational judgment and responsibility, otherwise peculiar to
infants (like refusal of the husband to support the family or excessive dependence
on parents or peer group approval) and habitual alcoholism, or the condition by
which a person lives for the next drink and the next drinks” but the CA reversed it
and held that the respondent may have failed to provide material support to the family and
has resorted to physical abuse, but it is still necessary to show that they were manifestations
of a deeper psychological malaise that was clinically or medically identified. The theory of
the psychologist that the respondent was suffering from an anti-social personality
syndrome at the time of the marriage was not the product of any adequate medical
or clinical investigation. The evidence that she got from the petitioner, anecdotal at best,
could equally show that the behavior of the respondent was due simply to causes like
immaturity or irresponsibility which are not equivalent to psychological incapacity, or the
failure or refusal to work could have been the result of rebelliousness on the part of one who
felt that he had been forced into a loveless marriage.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a basis to nullify Jocelyn’s marriage with Angelito under Article 36
of the Family Code.

HELD:
The Court find the petition devoid of merit. The CA committed no reversible error of
law in setting aside the RTC decision, as no basis exists to declare Jocelyn’s marriage with
Angelito a nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code and its related jurisprudence.
Jocelyn’s evidence is insufficient to establish Angelito’s psychological incapacity. The
psychologist evaluated Angelito’s psychological condition only in an indirect manner – she
derived all her conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause
cannot of course be doubted. The psychlologist, using meager information coming from a
directly interested party, could not have secured a complete personality profile and could not
have conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of
Angelito’s psychological condition. While the report or evaluation may be conclusive with
respect to Jocelyn’s psychological condition, this is not true for Angelito’s. The methodology
employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of examination
required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. Both the
psychologist’s report and testimony simply provided a general description of Angelito’s
purported anti-social personality disorder, supported by the characterization of this disorder
as chronic, grave and incurable. The psychologist was conspicuously silent, however, on the
bases for her conclusion or the particulars that gave rise to the characterization she gave.
Jurisprudence holds that there must be evidence showing a link, medical or the like, between
the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. A’s
testimony regarding the habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while
indicative of psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity.
All these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital obligations.
It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had
difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these
obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor – an adverse integral
element in the respondent’s personality structure that effectively incapacitated
him from complying with his essential marital obligations – must be shown. Mere
difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of
the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or
illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity
under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume
the essential obligations of marriage.

G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006

Leonilo Antonio vs Marie Ivonne F. Reyes

FACTS:
“Statistics never lie but lover’s often do, quipped the sage”
Antonio and Reyes first got married at Manila City Hall and subsequently in church on December 8,
1990. A child was born in April 1991 but died 5 months later. Antonio could no longer take her
constant lying, insecurities and jealousies over him so he separated from her in August 1991. He
attempted reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in
November 1991. Only after their marriage that he learned about her child with another man.

He then filed a petition in 1993 to have his marriage with Reyes declared null and void under Article
36 of the Family Code.
The trial court gave credence to Antonio's evidence and thus declared the marriage null and void.

Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision. It held that the totality of evidence presented was
insufficient to establish Reyes' psychological incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the 1997
Molina case had not been satisfied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Antonio has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36
of the Family Code and, generally, under the Molina guidelines.

RULING:
Yes. The petitioner, aside from his own testimony, presented a psychiatrist and clinical psychologist
who attested that constant lying and extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and pathological and
corroborated his allegations on his wife's behavior, which amounts to psychological incapacity.

The factual findings of the trial court are deemed binding on the SC, owing to the great weight
accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent
had consistently lied about many material aspects as to her character and personality. Her fantastic
ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe.
This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and
significance to her marriage.

The case sufficiently satisfies the Molina guidelines:

First, that Antonio had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his
wife;
Second, that the root cause of Reyes' psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically
identified that was sufficiently proven by experts, and was clearly explained in the trial court's
decision;
Third, that she fabricated friends and made up letters before she married him prove that her
psychological incapacity was have existed even before the celebration of marriage;
Fourth, that the gravity of Reyes' psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive
clause was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal from contracting marriage without their consent;
Fifth, that she being an inveterate pathological liar makes her unable to commit the basic tenets of
relationship between spouses based on love, trust, and respect.
Sixth, that the CA clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage was
annulled by the Catholic Church. However, it is the factual findings of the judicial trier of facts, and not
of the canonical courts, that are accorded significant recognition by this Court.
Seventh, that Reyes' case is incurable considering that Antonio tried to reconcile with her but her
behavior remains unchanged.

Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes, G.R. No. 185286, Aug. 18, 2010

FACTS: Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes met respondent Ramon Reyes at the UP
Diliman, in 1972 when they were both 19 years old. Petitioner enjoyed respondent’s style of
courtship which included dining out, unlike other couples their age who were restricted by a
university student’s budget. At that time, respondent held a job in the family business, the
Aristocrat Restaurant. Petitioner’s good impression of the respondent was not diminished by
the latter’s habit of cutting classes, not even by her discovery that respondent was taking
marijuana. On December 5, 1976, petitioner and respondent got married. They lived with
Ramon’s parents and they were supported by them. They had a child which made their
financial difficulties worse. All the business ventures of Ramon were unsuccessful and Socorro
became the breadwinner of the family. To make things worse, despite the fact that Socorro
would undergo an operation for removal of a cyst, respondent remained unconcerned and
unattentive; and simply read the newspaper, and played dumb when petitioner requested that
he accompany her as she was wheeled into the operating room. They tried to attend
counseling sessions but nothing has changed. Sometime in 1996, petitioner confirmed that
respondent was having an extra-marital affair. RTC granted the petition. CA reversed. Hence,
this petition.

ISSUE: W/N Ramon is psychologically incapacitated

HELD: Yes. Marriage is null and void. The lack of personal examination and interview of the
respondent, or any other person diagnosed with personality disorder, does not per se
invalidate the testimonies of the doctors. Neither do their findings automatically constitute
hearsay that would result in their exclusion as evidence. In the instant case, respondent’s
pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a psychological incapacity to perform the
essential marital obligations as shown by his: (1) sporadic financial support; (2) extra-marital
affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed business attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6)
inability to keep a job that is not connected with the family businesses; and (7) criminal charges
of estafa.

ARTICLE 36 OF FAMILY CODE

Te v. Te , GR 161793 February 13, 2009
FACTS:
On January 1996 Edward Kenneth Ngo Te a sophomore met Rowena Ong Gutierrez
Yu-Te a freshman in a gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in
their college. They developed a certain degree of closeness towards each
other. On March 1996, Rowena asked Edward that they elope. At first, he refused
but Rowena’s persistence made him relent. They left Manila and went
to Cebu that month. Edwards money lasted for only a month and they could not
find a job. On April 1996, they returned to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her
uncle’s house and Edward to his parents’ home. As his family was away, Rowena
threatened him that she would commit suicide, Edward go to Rowena’s house. On
April 23, 1996, Rowena’s uncle brought the two to a court to get married. The
couple continued to stay at Rowena’s uncles place where Edward was treated like
a prisoner and was not allowed to go out unaccompanied. After a month, Edward
escaped from the house and stayed with his parents. His family then hid him from
Rowena. On June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena and told her that they
should live with his parents but she said that it was better for them to live separate
lives. On January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the RTC of Quezon City,
for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latter’s
psychological incapacity. On July 30, 2001, the trial court rendered the marriage
of the parties null and void on the ground that both parties were psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. On review, the
appellate court reversed and set aside the trial’s court ruling. It ruled that
petitioner failed to prove the psychological incapacity of respondent, for the clinical
psychologist did not personally examine respondent, and relied only on the
information provided by petitioner. In sum, the evidence adduced fell short of the
requirements stated in the Molina case needed for the declaration of nullity of the
marriage under Art. 36 of the Family Code. Because of dissatisfaction, petitioner
filed before the SC the instant petition for review on certiorari. He posited that the
trial court declared the marriage void, not only because of respondent’s
psychological incapacity, but rather due to both parties’ psychological incapacity.
He also pointed out that there is no requirement for the psychologist to personally
examine respondent.

ISSUE:
Whether the marriage contracted is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:
Yes. The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties
psychologically incapacitated. Edward’s behavioral pattern falls under the
classification of dependent personality disorder, and Rowena’s, that of the
narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder.
There is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the
evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological
incapacity, the precipitous marriage that they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus,
declared null and void.

Ablaza vs Republic (Civil Law)

ISIDRO ABLAZA Vs REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 158298 August 11, 2010

BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS:

On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in RTC Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the
declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between
his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.

