Nietzsche on Music

Author(s): Kathleen Higgins

Source: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 47, No. 4 (Oct. - Dec., 1986), pp. 663-672
Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2709725
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 NIETZSCHE ON MUSIC

BY KATHLEEN HIGGINS

Because of its power to evoke emotional responses in its listeners, music

often been compared with language; music has been called "the langu
emotion"' and "the art of expressing sentiments and passions through th
dium of sound."2 These suggestive comparisons of music with language
a number of more specific questions regarding the nature of music's a
communication of its meaning to the human soul. If music is like a lan
what kind of meaning does it convey?
In the following discussion, I shall draw attention to an aspect of Friedr
Nietzsche's analysis of music that is relevant to the question of how mu
be said to have meaning. Nietzsche's view of music as expressed in The
of Tragedy, when taken together with some of his other remarks on la
and music, involves the rather startling suggestion that we can communicat
all only because ours is a world in which music is possible. The human ca
to experience music, according to Nietzsche, is something like a transcenden
precondition for the possibility of language.
In order to demonstrate that Nietzsche's understanding of music does en
these rather surprising claims, I shall begin by summarizing Nietzsche's
of the original of language and by explaining why Dionysus stands as a sym
for the mode of self-understanding that, according to Nietzsche, language p
supposes. I shall then show why Nietzsche understands music as the paradig
vehicle for the expression of this Dionysian mode of self-understanding.
I. Nietzsche considers the original of human language in Section 354 of T
Gay Science. There he argues that language developed along with conscio
to facilitate the survival of the proto-human herd animals from whom we de
At a certain point in evolution, and in response to dangers which thre
the herd from without, the conscious communication of information from
individual animal to another proved useful for the satisfaction of survival-r
needs. Nietzsche argues also that only in connection with the developm
language did human consciousness evolve. In order for the individual a
to communicate what pained or threatened him to another, he needed to "k
what pained or threatened him; and consciousness developed as the faculty
could have "knowledge" of this sort. Words express what human beings "kn
consciously. But most aspects of human experience are not "known" i
way: "We 'know' (or believe or imagine) just as much as may be useful
interests of the human herd, the species ...."3

'C. F. Michaelis, Ueber den Geist der Tonkunst, second essay (1800), 29, as q
by Eduard Hanslick, The Beautiful in Music, trans. Gustave Cohen, ed. Morris
(New York, 1957), 17.
2 Fermo Bellini, Manuale di Musica (Milano, 1853), quoted by Hanslick, The Bea
in Music, 18.
3 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science: With a Prelude in Rhymes and an App
of Songs, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York, 1974), 300.

663

Copyright 1986 by JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS, INC

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664 KATHLEEN HIGGINS

My summary of Section 354 is even m

and Nietzsche's account there involves
ment.4 The conclusions that he draws fro
important for an understanding of Nietz
music and language. In the first place he
that is often taken to be "the genius of th
of a previous level of mentality which
velopment of language, on this accoun
themselves only in connection with the l
only because of this intimate association
herd did language arise-it served a spe
conclusion follows: that language itself is
a social phenomenon, in fact, that the
experience through language must subord
are unique and personal to the generalized
words label and connote.
On the basis of this overview Nietzsche concludes, thirdly, that words do
violence to the immediacy and individuality of human experience. Words can
refer only to those aspects of experience that have been made conscious, and
"all becoming conscious involves a great and thorough corruption, falsification,
reduction to superficialities and generalization. Ultimately, the growth of con-
sciousness becomes a danger. . ."6 Nietzsche makes this same argument in
Thus Spoke Zarathustra, where Zarathustra warns that to name and describe
one's personal virtues with common words does violence to the virtue.

