SEC. 5. Commencement of action.

Ago Timber Corp. vs. Ruiz, et.al., L-23887, Dec. 26, 1967- action may be commenced by filing the complaint by
registered mail; date of mailing (by registered mail) is the date of filing. BUT if docket fee was actually paid, personally or
by mail at a subsequent date, the date of such payment or the mailing of said amount shall be considered as the date of
the filing of the complaint

Manchester Development Corporation, et.al. vs. CA et.al., G.R. No. 75919, May 7, 1987- a case is deemed filed only
upon payment of the docket fee; jurisdiction is acquired only upon full payment of docket fee; all complaints, petitions,
answers and similar pleadings must specify the amount of damages being prayed for both in the body of the pleading and
in the prayer therein, said damages will be considered in the assessment of the filing fees; otherwise, such pleading shall
not be accepted for filing or shall be expunged from the record.

Sun Insurance Office Ltd., et.al. vs. Asuncion, et.al., G.R. Nos 79937-38, February 13, 1989 – modified Manchester
ruling as follows: 1) when the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court
may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but not beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period;
(2) the same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings; and (3) when the trial court
acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but,
subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleadings, or if specified the same has been left for
determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment which shall be enforced
and the additional fee assessed and collected by the clerk of court.

Rule2:CauseofAction
Sec. 1-2

Joseph vs. Bautista, et. al., L-41423, Feb. 23, 1989 – A single act or omission can be violative of various rights at the
same time but where there is only one delict or wrong, there is but a single cause of action regardless of the number of
rights violated belonging to one person.

The singleness of a cause of action lies in the singleness of the delict or wrong violating the rights of one person.

TAXPAYER’S SUIT

PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC. VS. ROXAS, G.R. NO. 125509 (2007)

In a taxpayer’s suit, the suing party must prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure
of money raised by taxation. He must also establish that he has or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement.

Thus a taxpayer has been allowed to sue as such where there is: a) a claim that public funds are illegally
disbursed, b) public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or c) that public funds are wasted through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.

SEC. 4.

Splitting a cause of action – the act of dividing a single cause of action, claim or demand into two or more parts, and
bringing suit for one of such parts only, intending to reserve the rest for another purpose of action.

Remedy of Defendant: Motion to Dismiss under Rule 16 – there is another action pending between the same parties for
the same cause of action or litis pendentia; or if the first action has already been terminated on the ground of res
judicata;

Examples:

Larena vs. Villanueva, 53 Phil. 923 – where contract is to be performed by installments, each failure to pay an
installment constitutes one cause of action, however, if several installments are already due, all must be included in a
single cause of action, otherwise those included will be barred
Blossom & Co. vs. Manila Gas Corporation, 55 Phil. 226 – even if contract is divisible in performance, if obligor already
manifested refusal to comply with future periodic obligations, “the contract is entire and the breach total”, there should only
be one action for damages

SEC. 5.

Joinder of causes of action shall comply with rule on joinder of parties (sec. 6 rule 3)- right of relief from causes of action
should arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions, and a question of law and fact common to all the parties
or defendants may arise in the action

Rule3
Parties to Civil Action

SECTION 1.

Who are juridical persons?

- Art. 44 Civil Code of the Phils.

1. The State and its political subdivisions;

2. Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law; their personality
begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law; and
3. Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law grants a
personality, separate and distict from that of each shareholder, partner or member.

Includes estate of a person, political party (Corporation Code), Registered labor union with respect to its property,
and Roman Catholic Church

Chiang Kai Shek School vs. CA, et. al., G.R. No. 580028, April 18, 1989 – educational institution failed to
incorporate under Corporation Code but contracted with its teacher for 32 years with the representation that it was
possessed of juridical personality, is now estopped from denying such personality

SEC. 2.

LOCUS STANDI- a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of a challenged act.

DAVID VS. PGMA, 489 SCRA 160 (2006)Is the petitioner has locus standi?

Held: Yes, he has, because a suit is in the nature of a citizen’s suit.

The petitioner succeeded in satisfying the following requisites for a citizen’s suit:

a) The issue raised is either a constitutional one or a violation of a public right; and

b) He suffers injury in the enforcement of the questioned decree or presidential administrative order.

If the suit is not brought in the name of or against the real party in interest, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground
that the complaint states no cause of action (sec. 1 (g), Rule 16)

KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION VS. ERMITA, 526 SCRA 353, July 3, 2007

The SC ruled that since Kilosbayan is a people’s organization with a civic purpose and is raising an issue of a far-reaching
constitutional importance, such suit qualifies as a citizen’s suit and therefore, the question of locus standi was rejected.

SEC. 3. Representatives as parties.

Parties in interest are classified as follows:

1. indispensable parties – without whom no final determination can be had of an action

2. necessary parties – those not indispensable but ought to be parties if complete relief is to be accorded as to those
already parties, or for a complete determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action (Sec. 8)
3. representative parties (under this section)
4. pro-forma parties – those required to be joined as co-parties in suits
5. quasi-parties- those in whose behalf a class or representative suit is brought

SEC. 5.

Suit can be brought by or against the incompetent personally but with the assistance of his parents or his guardian. It is
sufficient that his incompetence be alleged in the corresponding pleadings and the trial court may pass upon the truth and
effects thereof (Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium)

SEC. 6.

Joinder of indispensable and necessary parties is compulsory

Permissive joinder of parties requires that:

a) The right to relief arises out of the same transaction or series of transaction

b) There is a question of law or fact common to all the plaintiffs or defendants; and

c) Such joinder is not otherwise proscribed by the provisions of the Rules on jurisdiction and venue

Series of transactions – separate dealings with the parties but all of which dealings are directly connected with the same
type of subject matter of the suit.

SEC. 8.

Action cannot proceed unless INDISPENSABLE PARTIES are joined

Action can proceed in the absence of NECESSARY PARTIES.

If an indispensable party is not impleaded, any judgment would have no effectiveness; whereas, even if a
necessary party is not included in the suit, the case may be finally determined in court, but the judgment therein will not
resolve the whole controversy.

Indispensable parties are those with such an interest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their
rights, so that the court cannot proceed without their presence.

Necessary parties are those whose presence is necessary to adjudicate the whole controversy but whose interests are so
far separable that a final decree can be made in their absence without affecting them (Wyoga Gas & Oil Corp. vs.
Schrack, 1 Fed. Rules Service, 292 cited in I Moran 191, 1979 Ed.)

Seno, et. al. vs. Mangubat, et. al., L-44339, December 2, 1987 Defendants sold their interests in the land subject of the
suit to their co-defendant even before the filing of the action. Dismissal against the former, who are only necessary parties
to the suit, will not bar the action from proceeding against the latter as the remaining defendant.

SEC. 9.

Court shall order inclusion of necessary party

Plaintiff shall be ordered to file an AMENDED COMPLAINT impleading the necessary party as a co-defendant

Non-inclusion of necessary party may be excused on meritorious grounds; absent which, the court shall order him to be
impleaded if jurisdiction over his person can be obtained.
Non-inclusion for unjustified cause – waiver of claim against such party

Non-inclusion for valid reasons, action may proceed but the judgment therein shall not prejudice the rights of that
necessary party.