The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been
celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9,
1950. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without
any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his
death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any person, himself included,
could impugn the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even
after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being void ab initio.

The RTC dismissed the petition for the following reasons: 1) petition is filed out of time (action
had long prescribed) and 2) petitioner is not a party to the marriage.

The CA affirmed the dismissal order of the RTC, thus:

While an action to declare the nullity of a marriage considered void from the beginning
does not prescribe, the law nonetheless requires that the same action must be filed by the
proper party, which in this case should be filed by any of the parties to the marriage. xxxx
 Certainly, a surviving brother of the deceased spouse is not the proper party to file the
subject petition. More so that the surviving wife, who stands to be prejudiced, was not even
impleaded as a party to said case.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner is a real party-in-interest in the action to seek the declaration of nullity
of the marriage of his deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the old Civil Code

HELD: YES

A valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation of husband and wife and to give
rise to the mutual rights, duties, and liabilities arising out of such relation. The law prescribes
the requisites of a valid marriage. Hence, the validity of a marriage is tested according to the
law in force at the time the marriage is contracted. As a general rule, the nature of the
marriage already celebrated cannot be changed by a subsequent amendment of the governing
law. Thus, a Civil Code marriage remains void, considering that the validity of a marriage is
governed by the law in force at the time of the marriage ceremony.

Before anything more, the Court has to clarify the impact to the issue posed herein
of Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity
of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which took effect on March 15,
2003.

Section 2 (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife.
Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family
Code and those solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3,
1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to
proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003.

Based on Carlos v. Sandoval the following actions for declaration of absolute nullity of a
marriage are excepted from the limitation, to wit:

1) Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and

2) Those filed in relation to marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and,
those celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15, 2003.

Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on December
26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage
as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under AM
02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.

The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a petition to declare the
nullity of a marriage, and when. Accordingly, in Niñal v. Bayadog, the children were allowed
to file after the death of their father a petition for the declaration of the nullity of their father’s
marriage to their stepmother contracted on December 11, 1986 due to lack of a marriage
license. There, the Court distinguished between a void marriage and a voidable one, and
explained how and when each might be impugned, thuswise:

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order
to establish the nullity of a marriage. “Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a
void marriage.......is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore,
being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding
in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral.” xxx

It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except

in direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the
death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. But
Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of
the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage
and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. For the same
reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the death of either party would
extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be
considered imprescriptible.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to

declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes......the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is
essential to the determination of the case.

However, that the absence of a provision in the old and new Civil Codes cannot be construed
as giving a license to just any person to bring an action to declare the absolute nullity of a
marriage. According to Carlos v. Sandoval, the plaintiff must still be the party who stands to
be benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit, for it is basic in
procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real
party in interest. Thus, only the party who can demonstrate a “proper interest” can file the
action. Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest, or an interest in issue
to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity
about the question involved or a mere incidental interest.

Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresenciano’s brother and surviving heir.
Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a material interest
in the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in the suit.
Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir under the laws of succession,
 has the right to succeed to the estate of a deceased brother under the conditions stated in
Article 1001 and Article 1003 of the Civil Code, as follows:

Article 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters
or their children to the other half.

Article 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving

spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance
with the following articles.

Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the action hinges upon a prior
determination of whether Cresenciano had any descendants, ascendants, or children
(legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late Cresenciano’s surviving
heir. Such prior determination must be made by the trial court, for the inquiry thereon involves
questions of fact.
Nevertheless, we note that the petitioner did not implead Leonila, who, as the late Cresenciano’s
surviving wife, stood to be benefited or prejudiced by the nullification of her own marriage. She was
truly an indispensable party who must be joined herein. We take note, too, that the petitioner and
Leonila were parties in Heirs of Cresenciano Ablaza, namely: Leonila G. Ablaza, and Leila Ablaza Jasul
v. Spouses Isidro and Casilda Ablaza, an action to determine who between the parties were the legal
owners of the property involved therein. As a defendant in that action, the petitioner is reasonably
presumed to have knowledge that the therein plaintiffs, Leonila and Leila, were the wife and daughter,
respectively, of the late Cresenciano. As such, Leila was another indispensable party whose substantial
right any judgment in this action will definitely affect. The petitioner should likewise implead Leila.

