Primary jurisdiction doctrine is a judicial doctrine whereby a court tends to favor allowing an agency an

initial opportunity to decide an issue in a case in which the court and the agency have concurrent
jurisdiction.

It is the principle that the courts can not or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is
within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, prior to the decision of that question by the
administrative tribunal:

1) where the case demands the exercise of administrative discretion, requiring the special knowledge,
experience, and services of the administrative tribunal, to determine technical and intricate matters of fact;
and

2) where uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute
administered.
Exceptions to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction

"There are established exceptions to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, such as: (a) where there is
estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is
patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction
that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively small so as to
make the rule impractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will
ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) when its
application may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted acts violate due
process; (i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; (j)
when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy; (k) when strong public interest is involved; and, (l) in quo warranto
proceedings.31 However, none of the foregoing circumstances is applicable
in the present case.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to

arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over
which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence.32 All the proceedings of the court in violation of the doctrine
and all orders and decisions rendered thereby are null and void.33"

Euro-Med Laboratories Inc. vs. Province of Batangas

G.R. No. 148106, July 17, 2006

FACTS: A civil case for collection of sum of money by Euro-Med against the Province of Batangas in the
amount of ₱487,662.80 of IVF incurred by respondent in behalf of various public hospitals. The
same was not paid even after demands were made.

At conclusion of petitioner’s presentation of evidence respondent filed a motion to dismiss the

complaint on the ground that the primary jurisdiction over petitioner’s money claim is lodged with
the COA.

RTC dismissed petitioners complaint without prejudice to the filing of a money claim with the
COA.
.

ISSUE: Does the COA have primary jurisdiction over the case at hand?

RULING: Yes, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its determination
requires the expertise, specialized training and knowledge of an administrative agency, relief
must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before resort to the courts is done.

Case at bar is enforcement of money claims against the government, which brought it under the
COA’s domain under Sec. 26 of the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines. Second, the
claim was founded on a series of purchases for medical supplies of respondent’s public
 hospitals, such being agreed by both parties to be governed by the LGU on supply and property
management as stated in Sec. 383 of said code.

Petition denied. RTC orders affirmed.

G.R. No. 148106 July 17, 2006

EURO-MED LABORATORIES, PHIL., INC., represented by LEONARDO H. TORIBIO, petitioner,

vs.
THE PROVINCE OF BATANGAS, represented by its Governor, HON. HERMILANDO I.
MANDANAS, respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing, on pure questions of law, the March 7 and
May 16, 2001 orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas City2 in Civil Case No. 5300.

Civil Case No. 5300 was a complaint for sum of money3 filed by petitioner Euro-Med Laboratories, Phil.,
Inc. against respondent Province of Batangas. The pertinent portions of the complaint read:

3. On several occasions, particularly from the period of 19 August 1992 to 11 August 1998, defendant
[respondent here], thru its various authorized representatives of the government hospitals identified and
listed below, purchased various Intravenous Fluids (IVF) products from the plaintiff [petitioner here], with
an unpaid balance of Four Hundred Eighty Seven Thousand Six Hundred Sixty-Two Pesos and Eighty
Centavos (P487,662.80), as of 28 February 1998, broken down as follows: x x x x which purchases were
evidenced by invoices duly received and signed by defendant’s authorized representatives, upon delivery
of the merchandise listed in said invoices.

4. Under the terms and conditions of the aforesaid invoices, defendant agreed and covenanted to pay
plaintiff, without need of demand, its obligations in the above-enumerated invoices on various terms
indicated therein.

5. Plaintiff made several demands for defendant to pay its accountabilities, including setting up several
dialogues with plaintiff’s representatives, but these proved fruitless.

6. Despite repeated demands by plaintiff for defendant to pay and settle its unpaid and outstanding
accounts under the aforementioned invoices, said defendant has failed and still fails to comply
therewith.4

In its answer,5 respondent admitted most of the allegations in the complaint, denying only those relating
to the unpaid balance supposedly still due petitioner. Respondent alleged that some payments it had
already made were not reflected in the computation set forth in the complaint and that it was continuously
exerting genuine and earnest efforts "to find out the true and actual amount owed." 6 Pre-trial and trial
followed.

At the conclusion of petitioner’s presentation of evidence, respondent filed a motion to dismiss 7 the
complaint on the ground that the primary jurisdiction over petitioner’s money claim was lodged with the
Commission on Audit (COA). Respondent pointed out that petitioner’s claim, arising as it did from a
series of procurement transactions with the province, was governed by the Local Government Code
provisions and COA rules and regulations on supply and property management in local governments.
Respondent argued that the case called for a determination of whether these provisions and rules were
complied with, and that was within the exclusive domain of COA to make.
Finding the motion to be well-taken, the RTC issued on March 7, 2001 an order 8 dismissing petitioner’s
complaint without prejudice to the filing of the proper money claim with the COA. In a subsequent order
dated May 16, 2001,9 the RTC denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

The resolution of this case turns on whether it is the COA or the RTC which has primary jurisdiction to
pass upon petitioner’s money claim against the Province of Batangas. We rule that it is the COA which
does. Therefore, we deny the petition.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its determination requires the
expertise, specialized training and knowledge of an administrative body, relief must first be obtained in an
administrative proceeding before resort to the courts is had even if the matter may well be within their
proper jurisdiction.10 It applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play
whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme,
have been placed within the special competence of an administrative agency. In such a case, the court in
which the claim is sought to be enforced may suspend the judicial process pending referral of such
issues to the administrative body for its view11 or, if the parties would not be unfairly disadvantaged,
dismiss the case without prejudice.12

This case is one over which the doctrine of primary jurisdiction clearly held sway for although petitioner’s
collection suit for P487,662.80 was within the jurisdiction of the RTC,13 the circumstances surrounding
petitioner’s claim brought it clearly within the ambit of the COA’s jurisdiction.

