Theology 8: The Meaning of Moral Principle

Author(s): Denis F. O'Callaghan

Source: The Furrow, Vol. 22, No. 9 (Sep., 1971), pp. 555-563
Published by: Furrow
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27679405
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The Meaning of Moral Principle

Denis F. O'Callaghan

What function do moral principles serve in man's life and action?

On investigation one discovers that they fulfil, or are expected to
fulfil, a much more complex role than that explicitly attributed to
them in the typical pattern of moral decision making. Here moral
principles present themselves as criteria for distinguishing right
from wrong in particular situations. But, viewed in another way,
moral principle plays a much larger role than this in the life of the
individual and in the moral welfare of the community.
The individual must find in his moral principles growth points
and incentives for moral development. The moral principles
implied here are not just those which serve to identify certain
actions as right or wrong but those which give moral colour and
direction to one's life. In fact, the description moral attaches more
immediately to person than to behaviour. Aristotle remarked that
the just man is he who acts from a sense of justice, not he who
happens to perform just actions. Principles which measure the
moral content of particular actions derive from a more static or
code morality, whereas those which orientate life derive from a
more dynamic or ideal morality. The former are a matter of means
to be employed, the latter are a matter of ends to be attained. The
former provide the moralist's material, the latter headline the
prophet's message.
In his moral ideals the person lays down once for all a moral
policy according to which or towards which he wills to direct his
life. They are his principles, they are the conscience he has formed
for himself. These principles introduce order and pattern into his
moral life and correct arbitrariness and the tendency to bend with
as
expediency or self-interest. But they do more than this. They act
a beacon drawing him forward to become the person he should be.
His principles identify the moral individual; they constitute his

Denis F. O'Callaghan is Professor of Moral Theology at Maynooth.

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 556 THE FURROW
moral personality. It does not matter that other people hold
different standards in regard to business dealings, political integ
rity, pre-marital sex or whatever. True, this kind of conviction
could make for Pharisaic self-satisfaction, but such an attitude
just cannot be part of the make-up of the person who is genuinely
moral in the sense outlined above. In fact he will tend to make
allowances and excuses for others and to be severely critical of self.
Himself he knows from within, others he sees from outside.
In speaking of the morality of the individual one just cannot
separate him from the community of which he forms part. In
every-day life one notes that the moral standards of the individual
tend to reflect the moral standards current in his community, and
in turn his ideals and the way in which he lives out his ideals
affects the community. This underlines the task of educators and
moral leaders. Their role is to inspire ever higher moral ideals in
their communities. The cloak of the prophet has fallen on them
and they fail their responsibility when they preach a grey innocuous
morality without life or challenge. A previous article showed how
the moral teaching of Christ differed in language and content from
what passed as morality in his time and from what often passes as
Christian morality today. The central force in Christ's moral teach
ing was his personality and the moral attitudes which his own life
portrayed. This is something which applies to every moral teacher
by the very nature of the case. How can he preach moral ideals
unless he is seen to be living out those ideals in his own life? A
moral message is credible only from the mouth of one who prac
tises it. Here was something taken for granted in the case of the
ancient Sapiens or Wise Man, but it is not so immediately obvious
when the moral teacher has become a moral philosopher or logi
cian, dealing professionally with morality as a science, as a matter
of logic rather than life.
It is the man of principle who teaches moral ideals. Experience
shows that men cannot ignore him or be neutral in regard to him,
no more than they could ignore or be neutral in regard to Christ.
The selfish and materially minded whom he makes uncomfortable
may deride him but such derision is itself a grudging praise. This
man of principle is the just man of the Psalms and Wisdom
literature. For him the overriding concern in life is to live out his
moral convictions before the Lord. Among the just men portrayed
in the Old Testament are Tobias, Job, the sons of the heroic
Maccabee mother, and in particular Eleazar, the teacher of the