SEC. 11.

Objection to misjoinder cannot be raised for the first time on appeal (Garcia vs. Chua 50 O.G. No. 2 653)

If the case is erroneously dismissed for failure to include necessary party without stating that it is without prejudice, and
plaintiff did not appeal, such dismissal bars the filing of another action on the same cause (Rivera vs. Luciano, L-20844,
August 14, 1965)

SEC. 12. Class suit.— When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons
so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them which the court finds to be sufficiently
numerous and representative as to fully protect the interests of all concerned may sue or defend for the benefit of all. Any
party in interest shall have the right to intervene to protect his individual interest. (12a)

Requisites of a Class Suit:

1. The subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons;

2. The parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the court; and

3. The parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and can fully protect the
interests of all concerned.

If there is a conflict of interest between those sought to be represented and those who filed the action, the class suit will
not prosper (Ibañez vs. Roman Catholic Church, 12 Phil. 227).

The parties who brought the class suit have control over the case with the right to compromise or even discontinue the
same. But a class suit cannot be compromised or dismissed without the approval of the court (Sec. 2 Rule 17).

SEC. 15.

In the answer of such defendant, the names and addresses of the persons composing said entity must all be
revealed. (15a)

SEC 16. Death of party; duty of counsel

DUTY OF COUNSEL TO INFORM-

LIMITED TO FACT OF DEATH –

Because death will require:

- Substitution by a legal representative by the court; OR

- Appointment of an executor or administrator by the probate court (IN THE ABSENCE OF A LEGAL
REPRESENTATIVE)

INCAPACITY OR INCOMPETENCY merely entails APPOINTMENT OF A GUARDIAN AD LITEM BY THE COURT

PROCEDURE APPLIES WHERE THE CLAIM SURVIVES (WHETHER CASE IS IN THE COURT OF ORIGIN OR
APPELLATE COURT; WHETHER IT IS PLAINTIFF OR DEFENDANT WHO IS DEAD)

ACTIONS THAT SURVIVE ARE:

a) ACTIONS TO RECOVER REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY AGAINST THE ESTATE;

 b) ACTIONS TO ENFORCE LIENS THEREON;

c) ACTIONS TO RECOVER FOR AN INJURY TO PERSON OR PROPERTY BY REASON OF TORT OR DELICT

COMMITTED BY THE DECEASED (Board of Liquidators, etc. vs. Heirs of Maximo M. Kalaw, et. al., L-18805,
August 14, 1967)

NO SUMMONS ARE REQUIRED TO BE SERVED ON THE SUBSTITUTE DEFENDANTS. INSTEAD, THE ORDER OF
SUBSTITUTION SHALL BE SERVED UPON THE PARTIES SUBSTITUTED IN THE ACTION, OTHERWISE THE
COURT DOES NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBSTITUTE PARTY (Ferreria et. al. vs. Vida de
Gonzales, et. al., 104 Phil. 143)

PROCEEDINGS CONDUCTED BY THE TRIAL COURT AFTER THE DEATH OF THE DEFENDANT, AND WITHOUT
SUCH SUBSTITUTION, ARE NULL AND VOID (Lawas vs. CA, et. al., L-45809, December 12, 1986)

UPON LEARNING OF THE DEATH OF A PARTY, THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NOT ORDER THE AMENDMENT OF
THE COMPLAINT BUT THE APPEARANCE OF THE DECEDENT’S LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE. AN ORDER FOR THE
AMENDMENT OF THE COMPLAINT BEFORE SUBSITUTION OF THE DECEASED PARTY IS VOID (Casenas vs.
Rosales, L-18707, February 28, 1967).

The rule is that in the substitution of the deceased, priority is given to his legal representative ,i.e. the executor or
administrator or when the estate was extrajudicially settled (Lawas vs. CA, et. al., supra)

Failure to comply with this section is a ground for DISCIPLINARY ACTION

FERRERIA VS. VDA. DE GONZALES,ET. AL. 104 PHIL. 143- If a party dies but the action for his death survives, and no
order of substitution was issued or effected by the court, the trial held by said court was null and void since it did not
acquire jurisdiction over the legal representative or heirs of the deceased hence the judgment was not binding on them.

FLORENDO ET. AL. VS. COLOMA,E T. AL., GR NO. 60544, MAY 19, 1984- Procedural lapse was disregarded in the
interest of substantial justice because defendant died while the case was pending on appeal in the CA and consequently,
involved only a review of the evidence presented; and Rule 39 provides that the successors-in-interest of a deceased
litigant are bound by a judgment in an ejectment case.

Napere vs. Barburona, G.R.No. 160426, Jan. 31, 2008

(1) Accion publiciana, quieting of title and damages survive the death of the defendant

(2) Substitution of parties in case of the death of the party in one action that survives is not a matter of jurisdiction but
of due process of law

(3) The failure of the court to issue an order for substitution of parties does not affect the validity and regularity of the
subsequent proceeding if the heirs of the deceased party participated thereon and were duly represented by
counsel (Rewera Filipina, Inc. vs. CA, 430 Phil. 8 (2002); Benavidez vs. CA, 372 Phil. 615 (1999).

SEC. 20. Action on contractual money claims

DISPOSITION OF CONTRACTUAL MONEY CLAIMS WHERE THE DEFENDANT DIES BEFORE THE TERMINATION
OF THE ACTION

Old procedure:

If defendant dies “before final judgment in the CFI”: Action should be dismissed without prejudice

Plaintiff will present instead his claim in the CFI as a money claim in the settlement of the estate of the deceased
defendant in accordance with and as required by Sec. 5, Rule 86.

If defendant died while the case is on appeal from the judgment of the RTC, the appeal will continue with the deceased
being substituted by his heirs or other legal representative
In case of death before final judgment in the RTC,

Present Procedure:

If the defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court where it was pending, ACTION SHALL NOT BE
DISMISSED;

- Action shall continue until entry of final judgment – in the RTC or in the appellate court

- The money claim, having been based on a FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENT CAN NO LONGER BE
REVIEWED as it now becomes conclusive upon the parties thereto

CONRACT “EXPRESS OR IMPLIED”

In Leung Ben vs. O’Brien, et. al. (38 Phil. 182) contracts “express or implied” (as in rule 57) include purely personal
obligations which are not based on a delict or tort, that is, a quasi-delict

NOW, implied contracts (in this section and in sec. 5 Rule 86) may properly include “quasi-contracts” as this is the term
now used in sec. 1(a) Rule 57

SEC. 21. Indigent party.—

INDIGENT PARTY

Suit in forma pauperis – pauper litigant is not really a pauper but “has no property or income sufficient for his support
aside from his labor, even if he is self-supporting when able to work and in employment

RULE 4: VENUE OF ACTIONS

SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions.—

Real action vs. Personal action

Refer to Russel and Fortune Motors for the distinction

The residence referred to is the place where the party actually resides at the time the action is instituted (Dela Rosas vs.
Bora 53 Phil. 998), not his permanent home or domicile (Koh vs. CA, et.al., L-40428, Dec. 17, 1975

