2. DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY, INC., EMMANUEL SALES, RONALD HOLMES, 1.

1. Whether it is the DECS or the CHED which has legal authority to review decisions of
JUDE DELA TORRE, AMPARO RIO, CARMELITA QUEBENGCO, AGNES YUHICO institutions of higher learning that impose disciplinary action on their students found
and JAMES YAP, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. WILFREDO D. violating disciplinary rules.
REYES, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 36, Regional Trial Court of
Manila, THE COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, THE DEPARTMENT OF 2. Whether or not petitioner DLSU is within its rights in expelling private respondents.
EDUCATION CULTURE AND SPORTS, ALVIN AGUILAR, JAMES PAUL
BUNGUBUNG, RICHARD REVERENTE and ROBERTO VALDES, JR., respondents.
G.R. No. 127980 December 19, 2007 2.a Were private respondents accorded due process of law?

FACTS: 2.b Can petitioner DLSU invoke its right to academic freedom?

PRIVATE respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and
Roberto Valdes, Jr. are members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity who were expelled by
the De La Salle University (DLSU) and College of Saint Benilde (CSB) Joint Discipline
Board because of their involvement in an offensive action causing injuries to petitioner
James Yap and three other student members of Domino Lux Fraternity. March 29,
1995, Mr. James Yap was eating his dinner alone in Manang’s Restaurant near La
Salle, when he overheard two men bad-mouthing and apparently angry at Domino Lux.
When he arrived at his boarding house, he mentioned the remarks to his two other
brods. The three, together with four other persons went back to Manang’s and
confronted the two who were still in the restaurant. By admission of respondent
Bungubung in his testimony, one of the two was a member of the Tau Gamma Phi
Fraternity. There was no rumble or physical violence then. After this incident, a meeting
was conducted between the two heads of the fraternity through the intercession of the
Student Council. The Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity was asking for an apology. But no
apology was made.
On March 29,1995, before James Yap’s class at 6:00 pm he went out of the campus
using the Engineering Gate to buy candies across Taft Avenue. As he was about to
re-cross Taft Avenue, he heard heavy footsteps at his back. Eight to ten guys were
running towards him. Then, respondent Bungubung punched him in the head with
something heavy in his hands which he assumed to be knuckles. Respondents
Reverente and Lee were behind Yap, punching him. Respondents Bungubung and
Valdes who were in front of him, were also punching him. As he was lying on the street,
respondent Aguilar kicked him. People shouted; guards arrived; and the group of
attackers left. Mr. Yap could not recognize the other members of the group who
attacked him. Three other students who are members of Domino Lux Fraternity was
also assaulted by the same group. The mauling incidents were a result of a fraternity
war.
2.c Was the guilt of private respondents proven by substantial evidence?
RULING:
1. It is the CHED, not DECS, which has the power of supervision and review over
disciplinary cases decided by institutions of higher learning.
On May 18, 1994, Congress approved R.A. No. 7722, otherwise known as "An Act
Creating the Commission on Higher Education, Appropriating Funds Thereof and for
other purposes."
Section 3 of the said law, which paved the way for the creation of the CHED, provides:
Section 3. Creation of the Commission on Higher Education. – In pursuance
of the abovementioned policies, the Commission on Higher Education is
hereby created, hereinafter referred to as Commission.
The Commission shall be independent and separate from the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) and attached to the office of the
President for administrative purposes only. Its coverage shall be both public
and private institutions of higher education as well as degree-granting
programs in all post secondary educational institutions, public and private.
The powers and functions of the CHED are enumerated in Section 8 of R.A. No. 7722.
They include the following:

The next day, James Yap filed a complaint with the Disciplinary Board of DLSU
charging private respondents with Direct Assault. The other members who were
assaulted filed a similar complaint. The Director of the DLSU Discipline Office sent
separate notices to private respondents Aguilar, Bungubung and Valdes, Jr. and
Reverente informing them of the complaints and requiring them to answer. Private
respondents filed their respective answers. During the proceedings before the Board
on April 19 and 28, 1995, private respondents interposed the common defense of alibi.
No full-blown hearing was conducted nor the students allowed to cross-examine the
witnesses against them.
Sec. 8. Powers and functions of the Commission. – The Commission shall
have the following powers and functions:
xxxx
n) promulgate such rules and regulations and exercise such other powers and
functions as may be necessary to carry out effectively the purpose and
objectives of this Act; and

