Bai Sandra Sema v Comelec July 16, 2008
Held:
Facts:
On 28 August 2006, the ARMM’s legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its
power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao
Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed
of the eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao. MMA Act 201 provides:
Later, three new municipalities were carved out of the original nine municipalities
constituting Shariff Kabunsuan, bringing its total number of municipalities to 11. Thus, what
was left of Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting its second legislative district.
Cotabato City, although part of Maguindanao’s first legislative district, is not part of the
Province of Maguindanao.
On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution No.
3999 requesting the COMELEC to “clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the
conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province” under MMA Act 201.
Resolution No. 07-0407, which adopted the recommendation of the COMELEC’s Law
Department under a Memorandum dated 27 February 2007, provides in pertinent parts:
Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, to adopt the
recommendation of the Law Department that pending the enactment of the appropriate law
by Congress, to maintain the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in
the First Legislative District of Maguindanao.
On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these petitions,
amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in question as “Shariff
Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with
Cotabato City).”
Issue:
The petitions raise the following issues:
I. In G.R. No. 177597:
(A) Preliminarily –
(1) whether the writs of Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus are proper to test the
constitutionality of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902; and
(2) whether the proclamation of respondent Dilangalen as representative of Shariff
Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City mooted the petition in G.R. No. 177597.
(B) On the merits –
(1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is
constitutional; and
(2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly
under MMA Act 201 pursuant to Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one
representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a
legislative district for such province.
II. In G.R No. 177597 and G.R No. 178628, whether COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid
for maintaining the status quo in the first legislative district of Maguindanao (as “Shariff
Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City [formerly First District of Maguindanao with
Cotabato City]”), despite the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan out of such
district (excluding Cotabato City).
WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054 UNCONSTITUTIONAL
insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
the power to create provinces and cities. Thus, we declare VOID Muslim Mindanao
Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. Consequently, we rule
that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is VALID.
Ratio:
The creation of any of the four local government units – province, city, municipality or
barangay – must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit
must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not
conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the
political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the
Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to
create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can
delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject to
reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution.
In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the
power to create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria
established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution. However, under the Local Government Code, “only x x x an Act
of Congress” can create provinces, cities or municipalities.
However, the creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of
the Constitution provides, “Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative” in the House of
Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides,
“Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter
increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately
following election to at least one Member x x x.”
Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to
the Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a population of 250,000 or more cannot
also be created without a legislative district.
This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create or reapportion
legislative districts is logical. Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its
allowable membership or in its incumbent membership through the creation of legislative
districts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact such a law. It would
be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative
districts for a national legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a
superior legislative body, cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body.
In view of certiorari and mandamus
The purpose of the writ of Certiorari is to correct grave abuse of discretion by “any
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.” On the other hand,
the writ of Mandamus will issue to compel a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person
to perform an act “which the law specifically enjoins as a duty.”
In view of mootness
 There is also no merit in the claim that respondent Dilangalen’s proclamation as winner in the provisions of the Constitution and national laws, x x x.” The Preamble of the ARMM
the 14 May 2007 elections for representative of “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato Organic Act (RA 9054) itself states that the ARMM Government is established “within the
City” mooted this petition. This case does not concern respondent Dilangalen’s election. framework of the Constitution.” This follows Section 15, Article X of the Constitution which
Rather, it involves an inquiry into the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, as well as the mandates that the ARMM “shall be created x x x within the framework of this Constitution
constitutionality of MMA Act 201 and Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054. Admittedly, the and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.”
outcome of this petition, one way or another, determines whether the votes cast in Cotabato
City for representative of the district of “Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City” will
be included in the canvassing of ballots. However, this incidental consequence is no reason
for us not to proceed with the resolution of the novel issues raised here. The Court’s ruling
in these petitions affects not only the recently concluded elections but also all the other
succeeding elections for the office in question, as well as the power of the ARMM Regional
Assembly to create in the future additional provinces.
In view of the Felwa case
As further support for her stance, petitioner invokes the statement in Felwa that “when a
province is created by statute, the corresponding representative district comes into existence
neither by authority of that statute — which cannot provide otherwise — nor by
apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment.”