First, petitioner was seeking the enforcement of a claim for a certain amount of money against a local
government unit. This brought the case within the COA’s domain to pass upon money claims against the
government or any subdivision thereof under Section 26 of the Government Auditing Code of the
Philippines:14

The authority and powers of the Commission [on Audit] shall extend to and comprehend all matters
relating to x x x x the examination, audit, and settlement of all debts and claims of any sort due from or
owing to the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities. x x x x.

The scope of the COA’s authority to take cognizance of claims is circumscribed, however, by an
unbroken line of cases holding statutes of similar import to mean only liquidated claims, or those
determined or readily determinable from vouchers, invoices, and such other papers within reach of
accounting officers.15 Petitioner’s claim was for a fixed amount and although respondent took issue with
the accuracy of petitioner’s summation of its accountabilities, the amount thereof was readily
determinable from the receipts, invoices and other documents. Thus, the claim was well within the COA’s
jurisdiction under the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines.

Second, petitioner’s money claim was founded on a series of purchases for the medical supplies of
respondent’s public hospitals. Both parties agreed that these transactions were governed by the Local
Government Code provisions on supply and property management 16 and their implementing rules and
regulations promulgated by the COA17 pursuant to Section 383 of said Code.18 Petitioner’s claim
therefore involved compliance with applicable auditing laws and rules on procurement. Such matters are
not within the usual area of knowledge, experience and expertise of most judges but within the special
competence of COA auditors and accountants. Thus, it was but proper, out of fidelity to the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, for the RTC to dismiss petitioner’s complaint.

Petitioner argues, however, that respondent could no longer question the RTC’s jurisdiction over the
matter after it had filed its answer and participated in the subsequent proceedings. To this, we need only
state that the court may raise the issue of primary jurisdiction sua sponte and its invocation cannot be
waived by the failure of the parties to argue it as the doctrine exists for the proper distribution of power
between judicial and administrative bodies and not for the convenience of the parties.19

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The March 7, and May 16, 2001 orders of the Regional
Trial Court of Batangas City are hereby AFFIRMED.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that “before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the administrative
machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on
a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the
court’s judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to
one’s cause of action. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and
legal reasons. The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a
speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and
convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed
and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its
error and dispose of the case.”⁠5 Indeed, the administrative agency concerned – in this case the
Commission Proper – is in the “best position to correct any previous error committed in its forum.”⁠

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies states that one should avail all the means of
administrative processes provided by law before seeking the intervention of the court. This is applied in
the exercise of quasi-judicial power of administrative agency.

Effect of the Doctrine

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is held whenever there is available administrative
remedy that should be used up or exhausted before a recourse to judicial action.[1] This is in order to:
 provide an orderly procedure prescribed by law with respect to matters peculiarly within the
competence of the administrative agency.[2]
 give the agency an opportunity to decide on its own matters and to correct its own errors.[3][4]
 prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the court.[5]
The doctrine asserts that courts, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, should not entertain cases
proper for determination by administrative agencies.[6]

Violation of the doctrine may dismiss a case due to lack of 'cause of action'.[7] A motion to dismiss must
be filled on this ground, otherwise it is deemed to be waived.

This doctrine is held in legal cases such as:

Exceptions to the Doctrine

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply:
 when the issue involved is a pure question of law
 when the due process is clearly violated
 when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
 when there is urgent need for judicial intervention
 when there is unreasonable delay or official inaction
 when there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy provided by law
 when there is estoppel on the part of the agency concerned
 when there is great and irreparable damage which can only be prevented by court action
 when the resort to administrative remedy will amount to the nullification of a claim
 when the law specifically provides that the issue shall be brought up to the court
 when the subject matter is private land in land case proceedings
Facts: Mark Maglalang was a teller at the Casino Filipino operated by PAGCOR. In December 2008, he
committed an error counting the money of a lady customer. Due to tension that arose between the two,
they were invited to the casino’s Internal Security Office in order to air their respective sides. He was
required to file an Incident Report. By January 2009, he was issued a memo charging him with
Discourtesy. He was later on found guilty of the same and 30-day suspension was imposed. He filed MR
seeking reversal of the decision and also Motion for Production to be furnished with documents relative to
the case. Both were denied. He then filed petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA. He ascribed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to the acts of PAGCOR in adjudging
him guilty of the charge, in failing to observe the proper procedure in the rendition of its decision and in
imposing the harsh penalty of a 30-day suspension. He further explained that he did not appeal to the
Civil Service Commission because the penalty imposed on him was only a 30-day suspension which is
not within the CSC’s appellate jurisdiction. CA outrightly dismissed the petition for certiorari for being
premature as petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking recourse from the CA.

Issue: WON CA was correct in outrightly dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before it on the ground
of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Decision: CA’s outright dismissal of the petition for certiorari on the basis of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies is bereft of any legal standing

Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him or her.

Exceptions: (1) when there is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal
question; (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
(4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned; (5) when there is
irreparable injury; (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the
President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (7) when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; (9)
when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings; (10) when the rule does not provide a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of
judicial intervention, and unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice the complainant; (12) where no
administrative review is provided by law; (13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies and
(14) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot.

The case falls squarely under exception number 12 since the law per se provides no administrative
review for administrative cases whereby an employee like petitioner is covered by Civil Service law, rules
and regulations and penalized with a suspension for not more than 30 days.