“In procedural law, however, specifically for purposes of venue it has been held that the residence of a person is his
personal, actual or physical habitation or his actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal
residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. It signifies physical presence in a place
and actual stay thereat. x x x No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be
more than temporary” (Italics supplied),” (Boleyley vs. Villanueva, et.al., G.R. No. 128734, September 14, 1999 SC E-
library)

SEC. 3. Venue of actions against nonresidents

WHERE THE DEFENDANT IS A NONRESIDENT AND IS NOT FOUND IN THE PHILIPPINES CIVIL ACTIONS ARE
PROPER ONLY WHEN:

a) ACTION AFFECTS THE PERSONAL STATUS OF THE PLAINTIFF; OR

b) PROPERTY OF THE DEFENDANT;

EXCEPTION: Art. 360. The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this
chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance of the province or city where the libelous
article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of
the offense: Provided however that where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is the city of Manila
at the time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or
of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such public officer does not hold
office in the city of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office
at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published and in case one of
the offended parties is a private individual, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city
where he actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense where the libelous matter is printed or first
published; Provided, further, That the civil action shall be filed in the same court where the criminal action is filed and vice
versa; Provided furthermore, That the court where the criminal action or civil action for damages is first filed, shall acquire
jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts: xxx

SEC. 4. When Rule not applicable.—

Sweet Lines vs. Teves, et. al., L-37750, May 19, 1978 In contracts of adhesion, such as those involving passage
tickets, a condition printed at back thereof to the effect that all actions arising out of a contract of carriage should be filed
only in a particular province or city, to the exclusion of all others, is void and unenforceable, considering the present state
of the interisland shipping industry.

A stipulation as to the venue of a prospective action does not preclude the filing of the suit in the residence of the plaintiff
or that of the defendant under sec. 2 of this Rule, in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words in the agreement that
would indicate that the venue cannot be any place other than that agreed upon by the parties (Polytrade Corp. vs.
Blanco, L-27033, Oct. 31, 1969), especially where the venue stipulation was imposed by the plaintiff for its own benefit
and convenience (Eastern Assurance and Surety Corporation vs. Cui, et.al. infra)

Actions involving domestic corporations – location of the principal place of business

PILTEL VS. TECSON, May 7, 2004

Section 4, Rule 4, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure[1][2] allows the parties to agree and stipulate in writing, before
the filing of an action, on the exclusive venue of any litigation between them. Such an agreement would be valid and
binding provided that the stipulation on the chosen venue is exclusive in nature or in intent, that it is expressed in writing
by the parties thereto, and that it is entered into before the filing of the suit. A contract of adhesion is not per se
inefficacious. The rule instead is that, should there be ambiguities in a contract of adhesion, such ambiguities are to be
construed against the party that prepared it. If, however, the stipulations are not obscure, but are clear and leave no
doubt on the intention of the parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations must be held controlling.

UNIMASTERS VS. CA, G.R.NO. 119657 FEB. 7, 1997

Polytrade Corporation v. Blanco, decided in 1969.In this case, the venue stipulation was as follows:

"The parties agree to sue and be sued in the Courts of Manila."

This Court ruled that such a provision "does not preclude the filing of suits in the residence of the plaintiff or the defendant.
The plain meaning is that the parties merely consented to be sued in Manila. Qualifying or restrictive words which would
indicate that Manila and Manila alone is the venue are totally absent therefrom. It simply is permissive. The parties solely
agreed to add the courts of Manila as tribunals to which they may resort. They did not waive their right to pursue remedy
in the courts specifically mentioned in Section 2(b) of Rule 4."

Unless the parties make very clear, by employing categorical and suitably limiting language, that they wish the venue of
actions between them to be laid only and exclusively at a definite place, and to disregard the prescriptions of Rule 4,
agreements on venue are not to be regarded as mandatory or restrictive, but merely permissive, or complementary of said
rule. The fact that in their agreement the parties specify only one of the venues mentioned in Rule 4, or fix a place for
their actions different from those specified by said rule, does not, without more, suffice to characterize the agreement as a
restrictive one.

The record of the case at bar discloses that UNIMASTERS has its principal place of business in Tacloban
City, and KUBOTA, in Quezon City. Under Rule 4, the venue of any personal action between them is "where the
defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the
election of the plaintiff."[1][33] In other words, Rule 4 gives UNIMASTERS the option to sue KUBOTA for breach of
contract in the Regional Trial Court of either Tacloban City or Quezon City.

But the contract between them provides that " ** All suits arising out of this Agreement shall be filed with/in the proper
Courts of Quezon City," without mention of Tacloban City. The question is whether this stipulation had the effect of
effectively eliminating the latter as an optional venue and limiting litigation between UNIMASTERS and KUBOTA only and
exclusively to Quezon City.

In light of all the cases above surveyed, and the general postulates distilled therefrom, the question
should receive a negative answer. Absent additional words and expressions definitely and unmistakably denoting the
parties' desire and intention that actions between them should be ventilated only at the place selected by them, Quezon
City -- or other contractual provisions clearly evincing the same desire and intention -- the stipulation should be construed,
not as confining suits between the parties only to that one place, Quezon City, but as allowing suits either in Quezon City
or Tacloban City, at the option of the plaintiff (UNIMASTERS in this case).

RULE 5: UNIFORM PROCEDURE IN TRIAL COURTS

PROCEDURE IN REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS

RULE 6: KINDS OF PLEADINGS

DEFINITIONS:

1. Pleadings are the written statements of the respective claims and defenses of the parties submitted to the court
for appropriate judgment.
2. Complaint is the pleading alleging the plaintiff’s cause(s) of action.
3. Answer is a pleading which a defending party set forth his defenses.
4. Defenses:
a. Negative- the specific denial of the material fact(s) alleged in the pleading of the claimant essential to his
cause(s) of action.
b. Affirmative- an allegation of a new matter which, while hypothetically admitting the material allegations in
the pleading of the claimant, would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery from him.
*A general denial will be deemed an admission of the averments in the complaint.
*Rule 8 sec. 10. Specific denial. – The defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the truth of which
he does not admit and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters upon which he relies to
support his denial. Where a defendant desires to deny only a part of an averment, he shall specify so much of it
as is true and material and shall deny only the remainder. Where a defendant is without knowledge or information
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment made in the complaint, he shall so state, and this
shall have the effect of a denial.
5. Counterclaim- any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing party.
6. Compulsory counterclaim (recoupment)- arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence
constituting the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence
of 3rd parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
7. Cross-claim- a claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein.
8. Reply- a pleading, the function of which is to deny, or alleged facts in denial or avoidance of new matters alleged
by way of defense in the answer and thereby join or make issue as to such new matters. If a party does not file
such reply, all the new matters alleged in the answer are deemed controverted.
9. 3rd (4th, etc.)-party complaint- a claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a
party to the action, called the 3 rd (4th, etc)-party defendant for contribution, indemnity, subrogation, or any other
relief, in respect of his opponent’s claim.

Sec. 6-7
Compulsory Counterclaim – known also as a “recoupment”; one which:

a) Arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the
opposing party’s claim;

b) It does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction;
and

c) Subject to the qualification on the jurisdictional amount with regard to counterclaims raised in the Regional Trial
Courts, the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim.