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 THE MEANING OF MORAL PRINCIPLE 557
law, martyred for his refusal to collaborate with those Hebrews
who had conformed to paganism under Antiochus Epiphanes. The
character study and analysis of his moral motivation in 2 Mac. 6
is very striking. He was commanded to eat pork as a symbol of
collaboration. His friends suggested that they would prepare other
meat for him and pretend that it was pork and that he would save
his life by this subterfuge. Eleazar recalled the distinction of his
position and his age, his blameless life from boyhood up and his
loyalty to God's law, and he decided that he had no choice but to
stand publicly by his convictions: 'Such pretence does not make
sense in our time of life; many young people would suppose that
Eleazar at the age of ninety had conformed to the foreigners' way
of life and would thereby be led astray. I would bring nothing but
defilement and disgrace on my old age.' Predictably his erstwhile
friends now turned from him because his decision was a judgment
on them. The narrator remarks that in his death he left to youth
and to the whole nation an example of nobility and virtue. What is
fundamentally attractive about Eleazar is not just that he died for
his principles but the moral sensitivity which inspired his action.
A man may die for his principles, as the saying goes, 'out of pure
pig-iron', from downright cussedness, but then his action repels
rather than attracts. Obstinacy and intransigence do not constitute
moral integrity.
The spirit of Eleazar can be seen in the attitude of the early
Christian martyrs who refused to accept certificates from their
Roman friends to the effect that they had offered incense before
the Emperor's statue. If they had taken refuge in a casuist morality
they would have discovered some such escape clause as is found
today in the broad mental reservation, but this they would have
seen as moral cowardice and betrayal. These the Christian com
munity recognizes as men of principle and its tradition treats them
as moral heroes. Even though it may not always emulate their
ideals, at least it admires them. If the day comes when the com
munity fails to honour such people it will be an undeniable sign of
general moral decadence. If the day comes when moral leaders
choose to employ casuistry (which might be legitimate in some
private capacity) rather than stand by principle then morality will
certainly suffer. This is the force of the stand of the Catholic
hierarchy inRhodesia or that of theWhite Fathers inMozambique.
It is evident that there is a world of difference between the kind
of moral principle of which we have been speaking in the previous

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558 THE FURROW

pages and the type of moral principle which is familiar to us in the

casuist tradition. In the first case principle is something to be lived
and died for, in the second it is something to be pared down and
maybe got around. One kind of principle scorns self-interest, the
other comes to terms with it. Christ and the gospels present us with
one kind of principle, the moral manuals present us with the other.
It is a daunting task to hold the balance between the two, but the
ultimate in confusion is reached when one fails to recognize that
there is a difference. This happens, for instance, when one attempts
to read Christ's Sermon on the Mount as a code of morals and
apply criteria to it which are quite alien to it. As a concrete
example one has only to see how Christ's teaching on the indissolu
bility of marriage has been interpreted in the moral and legal
traditions.
In the casuist moral scheme principles have been given the more
limited role of informing conscience with a view to particular
actions. In the process of informing conscience one may distinguish
two levels of operation. Firstly there is the factual level, the level
of objective observation, in which the person takes all measures
necessary to acquaint himself with the facts of the situation and
with the consequences which may or will result from a certain line
of action. This preliminary step is itself a duty of prudence because
the person is accountable in conscience for the full reality of his
action, not only for what he intends to do but for all the foresee
able consequences as well. The amount of prior reflection and
consultation required here will depend on the importance of the
matter in hand. Next there comes the critical level, the level of
moral judgment, where the person assesses different courses of
action from the viewpoint of morality as distinct from that of
expediency or mere practicality. It is here that moral principles
find their usual role. It is suggested that the task of conscience is
to apply general principles to particular situations, and informing
one's conscience in this sense may mean no more than identifying
the relevant moral principle and applying it rigorously. In fact,
some strands of the casuist tradition makes one feel that the ideal
scheme is when conscience is at a minimum or short-circuited by
principle.
This raises the fundamental question :Where does one get one's
principles? How are they formulated? These are the questions
which come up for discussion again and again in our times. The
authority crisis is at its most strident and emotional here. One fact