First. The issue in Felwa, among others, was whether Republic Act No. 4695 (RA 4695),
creating the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao and
providing for congressional representation in the old and new provinces, was
unconstitutional for “creating congressional districts without the apportionment provided in
the Constitution.”
Thus, the Court sustained the constitutionality of RA 4695 because (1) it validly created
legislative districts “indirectly” through a special law enacted by Congress creating a province
and (2) the creation of the legislative districts will not result in breaching the maximum
number of legislative districts provided under the 1935 Constitution. Felwa does not apply
to the present case because in Felwa the new provinces were created by a national law
enacted by Congress itself. Here, the new province was created merely by a regional law
enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly.
What Felwa teaches is that the creation of a legislative district by Congress does not
emanate alone from Congress’ power to reapportion legislative districts, but also from
Congress’ power to create provinces which cannot be created without a legislative district.
Thus, when a province is created, a legislative district is created by operation of the
Constitution because the Constitution provides that “each province shall have at least one
representative” in the House of Representatives.
Moreover, if as Sema claims MMA Act 201 apportioned a legislative district to Shariff
Kabunsuan upon its creation, this will leave Cotabato City as the lone component of the first
legislative district of Maguindanao. However, Cotabato City cannot constitute a legislative
district by itself because as of the census taken in 2000, it had a population of only 163,849.
Second. Sema’s theory also undermines the composition and independence of the House
of Representatives. Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, the ARMM Regional Assembly
can create provinces and cities within the ARMM with or without regard to the criteria fixed
in Section 461 of RA 7160, namely: minimum annual income of P20,000,000, and minimum
contiguous territory of 2,000 square kilometers or minimum population of 250,000. The
following scenarios thus become distinct possibilities:
It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the
Constitution. Section 20, Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that the legislative
powers of regional assemblies are limited “[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction and subject to
Tobias vs Abalos, G.R. No. L-114783 case brief summary
December 8, 1994

Facts:
Complainants, invoking their right as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, filed a
petition questioning the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An
Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as
the City of Mandaluyong." Before the enactment of the law, Mandaluyong and San Juan
belonged to the same legislative district.
The petitioners contended that the act is unconstitutional for violation of three provisions of
the constitution. First, it violates the one subject one bill rule. The bill provides for the
conversion of Mandaluyong to HUC as well as the division of congressional district of San
Juan and Mandaluyong into two separate district. Second, it also violate Section 5 of Article
VI of the Constitution, which provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed
of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law. The division
of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts increased the members of
the House of Representative beyond that provided by the Constitution. Third, Section 5 of
Article VI also provides that within three years following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard
provided in Section 5. Petitioners stated that the division was not made pursuant to any
census showing that the minimum population requirement was attained.

Issue:
(1) Does RA 7675 violate the one subject one bill rule?
(2) Does it violate Section 5(1) of Article VI of the Constitution on the limit of number of rep?
(3) Is the inexistence of mention of census in the law show a lack of constitutional
requirement?

Rulings:
The Supreme Court ruled that the contentions are devoid of merit. With regards to the first
contention of one subject one bill rule, the creation of a separate congressional district for
Mandaluyong is not a separate and distinct subject from its conversion into a HUC but is a
natural and logical consequence. In addition, a liberal construction of the "one title-one
subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede
legislation.
The second contention that the law violates the present limit of the number of
representatives, the provision of the section itself show that the 250 limit is not absolute.
The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law”. Therefore, the increase in
congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
With regards, to the third contention that there is no mention in the assailed law of any
census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum
requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two legislative districts,
unless otherwise proved that the requirements were not met, the said Act enjoys the
presumption of having passed through the regular congressional processes, including due
consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the
establishment of separate legislative district
The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
Mariano vs COMELEC GR No 118577 07 March 1995

Facts:
Juanito Mariano, resident of Makati filed a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief,
assailing unconstitutional sections in RA 7854 (“An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati
Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati”). Petitioners contend that (1)
Section 2 Article I of RA 7854 failed to delineate the land areas of Makati by metes and
bounds with technical descriptions, (2) Section 51 Article X of RA 7854 collides with Section 8
Article X and Section 7 Article VI of the Constitution, that the new corporate existence of the
new city will restart the term of the present municipal elective making it favourable to
incumbent Mayor Jejomar Binay, and (3) Section 52 Article X of RA 7854 for adding a
legislative district is unconstitutional and cannot be made by special law.

Issue:
Whether or not RA 7854 is unconstitutional.