Permissive Counterclaim – does not arise out of nor is necessarily connected with the subject matter of the opposing
party’s claim. It is not barred even if not set up in the action. This is also known as a ‘set-off”

Sec. 8

CROSS-CLAIM

- if not set up, the action is barred (compulsory cross- claim), except when it is outside the jurisdiction of the court or if the
court cannot acquire jurisdiction over third parties whose presence is necessary for the adjudication of said cross-claim
(permissive cross-claim)

Dismissal of the complaint carries with it the dismissal of a cross-claim which is purely defensive but not a cross- claim
seeking affirmative relief (Torres,et. al. vs. CA, et. al., L-25889, January 12, 1973)

Sec. 9

INSTANCES WHEN REPLY is COMPULSORY:

a) Where the answer alleges the defense of usury in which case a reply under oath is required, otherwise the
allegations of usury are deemed admitted (Rule 8 sec. 11); and

b) Where the answer is based on an actionable document in which case a verified reply is necessary, otherwise the
genuineness and due execution of said actionable document are generally deemed admitted (sec. 8 Rule 8)

LIM LAW VS. OLYMPIC SAWMILL, ET. AL. (L-30771, May 26, 1984) it was held that pursuant to sec. 9 of the usury
law, the first above cited instance requiring denial of allegations of usury under oath does not apply to a case where it is
the defendant, not the plaintiff, who is alleging usury IN HIS ANSWER.

SINCE PRESENT RULE SPECIFICALLY REQUIRES DENIAL UNDER OATH plaintiff need not file reply to such an
allegation

But if allegation is in a COUNTERCLAIM, there is a need to reply

IF CASE IS SUBMITTED ON THE PLEADINGS –

failure of the party to make a reply does not mean that he is deemed to have controverted the issues raised in the
answer; this is an exception to the rule (Falcasantos vs. How Suy Ching, 91 Phil. 456)

IN A REPLY – party cannot amend his cause of action (Calvo vs. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445);

nor introduce therein new or additional causes of action (Anaya vs. Palaroan, L-27930, Nov. 26, 1970)

Sec. 11

THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT

- Similar to cross claim; seeks to recover from another person some relief in respect to the opposing party’s claim;
 - Differs from cross-claim as third party is already impleaded in the action;

SUMMONS will have to be served on the third party defendant

TESTS TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT IS IN RESPECT OF PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM ARE:

1) Where it arises out of the same transaction on which the plaintiff’s claim is based; or whether the third party claim,
although out of another or different contract or transaction is connected with the plaintiff’s claim;

2) Whether the third party defendant would be liable to the plaintiff or to the defendant for all or part of the plaintiff’s
claim against the original defendant, although the third party defendant’s liability arises out of another transaction;
and

3) Whether the third party defendant may assert any defenses which the third party plaintiff has or may have to the
plaintiff’s claim (Capayas vs. CFI of Albay, et. al. 77 Phil. 81)

WHERE TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE MAIN CASE, IT ALSO HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE
THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT REGARDLESS OF THE AMOUNT INVOLVED AS THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT IS
MERELY AUXILIARY TO AND IS A CONTINUATION OF THE MAIN ACTION (Republic vs. Central Surety & insurance
Co, et. al., L-27802, Oct. 26, 1968; Eastern Assurance & Surety Corp. vs. Cui, et. al., G.R. No. 54452, July 20, 1981)

RULE 7: PARTS OF A PLEADING

Sec. 1

It is not the caption of the pleading but the allegations therein that determine the nature of the action, and the court shall
grant the relief warranted by the allegations and the proof even if no such relief is prayed for (Ras vs. Sua, L-23302, Sept.
25, 1968)

Caption in CRIMINAL CASES should state the designation of the offense or the section or subsection of the statute
punishing it

Sec. 2

The question of jurisdiction depends largely upon the determination of the true nature of the action filed by a party which,
in turn, involves the consideration of the ultimate facts alleged as constitutive of the cause of action therein (Bautista vs.
Fernandez, L-24062, April 30, 1971). The prayer for relief, although part of the complaint cannot create a cause of action,
hence it cannot be considered as a part of the allegations on the nature of the cause of action (Rosales vs. Reyes, 25
Phil. 495; Cabigao vs. Lim, 50 Phil. 844).

Sec. 3

NO SUBSTITUTION OF ATTORNEYS WILL BE ALLOWED UNLESS:

a) there is a written request for such substitution;

b) filed with the written consent of the client, and

c) with the written consent of the attorney to be substituted, or with proof of service of notice of said motion to the
attorney to be substituted. Unless these are complied with, no substitution will be permitted and the attorney who
last appeared in the case before such application will be responsible for the conduct of the case

COUNSEL should state his address in his pleading (P.O. Box is not allowed); should notify court of any change in his
address (otherwise, he may be charged for indirect contempt)
Counsels are now required to indicate in all pleadings in the courts, the counsel’s MCLE Certificate of Compliance or
Certificate of Exemption; otherwise, the complaint filed shall be dismissed and for subsequent pleadings, expunged from
the record.

Sec. 4

VERIFICATION must be based on PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE AND AUTHENTIC RECORDS

NOT MERELY ON KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF; DEFINITELY NOT ON MERE BELIEF

May be made by the PARTY, HIS REPRESENTATIVE, LAWYER OR ANY PERSON WHO PERSONALLY
KNOWS THE TRUTH OF THE FACTS ALLEGED IN THE PLEADING.

Where a Petition for Mandamus was verified by counsel to be true “to the best of (his) knowledge, information and
belief,” it was held to be sufficient in view of the sanctions respecting attorneys in sec. 5 (now, sec.3) of this Rule
(Guerra Enterprises, Co., Inc. vs. CFI of Lanao del Sur, et. a., L-28310, April 17, 1970)

In contrast, a CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING must be made by the PARTY HIMSELF and not by his
lawyer (Santos, et. al., vs. CA, et. al., G.R. No. 141947, July 3, 2001)

PLEADINGS which need TO BE VERIFIED:

a) Relief from Judgment

b) Review from the RTC to CA

c) Review from the CTA and quasi-judicial agencies to CA

d) Certiorari from CA to the SC

e) Annulment of Judgments, etc.

f) Injunction

g) Receivership

h) Support Pendente Lite

i) Certiorari against Judgments,etc. of Constitutional Commissions

j) Certiorari (65)

k) Prohibition

l) Mandamus

m) Quo Warranto

n) Expropriation

o) Forcible Entry or Unlawful Detainer

p) Indirect Contempt

q) Appointment of a General Guardian

r) Leave to Sell or Encumber property of an estate by a guardian

s) Declaration of competency of a ward

t) Habeas Corpus
 u) Change of Name

v) Voluntary Judicial Dissolution of a Corporation

w) Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry

Need TO BE UNDER OATH:

a) Denial of the genuineness and due execution of an actionable document

b) Denial of allegations of usury

c) Motion to set aside a Default Order

d) Answer to Written Interrogatories

e) Answer to Request for admission

Need TO HAVE AFFIDAVITS OR AFFIDAVITS OF MERITS:

a) Motion to postpone for absence of evidence

b) Motion to postpone for illness of a party or counsel

c) Motion for summary judgment or opposition thereto

d) Motion for New Trial on FAME or opposition thereto

e) Relief from Judgment or Order

f) Third-party claim

g) Proof required of a Redemptioner

h) Motion for Preliminary Attachment

i) Motion for Dissolution of Preliminary Injunction

j) Application for a Writ of Replevin

k) Claim against the estate of a decedent (Sec. 9, Rule 86); and

l) Motion for New Trial on Newly Discovered Evidence

VERIFICATION is a formal, NOT A JURISDICTIONAL requisite (Buenaventura vs. Uy, et. al., L-28156, March 31, 1987)