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 THE MEANING OF MORAL PRINCIPLE 559
is certain - there is no way of by-passing this question. Emphatic
re-assertions of traditional formulae and suggestions that those
who raise the questions are seeking to justify laxer moral attitudes
and behaviour are counter-productive. Some moral leaders may
still read their duty in these terms but far from achieving any
positive result this tends to lose the genuine moral case and alienate
the searching conscience. The person who questions a particular
moral principle or a particular formulation of a moral principle
is not thereby questioning the existence of an objective morality.
He may indeed be doing just this, but more likely than not - and
almost certainly if he is a Christian - he is asking whether a given
principle or a particular formulation of a principle corresponds to
objective morality. He does accept that there is a right moral
solution in any given moral situation and that there is an absolute
obligation to act in accordance with this solution. He will state
that God always knows what this solution is whereas man often
can only surmise what it is. To this way of thinking the charge that
one is denying objective morality when one questions a given
formulation of principle appears particularly inept and uncompre
hending. All this may be labouring a pretty obvious point, but it is
the source of a lot of confusion and of some ill-will.
Where does one discover principles for moral action, and how
does one formulate them? It would be too much to expect that
one could answer this question to everyone's satisfaction, but at
least there should be agreement on some basic points.
The first point is that moral values are primary whereas moral
principles are derived. Conscience perceives or recognizes values,
it works out or formulates principles. Typical values are respect
for the person; respect for his life, his freedom, his property;
respect for truth and privacy. These are the traditional natural
law values. It is on the basis of such values that one establishes
principles. For instance, one does not read off directly a blueprint
for marriage (monogamous, permanent, etc.) as a statement of
natural law. One concludes to a marriage structure from analysis
of the values which marriage serves in regard to the child, partners,
community.
Where moral values are abstract and general, principles are
concrete and particular. Principles are guidelines for action, direc
tives which bring moral values to bear on specific situations. Moral
values are more readily appreciated, principles are more often
questioned. They are questionable because they interact with the

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 560 THE FURROW

varying situations of life. They are questionable also because of

the very manner in which they come to be formulated. Where a
number of values intersect in a situation the resulting principle
will be more complex and more open to question and further
development. Even though many people would seem to welcome it,
there cannot be a simple rule of thumb for solving the complex
human situations which one meets with in business and medical
ethics and in responsibilities of community living. Moreover,
precisely because principles undertake to relate perennial values
to the myriad circumstances of life it should surprise no one that
they come to be formulated in different ways as time goes on.
It is this suggestion of development or of change in moral prin
ciple which tends to raise hackles and turn theological discussion
into controversy. The painstaking research into the history of
morality which recent years have brought about has provided a
corrective to the rather over-simplified picture which the text-book
sometimes presented. It is evident that change may come about
because of a more enlightened understanding of what a given moral
value entails. This is simply the progress of moral civilisation.
Change may also come about because of some alteration in the
general situation to which the moral value relates or, more often
than not, the two kinds of change may combine their forces in a
case.
given
As an example of the first kind of change one may cite Christian
attitudes to slavery. St Paul accepts slavery as a social structure of
his time and integrates it into Christian morality urging masters to
be kind to their slaves and slaves to be loyal and obedient to their
masters. It was only later that the whole institution of slavery was
called in question morally and judged discriminatory and unjust in
that it deprived a whole class of persons of basic human rights.
St Paul's domestic ethic, his attitude to the female sex, is similarly
coloured by contemporary mores. An example of the second kind
of change is encountered in the moral principle on usury. In the
primitive human condition money made its appearance as a means
of barter. It had mere exchange value, was simply non-productive,
and so there was no title to any interest on a loan. With the rise of
commerce money came to play a different role in the community.
It now had an investment function. Actual ready money had a
potential value over and above its face value, and so there was a
title to interest. It is salutary to recall that moral teachers con
tinued to work with the antiquated definition of money for cen