You would do better to say, "Inexpressible and nameless is that which give
my soul agony and sweetness and is even the hunger of my entrails."
May your virtue be too exalted for the familiarity of names; and if you must
speak of her, then do not be ashamed to stammer of her.7

These conclusions will prove relevant to Nietzsche's understanding of the

relationship between language and music because they serve to establish the
basis upon which language was built. It is important that language developed
because it was useful to the herd to communicate information relevant to survival-
related needs from one animal to another. In claiming that the communication
of such information was useful, Nietzsche presupposes that the herd animals
shared the same survival-related needs. One would, of course, take it for granted
that the members of any animal herd share the same essential biological char-
acteristics, but Nietzsche's point here is that it was because these proto-human

4 Nietzsche makes a similar case in his Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy
of the Future, trans. Walter A. Kaufmann (New York, 1966), #268: 216-17, Werke in
Drei Baenden, ed. Karl Schlechta (3rd edition; Munich, 1965), 2: 740-41. So the brevity
of Section 354 of The Gay Science should not be viewed as an indication that Nietzsche
considered the views there in an only cursory fashion on one occasion.
5 The title of Section 354 is, in fact, "On the 'genius of the species' " ("Vom 'Genius
der Gattung' "). See Nietzsche, The Gay Science, #354: 297; Schlechta, 2: 219.
6 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, #354: 300; Schlechta, 2: 222.
7 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, in The Portable Nietzsche, trans. and
ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York, 1968), 148; Schlechta, 2: 302.

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 NIETZSCHE ON MUSIC 665

beings shared essential biological characteri

develop language. And he claims further th
those aspects of experience that we can ass
beings by virtue of the fact that we are ani
same biological equipment in the same terrest
Nietzsche's association of the development o
is evident also in a fragment of 1871 enti
he argues that language has two aspects: th
gesture-symbolism. The speaker's tone symbol
pleasure," which in turn are "expressions of
us," the universal ground of being, which
Schopenhauerian will.8 Everything besides ple
through what Nietzsche calls "gesture-sym
pleasure and pain are expressions of the un
tonal subsoil" is universal, "comprehensible be
Gesture-symbolism is more arbitrary, as is ref

The whole realm of the consonantal and voc

under gesture-symbolism: consonants and vow
which is necessary above all else, are nothing b
in short, gestures-; as soon as we imagine
mouth of man, then first of all the root o
gesture-symbolism, the tonal subsoil, originat

By "tonal subsoil" and "tone" Nietzsche e

pattern of pitch inflection that be believes to
Whether or not such a "tonal subsoil" actu
questionable; one wonders whether Nietzsc
Hungarian, a language whose pitch inflection
And the exploitation of pitch in tonal langu
Nietzsche's dichotomy of a universal, tona
symbolism that is unique to a particular langua
Nonetheless, even if one does not take Nietz
sophisticated to account for all the functions
concur with Nietzsche that certain pitch in
or pain, comfort or discomfort, and that su
even by a person who does not understand th
Pitch inflection can serve this function in
because it expresses biologically based stat
common modes of experience for all human
the "tonal subsoil" of language, he refers to t
and he contrasts this function, which he take
of language, with the more conventionalized
labels "gesture-symbolism," referring primar

8 Nietzsche's use of Schopenhauer's system in

nication will be discussed in Part II, below.
9 Nietzsche, "On Music and Words," in The Com
ed. Oscar Levy, Vol. 2, Early Greek Philosophy a
Muegge (London, 1911), 31-32.

