#6

G.R. NO. 72005 MAY 29, 1987

Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc.

V
Intermediate Appellate Court, Sycwin Coating and Wires, Inc.

Facts:

Private respondent, Sycwin Coating and Wires, Inc. filed a complaint for the collection of a sum of money against
Varian Industrial Corporation. Private respondent, through posting of a supersedeas bond during pendency of
the case succeeded in attaching some of Varian Industrial Corporation’s properties. Said properties were
released when Varian Industrial Corporation, thru the petitioner, its insurer, Philippine British Assurance Co., Inc.
posted a counterbond.

The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner, which Varian Industrial Corporation
appealed in the Intermediate Appellate Court. Private respondent then filed a petition for execution pending
appeal against the properties of Varian Industrial Corporation, which the respondent court granted. The latter,
thru the petitioner, filed before the Supreme Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari the respondent court’s
decision. The Supreme Court, without giving due course to the petition issued a Temporary Restraining Order
enjoining the respondents from enforcing the order complaint.

Issue:

Whether an order of execution pending appeal maybe enforced on the petitioner’s counter bond?

Held:

The Supreme Court declared that it is well recognized rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should
not distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguish nec nos distinguere debemos. "The rule, founded on logic, is a corollary of
the principle that general words and phrases in a statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural and general
significance. The rule requires that a general term or phrase should not be reduced into parts and one part
distinguished from the other so as to justify its exclusion from the operation of the law. In other words, there should
be no distinction in the application of a statute where none is indicated. For courts are not authorized to
distinguish where the law makes no distinction. They should instead administer the law not as they think it ought
to be but as they find it and without regard to consequences.

A corollary of the principle is the rule that where the law does not make any exception, courts may not except
something therefrom, unless there is compelling reason apparent in the law to justify it. Thus where a statute grants
a person against whom possession of "any land" is unlawfully withheld the right to bring an action for unlawful
detainer, this Court held that the phrase "any land" includes all kinds of land, whether agricultural, residential, or
mineral. Since the law in this case does not make any distinction nor intended to make any exception, when it
speaks of "any judgment" which maybe charged against the counterbond, it should be interpreted to refer not
only to a final and executory judgment in the case but also a judgment pending appeal.

The rule therefore, is that the counterbond to lift attachment that is issued in accordance with the provisions of
Section 5, Rule 57, of the Rules of Court, shall be charged with the payment of any judgment that is returned
unsatisfied. It covers not only a final and executory judgement but also the execution of a judgment pending
appeal.

Based on these principles, the Supreme Court ruled that the order of execution pending appeal of any judgment
is enforceable to the petitioner’s counterbonds.
#46

G.R. No. L-36007 May 25, 1988

Fernando Gallardo
V
Juan Borromeo

Facts:

The petitioner-appellant, on December 7, 1963 Fernando Gallardo filed to terminate the leasehold of the
respondent tenant, Juan Borromeo so the petitioner may cultivate it himself. The respondent-appellee alleged
that the petitioner has no knowledge of farming and that his only purpose is to eject the respondent from the
landholding.

The Court of Agrarian Relations on a decision dated April 21, 1971 dismissed the petition and ordered the
petitioner to maintain respondent in the peaceful possession of the landholding. Petitioner-appellant appealed
to the Court of Appeals, which on October 24, 1972 rendered judgment affirming in toto the decision of the Court
of Agrarian Relations. Applying Section 7, Republic Act 6389, it held that the landowner's desire to cultivate the
land himself is not a valid ground for dispossessing the tenant. Petitioner-appellant filed before the Supreme Court
a Petition to Review on Certiorari the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Issue:

Whether the Court of Appeals correctly gave retroactive application to Section 7 of R.A. 6389.

Held:

The Supreme Court declared that the applicable law when Gallardo filed his supplementary complaint was
paragraph (1) of Section 36 of R.A. 3844.