The judicial recourse petitioner availed of in this case before the CA is a special civil action for certiorari
ascribing grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of PAGCOR,
not an appeal. An appeal and a special civil action such as certiorari under Rule 65 are entirely distinct
and separate from each other. One cannot file petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules where
appeal is available, even if the ground availed of is grave abuse of discretion. A special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is no appeal, or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment
despite the availability of that remedy, as the same should not be a substitute for the lost remedy of
appeal. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 190566 December 11, 2013

MARK JEROME S. MAGLALANG, Petitioner,

vs.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), as represented by its
incumbent Chairman EFRAIM GENUINO, Respondent.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before this Court is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended, seeking the reversal of the Resolution 2 dated September 30, 2009 issued by the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA"".G.R. SP No. 110048, which outrightly dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by
herein petitioner Mark Jerome S. Maglalang (petitioner). Also assailed is the appellate court's
Resolution3 dated November 26, 2009 which denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The facts follow.

Petitioner was a teller at the Casino Filipino, Angeles City Branch, Angeles City, which was operated by
respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), a government-owned or
controlled corporation existing by virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1869. 4

Petitioner alleged that in the afternoon of December 13, 2008, while he was performing his functions as
teller, a lady customer identified later as one Cecilia Nakasato 5 (Cecilia) approached him in his booth and
handed to him an undetermined amount of cash consisting of mixed ₱1,000.00 and ₱500.00 bills. There
were 45 ₱1,000.00 and ten ₱500.00 bills for the total amount of ₱50,000.00. Following casino procedure,
petitioner laid the bills on the spreading board. However, he erroneously spread the bills into only four
clusters instead of five clusters worth ₱10,000.00 per cluster. He then placed markers for ₱10,000.00
each cluster of cash and declared the total amount of ₱40,000.00 to Cecilia. Perplexed, Cecilia asked
petitioner why the latter only dished out ₱40,000.00. She then pointed to the first cluster of bills and
requested petitioner to check the first cluster which she observed to be thicker than the others. Petitioner
performed a recount and found that the said cluster contained 20 pieces of ₱1,000.00 bills. Petitioner
apologized to Cecilia and rectified the error by declaring the full and correct amount handed to him by the
latter. Petitioner, however, averred that Cecilia accused him of trying to shortchange her and that
petitioner tried to deliberately fool her of her money. Petitioner tried to explain, but Cecilia allegedly
continued to berate and curse him. To ease the tension, petitioner was asked to take a break. After ten
minutes, petitioner returned to his booth. However, Cecilia allegedly showed up and continued to berate
petitioner. As a result, the two of them were invited to the casino’s Internal Security Office in order to air
their respective sides. Thereafter, petitioner was required to file an Incident Report which he submitted
on the same day of the incident.6

On January 8, 2009, petitioner received a Memorandum 7 issued by the casino’s Branch Manager,
Alexander Ozaeta, informing him that he was being charged with Discourtesy towards a casino customer
and directing him to explain within 72 hours upon receipt of the memorandum why he should not be
sanctioned or dismissed. In compliance therewith, petitioner submitted a letter-explanation8 dated
January 10, 2009.

On March 31, 2009, petitioner received another Memorandum9 dated March 19, 2009, stating that the
Board of Directors of PAGCOR found him guilty of Discourtesy towards a casino customer and imposed
on him a 30-day suspension for this first offense. Aggrieved, on April 2, 2009, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration10 seeking a reversal of the board’s decision and further prayed in the alternative that if
he is indeed found guilty as charged, the penalty be only a reprimand as it is the appropriate penalty.
During the pendency of said motion, petitioner also filed a Motion for Production 11 dated April 20, 2009,
praying that he be furnished with copies of documents relative to the case including the recommendation
of the investigating committee and the Decision/Resolution of the Board supposedly containing the
latter’s factual findings. In a letter-reply12 dated June 2, 2009, one Atty. Carlos R. Bautista, Jr. who did not
indicate his authority therein to represent PAGCOR, denied the said motion. Petitioner received said
letter-reply on June 17, 2009.

Subsequently, on June 18, 2009, PAGCOR issued a Memorandum 13 dated June 18, 2009 practically
reiterating the contents of its March 19, 2009 Memorandum. Attached therewith is another
Memorandum14 dated June 8, 2009 issued by PAGCOR’s Assistant Vice President for Human Resource
and Development, Atty. Lizette F. Mortel, informing petitioner that the Board of Directors in its meeting on
May 13, 2009 resolved to deny his appeal for reconsideration for lack of merit. Petitioner received said
memoranda on the same date of June 18, 2009.

On August 17, 2009, petitioner filed a petition 15 for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, before the CA, averring that there is no evidence, much less factual and legal
basis to support the finding of guilt against him. Moreover, petitioner ascribed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to the acts of PAGCOR in adjudging him guilty of the charge,
in failing to observe the proper procedure in the rendition of its decision and in imposing the harsh penalty
of a 30-day suspension. Justifying his recourse to the CA, petitioner explained that he did not appeal to
the Civil Service Commission (CSC) because the penalty imposed on him was only a 30-day suspension
which is not within the CSC’s appellate jurisdiction. He also claimed that discourtesy in the performance
of official duties is classified as a light offense which is punishable only by reprimand.

In its assailed Resolution16 dated September 30, 2009, the CA outrightly dismissed the petition for
certiorari for being premature as petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking
recourse from the CA. Invoking Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution,17 the CA held that the
CSC has jurisdiction over issues involving the employer-employee relationship in all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters such as PAGCOR. Petitioner filed his Motion for
Reconsideration18 which the CA denied in the assailed Resolution 19 dated November 26, 2009. In
denying the said motion, the CA relied on this Court’s ruling in Duty Free Philippines v. Mojica 20 citing
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corp. v. CA,21 where this Court held as follows:

It is now settled that, conformably to Article IX-B, Section 2(1), [of the 1987 Constitution]
government-owned or controlled corporations shall be considered part of the Civil Service only if they
have original charters, as distinguished from those created under general law.