WHEREFORE, the case is reinstated, and its records are returned to RTC Masbate, for further
proceedings, with instructions to first require the petitioner to amend his initiatory pleading in order
to implead Leonila Honato and her daughter Leila Ablaza Jasul as parties-defendants.

MARRIAGE IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 40

DOMINGO v. CA
September 17, 1993 (G.R. No. 104818)

PARTIES:

Petitioner: Robert Domingo Respondents: Court of Appeals, Delia Soledad Avera represented
by her Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R. AVERA

FACTS:

 April 25, 1969, Robert Domingo married Emerlina dela Paz on which marriage is valid and still
existing
 November 29, 1976, he married Delia Soledad
 January 23 1979 up to the present, Soledad has been working in Saudi Arabia
 1983, Emerlina sued for bigamy, respondent found out about the prior marriage
 May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig entitled “Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of
Property” against petitioner Roberto Domingo
 1989, respondent found out that they are cohabiting and Robert was spending and disposing
of some of her properties without her knowledge or consent

ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in the
affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for purposes of remarriage.

HELD:

Yes. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a
cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is
sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable
in law for said projected marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void

Constitution as an “inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family;” as such, it

“shall be protected by the State. As a matter of policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage
for the purpose of contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the
perception of both parties or of one that their union is so defective with respect to the essential
requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it void ipso jure and with no legal effect

Domingo vs. CA
226 SCRA 572

FACTS:

Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto Domingo in 1976, filed a petition for the declaration of
nullity of marriage and separation of property. She did not know that Domingo had been previously
married to Emerlinda dela Paz in 1969. She came to know the previous marriage when the latter
filed a suit of bigamy against her. Furthermore, when she came home from Saudi during her one-
month leave from work, she discovered that Roberto cohabited with another woman and had been
disposing some of her properties which is administered by Roberto. The latter claims that because
their marriage was void ab initio, the declaration of such voidance is unnecessary and
superfluous. On the other hand, Soledad insists the declaration of the nullity of marriage not for
the purpose of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the separation and distribution of
properties acquired during the marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration should only be filed for purposes of
remarriage.
HELD:

The declaration of the nullity of marriage is indeed required for purposed of remarriage. However,
it is also necessary for the protection of the subsequent spouse who believed in good faith that his
or her partner was not lawfully married marries the same. With this, the said person is freed from
being charged with bigamy.

When a marriage is declared void ab initio, law states that final judgment shall provide for the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of
the common children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. Soledad’s prayer for separation of property will
simply be the necessary consequence of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their
marriage. Hence, the petitioner’s suggestion that for their properties be separated, an ordinary civil
action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the
effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according
to the regime of property relations governing them.
Ting vs Ting
BENJAMIN G. TING, Petitioner, - versus - CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING, Respondent. G.R. No. 166562
March 31, 2009

Facts: Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez-Ting first met in 1972 while they were classmates in medical
school. They fell in love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when respondent was already
pregnant with their first child. On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to
petitioner and while their youngest child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition before
the RTC of Cebu City praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the
Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the
celebration of their marriage, which, however, only became manifest thereafter.

Carmens allegations of Benjamins psychological incapacity consisted of the following manifestations:

1. Benjamin’s alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and his profession;

2. Benjamin’s violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular drinking;

3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it necessary to sell the family car
twice and the property he inherited from his father in order to pay off his debts, because he no longer
had money to pay the same; and

4. Benjamin’s irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal to give regular financial
support to his family.

In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained that he is a

respectable person, as his peers would confirm. He also pointed out that it was he who often comforted
and took care of their children, while Carmen played mahjong with her friends twice a week. Both
presented expert witnesses (psychiatrist) to refute each others claim. RTC ruled in favor of the
respondent declaring the marriage null and void.

Petitioner appealed to the CA. CA reversed RTC’s decision. Respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration, arguing that the Molina guidelines should not be applied to this case
Issues: 1. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the guidelines set
forth under the Santos and Molina cases,

2. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of psychological incapacity for
the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code has been
liberalized,

3. Whether the CAs decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void is
in accordance with law and jurisprudence.

Held: 1. No. respondent’s argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and Molina
should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no longer new.

2. The Case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis
of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts
should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts
and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

3. There is no evidence that adduced by respondent insufficient to prove that petitioner is

psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and more particularly, that
he suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage eighteen (18) years ago.