Decision:
Petition dismissed for lack of merit. The said delineation did not change even by an inch the
land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add, subtract,
divide, or multiply the established land area of Makati. In language that cannot be any
clearer, section 2 stated that, the city’s land area “shall comprise the present territory of the
municipality.”

The Court cannot entertain the challenge to the constitutionality of Section 51. The
requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well
delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of
constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be
raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question
must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. Considering that these
contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which
has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy.

In Tobias vs Abalos, Court ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made
through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city.
QUINTO and TOLENTINO, JR., vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 189698 December 1, 2009 Equal
Protection Clause, Appointed Officials

FACTS:

Before the Court is a petition for prohibition and certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction, assailing Section 4(a) of
Resolution No. 8678 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). They contend that the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it issued the assailed Resolution. They aver that
the advance filing of CoCs for the 2010 elections is intended merely for the purpose of early
printing of the official ballots in order to cope with time limitations. Such advance filing does
not automatically make the person who filed the CoC a candidate at the moment of filing.
Petitioners further posit that the provision considering them as ipso facto resigned from
office upon the filing of their CoCs is discriminatory and violates the equal protection clause
in the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Are appointed officials considered resigned upon filing of their certificates of candidacy? Is
Section 13 of RA 9369 violative of the equal protection clause?

RULING:

No to the first question and yes to the second. “ANY PERSON WHO FILES HIS CERTIFICATE OF
CANDIDACY WITHIN THIS PERIOD SHALL ONLY BE CONSIDERED AS A CANDIDATE AT THE
START OF THE CAMPAIGN PERIOD FOR WHICH HE FILED HIS COC.” The said proviso seems to
mitigate the situation of disadvantage afflicting appointive officials by considering persons
who filed their CoCs as candidates only at the start of the campaign period, thereby,
conveying the tacit intent that persons holding appointive positions will only be considered
as resigned at the start of the campaign period when they are already treated by law as
candidates.

In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts
upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants,
specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact
alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and
those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment.

Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential
treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is
not germane to the purposes of the law. There is thus no valid justification to treat
appointive officials differently from the elective ones. The classification simply fails to meet
the test that it should be germane to the purposes of the law. The measure encapsulated in
the second proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of
the OEC violates the equal protection clause.
Aquino III v. Comelec [April 7, 2010]
Issue:
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo seek the
nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled “An Act Reapportioning
the Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of
Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such Reapportionment.”
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government Code on the creation of a
province which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district.
Thus, Section 461 of the Local Government Code states:
Requisites for Creation. –
(a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the
Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on
1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:

Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was signed into law by (i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009 the Lands Management Bureau; or
creating an additional legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring (ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified
the existing first and second legislative districts of the province. by the National Statistics Office.

The Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of 1,693,821,2 distributed Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable requirement, but is merely an
among four (4) legislative districts. Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the alternative addition to the indispensable income requirement.
first and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional
legislative district for the province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan,
Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district
municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district.

Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs
afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. Petitioners rely on
Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum
population standard. The provision reads:
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and
adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative.

The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and
second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will
end up with a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.

Issue:
w/n a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the creation
of a new legislative district in a province?

Held:
We deny the petition.

Ruling:
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum population
that must compose a legislative district.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase “each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand” from the phrase “or each province” point
to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city,
but not for a province.26
G.R. No. 188078, January 25, 2010
Victorino Aldaba, etc. vs COMELEC
Facts:
May 1, 2009, RA 9591 passed into a law, amending the Malolos Charter by creating a
separate legislative district for the city. The population of Malolos is a contested fact given
that the house bill for this law relied on the undated certification issued by NSO that the
population of Malolos will be 254,030 by year 2010 due its current population growth rate.
Petitioners, taxpayers and registered residents of Malolos filed this petition contending that
RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250k for
a city to merit representation in Congress.
OSG contended that Congress use of projected population is non-justiciable as it involves a
determination on the wisdom of the standard adopted by the legislature to determine
compliance with constitutional requirement.
Any population projection forming the basis for the creation of a legislative district must be
based on an official and credible source. That is why the OSG cited Executive Order No. 135,
otherwise the population projection would be unreliable or speculative.
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution provides:
Any province that may be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to
more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election
to at least one Member or such number of members as it may be entitled to on the basis of
the number of its inhabitants and according to the standards set forth in paragraph (3),
Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution. xxx. (Emphasis supplied)

Issue: Whether or not R.A. 9591, “Án act creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos,
Bulacan” is unconstitutional as petitioned. And whether the City of Malolos has at least
250,000 actual or projected.