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 THE MEANING OF MORAL PRINCIPLE 561
turies and centuries after the change in the situation had come
about. An example which combines the two kinds of change
mentioned above is capital punishment or, in much the same kind
of way, war. The institution of capital punishment was inspired
by a number of theological, philosophical and practical consid
erations. At the practical level it was proposed as a measure for
neutralizing criminals who would otherwise pose a threat to the
community and as a deterrent to potential wrongdoers. At the
philosophical level it represented a view of retributive justice which
demanded life for life. On the theological level it presupposed that
God had delegated to civil authority some of his power over life
and death. In contemporary thinking these considerations no longer
prove so convincing and the moral sense of the community is
coming to see that capital punishment is a degrading experience of
collective revenge in a civilized community, which anyway has
other ways of remedying the evils which capital punishment set
out to combat.
From the point of view of the development of moral principle
the Bible is instructive. The Decalogue itself is a very primitive
moral code. But apart from this we can read in Exodus, Leviticus
and Deuteronomy regulations which must be regarded as the
institutionalization of prejudice and taboo into moral principles.
Here we find moral directives in regard to food and drink, mar
riage, slavery, sexual uncleanness, rising damp in houses etc. which
ring very strange to our ears. 'A woman shall not wear an article
proper to a man, nor shall a man wear woman's dress; for anyone
who does such things is an abomination to the Lord' (Deut. 22:5).
'You shall not plough with an ox and an ass harnessed together.
You shall not wear cloth or two threads, wool and linen woven
together' (Deut. 22:10). Admittedly, it is difficult to tease out the
various strands in many of these directives because the Pentateuch
lumps together in its moral teaching regulations which belong more
properly to civil and criminal law.
The admission of development in moral principle is simply a
sign that our moral thinking is human also. It would be conceit to
think that any age had all the answers and that it had summed up
the moral situation accurately for all time, or that a change in the
human situation may not involve some modification in principles.
Aristotle had one kind of change in mind when he said that the
accuracy of mathematical science is not to be expected in moral
argumentation and formulation. St Thomas had another kind in

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562 THE FURROW
mind when he distinguished between primary and secondary prin
ciples of natural law and between man's ontological and historical
nature. The secondary principles are those liable to dispensation,
the principles of man's historical nature are those subject to
variation with changing circumstances. The pity is that lesser minds
have come to speak of natural law as if it were a detailed chart
written in human nature, a maker's handbook which the profes
sional moralist is trained to read. If there is any sure way of losing
the moral case it is by overstating it. Even the very phrase 'right
reason' can suggest that the elaboration of moral principles is
primarily an intellectual exercise, whereas the experience of moral
living in a community is the vital and most important part of the
process.
For the person who accepts that Christ's message is a message
from God and that he established a teaching authority to perpe
tuate his mission the question of guidance in moral life takes on a
different colouring. He will accept that the Church which is
inspired by the Spirit of Truth and which incorporates the magis
terium or teaching authority of Christ has the right and responsi
bility to propose moral guidelines which bind the Christian in
conscience. The Church has played this role from the very begin
ning of its history. St Paul sees that his function as apostle teaching
in Christ's name implies moral direction as part of his ministry.
The First Council of Jerusalem presided over by St Peter discussed
certain moral questions which were causing friction between Jews
and non-Jews and came to its decision with the preface: Tt has
appeared good to the Holy Spirit and to us'. This has been the
role of the Church all down the centuries in Councils' statements,
in papal pronouncements, in the teaching of the bishops throughout
the world.
In these moral decisions the Church does not set out to solve
theoretically certain questions of morality for all time. It sets out
to explain the force of Christ's teaching and to provide practical
moral guidelines for various areas of Christian life. These direc
tives, though not definitive, constitute a safe and secure guide for
conscience, and the believer must listen to them and accept them.
To require that they be infallible before they can claim one's
allegiance really shows that one has little knowledge of the nature
of moral principle and of the limitations which man's life and
insights presuppose.
This act of faith in the Church does not mean that one is dis

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 THE MEANING OF MORAL PRINCIPLE 563
concerted when one learns that it has modified its moral teaching
down the ages whether this be in regard to usury, freedom of
religion, or whatever. In fact, this readiness to take new insights
and new circumstances into account is a sign of integrity and
vitality and makes the Church all the more convincing as a moral
teacher. Neither should one expect that the Church should have an
answer to every question. Such omni-competence would be quite
artificial and would make moral teaching into pure formalism. In
the days of Pius XII some people came to expect this kind of
service from the Pope. Many of his allocutions now read coldly
moralistic, apart altogether from the fact that some of the decisions
were premature even on the scientific evidence available.
Against the general background which we have tried to map out
in this article the topic of moral principle raises other questions of
a more technical nature - Are there intrinsically evil actions?
Do moral principles admit of exceptions? What of epikeia or
'condescension' in the Greek tradition? These we shall leave to
another time.

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