PAGCOR belongs to the Civil Service because it was created directly by PD 1869 on July 11, 1983.
Consequently, controversies concerning the relations of the employee with the management of PAGCOR
should come under the jurisdiction of the Merit System Protection Board and the Civil Service
Commission, conformably to the Administrative Code of 1987.

Section 16(2) of the said Code vest[s] in the Merit System Protection Board the power inter alia to:
a) Hear and decide on appeal administrative cases involving officials and employees of the Civil Service.
Its decision shall be final except those involving dismissal or separation from the service which may be
appealed to the Commission.

Hence, this petition where petitioner argues that the CA committed grave and substantial error of
judgment

1. IN OUTRIGHTLY DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BY PETITIONER AND IN

DENYING THE LATTER’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION[;]

2. IN RULING THAT THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION HAS APPELLATE JURISDICTION OVER
THE SUSPENSION OF THE PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PENALTY INVOLVED IS
NOT MORE THAN THIRTY (30) DAYS[;]

3. IN RESOLVING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BY PETITIONER IN A MANNER WHICH

IS UTTERLY CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE[;]

4. IN UNJUSTIFIABLY REFUSING TO RENDER A DECISION AS TO THE PROPRIETY OR VALIDITY

OF THE SUSPENSION OF THE PETITIONER BY THE RESPONDENT[;]

5. IN UNDULY REFUSING TO RENDER A DECISION DECLARING THAT THE ASSAILED

DECISIONS/RESOLUTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON
RECORD[; AND]

6. IN UNJUSTIFIABLY REFUSING TO RENDER A DECISION DECLARING THAT THE ASSAILED

DECISIONS/RESOLUTIONS OF RESPONDENT WERE ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.22

Petitioner claims that the CA clearly overlooked the applicable laws and jurisprudence that provide that
when the penalty involved in an administrative case is suspension for not more than 30 days, the CSC
has no appellate jurisdiction over the said administrative case. As authority, petitioner invokes our ruling
in Geronga v. Hon. Varela23 which cited Section 47,24 Chapter 1, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 292 otherwise known as The Administrative Code of 1987. Said Section 47 provides
that the CSC may entertain appeals only, among others, from a penalty of suspension of more than 30
days. Petitioner asserts that his case, involving a 30-day suspension penalty, is not appealable to the
CSC. Thus, he submits that his case was properly brought before the CA via a petition for certiorari. 25

On the other hand, PAGCOR alleges that petitioner intentionally omitted relevant matters in his
statement of facts. PAGCOR essentially claims that petitioner refused to apologize to Cecilia; that he
treated Cecilia’s complaint with arrogance; and that before taking the aforementioned 10-minute break,
petitioner slammed the cash to the counter window in giving it back to the customer. PAGCOR argues
that the instant petition raises questions of fact which are not reviewable in a petition for review on
certiorari. PAGCOR maintains that the CA’s ruling was in accordance with law and jurisprudence.
Moreover, PAGCOR counters that petitioner’s remedy of appeal is limited as Section 37 of the Revised
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides that a decision rendered by heads of
agencies whereby a penalty of suspension for not more than 30 days is imposed shall be final and
executory. PAGCOR opines that such intent of limiting appeals over such minor offenses is elucidated in
the Concurring Opinion of former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in CSC v. Dacoycoy26 and based on the
basic premise that appeal is merely a statutory privilege. Lastly, PAGCOR submits that the 30-day
suspension meted on petitioner is justified under its own Code of Discipline. 27 Prescinding from the
foregoing, the sole question for resolution is: Was the CA correct in outrightly dismissing the petition for
certiorari filed before it on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies?

We resolve the question in the negative.

Our ruling in Public Hearing Committee of the Laguna Lake Development Authority v. SM Prime Holdings,
Inc.28 on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is instructive, to wit:
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the administrative
machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on
a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the
court's judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to
one’s cause of action. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and
legal reasons. The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a
speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity and
convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed
and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its
error and dispose of the case.

However, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute as it admits of the
following exceptions:

(1) when there is a violation of due process; (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question; (3)
when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (4) when
there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned; (5) when there is irreparable injury;
(6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the
implied and assumed approval of the latter; (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies
would be unreasonable; (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; (9) when the subject matter
is a private land in land case proceedings; (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention,
and unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice the complainant; (12) where no administrative review is
provided by law; (13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies and (14) where the issue of
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot. 29

The case before us falls squarely under exception number 12 since the law per se provides no
administrative review for administrative cases whereby an employee like petitioner is covered by Civil
Service law, rules and regulations and penalized with a suspension for not more than 30 days.

Section 37 (a) and (b) of P.D. No. 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines,
provides for the unavailability of any appeal:

Section 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction.

(a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the
imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty
days’ salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from Office. A complaint may be
filed directly with the Commission by a private citizen against a government official or employee in which
case it may hear and decide the case or it may deputize any department or agency or official or group of
officials to conduct the investigation. The results of the investigation shall be submitted to the
Commission with recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or other action to be taken.

(b) The heads of departments, agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall
have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and
employees under their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is
suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days’ salary. In case
the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, the same may be
initially appealed to the department and finally to the Commission and pending appeal, the same shall be
executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be executory only after
confirmation by the department head. (Emphasis supplied.)