Court may give due course to a pleading even if VERIFICATION is lacking, insufficient or defective if circumstances
warrant in the interest of justice

Summary procedure pleadings are all required to be verified

Sec. 5

There is forum shopping when a party seeks a favorable opinion in another forum through means other than appeal or
certiorari by raising identical causes of action, subject matter and issues. Forum shopping exists when two or more
actions involve the same transactions, essential facts and circumstances, and raise identical causes of action, subject
matter and issues.

Forum shopping may be committed in three ways:

a) Elements of litis pendentia are present

 b) Elements of res judicata are present

c) Splitting a single cause of action

Requisites of Forum Shopping

a) Identity of parties

b) Identity of rights or causes of action

c) Identity of reliefs sought (BUAN VS. LOPEZ, JR. 145 SCRA 34)

NOTES: If plaintiff shares a common interest (like co-owners; conjugal partners) and raises a common cause of action;
one of them signing the certificate on non-forum shopping is enough. (Olarte vs. Office of the President, G.R. No. 165821,
(2005)

Where there are several petitioners, it is not sufficient that only one of them executes the certification, absent a showing
that he was so authorized by others. That certification requires personal knowledge and it cannot be presumed that the
signatory knew that his co-petitioners had the same or similar actions filed or pending (Loquias, et. al. vs. Office of the
Ombudsman, et. al., G.R. No. 139396)

REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORP. VS. CHINESE YOUNG MEN’S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION

While an unlawful detainer was pending in a municipal court, the lessee filed against the lessor in the RTC an
action for consignation of the rentals in arrears of the same subject land. The SC ruled that there is no forum shopping
because the issues are different in 2 cases. The issue in the lawful detainer case is whether the defendant was unlawfully
withholding the leased premises from the lessor, while the issue in the consignation case is whether plaintiff unlawfully
refuses to accept payment of the rentals.

CERTIFICATE AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING: CASES

GO VS. RECO, 488 SCRA 137 (2006)- A belatedly filed certificate of non-forum shopping (filed after filing the petition)
does not cure the defect.

VALDECANTOS VS. PEOPLE, 503 SCRA 474 (2006)- The submission of a certificate against forum shopping is
obligatory, but not jurisdictional. Consequently, as in this case, when the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and
attached thereto is the certificate against forum shopping, there is substantial compliance.

With respect to the contents of the certification, rule of substantial compliance may be availed of (Gabionza vs. CA, et. al.,
G.R. No. 112547, July 18, 1994)

This requirement is intended to apply to both natural and juridical persons. Where the petitioner is a corporation, the
certification against forum shopping should be signed by its duly authorized director or representative. The same is true
with respect to any juridical entity since it has of necessity the proper officer to represent it in its other transactions (Digital
Microwave Corp. vs. Ca, et. al., G.R. No. 128550)

PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC. VS. ROXAS, SUPRA- The failure of the petitioner to inform the court of the filing of a
similar action during the pendency of the case no matter who initiated it is a violation of the required certificate against
forum shopping.

Elinel Caña vs. Evangelical Free Church of the Philippines, G.R. No. 157573, Feb. 11, 2008

A petition for review filed in the CA was not accompanied by the basic pleadings in the lower court as required by
sec. 2 (d), Rule 42. The certificate of non-forum shopping was signed by the lawyer of the plaintiff corporation without
proper authority. The CA issued a resolution dismissing the petition and in a motion for reconsideration, the plaintiff
submitted the board resolution authorizing its counsel to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping and also attached
thereto the required documents.
 SC ruled that there was substantial compliance specifically so because of the merit of the case.

In National Steel Corp. vs. CA, 388 SCRA 85 (2002) and Vicar International Construction, Inc. vs. FEB Leasing and
Finance Corp., 456 SCRA 588 (2005), the SC ruled that Circular No. 28-01, which required the attachment of a
certificate of non-forum shopping is to be strictly complied with. It however allows a “specially authorized counsel of the
corporation who has personal knowledge of the matters required in the circular to sign the affidavit of non-forum shopping.

Cagayan Valley Drug Corp. vs. Com. IR,G.R. No 151413, February 13, 2008

Corporate officers who can sign the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping without Board Resolution are:

a) Chairman of the Board of Directors

b) President of Corporation

c) General Manager or Acting General Manager

d) Personnel Officer

e) Employment Specialist in Labor cases

RULE 8: MANNER OF MAKING ALLEGATIONS IN PLEADING

Sec. 1

Ultimate facts – important and substantial facts which either directly form the basis of the plaintiff’s primary right and duty
or directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant (Alzua vs. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308)

Evidentiary facts– those which are necessary to prove the ultimate fact or which furnish evidence of the existence of some
other facts.

Sec. 4

Where the plaintiffs are foreign corporations, the specific circumstance that they are duly licensed to do business in the
Philippines, or that the transaction sued upon is singular and isolated, is an essential part of the element of plaintiff’s
capacity to sue and must be affirmatively pleaded as required by sec. 4 of this Rule (Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co. vs.
Cebu Stevedoring Co., Inc. L-18961, Aug. 31, 1966)

Sec. 7-8

Actionable documents vs. Evidentiary documents

*2 permissible ways of pleading an actionable document:

a) By setting forth the substance of such document in the pleading and attaching the document thereto as an annex,
or

b) By setting forth such document verbatim in the pleading

IF NOT PLEADED IN THE FOREGOING MANNERS, RULE ON IMPLIED ADMISSION (SEC. 8) WILL NOT APPLY

If properly alleged:

FAILURE TO DENY THE SAME RESULTS IN THE ADMISSION OF THE “GENUINENESS AND DUE EXECUTION” OF
SAID DOCUMENT,

EXCEPT:
 a) When the adverse party was not a party of the instrument, and

b) When an order for the inspection of the document was not complied with (Rule 27)

*Genuineness – the document is not spurious, counterfeit or of different import on its face from the one executed by the
party (Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 208), or that the party whose signature it bears has signed it and that at the time it
was signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleadings (Hibberd vs. Rhode, 32 Phil. 476)

*Due Execution – document was signed voluntarily and knowingly by the party whose signature appears thereon, that if
signed by somebody else such representative had the authority to do so, that it was duly delivered, and that the
formalities were complied with (Hibberd vs. Rhode, supra; Ramirez vs. Orientalist Co., et.al. 38 Phil. 634)

Failure to deny the genuineness and due execution of the document does not estop a party from controverting it by
evidence of fraud, mistake, compromise, payment, statute of limitations, estoppel and want of consideration (I Martin 301,
citing Hibberd vs. Rhode, supra and Bough vs. Cantiveros, supra).