Ruling:

RA 9591 is unconstitutional. The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a
legislative district, the city must have a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand.[5]
The only issue here is whether the City of Malolos has a population of at least 250,000,
whether actual or projected, for the purpose of creating a legislative district for the City of
Malolos in time for the 10 May 2010 elections. If not, then RA 9591 creating a legislative
district in the City of Malolos is unconstitutional.

The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is based on demographic projections, is

without legal effect because Regional Director Miranda has no basis and no authority to issue
the Certification. The Certification is also void on its face because based on its own growth
rate assumption, the population of Malolos will be less than 250,000 in the year 2010. In
addition, intercensal demographic projections cannot be made for the entire year. In any
event, a city whose population has increased to 250,000 is entitled to have a legislative
district only in the immediately following election after the attainment of the 250,000
population.

The Certification of Regional Director Miranda does not state that the demographic
projections he certified have been declared official by the NSCB. The records of this case do
not also show that the Certification of Regional Director Miranda is based on demographic
projections declared official by the NSCB. The Certification, which states that the population
of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010, violates the requirement that intercensal
demographic projections shall be as of the middle of every year. In addition, there is no
showing that Regional Director Miranda has been designated by the NSO Administrator as a
certifying officer for demographic projections in Region III. In the absence of such official
designation, only the certification of the NSO Administrator can be given credence by this
Court.
BILL OF RIGHTS
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party vs. COMELECG.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010

FACTS:

Petitioner is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as

lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBT’s). Incorporated in 2003, Ang
Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in 2006 as a party-list organization
under Republic Act 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act. The application for
accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial
membership base. In 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a petition for registration with the
COMELEC upon which it was dismissed on moral grounds.

Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration but the COMELEC upheld its First Resolution, stating that
“the party-list system is a tool for the realization of aspirations of marginalized individuals
whose interests are also the nation’s. Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to justify that
having mixed sexual orientations and transgender identities is beneficial to the nation, its
application for accreditation under the party-list system will remain just that.” That “the
Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such
that some moral precepts espoused by said religions have sipped into society and these are
not publicly accepted moral norms.” COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a
concrete and genuine national poltical agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was
validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is
not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941. Thus Ladlad filed this
petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Petitioner should be accredited as a party-list organization under RA 7941

HELD:

The Supreme Court granted the petition and set aside the resolutions of the COMELEC. It also
directed the COMELEC to grant petitioner’s application for party-list accreditation.
The enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial
element is not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular
organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. Ang Ladlad
has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation.
Nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified
to register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “no law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-
establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly,
“governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.”
Laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs and they deserve to
participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-
represented sectors.
The principle of non-discrimination requires the laws of general application relating to
elections be applied to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation.
342 SCRA 247, October 6, 2000 (Constitutional Law – Party List Representatives, 20%
Allocation) 208

FACTS: ——– x .20 = 52

Petitioner assailed public respondent COMELEC resolutions ordering the proclamation of 38
additional party-list representatives to complete the 52 seats in the House of Representatives .80
as provided by Sec 5, Art VI of the 1987 Constitution and RA 7941.
The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to comprehend. The
On the other hand, Public Respondent, together with the respondent parties, avers that the problematic question, however, is this: Does the Constitution require all such allocated seats
filling up of the twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in the House of to be filled up all the time and under all circumstances? Our short answer is “No.”
Representatives, as provided under the Constitution, was mandatory, wherein the twenty
(20%) percent congressional seats for party-list representatives is filled up at all times.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is mandatory

HELD:
No, it is merely a ceiling for the party-list seats in Congress. The same declared therein a
policy to promote “proportional representation” in the election of party-list representatives
in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors to
contribute legislation that would benefit them.

It however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and coalitions participating

in the system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system in
order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than this percentage could
have “additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes.”

Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than three seats in
the House of Representatives (sec 11(b) RA 7941).