Similar provisions are reiterated in the aforequoted Section 47 30 of E.O. No. 292 essentially providing
that cases of this sort are not appealable to the CSC. Correlatively, we are not unaware of the Concurring
Opinion of then Chief Justice Puno in CSC v. Dacoycoy,31 where he opined, to wit:

In truth, the doctrine barring appeal is not categorically sanctioned by the Civil Service Law.1âwphi1 For
what the law declares as "final" are decisions of heads of agencies involving suspension for not more
than thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty (30) days salary. But there is a clear policy
reason for declaring these decisions final. These decisions involve minor offenses. They are numerous
for they are the usual offenses committed by government officials and employees. To allow their multiple
level appeal will doubtless overburden the quasijudicial machinery of our administrative system and
defeat the expectation of fast and efficient action from these administrative agencies. Nepotism, however,
is not a petty offense. Its deleterious effect on government cannot be over-emphasized. And it is a
stubborn evil. The objective should be to eliminate nepotic acts, hence, erroneous decisions allowing
nepotism cannot be given immunity from review, especially judicial review. It is thus non sequitur to
contend that since some decisions exonerating public officials from minor offenses can not be appealed,
ergo, even a decision acquitting a government official from a major offense like nepotism cannot also be
appealed.

Nevertheless, decisions of administrative agencies which are declared final and unappealable by law are
still subject to judicial review. In Republic of the Phils. v. Francisco,32 we held:

Since the decision of the Ombudsman suspending respondents for one (1) month is final and
unappealable, it follows that the CA had no appellate jurisdiction to review, rectify or reverse the same.
The Ombudsman was not estopped from asserting in this Court that the CA had no appellate jurisdiction
to review and reverse the decision of the Ombudsman via petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules
of Court. This is not to say that decisions of the Ombudsman cannot be questioned. Decisions of
administrative or quasi-administrative agencies which are declared by law final and unappealable
are subject to judicial review if they fail the test of arbitrariness, or upon proof of gross abuse of
discretion, fraud or error of law. When such administrative or quasi-judicial bodies grossly
misappreciate evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion, the Court will not hesitate to
reverse the factual findings. Thus, the decision of the Ombudsman may be reviewed, modified or
reversed via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, on a finding that it had no
jurisdiction over the complaint, or of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction.It bears stressing that the judicial recourse petitioner availed of in this case before the CA is
a special civil action for certiorari ascribing grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of PAGCOR, not an appeal. Suffice it to state that an appeal and a special civil
action such as certiorari under Rule 65 are entirely distinct and separate from each other. One cannot file
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules where appeal is available, even if the ground availed of is
grave abuse of discretion. A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is no
appeal, or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Certiorari cannot be allowed
when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy, as the same
should not be a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are
mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.33

In sum, there being no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law in
view of petitioner's allegation that P AGCOR has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the CA's outright dismissal of the petition
for certiorari on the basis of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is bereft of any legal standing and
should therefore be set aside.

Finally, as a rule, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is valid only when the question involved is an error
of jurisdiction, or when there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of the court or tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions. Hence, courts exercising certiorari
jurisdiction should refrain from reviewing factual assessments of the respondent court or agency.
Occasionally, however, they are constrained to wade into factual matters when the evidence on record
does not support those factual findings; or when too much is concluded, inferred or deduced from the
bare or incomplete facts appearing on record.34 Considering the circumstances and since this Court is
not a trier of facts, 35 remand of this case to the CA for its judicious resolution is in order.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Resolutions dated September 30, 2009 and
November 26, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 110048 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The instant case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
Actual and Proximate Cause

When a person is injured due to another person’s or entity’s negligence, he or she can recover economic
and noneconomic damages that flow from the negligence. Among the elements that the plaintiff suing for
negligence will have to prove is that the defendant’s violation of a duty was the actual and proximate
cause of his or her injuries. He or she will also have to prove duty, breach of duty, and damages.

Actual cause, also known as “cause in fact,” is straightforward. When a bus strikes a car, the bus driver’s
actions are the actual cause of the accident. Proximate cause means “legal cause,” or one that the law
recognizes as the primary cause of the injury. It may not be the first event that set in motion a sequence
of events that led to an injury, and it may not be the very last event before the injury occurs. Instead, it is
an action that produced foreseeable consequences without intervention from anyone else. In other words,
the plaintiff will have to show that the injuries were the natural and direct consequence of the proximate
cause, without which the injuries would not have occurred.

“But For” Test

Some states follow the “but for” rule to determine if an event is the proximate cause. This rule considers
whether the injury would not have happened but for the defendant’s negligent action or omission. When
there is a finding that an injury would not have happened but for a defendant’s action, it establishes the
element of proximate cause.
For example, when a drunk driver is weaving in and out of traffic and hits a pedestrian, causing massive
hemorrhaging and brain damage, the accident would not have happened but for the drunk driver’s
intoxication. It is foreseeable that if a driver is drunk and weaving through traffic, he or she may cause
injuries to a pedestrian. However, a defendant cannot be liable for totally unforeseeable injuries. If the
same drunk driver hits a warehouse full of explosives, and there is an explosion that causes drivers to
rubberneck and hit the pedestrian, the drunk driving is probably not the proximate cause of the
pedestrian’s injuries.

“Substantial Factor” Test

Other states use the “substantial factor” test in connection with proximate cause. Under this rule, the
court will consider whether the defendant’s actions or omissions were a substantial factor in causing the
injury. In jurisdictions that follow the substantial factor test, a substantial factor is one that contributes
materially to the occurrence of an injury. An action contributes materially when its causative effects are in
operation until the moment of injury. An act or omission that only trivially affects the occurrence of an
injury is not a substantial factor and will not be considered a proximate cause.