ISSUES:
 o) perform such other functions as may be necessary for its effective
operations and for the continued enhancement of growth or development of
higher education.
Clearly, there is no merit in the contention of petitioners that R.A. No. 7722 did not
transfer to the CHED the DECS' power of supervision/review over expulsion cases
involving institutions of higher learning.
First, the foregoing provisions are all-embracing. They make no reservations of
powers to the DECS insofar as institutions of higher learning are concerned. They show
that the authority and supervision over all public and private institutions of higher
education, as well as degree-granting programs in all post-secondary educational
institutions, public and private, belong to the CHED, not the DECS.
Second, to rule that it is the DECS which has authority to decide disciplinary cases
involving students on the tertiary level would render nugatory the coverage of the
CHED, which is "both public and private institutions of higher education as well as
degree granting programs in all post secondary educational institutions, public and
private." That would be absurd.
It is of public knowledge that petitioner DLSU is a private educational institution which
offers tertiary degree programs. Hence, it is under the CHED authority.
Third, the policy of R.A. No. 772261 is not only the protection, fostering and promotion
of the right of all citizens to affordable quality education at all levels and the taking of
appropriate steps to ensure that education shall be accessible to all. The law
is likewise concerned with ensuring and protecting academic freedom and with
promoting its exercise and observance for the continued intellectual growth of students,
the advancement of learning and research, the development of responsible and
effective leadership, the education of high-level and middle-level professionals, and the
enrichment of our historical and cultural heritage.
It is thus safe to assume that when Congress passed R.A. No. 7722, its members were
aware that disciplinary cases involving students on the tertiary level would continue to
arise in the future, which would call for the invocation and exercise of institutions of
higher learning of their right to academic freedom.
Fourth, petitioner DLSU cited no authority in its bare claim that the Bureau of Higher
Education, which CHED replaced, never had authority over student disciplinary cases.
In fact, the responsibilities of other government entities having functions similar to those
of the CHED were transferred to the CHED.62
Section 77 of the MRPS63 on the process of review in student discipline cases should
therefore be read in conjunction with the provisions of R.A. No. 7722.
Fifth, Section 18 of R.A. No. 7722 is very clear in stating that "[j]urisdiction over
DECS-supervised or chartered state-supported post-secondary degree-granting
vocational and tertiary institutions shall be transferred to the Commission [On
Higher Education]." This provision does not limit or distinguish that what is being
transferred to the CHED is merely the formulation, recommendation, setting and
development of academic plans, programs and standards for institutions of higher
learning, as what petitioners would have us believe as the only concerns of R.A. No.
7722. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus: Where the law does not
distinguish, neither should we.
To Our mind, this provision, if not an explicit grant of jurisdiction to the
CHED, necessarily includes the transfer to the CHED of any jurisdiction which the
DECS might have possessed by virtue of B.P. Blg. 232 or any other law or rule for that
matter.
2A. Private respondents were accorded due process of law.
The Due Process Clause in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution embodies a system
of rights based on moral principles so deeply imbedded in the traditions and feelings of
our people as to be deemed fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our
entire history.64 The constitutional behest that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law is solemn and inflexible.
In administrative cases, such as investigations of students found violating school
discipline, "[t]here are withal minimum standards which must be met before to satisfy
the demands of procedural due process and these are: that (1) the students must be
informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they
shall have the right to answer the charges against them and with the assistance if
counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they
shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must
be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school
authorities to hear and decide the case."66
Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed
to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process.67 Notice and hearing is the
bulwark of administrative due process, the right to which is among the primary rights
that must be respected even in administrative proceedings. 68 The essence of due
process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.69 So long as the party is given the
opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her interest in due course, it cannot be
said that there was denial of due process.70
A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due
process – it is enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their respective sides of the controversy and to present supporting evidence on
which a fair decision can be based.71 "To be heard" does not only mean presentation
of testimonial evidence in court – one may also be heard through pleadings and where
the opportunity to be heard through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due
process.72
Private respondents were duly informed in writing of the charges against them by the
DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board through petitioner Sales. They were given the
opportunity to answer the charges against them as they, in fact, submitted their
respective answers. They were also informed of the evidence presented against them
as they attended all the hearings before the Board. Moreover, private respondents were
given the right to adduce evidence on their behalf and they did. Lastly, the Discipline
Board considered all the pieces of evidence submitted to it by all the parties before
rendering its resolution in Discipline Case No. 9495-3-25121.

Private respondents cannot claim that they were denied due process when they were
not allowed to cross-examine the witnesses against them. This argument was already
rejected in Guzman v. National University73 where this Court held that "x x x the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due process.
And it bears stressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does
not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and
proceedings in courts of justice. The proceedings in student discipline cases may be
summary; and cross examination is not, x x x an essential part thereof."

2B. Petitioner DLSU, as an institution of higher learning, possesses academic

freedom which includes determination of who to admit for study.

Section 5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution guaranties all institutions of higher learning
academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school
or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free
from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public interest
calls for some restraint.74 According to present jurisprudence, academic freedom
encompasses the independence of an academic institution to determine for itself (1)
who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall teach, and (4) who may be
admitted to study.75

It cannot be gainsaid that "the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline,
a necessary, if not indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling discipline,
the school teaches discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewise
finds basis in the freedom "what to teach."76 Indeed, while it is categorically stated
under the Education Act of 1982 that students have a right "to freely choose their field
of study, subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to
graduation,"77 such right is subject to the established academic and disciplinary
standards laid down by the academic institution. Petitioner DLSU, therefore, can very
well exercise its academic freedom, which includes its free choice of students for
admission to its school.

2C. The guilt of private respondents Bungubung, Reverente and Valdes, Jr. was
proven by substantial evidence.

We reject the alibi of private respondents Bungubung, Valdes Jr., and Reverente. They
were unable to show convincingly that they were not at the scene of the crime on March
29, 1995 and that it was impossible for them to have been there. Moreover, their alibi
cannot prevail over their positive identification by the victims.