Note:

Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in
arriving at the number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise
“twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party-
list.” We thus translate this legal provision into a mathematical formula, as follows:

No. of district representatives

———————————- x .20 = No. of party-list

.80 representatives

This formulation means that any increase in the number of district representatives, as may
be provided by law, will necessarily result in a corresponding increase in the number of party-
list seats. To illustrate, considering that there were 208 district representatives to be elected
during the 1998 national elections, the number of party-list seats would be 52, computed as
follows:
G.R. No. 147589
G.R. No. 147613 June 26,2001

Ang Bagong Bayani; OFW et al. vs. COMELEC

FACTS:

Bagong Bayani and Akbayan Citizens Party filed before the COMELEC, challenging Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785 issued by the COMELEC.

The resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those
impleaded, in the 2001 party list elections.

Petitioners seek disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party list
system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented not the mainstream
political parties, the non marginalized or overrepresented.

ISSUE:

Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.

Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to marginalize and underrepresented sector
and organization.

HELD:

The petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the COMELEC which
will determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and
organizations satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941. The resolution of this
Court directed the COMELEC to refrain proclaiming any winner during the last party-list
election, it shall remain in force until after the COMELEC have complied and reported its
compliance.

Political parties, event the major ones, may participate in the party-list elections, Under the
Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents can not be disqualified from the Party-list
elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties.

The political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however, that
any political party or organization or group for that matter may do so. The requisite character
of these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list
system.
Bantay Republic Act. Vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 177271) Digest
FACTS:
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus to nullify and
set aside certain issuances of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) respecting party-list
groups which have manifested their intention to participate in the party-list elections on May
14, 2007.
A number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations and subsequently were
accredited by the Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections. Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA
7941) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR) filed with the Comelec an Urgent
Petition seeking to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list organizations. Meanwhile
petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed 2 letters to the Director of the Comelec’s
Law Department requesting a list of that groups’ nominees. Evidently unbeknownst then to
Ms. Rosales, et al., was the issuance of Comelec en banc Resolution 07-0724 under date April
3, 2007 virtually declaring the nominees’ names confidential and in net effect denying
petitioner Rosales’ basic disclosure request. According to COMELEC, there is nothing in R.A.
7941 that requires the Comelec to disclose the names of nominees, and that party list
elections must not be personality oriented according to Chairman Abalos.
In the first petition (G.R. No. 177271), BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR assail the Comelec resolutions
accrediting private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the forthcoming
party-list elections without simultaneously determining whether or not their respective
nominees possess the requisite qualifications defined in R.A. No. 7941, or the "Party-List
System Act" and belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector each seeks to.
In the second petition (G.R. No. 177314), petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan
Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution dated April 3,
2007.
While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names
of the nominees of the various party-list groups named in the petitions, BA-RA 7941 and UP-
LR have the additional prayers that the 33 private respondents named therein be "declare[d]
as unqualified to participate in the party-list elections and that the Comelec be enjoined from
allowing respondent groups from participating in the elections.
ISSUE:
1. Can the Court cancel the accreditation accorded by the Comelec to the respondent party-
list groups named in their petition on the ground that these groups and their respective
nominees do not appear to be qualified.
2. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of the
various party-list groups, has violated the right to information and free access to documents
as guaranteed by the Constitution; and
3. Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the Constitution to disclose to the public
the names of said nominees.
Ruling:
1. The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR for
cancellation of accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their petition. The exercise
would require the Court to make a factual determination, a matter which is outside the office
of judicial review by way of special civil action for certiorari. In certiorari proceedings, the
Court is not called upon to decide factual issues and the case must be decided on the
undisputed facts on record. The sole function of a writ of certiorari is to address issues of
want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and does not include a review of the
tribunal’s evaluation of the evidence. Also, the petitioner’s posture that the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted the assailed accreditations without
simultaneously determining the qualifications of their nominees is without basis, Nowhere in
R .A. No. 7941 is there a requirement that the qualification of a party-list nominee be
determined simultaneously with the accreditation of an organization.
2. Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz:
Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official
acts, transactions, or decisions, as well to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.
Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
As may be noted, no national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the
names of the nominees of the partylist groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec
committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners
for a list of the nominees of the party-list groups subject of their respective petitions.
Mandamus, therefore, lies.
The last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: "[T]he names of the party-list nominees
shall not be shown on the certified list" is certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to
deny the requested disclosure. To us, the prohibition imposed on the Comelec under said
Section 7 is limited in scope and duration, meaning, that it extends only to the certified list
which the same provision requires to be posted in the polling places on election day. To
stretch the coverage of the prohibition to the absolute is to read into the law something that
is not intended. As it were, there is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the
Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through mediums other than the "Certified List"
the names of the party-list nominees. The Comelec obviously misread the limited
nondisclosure aspect of the provision as an absolute bar to public disclosure before the May
2007 elections. The interpretation thus given by the Comelec virtually tacks an
unconstitutional dimension on the last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7941.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 177271 is partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to nullify the
accreditation of the respondents named therein. However, insofar as it seeks to compel the
Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of party-list groups, sectors or
organizations accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections, the same petition and
the petition in G.R. No. 177314 are GRANTED.
RA 7941 the Party list Act (1995) •In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A.
BANAT V. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009 No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed:

