POLITICAL LAW REVIEW 1 FOR NOVEMBER 6, 2019

Pimentel v. Office of Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 158088 July 6, 2005|PUNO J.|Conduct of Foreign Relations & Treaty-Making

PETITIONERS: SENATOR AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR., REP. ETTA ROSALES, PHILIPPINE

COALITION FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, TASK
FORCE DETAINEES OF THE PHILIPPINES, FAMILIES OF VICTIMS OF INVOLUNTARY
DISAPPEARANCES, BIANCA HACINTHA R. ROQUE, HARRISON JACOB R. ROQUE, AHMED
PAGLINAWAN, RON P. SALO, LEAVIDES G. DOMINGO, EDGARDO CARLO VISTAN, NOEL
VILLAROMAN, CELESTE CEMBRANO, LIZA ABIERA, JAIME ARROYO, MARWIL LLASOS,
CRISTINA ATENDIDO, ISRAFEL FAGELA, and ROMEL BAGARES

RESPONDENTS: OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, and the
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, represented by HON. BLAS OPLE

Facts:

1. The petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary and
the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippines for its concurrence pursuant to Sec. 21, Art VII of the
1987 Constitution.

2. The Rome Statute established the Int'l Criminal Court which will have jurisdiction over the most
serious crimes as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression as defined
by the Statute. The Philippines through the Chargie du Affairs in UN. The provisions of the Statute
however require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory state.

3. Petitioners contend that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic and international law, is a
function of the Senate, hence it is the duty of the Executive Department to transmit the signed copy to
the senate to allow it to exercise its discretion.

Issue: Whether or not the Exec. Secretary and the DFA have the ministerial duty to transmit to the
Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine mission to the U.N. even
without the signature of the President.

Held: NO.

1. The President as the head of state is the sole organ and authorized in the external relations and he
is also the country's sole representative with foreign nations, He is the mouthpiece with respect to the
country's foreign affairs.

2. In treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states and enter into
treaties but this power is limited by the Constitution with the 2/3 required vote of all the members of
the Senate for the treaty to be valid. (Sec. 21, Art VII).
3. The legislative branch part is essential to provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign
relations, to ensure the nation's pursuit of political maturity and growth.

Bayan v. Executive Secretary

Comm. Of Customs v. Eastern

BELTRAN v. MAKASIAR

November, 14, 1988 | Per Curiam, 3 Consolidated cases | Immunity from Suit

PETITIONER: Luis D. Beltran

RESPONDENTS: The Hon. Ramon P. Makasiar

SUMMARY: Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a
correlative disability to file suit."

- that if the president files a complaint-affidavit, she has to be a witness and waives her privilege of
immunity

- The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of
Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction

- the privilege of immunity may only be invoked by the holder, so an accused in a criminal case in which the
President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from
proceeding against such accused.

- there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded
the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction.

- the contention of petitioner Beltran that he could not be held liable for libel because of the privileged
character of the publication

- SC is not a trier of facts – best left to the trial courts

- Beltran's claim that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a "chilling effect" on press freedom,
the Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the point.

- petitions fail to establish that public respondents, through their separate acts, gravely abused their discretion
as to amount to lack of jurisdiction
DOCTRINE: Privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be
invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf.

FACTS: Pres. Cory Aquino filed a criminal complaint for libel against Beltran. Beltran argues that "the reasons which
necessitate presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit". He contends that if criminal
proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a
witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction. This would in an indirect way defeat her
privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible
contempt of court or perjury.

ISSUE/s: (1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them
although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and,
subsequently, by the President;- NO

(2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for
his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause;- NO
and

(3) whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings
against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit. -NO

RULING: WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G. R. Nos. 82585, 82827 and 83979. The Order to maintain
the status quo contained in the Resolution of the Court en bane dated April 7, 1988 and reiterated in the Resolution dated April 26,
1988 is LIFTED.

RATIO: (1) The allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that
instead of submitting his counter-affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his
right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a
criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is
required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.

(2) What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy
himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of
a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following
established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest;
or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission
of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. Sound
policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and
investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.
(3) The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of
Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of
the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's time, also demands undivided attention.

But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by
the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which
the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding
against such accused.

Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded
the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of
whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be
assumed and imposed by any other person.

Nixon v. Fitzgerald

Clinton v. Jones

Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations

Concepcion v. Paredes

In re Cunanan

Youngstown Tube and Sheet v. Sawyer

Marbury v. Madison

Facts: Thomas Jefferson defeated John Adams in the 1800 presidential election. Before
Jefferson took office on March 4, 1801, Adams and Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1801,
which created new courts, added judges, and gave the president more control over appointment
of judges. The Act was essentially an attempt by Adams and his party to frustrate his successor,
as he used the act to appoint 16 new circuit judges and 42 new justices of the peace. The
appointees were approved by the Senate, but they would not be valid until their commissions
were delivered by the Secretary of State.

William Marbury had been appointed Justice of the Peace in the District of Columbia, but his
commission was not delivered. Marbury petitioned the Supreme Court to compel the new
Secretary of State, James Madison, to deliver the documents. Marbury, joined by three other
similarly situated appointees, petitioned for a writ of mandamus compelling the delivery of the
commissions.

Issues:

1. Do the plaintiffs have a right to receive their commissions?

2. Can they sue for their commissions in court?
3. Does the Supreme Court have the authority to order the delivery of their commissions?
Ruling:

The Court found that Madison’s refusal to deliver the commission was illegal, but did not order
Madison to hand over Marbury’s commission via writ of mandamus. Instead, the Court held that
the provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789 enabling Marbury to bring his claim to the Supreme
Court was itself unconstitutional, since it purported to extend the Court’s original jurisdiction
beyond that which Article III, Section 2, established.

Marshall expanded that a writ of mandamus was the proper way to seek a remedy, but concluded
the Court could not issue it. Marshall reasoned that the Judiciary Act of 1789 conflicted with the
Constitution. Congress did not have power to modify the Constitution through regular legislation
because Supremacy Clause places the Constitution before the laws.

In so holding, Marshall established the principle of judicial review, i.e., the power to declare a law
unconstitutional.

Fernandez v. Torres

Dumlao v. Comelec

David v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

Arceta v. Mangrobang

Lagmay v. CA

Pascual v. Secretary

Bugnay Construction v. Laron

Tatad v. Garcia

ITF v. Comelec

Jumamil v. Café