BENJAMIN G. TING, Petitioner vs. CARMEN M. VELEZ TING, Respondent.

G.R. No. 166562

Facts:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the November 17, 2003 Amended
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), and its December 13, 2004 Resolution in CAG. R. CV
No. 59903. The appellate court, in its assailed decision and resolution, affirmed the January 9,
1998 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Cebu City, declaring the
marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of
the Family Code. Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen Velez Ting
(Carmen) first met in 1972 while they were classmates in medical school. They fell in love,
and they were wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when respondent was already pregnant with
their first child. At first, they resided at Benjamins family home in Maguikay, Mandaue City.
When their second child was born, the couple decided to move to Carmens family home in
Cebu City. In September 1975, Benjamin passed the medical board examinations.

In 1980, he began working for Velez Hospital, owned by Carmens family, as member of its
active staff, while Carmen worked as the hospitals Treasurer. On October 21, 1993, after being
married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while their youngest child was only two years
old, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the declaration
of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin
suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their marriage,
which, however, only became manifest thereafter.

In sum, Carmens allegations of Benjamins psychological incapacity consisted of the following

manifestations:
1. Benjamins alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and his profession;
2. Benjamins violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular drinking;
3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it necessary to sell the
family car twice and the property he inherited from his father in order to pay off his debts,
because he no longer had money to pay the same; and
4. Benjamins irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal to give regular
financial support to his family.

To refute Dr. Oates opinion, petitioner presented Dr. Renato D. Obra, a psychiatrist and a
consultant at the Department of Psychiatry in Don Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center, as
his expert witness. Dr. Obra evaluated Benjamins psychological behavior based on the
transcript of stenographic notes, as well as the psychiatric evaluation report prepared by Dr.
A.J.L. Pentz, a psychiatrist from the University of Pretoria in South Africa, and his (Dr. Obras)
interview with Benjamins brothers. Contrary to Dr. Oates findings, Dr. Obra observed that
there is nothing wrong with petitioners personality, considering the latters good relationship
with his fellow doctors and his good track record as anesthesiologist.

The RTC rendered judgment declaring the marriage between plaintiff and defendant null and
void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the
CA. On October 19, 2000, the CA rendered a Decision reversing the trial courts ruling. It
faulted the trial courts finding, stating that no proof was adduced to support the conclusion that
Benjamin was psychologically incapacitated at the time he married Carmen.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner’s alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship
and his

Profession may ground null and void ab intio pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.

Held:

The petitioner denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained that he is a

respectable person, as his peers would confirm. He said that he is an active member of social
and athletic clubs and would drink and gamble only for social reasons and for leisure. He also
denied being a violent person, except when provoked by circumstances.

In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioners defects were present at the time of the
celebration of their marriage. She merely cited that prior to their marriage, she already knew
that petitioner would occasionally drink and gamble with his friends; but such statement, by
itself, is insufficient to prove any preexisting psychological defect on the part of her husband.
Neither did the evidence adduced prove such defects to be incurable.

The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have been the decisive evidence in determining
whether to declare the marriage between the parties null and void. Sadly, however, we are not
convinced that the opinions provided by these experts strengthened respondents allegation of
psychological incapacity. The two experts provided diametrically contradicting psychological
evaluations: Dr. Oate testified that petitioners behavior is a positive indication of a personality
disorder, while Dr. Obra maintained that there is nothing wrong with petitioners personality.
Moreover, there appears to be greater weight in Dr. Obras opinion because, aside from
analyzing the transcript of Benjamins deposition similar to what Dr. Oate did, Dr. Obra also
took into consideration the psychological evaluation report furnished by another psychiatrist in
South Africa who personally examined Benjamin, as well as his (Dr. Obras) personal interview
with Benjamins brothers. Logically, therefore, the balance tilts in favor of Dr. Obras findings.

Lest it be misunderstood, we are not condoning petitioners drinking and gambling problems,
or his violent outbursts against his wife. There is no valid excuse to justify such a behavior.
Petitioner must remember that he owes love, respect, and fidelity to his spouse as much as the
latter owes the same to him. Unfortunately, this court finds respondents testimony, as well
as the totality of evidence presented by the respondent, to be too inadequate to declare
him psychologically unfit pursuant to Article 36.

The petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The November 17, 2003 Amended
Decision and the December 13, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG. R. CV No.
59903 are accordingly REVERSED and SET ASIDE.