*Even where the opposing party failed to deny under oath the authenticity and due execution of an actionable document,
he can still raise the defense in his Answer and prove at the trial that there is a mistake or imperfection in the writing, or
that it does not express the true agreement of the parties, or that the agreement is invalid or that there is an intrinsic
ambiguity in the writing, as these exceptions to the parol evidence rule are not cut off by, since they are not inconsistent
with, the implied admission of the authenticity and due execution of the instrument. (Regalado)

Toribio, et. al. vs. Bidin, et.al., G.R. No. 57821, Jan. 17, 1985)

Action for recovery of a parcel of land; defendants alleged that plaintiffs executed deeds of sale in favor of their
brother who in turn executed a deed of sale in their favor. Plaintiffs failed to file a reply under oath specifically denying the
actionable documents. Plaintiffs are deemed to have impliedly admitted the documents.

However, it was held that implied admission was not applicable to the other plaintiffs who are the heirs of one of
the deceased original vendors for they were not parties to the documents; and in their verified complaint, the plaintiffs
alleged that they never sold their hereditary shares, consequently, the defendants were aware that genuineness and due
execution of said deeds of sale would still have to be established. ACCORDINGLY, the SUPREME COURT RELIEVED
THE PLAINTIFFS OF THE EFFECTS OF THEIR IMPLIED ADMISSION IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE.

Sec. 9-10

2 ways of making specific denial:

a) By specifically denying the averment and, whenever possible, setting forth the substance of the matters relied
upon for such denial; and

b) By an allegation of lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the averment in the
opposing party’s pleading

NEGATIVE PREGNANT- that form of denial which at the same time involves and affirmative implication favorable to the
opposing party. Such a “negative pregnant” is in effect an admission of the averment to which it is directed (I Martin 306).
It is said to be a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to.

Sec. 11

AVERMENTS NOT DEEMED ADMITTED EVEN IF NOT SPECIFICALLY DENIED:

a) Allegations as to the amount of damages,

b) Allegations which are immaterial to the cause of action (Worcester vs. Lorenzana, 104 Phil. 134), which includes
conclusions of fact and law, inferences, etc.; and
 c) All allegations in the complaint where no answer has been filed by the defendant (Lopez vs. Mendezona, 11 Phil.
209; Worcester vs. Lorenzana, supra)

AVERMENTS DEEMED ADMITTED EVEN IF SPECIFICALLY DENIED BUT NOT UNDER OATH:

a) Allegations as to usury, and

b) Authenticity and due execution of actionable documents properly pleaded where the opposing party was a party
thereto.

Where the defendant relied solely on his defense of res judicata and submitted the case for decision on that issue, he is
deemed to have admitted all the material allegations in the complaint and judgment can be rendered accordingly
(Dominguez vs. Filipinas Integrated Services Corp. et. al., G.R. No. 58820, Sept. 30, 1982).

RULE 9: EFFECT OF FAILURE TO PLEAD

Sec. 1

OMNIBUS MOTION RULE (Rule 15 sec. 8) states:

“A motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment, or proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all
objections not so included shall be deemed waived.”

Rule 9 section 1 enumerates the exception.

The following defenses are not waived even if not raised in a motion to dismiss or in the answer:

a) Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter;

b) Litis pendentia;

c) Res judicata;

d) Prescription of the action

Sec. 2

Where, in a first action against him, the compulsory counterclaim of defendant was dismissed for non-payment of docket
fee, such dismissal is not a bar to his filing of the same counterclaim in a subsequent action instituted by the plaintiff
involving the same subject matter. This does not constitute res judicata as it was not a determination on the merits of the
counterclaim.

Sec. 3

DEFAULT- the failure of the defending party to file an answer within a period set forth by the court

Order of Default vs. Judgment of Default

*The court cannot motu proprio declare a defendant in default (Trajano, et. al. vs. Cruz, et. al., L-47070, December 29,
1977)

*There must be a motion to that effect by the plaintiff with proof of failure by the defendant to file his responsive pleading
despite due notice (Sarmiento vs. Juan, G.R. No. 56605, Jan. 28, 1983)

Remedies of a PARTY PROPERLY DECLARED IN DEFAULT

(1) Verified Motion to Set Aside the Order of Default any time after discovery thereof and before judgment, provided
that his failure to answer was due to FAME.
 (2) Motion for New Trial any time after service of judgment by default and within 15 days therefrom;

(3) Appeal

(4) Petition for Relief from Judgment within 60 days from notice of the judgment but within 6 months from entry
thereof

Remedies of a PARTY IMPROPERLY DECLARED IN DEFAULT:

(1) Certiorari without waiting for the default judgment;

(2) Certiorari on the Order and the Judgment by Default (not on the merits of the Judgment)

(3) No declaration in default in: Annulment of Marriage, Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Legal Separation

DOCTRINAL PRONOUNCEMENTS

- A declaration of default cannot be made ex-parte

- Even if an answer is filed beyond the reglementary period, the court cannot declare the defendant in default if he
filed his answer before a declaration of default.

RULE 10: AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS

Sec. 2 Even after a motion to dismiss has been filed by defendant or such motion has been
submitted for decision, the plaintiff can still amend his complaint as a matter of right, since a motion to dismiss is not a
responsive pleading within this rule.

Sec.3-4

Amendments are not proper and should be denied:

 Where the court has no jurisdiction over the original complaint and the purpose of the amendment is to confer
jurisdiction on the court by eliminating the objectionable portion;
 If it would result in delay;
 If it would result in a change of the cause of action or defense or change the theory of the case or are inconsistent
with the allegations in the original complaint unless justice and equity warrant such amendment which would
negate defendant’s liability, or will not result in substantial injury to the adverse party; and
 If the plaintiff had no cause of action at the filing of the original complaint and the purpose of the amendment is to
introduce a subsequently accrued cause of action.

Sec. 5

This is an instance wherein the court acquires jurisdiction over the issues even if the same are not alleged in the original
pleadings of the parties, i.e. where the trial of said issues is with the express or implied consent of the parties. Also, this
rule is premised on the fact that the evidence had been introduced on an issue not raised by the pleadings without any
objection by the adverse party. It therefore, does not apply when the case was decided on a stipulation of facts in which
the pleadings are not deemed amended to conform to the evidence (MWSS vs. CA, et. al., G.R. No. 5426, August 25,
1986).

One line of cases holds that where the evidence sustains an award in excess of that claimed in the complaint, but the
plaintiff failed to amend the prayer of its complaint as to the amount of damages to conform to the evidence, the amount
demanded in the complaint should be the measure of damages (Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Manila Port Service,
et. al., L-23128).