For example, if a distracted driver crashes into a truck carrying explosives, and as a result, the explosives
explode and kill the truck driver, the distracted driving is a substantial factor in the accident. The
distracted driver’s actions are in operation until the truck explodes. However, if a distracted driver
crashes into a stop sign and in order to avoid the site of the accident, a tractor-trailer driver turning left
swings particularly wide such that the portion of the truck carrying explosives hits a parked car and
explodes, killing a passing pedestrian, the distracted driver’s actions affected the pedestrian’s death only
incidentally, whereas the truck driver’s swinging wide turn is a substantial factor in his or her death.

proximate cause

n. a happening which results in an event, particularly injury due to negligence or an intentional wrongful
act. In order to prevail (win) in a lawsuit for damages due to negligence or some other wrong, it is
essential to claim (plead) proximate cause in the complaint and to prove in trial that the negligent act of
the defendant was the proximate cause (and not some other reason) of the damages to the plaintiff
(person filing the lawsuit). Sometimes there is an intervening cause which comes between the original
negligence of the defendant and the injured plaintiff, which will either reduce the amount of responsibility
or, if this intervening cause is the substantial reason for the injury, then the defendant will not be liable at
all. In criminal law, the defendant's act must have been the proximate cause of the death of a victim to
prove murder or manslaughter.

Calalas v Court of Appeals & Eliza Sunga (Torts – Proximate Cause)

MissIdea Uncategorized August 28, 2017 1 Minute

Facts:

Private Respondent Eliza Saunga took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by Petitioner Vicente
Calalas. As the jeepney was already full, she was just given an “extension seat”, a wooden stool, at the
rear end of the vehicle.

On the way, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. Since Sunga was seated at the rear end, she
gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu Elf Truck driven by Igclerio
Verena and owned by Francisco Salva, bumped to the left rear end of the jeepney. This incident cause
injury to Sunga.

She filed a compliant for damages against Calalas on the ground of breach of contract of carriage. On the
other hand, Calalas filed a third-party complaint against Salva, the owner of the truck.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found Salva guilty and absolved Calalas from liability holding that it was
the truck owner who is responsible for the accident based on quasi-delict.

However, on appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the appellate court reversed the RTC’s decision, on
the ground that Sunga’s cause of action was based on a breach of contract of carriage and not on
quasi-delict.

Hence, this appeal from Calalas.

ISSUE: Whether or not the negligence of the truck driver as the proximate cause of the accident which
negates petitioner’s liability?

RULING:

No.

First, the issue in this case is the liability under contract of carriage.

In this case, the petitioner failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination as a common carrier
in violation of Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the New Civil Code.

Moreso, there is no basis that the ruling of the RTC binds Sunga. It is immaterial that the proximate
cause of the collision was the truck driver, because the doctrine of proximate cause applies only to cases
of quasi-delict.

The doctrine of proximate cause is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation
between him and another party. But in the case at bar, there is a pre-existing relation between petitioner
and respondent in their contract of carriage. Hence, upon happening of the accident, the presumption of
negligence at once arose on Calalas’ part, which makes him liable.

Ramos vs. COL Realty Corporation; Proximate Cause

7/9/2013
0 Comments

G.R. No. 184905 August 28, 2009

Facts:
Petitioner Ramos is the employer of Rodel Ilustrisimo. While Rodel was driving the Ford Expedition of
petitioner an accident ensued, wherein it bumped with a Corrolla Altis driven by Aquilino Larin and owned by
Respondent COL Realty. Due to the impact of the vehicular mishap, the passenger of the sedan was injured.

A case was filed against Ramos making him solidarily liable with his driver. Ramos in his opposition argued
that he cannot be held solidarily liable since it is Aquilnio's negligence that is the proximate cause of the accident.
He further argued that when the accident happened, Aquilino violated an MMDA order, i.e. prohibiting the
crossing is the place where the accident happened.
Issue:
Whether or not Ramos may be held liable since the proximate cause of the accident is his employee's
negligence.

Ruling:
No. There is no doubt that Aquilino’s violation of the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue
from Rajah Matanda Street was the proximate cause of the accident.

Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. And
more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately
or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a
close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the
injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to
expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.

If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda, the
accident would not have happened. This specific untoward event is exactly what the MMDA prohibition was
intended for. Thus, a prudent and intelligent person who resides within the vicinity where the accident occurred,
Aquilino had reasonable ground to expect that the accident would be a natural and probable result if he crossed
Katipunan Avenue since such crossing is considered dangerous on account of the busy nature of the
thoroughfare and the ongoing construction of the Katipunan-Boni Avenue underpass. It was manifest error for
the Court of Appeals to have overlooked the principle embodied in Article 2179 of the Civil Code, that when the
plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages.

As to the alleged Rodel's contributory negligence- the court finds it unnecessary to delve into it, since it
cannot overcome or defeat Aquilino’s recklessness which is the immediate and proximate cause of the accident.
Rodel’s contributory negligence has relevance only in the event that Ramos seeks to recover from respondent
whatever damages or injuries he may have suffered as a result; it will have the effect of mitigating the award of
damages in his favor.

G.R. No. 184905 August 28, 2009

LAMBERT S. RAMOS, Petitioner,

vs.
C.O.L. REALTY CORPORATION, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

The issue for resolution is whether petitioner can be held solidarily liable with his driver, Rodel Ilustrisimo,
to pay respondent C.O.L. Realty the amount of P51,994.80 as actual damages suffered in a vehicular
collision.

The facts, as found by the appellate court, are as follows:

On or about 10:40 o’clock in the morning of 8 March 2004, along Katipunan (Avenue), corner Rajah
Matanda (Street), Quezon City, a vehicular accident took place between a Toyota Altis Sedan bearing
Plate Number XDN 210, owned by petitioner C.O.L. Realty Corporation, and driven by Aquilino Larin
("Aquilino"), and a Ford Expedition, owned by x x x Lambert Ramos (Ramos) and driven by Rodel
Ilustrisimo ("Rodel"), with Plate Number LSR 917. A passenger of the sedan, one Estela Maliwat
("Estela") sustained injuries. She was immediately rushed to the hospital for treatment.