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 666 KATHLEEN HIGGINS

Again in this passage, then, Nietzsche

language presupposes our implicit recogniti
ground of experience with other human
words can have meaning only because they
are common to other individuals besides
damental, usually preconscious, recognition
to whom one speaks the common biologic
common experience of having an individuat
one's words communicate to others.
Dionysus, while certainly an over-determined symbol for Nietzsche, em-
blemizes among other things the common biological character of the existence
of all human beings. In The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche links Dionysus to a
mode of self-awareness that is characterized by a forgetting of all that is individual
and by a sense of oneness with the rest of humanity and the rest of nature. For
this reason, Nietzsche associates the Dionysian mode of self-understanding with
the experience of self-abandonment involved in human sexuality. And the self-
abandonment that Nietzsche has in mind is so complete that he symbolizes the
sexuality associated with Dionysus through the image of the orgy.
The orgy disregards the individuality of the participants to such a significant
degree that its sexual licentiousness is traditionally linked to accompanying acts
of physical violence.11 Nietzsche takes pains to denounce the cruelty of barbarian
Dionysian orgies in favor of the later Dionysian festivals.12 But even the cruelty
of the early orgies is consistent with Nietzsche's point that the abandonment of
our everyday concern for our own individual well-being is necessary if we are
to recognize another, more fundamental aspect of being human: the aspect of
belonging, as a part, to the life force that drives the world. The recognition of
one's union with the rest of biological and natural being is a matter of significance:
Nietzsche suggests that he can overcome despair in the face of suffering and
human mortality only be recognizing that one belongs to this larger whole that
will survive one's death.13
Nietzsche's symbol of the Dionysian orgy thus calls attention to our preverbal
sense that we share the ground of our experience with each other. Our language,
however, though it depends on this sense, does not communicate the Dionysian
awareness that we share our world directly. Language, in fact, would cease to
function if we ceased to sustain this awareness; and no further use of language
would suffice in that instance to restore the Dionysian awareness that is a
precondition for its power.
Music, however, could restore Dionysian awareness. Music not only reflects
the fact that all our bodies respond to auditory sensation in essentially the same
way; music also has the capacity to transmit a mode of awareness to its listeners.

'o See Nietzsche, "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense," in Philosophy and Truth:
Selections from Nietzsche's Notebooks of the Early 1870's, trans. and ed. Daniel Breazeale
(Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1979), 81; Schlechta, 3: 311.
" Consider, for instance, the portrayal of Dionysus's influence in Euripedes's The
Bacchae.
12 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy (containing, in addition, The Case of Wagner)
trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York, 1967), 39; Schlechta, 1: 26.
13 See Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, 554; Schlechta, 2: 1025.

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 NIETZSCHE ON MUSIC 667

Specifically, it has the power to communica

mentally existence-all that is entailed by "b
listener can share with others. Nietzsche's r
music will become evident through the consid
The Birth of Tragedy of music as the parad
II. Although Nietzsche acknowledges that a s
Greeks to the god Apollo, whom he associates
visual arts, he distinguishes this music fr
Dionysus. Apollonian music, claims Nietzsch
it provides a wave-beat of rhythm, presum
etry.14 The tones of Apollonian music coincid
rhythm, with the result that the melody is n
a line with some independence from rhyth
suggested by the tones that occur at regular d
the rhythmic waves.15
Dionysian music, as Nietzsche understan
sense. Nietzsche's model of Dionysian music
a choral strophic song in honor of Dionysu
form involving "aulos accompaniment, soloi
sisting of various 'movements' " in a mann
cantata."16 In this later stage of development,
character that is described by Sachs as "enthu
and emotional ..., full of unbridled passion."
been dramatic from the very first," however,
prototype of tragedy.19
In referring to the dithyramb as the paradi
focuses on its affective associations. The un
he understands it, is the emotional power t
it is this power that makes Dionysian mus
Dionysian music.

The very element which forms the essence

music in general) is carefully excluded from

14 See Willi Apel, Harvard Dictionary of Musi

351. Apel notes that in ancient Greece, "lyric an
pattern of the music, which followed the verse
poetry was common and the kithara, which N
particularly associated with Apollo, was a kind
kithara became the symbol of Apollo, in whose ha
kalokagathia (harmonious moderation), as contr
ciated with Dionysus."
15 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 40; Schlech
16 Apel, Harvard Dictionary of Music, 238.
17 Curt Sachs, The Rise of Music in the Ancien
1943), 268.
18 Apel, Harvard Dictionary of Music, 238.
'9 Sachs, The Rise of Music in the Ancient World, 268. The dithyramb had other
formal descendants as well, specifically "the intricate solo songs of professional virtuosi."
Nietzsche does not attempt to differentiate the dithyrambic form from tragedy, however.