There have, however, also been cases where the Supreme Court has held that even without such amendment to conform
to the evidence, the amount proved at the trial may be validly awarded (Tuazon vs. Bolanos, 91 Phil. 106)
Sec. 6 AMMENDED VS SUPLEMENTAL

1. Amended pleadings refer to facts existing at the time of the commencement of the action; supplemental pleadings
refer to facts arising after the filing of the original pleading;
2. Amended pleadings result in the withdrawal of the original pleading; a supplemental pleading is merely in addition
to, but does not result in the withdrawal of, the original pleading; and
3. Amended pleadings can be made as of right, as when no responsive pleading has yet been filed; supplemental
pleadings are always with leave of court.

SEC. 7.

Amended pleading supersedes the original pleading which is deemed withdrawn and no longer constitutes part of the
record. However, the filing of the amended pleading does not retroact to the date of the filing of the original, hence, the
statute of limitations runs until the filing of the amendment (Ruymann, et.al., vs. Director of Lands, 34 Phil. 429)

It is the actual filing in court that controls, and not the date of the formal admission of the amended pleading (Republic vs.
Marsman dev. Co., L-18956, April 27, 1972)

Where the original complaint states a cause of action but does it imperfectly, and afterwards an amended
complaint is filed correcting the defect, the plea of prescription will relate to the time of the filing of the original
complaint (Pangasinan Trans. Co. vs. Phil. Farming Co., Ltd., 81 Phil. 273)

Sec. 8

While original pleadings are deemed withdrawn by an amended pleading, it REMAINS in the record WITH THE
FOLLOWING EFFECTS:

a) Admissions in the superseded pleading can still be received in evidence against the pleader; and

b) Claims or defenses alleged therein but not incorporated or reiterated in the amended pleading are deemed
waived.

RULE 11: WHEN TO FILE RESPONSIVE PLEADINGS

Sec. 1-2

EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE ANSWER NOT ALLOWED IN SUMMARY PROCEDURE

A MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE ANSWER may be heard and granted EX-PARTE

An order allowing the filing of a late answer is interlocutory and not appealable

RULE 12: BILL OF PARTICULARS

Sec. 1

Def.:
A written statement used in both civil and criminal actions that is submitted by a plaintiff or a prosecutor at the request of a
defendant, giving the defendant detailed information concerning the claims or charges made against him or her.

Purpose: To enable defending party to properly prepare his responsive pleading.

- Where the pleading is vague and uncertain courts should not be left to the commission of error or injustice by
exploring in the midst of uncertainty and divining the intention of the parties from the ambiguities in the pleadings
RULE 13: FILING AND SERVICE OF PLEADINGS, JUDGMENTS AND OTHER PAPERS

Sec. 1-2

It is the duty of counsel to adopt and strictly maintain a system that efficiently takes into account all court notices sent to
him. His failure to do so cannot excuse him from the consequences of his non-receipt of court notices (Babala vs. CA,
Feb. 16, 1970)

Soriano vs. Soriano, G.R. No. 130348 (2007)

Copies of a final order were served upon counsel and party. The reglementary period to appeal is counted not from
receipt of the order by party but from receipt by counsel.

Sec. 7

*service of the judgment on his wife at their residence is valid personal service (Cubar vs. Mendoza, G.R.No. 55035,
Feb. 23, 1983)

Sec. 9

Service of judgments, final orders or resolutions may be served by publication where the summons on the defendant had
also been served by publication

For constructive service by registered mail, there must be conclusive proof that a first notice by the postmaster to the
addressee was received. The presumption that official duty has been performed does not apply (ITT Phil. Inc. vs. CA,
Oct. 29, 1975

If however, the postmaster certifies that such notice was sent, the presumption arises and overrides the contrary claim of
the addressee (Ferraren vs. Santos, L-4323, April 27, 1980)

Where a copy of the decision was sent to counsel at his address of record but the same was not received because he
moved to another address without informing the court thereof, such omission or neglect will not stay the finality of the
decision (Magno,, et. al. vs. CA, et. al. G.R. No. 58781, July 31, 1987).

Sec. 14

Notice of lis pendens serves as a warning to prospective encumbrancers or purchasers that they should keep their hands
off the property unless they wish to gamble on the result of the litigation involving the same (Bisaya Land Trans Co., Inc.
vs. Cuenco, L-18173, April 22, 1968)

RULE 14: SUMMONS

Sec. 1-2

Jurisdiction cannot be acquired over the defendant without service of summons, even if he knows of the case against him,
unless he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the court by appearing therein as through his counsel filing the
corresponding pleading in the case (Habana vs. Vamenta, et. al. L-27091, June 30, 1970)

Sec. 3-5

Persons exclusively authorized to serve summons: Sheriff, Deputy Sheriff, Other court officers

Service was held invalid when served by the following:

(1) Police sergeant (Sequito vs. Letrondo, 9105 Phil. 1139);

 (2) Postmaster (Olar vs. Cuna, L-47935, May 5, 1978); or

(3) Patrolman (Bello vs. Ubo, et. al.,

Sec. 6-7

*Summons cannot be served by mail.

It is only when the service of summons is made by publication that “a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be
sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant” (sec. 15). That resort to registered mail is only
complementary to service of summons by publication but it does not mean that service by registered mail alone would
suffice.

Imelda Marcos Manotoc vs. CA, et.al. G.R. No. 130974, August 16, 2006- In an action strictly in personam, personal
service on the defendant is the preferred mode of service, that is, by handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in
person. If defendant, for excusable reasons, cannot be served with the summons within a reasonable period, then
substituted service can be resorted to. While substituted service of summons is permitted, “it is extraordinary in character
and in derogation of the usual method of service.

Requirements for Substituted Service

(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service

-sheriff must show that defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service. Section 8, Rule 14
provides that the plaintiff or the sheriff is given a “reasonable time” to serve the summons to the defendant in person, but
no specific time frame is mentioned. “Reasonable time” is defined as “so much time as is necessary under the
circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract or duty requires that
should be done, having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any[,] to the other party.” However, when the court,
clerk of court, or the plaintiff asks the sheriff to make the return of the summons and the latter submits the return of
summons, then the validity of the summons lapses. The plaintiff may then ask for an alias summons if the service of
summons has failed.[4][24] What then is a reasonable time for the sheriff to effect a personal service in order to
demonstrate impossibility of prompt service? To the plaintiff, “reasonable time” means no more than seven (7) days since
an expeditious processing of a complaint is what a plaintiff wants. To the sheriff, “reasonable time” means 15 to 30 days
because at the end of the month, it is a practice for the branch clerk of court to require the sheriff to submit a return of the
summons assigned to the sheriff for service. The Sheriff’s Return provides data to the Clerk of Court, which the clerk
uses in the Monthly Report of Cases to be submitted to the Office of the Court Administrator within the first ten (10) days
of the succeeding month. Thus, one month from the issuance of summons can be considered “reasonable time” with
regard to personal service on the defendant.

For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts (at least three (3) tries, preferably on
at least two different dates) by the sheriff to personally serve the summons within a reasonable period [of one month]
which eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service. In addition, the sheriff must cite why such
efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of service can be confirmed or accepted.

(2) Specific Details in the Return

-The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal
service.[5][25] The efforts made to find the defendant and the reasons behind the failure must be clearly narrated in detail
in the Return. The form on Sheriff’s Return requires a narration of the efforts made to find the defendant personally and
the fact of failure. Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 5 dated November 9, 1989 requires that “impossibility of
prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the failure of such
efforts,” which should be made in the proof of service.