(C.O.L. Realty) averred that its driver, Aquilino, was slowly driving the Toyota Altis car at a speed of five
to ten kilometers per hour along Rajah Matanda Street and has just crossed the center lane of Katipunan
Avenue when (Ramos’) Ford Espedition violently rammed against the car’s right rear door and fender.
With the force of the impact, the sedan turned 180 degrees towards the direction where it came from.

Upon investigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found probable cause to indict Rodel,
the driver of the Ford Expedition, for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property. In the
meantime, petitioner demanded from respondent reimbursement for the expenses incurred in the repair
of its car and the hospitalization of Estela in the aggregate amount of P103,989.60. The demand fell on
deaf ears prompting (C.O.L. Realty) to file a Complaint for Damages based on quasi-delict before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro Manila (MeTC), Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. 33277, and
subsequently raffled to Branch 42.

As could well be expected, (Ramos) denied liability for damages insisting that it was the negligence of
Aquilino, (C.O.L. Realty’s) driver, which was the proximate cause of the accident. (Ramos) maintained
that the sedan car crossed Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street despite the concrete barriers
placed thereon prohibiting vehicles to pass through the intersection.

(Ramos) further claimed that he was not in the vehicle when the mishap occurred. He asserted that he
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his driver, Rodel.
Weighing the respective evidence of the parties, the MeTC rendered the Decision dated 1 March 2006
exculpating (Ramos) from liability, thus:

"WHEREFORE, the instant case is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Counterclaims of the defendant are
likewise DISMISSED for lack of sufficient factual and legal basis.

SO ORDERED."

The aforesaid judgment did not sit well with (C.O.L. Realty) so that he (sic) appealed the same before the
RTC of Quezon City, raffled to Branch 215, which rendered the assailed Decision dated 5 September
2006, affirming the MeTC’s Decision. (C.O.L. Realty’s) Motion for Reconsideration met the same fate as
it was denied by the RTC in its Order dated 5 June 2007.1

C.O.L. Realty appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the view that Aquilino was negligent in
crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street since, as per Certification of the Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority (MMDA) dated November 30, 2004, such act is specifically prohibited.
Thus:

This is to certify that as per records found and available in this office the crossing of vehicles at Katipunan
Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street to Blue Ridge Subdivision, Quezon City has (sic) not allowed since
January 2004 up to the present in view of the ongoing road construction at the area.2 (Emphasis
supplied)

Barricades were precisely placed along the intersection of Katipunan Avenue and Rajah Matanda Street
in order to prevent motorists from crossing Katipunan Avenue. Nonetheless, Aquilino crossed Katipunan
Avenue through certain portions of the barricade which were broken, thus violating the MMDA rule. 3

However, the Court of Appeals likewise noted that at the time of the collision, Ramos’ vehicle was moving
at high speed in a busy area that was then the subject of an ongoing construction (the Katipunan
Avenue-Boni Serrano Avenue underpass), then smashed into the rear door and fender of the
passenger’s side of Aquilino’s car, sending it spinning in a 180-degree turn.4 It therefore found the driver
Rodel guilty of contributory negligence for driving the Ford Expedition at high speed along a busy
intersection.

Thus, on May 28, 2008, the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision, 5 the dispositive portion of
which reads, as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 5 September 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
215 is hereby MODIFIED in that respondent Lambert Ramos is held solidarily liable with Rodel Ilustrisimo
to pay petitioner C.O.L. Realty Corporation the amount of P51,994.80 as actual damages. Petitioner
C.O.L. Realty Corporation’s claim for exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and cost of suit are
DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, the instant petition, which raises
the following sole issue:

THE COURT OF APPEALS’ DECISION IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND

JURISPRUDENCE, AND THE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT AND JUSTIFY THE SAME
IS INSUFFICIENT.

We resolve to GRANT the petition.

There is no doubt in the appellate court’s mind that Aquilino’s violation of the MMDA prohibition against
crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street was the proximate cause of the accident.
Respondent does not dispute this; in its Comment to the instant petition, it even conceded that petitioner
was guilty of mere contributory negligence.6
Thus, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that:

The Certification dated 30 November 2004 of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA)
evidently disproved (C.O.L. Realty’s) barefaced assertion that its driver, Aquilino, was not to be blamed
for the accident –

"TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that as per records found and available in this office the crossing of
vehicles at Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street to Blue Ridge Subdivision,
Quezon City has (sic) not allowed since January 2004 up to the present in view of the
ongoing road construction at the area.

This certification is issued upon request of the interested parties for whatever legal
purpose it may serve."

(C.O.L. Realty) admitted that there were barricades along the intersection of Katipunan Avenue and
Rajah Matanda Street. The barricades were placed thereon to caution drivers not to pass through the
intersecting roads. This prohibition stands even if, as (C.O.L. Realty) claimed, the "barriers were broken"
at that point creating a small gap through which any vehicle could pass. What is clear to Us is that
Aquilino recklessly ignored these barricades and drove through it. Without doubt, his negligence is
established by the fact that he violated a traffic regulation. This finds support in Article 2185 of the Civil
Code –

"Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been
negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation."

Accordingly, there ought to be no question on (C.O.L. Realty’s) negligence which resulted in the
vehicular mishap.7

However, it also declared Ramos liable vicariously for Rodel’s contributory negligence in driving the Ford
Expedition at high speed along a busy intersection. On this score, the appellate court made the following
pronouncement:

As a professional driver, Rodel should have known that driving his vehicle at a high speed in a major
thoroughfare which was then subject of an on-going construction was a perilous act. He had no regard to
(sic) the safety of other vehicles on the road. Because of the impact of the collision, (Aquilino’s) sedan
made a 180-degree turn as (Ramos’) Ford Expedition careened and smashed into its rear door and
fender. We cannot exculpate Rodel from liability.