Facts:
•Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed before the
National Board of Canvassers(NBC) a petition to proclaim the full number of party list
representatives provided by the Constitution. However, the recommendation of the head of
the legal group of COMELEC’s national board of canvassers to declare the petition moot and
academic was approved by the COMELEC en banc.
•BANAT filed for petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the resolution of COMELEC
to their petition to proclaim the full number of party list representatives provided by the
Constitution.
•The COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated a resolution proclaiming thirteen (13)
parties as winners in the party-list elections in May 2007. The COMELEC announced that,
upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results, it would determine the total number
of seats of each winning party, organization, or coalition in accordance with Veterans
Federation Party v. COMELEC formula.
•Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action,
Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher) asked the COMELEC,
acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula. COMELEC denied the
consideration.
•Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher filed for certiorari with mandamus and prohibition
assailing the resolution of the COMELEC in its decision to use the Veterans formula.
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest
based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall
be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the
additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
•Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from
participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly
intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral
wings. Also, in defining a "party" that participates in party-list elections as either "a political
party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will
participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list
elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission,
and R.A. No. 7941. However, by the vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in
Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list elections,
directly or indirectly.

ISSUES:

•Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2),
Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling
•Whether or not the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is constitutional
•Whether or not the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify
for one seat is constitutional
•How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?
•Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list
elections?

RULING:

•The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives

cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives.
•Yes, it is constitutional. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a
qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents
any party from dominating the party-list elections.
•The second clause of Section 11(b) of R. A. 7941 “those garnering more than two percent
(2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes” is unconstitutional. The two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of
the additional seats presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section
5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of "the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives."
Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, (G)
G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013
FACTS:
 The case constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and
Prohibition filed by 52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions
issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from
participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their
petitions for registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their
registration and accreditation as party-list organizations.
 Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC
Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations
registered and manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections
 December 5, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Division’s
resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bida’s (PBB) registration and accreditation
as a political party in the National Capital Region. However, PBB was denied
participation in the elections because PBB does not represent any "marginalized
and underrepresented" sector.
 13 petitioners were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court. The
COMELEC, on 7 January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604, and excluded the names
of these 13 petitioners in the printing of the official.
 Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled
summary evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations
that filed manifestations of intent to participate in the elections have continually
complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party v. COMELEC (Ang Bagong Bayani).
 39 petitioners were able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Court, directing
the COMELEC to include the names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the
official ballot for the elections.
 Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. This Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions.
ISSUE:
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the elections
HELD:
 No, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing
decisions in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the coming elections.
However, since the Court adopts new parameters in the qualification of the party-
list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the
COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the present
petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under the
party-list system, and to participate in the coming elections, under the new
parameters prescribed in this Decision.
 Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during
the first three consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, "one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be
filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban
poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as
may be provided by law, except the religious sector." This provision clearly shows
again that the party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two
obvious reasons.
 First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would
naturally be open to non-sectoral party-list representatives, clearly negating the
idea that the party-list system is exclusively for sectoral parties representing the
"marginalized and underrepresented."
 Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies
only for the first "three consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution," clearly making the party-list system fully open after the end of the
first three congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there will be no
seats reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies under the three groups
constituting the party-list system.
 Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in
Section 5(1) and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the
party-list system is not for sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.
 R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national
and regional parties under the party-list system to represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and
cause-oriented parties from the party-list system. How will these ideology-based
and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections,
participate in the electoral process if they are excluded from the party-list system?
To exclude them from the party-list system is to prevent them from joining the
parliamentary struggle, leaving as their only option the armed struggle. To exclude
them from the party-list system is, apart from being obviously senseless, patently
contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A.
No. 7941