(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion

-If the substituted service will be effected at defendant’s house or residence, it should be left with a person of “suitable age
(attained the age of full legal capacity (18 years old) and is considered to have enough discernment to understand the
importance of a summons) and discretion (the ability to make decisions which represent a responsible choice and for
which an understanding of what is lawful, right or wise may be presupposed) then residing therein. To be of sufficient
discretion, such person must know how to read and understand English to comprehend the import of the summons, and
fully realize the need to deliver the summons and complaint to the defendant at the earliest possible time for the person to
take appropriate action. Thus, the person must have the “relation of confidence” to the defendant, ensuring that the latter
would receive or at least be notified of the receipt of the summons. The sheriff must therefore determine if the person
found in the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what the recipient’s relationship with the defendant
is, and whether said person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to immediately
deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt of summons.

(4) A Competent Person in Charge

The person on whom the substituted service will be made must be the one managing the office or business of defendant,
such as the president or manager; and such individual must have sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation of the
defendant in the summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the summons. Again, these
details must be contained in the Return.

AMWSLAI, ET. AL. VS. MANAY ET. AL. G.R. NO. 175338, Oct. 9, 2007- Personal service of summons is preferred over
substituted service. Only if the former cannot be made promptly may the process server resort to the latter. Moreover,
the proof of service of summons must (a) indicate the impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time; (b)
specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient
age and discretion who is residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office or regular place of business, of the
defendant. The failure to comply faithfully, strictly and fully with all the foregoing requirements of substituted service
renders the service of summons ineffective.

Sec. 11

ULTIMATE TEST ON THE VALIDITY AND SUFFICIENY OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS:

Whether the same and the attachments thereto were ultimately received by the corporation under such circumstances
that no undue prejudice was sustained by it from the procedural lapse, and that it was afforded full opportunity to present
its responsive pleadings.

* There is a continuing validity in the holding that although summons was served on the corporation’s secretary (not
official corporate secretary) and, therefore, such service was made on a person not authorized to receive the same, where
said summons and the complaint were in fact seasonably received by the corporation from its said clerk, there was
substantial compliance with the rule on service of summons (G&G Trading Corporation vs. CA, et. al., G.R. No. 78299,
Feb. 29, 1988)

Orion Security Corp. vs. Kalfam Enterprises Inc., G.R. No. 163287, April 27, 2007

In this case, records show that respondent’s president, managing partner, general
manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel never received the summons against respondent, either in
person or by substituted service.

Note that in case of substituted service, there should be a report indicating that the person who received the
summons in the defendant’s behalf was one with whom the defendant had a relation of confidence ensuring that the latter
would actually receive the summons. Here, petitioner failed to show that the security guard who received the summons in
respondent’s behalf shared such relation of confidence that respondent would surely receive the summons. Hence, we
are unable to accept petitioner’s contention that service on the security guard constituted substantial compliance with the
requirements of substituted service.

Sec. 15
EXTRATERRITORIAL SERVICE OF SUMMONS IS PROPER ONLY IN FOUR (4) INSTANCES:

(a) WHEN THE ACTION AFFECTS THE PERSONAL STATUS OF THE PLAINTIFF;

(b) WHEN THE ACTION RELATES TO, OR THE SUBJECT OF WHICH IS PROPERTY WITHIN THE PHILIPPINES
IN WHICH THE DEFENDANT HAS OR CLAIMS A LIEN OR INTEREST, ACTUAL OR CONTINGENT;

(c) WHEN THE RELIEF DEMANDED IN SUCH ACTION CONSISTS, WHOLLY OR IN PART, IN EXCLUDING THE
DEFENDANT FROM ANY INTEREST IN PROPERTY LOCATED IN THE PHILIPPINES; AND

(d) WHEN THE DEFENDANT NON-RESIDENT’S PROPERTY HAS BEEN ATTACHED IN THE PHILIPPINES (De
Midgely vs. Ferandos, L-34313, May 13, 1975)

(e) Where the complaint does not involve the personal status of plaintiff or any property in the Philippines in which
defendants have or claim an interest or which the plaintiff has attached, it is a personal action in personam.
Consequently, personal or substituted service, is necessary to confer jurisdiction on the court. In a personal action
for injunction, therefore, extraterritorial service of the summons and complaint on the non-resident defendants
cannot confer on the court jurisdiction or power to compel them to obey its orders (Kawasaki Port Service Corp.,
et. al.vs. Amores, etc., et. al., G.R. No. 58340, July 16, 1991)

Sec. 16-17

SERVICE OF SUMMONS BY PUBLICATION is authorized with prior leave of court:

(1) Where the identity of the defendant is unknown;

(2) Where the whereabouts of the defendant is unknown;

(3) Where the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines but the suit can properly be maintained
against him here, being in rem or quasi in rem; and

(4) Where the defendant is a resident of the Philippines but is temporarily out of the country.

(5) It has been ruled that where the defendant is a resident and the action is in personam, summons by publication is
invalid as being violative of the due process clause. Plaintiff’s recourse, where personal service fails, is to attach
properties of the defendant under Rule 57 sec. 1 (f), thus converting the suit to one in rem or quasi in rem and
summons by publication will be valid. Where plaintiff fails to or cannot do so, the court should not dismiss the
action but should order the case to be held pending in the archives, so that the action will not prescribe, until such
time as the plaintiff succeeds in ascertaining the defendant’s whereabouts or his properties (Pantaleon vs.
Asuncion 105 Phil. 761; Filmerco Comm. Co., Inc. vs. IAC, et.al., G.R. No. 70661, April 9, 1987).

RULE 15: MOTIONS

SECTION 1. Motion defined. — A motion is an application for relief other than by a pleading. (1a)

Sec. 2-4

Exceptions to the three day notice rule:

(1) Ex parte motions;

(2) Urgent motions;

(3) Motions agreed upon by the parties to be heard on shorter notice or jointly submitted by the parties; and

(4) Motions for summary judgment which must be served at least 10 days before its hearing (sec.3 Rule 35)
Sec. 4

EXCEPTED FROM HEARING REQUIREMENT:

NON-LITIGABLE OR NON-LITIGATED MOTIONS – or those which may be acted upon by the court without prejudicing
the rights of the adverse party

Ex- party motions while exempted from 3 day notice rule, not exempted from hearing.

Sec. 5-6

Any motion that does not comply with sec. 4 (hearing), 5 (notice of hearing) and 6 (proof of service) of this Rule is A
MERE SCRAP OF PAPER, SHOULD NOT BE ACCEPTED FOR FILING , and if file, IS NOT ENTITLED TO JUDICIAL
COGNIZANCE and DOES NOT AFFECT ANY REGLEMENTARY PERIOD INVOLVED FOR THE FILING OF THE
REQUISITE PLEADING.

Where the motion is (a) directed to the clerk of court, not to the parties, and (b) merely states that the same is submitted
“for the resolution of the court upon receipt hereof,” said motion is fatally defective (Cledera, et.al. vs. Sarmiento, et. al., L-
32450-51, June 10, 1971)