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668 KATHLEEN HIGGINS

ian-namely, the emotional power of the to

and the utterly imcomparable world of h
man is incited to the greatest exaltation of
never before experienced struggles for utt
maya, oneness as the soul of the race and o

Nevertheless, Nietzsche understands th

harmony as a symbolic expression of th
pretation he derives from Schopenhauer
at length in The Birth of Tragedy.2l The a
hauer that is almost relevant to my disc
Schopenhauerian position that music direct
which-as the reality behind the phenom
turbulence within itself. These struggles a
of the phenomenal world, on Schopenhauer
to particular "grades of the will's objecti
has, so to speak, "chosen" to objectify it
tification" are, according to Schopenhaue
The will, on Schopenhauer's scheme, is re
the conflicts between human beings, an
objectifications of the will's frenzied turbu
which suffering can be assuaged is for the
the illusion that the world is populated b
and things. When he sees through this illus
to strike back when other people or thi
thus the cycle of phenomenal beings foisti
mitigated in this individual's case.
Art serves the valuable function of helpin
Art stills the will of the aesthetically mov
beyond the particularity of whatever is pr
that it instantiates. As long as the obser
beyond the illusory character of the phe
his own suffering seriously. Art thus pr
beholder; and although these moments a
states of self-transcendence achieved by sa
that life has to offer on Schopenhauer's w
Music, however, has the potential to affe
any other art is able to affect its beholder
of any art is to release the observer from
world by making him aware of the reality
to depict individual things and thus stim
music bypasses any possible reference to
the will directly:22

20 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 40; Sch

21 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 101-03;
22 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will
J. Payne (New York; Vol. I: 1969; Vol. 2: 195
Schopenhauers Saemtliche Werke, ed. Paul D

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 NIETZSCHE ON MUSIC 669

Therefore music does not express this or that p

this or that affliction, pain, sorrow, horror, gai
but joy, pain, sorrow, horror, gaiety, merrime
a certain extent in the abstract, their essential
and so also without the motives for them.23

The emotional effect of music cannot, therefor

tation of the individual aspects of existence
argues, music has such a powerful effect on
represents the universal basis of human experie
Nietzsche follows Schopenhauer's analysis to t
music expresses the nature of the world as a w
expressing particular experiences understood
Nietzsche goes far beyond Schopenhauer in his
powers:24 "In music the passions enjoy themsel
claim in Beyond Good and Evil;25 and elsewhere
music is simply a mistake, a hardship, an exile.
are anticipated in The Birth of Tragedy, wh
alone can invest myths with the power to co
despite suffering, individual existence is jo
grounded in the basic unity of all that lives. Th
by Greek tragedies required music in order to
words expressing the mythic tales provided only
Dionysian truths that the music expressed far
the source of Dionysian insight than words, fo
of the world."27
Because of its ability to engulf the individ

23 Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Represen

Schopenhauers Saemtliche Werke, ed. Deuffen, I,
24 Nietzsche, when considering the power of mu
about the actual effect of music on any particul
observes in The Birth of Tragedy that his descriptio
actually apply only to a relatively small percentage
dramas. (Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 132; S
that Nietzsche is concerning himself with the effec
even though any particular member of the audienc
incapable of experiencing these effects at any part
tragic effect refers to the condition of the ideally
it seems reasonable to suppose that his analysis of t
the state of mind aroused in ideally responsive and
25 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, # 106, 84;
26 Nietzsche in a letter to Pewter Gast, Jan. 15, 188
An Introduction to the Understanding of His Phi
Wallraff and Frederick J. Schmidt (Chicago, 1961
27 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 129; Schl
discussion of Nietzsche's insistence on the primacy
image in "Metaphor, Symbol, Metamorphoses," i
Styles of Interpretation, ed. David B. Allison (New
man's emphasis on the unifying Dionysian ground o
of music to reflect the Dionysian ground, coincide