Having thus settled the contributory negligence of Rodel, this created a presumption of negligence on the
part of his employer, (Ramos). For the employer to avoid the solidary liability for a tort committed by his
employee, an employer must rebut the presumption by presenting adequate and convincing proof that in
the selection and supervision of his employee, he or she exercises the care and diligence of a good
father of a family. Employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence, that they
complied with everything that was incumbent on them.

(Ramos) feebly attempts to escape vicarious liability by averring that Rodel was highly recommended
when he applied for the position of family driver by the Social Service Committee of his parish. A certain
Ramon Gomez, a member of the church’s livelihood program, testified that a background investigation
would have to be made before an applicant is recommended to the parishioners for employment. (Ramos)
supposedly tested Rodel’s driving skills before accepting him for the job. Rodel has been his driver since
2001, and except for the mishap in 2004, he has not been involved in any road accident.

Regrettably, (Ramos’) evidence which consisted mainly of testimonial evidence remained

unsubstantiated and are thus, barren of significant weight. There is nothing on the records which would
support (Ramos’) bare allegation of Rodel’s 10-year unblemished driving record. He failed to present
convincing proof that he went to the extent of verifying Rodel’s qualifications, safety record, and driving
history.
So too, (Ramos) did not bother to refute (C.O.L. Realty’s) stance that his driver was texting with his
cellphone while running at a high speed and that the latter did not slow down albeit he knew that
Katipunan Avenue was then undergoing repairs and that the road was barricaded with barriers. The
presumption juris tantum that there was negligence in the selection of driver remains unrebutted. As the
employer of Rodel, (Ramos) is solidarily liable for the quasi-delict committed by the former.1avvphi1

Certainly, in the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience and service records. In the supervision of employees, the employer must
formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary
measures for the breach thereof. These, (Ramos) failed to do. 8

Petitioner disagrees, arguing that since Aquilino’s willful disregard of the MMDA prohibition was the sole
proximate cause of the accident, then respondent alone should suffer the consequences of the accident
and the damages it incurred. He argues:

20. It becomes apparent therefore that the only time a plaintiff, the respondent herein, can recover
damages is if its negligence was only contributory, and such contributory negligence was the proximate
cause of the accident. It has been clearly established in this case, however, that respondent’s negligence
was not merely contributory, but the sole proximate cause of the accident.

xxxx

22. As culled from the foregoing, respondent was the sole proximate cause of the accident.
Respondent’s vehicle should not have been in that position since crossing the said intersection was
prohibited. Were it not for the obvious negligence of respondent’s driver in crossing the intersection that
was prohibited, the accident would not have happened. The crossing of respondent’s vehicle in a
prohibited intersection unquestionably produced the injury, and without which the accident would not
have occurred. On the other hand, petitioner’s driver had the right to be where he was at the time of the
mishap. As correctly concluded by the RTC, the petitioner’s driver could not be expected to slacken his
speed while travelling along said intersection since nobody, in his right mind, would do the same.
Assuming, however, that petitioner’s driver was indeed guilty of any contributory negligence, such was
not the proximate cause of the accident considering that again, if respondent’s driver did not cross the
prohibited intersection, no accident would have happened. No imputation of any lack of care on
Ilustrisimo’s could thus be concluded. It is obvious then that petitioner’s driver was not guilty of any
negligence that would make petitioner vicariously liable for damages.

23. As the sole proximate cause of the accident was respondent’s own driver, respondent cannot claim
damages from petitioner.9

On the other hand, respondent in its Comment merely reiterated the appellate court’s findings and
pronouncements, conceding that petitioner is guilty of mere contributory negligence, and insisted on his
vicarious liability as Rodel’s employer under Article 2184 of the Civil Code.

Articles 2179 and 2185 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts apply in this case, viz:

Article 2179. When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury,
he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate
cause of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the
courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.

Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle
has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.

If the master is injured by the negligence of a third person and by the concurring contributory negligence
of his own servant or agent, the latter’s negligence is imputed to his superior and will defeat the superior’s
action against the third person, assuming of course that the contributory negligence was the proximate
cause of the injury of which complaint is made.10
Applying the foregoing principles of law to the instant case, Aquilino’s act of crossing Katipunan Avenue
via Rajah Matanda constitutes negligence because it was prohibited by law. Moreover, it was the
proximate cause of the accident, and thus precludes any recovery for any damages suffered by
respondent from the accident.

Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events,
each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under
such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and
intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to
some person might probably result therefrom.11

If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda, the
accident would not have happened. This specific untoward event is exactly what the MMDA prohibition
was intended for. Thus, a prudent and intelligent person who resides within the vicinity where the
accident occurred, Aquilino had reasonable ground to expect that the accident would be a natural and
probable result if he crossed Katipunan Avenue since such crossing is considered dangerous on account
of the busy nature of the thoroughfare and the ongoing construction of the Katipunan-Boni Avenue
underpass. It was manifest error for the Court of Appeals to have overlooked the principle embodied in
Article 2179 of the Civil Code, that when the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate
cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages.

Hence, we find it unnecessary to delve into the issue of Rodel’s contributory negligence, since it cannot
overcome or defeat Aquilino’s recklessness which is the immediate and proximate cause of the accident.
Rodel’s contributory negligence has relevance only in the event that Ramos seeks to recover from
respondent whatever damages or injuries he may have suffered as a result; it will have the effect of
mitigating the award of damages in his favor. In other words, an assertion of contributory negligence in
this case would benefit only the petitioner; it could not eliminate respondent’s liability for Aquilino’s
negligence which is the proximate result of the accident.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 28, 2008 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 99614 and its Resolution of October 13, 2008 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 215 dated September 5, 2006
dismissing for lack of merit respondent’s complaint for damages is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.