However, the above provision was amended on September 10, 1971, by Republic Act No. 6389 which eliminated
the landowner's desire to personally cultivate the landholding, as a ground for the ejectment of the tenant.
However, consonant with Article 4 of the New Civil Code which provides that "laws shall have no retroactive
effect unless therein otherwise provided," R.A. No. 6389 cannot be given retroactive effect in the abscence of a
statutory provision for retroactivity or a clear implication of the law to that effect.

A sound canon of statutory construction is that statute operates prospectively only and never retroactively, unless
the legislative intent to threatened contrary is made manifest either by the express terms of the statute or by
necessary implication. No court will hold a statute to be retroactive when the legislature has not said so.

Since Congress failed to express an intention to make Republic Act No. 6389 retroactive, it may not apply to
ejectment cases then already pending adjudication by the courts.

Thereby, based on the abovementioned principle, the Supreme Court held that the petitioner may terminate
the tenancy of the respondent and till his own land as provided by Sec. 36 of R.A. 3844, which was the applicable
law when he filed his petition. That the decision of the Agrarian Court and Court of Appeals set aside and
respondent-appellee vacate his leasehold and surrender its possession to petitioner-appellant.
#18

G.R. No. 116719 January 18, 1996

People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee,

V
Patricio Amigo alias "BEBOT", accused-appellant.

Facts:

On December 29, 1989, at around 1:00 P.M., Benito Ng Suy was driving their gray Ford Fiera back home. With him
during that time were his daughters, Jocelyn Ng Suy and a younger one together with his two year old son. On
their way home and while traversing the National Highway of Bajada, Davao City, an orange Toyota Tamaraw
driven by one Virgilio Abogada, suddenly made a left turn in front of the Regional Hospital, Bajada, Davao City,
without noticing the Ford Fiera coming from the opposite direction. An accidental head on collision occurred
between the Fiera and the Tamaraw, causing a slight damaged to the right bumper of the latter.

Right after the collision, Benito immediately alighted from the driver's seat and confronted Virgilio Abogada who
also went down from his vehicle. While the two drivers where having this verbal confrontation, Patricio who was
merely a passenger of Virgilio also alighted from the front seat of the Tamaraw and instantaneously approached
Benito and advised the latter to leave since it was merely a small and minor accident. A bit irritated with the
actuation exhibit by Patricio, Benito rebuked the former and told him not to interfere, since he had nothing to do
with the accident. Irked by the comment made by Benito, Patricio took a five inch knife from his waist and
simultaneously stabbed Benito which rendered him in a critical condition due to multiple stab wounds which led
to his death due to Sepsis.

An initial case of Frustrated Murder, under Art. 248 in relation to Art. 5 of the Revised Penal Code was filed against
the accused, Patricio Amigo. The charge was changed to Murder due to the death of the victim, which the
court after trial rendered the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder meting out a
penalty of reclusion perpetua. The accused sought for reversal arguing that error was committed by the trial
court in imposing him the penalty of reclusion perpetua against him despite the fact that Sec. 19, paragraph 1,
Art. III of the 1987 Constitution was already in effect when the offense was committed.

Issue:

Whether the trial court erred in imposing the accused the penalty of reclusion perpetua despite the fact that
Sec. 19, paragraph 1, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution was already in effect?

Whether the rendered penalty of reclusion perpetua, as claimed by the accused too cruel and harsh?

Held:

The Supreme Court declared that Section 19(1) of Article III merely says that the death penalty shall not be
imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it and, if
already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The language, while rather awkward, is still plain
enough. And it is a settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if the language under consideration is plain, it is neither
necessary nor permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like the records of the constitutional convention, for its
interpretation. The Supreme Court held that Article III, Section 19(1) does not change the periods of the penalty
prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code except only insofar as it prohibits the imposition of the death
penalty and reduces it to reclusion perpetua.

The Supreme Court held that courts are not the forum to plead for sympathy. The duty of courts is to apply the
law, disregarding their feeling of sympathy or pity for an accused. DURA LEX SED LEX. The remedy is elsewhere —
clemency from the executive or an amendment of the law by the legislative, but surely, at this point, this Court
can but apply the law.

Based on these principles, the trial court did not err in its decision and the Supreme Court affirms the appealed
decision.