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670 KATHLEEN HIGGINS

can communicate the Dionysian experie

orgy. In the midst of the Dionysian exper
appear integrally bound to the oneness
not divorced from the rest of reality, and
conscious, provokes a mood of celebratio
The phenomenon of dance testifies, I t
to provoke this celebratory mood that N
also provides further evidence for the c
music, find expression for their awareness
their common, bodily way of relating to
the physiologically based stimulation t
it serves as a vivid parable for what Nietzs
"Only in the dance do I know how to t
.... 28 Nietzsche describes the listener's r
the Dionysian music associated with Gre
utilizes the whole body as a vehicle of ex

The essence of nature is now to be expre

symbols; and the entire symbolism of the
symbolism of the lips, face, and speech,
forcing every member into rhythmic move

In dance the body does not become an in

sion; instead it conveys what the music ou
individuates most completely, is entirely s
music represents. The dancing body mo
grace.31 In this sense, the individual is mo
in which the body functions most comp
functioning at this high point of coordi
the dance a harmonious relationship with t
the graceful dancer feels attuned to his en
his delight at this state of the world.
The external environment, furthermore
conditioned by the music. The music organ
in common by all who hear it. Although
separate from the space occupied by others
the dance, which celebrates the possibility
to another. Dancing coordinates the exp
separate vantages of different individuals
through time. The Dionysian experience
because it draws the individual into a c
because it moves one into a joyous respon
III. Music, on Nietzsche's analysis, dire
that underlies all existence. Language is

28 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 224;

29 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, 40; Schl
30 This is, of course, assuming that the dancer
"dancing." Again, I am referring to dance in
31 See Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra,

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 NIETZSCHE ON MUSIC 671

because words are conventionally established

things; but music expresses the Dionysian ba
mediation of vocabularies established by conven
of music do not, in principle, mean specific th
and that as a consequence music lacks the partic
but Nietzsche does not regard this as an ind
part of music.
On the contrary, music "means" in the sense
the experience of being a part of the entire
experience which occasions delight. This is not
we normally say that language "means"; but
of membership in a larger world, as it is direct
music, is actually a fundamental element inv
though an element that we simply assume pr
to reflect differences amongst the elements of
awareness on the part of language-users tha
experiencing music as we do, we reveal the a
be prerequisite to our use of language. What
then, is something like the fulfillment of a tr
possibility of human language.
Nietzsche does not mean to suggest that ev
experience of music before being capable of l
He is not making a claim about individual huma
that in music we directly celebrate the comm
and experience, which appears there as a med
that it is only because we implicitly presuppose
to communicate through language at all.
Nietzsche's assessment that music has the p
the social world in a more complete way tha
a convincing interpretation of music, even if h
principle, superficial is itself an oversimplicatio
marily to illuminate Nietzsche's account of th
Obviously, this aspect of Nietzsche's view of m
of the phenomenon of music in general. He
Nietzsche's understanding of "music" as opposed
sion, without regard for differences amongst v
But even if the music of Glenn Miller and th
be said to demonstrate "the power of music" in
question would ask why and how the two are d

32 The exception to this occurs in instances wher

conventionalized referential vocabulary in music, a
But such vocabularies must be "taught" to the liste
they can be recognized; and the fact that Bach's
knowledge reveals that the music even in these c
of referring to specific things.

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672 KATHLEEN HIGGINS

Nietzsche himself considers the differenc

primarily in his later works that attack
consider whether or not Nietzsche's eff
music are, in the final analysis, compat
general, as the Dionysian art. But this is

University of Texas at Austin.

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